The document discusses a meeting of experts from Europol and member states that reviewed changes in the modus operandi of Islamic State terrorist attacks following the November 2015 Paris attacks. Key findings from the meeting include that the Paris attacks indicate IS shifting towards a broader global strategy of specifically targeting France and possibly other EU member states. Intelligence also suggests IS has developed an external operations command trained for complex attacks. While most IS cells in Europe are locally based, foreign fighters are increasingly recruited through social pressures instead of purely religious motivations. The experts concluded future IS attacks may continue aiming for indiscriminate mass casualties in coordinated, Mumbai-style assaults across Europe.
This document provides an overview of terrorism trends in the European Union in 2017. It finds that the main terrorist threat comes from jihadist terrorism, including both directed attacks from groups like ISIS as well as lone actor attacks inspired by their ideology. Such attacks have targeted civilian populations using methods like bombs, firearms, and vehicles to cause mass casualties. The document also notes that the number of foreign terrorist fighters traveling to conflict zones has decreased but the returning fighters may increase the domestic threat. Other trends discussed include the use of social media for radicalization and recruitment, the targeting of soft targets, and the increasing role of women and youth in carrying out attacks. The level of jihadist terrorist activity in the EU remains high according to arrests
The document analyzes the 2012 shootings in Toulouse and Montauban, France carried out by Mohammed Merch through a critical lens of terrorism. It discusses how Merch claimed he wanted to avenge Palestinian children and protest French foreign wars and the ban on face veils. The document argues that religious terrorism is a label used to delegitimize political grievances and that one must understand the historical contexts and power dynamics that may have provoked the attacks, such as the oppression of Palestinians and Muslim women in France.
Syria, Iraq, Libya: The Staged-Massacre Routine and False Flag Operations For...Chris Helweg
This document discusses staged massacres and false flag operations that have been used by Western powers to justify regime change in other countries. It provides examples from recent decades in Romania, Kuwait, and Iraq where manipulated media coverage of alleged massacres and weapons of mass destruction were used to build public support for military interventions and regime change. Regarding Syria, it questions the logic of the Syrian government carrying out a chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun while winning the war, and cites this and other incidents as following a pattern of false allegations made by groups like the White Helmets to promote Western intervention.
Threats, risks, conflicts and human securitySinead Smith
This essay aspires to analyse a particular terrorist attack through the application of a critical perspective on terrorism as described by Jackson, Smyth and Gunning (2010).
This expert report examines cases of civilian casualties documented by the Mission throughout 2016 in relation to ceasefire violations and the conduct of hostilities.
What is an "Independent Journalist" is this someone who can be trusted with telling the truth or disinformation propaganda strategies. Armed with social media and internet this "Queen of Disinformation" along with her loyal cult following has taken over Social Media Syria narratives with their brand of the truth. In the war of words and propaganda, Syria wasn't as prepared as they are as physically fighting passionately for their motherland. Who will win the war of words?
Market Analysis for MBOSS.US, Frankfurt am Main - all rights reserved @2019 M...Maricla Kandzorra
The document provides a PESTEL analysis of the market for MBOSS.US, a peer-to-peer event hosting company. It analyzes political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal factors. Key points include: political factors like terrorism threats create security costs; an economic recession could reduce international visitors; an aging population means catering to older customers; technology both enables security measures but could facilitate crimes or attacks; and legislation and ongoing legal issues for the CEO create additional costs. The analysis aims to identify opportunities to strengthen MBOSS.US' competitive position despite external macro factors mostly outside its control.
「我是查理」的「新聞自由」與法西斯主義的表裡 Charlie Hebdo’s Press Freedom and the Resurgence of Fa...Shih-Yu Chou
This document analyzes Charlie Hebdo's stance on freedom of press and fascism from a Marxist perspective. It argues that Charlie Hebdo is not truly left-leaning and supports French imperialism and NATO militarism. It claims Charlie Hebdo publishes racist caricatures of Muslims that breed Islamophobia, similarly to how antisemitic caricatures of Jews were used in the past in France. It also criticizes the inclusion of the far-right neo-fascist party FN in the unity displayed after the Charlie Hebdo attack, seeing it as a rise of fascism in France.
This document provides an overview of terrorism trends in the European Union in 2017. It finds that the main terrorist threat comes from jihadist terrorism, including both directed attacks from groups like ISIS as well as lone actor attacks inspired by their ideology. Such attacks have targeted civilian populations using methods like bombs, firearms, and vehicles to cause mass casualties. The document also notes that the number of foreign terrorist fighters traveling to conflict zones has decreased but the returning fighters may increase the domestic threat. Other trends discussed include the use of social media for radicalization and recruitment, the targeting of soft targets, and the increasing role of women and youth in carrying out attacks. The level of jihadist terrorist activity in the EU remains high according to arrests
The document analyzes the 2012 shootings in Toulouse and Montauban, France carried out by Mohammed Merch through a critical lens of terrorism. It discusses how Merch claimed he wanted to avenge Palestinian children and protest French foreign wars and the ban on face veils. The document argues that religious terrorism is a label used to delegitimize political grievances and that one must understand the historical contexts and power dynamics that may have provoked the attacks, such as the oppression of Palestinians and Muslim women in France.
Syria, Iraq, Libya: The Staged-Massacre Routine and False Flag Operations For...Chris Helweg
This document discusses staged massacres and false flag operations that have been used by Western powers to justify regime change in other countries. It provides examples from recent decades in Romania, Kuwait, and Iraq where manipulated media coverage of alleged massacres and weapons of mass destruction were used to build public support for military interventions and regime change. Regarding Syria, it questions the logic of the Syrian government carrying out a chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun while winning the war, and cites this and other incidents as following a pattern of false allegations made by groups like the White Helmets to promote Western intervention.
Threats, risks, conflicts and human securitySinead Smith
This essay aspires to analyse a particular terrorist attack through the application of a critical perspective on terrorism as described by Jackson, Smyth and Gunning (2010).
This expert report examines cases of civilian casualties documented by the Mission throughout 2016 in relation to ceasefire violations and the conduct of hostilities.
