This document provides an overview of airport charges and regulations. It discusses whether airports face real competition or are natural monopolies. It examines how discounts and incentives offered by some airports to select carriers could affect fair competition. The EU Airport Charges Directive aims to prevent discrimination in airport charges. It requires charges to be transparent, non-discriminatory, and related to costs. The directive established independent supervisory authorities in EU countries to oversee compliance. Airport competition takes place through pricing and quality of services to attract airlines and passengers.
Development of lcc in poland after eu accession[1]kennethpkennedy
This document provides an overview of the development of air transport law in the European Union following the liberalization process. It discusses the three "Packages" of EU legislation from 1987-1992 that opened up the air transport market by deregulating fares, market entry, and removing barriers. The Packages established common air transport rules across member states and increased competition by allowing alliances and codesharing between carriers. This created benefits for consumers but also required new regulations on safety, technical standards, and slots to manage increased traffic at airports.
Will SES require a new legal framework by A. MasuttiALIAS Network
If you are interested in the topic please register to the ALIAS network:
http://network.aliasnetwork.eu/
to download other materials and get information about the ALIAS project (www.aliasnetwork.eu).
This presentation by Libor LOCHMAN, Executive Director of the Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies was made during the roundtable discussion on competition and innovation in land transport held during the 62nd meeting of the OECD Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation on 28 November 2016. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-and-innovation-in-land-transport.htm
This presentation by Professor Marco PONTI, Professor of Applied Economics at the Polytechnic University of Milan was made during the roundtable discussion on competition and innovation in land transport held during the 62nd meeting of the OECD Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation on 28 November 2016. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-and-innovation-in-land-transport.htm
This document provides a summary of a report on implementing a Variable Price and Attribute Transport System (VPATS). Some key points:
- VPATS aims to increase transport system efficiency and reduce social exclusion through advanced technology and new practices that provide more transport options tailored to individual needs.
- Practical barriers to implementing VPATS include operator reluctance to change, challenges integrating new technologies and services, and ensuring effective long-term management.
- The report outlines a scenario where VPATS is gradually implemented, starting with shared taxis and expanding to include buses. Initial funding from public sources could prove the concept and generate revenue to become self-sustaining over time.
- Key factors for success
The EPA agreement between Cariforum and the EU contains comprehensive rules on services and investment. It liberalizes over 90% of sectors for EU investment in Cariforum states and provides opportunities for Caribbean professionals to supply services in the EU. Notably, the EU has opened its entertainment services sector to CSS from Cariforum without quotas. The agreement also includes a protocol on cultural cooperation to facilitate movement of artists between the regions. While Cariforum's commitments are more limited in scope, most states have opened key business services sectors. The agreement establishes dispute settlement procedures for violations of commitments.
This document summarizes an essay that examines the evolution of the aviation sector towards increased competition among airports. It discusses how deregulation and the emergence of low-cost airlines has led to more efficient and competitive practices in the industry. However, some barriers to competition still remain, such as dominant hub airports controlling slot allocation, ground handling monopolies, and issues with air traffic control coordination. The essay analyzes these remaining obstacles that prevent the aviation sector from fully realizing the benefits of a contestable market structure.
The AIRPOL network was established in 2010 to facilitate cooperation between law enforcement units at European airports. It aims to enhance security at European airports through optimizing effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement, and contributing to a more harmonized enforcement approach. AIRPOL activities focus on three areas: airport policing, aviation security, and air border security. Its goals are to establish a functional network for information sharing, coordinate cross-border operations, and provide an advisory role. Key partners include the European Commission, Europol, Frontex, and Interpol. AIRPOL seeks to generate lasting added value in preventing and fighting crime in the European aviation sector.
Development of lcc in poland after eu accession[1]kennethpkennedy
This document provides an overview of the development of air transport law in the European Union following the liberalization process. It discusses the three "Packages" of EU legislation from 1987-1992 that opened up the air transport market by deregulating fares, market entry, and removing barriers. The Packages established common air transport rules across member states and increased competition by allowing alliances and codesharing between carriers. This created benefits for consumers but also required new regulations on safety, technical standards, and slots to manage increased traffic at airports.
Will SES require a new legal framework by A. MasuttiALIAS Network
If you are interested in the topic please register to the ALIAS network:
http://network.aliasnetwork.eu/
to download other materials and get information about the ALIAS project (www.aliasnetwork.eu).
This presentation by Libor LOCHMAN, Executive Director of the Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies was made during the roundtable discussion on competition and innovation in land transport held during the 62nd meeting of the OECD Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation on 28 November 2016. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-and-innovation-in-land-transport.htm
This presentation by Professor Marco PONTI, Professor of Applied Economics at the Polytechnic University of Milan was made during the roundtable discussion on competition and innovation in land transport held during the 62nd meeting of the OECD Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation on 28 November 2016. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-and-innovation-in-land-transport.htm
This document provides a summary of a report on implementing a Variable Price and Attribute Transport System (VPATS). Some key points:
- VPATS aims to increase transport system efficiency and reduce social exclusion through advanced technology and new practices that provide more transport options tailored to individual needs.
- Practical barriers to implementing VPATS include operator reluctance to change, challenges integrating new technologies and services, and ensuring effective long-term management.
- The report outlines a scenario where VPATS is gradually implemented, starting with shared taxis and expanding to include buses. Initial funding from public sources could prove the concept and generate revenue to become self-sustaining over time.
- Key factors for success
The EPA agreement between Cariforum and the EU contains comprehensive rules on services and investment. It liberalizes over 90% of sectors for EU investment in Cariforum states and provides opportunities for Caribbean professionals to supply services in the EU. Notably, the EU has opened its entertainment services sector to CSS from Cariforum without quotas. The agreement also includes a protocol on cultural cooperation to facilitate movement of artists between the regions. While Cariforum's commitments are more limited in scope, most states have opened key business services sectors. The agreement establishes dispute settlement procedures for violations of commitments.
This document summarizes an essay that examines the evolution of the aviation sector towards increased competition among airports. It discusses how deregulation and the emergence of low-cost airlines has led to more efficient and competitive practices in the industry. However, some barriers to competition still remain, such as dominant hub airports controlling slot allocation, ground handling monopolies, and issues with air traffic control coordination. The essay analyzes these remaining obstacles that prevent the aviation sector from fully realizing the benefits of a contestable market structure.
The AIRPOL network was established in 2010 to facilitate cooperation between law enforcement units at European airports. It aims to enhance security at European airports through optimizing effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement, and contributing to a more harmonized enforcement approach. AIRPOL activities focus on three areas: airport policing, aviation security, and air border security. Its goals are to establish a functional network for information sharing, coordinate cross-border operations, and provide an advisory role. Key partners include the European Commission, Europol, Frontex, and Interpol. AIRPOL seeks to generate lasting added value in preventing and fighting crime in the European aviation sector.
