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RA9184 GPPB Presentation
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- 2. Public Procurement Process •Competitive public bidding for government procurement began a century ago when the United States Philippine Commission introduced it • The procurement process was overhauled on October 8, 2001 when President arroyo issued EO 40 which consolidated procurement rules and procedures for all national government agencies • 2 years later, RA9184 came to be
- 3. Brief Background • Mandatesmeasures for transparency, accountability, harmonization, and efficiency • Seeks to combat corruption in public procurement • Bill stresses that ICT should play a central role in how the government meets these goals. • Invites the involvement of civil society through an e-procurement portal, PhilGEPS, and by opening proceedings to outside observers • Values and practices are promised, but not realized
- 4. Struggles in Procurement •Vincent Lazatin, the executive of the Transparency and Accountability Network (TAN), offers a summary of procurement here in the Philippines: “The Philippines is cited very often for having a world- class type of legal framework for procurement, but where we fail most of the time is in actual compliance and implementation. So here we are 10 years into the law and we are still having huge implementation problems.”
- 5. Struggles in Procurement •Attorney Rachelle Padre-isip wrote an article about the public procurement process here in the Philippines entitled: “Good law, poor reality” • Hermogenes Ebdane, former secretary of DPWH has this to say about forms of corruption in procurement: “collusion is part of the way contractors do business but it does not mean that public works officials are involved in it”, he also says DPWH officials “cannot prevent contractors from talking among themselves”
- 6. Struggles in Procurement •Former COA commissioner Sofronio B. Ursal believes corruption in public procurement “goes well beyond the actual bidding process”, • Along with secret agreements among bidders to stifle competition, the process is undermined by things such as the falsification of documents, ghost deliveries, bribery, premature opening of bids, nepotism/favoritism, delaying without justifiable cause, and many other forms of dishonesty
- 7. Struggles in Procurement •Using terms like “cannot prevent” or “goes beyond this and that” It seems as though a good number of public officials have accepted human corruption as a reality that cannot be eradicated • But it simply means that as long as corrupt individuals have opportunities to subvert the process, the law will always have opportunities to improve • Experimenting with new ideas can pave the way for improvement.
- 8. A Comprehensive Procurement Framework •“Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement in Asia and the Pacific” published by ADB and OECD gives an overview of the procurement systems in 25 Asian countries. • Korea’s procurement framework is the most comprehensive, and is considered one of the most efficient (but not immune to corruption).
- 9. A Comprehensive Procurement Framework •The recommendations I am presenting are drawn from more than 10 countries, with South Korea in the center.
- 10. The Procurement Frameworkof South Korea • There are 8 salient features in the procurement system of South Korea that I will touch, add on, and draw from: • 1. There is a single agency for military procurement, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA). They require the use of Defence Integrity Pacts for all military contracts made.
- 11. The Procurement Frameworkof South Korea • There are 8 salient features in the procurement system of South Korea that I will touch, add on, and draw from: • 2. A code of conduct is implemented in all levels of staff and management to instill integrity among all workers and corporations.
- 12. The Procurement Frameworkof South Korea • There are 8 salient features in the procurement system of South Korea that I will touch, add on, and draw from: • 3. Korea rotates its public procurement agents every two years to prevent the establishment of relationships that could lead to favoritism.
- 13. The Procurement Frameworkof South Korea • There are 8 salient features in the procurement system of South Korea that I will touch, add on, and draw from: • 4. All negotiated contracts are made known to audit institutions. Regular annual audits are mandatory.
- 14. The Procurement Frameworkof South Korea • There are 8 salient features in the procurement system of South Korea that I will touch, add on, and draw from: • 5. All suppliers who want to participate in bids are required to obtain a certificate before completing their registration one day prior to bid opening.
- 15. The Procurement Frameworkof South Korea • There are 8 salient features in the procurement system of South Korea that I will touch, add on, and draw from: • 6. Korea’s protest/grievance mechanisms allows bidders and suppliers to file complaints to the Public Procurement Service, the Korea Independent Commission against Corruption, or the ombudsman.
- 16. The Procurement Frameworkof South Korea • There are 8 salient features in the procurement system of South Korea that I will touch, add on, and draw from: • 7. Sanctions and penal clauses are very strict and comprehensive, touching on the top of the hierarchy all the way to the bottom.