What is an "Independent Journalist" is this someone who can be trusted with telling the truth or disinformation propaganda strategies. Armed with social media and internet this "Queen of Disinformation" along with her loyal cult following has taken over Social Media Syria narratives with their brand of the truth. In the war of words and propaganda, Syria wasn't as prepared as they are as physically fighting passionately for their motherland. Who will win the war of words?
Market Analysis for MBOSS.US, Frankfurt am Main - all rights reserved @2019 M...Maricla Kandzorra
The document provides a PESTEL analysis of the market for MBOSS.US, a peer-to-peer event hosting company. It analyzes political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal factors. Key points include: political factors like terrorism threats create security costs; an economic recession could reduce international visitors; an aging population means catering to older customers; technology both enables security measures but could facilitate crimes or attacks; and legislation and ongoing legal issues for the CEO create additional costs. The analysis aims to identify opportunities to strengthen MBOSS.US' competitive position despite external macro factors mostly outside its control.
「我是查理」的「新聞自由」與法西斯主義的表裡 Charlie Hebdo’s Press Freedom and the Resurgence of Fa...Shih-Yu Chou
This document analyzes Charlie Hebdo's stance on freedom of press and fascism from a Marxist perspective. It argues that Charlie Hebdo is not truly left-leaning and supports French imperialism and NATO militarism. It claims Charlie Hebdo publishes racist caricatures of Muslims that breed Islamophobia, similarly to how antisemitic caricatures of Jews were used in the past in France. It also criticizes the inclusion of the far-right neo-fascist party FN in the unity displayed after the Charlie Hebdo attack, seeing it as a rise of fascism in France.
Russian information psychological actions-implications for u.s. psyopClifford Stone
The document discusses Russian theories and concepts related to information-psychological actions, which are equivalent to psychological operations (PSYOP). It describes how Russia sees these actions evolving from Soviet-era propaganda to encompass information warfare techniques. These include using loudspeakers, leaflets, and manipulated media to influence enemy forces, as well as more novel approaches like reflexive control and ensuring the "moral-psychological" stability of their own soldiers. The document analyzes Russian perspectives on the relationship between information operations and psychological warfare and how they aim to develop capabilities in this area.
The article analyzes the structure, content, properties and effects of the
Russian-Ukrainian ‘hybrid war’ in its non-military dimension. Particular emphasis is
placed on the aspect of the information and propaganda war, as well as activities in
cyberspace. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is described in the context of the new war
strategy of General Valery Gerasimov. Contemporary practice of hybrid actions in the
conflict in Ukraine has revealed that, for the first time, a stronger opponent, Russia,
uses the full spectrum of hybrid interaction on an opponent who is weak and unable
to defend the integrity of its territory. The military conflict of 2014 showed not only
the weakness of the Ukrainian state, but also, more importantly, the inefficiency of the
organizations responsible for ensuring international security: NATO, OSCE and the
UN. In the longer term, it should be noted that the escalation of hybrid activities in
Ukraine clearly threatens the states on the Eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance.
The analysis conducted refers to the problem defined in the form of questions: what
is the essence of hybrid operations? What is the nature of non-military hybrid operations? What was the course of these activities in Ukraine? How was international law
interpreted in relation to this conflict?
Top ten secret inteligent agencies part twoKingshuk Basu
The document summarizes information about several intelligence agencies, including the Federal Security Service of Russia, MI6, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) of Germany, the CIA, and the ISI of Pakistan. It provides details on the formation, roles, and achievements of these agencies. The BND section specifically notes that it was formed in 1956 and acts as an early warning system to the German government, collecting information on terrorism, weapons trafficking, and other threats. It has had successes such as recruiting sources in Liechtenstein banks and mediating negotiations between Israel and Hezbollah.
Top ten secret inteligent agencies part oneKingshuk Basu
The Mossad is Israel's national intelligence agency responsible for intelligence collection, covert operations, and counterterrorism. It was formed in 1949 and reports directly to the Prime Minister. Notable Mossad operations include Operation Plumbat to further Israel's nuclear program and various operations to scout locations to ambush Saddam Hussein.
The Ministry of State Security is China's security agency formed through a 1983 merger. It is also China's largest foreign intelligence agency though also involved in domestic security.
The Research and Analysis Wing is India's foreign intelligence agency formed in 1968 and focused on counterterrorism, foreign intelligence collection, and protecting India's nuclear program.
Ukrainian revolution from the point of view of the Russian analystЕлена Волковская
This document summarizes the political situation in Ukraine from the perspective of a Russian analyst. It describes the power dynamics between Ukrainian oligarchs, the roles of external actors like Russia and the EU, and the strategies employed by different political factions during the 2013-2014 Ukrainian revolution and subsequent elections. Key events and the various interests, failures, and technologies used by different groups are analyzed.
Russian cyber offense strategy development Yuri Livshitz
This document provides an overview of Russian cyber offense strategy development and capabilities building. It discusses key factors that motivated Russia's selection of cyber offense as a vital tool, including weaknesses in the military after the Soviet Union's dissolution. It outlines General Gerasimov's theory of "hybrid warfare" which emphasizes non-military means for achieving goals and influenced Russia's approach. The document also examines Russia's efforts to build unified cyber offensive networks and cooperate internationally, as well as strategies for resilience in response to potential Western retaliation. Overall, it analyzes the evolution of Russia's cyber capabilities and strategy from both an academic and strategic perspective.
This document provides an overview of refugee policies in France and Germany. It begins with an introduction discussing Angela Merkel's open-door policy for Syrian refugees in Germany and the varied responses from other EU countries. Chapter 1 discusses the methodological framework, including a comparative approach and literature review on migration studies in Germany and France. Chapter 2 focuses on Germany, describing Merkel's initial open policy and subsequent restrictions after terrorist attacks. It also examines the rise of far-right parties in response to refugees. The document concludes by analyzing the effects of increased border security in the EU and influence of far-right parties on refugee flows.
