PSC 497---THESIS PAPER

ISIS and the Use of Twitter to Network Terrorists
PSC 497 Senior Thesis Paper
Professors Gelbman and Hoerl
By Nash Jones

ISIS and the Use of Twitter to Network Terrorists
Introduction
The past fifteen years have led to an increased amount of globalized interconnection via
the internet. Much of this connection has taken place in the form of social media websites, such
as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. Most of the time, these websites are used for benign
purposes, such as keeping in contact with friends from high school or watching the latest video
of cats doing ridiculous things. However, there is also a dark side to the development of online
social environments. These same websites have become recruiting grounds for violent terrorist
extremists. ISIS has become one of the boldest users of social media, often targeting young
women and socially isolated men to use as agents of violence and destruction. The question is,
then, how is ISIS utilizing Twitter to spread its influence globally?
This paper will attempt to explain how ISIS uses Twitter specifically to both recruit new
users and to network with current ones. Twitter, with its limited character count, is strangely a
very active site for ISIS supporters. Although it can only be used to convey short public
messages, it can be used to send longer private ones, and also happens to work well with smart
phones, allowing agents to work from anywhere. Original research was done over the course of
two months to gather profile information on obvious supporters of ISIS based on media and
tweet content. Profiles were analyzed for pictorial support of ISIS, such as pictures depicting
Christians and non-violent Muslims being burned alive, beheaded, or shot, or for pro-ISIS tweet
content, such as open support for jihadists or the caliphate. Further methodology will be
explained later on in this paper. After going over existing literature and news articles pertaining
to ISIS and social media, I will focus on the different factors that contribute to marking a profile
as one that supports ISIS. I will then present a statistical analysis of my findings in regard to user
language, presence and type of multimedia, and number of followers and whether or not they are

significant. Finally, I will present some possible explanations for trends in ISIS profiles and
posts.
Literature Review
Earlier this year, the Brookings Center for Middle East Policy conducted research of a
similar nature on how ISIS networked over Twitter1. Similarly to the project to be presented in
this paper, they measured activity by number of tweets, followers, and number of accounts the
user was following. Their determining criteria for ISIS support was whether or not a user
followed and was being followed by a confirmed ISIS supporter. By starting with a large dataset,
they were able to narrow their sources down from nearly 50,000 accounts to 454 active accounts.
This was done to filter out inactive accounts, accounts for research purposes, and accounts that
were primarily spam. After this, they coded profiles at different levels, with open supporters
being Level 1, and those who followed these profiles but weren’t obvious supporters being Level
2. Their final method to determine support was the use of social nodes, in which groups of
profiles followed each other in an obvious manner. Their results showed that, although Twitter
had suspended a large number of profiles, ISIS still had a large presence on the site, and could
quickly replace banned profiles.
Shortly after the Brookings study was completed, a mass purging of ISIS Twitter
accounts occurred. When this happened, many of the hashtags that were used previously were
dropped in order to avoid drawing further attention to the users. My study differs from Brookings
in that it highlights changes in the way ISIS is currently recruiting, and what words they are
using to tag their messages since the earlier purge. Due to the purges, there are fewer ISIS
accounts with mass followers. Instead, the networks have grown more interconnected, with
potential leaders setting their security to private, preventing the gathering of information by
1 Berger, JM; Morgan, Jonathan; The ISIS Twitter Census, Brookings Institute.March 2015.