- 17. The Procurement Frameworkof South Korea • There are 8 salient features in the procurement system of South Korea that I will touch, add on, and draw from: • 8. Procurement agency personnel are obligated to disclose attempts at corruption. Their legal framework makes legal persons responsible for foreign bribery
- 18. The Procurement Frameworkof South Korea • There are 8 salient features in the procurement system of South Korea that I will touch, add on, and draw from: • 9. In some cases, Korea uniquely applies a “multiple-award method” to give procuring entities more options on how to enter contracts with qualified suppliers of similar goods.
- 19. I. National Defense Procurement •R.A. 9184 is tailored fit for DPWH and DOTC • Government purchases in the armed forces require special attention technicality-wise and confidentiality-wise. • Again, Korea has a specific defense agency in charge of conducting national defense procurement. • In Bangladesh and Mongolia, the government can decide not to apply procurement rules and regulations in the interest of national defense and security
- 20. I. National Defense Procurement-India uses integrity pacts for all military transactions made - Security-sensitive purchases in Singapore are exempt from the application of regulations - Turkey has a law that exempts the military from making public its goals and targets - Canada keeps its military spending and procurement a secret - Argentina includes the participation of civil society in developing defense plans - In Colombia, military procurement information is made available to the public except technical specifications.
- 21. I. National Defense Procurement -The Philippines should have specific provisions on security information. - This provision can aid the DND in practicing more confidentiality in their military transactions *The DND BAC has too much power over end users. There has been several cases where the DND procurement entity interferes or dictates the AFP on what technical specifications should be.
- 22. National Defense Procurement: Recommendations •A new “National Defense Procurement” Article can be inserted in RA9184, with the following provisions: • A) Transparency is the default principle for all military procurement, but confidentiality is a possibility only if relevant and necessary.
- 23. National Defense Procurement: Recommendations •A new “National Defense Procurement” Article can be inserted in RA9184, with the following provisions: • B) To ensure sensitive information is protected, the government can decide not to apply procurement regulations in the interest of national defense and security.
- 24. National Defense Procurement: Recommendations •A new “National Defense Procurement” Article can be inserted in RA9184, with the following provisions: • C) Integrity pacts and anti-corruption agreements must be used for all contracts made. A confidentiality affidavit must be signed by both the procuring entity and the bidder.
- 25. National Defense Procurement: Recommendations •A new “National Defense Procurement” Article can be inserted in RA9184, with the following provisions: • D) All military procurement information is made available to the public except for technical specifications.
- 26. National Defense Procurement: Recommendations •A new “National Defense Procurement” Article can be inserted in RA9184, with the following provisions: • E) AFP’s decisions on projects and purchases should not be dictated by the DND.
- 27. National Defense Procurement: Recommendations •A new “National Defense Procurement” Article can be inserted in RA9184, with the following provisions: • F) The AFP BAC can invite members from the academe to become members in making decisions in this area, particularly scholars of national security.
- 28. National Defense Procurement: Recommendations •A new “National Defense Procurement” Article can be inserted in RA9184, with the following provisions: • G) A defense committee can be created by the AFP, with roles similar to Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA).
- 29. II. Codes ofConduct • A system of Codes of Conduct is a common integrity practice in several countries, including here in the Philippines • They’re a means not only to safeguard integrity but also to enforce it.
- 30. II. Codes ofConduct • Cambodia’s codes of conduct contain rules that emphasize staff respect, honesty and proper management of conflict interests • The winning bidder in Cambodia even has to explicitly declare that not bribes have been paid to procurement personnel or any competing bidder
- 31. II. Codes ofConduct • In Japan and Kazakhstan, both national and local government officials are subject to a code of ethical conduct • Again, Korea has a mechanism for monitoring compliance with the code of conduct, and impose sanctions if it is ever violated • Some country’s codes of conduct require integrity pacts to be included for every agreement made
- 32. II. Codes ofConduct • Integrity pacts are a tool for preventing corruption in public contracting. • They are essentially an agreement between the government agency offering a contract and the companies bidding for it that they will abstain from bribery, collusion, and other corrupt practices for the extent of the contract. • Benefits: save taxpayer funds, avenues for illicit gain are staved off, provide enhanced access to information, increase trust and confidence, and encourage participation
- 33. II. Codes ofConduct • South Korea also requires private enterprises to establish codes of conduct • Adopting a code of conduct for private enterprises here in the Philippines can shed light on the obligations of workers to enforce conduct and fairness.