The world hybrid war: Ukrainian forefront. Volodymyr HorbulinDonbassFullAccess
In this multi-authored monograph the scholars of the National Institute for Strategic Studies of Ukraine present an unprecedented study of the phenomenon of the world hybrid war, which manifested itself in the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The nature of the hybrid war was analyzed in the context of the global security crisis and was studied as a new type of global confrontation. This monograph is a complex analysis of the causes and preconditions of the Russian aggression against Ukraine with respect to the strategic purposes and special aspects of conduct in various dimensions including military, political, economic, social, humanitarian, and informational. This monograph also presents research of the local success of our country in resisting the hostile plans of the Russian Federation in certain areas. The conclusion reached by this study is that Ukraine is capable of fighting against an aggressor for her sovereignty. The reformation of international security institutions and attainment of balance of power in the new hybrid reality are also addressed in the monograph. This book is meant for politicians, political analysts, senior government officials and scientists in the field of security studies. The research results would also be interesting for academia, representatives of civil society, as well as patriotic and responsible citizens.
This document discusses the growing call for the re-establishment of the Caliphate in the Muslim world and efforts by Western governments to undermine this movement. It notes that despite distortions, the call for the Caliphate has widespread support. Western leaders like Bush and Blair have warned about the consequences of its return and attempted to link it with terrorism. However, these attempts have failed to convince Muslims and others given the track record of false claims made during the War on Terror. The document argues a Caliphate would bring stability and that its opponents aim to maintain control over the Muslim world.
Acertas - NATO responses to Russian incursion into Norway scenario 31 jul 19 MagnusNordmoEriksen
- NATO approval of Article 5 is unlikely to be unanimous if Russia incurs into Norway, as Turkey and Hungary are expected to oppose it. With moderate Norwegian casualties (100-500), approval is moderately likely to be rejected. With high casualties (>500), unanimous approval is highly likely.
- The US, Germany, France, UK, and others will strongly support Norway. Without unanimity, Russia may maintain confrontation, but the major European allies will still support Norway.
- Covert incursions may fail to attract full Article 5 support, as some see it as outside NATO obligations. Only clear violations of sovereignty increase chances of support. Unanimity is key for Russia to withdraw from Norway.
Small Wars Journal_Identity and Biometrics Enabled Intelligence (BEI)_MAR_16Victor R. Morris
This document summarizes initiatives to enhance international identity operations and intelligence sharing between law enforcement and military organizations to identify transnational threat actors. It discusses several intergovernmental organizations involved in this effort, including INTERPOL, Europol, NATO, OSCE, and Frontex. The goal is to support threat network analysis and engagement through compliant biometric data sharing once an interoperable framework has been established between these organizations. This will help with identifying threat actors from civilian populations in contexts involving transnational terrorism and political violence.
This document is a thesis submitted by Pietro Moro to Leiden University and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael examining jihadi terrorism in Europe between 2010-2015. It acknowledges the rise in global terrorism deaths since 2000 and focuses on analyzing the characteristics of jihadi terrorist networks and individuals in Europe during this time period. The thesis seeks to answer three research questions regarding the characteristics of networks behind attacks, characteristics of individual terrorists, and how these have changed between the first and second decades of the 21st century.
The document discusses the terrorism threat facing Europe from groups like al-Qaeda. It outlines Europe's counter-terrorism strategy which takes a holistic approach using civilian and military tools. The strategy aims to prevent radicalization, better protect targets, pursue terrorist networks, and improve response to attacks. However, the causes of terrorism are complex and addressing root issues like inequality will take time. While Europe is working hard on counter-terrorism, the dynamic threat posed by al-Qaeda means it is still too early to say Europe is completely safe from terrorism.
MASTER THESIS - THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM - Thibaut GRANCHERThibaut GRANCHER
- The document discusses the economic consequences of terrorism in five developed countries that have experienced terrorist attacks since 2001: the US, Spain, UK, France, and Belgium.
- It analyzes the impact of terrorism on three areas: household consumption, the tourism industry, and military expenditures. It uses data on attack frequency, deaths, and injuries as independent variables to measure their effect on economic indicators like household spending, consumer confidence, tourism's contribution to GDP, and tourist flows.
- The analysis seeks to determine if government actions after attacks, like extending states of emergency, impact the economic consequences of terrorism.
[3 December, 2015] ISS Risk Special Report on the Paris Attacks by ISIS, November 2015.
The ability for ISIS to effectively deliver its agenda of terror and to affect an ever evolving threat on an incrreasingly global scale has been clearly demonstrated through the Paris attacks of November 2015. Intelligent Security Solutions (ISS Risk) has for some time focused on the threat presented by ISIS (and other Islamic extremist groups) to various sovereign and commercial concerns across Eurasia, with a specific focus on not only ISIS‟ motivations and actions to date, but more importantly a focus on how the threat is being shaped and how it will be driven and manifested in the coming 12-18 months.
Our early December 2015 assessment of the Paris attacks by ISIS:
"The ability for ISIS to effectively deliver its agenda of terror and to affect an ever evolving threat on an increasingly global scale has been clearly demonstrated through the Paris attacks of November 2015 ... As shown with the Paris attacks the absence of coherent and rooted answers to core security questions, such as how did they perform such a complex attack? why and how was this achieved? will they strike again? how underprepared are the security services in Europe? is this the beginning of an orchestrated campaign? etc… have been as near shocking as the events themselves."
This document summarizes what is known about the perpetrators of the November 2015 Paris attacks based on an intelligence report. At least 25 individuals from France, Belgium, Germany and Syria were involved in planning and executing the highly coordinated multi-site attacks that killed 132 people. Many of the identified attackers had traveled to Syria for military training with ISIS and then entered Europe as refugees, exploiting weaknesses in border security. The attacks required significant planning and manpower, involving suicide bombings and shootings across Paris. Ongoing investigations continue to reveal new suspects and accomplices who helped facilitate the attacks.
This paper analyzes media attention given to terrorist attacks worldwide from 1998 to 2012 using data from the Global Terrorism Database. The summary is:
1) Suicide terrorist attacks receive significantly more media coverage than non-suicide attacks, which could explain their increased popularity among terrorist groups seeking attention.
2) Attacks in countries further away from the US receive less media attention.
3) Terrorist attacks in countries governed by leftist administrations receive more coverage, though this is not the case for suicide attacks specifically in leftist countries.
4) Attacks receive more coverage the more the targeted country trades with the US.
This document analyzes media attention given to terrorist attacks worldwide from 1998 to 2012. It finds that suicide attacks receive significantly more media coverage than other attacks. This extra attention could explain the rising popularity of suicide missions among terrorist groups who are seeking media coverage. The document also finds that less media attention is given to attacks further from the US, and attacks in countries ruled by leftist governments receive more coverage. However, this is not the case for suicide attacks in leftist-ruled countries. Overall media coverage of an attack predicts future attacks in that country.