outside sources. Additionally, my study does not discount accounts that do not make frequent
public posts as “dead”, due to the fact that these accounts may still be sending private messages.
In addition to being a good source on how Twitter has affected political life in the Middle
East, “Twitter and the Middle East” by Ali Oğuz Diriöz sheds some light on why Twitter is
particularly active in Turkey, as well as the role it has played in Middle Eastern politics and what
ISIS may have learned from it. Twitter played a significant role in protests in both Iran, after the
re-election of President Ahmadinejad, as well as in the uprisings in Egypt and surrounding areas
that would become the Arab Spring2. The Middle East, and Turkey especially, has a large and
growing number of active Twitter users, due to such events as the Gezi Park Protests3. In
addition to explaining the reason for the high amount of Turkish profiles collected for my study
that support ISIS (22% of those sampled), it also explains why ISIS is so prominent on Twitter.
By using systems of communications that have proved reliable in the past at reaching mass
numbers of Arabs and similar groups, as well as many non-arabs in Western countries, ISIS can
rapidly spread its message to young, active, and radical potential recruits.
In July 2015, Ryan Reilly of the Huffington Post wrote an article titled, “If You’re
Trying to Join ISIS Over Twitter, the FBI Probably Knows About It”4. The article focuses on
counterterrorism efforts to control the spread of ISIS propaganda and influence over Twitter.
ISIS’ use of Twitter is exactly the reason Twitter is so successful: it allows for the rapid spread
of ideas to users all over the world. Contact between recruit and recruiter usually begins by the
recruit seeking out and following and ISIS contact. After that, direct messaging often makes it
difficult to determine who is communicating with whom. It is possible for the government to
obtain access to this information. The FBI is trying to slow this spread by cutting off supporters’
2 Diriöz,Ali Oğuz; “Twitter and the MiddleEast.”. MiddleEastern Analysis.Online.2013 Issue.Page6.
3 Diriöz,Ali Oğuz; “Twitter and the MiddleEast.”. MiddleEastern Analysis.Online.2013 Issue.Page 7.
4 Reilly,Ryan; “If You Are Trying to Join ISIS Over Twitter, the FBI Probably Knows About It.” Huffington Post.
7/9/15

profiles, especially those of confirmed supporters. This article forms the basis for studying how
networks of ISIS sympathizers and supporters form and connect. If several people follow the
same people and all or most exhibit signs of ISIS support along with the common follower, it can
be assumed that the person they have in common acted as their recruiter. This study attempts to
use a method similar to the ones the previously used by the FBI and reporters to determine ISIS
networks by looking at what will be referred to as “Follow X” trails to look at how networks are
formed amongst agents.
Alternatively, there are some who believe that suspending ISIS accounts is counter –
productive and ineffective. Eliyahu Federman of Fox News, in his article “Don’t suspend ISIS
Twitter accounts”5, says that suspending accounts can be harmful to open source intelligence
gathering, depriving governments of easy information as well as keeping ISIS atrocities from the
public. He goes on to say that State Department and FBI counterterrorism units are working to
use these sources of information to search for ISIS supporters and target their training camps and
bases. These same sources have helped to thwart several attempted and planned terrorist attacks
here in the United States. By keeping these sources open and in a false state of security,
counterterrorism units are able to more easily keep track of terrorist activities. The Federman
article presents a different explanation for the value of following chains and networks on Twitter,
and discusses the value that might be presented if Tweets are translated and accounts are closely
monitored.
Interviews and case studies, such as “Alex” from the New York Times article, “ISIS and
the Lonely Young American” by Rukmini Callimachi, indicates that ISIS recruiters often use
social media to target lonely or introverted Americans6. Alex, a resident of rural Washington,
had few actual friends, no boyfriend, and little social interaction outside of work and home. By
5 Federman, Eliyahu;“Don’t Suspend ISIS Twitter Accounts”. FoxNews.com. 3/29/2015.
6 Callimachi,Rukimini;“ISIS and the Lonely Young American”. New York Times. 6/28/15

building a relationship with Alex, her recruiter was able to convert her from a devout Christian to
a radical Muslim. She was prepared to meet her recruiter friend in Austria when her grandparents
intervened. Even after her intervention, and subsequent investigation by the FBI, she continued
to keep in contact with her ISIS friend. The article reveals that recruiters actively try to keep their
converts from being open about their conversion. Additionally, there is little physical outreach,
instead encouraging their recruits to meet them in foreign destinations.
ISIS also uses social media to present the life style as a jihadist or mujahideen as
adventurous, lavish, or as a way to give life meaning. The article “How the World's Most
Dangerous Group Uses Social Media” by Jason Hahn, gives evidence to this7. YouTube videos
and pictures on Twitter are used to show potential recruits the “wonderful and fulfilling” lifestyle
that ISIS offers them. Generally, these same recruits have leadership potential, a stable family,
and good interpersonal skills, although ISIS is not above using “lone wolf” types to carry out
acts of violence. In this study, I have used media presence other than Tweets, such as embedded
YouTube videos, as a factor in determining the effectiveness of ISIS’ Twitter campaign. Earlier
studies, such as those done by Brookings, focused primarily on the number of Tweets and verbal
content rather than potential multimedia content.
Jared Cohen’s article in the November/December issue of the journal Foreign Affairs
nicely summarizes some of the more detailed points of ISIS’ use of cyberspace to conduct
terrorism and recruit perspective soldiers. Mass networks of online agents disseminate
information from a central command through both human-run accounts and bot accounts, which
can be programmed to tweet certain pieces of information8. Some of these agents may not even
live in Syria or the Middle East, but can spread radical propaganda from anywhere in the world
with a free internet connection. Cohen suggests that only strategically important Twitter accounts
7 Hahn, Jason; “How the World’s Most Dangerous Group Uses Social Media.”Complex.com. April 2015.
8 Cohen, Jared; “Digital Counterinsurgency:How to Minimalizethe IslamicState Online”.Print. Foreign Affairs
November/December 2015.Page 53.

