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Privacy Enhanced
Electronic Cheque System
(PEEC)
Vijayakrishnan. P
with
Prof. Josef Pieprzyk and Dr. Hua Xiong Wang
krishnan@ics.mq.edu.au

Centre for Advanced Computing - Algorithms and Cryptography
DepartmentPrivacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.1/19
of Computing,
CEC2005,July2005
Contents
Electronic cheques
Related Work
FSTC’s eCheck
Issues in FSTC’s eCheck
Privacy Enhanced E-cheque(PEEC)
Characteristics of PEEC

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.2/19
Electronic Cheques An overview
- Typically, E-cheques mirror Paper cheques
- A payment type for high value transactions
- Post-pay method of payment

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.3/19
Electronic Cheques An overview
- Typically, E-cheques mirror Paper cheques
- A payment type for high value transactions
- Post-pay method of payment
Advantages
- Extra Services anonymity, unlinkability
- Multiple account draws and deposits
- Supports multiple signatures

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.3/19
Related Work
Based on traditional paper cheques [FSTC,
NetCheque, MANDATE]

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.4/19
Related Work
Based on traditional paper cheques [FSTC,
NetCheque, MANDATE]
Server based [NetBill, PayNow]

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.4/19
Related Work
Based on traditional paper cheques [FSTC,
NetCheque, MANDATE]
Server based [NetBill, PayNow]
Modified version of e-Cash [Brands, Chaum]

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.4/19
Related Work
Based on traditional paper cheques [FSTC,
NetCheque, MANDATE]
Server based [NetBill, PayNow]
Modified version of e-Cash [Brands, Chaum]
Need to revisit
- Introduction of Check 21 US federal law, Oct
2004.
- Development of FSTC’s eCheck system.
CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.4/19
E-Cheque Working
2. Signed eCheck

Payer

Payee
1. Invoice
3. Endorsed
eCheck

5. Account Statment
(Substitute eCheck)

Issuer

4. eCheck presentment

Acquirer

(Interbank settlement)

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.5/19
FSTC eCheck Project
Backing from major financial institutions and
goverment agencies. (Around 100 members)
Electronic payment instrument for Internet.
Compatable with interactive web transactions
or e-mail.
Same legal framework as paper cheques.
Savings in transactional and processing cost.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.6/19
FSTC eCheck
Structure
Two core components - FSML and SDML
(XML block structures)
<fsml-doc docname="C" type="check">
<action> <blkname>C1 ... </action>
<check> <blkname>C2 ... </check>
<signature> <blkname>C3 ... </signature>
<account> <blkname>C4 ... </account>
<cert> <blkname>C5 ... </cert>
<attachment> <blkname>C6 ... </attachment> (optional)
<signature> <blkname>C7 ... </signature>
<cert> <blkname>C8 ... </cert>
</fsml-doc>

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.7/19
FSTC eCheck
Structure
Two core components - FSML and SDML
(XML block structures)
<fsml-doc docname="C" type="check">
<action> <blkname>C1 ... </action>
<check> <blkname>C2 ... </check>
<signature> <blkname>C3 ... </signature>
<account> <blkname>C4 ... </account>
<cert> <blkname>C5 ... </cert>
<attachment> <blkname>C6 ... </attachment> (optional)
<signature> <blkname>C7 ... </signature>
<cert> <blkname>C8 ... </cert>
</fsml-doc>

Documents attached when endorsed.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.7/19
Issues with FSTC
eCheck
No data confidentiality of payer information.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.8/19
Issues with FSTC
eCheck
No data confidentiality of payer information.
No privacy for payer account details in an
eCheck.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.8/19
Issues with FSTC
eCheck
No data confidentiality of payer information.
No privacy for payer account details in an
eCheck.
Smart card security and non-repudiation of
transactional proof.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.8/19
Issues with FSTC
eCheck
No data confidentiality of payer information.
No privacy for payer account details in an
eCheck.
Smart card security and non-repudiation of
transactional proof.
Traceablility of transactional information. w.r.t
TTP.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.8/19
Issues with FSTC
eCheck
No data confidentiality of payer information.
No privacy for payer account details in an
eCheck.
Smart card security and non-repudiation of
transactional proof.
Traceablility of transactional information. w.r.t
TTP.
Smart card logging problem. [FSTC]
(http://www.echeck.org/)

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.8/19
PEEC
A post pay method.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.9/19
PEEC
A post pay method.
Works with exisiting legal and finance
infrastrucutre

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.9/19
PEEC
A post pay method.
Works with exisiting legal and finance
infrastrucutre
Provide better privacy features.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.9/19
PEEC
A post pay method.
Works with exisiting legal and finance
infrastrucutre
Provide better privacy features.
Protocols:
Setup phase
Registration - payer and payee
Payment
Deposit

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.9/19
PEEC - Setup
Bank B setup
Bank B chooses primes p and q such that
|p − 1| = δ + k for a specified constant δ, and
p = γq + 1, for a specified integer γ.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.10/19
PEEC - Setup
Bank B setup
Bank B chooses primes p and q such that
|p − 1| = δ + k for a specified constant δ, and
p = γq + 1, for a specified integer γ.
A unique subgroup Gq of prime order q of the
∗
multiplicative group Zp and generators g0 , g1 ,
g2 of Gq are defined.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.10/19
PEEC - Setup
Bank B setup
Bank B chooses primes p and q such that
|p − 1| = δ + k for a specified constant δ, and
p = γq + 1, for a specified integer γ.
A unique subgroup Gq of prime order q of the
∗
multiplicative group Zp and generators g0 , g1 ,
g2 of Gq are defined.
Hash functions H(.) from a family of
collision-free hash functions are defined.
CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.10/19
PEEC - Bank
Setup. . .
Bank also generates a secret key XB ∈R Zq
X
and corresponding public keys h = g0 B ,
X
X
h1 = g1 B , h2 = g2 B .
The Bank also chooses a value n that
represents the number of PEE-cheques in a
PEE-cheque book.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.11/19
PEEC - Bank
Setup. . .
Bank also generates a secret key XB ∈R Zq
X
and corresponding public keys h = g0 B ,
X
X
h1 = g1 B , h2 = g2 B .
The Bank also chooses a value n that
represents the number of PEE-cheques in a
PEE-cheque book.
p, q, H(.), (g0 , g1 , g2 ) are published along with
h, h1 and h2 .

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.11/19
PEEC - Payer and
Payee Setup
Payer U setup
Each payer U has to intitally register with the
u1
Bank B. The payer generates a public key I = g1
u
where u1 ∈ Gq such that g1 1 g2 = 1.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.12/19
PEEC - Payer and
Payee Setup
Payer U setup
Each payer U has to intitally register with the
u1
Bank B. The payer generates a public key I = g1
u
where u1 ∈ Gq such that g1 1 g2 = 1.
Payee M setup
Similar to the payer, each payee M intitally register with the Bank B to obtain a certified public key
XP
P = g1 where XP ∈ Gq .
CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.12/19
PEEC - Registration
Protocol
Payer U

Bank B
I

u
I = g1 1

→
k, [k1 , k2 , .kj ., kn ], t ∈R Zq
′

∀ n: Ei = H(Ig bact g i )
′

∀ n: SE ′ = Ei XB + kj mod q
i

t
y = g1 ; Y = Iy

SY = Y XB + k2 mod q
Y,SY ,y,t,

←

′

′

[Ei ,...,Ei+n ],

←

[S ′ ,...,S ′
E

i

E

←

]

i+n

VerifySign(SY ′ )
∀ n: VerifySign(SE ′ )
CEC2005,July2005i

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.13/19
PEEC - Payment
Protocol
Payer U

Payee M
{amt,d/t,M N ame}S

←

M

s, w ∈R Zq
u
A = Y s ; A1 = g1 1 s , A2 = y s

O = H(d/t||M N ame||amt)
r = u1 s2 t − O.u1 .s
′

r = r.s
′

r ,A1 ,A2 ,A,O

→

′

Ei ,S ′ ,Y,SY ,SU ′
E

i

E

→

i
′

O = H(d/t||M N ame||amt)
?

VerifySign(SY ) ; A = A1 A2
?

CEC2005,July2005

′

′

A = Cheque r
AO Y System – p.14/19
1
Privacy Enhanced Electronic
PEEC - Deposit
Protocol
Payee M

Bank B

k3 ∈R Zq
SMO′ = O′ XM + k3 mod q
amt,d/t,M N ame,O

′

→

SMO′ ,r ′ ,SY ,Y,

→

′
SIE ′ ,Ei ,A,A1 ,A2
i

→
O′′ = H(d/t||M N ame||amt)
?

?

O′′ = O′ = O
VerifySign(SY ), VerifySign(SIE ′ )
i

VerifySign(SMOrder′ )
?

VerifySign(SY ) ; A = A1 A2
CEC2005,July2005

(I, bact, i) = ObtainIdbasenum(Y )

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.15/19
PEEC Characteristics
Security
(a) There exists no polynomial-time algorithm to
solve the discrete log problem,
(b) Schnorr signatures are unforgeable and
(c) Hash functions are cryptographically secure.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.16/19
PEEC Characteristics
Security
(a) There exists no polynomial-time algorithm to
solve the discrete log problem,
(b) Schnorr signatures are unforgeable and
(c) Hash functions are cryptographically secure.
Privacy
- The payer’s identity remains protected by an anonymous identity.
- No communication with the bank to create an anonymous identity A
- There is a provable linkage between the original identity and the anonymous identity.
- The anonymous identity is guaranteed to be secure as long as the linkage value t remains known only to the payer and the bank.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.16/19
PEEC Characteristics
Authentication
- Based on public key verification.
- The proof for anonymous identity is essential a Schnorr identification protocol in a
non-interactive setting.
- From Schnorr identification and the payer’s signature on the PEE-cheque presented to
the payee, authentication of the payer is guaranteed.
- The Bank authenticates the payee by verifying the digital signature on the Order′ that
is sent by the payee during the deposit protocol.
- The authentication of the payee towards the payer and the bank is based on verification
of the payee’s public key identity M.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.17/19
PEEC Characteristics
Authentication
- Based on public key verification.
- The proof for anonymous identity is essential a Schnorr identification protocol in a
non-interactive setting.
- From Schnorr identification and the payer’s signature on the PEE-cheque presented to
the payee, authentication of the payer is guaranteed.
- The Bank authenticates the payee by verifying the digital signature on the Order′ that
is sent by the payee during the deposit protocol.
- The authentication of the payee towards the payer and the bank is based on verification
of the payee’s public key identity M.

Unforgeability
- Every e-cheque created by the bank uses a cryptographically secure hash function with
inputs, payer’s identity I, payer’s unique bank account (bact) and a unique e-cheque
number generated by the bank (i).
- The e-cheque is digitally signed.
- For a e-cheque to be forgeable by the payer, the payer must be able to forge the digital
CEC2005,July2005
Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.17/19
PEEC - Extension
Multiple Payers and Payees.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.18/19
PEEC - Extension
Multiple Payers and Payees.
Multiple Account withdraws and deposits.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.18/19
PEEC - Extension
Multiple Payers and Payees.
Multiple Account withdraws and deposits.
Mobile payments.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.18/19
PEEC - Extension
Multiple Payers and Payees.
Multiple Account withdraws and deposits.
Mobile payments.
Point of sale payments.

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.18/19
Thank You
krishnan@ics.mq.edu.au

CEC2005,July2005

Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.19/19

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Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System

  • 1. Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System (PEEC) Vijayakrishnan. P with Prof. Josef Pieprzyk and Dr. Hua Xiong Wang krishnan@ics.mq.edu.au Centre for Advanced Computing - Algorithms and Cryptography DepartmentPrivacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.1/19 of Computing, CEC2005,July2005
  • 2. Contents Electronic cheques Related Work FSTC’s eCheck Issues in FSTC’s eCheck Privacy Enhanced E-cheque(PEEC) Characteristics of PEEC CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.2/19
  • 3. Electronic Cheques An overview - Typically, E-cheques mirror Paper cheques - A payment type for high value transactions - Post-pay method of payment CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.3/19
  • 4. Electronic Cheques An overview - Typically, E-cheques mirror Paper cheques - A payment type for high value transactions - Post-pay method of payment Advantages - Extra Services anonymity, unlinkability - Multiple account draws and deposits - Supports multiple signatures CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.3/19
  • 5. Related Work Based on traditional paper cheques [FSTC, NetCheque, MANDATE] CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.4/19
  • 6. Related Work Based on traditional paper cheques [FSTC, NetCheque, MANDATE] Server based [NetBill, PayNow] CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.4/19
  • 7. Related Work Based on traditional paper cheques [FSTC, NetCheque, MANDATE] Server based [NetBill, PayNow] Modified version of e-Cash [Brands, Chaum] CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.4/19
  • 8. Related Work Based on traditional paper cheques [FSTC, NetCheque, MANDATE] Server based [NetBill, PayNow] Modified version of e-Cash [Brands, Chaum] Need to revisit - Introduction of Check 21 US federal law, Oct 2004. - Development of FSTC’s eCheck system. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.4/19
  • 9. E-Cheque Working 2. Signed eCheck Payer Payee 1. Invoice 3. Endorsed eCheck 5. Account Statment (Substitute eCheck) Issuer 4. eCheck presentment Acquirer (Interbank settlement) CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.5/19
  • 10. FSTC eCheck Project Backing from major financial institutions and goverment agencies. (Around 100 members) Electronic payment instrument for Internet. Compatable with interactive web transactions or e-mail. Same legal framework as paper cheques. Savings in transactional and processing cost. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.6/19
  • 11. FSTC eCheck Structure Two core components - FSML and SDML (XML block structures) <fsml-doc docname="C" type="check"> <action> <blkname>C1 ... </action> <check> <blkname>C2 ... </check> <signature> <blkname>C3 ... </signature> <account> <blkname>C4 ... </account> <cert> <blkname>C5 ... </cert> <attachment> <blkname>C6 ... </attachment> (optional) <signature> <blkname>C7 ... </signature> <cert> <blkname>C8 ... </cert> </fsml-doc> CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.7/19
  • 12. FSTC eCheck Structure Two core components - FSML and SDML (XML block structures) <fsml-doc docname="C" type="check"> <action> <blkname>C1 ... </action> <check> <blkname>C2 ... </check> <signature> <blkname>C3 ... </signature> <account> <blkname>C4 ... </account> <cert> <blkname>C5 ... </cert> <attachment> <blkname>C6 ... </attachment> (optional) <signature> <blkname>C7 ... </signature> <cert> <blkname>C8 ... </cert> </fsml-doc> Documents attached when endorsed. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.7/19
  • 13. Issues with FSTC eCheck No data confidentiality of payer information. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.8/19
  • 14. Issues with FSTC eCheck No data confidentiality of payer information. No privacy for payer account details in an eCheck. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.8/19
  • 15. Issues with FSTC eCheck No data confidentiality of payer information. No privacy for payer account details in an eCheck. Smart card security and non-repudiation of transactional proof. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.8/19
  • 16. Issues with FSTC eCheck No data confidentiality of payer information. No privacy for payer account details in an eCheck. Smart card security and non-repudiation of transactional proof. Traceablility of transactional information. w.r.t TTP. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.8/19
  • 17. Issues with FSTC eCheck No data confidentiality of payer information. No privacy for payer account details in an eCheck. Smart card security and non-repudiation of transactional proof. Traceablility of transactional information. w.r.t TTP. Smart card logging problem. [FSTC] (http://www.echeck.org/) CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.8/19
  • 18. PEEC A post pay method. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.9/19
  • 19. PEEC A post pay method. Works with exisiting legal and finance infrastrucutre CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.9/19
  • 20. PEEC A post pay method. Works with exisiting legal and finance infrastrucutre Provide better privacy features. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.9/19
  • 21. PEEC A post pay method. Works with exisiting legal and finance infrastrucutre Provide better privacy features. Protocols: Setup phase Registration - payer and payee Payment Deposit CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.9/19
  • 22. PEEC - Setup Bank B setup Bank B chooses primes p and q such that |p − 1| = δ + k for a specified constant δ, and p = γq + 1, for a specified integer γ. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.10/19
  • 23. PEEC - Setup Bank B setup Bank B chooses primes p and q such that |p − 1| = δ + k for a specified constant δ, and p = γq + 1, for a specified integer γ. A unique subgroup Gq of prime order q of the ∗ multiplicative group Zp and generators g0 , g1 , g2 of Gq are defined. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.10/19
  • 24. PEEC - Setup Bank B setup Bank B chooses primes p and q such that |p − 1| = δ + k for a specified constant δ, and p = γq + 1, for a specified integer γ. A unique subgroup Gq of prime order q of the ∗ multiplicative group Zp and generators g0 , g1 , g2 of Gq are defined. Hash functions H(.) from a family of collision-free hash functions are defined. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.10/19
  • 25. PEEC - Bank Setup. . . Bank also generates a secret key XB ∈R Zq X and corresponding public keys h = g0 B , X X h1 = g1 B , h2 = g2 B . The Bank also chooses a value n that represents the number of PEE-cheques in a PEE-cheque book. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.11/19
  • 26. PEEC - Bank Setup. . . Bank also generates a secret key XB ∈R Zq X and corresponding public keys h = g0 B , X X h1 = g1 B , h2 = g2 B . The Bank also chooses a value n that represents the number of PEE-cheques in a PEE-cheque book. p, q, H(.), (g0 , g1 , g2 ) are published along with h, h1 and h2 . CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.11/19
  • 27. PEEC - Payer and Payee Setup Payer U setup Each payer U has to intitally register with the u1 Bank B. The payer generates a public key I = g1 u where u1 ∈ Gq such that g1 1 g2 = 1. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.12/19
  • 28. PEEC - Payer and Payee Setup Payer U setup Each payer U has to intitally register with the u1 Bank B. The payer generates a public key I = g1 u where u1 ∈ Gq such that g1 1 g2 = 1. