Quick Reference Guide – The BasicsDr. Susan CathcartGeneral In.docx

Quick Reference Guide – The Basics
Dr. Susan Cathcart
General Information
· First or second person should not be used unless expressing an
opinion or sharing experiences.
· Font size and style – Times New Roman Size 12 Font.
· Headings (you are only required to use level one and two
headings for this class). Please refer to the example for a visual
representation of the format of headings.
· Title of Paper – not bolded and centered (there is no level to
the title)
· Level one – Centered, bolded, Uppercase and lowercase
heading
· Introduction is always a level one heading. There are never
level two headings after the Introduction.
· Level two -Left justified, bolded, Uppercase and lowercase
heading
· Line Spacing – Double spaced (Paragraph, Paragraph Settings,
Double Spaced and select box – Do not add space between
paragraphs).
· Numbers – Write out numbers 1-9.
· Page header (Running head is left justified and page number is
right justified)
· Title Page; Running head: TITLE IN ALL CAPS
1
· Subsequent pages; TITLE PAGE IN ALL CAPS
1
· Paragraph – The first sentence of a paragraph is always
indented.
· Underlining – Nothing is underlined in APA.
In-text citations
· General Information
· Always provide appropriate credit; otherwise it is considered
plagiarism.

· Everything cited in text must appear on the Reference page.
Everything on the Reference page must be cited within the text.
· When citing at the end of a sentence, the punctuation should
be place after the citation and never before.
· When citing in ( ), use & between two or more authors (not
the word and).
· If there is no year in a Reference, cite as n.d.
· If there is no page number, cite as n.p.
· When citing at the end of a sentence, punctuation only goes
after the citation.
· The first time you cite a reference in a paragraph, you must
cite the year.
· Examples of citations when paraphrasing (you must cite the
year the first time you cite a reference in a paragraph).
· According to Cathcart (2019), it is always snowy in Michigan.
· It is always snowy in Michigan (Cathcart & Ryan, 2019).
· According to Cathcart, Ryan, & Masica (2019), you cite three
or more authors the first time.
· In subsequent citations for three or more authors, you use et
al. (Cathcart et al., 2019).
· Flowers do not bloom until it is spring (“Today’s gardener,”
2018) or (Today’s gardener, 2018). There is no author listed in
this example.
· Direct Quotes – Should be avoided as much as possible as this
does not provide analysis. If you do not cite with a page
number, you will not receive credit.
· According to Cathcart (2019, p. 15), “Driving is horrible
during an ice storm.”
· “Driving is always horrible during and ice storm” (Cathcart,
n.d., n.p.).
You never use a page number unless you are citing a direct
quote.
Reference Page – This is a level one heading. This is not an all-
inclusive list.
· General Information
· References are always listed in alphabetical order.

· The author’s first name should not be used. Only the first
letter of the first name is used.
· Professional credentials should not be used.
· Use & between two or more references (not the word and).
· The first letter of the first word and the first letter of proper
nouns are capitalized
for articles and books. The journal name and the journal number
are italicized.
Books:
Cathcart, S. D. (2015). Communication in the workplace.
Cambridge, NJ: Boston Books.
Communication in the workplace. (2015). Cambridge, NJ:
Boston Books.
Journal Articles:
Cathcart, S. D. (2019, January 7). Human resource management
in Fortune 500 organizations.
HR Today, 9(2), 15-22. Retrieved from https://........
Cathcart, S. D., & Ryan, J. (2019). Human resource
management in Fortune 500 organizations.
HR Today, 9(2), 15-22. Retrieved from https://........
Newspapers:
Cathcart, S. D., Ryan, J., & Masica, A. J. (2018, December 30).
Roads in Michigan. The
Oakland Press, pp. A1.
Online Video from the Internet:
Cathcart, S. (2019, June 1). How to grow herbs [Video}.
Retrieved from http://youtube.com....
Website Articles (remember to avoid .com websites):
DOL appeals association health care plan ruling. (2019, May 1).
Retrieved from https:// shrm.org
*The authority on APA style is the APA manual.
FINAL PAPER PROJECT ART AND ARCHITECTURE OF
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC WORLD 2020

DUE SUNDAY MAY 3
1. choose an object/structure from the Art&Christianity
Ecclesiart Projects site -
https://www.artandchristianity.org/ecclesiart-projects
OR from slide file posted on Blackboard.
2. Review your slides and notes for an object/structure that you
would like to explore, and to compare to a similar although
modern one, selected from the sources above.
3. The premise is that you will find significant similarities, as
well as differences between the selected image, one that has
been created in the 20th/21st centuries, and an object covered in
the course, from the 4th to the 17th century.
4. While this project is based on the standard art history
compare/contrast exercise, you must also be thinking about the
underlying belief, its imagery, its rituals, its adherents, and the
impact or the use that EACH of your two objects has on those
who experience the object or space in person.
5. Since we are dealing with a very different set of
circumstances, my requirements are simple:
Images of both objects, and of any other objects that may come
into your discussion.
A solid bibliography that demonstrates your exploration of both
topics. By this I mean VETTED sources including online
resources. No popular sites like PBS, for example, although
there may be suggestions for further reading connected to some
of their programs. The same for Wikipedia – there can be decent
bibliographies but be careful. A very good place is of course,
the Metropolitan Museum’s Heilbrunn Timeline of Art for

contextual essays, as well as object information.
I am finicky about notes, I want them at the end of the paper,
not on the page. This is easy to set up in any word processing
program. Be careful of plagiarism – any idea as well as direct
quotes MUST be cited in your end notes as well as the source
included in the bibliography. I am less finicky about the style
of format, although I prefer Chicago, just pick one and be
consistent.
Any questions about format can be found at the Purdue OnLine
Writing Lab - https://owl.purdue.edu/owl/purdue_owl.html
Length is always arbitrary, right? But for a decent job, the paper
should be a minimum of 1500 to 2000 words, but not more than
4000 words - exclusive of bibliography and end notes.
Do something of which you are proud; think of this as the
culmination of what you have learned in this course.
Running head: TITLE OF PAPER – ALL CAPS 1
TITLE OF THE PAPER
3
Comment by Dr. Susan Cathcart: Please notice that the h in
Head is not capitalized.

Title of Paper
Your Name Comment by scathc01: Don’t’ forget to include
your name here! Don’t forget to remove any comments.
Columbia Southern University
You are required to use headings for all assignments for this
class.
Title of Paper
Introduction Comment by Dr. Susan Cathcart: You must
include an Introduction for all assignments.
The Introduction includes 4-6 sentences overview of the topic
and 3-6 sentences overview of the paper. The overview of the
paper tells me what I am going to read in the next 3 or more
pages.
The heading following an Introduction is always level one.
This is your introduction where you have a comprehensive
overview of the topic. Then you need an overview of the paper.
The next heading is always level one.
Level One Heading Comment by Dr. Susan Cathcart: Never use
Part I or Part II as headings. Headings tell the reader what to
expect next.

The heading after an introduction is always a level ne heading
(centered and bolded).
Text starts here. You must always have paragraph after a
heading.
Level Two Heading
Text starts here. The level two heading is a sub-heading of a
level one heading.
Leadership Styles Comment by Dr. Susan Cathcart:
Don’t forget to cite when you paraphrase. Essentially, you will
have a citation in every paragraph.
If you do not cite, you will not get credit for what you write.
Direct quotes are not analysis without a substantial discussion
of relevance. If you feel you must use a direct quotes, you must
cite with author, year, p. #. If you do not include a page
number, no credit is earned for the quote.
Paragraph starts here.
Servant Leadership
Transformational Leadership
Conclusion
The conclusion should include 4-5 sentences providing a
summary of the facts/findings for the assignment. This is the
end to the paper. There are no headings after the Conclusion.
**This template provides examples of headings that are 2-5
words long. The organization and the words used in a heading
are up to you. You never ask a question in a heading nor use
Part I or Part II as headings.
References Comment by Dr. Susan Cathcart: Always in
alphabetical order. The reference and citation must match.

Author, A. A., & Author, B. B. (Year). Title of the journal
article is case sensitive. Name of the Journal in Title Case,
vol(issue), starting page-ending page. Retrieved from…
Author, A. A. (Year, Month Date). Title of the newspaper
article is case sensitive. Name of the Newspaper in Title Case,
vol(issue number), page-page. Retrieved from name of the
database.
Author, A. A. or Organization Name, if available. (Date of
publication; use n.d. if there is no date). Website document title
– case sensitive. Retrieved from URL.
Author, A.A. (2019). Title of the book is case sensitive and
italicized (3rd ed). City, State: Publisher.
Other hints:
1. The expectations do not provide the headings nor the
organization. This is up to you to determine. Headings – not
formatted as a question. Headings tell me what to expect in the
next discussion. You do not Part I or Part II as a heading.
2. Everything is formatted in Times new roman size 12 font.
3. Everything is double spaced. To do this, you select Don’t add
space in the paragraph settings.
4. You must cite in every paragraph unless solely based on your
experiences. If you do not cite, you will not receive credit.
5. Direct quotes – should be avoided and when used, you must
explain its relevance in 3-4 sentences. I would prefer if you
avoid direct quotes as they are not analysis when you use the
author’s own words.
a. If you do not include a citation with a page number, you do
not earn credit.
b. If you do not have a page number when you cite a direct
quote, you would use n.p. (Cathcart, 2017, n.p.).
c. You do not use a page number unless citing a direct quote.
d. If you do not have a year when you cite, you would cite as
n.d. (Cathcart, n.d.).
6. When citing three or more authors, cite all authors in the first
citation. In subsequent citations, use only the last name of the
first author followed by et al. Example - (Cathcart et al., 2018).

7. Everything cited in text must appear on the Reference page;
likewise, everything cited on the Reference page must appear
within text. If this does not happen, points will be deducted.
20 / Regulation / spring 2014
L a b o r
I
n the United states today, less than 10 percent of pri-
vate sector employment is unionized. After peaking
at 35 percent in the early 1950s, union membership
has been in decline for the last 59 years. The decline
represents one of the most important institutional
shifts in the U.s. economy. reflecting the decline, a
common theme among academic legal commentators
is that the law governing unionization and collective bargaining,
the national Labor relations Act (nLrA), has been a terrible
failure. i believe the opposite is true: the nLrA has been largely
successful and in one key area it has been exceedingly
successful.
Moreover, its presumed failure—declining union enrollment—is
due largely to its overall success.
in this article, i will describe this success. i will first outline the
goals of the Wagner Act (the nLrA’s progenitor legislation),
and
then explain how the nLrA achieved those goals. i will conclude
by explaining why it’s not surprising that those successes would
result in declining union membership.

GOALS OF THE NLRA
The first of the Wagner Act goals was, and is, industrial peace.
The preamble of the Act states that the “denial by some employ-
ers of the right of employees to organize” and bargain
collectively
M icH A EL L . WAcH T ER is the William B. and Mary Barb
Johnson Professor of Law
and Economics and co-director of the institute for Law and
Economics at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law School.
The author thanks Sarah Edelson for research assistance and
useful comments for
this article.
This article is condensed from a chapter in the Research
Handbook on the Economics of
Labor and Employment Law, cynthia L. Estlund and Michael L.
Wachter eds., Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2013.
had led “to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or
unrest.”
On one level, that goal means reducing the number of strikes
or the economic effects of strikes. But that barely scratches the
surface of that goal. industrial strife in the late 19th and early
20th centuries went far deeper, raising the question of whether
the employees would agree to work within a capitalist system.
prior to 1932, there was no federal legal right to strike, even
peace-
fully, and many strikes were illegal under state law or the
federal com-
mon law. Employers often required that workers agree not to

join
a union or be involved in union activities during the term of
their
employment, and the federal courts held such agreements
binding.
Concerted activity by employees was not protected. if workers
went
out on strike and did not return to work when served with a
state
court–ordered injunction, the striking workers were in contempt
of court. When confronted by police or pinkerton guards, strikes
would often turn violent. The next move in many strikes was for
the
governor to call out the national guard to restore order.
in the great railroad strike of 1877, federal troops were
deployed in major cities in six states, including Baltimore,
pitts-
burgh, Chicago, and st. Louis. striking workers often resisted,
resulting in considerable violence and many deaths. Certainly
one could understand president rutherford Hayes’ concern that
a revolution against the government itself might be in the mak-
ing. Hence, when i use the term “industrial peace” to describe
what Congress was seeking, my focus is—and Congress’s focus
was—on the unrest that led to riots and the eventual use of
police
or military force to restore order.
Equality of bargaining power / The second goal was, and is, to
redress “inequality of bargaining power.” in the words of the
Act,
The STriking SucceSS
of The naTional
labor relaTionS acT

The NLRA has brought labor peace and improved workers’
negotiating power,
which may explain why union membership is declining.
✒ By MicHAEL L. WAcHTER
B
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B
IS
wage and the nonunion wage for workers doing similar work.
Collective bargaining and higher wages were linked. it was
always
understood that the collectively bargained wage would be higher
than the wage achieved in the nonunion sector.
Under the traditional industrial relations view, the procedural
goal is achieved when workers join unions and engage in
collective

bargaining and the substantive goal is achieved when the collec-
tively bargained wage is set above otherwise-prevailing wages
in an
unorganized labor market. But that understanding of the second
goal of the Act is problematic because it is internally
inconsistent,
based on flawed and outdated theories of wage determination
and of business cycles.
The labor market analysis at the time of the great Depression
was still rooted in the theories of Thomas Malthus and John
r. Commons. Malthus claimed that population growth would
always leave a pool of unemployed workers that would keep
wages
at the subsistence level. Commons, one of the original giants of
industrial relations, extended the claim, saying that “cutthroat
competition” among workers set the market wage at the wage
that the “cheapest laborer” would be willing to accept. To
remedy
the problem, unions were needed to address the inequality of
bargaining power.
“[t]he inequality of bargaining power … substantially burdens
and
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the
purchasing
power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the
stabiliza-
tion of competitive wage rates and working conditions within
and
between industries.” Whereas the goal of industrial peace is
easily
stated, the same is not true of the equality of bargaining power.
The second goal is complex because it has both procedural and

substantive elements. On the procedural element, the
legislation’s
author, sen. robert F. Wagner (D-n.Y.), said that the goal was
satisfied if workers were represented by unions. i will adopt
sena-
tor Wagner’s interpretation by equating the procedural element
with workers’ achievement of collective bargaining status. This
provides a clear and measurable goal. The greater the percent-
age of workers belonging to unions and engaging in collective
bargaining, the more successful is the Act. Hereafter, i use the
economic term “union density,” which means the percentage of
workers who belong to unions.
The substantive element is raising wages, which it was hoped
would reduce the likelihood or severity of depressions. The
tradi-
tional indicator of whether unions raise wages is the union wage
premium—that is, the percentage difference between the union
spring 2014 / Regulation / 21
B
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B
IS
L a B O R
The modern concept of competitive labor markets was unde-
veloped at this time. it was not until 1932 that John Hicks pub-
lished The Theory of Wages and laid the framework for the
neoclas-
sical theory of wage determination, and it was several decades
later before it became widely known and accepted. in the
modern
theory of wage determination, the competitive wage is the wage
that equates supply and demand. Both employers and employees
are “price takers”—neither exercises bargaining power. The
com-
petitive wage may be a depressed wage in terms of some norm
of
acceptable living conditions, but it is the market outcome. But
the
conventional wisdom among policymakers when labor law was
being developed in the 1930s was that of Commons and not
Hicks.
The business cycle language of the Act also creates problems
in light of modern neoclassical economic theory. The statutory
language looks to unions to raise wages to counter an ongoing
deflationary cycle where declining wages result in under-
consump-
tion and increased unemployment. The under-consumption story
was a neat one but there was never any solid economic support

for it, and it was gradually being replaced by Keynesian
econom-
ics even as the Act was passed. Keynesian economics posits that
a
combination of countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy could
reduce the severity and length of downturns in business activity.
Elevating peace / Two alternative stories can be told in
evaluating
the two goals. The first story is the one told by the framers of
the
Wagner Act. industrial peace is an important, clear, and
coherent
goal of the Wagner Act. replacing industrial strife and unrest
with industrial peace makes both employers and employees bet-
ter off and has enormous benefits for social welfare. On the
other
hand, a violent regime of illegal strikes, riots, and the recurring
exercise of police power represents a failed industrial relations
system. in this story, the goal of equalization of bargaining
power
seems to fit neatly with the goal of industrial peace. Equality of
bargaining power was required for labor disputes to be resolved
peacefully. The two goals are thus complementary.
The second story reaches a very different conclusion. As a
threshold economic issue, the procedural and substantive
aspects
of the goal of equalizing bargaining power are inconsistent. The
higher the union wage, the lower the level of employment in the
union sector. Thus the substantive goal of a high wage pulls in
one direction, while the procedural goal of more workers
covered
by collective bargaining pulls in the other. There also is a
potential
inconsistency between the substantive goal of higher union

wages
and the goal of industrial peace. High union wage, relative to
the
nonunion wage, means greater management opposition to union
demands (and to union organizing efforts generally), thus the
greater likelihood of strikes.
The complexities and potential inconsistencies inherent in this
second goal of the nLrA are one reason for emphasizing the
more
straightforward goal of industrial peace. But another reason lies
in the dramatic statutory revisions of 1947. in the Taft-Hartley
Amendments to the nLrA, making greater progress in achiev-
ing industrial peace was the paramount goal. At the same time,
certain tactics and conduct during labor disputes were
restricted,
even at the obvious cost of curbing unions’ bargaining power.
With the Taft-Hartley amendments, the goal of industrial peace
clearly became paramount.
THE FOUR LEGAL REGiMES
To evaluate the success of the nLrA, i will treat it as one of four
alternative legal regimes that have each existed in the United
states at some time since the beginning of the new Deal. i will
then ask which of the four is most likely to achieve the two
goals.
in terms of terminology, i note that the nLrA has been amended
several times since the original Act—the Wagner Act—was first
passed in 1935. When i use the term “nLrA,” i refer to the labor
law as it exists today.
The NIra / The f irst of the alternative legal regimes is the
national industrial recovery Act (nirA) of 1933, which was
the first attempt in the United states to give workers the right

