1. Residents’ Influence on the Adoption of
Environmental Norms in Tourism
Malgorzata OGONOWSKA
Dominique TORRE
Université de Nice – Sophia Antipolis, France
GREDEG - CNRS

2. Problem Definition
Local
population
TOURISM
includes
wide
range of
economic
activities
Environment
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3. Problem Definition
Since 1990s: actors’ awareness of pollution and environmental
protection
Modification of tourists’ preferences & intensification of local
populations’ resistance to tourism related activities
Sustainable Tourism:
“Every tourism activity that preserves for a long time the local natural,
cultural and social resources, contributing to the well-being of
individuals living in those tourist areas”
(Associazione Italiana Turismo Responsabile)
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4. Related Literature (1/2)
“tourism which is economically viable, but does not destroy the resources on
which the future tourism will depend, notably the physical environment and
the social fabric of the host community“
Swarbook [1999]
§
Demand influence on sustainable products’ development
Accinelli et al. [2007], Brau [2008], Claude, Zaccour [2009], Minciu et al. [2010], Ogonowska, Torre [2013]
§
Public policies enhancing the actors to implement ecologically
responsible measures and amenities
Accinelli et al. [2007], Accinelli et al. [2008], Brau [2008], Caserta, Russo [2002], Claude, Zaccour [2009],
Minciu et al. [2010], Rivera [2002], Weaver [2005], Shen, Zheng [2010]
§
Ecological education of market actors and population
Henry and Jackson [1995], Jamal et al. [2011] Nita and Agheorghiesei [2010]
§
Price discrimination in natural reserves ticket pricing
Becker [2009], Walpole et al. [2001]
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5. Related Literature (2/2)
§
Tourism activities should assure relationship between the local
community and the tourists
Accinelli et al. [2008], Bohdanowicz, Zientara [2009], Bramwell, Lane [1993], Crook [2005], Caserta,
Russo [2002], Swarbook [1999]
§
Tourists’ heterogeneity
Choi et al. [2009], Dodds et al. [2010], Fairweather et al. [2005], Hedlund [2011], Laroche et al. [2001],
Lee, Moscardo [2005], Luzar et al. [1998], ], Ogonowska, Torre [2013], Schultz, Zelezny [1999], Schultz
[2001], Thogersen [2000], Weaver, Lawton [2002
§
Tourism and pollution adverse agents
Giannoni [2009], Kousis [2000]]
“sustainable tourism is an economic development model conceived to improve
the quality of life for the local community, and to facilitate for the visitor a
high-quality experience of the environment, which both the host community
as the visitors depends on“
Bramwell, Lane [1993]
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6. ISSUE
What role do the residents play in the emergence of environmental
and sustainability norms?
Have the proportion and other characteristics of environmentally
conscious tourists an influence on interactions with the residents?
Do these interactions between the service provider and residents
generate spillovers in the nature of provided services?
Method:
optimisation model with heterogeneous tourists
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7. Model’s framework (1/2)
Tourism
Service
Provider
Sustainable or
traditional product
prices
hotel
Tourists
Traditional Responsible
monopoly
• Wages w
• Reduction cost of
negative tourism’
incidence ci
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Residents
Tourists’
expenses z
Workers, locals,
craftsmen,
retailers, local
authorities
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8. Model’s framework (2/2)
Tourism
Service
Provider
Tourists
hotel
Traditional Responsible
monopoly
More or less
aggressive actions a
Tourism’ subjective
negative impacts s
Residents
Tourism’ objective
negative impacts o
Workers, locals,
craftsmen,
retailers, local
authorities
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9. Benchmark model (without residents) 1/2
•
Evolution of an accommodation service provider (monopoly):
–
•
Offers traditional (polluting) or sustainable tourism product
n potential tourists differentiated by their sensibility to sustainability
issues:
–
–
–
“Traditional tourists” interested in traditional products according to their net utility
T
function:
uT = α − PT 1 + β ,
with: a – consumer’s propensity to pay (a>0)
b - traditional product’s quality (b>0)
m (0 < m < n) “environmentally conscious tourists” sensible to sustainability issues and
perceiving traditional products as polluting:
S
with a’<a
uT = α′ − P 2 + β ,
T
Service provider’s profits if he serves only traditional tourists’ population:
ΠT 1 = (n − m)(α + β )
–
Profits while serving the whole population:
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ΠT 2 = n(α '+ β )
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10. Benchmark model (without residents) 2/2
•
Service Provider adapts to the new segment of demand & offers a
sustainable tourism product
–
Utility of traditional tourists:
T
uG = α − PG1 + γ
–
Utility of environmentally conscious tourists:
–
with α ′′ > α > α ′.
Profits if service provider serves only environmentally conscious population:
S
uG = α ′′ − PG 2 + γ ,
Π G 2 = m(α ′′ + γ ) − c
–
•
Profits when the whole population is served
Π G1 = n(α + γ ) − c
TSP never chooses to serve only a fraction of tourists:
(n − m)(α + β ) < n(α ′ + β )
m(α ′′ + γ ) < n(α + γ )
•
TSP offers to the whole tourists’ population sustainable product if:
c
γ ≥ (α ′ + β − α ) +
n
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11. Residents’ utility
•
•
k – homogeneous residents
Utility of a given resident:
v = t1/ 2 − d ,
with t = ( w + z ) and d = (o + s ),
where:
–
w figures the wages and other service providers’ expenses benefiting the residents,
–
z - tourists direct expenses benefiting the residents,
–
o - individual perception of objective inconveniences generated by tourism activity,
–
s - subjective negative impacts.
•
According to their utility function’ components residents may undertake
actions in order to encourage or deter tourism. Their intensity depends
on residents’ utility:
a (v) = − min 0,η (t1/ 2 − d ) 
with h>0.