should be suspended9. Additionally, a media counter-campaign should be started to dissuade
potential recruits from lending their support to ISIS10. Cohen’s article demonstrates the
qualitative value we can assign to having a large number of followers.
Research and Methodology
The first step was to create a database of profiles to scan for content. The sample size was
capped at sixty profiles, both in the interest of time and in order to ensure the account had useful
information. The first sixty profiles found via a web crawling, or follower-to-follower, type
search to meet the selection criteria were the ones used for this study. Profiles that were reviewed
but not selected were rejected primarily on the basis that they did not substantially link the user
to ISIS. In some cases, profiles supported jihadist causes, but did not directly support ISIS. Due
to the fact that many of these groups are also hostile to ISIS, they were not included in the study.
Larger samples would inevitably include more parody accounts, independent researchers, and
news reporters than a well-investigated smaller sample.
When using the web crawling/follower-to-follower search method, it was necessary to
first start out by using past hash to see if they rendered any leads. When this generated only
parodies and news sources, it was necessary to try different hashtag searches until one positive
match was confirmed. After this, the search for ISIS supporters was conducted by viewing the
“followers” and “following” lists of a supporter and checking profiles on these lists for
confirming criteria until another confirmed supporter was found. The method of checking lists
until other followers were found continued to be used until a large enough sample group was
found to generate reasonably stable statistics.
Initial searches for #ISIS, #Caliphate, and #EyesOnISIS (taglines that were used by
9 Cohen, Page 55.
10 Cohen, Page 56.

Brookings Institute) proved relatively unsuccessful. These searches often brought up news
sources, independent tweets regarding news of ISIS, or parody accounts. Shortly after Brookings
published their study, Twitter worked with various governments to purge pro-ISIS accounts from
the website. This resulted in old hashtags being dropped and new ones created, in order to evade
detection. A switch to #Daesh, the Arabic word that ISIS uses to describe itself, met with one
suspect account that soon proved to be a trail to confirmed accounts. Later usage of #Baqiyah
also led to greater success and more hits.
A profile was considered to be confirmed as an ISIS supporter if it met one of three
criteria. First, if the profile picture of background picture included the ISIS flag, pictures of anti-
ISIS forces being burned, mutilated, or beheaded; or pictures of well-known ISIS leaders, then it
was considered a confirmed supporter. If pictures were not present, the second step was to gather
rough translations of profile names or tweets. References to the caliphate had to be looked at
carefully, but often were in conjunction with praise for the rebellion in Syria, which pointed
towards pro-ISIS support. Other times, specific quotes could be picked out, such as, "Insults to
the mujahideen are among the signs of debauchery of man.”. These quotes, in addition to content
regarding hostility to Shiite Muslims, were usually enough to confirm an account as supporting
ISIS. Finally, should all of these fail to produce a confirmed hit, followers and accounts being
followed are checked for an usually large number of ISIS supporters. Five ISIS supporters being
followed, following, or a combination of the two was considered significant enough to mark
the account as confirmed. Accounts that were suspended during the study or marked “Private”
that met the first criteria were also considered confirmed.
After confirming an account, the content was analyzed for pro-ISIS material. Pro-ISIS
material took two forms: Humanizing and intimidating. Humanizing material is any kind of
picture, video, or quote that attempts to downplay the violent nature of ISIS. For example, one
profile contained pictures of a water conservation project being set up to help poorer members of

