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Rugged by
Example
with
Gauntlt
@wickett
College Startup
Web Systems Engineer
Media Startup
Web Ops Lead
DevOps
CISSP
CISSP, sounds cool
a brief
history of
infosec
1337 tools
the worms
and viruses
didn’t stop
we faced
skilled
adversaries
we couldn’t
win
Instead of
Engineering
InfoSec
became
Actuaries
“[RISK ASSESSMENT]
INTRODUCES A DANGEROUS
FALLACY: THAT
STRUCTURED INADEQUACY
IS ALMOST AS GOOD AS
ADEQUACY AND THAT
UNDERFUNDED SECURITY
EFFORTS PLUS RISK
MANAGEMENT ARE ABOUT
AS GOOD AS PROPERLY
FUNDED SECURITY WORK”
there were
other
movements
devs became cool
devs became cool agile
the biz
sells time
now
dev and ops
now play nice
http://www.slideshare.net/jallspaw/10-deploys-per-day-dev-and-ops-cooperation-at-flickr
http://www.slideshare.net/jallspaw/10-deploys-per-day-dev-and-ops-cooperation-at-flickr
culture
automation
measurement
sharing
credit to John Willis and Damon Edwards
infosec
hasn’t kept
pace
Your punch
is soft,just
like your
heart
“Is this
Secure?”
-Your
Customer
“It’s
Certified”
-You
there’s a
better way
6 R’s of
Rugged
DevOps
http://www.slideshare.net/wickett/putting-rugged-into-your-devops-toolchain
how does
one join
rugged
devops?
enter
gauntlt
gauntlt is
like this
sqlmap sslyze
dirb
curl
generic
nmap
your app
gauntlt
exit status: 0
gauntlt
credits:
Project Leads:
James Wickett
Jeremiah Shirk
Friends:
Jason Chan, Netflix
Neil Matatall, Twitter
Mani Tadayon
security tools
are confusing
mapping
discovery
exploitation
fuzzfind inject
security
tests on
every change
wisdom from
a video game
always
listen to
Doc
Find the
weakness of
your enemy
Codify your
knowledge
(cheat sheets)
sometimes, you
face the same
enemies again
gauntlt is
collaboration
Gauntlt helps
dev and ops
and security
to communicate
gauntlt
harmonizes
our languages
Behavior
Driven
Development
BDD is a second-generation, outside–in, pull-based,
multiple-stakeholder, multiple-scale, high-automation, agile
methodology. It describes a cycle of interactions with well-
defined outputs, resulting in the delivery of working, tested
software that matters.
Dan North , 2009
we have to
start
somewhere
$ gem install gauntlt
install gauntlt
gauntlt
design
Simple
Extensible
UNIX™: stdin, stdout, exit status
Minimum features yield maximum
utility
$ gauntlt --list
Defined attacks:
curl
dirb
garmr
generic
nmap
sqlmap
sslyze
Attack File
Plain Text File
Gherkin syntax:
Given
When
Then
Feature: nmap attacks for example.com
Background:
Given "nmap" is installed
And the following profile:
| name | value |
| hostname | example.com |
Scenario: Verify server is open on expected ports
When I launch an "nmap" attack with:
"""
nmap -F <hostname>
"""
Then the output should contain:
"""
80/tcp open http
"""
Scenario: Verify that there are no unexpected ports open
When I launch an "nmap" attack with:
"""
nmap -F <hostname>
"""
Then the output should not contain:
"""
25/tcp
"""
Given
When
Then
When
Then
running gauntlt with failing tests
$ gauntlt
Feature: nmap attacks for example.com
Background:
Given "nmap" is installed
And the following profile:
| name | value |
| hostname | example.com |
Scenario: Verify server is open on expected ports
When I launch an "nmap" attack with:
"""
nmap -F www.example.com
"""
Then the output should contain:
"""
443/tcp open https
"""
1 scenario (1 failed)
5 steps (1 failed, 4 passed)
0m18.341s
$ gauntlt
Feature: nmap attacks for example.com
Background:
Given "nmap" is installed
And the following profile:
| name | value |
| hostname | example.com |
Scenario: Verify server is open on expected ports
When I launch an "nmap" attack with:
"""
nmap -F www.example.com
"""
Then the output should contain:
"""
443/tcp open https
"""
1 scenario (1 passed)
4 steps (4 passed)
0m18.341s
running gauntlt with passing tests
$ gauntlt --steps
/^"(w+)" is installed in my path$/
/^"curl" is installed$/
/^"dirb" is installed$/
/^"garmr" is installed$/
/^"nmap" is installed$/
/^"sqlmap" is installed$/
/^"sslyze" is installed$/
/^I launch a "curl" attack with:$/
/^I launch a "dirb" attack with:$/
/^I launch a "garmr" attack with:$/
/^I launch a "generic" attack with:$/
/^I launch an "nmap" attack with:$/
/^I launch an "sslyze" attack with:$/
/^I launch an? "sqlmap" attack with:$/