This presentation by André SCHWÄMMLEIN, Founder and Global MD of Flixbus was made during the roundtable discussion on competition and innovation in land transport held during the 62nd meeting of the OECD Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation on 28 November 2016. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-and-innovation-in-land-transport.htm
The Transport Code aims to regulate transport in a new way by promoting open and interoperable digital data, new services for customers, and new business opportunities. It serves multiple goals of the Finnish Government including building a digital business environment, more streamlined regulation, and reinforcing competitiveness. The Transport Code enables Mobility as a Service (MaaS) by removing barriers between transport modes, requiring open APIs and payment systems, and allowing comprehensive travel agents to integrate options and payments. It promotes competition by making essential data available to all operators and reducing red tape so services can develop according to demand.
Concession agreements and market entry in the containerbharath_krishna
This document discusses concession agreements and their role in facilitating private sector entry and investment in container terminal industries at seaports. It notes that concession agreements define the relationship between governments and private firms regarding the right to develop and operate port infrastructure. The dominant mode of private entry into seaport operations globally has been through concession agreements. The document outlines the procedures for granting concessions, including direct negotiations and competitive bidding processes. It also examines barriers to entry in seaport markets and how concession agreements have favored expansion by global terminal operators.
Assignment on legislations and ethics in travel and tourismSeemanto
This document provides an overview of legislations and regulations that govern the travel and tourism sector in the UK and EU. It discusses the legal framework, including various acts and conventions that establish carrier liability for passenger safety during air, sea, rail, and road transportation. Regulations address issues like disability access, package travel protection, emergency assistance, and facilitating travel within the EU. The document also examines contract law, consumer protection legislation, health and safety compliance, and the ethical responsibilities of tourism businesses to operate sustainably and with corporate social responsibility.
WNS Decision Point - Thought Leadership is connected to using your business experience and vitality to dependably react to the request of your planned intrigue gathering!
Governance and economics of the taxi industry with special reference to sydne...temptingmoney
The document discusses regulations and performance issues in the Sydney taxi industry. It finds that the industry is over-regulated, with restrictions on entry, fares, and operations. Performance is poor according to surveys, with high failure rates for passengers trying to get taxis. The networks control over 90% of the industry and extract rents, rather than prioritizing customer service. Estimates suggest deregulation could provide $265 million in annual net benefits through more taxis, lower fares, and better service.
This document discusses competition policy and regulation in the digital age in South Africa. It outlines the competition policy framework, including the Competition Commission Act and Electronic Communications Act. The Competition Commission and ICASA both have jurisdiction over competition matters in telecommunications, with the Commission addressing ex post issues and ICASA ex ante regulation. A precedent case found that the Competition Act applies to all economic activity, including in regulated sectors like telecoms. ICASA regulates mobile interconnection rates. While concurrent jurisdiction has generally been effective, some areas like broadcasting remain dominated by incumbents. Ongoing improvement is needed in competition and economic regulation.
This document discusses proposals to complete the opening of the European railway market through a "fourth railway package". It proposes strengthening the independence of infrastructure managers through institutional separation from transport operations. It also proposes fully opening domestic passenger rail markets to competition through open access rights and competitive tendering of public service contracts. This is aimed at improving competitiveness and efficiency in the railway sector to increase its market share. The social impacts are recognized and measures are proposed to facilitate workforce transfers between operators and address potential shortages due to retirements.
This presentation by Andrea Minuto Rizzo was made at the workshop on Competition in Publicly Funded Markets (28 February 2019). Find out more at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/workshop-on-competition-in-publicly-funded-markets.htm
This presentation by Lara Tobías Peña was made at the workshop on Competition in Publicly Funded Markets (28 February 2019). Find out more at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/workshop-on-competition-in-publicly-funded-markets.htm
This presentation by Andrea Minuto Rizzo was made at the workshop on Competition in Publicly Funded Markets (28 February 2019). Find out more at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/workshop-on-competition-in-publicly-funded-markets.htm
The document discusses Nottingham's workplace parking levy (WPL) scheme, the first of its kind in Europe. The WPL places a modest charge on commuter parking spaces to encourage more sustainable transportation. It has raised £25.3 million over three years to fund transportation improvements like tram expansions. The WPL scheme focuses on ensuring employer compliance through education and support rather than enforcement. It has achieved 100% compliance from liable employers.
Competition law-review 5 mar2010 eng julija-debora.cJulija Jerneva
The document provides an overview of recent competition law developments in the EU and Latvia in 2009. It discusses cases related to horizontal agreements, vertical agreements, abuse of dominant position, and mergers. For horizontal agreements, it summarizes the Akzo, Hoechst, KME Germany, and T-Mobile Netherlands cases from the EU and several Latvian cases. For vertical agreements, it discusses the draft EU Regulation and Guidelines and the Samsung case in Latvia. For abuse of dominant position, it analyzes the Microsoft, RWE, Rambus, Intel, and several Latvian cases. It also briefly discusses some merger cases and procedural issues raised by the Intel case.
Nowadays, the spread of digital platform is widely increasing due to the fact that these platforms connect demand and supply through traditional operators (taxi and ncc) and nonprofessional drivers, who use their vehicles to give a service.
This presentation shows the UBER situation in Italy and how the strong presence of this service has consequences in the regulation framework
Partners Rory McPhillips, Stuart Kennedy and Senior Associate Stephen Gardiner of the Aviation Finance and Transportation team co-author an article for Lexology Navigator - Aviation in Ireland.
The document discusses issues with Sydney Ferries' current state-controlled model. It has proved inefficient, costly to taxpayers, and reported persistent deficits despite subsidies accounting for over 50% of revenue. While the NSW government's franchise reform aims to address problems, it does not change the underlying structural issues of monopoly and regulation. The document argues that Sydney would benefit from a competitive ferry market that allows private companies to operate services without impediments like price controls or route restrictions. This would encourage innovation, cut costs, and end subsidies that see non-ferry users financing ferry commuters.
The document is a curriculum vitae for B. Thimma Reddy. It summarizes his career objective of contributing his knowledge to an organization's development. It then lists his skills and experience in film production management, including planning production schedules and budgets, location management, casting, and ensuring safety regulations are followed. His educational background includes a bachelor's degree in commerce and postgraduate diploma in taxation. He has over 10 years of experience managing production for film companies.
La naturaleza incluye todo lo creado de forma natural en la Tierra como seres vivos, clima y geología. Proporciona belleza paisajística y fenómenos climáticos que generan emociones. Nuestra vida depende de la naturaleza, la cual contiene ecosistemas acuáticos, terrestres, aéreos y marítimos, por lo que debemos cuidarla.