Russian information psychological actions-implications for u.s. psyopClifford Stone
The document discusses Russian theories and concepts related to information-psychological actions, which are equivalent to psychological operations (PSYOP). It describes how Russia sees these actions evolving from Soviet-era propaganda to encompass information warfare techniques. These include using loudspeakers, leaflets, and manipulated media to influence enemy forces, as well as more novel approaches like reflexive control and ensuring the "moral-psychological" stability of their own soldiers. The document analyzes Russian perspectives on the relationship between information operations and psychological warfare and how they aim to develop capabilities in this area.
The article analyzes the structure, content, properties and effects of the
Russian-Ukrainian ‘hybrid war’ in its non-military dimension. Particular emphasis is
placed on the aspect of the information and propaganda war, as well as activities in
cyberspace. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is described in the context of the new war
strategy of General Valery Gerasimov. Contemporary practice of hybrid actions in the
conflict in Ukraine has revealed that, for the first time, a stronger opponent, Russia,
uses the full spectrum of hybrid interaction on an opponent who is weak and unable
to defend the integrity of its territory. The military conflict of 2014 showed not only
the weakness of the Ukrainian state, but also, more importantly, the inefficiency of the
organizations responsible for ensuring international security: NATO, OSCE and the
UN. In the longer term, it should be noted that the escalation of hybrid activities in
Ukraine clearly threatens the states on the Eastern flank of the North Atlantic Alliance.
The analysis conducted refers to the problem defined in the form of questions: what
is the essence of hybrid operations? What is the nature of non-military hybrid operations? What was the course of these activities in Ukraine? How was international law
interpreted in relation to this conflict?
Top ten secret inteligent agencies part twoKingshuk Basu
The document summarizes information about several intelligence agencies, including the Federal Security Service of Russia, MI6, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) of Germany, the CIA, and the ISI of Pakistan. It provides details on the formation, roles, and achievements of these agencies. The BND section specifically notes that it was formed in 1956 and acts as an early warning system to the German government, collecting information on terrorism, weapons trafficking, and other threats. It has had successes such as recruiting sources in Liechtenstein banks and mediating negotiations between Israel and Hezbollah.
Top ten secret inteligent agencies part oneKingshuk Basu
The Mossad is Israel's national intelligence agency responsible for intelligence collection, covert operations, and counterterrorism. It was formed in 1949 and reports directly to the Prime Minister. Notable Mossad operations include Operation Plumbat to further Israel's nuclear program and various operations to scout locations to ambush Saddam Hussein.
The Ministry of State Security is China's security agency formed through a 1983 merger. It is also China's largest foreign intelligence agency though also involved in domestic security.
The Research and Analysis Wing is India's foreign intelligence agency formed in 1968 and focused on counterterrorism, foreign intelligence collection, and protecting India's nuclear program.
Ukrainian revolution from the point of view of the Russian analystЕлена Волковская
This document summarizes the political situation in Ukraine from the perspective of a Russian analyst. It describes the power dynamics between Ukrainian oligarchs, the roles of external actors like Russia and the EU, and the strategies employed by different political factions during the 2013-2014 Ukrainian revolution and subsequent elections. Key events and the various interests, failures, and technologies used by different groups are analyzed.
Russian cyber offense strategy development Yuri Livshitz
This document provides an overview of Russian cyber offense strategy development and capabilities building. It discusses key factors that motivated Russia's selection of cyber offense as a vital tool, including weaknesses in the military after the Soviet Union's dissolution. It outlines General Gerasimov's theory of "hybrid warfare" which emphasizes non-military means for achieving goals and influenced Russia's approach. The document also examines Russia's efforts to build unified cyber offensive networks and cooperate internationally, as well as strategies for resilience in response to potential Western retaliation. Overall, it analyzes the evolution of Russia's cyber capabilities and strategy from both an academic and strategic perspective.
This document provides an overview of refugee policies in France and Germany. It begins with an introduction discussing Angela Merkel's open-door policy for Syrian refugees in Germany and the varied responses from other EU countries. Chapter 1 discusses the methodological framework, including a comparative approach and literature review on migration studies in Germany and France. Chapter 2 focuses on Germany, describing Merkel's initial open policy and subsequent restrictions after terrorist attacks. It also examines the rise of far-right parties in response to refugees. The document concludes by analyzing the effects of increased border security in the EU and influence of far-right parties on refugee flows.
The world hybrid war: Ukrainian forefront. Volodymyr HorbulinDonbassFullAccess
In this multi-authored monograph the scholars of the National Institute for Strategic Studies of Ukraine present an unprecedented study of the phenomenon of the world hybrid war, which manifested itself in the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The nature of the hybrid war was analyzed in the context of the global security crisis and was studied as a new type of global confrontation. This monograph is a complex analysis of the causes and preconditions of the Russian aggression against Ukraine with respect to the strategic purposes and special aspects of conduct in various dimensions including military, political, economic, social, humanitarian, and informational. This monograph also presents research of the local success of our country in resisting the hostile plans of the Russian Federation in certain areas. The conclusion reached by this study is that Ukraine is capable of fighting against an aggressor for her sovereignty. The reformation of international security institutions and attainment of balance of power in the new hybrid reality are also addressed in the monograph. This book is meant for politicians, political analysts, senior government officials and scientists in the field of security studies. The research results would also be interesting for academia, representatives of civil society, as well as patriotic and responsible citizens.
This document discusses the growing call for the re-establishment of the Caliphate in the Muslim world and efforts by Western governments to undermine this movement. It notes that despite distortions, the call for the Caliphate has widespread support. Western leaders like Bush and Blair have warned about the consequences of its return and attempted to link it with terrorism. However, these attempts have failed to convince Muslims and others given the track record of false claims made during the War on Terror. The document argues a Caliphate would bring stability and that its opponents aim to maintain control over the Muslim world.
Acertas - NATO responses to Russian incursion into Norway scenario 31 jul 19 MagnusNordmoEriksen
- NATO approval of Article 5 is unlikely to be unanimous if Russia incurs into Norway, as Turkey and Hungary are expected to oppose it. With moderate Norwegian casualties (100-500), approval is moderately likely to be rejected. With high casualties (>500), unanimous approval is highly likely.