- 34. II. Codes ofConduct • Toyo-Korea Code of Conduct • Code of conduct of Toyo-Korea provides principles of practical business operation, and explains what is to be considered with priority when carrying out business activities and ethical values for directors and officers, employees and subcontract personnel. • Comply with laws and regulation of the countries of business operation and with internal corporate rules, with the highest standards of honesty, integrity and fairness. • Respect humanity of the people in the world, free from discrimination and harassment. • Comply with international arrangements governing global business operations. • Comply with international treaties and laws and regulations for environmental conversation and protection, and place the highest priority on health, safety, security and environment. • Respect intellectual properties, patented or otherwise, of customers, partners, and others and protect those of Toyo-Korea. • Do not commit unfair business transactions such as insider trading of stocks, in compliance with laws and regulations of the countries of business operation. • Keep accurate, complete and timely financial and accounting records, in compliance with laws and regulations of the countries of business operation. • Do not stand against the overall interests of Toyo-Korea, and with the highest standards of ethics draw a line between public and private. • Comply with laws and regulations of the countries of business operation in dealing with customers, partners and stakeholders, and observe the highest standards of ethics in conducting business anywhere in the world. • Oppose resolutely any antisocial influences and do not submit to their demands. • Report immediately and in good faith to Administration Division Manager of any known or suspected violation of this Code of Conduct.
- 35. Codes of Conduct: Recommendations •Requiring the Philippines to create a Code of Conduct in procurement procedures will be a significant step in fostering integrity. It can be a complement to the “no contact” clause between the bidder and the BAC in the beginning of bidding procedures: • A) Private enterprises should be required to establish codes of conduct of their own.
- 36. Codes of Conduct: Recommendations •Requiring the Philippines to create a Code of Conduct in procurement procedures will be a significant step in fostering integrity. It can be a complement to the “no contact” clause between the bidder and the BAC in the beginning of bidding procedures: • B)The code should require winning bidders to explicitly declare (in speech and in writing) honesty in their proceedings.
- 37. Codes of Conduct: Recommendations •Requiring the Philippines to create a Code of Conduct in procurement procedures will be a significant step in fostering integrity. It can be a complement to the “no contact” clause between the bidder and the BAC in the beginning of bidding procedures: • C)The code should compel procurement and BAC personnel to attend integrity issues and seminars, facilitated by the academe.
- 38. Codes of Conduct: Recommendations •Requiring the Philippines to create a Code of Conduct in procurement procedures will be a significant step in fostering integrity. It can be a complement to the “no contact” clause between the bidder and the BAC in the beginning of bidding procedures: • D) To ensure that all personnel adhere to the code of conduct, penal clauses and sanctions can be added following repeated violations of codes.
- 39. III. Staff Rotationand the BAC Composition • Staff rotation here in the Philippines happens every 3 years; it should be done more often and it should not be within the same agency. • The composition of the BAC in RA9184 is composed of chairman, two officers, technical experts, and corresponding representatives. • The BAC can be reconstructed to prevent this from happening.
- 40. III. Staff Rotationand the BAC Composition • A possibility is making technical experts anonymous, reviewing bids on their own without group influence and institutional inertia, legally part of the BAC but physically outside of the BAC circle • Adding regular members from the academe along with technical experts is also a risk worth taking. • Another possibility is the inclusion of well- known firms to the committee.
- 41. III. Staff Rotationand the BAC Composition • The Philippine procurement system also tasks “observers” to watch the stages of the procurement process, composed of individuals from a “duly recognized private group”. • Observers should not be invited by the BAC chairman and junior officers, but by a third party to ensure objective screening
- 42. Staff Rotation andthe BAC Composition: Recommendations • A) Staff rotation for the BAC and procuring entities should be done more often, possibly yearly • B) Technical experts, members from the academe, and well-known firms can possibly be made into regular members of the BAC, not just provisional members. • C) Observers of the procurement process should be invited by another entity apart from the chairman and junior officers of the BAC
- 43. IV. Auditing Authorities •Auditing increases the possibility of detecting corruption and decreases the spread of it. • COA has already been given the authority to conduct internal and external audits of which every procurement entity must comply with • The Philippines can have its top 30 audit firms (SGV, KPMG, PUNONG BAY, etc.) be empowered and obliged to audit procurement transactions.
- 44. IV. Auditing Authorities •Auditing increases the possibility of detecting corruption and decreases the spread of it. • COA has already been given the authority to conduct internal and external audits of which every procurement entity must comply with • The Philippines can have its top 30 audit firms (SGV, KPMG, PUNONG BAY, etc.) be empowered and obliged to audit procurement transactions.