This presentation by André SCHWÄMMLEIN, Founder and Global MD of Flixbus was made during the roundtable discussion on competition and innovation in land transport held during the 62nd meeting of the OECD Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation on 28 November 2016. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found out at www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-and-innovation-in-land-transport.htm
The Transport Code aims to regulate transport in a new way by promoting open and interoperable digital data, new services for customers, and new business opportunities. It serves multiple goals of the Finnish Government including building a digital business environment, more streamlined regulation, and reinforcing competitiveness. The Transport Code enables Mobility as a Service (MaaS) by removing barriers between transport modes, requiring open APIs and payment systems, and allowing comprehensive travel agents to integrate options and payments. It promotes competition by making essential data available to all operators and reducing red tape so services can develop according to demand.
Concession agreements and market entry in the containerbharath_krishna
This document discusses concession agreements and their role in facilitating private sector entry and investment in container terminal industries at seaports. It notes that concession agreements define the relationship between governments and private firms regarding the right to develop and operate port infrastructure. The dominant mode of private entry into seaport operations globally has been through concession agreements. The document outlines the procedures for granting concessions, including direct negotiations and competitive bidding processes. It also examines barriers to entry in seaport markets and how concession agreements have favored expansion by global terminal operators.
Assignment on legislations and ethics in travel and tourismSeemanto
This document provides an overview of legislations and regulations that govern the travel and tourism sector in the UK and EU. It discusses the legal framework, including various acts and conventions that establish carrier liability for passenger safety during air, sea, rail, and road transportation. Regulations address issues like disability access, package travel protection, emergency assistance, and facilitating travel within the EU. The document also examines contract law, consumer protection legislation, health and safety compliance, and the ethical responsibilities of tourism businesses to operate sustainably and with corporate social responsibility.
WNS Decision Point - Thought Leadership is connected to using your business experience and vitality to dependably react to the request of your planned intrigue gathering!
Governance and economics of the taxi industry with special reference to sydne...temptingmoney
The document discusses regulations and performance issues in the Sydney taxi industry. It finds that the industry is over-regulated, with restrictions on entry, fares, and operations. Performance is poor according to surveys, with high failure rates for passengers trying to get taxis. The networks control over 90% of the industry and extract rents, rather than prioritizing customer service. Estimates suggest deregulation could provide $265 million in annual net benefits through more taxis, lower fares, and better service.
This document discusses competition policy and regulation in the digital age in South Africa. It outlines the competition policy framework, including the Competition Commission Act and Electronic Communications Act. The Competition Commission and ICASA both have jurisdiction over competition matters in telecommunications, with the Commission addressing ex post issues and ICASA ex ante regulation. A precedent case found that the Competition Act applies to all economic activity, including in regulated sectors like telecoms. ICASA regulates mobile interconnection rates. While concurrent jurisdiction has generally been effective, some areas like broadcasting remain dominated by incumbents. Ongoing improvement is needed in competition and economic regulation.
This document discusses proposals to complete the opening of the European railway market through a "fourth railway package". It proposes strengthening the independence of infrastructure managers through institutional separation from transport operations. It also proposes fully opening domestic passenger rail markets to competition through open access rights and competitive tendering of public service contracts. This is aimed at improving competitiveness and efficiency in the railway sector to increase its market share. The social impacts are recognized and measures are proposed to facilitate workforce transfers between operators and address potential shortages due to retirements.
This presentation by Andrea Minuto Rizzo was made at the workshop on Competition in Publicly Funded Markets (28 February 2019). Find out more at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/workshop-on-competition-in-publicly-funded-markets.htm
This presentation by Lara Tobías Peña was made at the workshop on Competition in Publicly Funded Markets (28 February 2019). Find out more at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/workshop-on-competition-in-publicly-funded-markets.htm
This presentation by Andrea Minuto Rizzo was made at the workshop on Competition in Publicly Funded Markets (28 February 2019). Find out more at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/workshop-on-competition-in-publicly-funded-markets.htm
The document discusses Nottingham's workplace parking levy (WPL) scheme, the first of its kind in Europe. The WPL places a modest charge on commuter parking spaces to encourage more sustainable transportation. It has raised £25.3 million over three years to fund transportation improvements like tram expansions. The WPL scheme focuses on ensuring employer compliance through education and support rather than enforcement. It has achieved 100% compliance from liable employers.
Competition law-review 5 mar2010 eng julija-debora.cJulija Jerneva
The document provides an overview of recent competition law developments in the EU and Latvia in 2009. It discusses cases related to horizontal agreements, vertical agreements, abuse of dominant position, and mergers. For horizontal agreements, it summarizes the Akzo, Hoechst, KME Germany, and T-Mobile Netherlands cases from the EU and several Latvian cases. For vertical agreements, it discusses the draft EU Regulation and Guidelines and the Samsung case in Latvia. For abuse of dominant position, it analyzes the Microsoft, RWE, Rambus, Intel, and several Latvian cases. It also briefly discusses some merger cases and procedural issues raised by the Intel case.
Nowadays, the spread of digital platform is widely increasing due to the fact that these platforms connect demand and supply through traditional operators (taxi and ncc) and nonprofessional drivers, who use their vehicles to give a service.
This presentation shows the UBER situation in Italy and how the strong presence of this service has consequences in the regulation framework
Partners Rory McPhillips, Stuart Kennedy and Senior Associate Stephen Gardiner of the Aviation Finance and Transportation team co-author an article for Lexology Navigator - Aviation in Ireland.
The document discusses issues with Sydney Ferries' current state-controlled model. It has proved inefficient, costly to taxpayers, and reported persistent deficits despite subsidies accounting for over 50% of revenue. While the NSW government's franchise reform aims to address problems, it does not change the underlying structural issues of monopoly and regulation. The document argues that Sydney would benefit from a competitive ferry market that allows private companies to operate services without impediments like price controls or route restrictions. This would encourage innovation, cut costs, and end subsidies that see non-ferry users financing ferry commuters.
The document is a curriculum vitae for B. Thimma Reddy. It summarizes his career objective of contributing his knowledge to an organization's development. It then lists his skills and experience in film production management, including planning production schedules and budgets, location management, casting, and ensuring safety regulations are followed. His educational background includes a bachelor's degree in commerce and postgraduate diploma in taxation. He has over 10 years of experience managing production for film companies.
La naturaleza incluye todo lo creado de forma natural en la Tierra como seres vivos, clima y geología. Proporciona belleza paisajística y fenómenos climáticos que generan emociones. Nuestra vida depende de la naturaleza, la cual contiene ecosistemas acuáticos, terrestres, aéreos y marítimos, por lo que debemos cuidarla.