- The US, Germany, France, UK, and others will strongly support Norway. Without unanimity, Russia may maintain confrontation, but the major European allies will still support Norway.
- Covert incursions may fail to attract full Article 5 support, as some see it as outside NATO obligations. Only clear violations of sovereignty increase chances of support. Unanimity is key for Russia to withdraw from Norway.
Small Wars Journal_Identity and Biometrics Enabled Intelligence (BEI)_MAR_16Victor R. Morris
This document summarizes initiatives to enhance international identity operations and intelligence sharing between law enforcement and military organizations to identify transnational threat actors. It discusses several intergovernmental organizations involved in this effort, including INTERPOL, Europol, NATO, OSCE, and Frontex. The goal is to support threat network analysis and engagement through compliant biometric data sharing once an interoperable framework has been established between these organizations. This will help with identifying threat actors from civilian populations in contexts involving transnational terrorism and political violence.
This document is a thesis submitted by Pietro Moro to Leiden University and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael examining jihadi terrorism in Europe between 2010-2015. It acknowledges the rise in global terrorism deaths since 2000 and focuses on analyzing the characteristics of jihadi terrorist networks and individuals in Europe during this time period. The thesis seeks to answer three research questions regarding the characteristics of networks behind attacks, characteristics of individual terrorists, and how these have changed between the first and second decades of the 21st century.
The document discusses the terrorism threat facing Europe from groups like al-Qaeda. It outlines Europe's counter-terrorism strategy which takes a holistic approach using civilian and military tools. The strategy aims to prevent radicalization, better protect targets, pursue terrorist networks, and improve response to attacks. However, the causes of terrorism are complex and addressing root issues like inequality will take time. While Europe is working hard on counter-terrorism, the dynamic threat posed by al-Qaeda means it is still too early to say Europe is completely safe from terrorism.
MASTER THESIS - THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM - Thibaut GRANCHERThibaut GRANCHER
- The document discusses the economic consequences of terrorism in five developed countries that have experienced terrorist attacks since 2001: the US, Spain, UK, France, and Belgium.
- It analyzes the impact of terrorism on three areas: household consumption, the tourism industry, and military expenditures. It uses data on attack frequency, deaths, and injuries as independent variables to measure their effect on economic indicators like household spending, consumer confidence, tourism's contribution to GDP, and tourist flows.
- The analysis seeks to determine if government actions after attacks, like extending states of emergency, impact the economic consequences of terrorism.
[3 December, 2015] ISS Risk Special Report on the Paris Attacks by ISIS, November 2015.
The ability for ISIS to effectively deliver its agenda of terror and to affect an ever evolving threat on an incrreasingly global scale has been clearly demonstrated through the Paris attacks of November 2015. Intelligent Security Solutions (ISS Risk) has for some time focused on the threat presented by ISIS (and other Islamic extremist groups) to various sovereign and commercial concerns across Eurasia, with a specific focus on not only ISIS‟ motivations and actions to date, but more importantly a focus on how the threat is being shaped and how it will be driven and manifested in the coming 12-18 months.
Our early December 2015 assessment of the Paris attacks by ISIS:
"The ability for ISIS to effectively deliver its agenda of terror and to affect an ever evolving threat on an increasingly global scale has been clearly demonstrated through the Paris attacks of November 2015 ... As shown with the Paris attacks the absence of coherent and rooted answers to core security questions, such as how did they perform such a complex attack? why and how was this achieved? will they strike again? how underprepared are the security services in Europe? is this the beginning of an orchestrated campaign? etc… have been as near shocking as the events themselves."
This document summarizes what is known about the perpetrators of the November 2015 Paris attacks based on an intelligence report. At least 25 individuals from France, Belgium, Germany and Syria were involved in planning and executing the highly coordinated multi-site attacks that killed 132 people. Many of the identified attackers had traveled to Syria for military training with ISIS and then entered Europe as refugees, exploiting weaknesses in border security. The attacks required significant planning and manpower, involving suicide bombings and shootings across Paris. Ongoing investigations continue to reveal new suspects and accomplices who helped facilitate the attacks.
This paper analyzes media attention given to terrorist attacks worldwide from 1998 to 2012 using data from the Global Terrorism Database. The summary is:
1) Suicide terrorist attacks receive significantly more media coverage than non-suicide attacks, which could explain their increased popularity among terrorist groups seeking attention.
2) Attacks in countries further away from the US receive less media attention.
3) Terrorist attacks in countries governed by leftist administrations receive more coverage, though this is not the case for suicide attacks specifically in leftist countries.
4) Attacks receive more coverage the more the targeted country trades with the US.
This document analyzes media attention given to terrorist attacks worldwide from 1998 to 2012. It finds that suicide attacks receive significantly more media coverage than other attacks. This extra attention could explain the rising popularity of suicide missions among terrorist groups who are seeking media coverage. The document also finds that less media attention is given to attacks further from the US, and attacks in countries ruled by leftist governments receive more coverage. However, this is not the case for suicide attacks in leftist-ruled countries. Overall media coverage of an attack predicts future attacks in that country.
The document discusses terrorism and its causes and responses. It notes that terrorism first emerged during the French Revolution and has since become a prominent problem worldwide. Modern terrorist groups like ISIS have carried out deadly attacks in cities like Paris. While some argue for diplomatic solutions, the document asserts that using military and special forces to target leaders and funders is a more realistic approach to ending terrorism, as many terrorist groups are too radical to negotiate.
The media plays a significant role in influencing tourists' travel decisions after terrorist attacks by magnifying fear through extensive coverage of incidents. Terrorists rely on media attention to spread their messages, and the media benefits from increased viewership. While coverage of attacks informs the public, it also helps terrorists achieve their goals and damages tourism for countries highly dependent on the industry. The relationship between media, terrorism, and tourism is complex with arguments that both excessive and insufficient coverage can negatively impact tourist destinations.