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12. Tourism Service Provider’s decisions
•
•
•
Extra-wage cost k ( w − w) paid to local workers (less productive than non
locals), with w > w, w figuring normal wage cost. To simplify: w = 0.
Protection costs c p (a ) = µ a linearly increasing with intensity of actions,
with m>0.
Cost ci of reduction of negative subjective incidence of tourism to level s :
ci ( s − s ) = λ ( s − s ) 2 ,
with s > s .
– c i is impossible to vanish, but may be reduced by few actions in favour of residents
•
Service provider’s profits:
Π = R − δ c − k ( w − w) − µ a − λ ( s − s ) 2
with R – service provider’s receipts and d = 0 when only the traditional product is offered
and d = 1 if the other cases.
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13. Equilibrium of TSP – Residents’ game in
partial interaction setting
•
•
•
R and c – given for the service provider;
o and s – given for the residents’ (type of product provided and
distribution of tourists do not depend on TSP – residents’ interactions)
Equilibrium triplet
–
–
–
–
{
a* , w* , s*}
TSP announces w* and ci , which decreases s to level s ;
Game is played sequentially;
TSP is a leader;
Game solved by backward induction;
–
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Stackelberg equilibrium
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14. Proposition 1
–
–
–
•
•
Wages increase sharply when compared to the sensibility of residents’ actions to their
utility;
Cost of reduction of negative subjective incidence of tourism increases strongly with
the sensibility of this cost to the residents actions;
Wages decrease only linearly with the tourists expenses.
It is costly for the TSP to gain residents’ approval and avoid more or less
aggressive actions;
Avoid location’s disgrace.
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15. Equilibrium of TSP – Residents – Tourists’
game in global interaction setting
•
Distinction of the two subpopulations:
– m1 - optimal number of environmentally conscious tourists
– m2 - optimal number of traditional tourists
•
Tourists expenses – function of their total number but also environmental
responsibility:
z = ζ (m1 + m2 ) + ζ ′m1 ,
where ζ and ζ ′ are positive constants.
Objective negative tourism’ impact – function of tourists’ number:
o = ω (m1 + m2 ),
where ω is a positive constant.
Subjective negative tourism’ impact increases only with traditional
tourists:
s = σ m2 .
•
•
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16. TSP Profits
•
TSP chooses to provide the whole tourists’ population or one of
subpopulations with one or the other product:
π = max π t1 , π t 2 , π g1 , π g 2  ,


with:
π t1 = max (n − m)(α + β ) − kw − µ a(m1 = 0, m2 = n − m) − λ (σ (n − m) − s ) 2
( w≥ 0, s ≥ s )
π t 2 = max n(α ′ + β ) − kw − µ a (m1 = m, m2 = n − m) − λ (σ (n − m) − s ) 2
( w≥ 0, s ≥ s )
π g1 = max m(α ′′ + γ ) − kw − c − µ a(m1 = m, m2 = 0)
( w≥ 0)
π g 2 = max n(α + γ ) − kw − c − µ a (m1 = m, m2 = n − m) − λ (σ (n − m) − s ) 2
( w≥ 0, s ≥ s )
and
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a = − min 0,η ( ( w + ζ (m1 + m2 ) + ζ ′m1 )1/ 2 − ω (m 1 + m2 ) − s ) 

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17. Results
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18. Results & Further research
• Interactions with residents’ integration has a double impact:
1. Limits the number of tourists;
2. Accelerate or slow down the adoption of environmental norms:
–
–
•
Accelerating forces dominate – residents have a better perception of products and
tourists respectful of local culture and environment.
But when objective negative impacts dominate the others, it is more profitable to
provide traditional tourists only with traditional product.
Further research:
–
–
–
Possibility of discrimination among agents composing one or another
subpopulation;
Oligopoly/competition setting (optimal firms’ number), Salop circle framework
Confirm or infirm the results statistics/data analysis.
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19. Residents’ Influence on the Adoption of
Environmental Norms in Tourism
Malgorzata OGONOWSKA & Dominique TORRE
Malgorzata.Ogonowska@gredeg.cnrs.fr
Dominique.Torre@gredeg.cnrs.fr
Université de Nice – Sophia Antipolis, France
GREDEG - CNRS
Merci!