/^the "(.*?)" command line binary is installed$/
/^the file "(.*?)" should contain XML:$/
/^the file "(.*?)" should not contain XML:$/
/^the following cookies should be received:$/
/^the following profile:$/
$ gauntlt --steps
/^"(w+)" is installed in my path$/
/^"sqlmap" is installed$/
/^I launch a "generic" attack with:$/
/^I launch an? "sqlmap" attack with:$/
Feature: nmap attacks for example.com
Background:
Given "nmap" is installed
And the following profile:
| name | value |
| hostname | example.com |
Scenario: Verify server is open on expected ports
When I launch an "nmap" attack with:
"""
nmap -F <hostname>
"""
Then the output should contain:
"""
80/tcp open http
"""
Scenario: Verify that there are no unexpected ports open
When I launch an "nmap" attack with:
"""
nmap -F <hostname>
"""
Then the output should not contain:
"""
25/tcp
"""
setup steps
verify
tool
set
config
Feature: nmap attacks for example.com
Background:
Given "nmap" is installed
And the following profile:
| name | value |
| hostname | example.com |
Scenario: Verify server is open on expected ports
When I launch an "nmap" attack with:
"""
nmap -F <hostname>
"""
Then the output should contain:
"""
80/tcp open http
"""
Scenario: Verify that there are no unexpected ports open
When I launch an "nmap" attack with:
"""
nmap -F <hostname>
"""
Then the output should not contain:
"""
25/tcp
"""
attack
get
config
Feature: nmap attacks for example.com
Background:
Given "nmap" is installed
And the following profile:
| name | value |
| hostname | example.com |
Scenario: Verify server is open on expected ports
When I launch an "nmap" attack with:
"""
nmap -F <hostname>
"""
Then the output should contain:
"""
80/tcp open http
"""
Scenario: Verify that there are no unexpected ports open
When I launch an "nmap" attack with:
"""
nmap -F <hostname>
"""
Then the output should not contain:
"""
25/tcp
"""
assert
needle
haystack
Supported
Tools
curl
nmap
sqlmap
sslyze
Garmr
dirb
generic
Netflix
Use Case
Real World Cloud Application Security, Jason Chan
https://vimeo.com/54157394
Check your ssl certs
cookie tampering
curl hacking
Look for common
apache
misconfigurations
@slow
Feature: Run dirb scan on a URL
Scenario: Run a dirb scan looking for common
vulnerabilities in apache
Given "dirb" is installed
And the following profile:
| name | value |
| hostname | http://example.com |
| wordlist | vulns/apache.txt |
When I launch a "dirb" attack with:
"""
dirb <hostname> <dirb_wordlists_path>/<wordlist>
"""
Then the output should contain:
"""
FOUND: 0
"""
.htaccess
.htpasswd
.meta
.web
access_log
cgi
cgi-bin
cgi-pub
cgi-script
dummy
error
error_log
htdocs
httpd
httpd.pid
icons
server-info
server-status
logs
manual
printenv
test-cgi
tmp
~bin
~ftp
~nobody
~root
I have my weakness.
But I won't tell
you! Ha Ha Ha!
Test for SQL
Injection
@slow @announce
Feature: Run sqlmap against a target
Scenario: Identify SQL injection vulnerabilities
Given "sqlmap" is installed
And the following profile:
| name | value |
| target_url | http://example.com?x=1 |
When I launch a "sqlmap" attack with:
"""
python <sqlmap_path> -u <target_url> --dbms sqlite --batch -v 0 --tables
"""
my_first.attack
See ‘GET STARTED’ on
project repo
Start here > https://
github.com/gauntlt/
gauntlt/tree/master/
examples
Find examples for the
attacks
Add your config (hostname,
login url, user)
Repeat
Starter Kit on GitHub
The starter kit is on GitHub:
github.com/gauntlt/gauntlt-starter-kit
Or, download a copy from:
www.gauntlt.org/
@gauntlt
future plans
Next
Features
More output parsers
More attack adapters
JRuby & Java Support
Front end UI / web
reports
Add feature
requests here:
https://github.com/
gauntlt/gauntlt/
issues
Contribute
to gauntlt
See ‘FOR DEVELOPERS’ in
the README
Get started in 7 steps
If you get
stuck
Check the README
IRC Channel: #gauntlt
on freenode
@gauntlt on twitter
Mailing List (https://
groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/
gauntlt)
Office hours with
weekly google hangout
get started
with gauntlt
github/gauntlt
gauntlt.org
videos
tutorials
google group
@gauntlt
IRC #gauntlt
we
help!
start here
cool
vids!
@wickett
james@gauntlt.org
Be Mean to
Your Code!

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