After Charlie and Garissa, addressing the external dimension of global terror...Philippe Darmuzey
This document discusses the need for a new treaty between Africa and Europe to address shared security challenges like terrorism. It notes the "annus horribilis" of 2015, with attacks in both continents like Charlie Hebdo, Garissa University, and the Mediterranean migrant crisis. It argues the current Africa-EU strategic partnership is not adequate given worsening threats. A new treaty could help promote peace as the foundation of relations between the two regions, which will share over 2.5 billion citizens by 2050. It would also help prevent, manage and resolve crises that impact both continents.
This research paper is an attempt to investigate the
phenomenon of global terrorism and its threats to the security of the state. The study clarifies the concept of terrorism
and it its definition, then the categories of terrorism. Next,
it shows how terrorism became a global phenomenon
through the historical overview of international terrorism
and the theories explaining it and its current situation. The
causes of international terrorism are economic causes,
social causes, religious causes, political causes, and other
causes.
The document discusses Europe's response to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris. It summarizes the views of prominent figures on whether Islam itself is responsible for terrorism. It also profiles the attackers and notes commonalities with other recent extremists in Europe. While a small minority of Muslims hold extreme views, the vast majority do not, and the issue affects all societies. A balanced, nuanced response is needed to address the complex social and religious factors driving radicalization.
Acolyte Episodes review (TV series) The Acolyte. Learn about the influence of the program on the Star Wars world, as well as new characters and story twists.
Here is Gabe Whitley's response to my defamation lawsuit for him calling me a rapist and perjurer in court documents.
You have to read it to believe it, but after you read it, you won't believe it. And I included eight examples of defamatory statements/
An astonishing, first-of-its-kind, report by the NYT assessing damage in Ukraine. Even if the war ends tomorrow, in many places there will be nothing to go back to.
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1. Europol Public Information
Page 1 of 8
Changes in modus operandi of
Islamic State terrorist attacks
Review held by experts from Member States and Europol on 29
November and 1 December 2015
The Hague, 18 January 2016
2. EUROPOL PUBLIC INFORMATION
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
KEY JUDGMENTS ...........................................................................................................3
KEY FINDINGS ..............................................................................................................3
1. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................4
1.1 BACKGROUND...........................................................................................4
1.2 AIMS AND PURPOSES ..................................................................................5
2.1 TERRORISTS INVOLVED................................................................................5
2.2 TERRORIST ATTACKS / TARGET SELECTION .........................................................7
2.3 FINANCING ..............................................................................................7
2.4 SCENARIOS .............................................................................................8
3 CONCLUSIONS ..........................................................................................8
Europol Public Information
3. EUROPOL PUBLIC INFORMATION
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Key Judgments
• There is every reason to expect that IS, IS inspired terrorists or another religiously
inspired terrorist group will undertake a terrorist attack somewhere in Europe again, but
particularly in France, intended to cause mass casualties amongst the civilian population.
This is in addition to the threat of lone actor attacks, which has not diminished;
• Europol’s involvement in the exchange of information following the November Paris
attacks and earlier, has once again revealed that the exchange of information on CT
matters between parties (Member States and between Member States and Europol)
needs improving;
• There is no concrete evidence that terrorist travellers systematically use the flow of
refugees to enter Europe unnoticed. A real and imminent danger, however, is the
possibility of elements of the (Sunni Muslim) Syrian refugee diaspora becoming
vulnerable to radicalisation once in Europe and being specifically targeted by Islamic
extremist recruiters.
Key findings
• The Paris attacks, and subsequent investigation, appear to indicate a shift towards a
broader strategy of IS going global, of them specifically attacking France, but also the
possibly of attacks against other Member States of the EU in the near future.
• Intelligence suggests that IS has developed an external action command trained for
special forces style attacks in the international environment;
• IS terrorist cells currently operating in the EU are largely domestic and/or locally based;
• For foreign fighters the religious component in recruitment and radicalisation is being
replaced by more social elements such as peer pressure and role modelling. Additionally
the romantic prospect of being part of an important and exciting development, apart
from more private considerations, may play a role. Suicide bombers see themselves
more as heroes than as religious martyrs;
• A significant portion of foreign fighters have been diagnosed with mental problems prior
to joining IS. Also, a large proportion of recruits have criminal records varying from
petty crimes to more serious offences;
• An increasing phenomenon is that of Islamist “brotherhood gatherings”, analogous to
other faction camps such as ‘Bible camps’. This is a relatively new concept for Muslims;
• The nature and structure of IS training apparently enables its operatives to execute
terrorist acts in an emotionally detached manner, as demonstrated in the shootings in
Paris;
• In selecting what to attack, where, when and how, IS shows its capacity to strike at will,
at any time and at almost any chosen target;
• IS is not the only religiously inspired terrorist organisation threatening Western
countries. Al-Qaeda is still a factor to be considered and a reason for the EU to focus on a
broader range of religiously inspired groups.
4. EUROPOL PUBLIC INFORMATION
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1. Introduction
1.1 Background
On 13 November 2015 a series of complex and well-coordinated attacks took place on
carefully chosen targets in Paris that included a football stadium, a theatre, two cafes and
two restaurants. The attacks were designed to kill and injure as many civilians as possible.
From the perspective of the development of the terrorist threat directed at EU Member States
and France in particular, the 13 November attacks were significant in two aspects:
a) The attacks resembled those in Mumbai of 2008 in terms of modus operandi, targets
chosen, numbers of attackers and impact1
;
b) There were three groups of attackers, among them those born and raised in France
and returned foreign fighters.
The “Mumbai” style (albeit executed by local people) of attacking targets in a European
country is a first for IS. In combination with the 31st
October 2015 bombing of a Russian
airliner in Egypt, also claimed by IS, and other attacks in Suruç and Ankara (Turkey), Beirut
and Baghdad, and short of an obvious objective of immediate retaliation, the Paris attacks
appear to be part of a broader strategy of IS going global, and specifically attacking France,
but possibly more Member States of the EU in the near future.
This idea is reinforced by the fact that there have been strong indications of another series of
attacks by IS that were planned to take place somewhere in the EU but most likely in France
or in Belgium, that were however foiled through police activities following the Paris attacks.
The possible shift in strategy of IS led Europol to organise a meeting with members of the
First Response Network (FRN)2
of Member States that are currently believed to run an
elevated risk of being targeted by IS, to discuss changes in this modus operandi. This
meeting took place at Europol on 30 November and 1 December 2015.