Este documento presenta la estructura del modelo educativo Secundaria Activa. El modelo contiene materiales para siete áreas del conocimiento y orientaciones para proyectos pedagógicos productivos. Los materiales incluyen módulos para estudiantes y guías para docentes por grado. Los módulos contienen unidades con capítulos y temas, que abordan situaciones problema y conceptos clave. Cada tema incluye momentos de indagación, conceptualización y aplicación. Adicionalmente, se incluyen secciones transversales como "Entendem
El documento describe tres programas implementados en Yucatán, México para promover el desarrollo sustentable: 1) El Programa Premio a Yucatán Emprendedor que incentiva ideas innovadoras y nuevas empresas mediante estímulos económicos y reconocimientos. 2) Un programa educativo que fortalece la cultura ambiental a través de talleres y certificación de escuelas sustentables. 3) La Asistencia Jurídica al Pueblo Maya que brinda asesoría legal y apoyo a la población maya.
The document discusses the benefits of exercise for mental health. Regular physical activity can help reduce anxiety and depression and improve mood and cognitive function. Exercise causes chemical changes in the brain that may help protect against mental illness and improve symptoms.
The document summarizes a speech given by Augustin de Romanet, President of ACI EUROPE, at the European Aviation Summit in Amsterdam. He urged EU member states to implement the European Commission's new Aviation Strategy to take advantage of opportunities in growing aviation markets. However, he also warned that the strategy needs to address challenges to competitiveness within Europe, such as aviation taxes and airport capacity constraints. The director general of ACI EUROPE rejected criticism of airports from a new airline association, arguing that airlines under-pay for airport facilities and services.
UK Airport Competition_Published Article_57(2016) pp155-167__060816Ian Thompson
This document analyzes changes to the delivery of terminal air navigation services (TANS) in the UK using Porter's five forces model. It summarizes that the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has sought to create a competitive market for TANS to meet government goals. Recently, Gatwick Airport awarded its aerodrome control service to Air Navigation Solutions and Birmingham Airport decided to self-supply TANS, providing evidence that market conditions now exist. The document examines the competitive dynamics of the TANS market at the nine largest UK airports using industry data and interviews. Competition is intense among a small number of providers, and airport operators require services that optimize costs and provide greater value through performance alignment and integration with other functions.
This document summarizes the history of aviation regulation in Europe and Southeast Asia. It discusses:
1) How civil aviation was initially regulated through bilateral agreements between states after World War 2, with the Chicago Convention establishing state sovereignty over aviation.
2) How the European Union gradually liberalized aviation between member states through three "packages" from 1987-1992, transforming the sector from one dominated by state-owned carriers to a more competitive single market.
3) ASEAN's efforts to integrate its own aviation markets through the ASEAN Economic Community, seeking to follow the EU's example of liberalization to develop a single aviation market in Southeast Asia.
Alfredo Roma - addressing liabilities with rpasALIAS Network
The document discusses the European Commission's strategy and roadmap for integrating remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), or drones, into the European aviation system by 2016 in a safe and sustainable manner. It outlines the regulatory work plan, research and development needs, and efforts to address societal and ethical concerns like privacy. Studies have examined liability issues and insurance requirements for drones. The roadmap's annexes provide details on regulations, technology, and societal impacts, aiming to favor harmonization of rules across the EU to help the integration of drones.
Business advantages of the international railway law for railway undertakings...Ibrahim Al-Hudhaif
The document discusses the business advantages of international railway law for railway undertakings in the Arabian peninsula. It notes that a single legal regime established by the Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF) reduces administrative costs by around 10% by providing uniform rules for international contracts. These rules promote legal certainty and reduce legal costs compared to separate national laws and contracts. The Convention and its protocols establish standardized rules for relationships between carriers, customers, infrastructure managers and others.
This document discusses control over airport capacity between airlines and regional authorities. It explores the economic benefits of aviation and how airport capacity is constrained by demand. There are differing views between airlines, who want fair competition, and airports/governments, who want to influence capacity allocation. European legislation requires a level playing field, but some regional policies aim to influence which airlines can operate, going against this principle. The control over use of scarce airport capacity is an ongoing debate between prioritizing free market forces or regional economic interests.
This document discusses transport externalities such as congestion, accidents, and air pollution costs and proposes pricing policies to better align prices with real transport costs. It notes that these externalities currently cost the EU around 250 billion euros annually, with over 90% related to road transport. The document explores using price signals through measures like road tolls and differentiated taxes to reduce negative impacts while making the transport system more efficient and fair. It argues for a community-wide discussion to ensure consistency across policies set at national and EU levels.
Airports Of The Future Essentials For A Renewed Business ModelGina Rizzo
The document discusses how airports and airlines have traditionally viewed each other, but that a renewed business model is needed. Airports have historically seen themselves as providers of infrastructure to airlines, their primary customers, but now must see passengers as another key customer segment. As airports expand non-aeronautical revenues like retail, potential conflicts can arise with airlines over priorities. The renewed model maintains airports' core functions but views quality of service as an interactive process involving all stakeholders in service provision.
The report summarizes the Civil Aviation Authority's review of the implementation of European legislation on the rights of disabled and reduced mobility passengers in the UK. Key points:
- The legislation aims to provide comparable air travel access for disabled passengers as other passengers. It requires airports to provide free assistance during flights.
- Stakeholders had varying views on the impact, with some saying quality decreased as responsibility shifted to airports, while airports saw more consistent service.
- Between 2008-2009, around 1.75 million passengers or 0.8% of UK passengers used dedicated airport assistance required by the legislation.
matter how their mobility is impaired, they are treated equally.”
The report follows research carried out by Tourism for All, a British-based charity that specialises in travel for the disabled, that suggested travel companies are failing to serve the needs of disabled travellers.
A survey of its members found that 85 per cent of respondents did not believe travel agents understand the needs of disabled travellers. More than three quarters of those questioned said they did not feel they were catered for by high street agents.
The study analyzes the impact of low-cost carriers (LCCs) in the European aviation sector. It finds that LCCs have significantly impacted established airlines, major airports, and competition. Key impacts include a consolidation trend among LCCs; effects on regional airports; the need to monitor costs to understand LCC strategies; and questions around how primary airports will respond to LCCs. The study also examines issues like airport and airspace congestion. Overall, the growth of LCCs in Europe has led to both benefits like increased traffic and lower fares, as well as challenges around competition and infrastructure.
The document discusses new European regulations for private aviation operations. Specifically:
- New EASA regulations implemented in 2016 require that aircraft over 5.7 tons operate under either commercial (Part-CAT) or non-commercial complex (Part-NCC) regulations.
- Existing private operators will now need to comply with the more stringent Part-NCC regulations, which impose safety and maintenance requirements similar to commercial regulations.
- The new regulations aim to standardize aviation rules across Europe and improve safety, but will also increase regulatory burden and costs for private operators.
2013-09-13_LCGGS_CUSST_Leuven_EASA_Paper_Marciacq et al_finalJean-Bruno Marciacq
This document discusses establishing a regulatory framework in the EU for sub-orbital and orbital aircraft (SOA) development and operations, with a focus on the role of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). It provides background on SOA projects in Europe and the US. EASA's remit includes regulating aviation safety, and SOA could in principle fall under this. The document reviews relevant international law and outlines options for developing regulations to allow safe and environmentally controlled SOA operations in Europe.
Revenue management first appeared in the airline industry in the early 1980s. It arose from the need for accurate demand estimates and profit-generating resource allocations in a newly deregulated environment. We begin this program and this module with a look back at the main causes and consequences of airline deregulation in North America. We describe how the deregulated North American airline industry has encouraged a trend toward deregulation, or at least liberalization, worldwide. We then move on to introduce the basic concept involved in airline revenue management.
Evolving Airport Competition - Competition & Pricingkopila
The presentation shows the competition that evolves between neighbouring airports. It also examines the strategies which airport operators can adopt to make the airport more competitive for their businesses. The second part deals with User Development Fee (UDF) pricing and application of crystal ball simulation on UDF.
The document discusses building airport infrastructure in Central Europe through public-private partnerships (PPPs). It notes that Central Europe has strong growth potential as an air travel market but lacks sufficient airport infrastructure. PPPs can help raise necessary private funds and expertise to develop new airports if risks and rewards are fairly allocated between public and private partners based on realistic traffic forecasts in a tailored business plan. A case study examines a proposed PPP to develop a new capital city airport through a special purpose vehicle owned by both government and private investors.
The second volume of the airport policy report discusses how the interests of airports would be met under FAA Transformational Reform. Included is a discussion of funding and self-help options for the system of airports.
This document summarizes a journal article that investigates the pricing strategies of full-service airlines in the European aviation market in response to competition from low-cost carriers. The summary is:
1) Deregulation of the European aviation market in the 1980s and 1990s led to increased competition among full-service carriers and the rise of low-cost carriers.
2) Using data on fares from major European carriers, the study develops a model of airline competition under various market structures including low-cost entrants.
3) The empirical findings show that competition among full-service carriers reduces business fares more than leisure fares, while competition with low-cost carriers reduces fares more uniformly across
The document discusses the evolution of low-cost airline business models. It describes how low-cost carriers initially had significantly lower operating costs than traditional airlines by utilizing strategies like higher seating density, direct ticket sales, and eliminating in-flight services. However, increased fuel costs and competition have reduced the cost differences between airlines. Now many carriers utilize hybrid business models, and low-cost carriers are focusing more on factors beyond price, like partnerships and new services. The business models of both low-cost and traditional carriers continue to change as the airline industry dynamics shift.
Airport capacity in London (report by the London Assembly)London Assembly
The Transport Committee’s report, Airport Capacity in London, suggests existing airport capacity in London, including at Heathrow and Gatwick airports, could be used more effectively.
Airport capacity in London (report by the London Assembly)
Public law paper `q
1. 1 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
“Our role is to maintain and monitor a
framework in which fair competition can
flourish”
– Arthur LevittJnr
Do the discount of airport charges and other similar
incentives for a few select airliners at airports promote
anti-competitive conducts?
2. 2 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
Public Air Law
Effects of Airports Charges on Fair
Competition
Leiden University
Air & Space Law
Adewale Mobolai B. (s1779591)
3. 3 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
Abstract
This paper provides a comprehensive overview on airport
charges. Starting with discussion of whether airports are
natural monopolies or if they face real competition, It further
goes on to ascertain if the discounts and incentives offered to
a few select carriers on airport charges, most times to
prevent airport switching and further increase commercial
revenue as opposed to maintaining their dominant position,
affects fair competition and promotes anti-competitive
conducts. The directives enacted by the European Union on
airport charges will be reviewed and also the instruments put
in place by these regulations to curb or prevent anti-
competitive conducts.
4. 4 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
Table of Contents
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………….… 5
2. Airport Regulations……………………..…………………………..…………….. 7
3. Airport Competition…………….…………………….…………….…………… 11
4. Cases………….………….……………………….……………………………………… 15
6. Conclusion……………………..…………………………………………………….… 18
1.Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyse the effectiveness of the European Union
Airport Charges Directive (2009/12/EC) (hereafter "EU Airport Charges
5. 5 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
Directive") in dealing with possible discrimination in the airport sector in
relation to airport charges. It should be borne in mind that, from the onset and
for a long time, airports have operated as natural monopolies; this scenario
began to change with the deregulation of airports which has led to changes and
diversity in ownership models for European airports such as, privately owned
airports or a joint partnership structure between the government and private
institutions and also as a public company. This new airport policy has changed
the way airports relate to each other as well as their relationship with the
airlines, especially after the introduction of the liberalization of air services that
fostered competition in aviation and put pressure on the airports to improve
their performance
This has led to a sort of competition between airports as they have to compete
amongst one another on price and service quality in order to retain and attract
the traffic they need, as both airliners and passengers are now “footloose”,
which is not helped by the fact that over 60% of the European population live
within two hours’ driving time of at least two airports, aligned with the growth
in numbers of direct routes served by airlines, which provides higher consumer
choice.1
Airport competition is limited and probably distorted by the wide
range of regulations it is subjected to which include the regulations enacted by
the European Union aimed at levelling the playing field in the airport sector.
Airport charges are paid by airlines for the use of airport facilities.2
They include
aircraft landing, freight and other charges related to the use of airport
infrastructure such as runways and passenger terminals. Ultimately these
charges are paid, indirectly, by passengers and freight customers via the ticket
price or freight forwarding fee. Airport charging systems are in many instances
imposed or otherwise regulated by national authorities. Even where the
airports concerned are privately owned, the charges have to comply with the
rules by the authorities.3
Many airports offer discounts as an incentive to grow
their network and attract new airlines. Nonetheless, there are some situations
in which incentives can discriminate between airlines –
1 J. Wiltshire,IATA Economics Briefing No 11: Airport Competition, November 2013
2 Charges are levied based on the weight formula being Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW) as indicated in
certificateof airworthiness asa basisfor assessment.
3 European Union, Mobility and Transport,Air charges
<https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/airports/airport-charges_en>accessed 14th November, 2016
6. 6 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
when incentive schemes are not open to all carriers,
benefit only a limited number of users
And are funded by thoseairlines that do not benefit from them.
In such a situation, incentives and discounts distort competition between
airlines and are detrimental to users who do not benefit from them.4
Given the broad scope of EU Competition Law5
, the policy-makers in Europe
may choose either to impose a strict price regulation on the airports or simply
rely on the application of Article 102 when it is a dominant airport. Yet even
the application of EU Competition Law has to take account of the particular
features of the industry, such as issues related to market definition, the
countervailing buyer power of the airlines and the economic incentives
provided by the commercial activities in the airport area.
First the author examines how the European airport industry is regulated and
then goes on to describe how the airports compete and what kind of obstacles
may be hindering the competitive process.
2.Airport Regulations
Airport regulations were originally established in Article 15 the Chicago
Convention6
, in 1944, in the guidelines from the International Civil Aviation
4 IATA, Charges,Discounts and Incentives < https://www.iata.org/policy/Documents/charges-discounts-
incentives.pdf > accessed 14th November, 2016
5 European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioningof the European Union (13 December
2007) , 2008 O.J. C 115/47
6 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago,7 Dec. 1944) 15 U.N.T.S. 295, entered into force 4
April 1947,art15
7. 7 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
Organization (ICAO) laid down in 1947. The Convention's rules were binding on
the signatory states and governed sensitive areas such as discrimination against
foreign airlines, whereas the ICAO's rules concerned best practices and were
designed to provide a harmonious relationship between the airlines and
airports.
In 1974, ICAO’s document 9082/7 - Policies on Charges for Airports and Air
Navigation Services which contained the recommendations and conclusions of
the Council resulting from ICAO’s continuing study of charges in relation to the
economic situation of airports and air navigation services provided for
international civil aviation was published. States are encouraged to incorporate
the four key charging principles of; 7
Non-discrimination: Charges must be non-discriminatory both between
foreign users and domestic users and between any two or more foreign
users
Cost relatedness: The charge is related to all the costs of operating the
airport and its ancillary services. As a general principle it is desirable,
where an airport is provided for international use, that the users shall
ultimately bear the full and fair shareof the costof providing the airport.
Transparency: Airports should maintain accounts that provide
information adequate for the needs of both airports and users, and that
the facilities and services related to airport charges are identified as
precisely as possible, should publish their financial statements on a
regular basis, and should provide appropriate financial information to
users in consultations.8
Consultation with users: Consultation between operators and airlines
implies discussion of proposed charges, which should be notified a
minimum of two months before the increase is due to take effect. This is
not a negotiation, where no agreement can be reached by both parties,
airport operators are free to impose charges at the level they deem
necessary.
7 Prof. Dr. P. Mendes de Leon, Public Air LawReader 2016-2017,pg. 335
8 Guidanceon accountingcontained in the Airport Economics Manual (Doc 9562) may be found useful in this
context, although there are other approaches.
8. 8 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
Into their national legislation, regulation or policies, as well as into their future
air services agreements, in order to ensure compliance by airport operators
and air navigation services providers (ANSPs). The most recent of the above
document was published in 2012 and is the 9th
edition, which confirms a
constant effort by ICAO to review the document and keep it up to date with the
latest developments in the aviation industry. There may be separate sets of
airport charges for domestic and international flights at international airports
and domestic airports.
The European Union has traditionally been involved in airport policy, for
example, the Council Regulation (EEC) 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on Common
Rules for the Allocation of Slots at Community Airports and the Council
Directive 96/67/EC of 15 October 1996 on Access to the Ground Handling
Market. A need for a directive targeting airport charges specifically arose from
the existence of multiple frameworks applied in the different Member States
that could have threatened fair competition among airlines using European
airports.9
On 24 January 2007, the European Commission proposed an initial
legislative document whose purpose was to set up common principles for the
levying of airport charges at European airports under the form of a Directive of
the European Parliament and of the Council. The Directive 2009/12/EC of The
European Parliament and of The Council of 11 March 2009 (“The Directive”)
was established with explicit reference to ICAO’s Policies on Charges for
Airports and Air Navigation Services (Doc 9082).10
The final legislative act was
adopted on 11 March 2009 by the Council, which approved all amendments
voted by the European Parliament.
The European Commission initially proposed that the Directive be applied to
any European airport whose traffic is over 1 million passenger movements or
25,000 tonnes of cargo, or which accounts annually for more than 15% of the
passenger movements in the Member State in which it is located. But the
European Parliament and the Council decided to subject to the Directive all
European airports whose annual traffic is over 5 million passenger movement
9 ICAO CaseStudy on Commercialization,Privatization and Economic Oversightof Airports and Air Navigation
Services Providers,Directive2009/12/EC of the European Parliamentand of the Council of 11 March 2009 on
Airport Charges,28 January 2013
10 Like the ICAO, the Directiveonly sets out principles thatmust be embodied in national law.
9. 9 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
and to add the largest airport in each Member State.11
The Directive applies to
all airport charges apart from the provision of air navigation and ground
handling services which are already subject to Commission Regulation (EC) No
1794/2006 and CouncilDirective 96/67/EC respectively.12
The Directive looked to emphasizethe following points;
Prohibition of discrimination among airport users. This does not prevent
the modulation of airport charges for issues of public and general
interest, including environmental issues. The criteria used for such a
variation shallbe relevant, objective and transparent.
Charges must be set in Transparent fashion and must be open and clear
to anyone inquiring about the charge.
The level of airport charges may vary in accordance with the tailor-made
services provided and airport operators have access to them on a non-
discriminatory basis.
Member states must establish procedures for resolving disagreements
between the parties
EU Member states must establish an independent supervisory authority
(ISA) to guarantee the execution of The Directive once ratified into
national law.
The scope of Directive 2009/12/EC is restricted to procedural matters that
affect the economic regulation of airports
ISA functions have been granted to the national Civil Aviation Authorities,
which are already in charge of several aviation matters in Member States.
Some countries have instead granted ISA functions to existing independent
regulators (Belgium, Luxembourg) or competition and regulation commissions
(Netherlands, Estonia, Ireland). In Denmark, Finland and Sweden the national
transport authorities now have ISA functions. Finally in Germany, federal
governments retain competence over regional aviation and as such they have
been designated as the ISAs, while referring to the central Ministry for policy
11 Directive2009/12/EC was expected to affect 150 of the EU's airports by the time that it came into force
(Marques and Brochado,2008).
12 Security charges arealso beyond the scopeof Directive 2009/12/EC as they were the object of another
Directiveproposal in 2009.
10. 10 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
matters. In Italy, no ISA has been formally appointed – the CAA (ENAC) is
performing its functions temporarily as part of its regulatory activities.13
No
Member States have “established” an ISA ex-novo, but rather they have
assigned its functions to existing entities. The level of activity at ISAs has been
low, with respect to the specific functions contemplated by the Directive.