- 45. IV. Auditing Authorities •Procurement seminars are also a means for the government to do its yearly inspection • In Japan, the government holds yearly seminars to discuss upcoming procurement. • Yearly government seminars can greatly aid procurement planning and give all procuring entities more confidence in their purchases
- 46. Auditing Authorities: Recommendations • A)The procurement process should not only be audited by COA, but by audit firms as well. They can be funded with a small amount from the budget of the project. • B) The Government of the Philippines (GOP) should hold yearly procurement seminars. This is to inspect its procurement processes and discuss all upcoming procurement.
- 47. Auditing Authorities: Recommendations • A)The procurement process should not only be audited by COA, but by audit firms as well. They can be funded with a small amount from the budget of the project. • B) The Government of the Philippines (GOP) should hold yearly procurement seminars. This is to inspect its procurement processes and discuss all upcoming procurement.
- 48. V. Bid Opening •A way for bid openings to be fair, based on the suggestions of experienced bidders, is for bid- opening proceedings to be video and audio recorded. • All bidding documents from different bidders should be shown on the big screen, since it is an open bidding after all • Bidders should be allowed to record the proceedings themselves and be entitled to use it as evidence when corruption occurs.
- 49. Bid Opening: Recommendations • A)Bid opening proceedings should be video and audio recorded. These recordings should be made publicly available. If this cannot be done, the bidders themselves should be allowed to record on their own, and entitled to use it as evidence. • B) During the bid opening, there should be a big screen (camera pointed to the bid documents table) in which everyone in the room knows what is being done to the documents.
- 50. VI. Protest/Grievance Mechanisms andCivil Society’s Right to Information • Complaints are only directed to the procuring entity itself, and appeals to a higher level of jurisdiction are only seen as a last resort • This can be problematic if the head of the procuring entity himself/herself is hiding a corrupt act and if the protest is against the head himself/herself • This discourages bidders to report cases of corruption.
- 51. VI. Protest/Grievance Mechanisms andCivil Society’s Right to Information • In Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Japan, and Hong Kong, review of complaints is given to independent review boards (comprising of members from the legal profession and even civil society) • The jurisdiction of protests here in the Philippines can be given to independent review panels comprised of members from the legal profession, regional court authorities, an ombudsman, or any third party.
- 52. VI. Protest/Grievance Mechanisms andCivil Society’s Right to Information• Civil society can be given an avenue to complain against procuring agencies here in the Philippines. • In Indonesia, decisions on complaints are published publicly so any citizen can request for procurement information and file a complaint against an agency. Any aggrieved citizen can be an oversight tool. • India and Thailand also empower individuals who are not involved in procurement to bring allegations of corruption to the attention of specialized audit or anti-corruption bodies
- 53. VI. Protest/Grievance Mechanisms andCivil Society’s Right to Information • To complement the involvement of civil society, court action should be made available not just as a last resort. • Bidders will benefit from an immediate legal channel where they can file complaints directly to a legal entity. This equals the playing ground and ensures justice and fair play.
- 54. Protest/Grievance Mechanisms and CivilSociety’s Right to Information: Recommendations • A) Jurisdiction of protests can be given to independent review panels instead of the head of the procuring entity or the BAC • B) Final decision should also lie in these said panels instead of the head of the procuring entity • C) Civil society should be given an avenue where they can also complain.
- 55. Protest/Grievance Mechanisms and CivilSociety’s Right to Information: Recommendations • D) Court action should be made available not just as a last resort. A direct legal channel can allow aggrieved bidders to pursue justice objectively.
- 56. VII. Sanctions andPenal Clauses • The only recommendations here are to put, public officials, private individuals, BAC personnel, heads of BAC, into account – establishing punishments for these parties if they perform bribery (or receive gifts and advantages), favoritism, nepotism, delaying of bids, manipulating eligibility requirements, and any attempts to undermine procurement regulations.
- 57. VIII. Obliging LegalPersons and Procurement Personnel • The legal framework of Korea that holds legal persons responsible for foreign bribery is a new idea not practiced by a lot of countries. • If applied in the Philippine context, it will largely necessitate legal persons to actively ensure the containment of corruption. If not, then they will face consequences along with the bribers themselves. • This entails a whole new discussion beyond the scope of this research.
- 58. Obliging Legal Personsand Procurement Personnel: Recommendations • A) Legal persons and procurement personnel can be held partially responsible for both domestic and foreign bribery. This will oblige them to report such cases • B) They can be penalized if a case of bribery is proven and they failed to report it, and offered a reward if they are able to report it with evidence.