Although the meeting was triggered by the recent IS attacks, discussions covered the threat
of all religiously inspired terrorism. Al-Qaeda continues to threaten western countries, and
may even be triggered to put words into action by competing with IS, an organisation that is
now attacking targets that were previously considered to be out of their reach3
.
1
The modus operandi were similar where it comes to the use of AK 47 automatic weapons throughout
both attacks. The chosen targets in Paris and Mumbai both included restaurants and cafes and centres
of entertainment, guaranteeing high impact in numbers of fatalities and in the level of attention
generated. In Mumbai there were ten attackers, in Paris at least the same number. The Mumbai attacks
resulted in 164 deaths. The Paris attacks resulted in 130 deaths and 352 wounded. The death rate
could even have been much higher if one of the three suicide bombers outside “Stade de France”, the
national football stadium where France was playing an exhibition game against Germany, would not
have been stopped entering by a security guard on duty, and would have been able to detonate his vest
inside the stadium, and the other two in the panicking crowd attempting to flee the stadium directly
after.
2
The First Response Network (FRN) is a network of more than 56 counter terrorism officers from all
European Union Member States, combined with counter terrorism officers from the European Counter
Terrorism Centre (ECTC) at Europol. This network is available for activation in the event of a major
terrorist incident (attack or threat) in the EU or against EU interests. In the meeting also CT experts
who are not part of the FRN, but are involved in investigating IS related activities contributed their
expertise.
3
Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri said in a video message released on 1 December 2015: “(….)
therefore we must move the battle to the enemy’s own home, especially Europe and America, because
they are the leaders of the contemporary crusader campaign. They must be killed, just like they kill,
and be wounded, just like they wound, and be bombarded, just like they bombard, and be made to
weep, be orphans and widows, just like they make others sob and be orphans and widows”. (SITE
Intelligence Group)
5. EUROPOL PUBLIC INFORMATION
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1.2 Aims and purposes
Assessing changes in modus operandi of IS and other religiously inspired terrorist groups
provides a better understanding of the threat these groups pose to Member States of the EU.
It supports the development of likely future scenarios, based on which Member States can be
better prepared for future attacks. It also stimulates the early exchange of information and
intelligence between CT units.
2. Outcomes of the FRN Meeting
The FRN meeting was aimed at generating ideas about possible developments in the threat
posed by IS to the EU, in terms of relevant changes in modus operandi and strategy,
following the November 2015 Paris attacks. The discussions centred around the following
general questions:
• Do the November 2015 Paris attacks indicate a departure from the strategy of
employing or stimulating lone actor attacks in the EU, and is that a trend expected to
further develop? Would that put an end to IS induced lone actor attacks?
• Is causing indiscriminate mass- killings a goal to be further expected from future IS
attacks?
• Is acting in a series of coordinated attacks a modus operandi to be further expected
from future IS attacks, and;
• Are the November 2015 Paris attacks an indication of a wish of IS to (further) expand
its activities into Western countries?
In two small groups the discussions centred on specific elements related to any notable
change in regard to terrorists, terrorist attacks, targets and resources.
2.1 Terrorists involved
1. Intelligence suggests that IS has developed an external actions command trained for
‘special forces style’ operations abroad, to include the EU and France in particular. This could
mean, that more attacks such as those that took place in Paris in November are currently
being planned and prepared.
2. Terrorist cells ready to perpetrate a terrorist attack are largely domestic and/or locally
based. Members could have been trained in Syria, as was the case in the November Paris
attacks, but that is not imperative.
3. Before the November Paris attacks the main threat of IS inspired terrorism to EU
societies came from locally radicalised individuals, despite the fact that a number of foreign
fighters had returned from the conflict areas in Syria and Iraq. Considering the involvement
of returnees in the Paris attacks, this assessment needs to be revisited.
4. There is no concrete evidence that terrorist travellers systematically use the flow of
refugees to enter Europe unnoticed. It is possible that elements of the (Sunni Muslim) Syrian
refugee diaspora in Europe may be vulnerable to radicalisation. Indeed there are reports that
refugee centres are being specifically targeted by Islamic extremist recruiters.
6. EUROPOL PUBLIC INFORMATION
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5. IS training of recruits consists of imported warfare techniques in the use of weapons,
explosives and specific killing techniques, which include beheading. Operatives are also
trained in clandestine actions and counter-surveillance. The nature and structure of the
training apparently enables IS operatives to execute terrorist acts in an emotionally detached
manner, as demonstrated in the shootings in Paris. Acceptance of death is also seen as a
facilitator for recruitment and for the execution of IS terrorist attacks. To date there is no
conclusive evidence of drugs use playing a significant role in reaching such a mental state.
6. Apart from training facilities in Syria, there exist also smaller scale training camps in
the EU and in Balkan countries. Survival training enables IS recruiters to test fitness and
determination of aspiring IS members. Sports activities have been used for combat and
interrogation resistance training. An increasing phenomenon is that of Islamist “brotherhood
gatherings”, analogous to other faction camps that have existed for decades with other
religious movements. This is a relatively new concept for Muslims, which first surfaced only a
couple of years ago.
7. Information on foreigners joining the ranks of IS suggests that recruitment can take
place very quickly, without necessarily requiring a long radicalisation process. Age plays a
role: younger people are found to be more impressionable and radicalise quicker than older
candidates. Important elements in recruitment and the development of group structures are
social bonds (common background, ethnic and geographical commonalities and language)
and not exclusively religious or ideological beliefs or motives. Less than half of all persons
arrested for joining IS or expressing/displaying and intention to do so have relevant
knowledge about their religion and are thus vulnerable to interpretations of the Koran that fit
IS logic.
8. In view of this shift away from the religious component in the radicalisation of,
especially, young recruits, it may be more accurate to speak of a ‘violent extremist social
trend’ rather than using the term ‘radicalisation’.
9. A significant proportion of foreign fighters (20 per cent according to one source, even
more according to another) have been diagnosed with mental problems prior to joining IS. A
large proportion of recruits (estimates are as high as 80 per cent) have criminal records
varying from petty crimes to more serious offences. Rates and types of offences seem to
differ between countries. It may be that recruiters specifically target criminals with an
inclination for violence, or that some criminals find that, in joining IS, it provides the
opportunity to give free rein to their violent impulses. One Member State reported that most
of the returnees they had detected had resumed their criminal activities on returning home.