ISIS controlled territory. This was by far the rarer of the two types of media, although it is
potentially more important to the study. Beheadings and immolations are commonly connected
Caption: ISIS Water Conservation Project (Photo taken from Twitter profile. Source Unknown.)
to ISIS, and are likely only to attract violent extremists. Moderating media can portray ISIS as a
more humane state, thereby broadening their range of potential recruits. The particular account
that the picture above was taken from was suspended before the end of the study, confirming a
link to the Islamic State. Beyond being good press in a world hostile to ISIS, the humanizing
media also gives us a look into what the day-to-day Islamic State citizen is doing while the
military is at war. Not every citizen can be a soldier. Ordinary needs must be met in order
to keep the “state” from falling apart. At the very least, supply lines need to be maintained to
keep soldiers in the field able to fight. State capacity and infrastructure are necessary for the
continued function and attempted legitimization of the Islamic State.
Another kind of humanizing media is news regarding the Syrian immigration crisis. ISIS
has taken full advantage of the bad press behind the Assad regime and used it to their advantage.
A prominent picture that was featured on more than one profile was that of Syrian refugees being

welcomed into the borders of the Islamic state. The attempt to paint the IS as a noble and
welcoming brotherhood is likely to be of some influence to Muslims and refugees alike in
Europe, as the EU struggles to keep these same men, women and children out. With few safe
places to go, it is likely that refugees exposed to these images would consider defecting to ISIS,
even if it is classified as a terrorist state. It should also serve as a warning to these same
European States that if they cannot, or will not, take in those in need, somebody else will.
Caption: ISIS Welcomes Syrian Refugees of the Assad Regime (Photo taken from Twitter profile. Source Unknown.)
Other pictures that showed up involved condemning sending women into combat, as well as
results of Russian air strikes.
Violent or intimidating media is the norm of ISIS media. During this study, it was not
uncommon to find pictures of beheadings or immolations. Roughly 68% of all profiles surveyed
presented access to violent media in the form of pictures or videos. Much less needs to be said
about this media, although it still provides insight into the way that ISIS thinks. Violent displays
of aggression can be used to attract more radical Muslims, as well as the lone-wolf types
mentioned in other media. These are the fodder in ISIS’ metaphorical cannon, and can be some
of their most useful members in terms of deterrence of opposition.

Looking deeper than posts directly to Twitter, the next pieces of media to be analyzed
were links to external sites. Confirmed ISIS supporters frequently had links to YouTube accounts
that preached extremist Sunni teachings of various religious leaders. Occasionally, links would
lead to copies of videos of beheadings or executions. Much more commonly, links led to
Tumblr blogs, archive.org (an online archival website), or websites dedicated to promoting ISIS’
mission. This is an alternative to making information public and readily available to Twitter, and
can allow for access to greater amounts of information for would-be recruits. By simply
providing a link instead of full content, ISIS agents could also avoid detection from cursory and
random investigations. A picture of Christians being beheaded is an obvious link to terrorism; a
link to a non-descript website is not. By spreading ideas to different large websites, ISIS makes it
that much harder to trace and destroy all cached information. ISIS has also began using TOR,
which encrypts files, making them nearly impossible to access without a TOR reader. Out of the
entire sample group, only ten percent lacked any kind of embedded or linked media. Non-media
accounts averaged lower total followers. This will be explained in greater detail in the findings
section of this paper.
Moving beyond media content, an interesting finding was “Follow X” trails, in which one
user would create a list of other users and tell their followers to also follow users X, Y, and Z.
Occasionally, one or more of these users were suspended, leading only to a notification of
suspension. This method is less effective for recruiting than it is for creating an intricate network
of ISIS Twitter accounts. A Syrian refugee who defects to ISIS could quickly contact his cohorts
in France and connect them with the names of five other fellow jihadists. They also use these
lists to warn fellow jihadists about accounts that are government or independent plants. Doing so
can narrow the network to a more homogeneous set of users.
Language was also analyzed to determine the audience being targeted. Much like media,
language shows us who ISIS is targeting. For the purpose of this study, Arabic is included in the