- 59. Conclusion • From thedifferent processes of national defense procurement, staff rotation, auditing authorities, to legal frameworks, bid opening procedures, and grievance mechanisms, the procurement framework of Korea and several more Asian countries present a great deal of possibilities for our country’s own procurement laws.
- 60. Citations • Citations • Campos,J., & Syquia, J. (2005). Managing the politics of reform overhauling the legal infrastructure of public procurement in the Philippines. Washington, DC: World Bank. • • Curbing corruption in public procurement in Asia and the Pacific: Progress and challenges in 25 countries : Thematic review. (2006). Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank • • Defense Industry Daily. South Korea's 2015 Defense Budget up 4.9%. Retrieved Jule 2015, from http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/rok-2015-military-spending-028895/ • • Defence Procurement. (n.d.). Retrieved June 2015, from http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/key_topics/defence_procurement.html • • Directive 2009/81/EC. (n.d.). Retrieved June 2015, from http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/defence/faqs_28-08-09_en.pdf • • Freeman, S., & Solmirano, C. (n.d.). Why arms procurement goes wrong. Retrieved July 1, 2015, from http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/publications/unpubl_milex/unpubl_milex_default/procurement • • Kim, Seok. Korean Defense Procurement from Foreign Countries and International Cooperation Plan, International Public Procurement Conference. Retrieved July 2015, from http://www.ippa.org/IPPC4/Proceedings/03DefenseProcurement/Paper3-2.pdf • • Korean Government Procurement Reform Act • • Korean Investment Corporation. Ethics Management, Codes of Ethics & Code of Conduct. Retrieved July 2015, from http://www.kic.go.kr/en/in/in060100.jsp • • Philippines Government Procurement Reform Act • • Steinberg, G. (n.d.). Accountability and Confidentiality in Israeli Military Procurement. Retrieved June 2015, from http://www.isr.umich.edu/cps/pewpa/archive/archive_98/19980010.pdf • • Singapore Government Procurement Act • • Taiwan National Security and Defense Law and Regulations Handbook. (2007). Intl Business Pubns USA. • • United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Thematic compilation of relevant information submitted by the Republic of Korea. Retrieved July 2015, from https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/WG-Prevention/Art_8_Codes_of_conduct/Republic_of_Korea.pdf • • Toyo Engineering Korea Ltd. Code of Conduct. Retrieved July 2015, from http://www.toyo-eng.com/kr/en/company/ethical/e_rule • http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/10/07/case-study-public-procurement-in-the-philippines/ • http://peranatinito.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=63:the-public-procurement-process-good-law-poor-reality&catid=51:procurement-watch&Itemid=76
Editor's Notes
- #4 - ICT portion I can’t talk about since I’m not an IT specialist, so I’ll focus on the legal side of the law
- #8 *This means that even in areas where the law seems flawless and perfect, in areas where the law addresses almost every possible circumstance, that it won’t hurt to experiment with new ideas from other countries and explore their causes and effects
- #9 So I found as much sources as I could from the Internet and Ateneo library and that’s where my research is based on (OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). They have made procurement reforms that have halved decision-making processes, increased transparency, and reduced corruption.
- #10 Korea is in the center because it encompasses all the procurement characteristics the other countries contain. India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, China, Japan, Canada, Thailand, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Singapore, Turkey
- #12 Bidding companies and subcontractors are required to establish their own codes of conduct for their employees as well. Included in their codes of conduct is the guarantee of security for whistleblowers wherever they come from. They have a mechanism for monitoring compliance of the code.
- #14 To make sure that there is proper conduct of procurement and there is proper implementation of rules and regulation.
- #16 The ombudsman has the power to carry out audits in response to complaints. A case unresolved after review by any of these parties is immediately referred for judicial review.
- #18 It spreads the responsibility for corruption to people who fail to report corruption.
- #19 This 9th unique feature of South Korea’s procurement system is not something I will be discussing as I do not have enough information about it, but it is worth looking into. They have set up an independent contract review council specifically set up to manage these kinds of contracts.
- #20 Procuring military and defense equipment entails a wiser discretion and stricter rules, since obviously we’re talking about national security. This is the case for Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand. They all have specific regimes that procure defense equipment.
- #21 These are all things we can consider in working with confidentiality in the area of military procurement. Like in Colombia, transparency is the default, but can be overturned when the situation calls for it.
- #22 To ensure that sensitive information will remain protected against unauthorized access. AFP’s decisions on projects should not be discussed, voted, or influenced by the DND. AFP’s technical decisions should be final because they know exactly what our country needs in improving our national defense procurement. So to summarize the recommendations for National Defense Procurement.
- #29 When procuring defense articles, DAPA is the one that makes contracts with local or foreign companies. They come up with a military acquisition plan, creating policies for defense capability improvement, managing defense science technology, and establishing a research and development plan for the defense industry. It’s also their job to enlarge the international cooperation in the defense sector and promote defense export.
- #30 Countries that implement this include Bangladesh, Cambodia, Fiji Islands, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Singapore, and Korea.
- #33 To ensure accountability, integrity pacts also include a monitoring system typically led by civil society groups.
- #34 I have found 2 sample code of conduct templates from 2 Korean private corporations. The first one is from Toyo-Korea and the other one is from Korean Investment Corporation.
- #40 Staff rotation exists in several Asian countries including Fiji Island, China, India, Japan, and Korea. Unfortunately, this kind of composition has facilitated corruption because the head and employees of BAC make absolute decisions that essentially cannot be overturned.
- #41 People from the academe have a reputation to preserve. They have a reputation to be objective scholars. They have ample security from threats.
- #42 These observers can be considered to become the technical experts of the BAC, since these observers need to have technical expertise in the subject matter and the contract of the bid.
- #43 In my opinion, the power distribution in making decisions should be spread to these parties as well, and not just limited to the BAC chairman and junior officers
- #44 Apart from Korea, regular auditing procedures exist in China, Fiji Islands, Japan, and Singapore. Their incentive can be in the form of money, considering that these firms can save billions of pesos that otherwise end up in the wrong hands due to corrupt procurement officials. As an additional safeguard, these audit firms should also be subject to punishments and sanctions if they end up resorting to corrupt acts.
- #45 Apart from Korea, regular auditing procedures exist in China, Fiji Islands, Japan, and Singapore. Their incentive can be in the form of money, considering that these firms can save billions of pesos that otherwise end up in the wrong hands due to corrupt procurement officials. As an additional safeguard, these audit firms should also be subject to punishments and sanctions if they end up resorting to corrupt acts.
- #46 This may prove to be useful in the Philippine context. It can be added to Article II under Procurement Planning.
- #47 They can possibly be incentivized such that the more corruption they find, the more they get paid. But at the same time, that might be too risky. Like in Japan.
- #48 They can possibly be incentivized such that the more corruption they find, the more they get paid. But at the same time, that might be too risky. Like in Japan.
- #49 There have been cases of bid opening sessions where a procuring entity’s BAC opens bids and pretend they never saw it – all in plain sight. These video and audio recordings should then be made publicly available through the e-portal. This simple provision will make corrupt officials hesitate in performing corrupt acts in plain sight, hoping that no one noticed or that those who noticed are too afraid to speak up because they do not have any evidence. If confidentiality is vital, bidders should sign a confidentiality agreement.
- #51 Such cases exist in countries with the most corruption in procurement: China, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Cases of corruption occur at a much smaller rate in places like Australia and Pakistan, where the review of complaints is given to officers other than those who make the final decision.
- #52 Independent from procuring entities and not members of the BAC.
- #53 Indonesia believes the scrutiny of citizens can “complement institutional oversight bodies”.
- #54 It’s worth noting that there are more options for judicial reviews in other countries compared to here in the Philippines. The legal entity can either be a special court or the local regional court.
- #55 Which becomes possible only if bid proceedings, results, and information are open for public access in a periodical or on the Internet.
- #56 Maybe special courts can be created, handling the smallest complaints to the biggest ones. The US has special courts like “Drug courts”, “Family courts”, and “Traffic courts”. The same can possibly be replicated here in the Philipppines.
- #57 Punishments should include imprisonment, debarment, and perpetual disqualification from their positions.
- #58 I believe it’s a really interesting idea because… It’s a kind of law that makes us think: What kind of laws can force collusive officials and private individuals to turn against each other? What kind of laws can legally oblige legal persons to willfully disclose all attempts at corruption? But one possible idea is awarding the detection of bribery or any form of collusion, as long as it is paired with conclusive proof. This, coupled with the guarantee of protection for these whistleblowers, will give truth-seekers the motivation to ensure justice.
- #59 At this point it is difficult to tell whether positive reinforcement or negative reinforcement will be more useful. A combination may be ideal, similar to the way I have combined the replicable practices of more than 10 countries into a list of possible recommendations to the law here in the Philippines.
- #60 And I hope the similarities I compiled across the entire Asian continent can contribute to the pool of knowledge related to procurement, as well as institutions such as this one dedicated to turning the tides of corruption little by little.