10. Potential suicide bombers are indistinguishable among potential foreign fighters. They
do not share common characteristics other than a certain vulnerability, picked-up by
recruiters, to be used as such. Suicide bombers used to make wills and write testimonies,
which have now become rare. This could be from realising that such actions could be used as
indicators and even evidence in investigations. The mind-sets of suicide bombers, either
before or after being selected as such, used to be geared towards dying as martyrs. Currently
they are believed to primarily be willing to die as heroes.
11. The internet and social media are used for communication and the acquisition of
goods (weapons, fake IDs) and services, made relatively safe for terrorists with the
availability of secure and inherently encrypted appliances, such as WhatsApp, Skype and
Viber. In Facebook, VKA and Twitter they join closed and hidden groups that can be accessed
by invitation only, and use coded language. Use is also made of anonymising tools, such as
ToR (“The Onion Router”) networks and VPN’s (Virtual Private Networks). The use of
encryption and anonymising tools prevent conventional observation by security authorities.
There is evidence of a level of technical knowledge available to religiously inspired terrorist
7. EUROPOL PUBLIC INFORMATION
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groups, allowing them to make their use of the internet and social media invisible to
intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
2.2 Terrorist attacks / Target selection
12. IS incited attacks do not necessarily have to be coordinated from Syria. Central
command in Syria is believed to map out a general strategy, but leaves tactical freedom to
local leaders to adapt their actions to circumstances on the spot. This then leads to the choice
of targets based on group capability, size and resources, and leaves room for spontaneous
choices versus executions as planned beforehand.
13. In selecting their targets IS has shown its capability to strike at will, at any time, and
at almost any chosen target. In its target selection it shows a preference for soft targets with
a potential to cause mass casualties.
14. This preference for soft targets means that attacking critical infrastructure such as
power grids, nuclear facilities and transportation hubs is currently not a priority. The same
applies to cyber attacks, because of the low impact on the general public such attacks would
generate. This is regardless of the level of damage that could be caused and the impact a
successfully executed cyber-attack might have on the security of a state, the economy and
society as a whole.
15. The escalation of violence and the employment of massive attacks could represent a
new phase in IS strategy in the EU. The intended randomness in target selection urges
Member States to ‘expect the unexpected’. Unexpected events however are not by definition
events that have never happened before. They could very well include repeats of earlier
attacks. The November Paris attacks demonstrate the intentions and capabilities of IS to
strike outside the areas under their control, and employ a modus operandi already observed
in Iraq, Pakistan and other countries. In that sense these attacks have set a new standard.
This does not mean however, that the tactic of stimulating local individuals to carry out lone-
actor attacks has been abandoned. This type of attack still poses a real and acute threat.
16. IS is innovative in its selection of targets in the EU, but conservative in its choice of
weapons. The long-time truism “real terrorists use bombs – crazies use weapons” proves no
longer to be valid. The weapon of choice is the AK 47, which has iconic value as
demonstrated on various logos of the organisation and its affiliates. The AK 47 is easy to buy
and can usually be acquired in the country where an attack is planned, or in a neighbouring
country from where they can be easily transported. In the future more use could be made of
cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructures and state security, hitting western countries
where they are vulnerable. There is no evidence of IS or other religiously inspired terrorist
groups aspiring to use CBRN weaponry in the EU.
17. New in the EU is the use of explosive belts, such as those used in the November Paris
attacks.
2.3 Financing
18. The financing of terrorist operations has not undergone any marked changes in the
recent past. The sources of funding of the operatives in the EU are largely unknown. It is
obvious that the costs of travel, the renting of cars and safe houses and the acquisition of
means of communication and of weapons and explosives may involve considerable sums of
money. There is no evidence however of IS-financing networks in existence. Despite third
party reporting suggesting the use of anonymous currencies like Bitcoin by terrorists to
finance their activities, this has not been confirmed by law enforcement.
8. EUROPOL PUBLIC INFORMATION
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19. The travel of foreign fighters to the conflict zones is likely to be funded by the
travellers themselves with both legal means and criminal activities, such as frauds. This also
has not changed recently.
2.4 Scenarios
To explore the risks of EU Member States being confronted with violent jihadist terrorist
attacks in the near future, consideration was given to possible future terrorist attacks, along
two sets of extremes: sophisticated vs. unsophisticated attacks, and hard targets vs. soft
targets. Sophisticated attacks are violent terrorist attacks that are carefully planned, directed
against specific targets and professionally executed by focused, well trained and fully
prepared operatives. In other words: attacks that are not committed by impulse without any
relevant prior preparation. Soft targets are targets that have no defence against violent
attacks. The entire civilian population is a soft target. The military or the police, or heavily
protected people and places are hard targets. A combination of the two sorts of attacks and
the two sorts of targets produces four scenarios.
For all four scenarios a small sample of possible attacks were identified.
3 Conclusions
The discussions led to the conclusion that IS is preparing more terrorist attacks, including
more ‘Mumbai style’ attacks, to be executed in Member States of the EU, and in France in
particular. The attacks will be primarily directed at soft targets, because of the impact it
generates. Both the November Paris attacks and the October 2015 bombing of a Russian
airliner suggest a shift in IS strategy towards going global. In selecting their targets, local IS
commanders are believed to enjoy tactical freedom to adapt their plans to specific local
circumstances, adding to the difficulty for law enforcement to detect such plans and
identifying the people involved at an early stage.
The observed changes in modus operandi do not mean that other tactics are abandoned.
Lone actor attacks by IS inspired or directed individuals still pose a serious threat.
Without reliable intelligence on the intentions, activities, contacts and travels of known
terrorists it is nearly to impossible to exactly predict when and where the next terrorist attack
will take place, and what form it will take. The role of judgment precedes in assessments
over the role of facts and hard information, both of which are in short supply.
The wide range of possible targets in combination with an opportunistic approach of locally
based groups creates a huge variety of possible scenarios for future terrorist events. Attacks
organised or inspired by IS or other religiously inspired groups such as Al-Qaeda can both be
sophisticated and well prepared, or spontaneous without any preparation. A regular exchange
of strategic intelligence is essential to any up to date assessment of the situation to be
shared amongst Member States.