data only as a point of reference. This way, we can look at what a profile targeting regional
jihadists looks like in comparison to one recruiting foreigners. Profiles that used multiple
languages were counted twice in the languages section of the database, as they could be viewed
equally as one profile of each language used. Profiles were given a number that corresponded to
their language for the purpose of simplification in calculation. The results of profile languages
will be shared in the findings section of this paper.
Example of a “Follow X” trail
There were two metrics which were measured but were not considered critical to this
study. The first of which was location. Location is only as trustworthy as the person posting it.
Twitter does not prevent a user from claiming to be in a false location, meaning that users could
claim to be in Syria or other territory claimed by ISIS without actually being there. Alternatively,
they could be tweeting from Syria or Iraq and claim to be in California. However, locations were
still recorded when reported.
The other metric that does not necessarily determine anything worth knowing is number
of tweets. Number of tweets can be used to tell the prevalence of communication, and if fully

translated, can tell us what kinds of buzzwords are currently being used to recruit new members
or inform existing ones. Assuming we are looking for quality of content, media serves as a much
more convincing source of information. Number of tweets looks only at the volume of public
updates displayed. However, this does not account for private messages sent to new recruits. An
intelligent high-level recruiter would post very few public Tweets to avoid attracting attention,
and have more public accounts refer new recruits to him. Private messages cannot be measured,
leaving us with without a way to tell which profiles are truly the most active.
Findings
The study produced some interesting results in terms of finding what draws a large
following. To begin with, the presence of media on a Twitter page, regardless of whether it is
humanizing or violent, will increase the number of followers on that page. Private pages, which
had no media visible to the public, and pages with only text had, on average, 208 followers.
Pages that had pictures, videos, or links to outside sources averaged 334 followers per page.
While the non-media profiles represented only 10% of the study, it would still make sense that
pages that don’t promote ISIS as enthusiastically would be likely to have fewer followers. Media
sources act as a sign of support of ISIS, as well as a billboard to promote its recent
accomplishments.
Surprisingly, profiles with violent media had significantly more followers than profiles
with humanizing media. As discussed earlier, humanizing media is any type of image that casts
blame on other countries or promotes the more civil, state-building side of ISIS. Profiles that
contained primarily this kind of media averaged 242 followers per page. This group represented
22% of the sample group, and was less common than violent media profiles. Violent profiles
averaged closer to 366 followers per profile and 68% of the sample group. This would lead a
rational person to believe that ISIS wants to promote its image as a terrorist state more than it

does the image of a rational and reasonable group of people escaping an oppressive regime. The
promotion of radical materials and images also leads to the conclusion that ISIS is more
interested in recruiting potential soldiers than it is in recruiting skilled laborers necessary for
state building.
Media Type Number of Followers Percentage of Sample Number of Accounts
Violent 366.435 68.33% 41
Humanizing 241.643 21.67% 13
None 207.833 10.00% 6
Table 1
Language choices also point to some interesting results. While English profiles had the
majority of the sample with 38.8%, French, Turkish, and Russian all enjoyed a decent
representation. Table 2 shows the percentages of each country, as well as the number of profiles
in which they are used. Note that if a profile contained two primary languages, it was counted as
one profile in each category, leading to a final count of sixty-seven profiles. Turkish and French
were the two next most commonly used languages. The explanation for Turkish is much more
obvious than the one for France. With ISIS encroaching on and seizing Turkish sovereign soil, it
is beneficial to try to reach out to Turkish Muslims who might be willing to defect to ISIS.
Knowledge of the area and people is beneficial to insurgent groups in plotting acts of violence,
and the best way to gain this knowledge is to recruit people who already have it.
Language Percentage Number of Profiles
English 38.8% 26
Turkish 22.4% 15
French 13.4% 9
Russian 10.4% 7
Other 14.9% 10
Table 2: Language Prominence

The heavy focus on English as a recruiting language can potentially be explained by both
American hostility to Islam, as well as its aversion to extremist ideology. Because of both of
these factors, much more time, energy, and resources must be devoted to recruiting English-
speaking Americans to their cause. More generally put, when recruiting Americans, the focus is
on quantity recruiters rather than quality. America, due to its status as a superpower of the
western world, has frequently served as a prime target for terrorist activity.
A significant portion of the sample also used Russian as their primary outreach language.
Russian-speaking former Soviet states, such as Chechnya, Georgia, and the Republic of
Ingushetia, all have high percentages of Muslim population. Recent Russian air strikes on Syria
could create a surge of Russian speaking profiles, as both a way to recruit radicals in border
states, as well as to spread ISIS influence to a very anti-ISIS state. Additionally, one profile was
found for an ISIS supporter in Ingushetia. Russian law enforcement raided an ISIS cache in
Ingushetia earlier this year, which leads to the question of whether or not this user was
involved11. Russia’s pro-force methods of handling extremism also explains the need to expand
to fringe states with high Muslim population before going after the mainland. Border states with
high Muslim populations and low opinions of Russia are more likely to be sympathetic to ISIS
insurgents, and are therefore better forward operating bases.
What did not make as much sense, however, was the relatively high percentage of French
profiles. After cross-checking a list of French-speaking countries with the 2010 Pew Report12 of
Muslim population by country, the most obvious target would be northern Africa, which retains
French as a major language from colonial and also has a high Muslim population. Northern
Africa would be a strategic position for ISIS, due to its proximity to both Europe and the Middle
East. If ISIS took northern Africa, it would also have known-enemy Saudi Arabia flanked,
11 “8 Supporters Killed in N. Caucuses Special Op.”.RT.com. 8/2/2015.
12 MuslimPopulation By Country; Pew Research Center. Pewforum.org. 1/27/2011.

weakening its defensive position and leaving it more vulnerable to attack. This is particularly
dangerous due to Saudi Arabia’s oil deposits. If these fell to ISIS, it would give them oil for
use in war, as well as a powerful stake in world petroleum markets.
Recent events, however, create some secondary and more obvious arguments for why
French would be a particularly prominent language to use. Belgium, one of the more prominent
states in the European Union, has a large French-speaking population. According to some
sources, Belgium is also the primary European source of ISIS agents, producing more recruits
per capita than any other European country13. It is much easier and more convenient to recruit
Muslims who are already citizens of Schengen Area states—giving them free movement around
Europe—than it is to try to help a Middle Eastern agent gain access to Europe, especially due to
recent events involving the Syrian immigration crisis and the Paris attack earlier this year.
A third possible reason for the prominence of French is France’s strict laws on religious
symbolism and religion in politics. The French word “Laïcité” is used to describe the laws
banning religion from having any influence in political decisions. This is the exact opposite of
how ISIS has designed its state, since Sharia is based on the Koran. This makes France a prime
ideological target for ISIS, as it would see France as one of the worst offenders of what it
considers to be holy law. Because France also has one of the highest Muslim populations in the
European Union, it also could serve as one of the best recruitment areas14. Radicalization could
be a result of religious suppression created by the French government to, in part, control the very
movement it might be helping to create.
Finally, “Follow X” trails proved to be productive in forming networks, but also
productive in breaking them. For one particular profile in the study, the user posted twenty “X”
trails since April of 2015. All twenty of these trails had been suspended at the time of this study.
13 Belgium providingmost ISIS recruits per capita in Europe – UN. RT.com. 10/20/2015.
14 Pew Research Center; “5 facts about the Muslimpopulation in Europe.”. 11/17/2015.

These trails appear to create easy targets for anyone attempting to break the link between profiles,
although previous literature seems to suggest that recruiters try to connect on an individual
basis15, and then refer recruits to other agents via personal message or skype. These trails appear
to serve very little purpose unless they are taken to a deeper level. If fifty users start to follow a
user mentioned in a trail, and from the this account learns of a less conspicuous account that the
user actually conducts business from, the chain can remain unbroken. For purposes of alerting
fellow ISIS agents to fake accounts, however, the trails seemed to work quite well, although
there were few accounts to observe that had used this method.
Conclusion and Discussion
ISIS has been one of the few terrorist cells to step out of the Stone Age and embrace
western technology, especially social media. It is well known by the global community that ISIS
has started to recruit via social media sites, such as Facebook and Twitter. By using Twitter as a
recruiting and networking tool, ISIS can go undetected among millions of users while spreading
their violent message globally. From the sample used in this experiment, we can be sure of a few
things. In order to determine what tools ISIS used to promote itself on Twitter, 60 profiles were
sampled and analyzed based on number of followers, language, and content. First, profiles with
non-text media incorporated into them attract more followers than profiles that only contain
tweets. This is most likely because pictures and videos act as good advertising tools and can be
the best way to attract non-Arab recruits. Second, violent media profiles tended to have, on
average, more followers than profiles that focused on ISIS’ positive qualities as a state builder.
People who want to join ISIS tend to be more violent or extremist in nature, reducing the appeal
of what a normal person would consider positive media. Third, language demographics indicate
that recruiters are focusing heavily on English speaking states for recruitment, but also have
15 Calimachi,“ISIS and the Lonely Young American”

vested interest in attracting recruits from Turkish, French, and Russian speaking states as well.
ISIS has a vested interest in extending its caliphate to the entire world, and can best do so by
targeting states that have high Muslim populations, such as Russian border states and northern
Africa.
By the end of this study, all but seven of the profiles studied had been suspended by
Twitter or shut down by the user. While this cannot prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that these
profiles supported ISIS, it does act as a strong sign that the profiles were promoting a radical
terrorist agenda. Normally, Twitter will not shut down a profile for free speech exercise, and a
government agent acting to intercept ISIS communication would probably stay active, albeit
while keeping a low profile.
There are a few topics that would be interesting proposals for future research. First, given
a larger database, it would be useful to see where the majority of recruits come from. While the
location on Twitter isn’t useful, GPS coordinates from phones could be used by higher level
researchers to determine where most recruits are posting from. Government plants who pretend
to be recruiters could keep track of where recruits claim to be from, creating an accurate database
of where recruits are coming from. This would address security concerns globally, as well as
regionally.
The other aspect that should be studied is how successful recruitment is from states with
censored or limited social media. Countries where Facebook and Twitter are blocked
superficially but can be accessed by proxy servers would be useful sample groups to analyze.
Censorship and fear of government-enforced punishment may prevent some potential recruits
from taking the risk of contacting ISIS. The block could also inspire these same people to take
the risk and pursue terrorist activities against the state. In either case, there would be fewer
independent researchers following ISIS Twitter users and more genuine recruits, which would
make for a cleaner sample.

In conclusion, we are left with a final question: does it really matter if people follow and
support ISIS’ mission, even if they don’t actively participate in violence? The answer to this
question must be yes. Ideas and dogmas are some of the most dangerous weapons in existence.
Simply posting a tweet in support of ISIS sends the message that the user would not resist an
extremist government, and in fact is likely to offer support if possible. If ISIS is to be stopped, it
must be prevented from spreading its radical ideas, both offline and online.

Bibliography:
Berger, JM; Morgan, Jonathan; The ISIS Twitter Census, Brookings Institute. March 2015.
https://www.google.com/search?q=ISIS+Twitter+Census&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8 . Viewed 8/1/15.
Diriöz, Ali Oğuz; “Twitter and the Middle East.”. Middle Eastern Analysis. Online. 2013 Issue.
9 Pages. Viewed 12/8/2015.
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=twitter+and+the+middle+east&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%
2C15
Reilly, Ryan; “If You Are Trying to Join ISIS Over Twitter, the FBI Probably Knows About It.”
Huffington Post. 7/9/15. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/09/isis-twitter-fbi-islamic-
state_n_7763992.html . Viewed 8/10/15.
Federman, Eliyahu; “Don’t Suspend ISIS Twitter Accounts”. FoxNews.com. 3/29/2015.
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2015/03/29/dont-suspend-isis-twitter-accounts.html . Viewed
9/1/15.
Callimachi, Rukimini; “ISIS and the Lonely Young American”. New York Times. 6/28/15.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/world/americas/isis-online-recruiting-american.html?_r=0 .
Viewed 9/12/15.
Hahn, Jason; “How the World’s Most Dangerous Group Uses Social Media.” Complex.com.
April 2015. http://www.complex.com/pop-culture/2015/04/isis-social-media-methods . Viewed
9/20/15.
“8 Supporters Killed in N. Caucuses Special Op.”. RT.com. 8/2/2015.
https://www.rt.com/news/311392-isis-killed-russia-caucasus/ . Viewed 9/20/15.
Herman, Yves; “Belgium providing most ISIS recruits per capita in Europe – UN”. RT.com.
10/20/2015. Online. https://www.rt.com/news/318921-isis-recruitment-belgium-pay/
Muslim Population By Country; Pew Research Center. Pewforum.org. 1/27/2011.
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/ . Viewed 9/25/15.

Pew Research Center; “5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe.”. 11/17/2015.
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-
europe/

PSC 497---THESIS PAPER

More Related Content

What's hot

Viewers also liked

Similar to PSC 497---THESIS PAPER

PSC 497---THESIS PAPER