However several ISA representatives have been involved in consultation
sessions in their respective Member States. These meetings took place either
as part of the reformulation of economic regulatory measures in some Member
States (UK, Ireland) or as part of the annual consultation mandated by the
Directive (Czech Republic, Romania).14
3.Airport Competition
Competition, as defined by the OECD (1993), is "a situation in a market in which
firms or sellers independently strive for the patronage of buyers in order to
13 The European Commission recently issued a formal noticeto the Italian government for failures in
implementing the EU AirportCharges Directive(2009/12/EC). With infringement procedure 2014/4187 (still in
its pre-litigation phase) the commission contested the consultation procedurethat aimed to regulate charges
at five major Italian airports (Fiumicino and Ciampino in Rome, Malpensa and Linate in Milan and Venice
airport) through contractagreements between airportmanagement and the Italian Civil Aviation Authority
(ENAC).
14 S. Gleaves, Evaluation of Directive2009/12/EC on airportcharges 75 (2013)
11. 11 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
achieve a particular business objective, e.g., profit". Competition between
airports can take many forms but it ultimately occurs in two areas: pricing and
services. First, they compete to attract airlines; then they attempt to attract
other service providers that may or may not compete with their other services
(ground handling and commercial).15
In a report by ACI Europe, the following methods were listed as the ways which
airports compete amongstthemselves;16
Competition to attract new airline services (passengers and freight); by
stressing the quality of the infrastructure and the attractiveness of their
amenities to the passengers served by the airlines and also granting
discounts on the cost of landing and taking off. For example Brussels
citing Charleroi as their main competitor, Amsterdam citing Brussels,
Lisbon citing Madrid, Malmö citing Copenhagen and so on for new low
cost carriers (LCC)
Competition between airports with overlapping hinterlands; Airports in
the same cities, such as Heathrow and Gatwick which are airports
situated in London with a similar amount of time to be accessed by
passengers and similar costs.
Competition for a role as a hub airport and for transferring traffic
between hubs; this are airports that have a large amount of transfer
passengers.17
Other examples are Liège and Cologne competing to be the carrier hub for
express parcels; the Frankfurt Hahn and Stockholm Skavsta competition for
being the aircraft base for low-cost carrier as with Liverpool and Manchester;
Also Munich and other larger German airports competing to be the second hub
for Lufthansa - the list identifies alternatives open to the airline, whether or not
any formal competition by the airports in question took place. In fact,
Manchester Airport did not have the margin of unused capacity that might
15Dr. P. Morrell,Airportcompetition or network access? A European perspective (2010)
16 ACI Europe, European airports:a competitive industry Policy paper submitted by the Airports Council
International (ACI) Europe Policy Committee (2009)
17 The listis notexhaustive.In the book Airport Competition; The European Experience (2010), written by Dr. J.
P. Forsyth a longer listis given.
12. 12 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
have motivated it to seek low-cost airline services. The same would have
applied to Düsseldorf Airportin relation to Lufthansa’s second hub.18
Competition law can be broadly defined as the rules that guide the
Government's intervention to stop or prevent anti-competitive conduct and
preserve competition in the markets with the aim of enhancing economic
welfare. The way competition law is enforced is constantly evolving as it is
influenced by political, economic and institutional factors.19
When the EU Competition Law is applied to deal with an abuse of dominance in
the airport services, there is likely to be opposition to the Commission's
decision on the grounds that there already exists regulators established by
National law as directed by Directive2009/12/EC, with one of the aims being to
promote Fair competition and with the ability to permit or block a particular
form of conduct. This issue was addressed in the dispute between the
Commission and Deutsche Telekom20
(DT) in which the latter was accused of
adopting a margin squeeze system of pricing to the detriment of its
competitors. In its decision, the Commission found that the DT had abused its
dominant position by charging prices for access to its network that were even
higher than it charged to its own subscribers in the downstream retail market.
DT defended itself by arguing that its fees had been approved by the German
regulator and that any legal action should be taken against Germany under
Article 258, TFEU (formerly Article 226, TEC). The Commission was of the view,
backed by the case-law, that the "competition rules may apply where the
sector-specific legislation does not preclude the undertakings it governs from
engaging in autonomous conduct that prevents, restricts or distorts
competition".
The General Court upheld the Commission's decision by stating that DT could
only have escaped prosecution under Article 102 if the anti-competitive
conduct had been required by national legislation or if the latter had created a
legal framework which in itself precluded the possibility of competition. The
decision went even further by holding DT responsible for not correcting its
18 See Forsyth, supra note 17, at 16
19 G. Monti, EC Competition Law (2007)
20 Commission Decision N.2003/707/EC, OJ L 263/9 2003
13. 13 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
conduct when the German regulator had failed to recognize its anti-
competitive effects.21
Although the DT case has not received a final word from the ECJ, the Court is
expected to decide in favour of the Commission. This is due to the
constitutional status of the Treaty that gives competition provisions prevalence
over national law, even when the latter has been set out in response to an EU
Directive.
Article 102 TFEU(formally 82 TEC) describes an abusivedominant position;
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market or in a
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may
affect trade between Member States.
In the United Brands v. Hoffmann-La Roche case(1978), the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) offers definitions of a ‘‘dominant position’’ and of the ‘‘abuse’’ of
such a position, which are still used today;
“[A] position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective
competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an
appreciableextent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers”
In the ECJ’s decision, dominance is defined as the power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of the behaviours of others. However,
European competition law does not impose sanctions on the dominant position,
per se, but only its abuse.22
In the same case the ECJ portrayed abusive conduct
as behaviour which, through recourse to methods different from those which
condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of the
transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the
maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the
growth of that competition. Although Article 102 provides some examples of
abuses, the list is not exhaustive.
For the liability conditions of Article 102 TFEU to apply, the airport must have a
substantial share of the internal market. The General Court ruled in Aéroports
21 CaseT-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission,C 128, 29, 24/05/2008, Paragraph 86
22 The ECJ confirms a findingthat an undertaking has a dominantposition is notitself a recrimination butsimply
means that, irrespectiveof the reasons for which ithas such a dominant position,the undertaking concerned
has a special responsibility notto allowits conductto impair genuineundistorted competition on the common
market (NV Neverlandsche Banden-IndustrieMichelin v.Commission,1983).
14. 14 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
de Paris (ADP) v Commission23
that this requirement should be assessed in
terms of the size of the undertaking and volume of passengers that use the
dominant airport in comparison with the airport capacity that exists in the
European Union.24
The first step in determining whether an airport has a dominant position is to
determine in which market, judged by its products and geographical
dimensions, its competitors are capable of promoting effective competition or
constraining the airport's conduct. Once the boundaries of this market have
been determined, it is necessary to calculate the market share of the
competitors to make a preliminary assessment of their degree of dominance.
The regulatory and competition authorities have relied heavily on examining the
overlap of arbitrarily-defined catchment areas to define the number of airports
within a certain drive-time.
As mentioned by the UK Competition Commission in its "Working paper on
market definition" (2009), the demand for airport services is derived from the
demand for air transport. Hence a change in price or quality of airport services
can affect the demand in two, possibly cumulative, ways:
By inducing a direct airline to replace its current airportwith another;
By affecting the airline's prices and indirectly inducing passenger to
switch to another airline and/or airport.
4.Case Law
23 CaseT-128/98 [2000] ECR II-3929
24 It should be mentioned though that a national courtor NCA is not bound by a previous findingof dominance
by the Commission
15. 15 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
A large part of case law in its application to airports has been based on State
Aid, such as State Aid No. C 12/08 (ex NN 74/07), Agreement between
Bratislava Airport and Ryanair; State aid No N 27/2008 – United Kingdom Aid of
a Social Character Air Services in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland
(prolongation of N 169/2006 and several similar cases, but the focus here will
only be on the cases where the abuse of dominance under Article 102 was
brought into question. Remarkably, there have not been many investigations
by the Commission aimed at revealing abusiveprices charged by the airports.25
In a case against Brussels-Zaventem Airport26
in which British Midlands Airways
complained that a discount system based on the volume of traffic, put the
small carriers at a competitive disadvantage and did not have any objective
justification. As part of their assessment, the Commission ruled that the
airways authority (the public body responsible for managing the airport and
setting its prices) was a public undertaking to which was given exclusive rights
under the provision of Article 106(1). In addition, the decision declared that the
airport's position as the eleventh busiest airport in the internal market in terms
of passenger movement and the fifth busiest in terms of freight made it a
substantial part of the common market. Having proved its undertaking liability
under Article 102, the Commission analyzed the following arguments brought
forward on behalf of the defendant:
the right of an undertaking to introduce a system of reductions as part of
its commercial policy,
the right to grant larger discounts to loyal customers, particularly in view
of the financial security they provide,
the economies of scale by which it costs less (in terms of administration
and staff) to supply services to a national carrier with a large volume of
traffic at the airport,
The airport is made more attractive when there is a national carrier
offering an extensive network of destinations (paragraph 16).
The first two arguments were rejected by referring to the "special
responsibility" doctrine (Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461,
25See Commission Decision SA.23324 —C 25/07 (ex NN 26/07),25/07/12
26 Commission decision 95/364/EC OJL 216, 12/09/1995
16. 16 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
paragraph 57) that the dominant undertaking must not to impair competition
even further (as had been the case with regard to the loyalty-inducing rebates).
The Commission argued that the defendant had failed to prove that there were
economies of scale since the services provided were the same, regardless of
how often they were supplied and it dismissed the idea that the concentration
of flights by the national airline would have the effects that had been alleged.
In assessing the merits of the case, the Commission interpreted the
undertaking's conduct as demonstrating discriminatory abuse and following the
reasoning adopted in the Corsica Ferries II (Case C-18/93 [1994] ECR I-1783),
decided that, by acting through an intermediary, The Kingdom of Belgium had
benefited the national airline. The discount system was found to be in breach
of Articles 102 and 106(1), formerly Articles 86 and 90 (1) of the EC Treaty.27
On a national level, price undercutting has been found by an investigation
carried out at Stansted airport28
. Luton airport made a complaint to the British
regulator (CAA) that Stansted was levying very low charges and this caused
Ryanair to transfer its services. Stansted confirmed that the charges were
below its costs but justified its conduct on the grounds that the airport was
relatively new and was still seeking to recover its initial operating costs. It also
argued that the airport's revenues were still above the average avoidable costs
and thus it could not be accused of being engaged in predatory pricing. After
examining the Stansted figures, the CAA admitted that discounts were below
costs and could not be matched by Luton. However, the regulator found itself
in a situation where it was bound by the airports policy (which allowed an early
expansion of Stansted) and stated that:
"Luton has been materially harmed but that harm stems from the Government's decision in 1985 that
the next significant tranche of airport capacity to serve the South-East should be at Stansted ... For the
Authority to find that the policies Stansted has pursued…. should be inhibited or reversed because of
their effect on Luton would be tantamount to saying that the decision to develop Stansted was wrong"
(paragraph 61).29
In the end, the CAA concluded that no remedy was feasible under its statutory
discretionary powers to impose a price monitoring framework on the airport.30
27 See Commission Decision 1999/199/EC OJL 069, 16/03/1999 0031-0039
28 It was a sector-specific investigation as theCAA does not have the power to enforce EU Competition Law
29 D. Starkie,Testing the Regulatory Model: The Expansion of Stansted Airport 397 (2004)
30 See S.41(3)(c) of the Airports Act (1986)
17. 17 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
Unfortunately, the case was not analysed by the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission (the predecessor of the Competition Commission) and there was
no additional information available to verify whether or not the airport had
been guilty of predatory pricing.
5.Conclusion
In 2013 the Commission carried out a study and subsequently presented a
report in 2014 on the application of the Airport Charges Directive by the
Member States. In this report the Commission noted that whilst some
18. 18 | s 1 7 7 9 5 9 1
positive results can be identified in terms of increased transparency of
airport charges, more needs to be done to ensure the consistent application
of the Directive in the EU. It should be understood that though this
directive has made some improvements, it still isn’t yet as effective as
airliners are still complaining about the charging powers of the major
airports such as the UK’s Heathrow Airport, which has some of the highest
charges globally, upset airlines with plans to raise charges per passenger
from GBP21.96 to GBP27.30 over a five-year period (almost 6% over
inflation), which it claimed to be necessary to support its ongoing GBP3
billion investment programme. Those charges paid by airlines constitute
the biggest single source of income for Heathrow Airport, raising GBP1.3
billion for Heathrow in 2012. 31
The above is to the detriment of airports in the same catchment area with
Heathrow, such as Gatwick Airport and Stansted, as they are restricteed by
the Directive and ISA’s from also increasing their airport charges which
creates an unfair market for them as they cannot grow economically with
preference being given to the main airport. Amongst other reforms, it is
advised that the commission should move its focus to the largest Airports in
a catchment area, as it is definitely clear airports are no longer natural
monopolies, so as their business does not kill the growth of the smaller
Airports who are restricted from increasing charges and thus cannot
improveservicesbeing provided by them to airliners.
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31 CAPA Centre For Aviation, Airport charges:EC reports increased transparency in settingcharges,but uneven
implementation < http://centreforaviation.com/analysis/airport-charges-ec-reports-increased-transparency-in-
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