to act in concert without employer interference and to encour-
age collective bargaining. The theme of the Act, as stated in
its preamble, was to replace “free competition” with managed
“fair competition.”
The nirA’s legal structure is known as corporatism. Cor-
poratism emphasizes cooperation among interest groups or
constituencies—especially labor and capital—and between those
constituencies and the government. One problem with this
scheme was that unions represented only a small percentage of
the private labor force at the time. Without labor unions that
broadly represent employees’ interests, industry codes would
likely be unbalanced, reflecting only the interests of business.
To provide a countervailing power to corporations, the nirA
actively encouraged unionization. As a result, union member-
ship grew exponentially in the period following the adoption
of the nirA.
Essentially, the economic goal of the nirA legal regime was
to cartelize industry in order to prevent price and wage competi-
tion from feeding deflation. Although the term “cartel” was not
explicitly used, it was this feature that encouraged corporations
to participate. At the heart of the nirA’s labor policy was
section
7(a), which required that each code recognize the rights of
employ-
ees “to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives
of their own choosing free from employer interference.” section
7(a) was breakthrough legislation for the union movement, pro-
viding labor the right to organize and to do so without interfer-
ence from employers.
Most importantly, the nirA held out the promise of a truly
cooperative relationship between labor and capital. By

equalizing
pay across competing firms, unions took wages out of the price
competition. The incentive to reduce wages and then prices to
gain market share was no longer possible or profitable. Cutting
prices would violate the nirA’s codes of conduct. Moreover, the
extra revenue provided by the higher prices could pay the
higher
union wages. High union wages thus did not put unionized
firms at a competitive disadvantage. Management associations
and labor unions worked together to form codes of behavior that
prevented competitive cost cutting.
The nirA experiment ended when the Act was declared uncon-
stitutional by the U.s. supreme Court. in the case Schecter
Poultry
Corporation v. United States, the Court held that the code-
making
authority conferred by the nirA was an excessive delegation
of legislative power and therefore unconstitutional. With its
emphasis on fair competition, the nirA is against the spirit of
free competition embodied in neoclassical economics. And as
a legal regime, the nirA failed to work effectively. rather than
attempting to reform the nirA, president Franklin roosevelt
made the important political decision to let it become a brief
footnote in American economic history.
Wagner act / After the nirA was declared unconstitutional, a
second attempt to calm industrial strife was made with the
1935 passage of the national Labor relations Act, better known
as the Wagner Act. The heart of the legislation, section 7, was
largely a carryover from section 7(a) of the nirA. Workers were

given a right to join labor organizations, bargain collectively,
and
engage in concerted activity such as strikes without
“interference,
restraint, or coercion” by management. The nLrA provided a
detailed set of rules for both union recognition and collective
bargaining. it forbade many employer tactics that discouraged
unionization, set up machinery for determining the union des-
ignated as the bargaining agent of the employees, and directed
employers “to bargain collectively” with the chosen representa-
tives in good faith.
To achieve its goal of promoting industrial peace, the Wagner
Act provided for a legal strike mechanism that channeled con-
certed activity into a peaceful form. Employees were given the
right to strike, but that right was required to be exercised in a
peaceful fashion.
The Act favored collective bargaining as the preferred form of
the employment relationship and favored spreading collective
bargaining throughout the economy. With the Wagner Act
favor-
ing unionization, if all firms in an industry were to unionize,
the
competitive pressures for firms to compete based on differences
in costs would be reduced. The advantages of higher prices and
higher wages, promised by the nirA, might be gained without
the
cumbersome structure and questionable constitutional legality
of
the nirA. Again, higher prices would fund the higher wages with
the associated economic inefficiencies promoted by the nirA.
The cooperative spirit between employers and unions envi-
sioned by senator Wagner, however, was an impossible dream
from the beginning. Without the government assistance to

cartel-
ize labor and product markets provided by the nirA, the Wagner
Act could only take wages out of competition if all firms in the
industry were unionized and if wages were bargained at the
industry level. Under the best of circumstances that would take
time to develop. Thus, from the outset, staying nonunion under
the Wagner Act gave firms much lower labor costs, negating
any
incentive to cooperate with unions.
Taft-Hartley amendments / Most of the changes brought by the
Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947—the third of the four legal
regimes—reduced the scope and effectiveness of the economic
weapons available to the union in organizing new workers.
Criti-
cally, Taft-Hartley replaced the “closed shop” of the Wagner
Act
with the “union shop.” Under the new rules, prospective
employ-
ees did not need to be members of a union as a condition of
employment. instead, the collective bargaining agreement could
require that an employee join the union and was given at least
30 days from the date of hire to join. Although the loss of
closed
shop status was important to unions, it was minor compared to
the effect of the “open shop.” The new section 14(b) permitted
states to pass “right to work” laws mandating the “open shop.”
in the open shop, employees hired into a bargaining unit job did
not have to join the union or pay dues. The effect of the right-
to-work laws, which were especially popular in the south, was
to
make it much more difficult for a union to organize and sustain
bargaining units across an entire industry. Competing on wages
was back as a business strategy.

in addition, Taft-Hartley added a list of unfair labor practices
by unions to balance the list of unfair labor practices by
employers
in the Wagner Act. Taft-Hartley also added a new section 8(c)
to
clarify that employers had the right to express their views about
unionization in response to a union organizing drive.
The main effect of Taft-Hartley was to limit the spread of
unionization. The relative difficulty of organizing, as well as
the ban on the “closed shop,” guaranteed that there would be a
vibrant nonunion sector, especially in the “right-to-work” states
that required an “open shop.” Consequently, the legal regime of
the Taft-Hartley Act has a nonunion sector competing actively
with a union sector.
The nonunion sector / The fourth legal regime is the patchwork
of employment laws that regulate today’s nonunion sector. The
employees in this sector do not have the benefits of an enforce-
able contract, or of “just cause”–type job security, and they do
not have a bargaining agent to represent their interests before
the employer. This legal regime has two components. The first
is the employment-at-will doctrine, which governs the norms
of the workplace. The second is a set of government mandates
such as the Fair Labor standards Act (FLsA); the Occupational,
safety, and Health Act (OsHA); and the Employee retirement
income security Act (ErisA); as well as Title Vii and other anti-
discrimination laws.
The employment-at-will doctrine effectively operates as a
jurisdictional boundary. The effect of allowing an employer to

L a B O R
discharge a worker at-will is that the employee cannot contest
that decision in court. if taken literally, this rule may appear to
promote employer opportunism and unfairness. Yet
employment-
at-will survives.
What explains the almost universal fact that the nonunion
employment relationship works without use of an enforceable
contract for most of its terms? One possible answer is that
employers are able to exploit their superior bargaining power
over
employees and impose this unfair arrangement. But that begs
the
question of why the nonunion sector seems tranquil today,
rather
than having a labor force eager and ready to unionize. perhaps
nonunion employers can offer a pay and job security package
that
is attractive because it has lower costs than the unionized firms
with which they compete. Understanding this point takes us to
the neoclassical theory of the firm.
The key point here is that in addition to higher union pay, col-
lective bargaining is a high-cost mechanism for providing
worker
protection against employer opportunism. simply put, collective
bargaining is very expensive because of its high transaction
costs.
in general, when transaction costs are high and contract
enforce-
ment is expensive, the economic relationship is brought inside
the
firm, where the parties are governed by the intra-firm
hierarchical

governance structure. From the perspective of transaction cost
theories, the decision to bring relationships within the firm is
the decision to opt for the intra-firm governance structure over
contractual governance within markets.
With the single exception of the collective bargaining contract,
the decision to bring an activity inside the firm means that the
activity will not be governed in most of its particulars by con-
tract terms. What then explains the fact that employers do not
use the employment-at-will doctrine to act opportunistically
and take advantage of their work force? As an empirical matter,
employment-at-will is today an accepted part of the nonunion
employment relationship, at least to the extent that it is not a
seri-
ous topic of labor law reform at either the national or state
level.
What explains the relative lack of employer opportunism in
today’s nonunion sector? The answer is to be found in the
unique
nature of the employment relationship: it is an intensive repeat-
play game. Monitoring is costly and thus incomplete. it is now
well known that informal norm governance works best in such
situations because self-help methods are much more effective.
in
this situation, it is the firm that arguably lacks bargaining
power,
since the remedy—increased monitoring—can be prohibitively
expensive for the same reasons that contract writing is prohibi-
tively expensive.
The employment relationship is typically marked by the parties
investing in their match. Firm-specific investments create a
wedge
between the employee’s value to her current employer versus
her

value to a new employer. The contract is self-enforcing because
both sides then lose their investment if the relationship is termi-
nated early. in addition to the self-enforcing structure of norms,
other factors are also at work. For instance, reputational effects
can be a strong deterrent to employer opportunism.
The ultimate deterrent to employer opportunism, however, is
the threat effect of unionization. A nonunion firm will become
much less profitable if unionized. Wage and benefits will likely
be
raised above competitive levels and the firm will have the
transac-
tion costs of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement that
will also impose restrictions on its ability to manage its work
force unilaterally.
The second component of the nonunion legal regime is the
extensive set of government mandates such as the FLsA, OsHA,
and ErisA, as well as Title Vii and other antidiscrimination
laws.
Mandates such as ErisA and OsHA serve to remedy potential
problems of information asymmetries. Mandates such as mini-
mum wages, child labor prohibitions, and discrimination-free
employment serve a different function. rather than correcting a
market imperfection, they impose a public moral standard. such
regulations impose minimum standards on the theory that some
market-determined outcomes are unacceptable as a matter of
national policy.
AccOMPLiSHiNG THE GOALS OF THE NLRA
Which legal regime best accomplishes the goals of the nLrA?
The nirA receives some credit for being the first federal labor
law
legislation to provide for the right to engage in lawful concerted

activity: both to unionize and to strike without interference
from
employers. As a practical matter, however, the nirA failed on
the
ground, and the problems showed up almost immediately. price-
fixing proved difficult to accomplish. noncompliance begot
further noncompliance, as code-abiding business executives
began to feel the pinch of competition from cheating firms. The
hoped-for stable higher prices were not achieved.
The nirA was no more successful in labor relations than it was
at fixing prices. in the nirA framework, unions and business
were
expected to exercise self-restraint in their bargaining demands
in
order to support national priorities. That did not happen. The
historical record of strike activity during the brief nirA era
illus-
trates the failure of the law to reduce industrial strife. instead of
providing for greater labor stability, the number of workdays
lost
to strikes tripled over the first three years of the nirA.
The nirA does much better with the goal of equalization of
bargaining power. On the procedural element, the nirA suc-
ceeded because the percentage of workers from the private
sector
belonging to unions increased. On the substantive element, The
nirA was also successful. Although the exact premium differs
by industry and over time, the evidence uniformly supports the
existence of a high union wage premium over the entire period
studied here.
Overall, the nirA scores high as the first major legislation
to grapple with the problems of industrial strife and unequal
bargaining power. Much more statutory work needed to be done,

but the nirA was a good first attempt.
achieving the Wagner act’s goals / One would expect that the
Wagner Act would be successful in achieving its own goals. in
fact, the record turned out to be mixed. With respect to indus-
trial peace, the Wagner Act created a legal strike mechanism
that turned many strikes from violent ones to non-violent ones.
This was an important change. Although less threatening to the
established order, industrial strife—which had already increased
during the nirA years—increased further under the Wagner Act.
rather than bringing industrial peace, the number of strikes and
lockouts nearly doubled under the Wagner Act.
There are several explanations for the worsening in industrial
strife. First, particularly in the late 1930s, many new unions
were
forming, undertaking their organizing drives and bargaining for
their first contract. second, the legal regime was particularly
favor-
able to unions. For example, the fact that there were no unfair
labor practice standards restricting union
action meant that the strike weapon could
be used freely except as constrained by
state law. Third, the aspirations of union
leaders and workers increased along with
the more favorable legal regime, and rising
aspirations translated into more costly
bargaining demands that were difficult
to resolve without strikes.
The jump in industrial strife went along
with a sharp increase in union membership.

so while the Wagner Act was unable to
reduce industrial strife, it was able to increase union
representation.
That is, while the first goal was proving unattainable, the
second
goal was being achieved. This underscores one of the themes of
this
article: the goals of the Wagner Act were potentially
inconsistent. A
potential inconsistency in the Act turns into an actual
inconsistency
once the substantive goal of equalizing bargaining power is
taken
into account. Concomitant with the increase in union density,
the
newly organized union members were able to achieve higher
wages
and thus gained the union wage premium. Herein lies the
problem:
who would pay for the higher wages?
Under the Wagner Act, and unlike the nirA, firms would pay
for the higher wages through reduced profits. Although firms
might be able to pass on some of the wage increases to
consumers,
there is no reason to suppose that they could pass on the bulk of
the increase. Consequently, employer opposition to unions was
built into the Wagner Act.
in summary, the Wagner Act scores high on the goal of equal-
izing bargaining power. With respect to the key goal of
industrial
peace, however, the Wagner Act was not a success. strikes did
become less violent compared to the strikes of the late 19th cen-
tury, but violence was still a frequent feature of strike activity.
in

addition, the level of strike activity increased dramatically, and
this—combined with the continuing incidence of violence—was
eventually deemed to be unacceptable. Whatever its success in
promoting the bargaining power of workers, it was doomed to
be replaced because it failed to achieve industrial peace.
Taft-Hartley and the NLra’s goals / The Taft-Hartley
Amendments
transformed the original Wagner Act into a very different
regime.
it certainly changed the Wagner Act’s balance between
employers
and unions in favor of employers. it also supported the develop-
ment of a vibrant nonunion sector in almost every industry, thus
raising the likelihood of direct labor cost competition between
union and nonunion companies.
With respect to the goal of industrial strife, the post-Taft-
Hartley nLrA has been much more successful than the Wag-
ner Act. The average number of strikes, adjusted for the size of
employment, dropped throughout the decades following passage
of Taft-Hartley. During the 1970s, there was an average of 289
strikes per year involving 1,000 or more workers. This …
MHR 6451, Human Resource Management Methods 1
Course Learning Outcomes for Unit VI
Upon completion of this unit, students should be able to:

8. Analyze the impact of different collective bargaining
strategies on employee morale.
Reading Assignment
In addition to the articles and videos listed directly in the Unit
VI Lesson, the following items are also required.
In order to access the following resources, click the links
below.
Hurd, R. W. (2013). Moving beyond the critical synthesis: Does
the law preclude a future for US unions?
Labor History, 54(2), 193-200. Retrieved from
https://libraryresources.columbiasouthern.edu/login?url=http://s
earch.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direc
t=true&db=bth&AN=87786622&site=ehost-live&scope=site
Wachter, M. L. (2014). The striking success of the National
Labor Relations Act. Regulation, 37(1), 20-26.
Retrieved from
Unit Lesson
In order to access the following resource, click the link below.

College of Business – CSU. (2016, September 1). Collective
bargaining [Video file]. Retrieved from
https://youtu.be/KZcuT1oM2GE
To view the transcripts for this video, click here.
Collective Bargaining and Employee Morale
This unit begins with a rapid look back at the history of
American trade unions and how the first friendly
societies in the 18th century evolved and later began to tackle
important issues such as minimum wage,
health and safety conditions, discrimination, benefits, job
security, strikes, and even challenges posed by new
technologies of the 1980s and 1990s.
As you watch the following archival footage, veterans of the
labor struggles along with business and
government officials reveal fascinating personal insights into
labor’s sometimes violent origins and how it has
altered the workplace over the past 200 years. This film can be
viewed in the Films on Demand database
within the CSU Online Library. You are encouraged to watch
Segments 2 (Immigrant Labor), 3 (Labor Unions:
A.F.L. and the I.W.W.), and 8 (Change in the Labor Market) in
the video linked below.
Gardner, E. T. (Producer), Angel, C. (Producer), & Boyd, K.
(Director). (1994). Organizing America: The
history of trade unions [Video file]. Retrieved from
https://libraryresources.columbiasouthern.edu/login?auth=CAS
&url=http://fod.infobase.com/PortalPla
ylists.aspx?wID=273866&xtid=8049

To view the transcript of the video above, click here.
Hopefully, after watching the video, you have learned a little
more about the beginnings of the labor unions
UNIT VI STUDY GUIDE
Collective Bargaining
and Employee Morale
earch.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=8778
6622&site=ehost-live&scope=site
https://youtu.be/KZcuT1oM2GE
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and have an appreciation for the sacrifices endured by all during
those tough economic times.
Today, the American Bar Association (1997) and the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW) (n.d.) remind us
that labor law is still linked to three significant federal statues:
Relations Act (NLRA);
-Hartley Act, also known as the Labor
Management Relations Act (LMRA); and
-Griffin Act, also known as the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
(LMRDA).
The Wagner Act is a federal law that grants employees the right
to form and join a union, promote and aid
unions, select a union to act for them as their collective
bargaining representative, and help them regarding
workplace issues. Additionally, employees have a right to not
engage in concerted activities under this act.
These rights are provided to employees working for employers
in the private sector who are covered by the
NLRA. This excludes employees of airlines, railways,
independent contractors, farmworkers, domestic
workers, supervisors, and managers. The National Labor
Relations Board administers the Wagner Act and
investigates charges of unfair labor practices by employers and

unions (American Bar Association, 1997;
Industrial Workers of the World, n.d.; Ivancevich, 2010).
Congress amended the NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act,
with the Taft-Hartley Act. This act has two
purposes: to reduce industrial arguments and to restrict the
power of labor unions. It establishes guidelines for
employee and employer relationships and protects employees
from unfair labor practices by unions (National
Labor Relations Board, n.d.).
Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin Act, also known as the
LMRDA, to protect individual members from
illegal practices by the unions and by employers as well. It
gives union members rights such as the right to
nominate individuals for union office, vote in the elections, and
attend union meetings. It ensures that union
accounts and records are available to all union members. In an
effort to eliminate what was referred to as
sweetheart contracts, where union and management agreed to
terms that benefitted their own interests but
allowed poor working conditions for the workers, the union
must submit an annual financial report to the
Secretary of Labor. Additionally, the employer is required to
report any payments or loans given to the union,
union officials, or employees (American Bar Association,
1997).
Collective Bargaining: What is it?
At the center of the employer-employee relationship is the
collective bargaining process. As the exclusive
agent for the employees, it is the union’s duty to negotiate a
collective bargaining agreement with the
employer. The employer and union are required by the NLRA to
bargain in good faith concerning employee

wages, benefits, hours, and terms and conditions of their
employment in order to reach an agreement.
Refusing to bargain in good faith violates the law. Once the
union has been elected, the employer cannot
negotiate with anyone else—not directly with employees or with
another union (American Bar Association,
1997; Carrell & Heavrin, 2010).
Rather than negotiating each time an issue occurs, the terms and
conditions of employment are set down in a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Ideally, both
management and the union agree on the duties, rules,
and benefits that will govern the workplace relationship
between management and employees for a set period
of time (e.g., three years) (American Bar Association, 1997).
Since the agreement will be in use over a period of time, it is
imperative that both parties, management and
union, bargain in good faith and understand their role in the
collective bargaining process. There are several
phases of the bargaining process. The first is preparation; it is
extremely important that both parties do their
homework by analyzing the data for their proposals,
anticipating the other’s proposals, selecting their
bargaining items, and planning their strategy. Next is the actual
bargaining stage, where ground rules are
established and an exchange of demands, proposals, and
counterproposals are made. The resolution stage
is where an agreement is reached. The union members ratify the
contract, or if the parties find themselves at
an impasse over the terms and conditions of employment, then it
is often resolved through mediation or
arbitration. When these measures fail, a lockout or strike may
occur, and even hiring replacement employees
may happen until a resolution can be reached. Having a unified
strategy and being prepared usually keeps

this worst-case scenario from happening (Carrell & Heavrin,
2010).
One industrial relations professional describes collective
bargaining as having four phases: planning, face-to-
face negotiations, coming to agreement, and implementing the
agreement (Queen’s IRC, 2014). In the
following short video, Ann Grant of Queen’s Industrial
Relations Centre (IRC) talks about the collective
bargaining process, and she describes what parties should
expect when trying to reach a collective
agreement.
Queen’s IRC. (2014, February 25). What are the four phases of
collective bargaining? [Video file] Retrieved
from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F02opoWS6bU&feature=yo
utu.be
Collective Bargaining: What’s Discussed at the Bargaining
Table?
The National Labor Relations Board established mandatory
subjects that must be discussed if brought up by
either party during collective bargaining. It is the duty of
management and the union to negotiate mandatory

issues such as wages, hours, benefits, vacations, profit sharing,
drug testing, layoffs, transfers, and recalls
(American Bar Association, 1997; Carrell & Heavrin, 2010;
National Labor Relations Board, n.d.).
Nonmandatory or volunteer subjects can be discussed only if
both parties agree to discuss them; there is no
duty to negotiate issues such as what products the company will
offer, how much will be spent for advertising,
or how much will be put into the marketing budget. However, if
the company and union enter into a
negotiation and agree on a nonmandatory subject under the
CBA, they must adhere to the conditions.
The last categories are illegal subjects, and even if both parties
agree to discuss them, they cannot be
negotiated. These would include topics such as discriminatory
treatment, whistleblowing, and closed shop.
The CBA includes three provisions: just cause clauses,
grievance and arbitration clauses, and union security
clauses (American Bar Association, 1997; Carrell & Heavrin,
2010; National Labor Relations Board, n.d.).
Let’s hear what Stephen Cabot, a management-labor expert,
says about the permissive and mandatory
subjects in collective bargaining. As you listen to Cabot’s
advice, be thinking critically about the approach or
type of strategy he is suggesting.
Cabot, S. J. (2009, November 9). Stephen Cabot’s labor strategy
survival seminar – Bargaining subjects
[Video file]. Retrieved from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCqP0AzAOxk&feature=yo
utu.be

Collective Bargaining: Types of Strategies
There are commonly two types of strategies used in collective
bargaining: distributive bargaining and interest-
based bargaining (IBB). When selecting which type of strategy
to use, it is most important to review the
specific issues to be negotiated, the people involved, and the
context of the discussions. If only one issue will
be negotiated, then a distributive bargaining process would
probably be used. If there are multiple issues and
there is a positive bargaining relationship between the parties, a
more collaborative approach, such as IBB
(also referred to as a win-win approach), would be used.
Distributive bargaining is defined as a negotiation process that
has the goal of coming to an agreement over
how resources should be allocated. There are three components
to this win-lose approach:
resource,
bargaining process, and
the immediate
interaction and negotiation, with little concern for
past or future relationships.
In collective bargaining, the reality is that both parties are fully
aware that they may be negotiating in the
future and want to accomplish their goals in good faith. They

do, however, start the process with different
strategies.
IBB is a mutual gains or win-win approach that looks for logical
trade-offs and is referred to as an expanded-
pie approach, whereas the distributive bargaining is a fixed-pie
approach. IBB, also called integrative
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bargaining, strives to create value for both sides and claim as
much value as possible for personal interests.
IBB pursues principled negotiation and strives to separate the
people from the problem, focuses on interests
rather than positions, and creates options for mutual gain. For
examples of this and other differences between
distributive and IBB, view the following video:
Professional Development Training. (2013, September 24).
Negotiation-2 strategies [Video file]. Retrieved
from https://youtu.be/PO3Mv8dGbJM

Most collective bargaining has elements of both types of
bargaining. It is important to stay focused and not
become too greedy; those who are negotiating for the employees
or the company have reputations to uphold.
Here is some good advice from a veteran negotiator; watch the
short video indicated below.
101therealest. (2015, December 3). 7.Distributive bargaining
and the dangers of being greedy [Video file].
Retrieved from https://youtu.be/b3XpVlTQ1Xo
Collective Bargaining: The Opening Session and Recognizing
Bargaining Tactics
The opening session of collective bargaining establishes the
details of the process, and if the parties have not
bargained before, more time is spent introducing members,
designating leaders, and setting the ground rules.
If the parties have negotiated formerly, a general conversation
and introductions take place, and each party
states their intention to use a traditional or collaborative
process (Carrell & Heavrin, 2010).
The following brief article, which you can access by clicking
the link in the reference below, provides a
glimpse into tactics used by members of management who are
intending to use the traditional process of
collective bargaining:
Outsmarting the "stealth" union organizer. (2010). Management

Report for Nonunion Organizations (Wiley),
33(8), 5. Retrieved from
The importance of an opening statement when preparing an
interest-based strategy should not be
underestimated. Both parties need to paint the big picture of the
negotiation, the past relationship, current
issues, intentions, and ground rules, and parties should
exchange the key economic and non-economic
issues that must be resolved to reach a settlement (Queen’s IRC,
2013). To see how understanding the
dynamics and skills for negotiating a collective agreement can
impact the outcome of the collective bargaining
process, watch Queen’s IRC facilitator Gary Furlong discuss
this issue.
Queens IRC. (2013, August 12). How can the dynamics of
collective bargaining impact the outcome of your
negotiations? [Video file]. Retrieved from
https://youtu.be/hOBORmAETxk
Unfortunately, if distributive bargaining is used by one party,
the other party must follow suit, or they stand to
lose it all. If distributive bargaining is used, the other party
should anticipate some bargaining tactics in case
conflict arises. It is good to show patience and to remember that
goals are interdependent, and neither side
can be successful without a future healthy relationship. Another

tactic is the packaging of issues to be
negotiated, and this tactic can establish trust and will allow for
gains on both sides. The same is true of
throwaway items; some may have value to one side but may not
have value to the other side. Caucusing,
flexibility, compromise, and saving face are all important as
well; however, they can take up valuable time and
must be carefully executed (Carrell & Heavrin, 2010).
To be better prepared for any traditional bargaining you may
find yourself in, watch the quick video indicated
below.
Arden, D. (2013, August 11). The 7 mistakes people make when
they negotiate [Video file]. Retrieved from
https://youtu.be/PO3Mv8dGbJM
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https://youtu.be/BldEUM1Ha94
Sometimes, tactics reach the general population and have
lasting effects on both parties. For an example of
this, watch Segments 4 and 5 in the video linked below.
Moyers, B. (Writer), Winship, M. (Writer), & Diego, K
(Director). (2009). United Steelworkers’ Leo
Gerard/earmark abuse [Television series episode]. In T.
Casciato (Executive Producer), Bill Moyers
Journal. Retrieved from
For an appreciation of what slows down negotiations and to
learn how each party can more effectively
negotiate by understanding the way the opposing party thinks at
the bargaining table, watch the following
video.
Candian HR Reporter. (2012, April 16). Overcoming mental
barriers in collective bargaining [Video file].
Retrieved from https://youtu.be/688KDSeQHGo
Collective Bargaining and Employee Morale

In Reframing Organizations, Bolman and Deal (1997) stress the
importance of having organizations build a
thoughtful human resource (HR) philosophy that clearly
explains how to treat people. They provide many
examples of successful organizations that diligently enforce
their philosophy into the corporate structure,
provide incentives, and develop ways to measure the
management of HR. This philosophy is achieved by
investing in people—hiring the right people; paying the
employees well; providing guidance and direction, job
security, training, and education; promoting from within; and
sharing the wealth through profit or gain (sharing
or employee ownership).
These are all necessary elements of an HR philosophy; however,
it is the work itself that provides the
opportunity for the autonomy, influence, and intrinsic rewards
that skyrocket morale. By empowering
employees with autonomy and participation and by redesigning
their work with a focus on job enrichment and
teamwork, equality and self-efficacy is ensured (Bolman &
Deal, 1997).
There have been many HR scholars; one such scholar is
Frederick Herzberg due to his work on the
importance of achievement, responsibility, and recognition.
Herzberg (1969) called these factors motivators,
and his research showed that remarkable results can happen
when people are given the authority to influence
their working conditions.
Bolman & Deal (1997) relate a classic study captured by Whyte
in 1955. In a reengineering process, a group
of women who painted toy dolls manually in a toy factory were
asked to use a new system where they took a

toy from a tray, painted it, and then put it on a passing hook.
They were given an hourly rate, a bonus for the
group, and a learning bonus. Management had no expectation of
a system problem, but the results were
disappointing, and the employees’ morale was poor. The
workers protested that the hooks moved too fast
and the environment was too hot. After hiring a consultant, the
managers agreed to meet with the women
face to face, and as a result of the meeting, management decided
to bring in fans. To their surprise, morale
improved.
After several meetings, the women made a radical request: They
wanted to control the speed of the belt.
Against the engineer’s objections, management decided to try
the women’s suggestion. They prepared a
production schedule that was logical to their work day. The belt
was slow at the start of the shift, and as the
employees warmed up, the speed of the belt increased; the speed
of the belt slowed again right before lunch
and so on and so forth. The results increased production beyond
anyone’s expectations; the women’s
bonuses were giving them more income than other employees
who were more highly skilled. The women’s
higher pay and production was disruptive, and other workers
protested. To still the waters, management went
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back to the engineers’ fixed speed; production decreased,
morale fell, and most of the women quit. This
makes one wonder if the cost of redesigning other positions
would have outweighed the benefits they would
have gained?
Research that extended Herzberg’s ideas on job enrichment was
conducted by Hackman & Oldham (1980)
and indicates that for redesign to be successful, three factors
need to be present. First, people need to
identify their work as meaningful and worthwhile, and they
must see it as a whole rather than seeing it as a
part of something. They also need to be able to use discretion
and judgement and be accountable for the
results. Finally, they should be given feedback that will allow
them to improve.
One popular program of this time period that is still being used
today is Total Quality Management (TQM),
which combines Eastern and Western philosophies and
encourages bottom-up critical thinking.
Another result of research done on job enrichment is that it has
a stronger impact on quality than productivity,
which makes sense if you think about the satisfaction one gets

from a job well done versus just doing more
work (Lawler, 1986). Most of the successes with teams come
from self-managed, autonomous work groups
who are given responsibility for a meaningful whole such as a
product or a complete service. This was not
always acceptable to management or unions on many levels,
mostly because they did not want to lose
prerogatives they were currently enjoying, and they believed
their involvement was essential to success.
However, things are changing; one of the world’s first plants
was built by Volvo in Kalmar, Sweden, to
accommodate self-managing work groups (Bolman & Deal,
1997). When it comes to worker morale, they
prefer autonomy and more power to less, and when they are
allowed to gain influence, they want more. The
question then remains, will management and union leaders
bargain for and encourage the environment that
provides employees with the highest morale?
Collective Bargaining and its Future
This unit closes with looking at where the union movement is
today and the trends in labor laws for tomorrow.
Union membership may be down; however, unions have been
influential, although not successful, in pushing
Congress to pass the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), which
allows employees to vote using authorization
cards to have a union and to bypass formal elections.
Speculation as to what would have happened if the
EFCA had been passed, as well as other failed efforts for union
revitalization, is discussed in the Richard
Hurd (2013) article, “Moving Beyond the Critical Synthesis:
Does the Law Preclude a Future for US Unions?,”
which is listed in the required reading section of this unit.
Another trend is creating new strategies for cooperative labor

relations. These efforts can lead management
to share information with unions, and this encourages unions to
be more cooperative with management,
which, consequently, ensures a more competitive organization.
An excellent example of this can be seen in
the following video. You are encouraged to watch Segments 1
and 2 in the video indicated below.
Smith, H. (Producer). (1998). Management combines forces
with unions-Northwest Airlines [Television series
episode]. In Surviving the Bottom Line with Hedrick Smith.
Retrieved from
For a different viewpoint, go to the General OneFile database,
and read the article by M. L. Wachter, titled
“The Striking Success of the National Labor Relations Act,”
which is listed in the required reading section for
this unit.
Despite a continuing decline of union membership in America,
Labor Secretary Thomas Perez remains
optimistic about the future of organized labor. Watch as the
Labor Secretary reflects on the future of unions in
this interview excerpt with PBS News Hour:
PBS News Hour. (2013, September 2). Labor secretary reflects
on the future of unions [Video file]. Retrieved
from https://youtu.be/vq_EB5MxhFo

&xtid=7827
&xtid=7827
71368692_1
https://youtu.be/vq_EB5MxhFo
71368689_1
Another positive but varying perspective comes from Sara
Horowitz, an international lawyer and founder of
the Working Today & Freelancer’s Union, a leading
organization of independent workers. This labor expert
sees a bold new role for unions in the new economy, and
Horowitz shares her outlook by answering two
interesting questions: What is the role of unions in the new
economy? Does labor hamper industrial growth?
Find out the answers in this short video:
Big Think. (2012, April 23). Sara Horowitz envisions the future
of unions [Video file]. Retrieved from
https://youtu.be/X9rP9aGw4xE

References
American Bar Association. (2006). The American Bar
Association guide to workplace law (2nd ed.). New
York, NY: Random House.
Bolman, L. G., & Deal, T. E. (2013). Reframing organizations:
Artistry, choice, and leadership (5th ed.). San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Carrell, M. R., & Heavrin, J. D. (2010). Labor relations and
collective bargaining: Private and public sectors
(10th ed.). New York, NY: Pearson.
Hackman, J. R., & Oldham, G. R. (1980). Work redesign.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Herzberg, F. (1969). Work and the nature of man. New York,
NY: Crowell.
Hurd, R. W. (2013). Moving beyond the critical synthesis: Does
the law preclude a future for US unions?
Labor History, 54(2), 193-200.
Industrial Workers of the World. (n.d.). The basic labor laws
(United States of America). Retrieved from

http://www.iww.org/organize/laborlaw/Lynd/Lynd3.shtml
Ivancevich, J. (2010). Human resource management (11th ed.).
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Irwin.
Lawler, E. E., III (1986). High involvement management:
Participative strategies for improving organizational
performance. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
National Labor Relations Board. (n.d.). National Labor
Relations Act. Retrieved from
https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-relations-act
Queens IRC. (2013, August 12). How can the dynamics of …
Moving beyond the critical synthesis: does the law preclude a
future
for US unions?
Richard W. Hurd*
Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA
This retrospective essay on Tomlins’ The State and Unions
assesses the
durability of his observations in light of developments over the
past quarter
century. The decline of unions in the context of minimal
protections offered
under contemporary labor law seems to fit Tomlins’ thesis that
the New Deal
offered only a counterfeit liberty to labor. A brief review of

failed efforts at
union revitalization demonstrates that labor’s waning fortunes
are as much a
sign of institutional rigidity and internal weakness as result of
external
constraints. Any current semblance of liberty offered to the U.S.
working class is
indeed counterfeit, but the source of fraud is the full set of
neoliberal economic
policies, not the narrow constraints of labor law alone.
As Jean-Christian Vinel reminds us, when Christopher Tomlins’
The State and Unions was
published in 1985 it was embraced by left academics as a
‘devastating analysis of the labor
relations regime erected by Progressive and New Deal
reformers.’ Indeed Tomlins’
portrayal of the original National Labor Relation Act (NLRA)
as the foundation of a set of
‘legal rules and institutional constraints’ that would curb
workers militance and ultimately
weaken the labor movement was particularly pertinent in the
mid-1980s. At that juncture,
private sector union density was in sharp decline, and even
prominent labor leaders
seemed to be echoing Tomlins with their outspoken criticism of
the law and the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB).

Vinel appropriately positions Tomlins contribution within an
interdisciplinary
paradigm that he labels the ‘critical synthesis’ encompassing
New Left social scientists
and Critical Legal scholars. Indeed those of us with roots in the
New Left greeted Tomlins
work as a vindication of our skepticism regarding the New Deal
and its supposed left-
progressive tilt, and as a piece of thorough scholarship that
confirmed our own less well-
framed arguments.
1
Of course The State and the Unions was not met with universal
praise, but like all good
scholarship served as a catalyst for healthy debate. As noted by
Vinel, among the critics
was Melvyn Dubofsky, who questioned whether a militant labor
movement would have
emerged even if conflict had not been channeled into the
bureaucratic procedures of the
NLRB. Dubofsky went beyond this basic criticism (which was
raised as well by others at
the time) and also disagreed with Tomlins’ main thesis, arguing
instead that the law and its

administration can be understood only in the broader context of
shifting economic and
political power relations.
2
The latter point has been developed more fully by James Gross
q 2013 Taylor & Francis
*Email: [email protected]
Labor History, 2013
Vol. 54, No. 2, 193–200,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0023656X.2013.773147
in his three-volume history of the NLRB, the first two of which
were published before
Tomlins’ book.
3
Perhaps more intriguing as we look back on Tomlins’
contribution is the reaction of
Craig Becker in a full-length Harvard Law Review article,
relevant for both its content and
its author. Parallel to Dubofsky, Becker argued that Tomlins
failed to appreciate internal
complexities of the labor movement and its responses to the
NLRA. Furthermore, although

agreeing that the New Deal ‘was hardly an unalloyed victory for
unions,’ Becker chided
Tomlins for dismissing ‘far too hastily the rights the NLRA
afforded labor.’
4
Given
Becker’s recent position on the NLRB (as an Obama recess
appointee loudly condemned
by the Republican right), a careful read of his reaction to The
State and the Unions should
prove valuable for those who are monitoring the actions of the
Board a quarter of a century
later.
Indeed, even those of us who praised Tomlins in the mid-1980s
have cause to re-
evaluate the efficacy of his damning of the NLRA. Vinel
captures this revised perspective
in his thoughtful essay when he notes, ‘Thirty years of
conservative rule have
fundamentally changed the debate on the merits of the system
created by the pluralists of
the 1930s.’ The New Deal may have done less to create a just
society than recalled by
champions of Franklin Delano Roosevelt among historians and
labor relations academics,

but it most certainly offered more to workers and unions that
the current neoliberalism that
dominates the thinking and policies of both major political
parties. To fully appreciate how
a recasting of Tomlins may make sense in light of what has
transpired over the succeeding
quarter century, we need to go beyond Vinel’s rendering and
consider developments in
union strategy and practice, including the push for labor law
reform that has dominated the
political agenda of unions since before the Reagan era.
Union transformation: the search for a militant working class
As if on cue from Tomlins and the publication of his book, 1985
was a pivotal year for the
labor movement with the release of the American Federation of
Labor – Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO’s) blueprint for
revitalization, The Changing Situation
of Workers and Their Unions. The culmination of a strategic
planning process that
involved the presidents of most major unions, The Changing
Situation, offered five sets of
recommendations, two of which are relevant here: increase

member participation/activism
and improve organizing methods.
5
Initiatives to address members’ apathy were initially framed as
internal organizing,
then later as the organizing model that was contrasted with the
servicing model, or the
traditional insurance agent approach to union representation.
6
Most unions endorsed the
organizing model at least rhetorically, and several initiated
broad-based efforts to inspire
activism and militancy. For example, the Communications
Workers of America devoted
considerable resources to a mobilization structure that increased
member involvement in
both workplace actions and coalitions with other unions and
community organizations.
7
Similarly, the Service Employees International Union (SEIU)
designed a contract
campaign framework to increase militancy during contract
negotiations,
8
and encouraged

locals to experiment with approaches to implement the
organizing model in all aspects of
their work.
On the external organizing front, the AFL-CIO created the
Organizing Institute (OI) to
recruit, train, and place union organizers. The OI adopted a
grassroots style that paralleled
R.W. Hurd194
the mobilization efforts being developed to increase member
activism. This bottom-up
organizing contrasted with the traditional method of selling
union representation to
prospective customers. By the mid-1990s there were hundreds
of OI trained organizers
working in the labor movement, and the OI method of member
recruitment was accepted
as the preferred ‘model’ of organizing. Perhaps because of the
parallels to the mobilization
of current members being promoted simultaneously, it became
common for those in union
circles to refer to the OI style as the organizing model. Thus,
for the past 15 plus years, the

term has been used indiscriminately to refer to both internal and
external organizing with
an activist core.
9
In spite of nearly a decade of concerted efforts to build an
activist culture, union
density continued to decline into the mid-1990s. Frustration
among the more engaged
elements of the labor movement culminated in a successful
effort to oust long time
President Lane Kirkland and elect a new slate of AFL-CIO
officers in 1995: John
Sweeney, Richard Trumka, and Linda Chavez-Thompson. This
‘New Voice’ team
promised to ‘organize at a pace and scale that is
unprecedented.’
10
Under the strategic
guidance of Richard Bensinger, who moved from the OI to
become Organizing Director, a
blueprint for growth was adopted and vigorously promoted as
‘Organizing for Change,
Changing to Organize.’
11

These efforts at revitalization are relevant to an assessment of
Tomlins’ enduring
contribution because they offered the potential for radical
change in organized labor even
within constraints of the NLRA framework. Indeed specific
unions and groups of unions
began to look tantalizingly like a left, militant labor movement.
Many of us in scholarly
circles reported, analyzed, and hailed the transformation in
progress as the beginning of a
new social movement unionism, or social justice unionism.
12
The enthusiasm was never fully justified. It became clear within
relatively few years
that the internal application of the organizing model was
proving to be difficult except
during the period immediately preceding the expiration of a
collective bargaining
agreement. Even then, mobilization required careful planning
and intense efforts by staff
and elected leaders. Burnout was a common problem, and rank-
and-file enthusiasm was
difficult to sustain. It seemed that union members did not have a
taste for perpetual

warfare, preferring stability rather than class struggle.
13
External organizing seemed to offer more potential, especially
with enthusiastic
leadership from John Sweeney and the AFL-ICO. But the
Changing to Organize agenda
included not only a grassroots approach (which proved
threatening to elected leaders at the
local level) but also a substantial shift of resources. Individual
national unions were happy
to proclaim support for the organizing priority, but union
officers jealously guarded their
authority over resource allocation, organizing strategy, target
selection, and all decisions
regarding coordination with other unions. Efforts by the AFL-
CIO to take the strategic
lead and build a movement wide growth agenda were effectively
rejected.
14
The end result was continued decline, and growing frustration
among those unions that
were most committed to the organizing priority. Dissension
came to a head in 2005 when
the SEIU led the exodus of six key unions from the AFL-CIO to
form Change to Win

(CTW). Some saw the new federation as yet another sign that
union revitalization was still
vibrant, and indeed for the first few years strategic coordination
among CTW unions
suggested potential vitality. But internal warfare at SEIU and
UNITE-HERE undermined
potential gains. Realistically, the split and subsequent events
merely sealed the fate of a
24-year failed attempt to transform and revitalize a declining
movement.
15
Labor History 195
Could labor’s failure to rekindle the flames of rank-and-file
militancy be blamed on the
strictures of law, and therefore be interpreted as a confirmation
of the durability of Tomlins
thesis over time? Perhaps but other factors were clearly also at
play. As Vinel reminds us,
many scholars have expressed doubts that there was ever any
real potential for a left-
progressive labor movement in the USA. For these skeptics, it
was not the law that de-

radicalized unions in the 1940s and 1950s; labor de-radicalized
itself. Similarly, over the
past 20 years the inability to overcome institutional rigidity and
build a more activist
movement is as much a sign of internal weakness as of external
constraints.
Unions and the law: labor’s campaign to restore the promise of
the Wagner Act
Vinel presents us with two complementary interpretations of
labor’s view of the law. First,
based on public posturing by two prominent labor leaders in the
1980s, Vinel asserts that
‘Tomlins’ conclusions gained particular favor. Second, Vinel
proclaims that in recent
years labor has pursued a ‘new progressive statist agenda’ with
its campaign for the
Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA). A careful review of
criticisms of the NLRB in the
1980s, and of the labor movement’s political program reveals
neither an embrace of
Tomlins nor a new progressive agenda.
Regarding labor’s supposed endorsement of Tomlins’ thesis,
Vinel relies on quotes from
AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland and United Mineworkers of

America President Richard
Trumka. Kirkland’s call for a return to ‘the law of the jungle’
(repeated several times during
the 1980s) should be interpreted in light of his reputation for
bombast and rhetorical flourish.
Samuel Estreicher and Matthew Bodie appropriately suggest
that Kirkland made this
proclamation ‘with tongue firmly implanted in cheek.’
16
Kirkland’s wrath was aimed not at
the law itself, but at the Reagan presidency (which he described
as ‘guided doggedly by myth
and fallacy’), and particularly at the decisions of the NLRB
during the Reagan years. As for
the New Deal, Kirkland was an enthusiast and particularly fond
of Senator Wagner.
17
Vinel’s claim that Trumka ‘rejected the Progressive ideal of
administrative
government through experts and agencies’ is also misleading.
Indeed Trumka did write
‘abolish the Act’ in a law review article, but as with Kirkland
this was to drive home his
criticism of the Reagan NLRB. In the same article he was
explicit about this distinction,

arguing that ‘labor law has become a dangerous farce’ because
‘the National Labor
Relations Board has transformed itself under Ronald Regan into
an active and conscious
proponent of the destruction of unions.’ In contrast, he praised
NLRB decisions during the
Ford and Carter administrations. It was the NLRB headed by
Reagan appointee Donald
Dotson that Trumka condemned, not the Wagner Act itself,
whose underpinnings he
described as ‘fairness, rights of employees, and collective
bargaining.’
18
As this brief review of the essence of Kirkland’s and Trumka’s
position regarding the
NLRA should make clear, labor did not accept Tomlin’s
perspective of the law as offering
a ‘counterfeit liberty’ that had from the outset put unions ‘on a
road of secular stagnation
and decline.’ Rather, organized labor’s official position (and the
personal views of most
prominent labor leaders) consistently has been much closer to
James Gross’s analysis: the
intent of the Wagner Act was frustrated by the Taft-Hartley

amendments, the politicization
of the NLRB, and substantial intervention into labor policy by a
conservative judiciary.
19
This perspective is even more obvious when we consider labor’s
efforts to reform the law.
Labor’s political program dating back to the Carter
administration is most accurately
defined as an effort to return to the original purposes of the
Wagner Act. In 1977, the
R.W. Hurd196
Carter Administration introduced a set of proposed amendments
to the NLRA that was
strongly supported by unions. The Labor Reform Act of 1977
would have accelerated the
representation election process, increased penalties for unfair
labor practice (ULP)
violations related to illegal discharge for union activity, and
provided for automatic wage
increases based on a Bureau of Labor Statistics index in those
first contract negotiations in
which employers refused to bargain. Testifying before the
Senate on behalf of the AFL-

CIO, Lane Kirkland expressed regret that the proposal did not
provide for the repeal of key
anti-labor provisions of Taft-Hartley, but nonetheless praised
the bill because it would
further ‘the effective pursuit of the basic purpose of the Act,
which is to assure the worker
the right to be represented.’
20
The bill passed the House but fell two votes short of the
super majority required to stop debate in the Senate.
Sixteen years later, during the Clinton administration, reform
again seemed possible
when the Secretary of Labor appointed the Dunlop Commission
(officially the
Commission on the Future of Worker–Management Relations).
Testifying before the
Commission, Lane Kirkland explicitly endorsed yet again the
‘policy embedded in the
NLRA,’ which he described as promoting ‘private dispute
resolution and labor-
management cooperation.’ He went on to complain that this
policy had been undermined
by Congressional amendments and ‘sixty years of judicial

interpretation.’
21
The AFL-CIO
submitted to the Commission a detailed set of proposals that
included repeal of many of
the provisions of Taft-Hartley, plus these familiar changes in
the representation process:
increased penalties for ULP violations during union organizing
campaigns, card-check
certification, and first contract arbitration.
22
Although the latter proposals were included
(in modified form) in the Dunlop Commission’s
recommendations, other aspects of its
final report were unsavory to the labor movement. This proved
irrelevant when
Republicans regained control of the House of Representatives in
the 1994 elections which
erased any chance of Congressional action. Ironically, the 1994
election defeat of labor-
backed candidates also paved the way for the ouster of Land
Kirkland at the AFL-CIO.
Labor law reform was not a priority during the early years of
the ‘New Voice’ leaders

at the AFL-CIO, who were convinced that aggressive organizing
could reverse labor’s
fortunes even given the weak protections afforded by the law
(especially with help from a
labor friendly NLRB headed by William Gould). But the
organizing program faltered as
noted, and by 2000 the pursuit of labor law reform was
renewed. Now the AFL-CIO
Secretary-Treasurer, Richard Trumka, became a leading voice in
the campaign. He argued
that in order to succeed with the organizing priority, labor had
to support the Democratic
Party: ‘We can’t organize new workers unless we are successful
politically . . . We should
and must win labor law reform.’
23
Although it had not yet been drafted, the 10-year
campaign for the EFCA effectively began with the 2000
presidential elections.
And what would EFCA have changed? Like the Carter
amendments, it was restricted
to securing representation rights; its provisions were similar to
Carter’s and identical to the
relevant portions of the AFL-CIO recommendations to the

Dunlop Commission: EFCA
would have eased union organizing by allowing card-check
certification to replace
elections in most cases, it would have increased penalties for
management of ULPs, and it
would have provided for arbitration of first contracts if
bargaining failed after certification.
These modest proposals, patterned after Canadian practice, were
designed not to replace
the New Deal framework but to improve its effectiveness. There
was not even an effort to
repeal the more pernicious provisions of the Taft-Hartley
amendments, such as restrictions
or secondary boycotts and organizing strikes and those
weakening union security.
Labor History 197
In contrast to Vinel’s presentation, then, the campaign for
EFCA did not signify a new
progressive statist agenda, but rather the continuation of labor’s
long-term acceptance of
the general framework of labor relations established by the
Wagner Act. Had EFCA been

enacted, some of the original promise of the Act would have
been restored and it is
possible that private sector union density would have increased
modestly, but the Taft-
Hartley restrictions on militance and state Right-to-Work laws
would have remained, as
would the inherent weakness in the duty-to-bargain provisions
along with employers’ right
to permanently replace striking workers.
It is worth noting that the Obama NLRB is endeavoring to
uphold recent member
Becker’s 25-year-old assertion that the NLRA confers important
rights for workers and
unions. New rules proposed by the board would speed the
certification process much like
the Carter bill of old, and are being vigorously supported by the
AFL-CIO.
24
Also the
Board’s decisions have tilted in labor’s direction (consistent
with Gross’s framework of a
political process), including a rebuke of Boeing for relocating
work from a unionized
facility in Washington to a nonunion plant in South Carolina.

25
But alas, labor had a
friendly board during the Clinton years as well, but was unable
to overcome internal inertia
and external economic hurdles to mount effective revitalization.
Does the law preclude a future for US unions?
With the failure of the campaign for EFCA and the continuing
decline of unions in the
private sector, the future of US labor appears to be bleak. As
one leading union strategist
proclaimed in a conversation with American Prospect editor
Harold Meyerson, ‘It’s
Over.’
26
Does this mean that the law as currently amended, interpreted
and applied dooms
labor to oblivion? It is easy to see how advocates for Tomlins’
basic analysis could make a
strong case that his original conclusions have stood the test of
time and have been
confirmed by the disappearing US labor movement. Indeed,
there is little doubt that in the
early twenty-first century any semblance of liberty offered to
the US working class is

counterfeit, much as Tomlins asserted regarding the New Deal
policies of the 1930s. But
the source of the contemporary fraud is the full set of neoliberal
economic policies, not the
narrow construct of labor law alone. Richard Trumka, now
President of the AFL-CIO,
explicitly recognizes the threat posed by neoliberalism, noting
that ‘Workers voices have
been silenced in the workplace.’ Although this recognition is
paired with an overly
sanguine portrayal of Roosevelt’s New Deal as ‘characterized
by imagination and vision
and a focus on the plight of the public,’
27
this is understandable given the dismal prospects
faced by the movement he leads. In reality, of course, unions
clearly share the blame for
their own decline, and the limitations of labor law (including
the Wagner Act and
subsequent amendments) have certainly contributed. But in the
current era it is
deregulation, global free trade, privatization, and financial
market speculation that have
combined to reshape labor and product markets, and thereby to

undermine the potential of
collective action and union power.
It is in this vein that Vinel’s most salient observations are
offered in his concluding
section regarding the ‘Right Nation.’ Neoliberal ideas with
roots in the Austrian school of
economics now dominate the thinking of the Republican right,
and inexplicably influence
even ‘left leaning’ Democrats and social democratic parties
globally. It is only in this
context that the EFCA campaign appeared to represent a new
progressive agenda,
although in reality it was little more that an effort to recapture a
semblance of what the
R.W. Hurd198
New Deal promised. In retrospect, then, the Wagner Act may
have offered a constrained
liberty, but that liberty was far more real than what seems
possible in the contemporary
political wasteland.
Notes on contributor

Richard W. Hurd is Professor of Labor Studies at Cornell
University’s School of Industrial and
Labor Relations. He works closely with labor organizations on
strategic issues including
organizational change, internal and external organizing, and
leadership development. A regular
contributor to labor relations academic journals, he also has co-
edited four volumes, three published
by Cornell University Press – Rekindling the Movement (2001),
Beyond the Organizing Model
(1998), and Restoring the Promise of American Labor Law
(1994), and one by Edward Elgar
Publishing – International Handbook on Labour Unions –
Responses to Neoliberalism (2011).
Notes
1. See for example this author’s modest contribution published
a decade earlier, Hurd, “New Deal
Labor Policy.”
2. Dubofsky, “Review of The State and the Unions.”
3. Gross, The Making of the National Labor Relations Board;
The Reshaping of the National
Labor Relations Board; Broken Promises.
4. Becker, “Individual Rights and Collective Action,” 684.
5. AFL-CIO, The Changing Station of Workers and Their
Unions, 23–4, 27–9.
6. AFL-CIO, Numbers That Count: a Manual on Internal
Organizing, 6–7.
7. Communications Workers of America, Mobilization to Build
Power.
8. Service Employees International Union, Contract Campaign
Manual.
9. Hurd, “Rise and Fall of the Organizing Model,” 194–6.

10. Sweeney, Trumka, and Chavez-Thompson, A New Voice.
11. AFL-CIO, “Organizing for Change.”
12. Turner, Katz, and Hurd, Rekindling the Movement.
13. Hurd, “Rise and Fall of the Organizing Model,” 199.
14. Hurd, “The Failure of Organizing,” 10.
15. Milkman, “Divided We Stand”; Hurd, “US Labor 2006,”
318–9.
16. Estreicher and Bodie, “Administrative Delay at the NLRB,”
87.
17. Kirkland, “The Class of 1930 Fellowship,” 6.
18. Trumka, “Why Labor Law has Failed,” 871, 874, 877.
19. Gross, “The Demise of the National Labor Policy,” 46, 47,
49.
20. Kirkland, Statement of Lane Kirkland, Secretary Treasurer,
1589.
21. Kirkland, “Statement of Lane Kirkland,” 9, 20.
22. AFL-CIO, Recommendations of the AFL-CIO, 6, 10, 13.
23. Trumka, “Building to Win.”
24. Greenhouse, “NLRB Rules would Streamline Unionizing.”
25. Johnson and Snell, “Sparks Fly on NLRB’s Modest
Proposal.”
26. Meyerson, “Labor’s Hail Mary Pass.”
27. Trumka, “The Crisis of Neo-liberlism,” 255, 264.
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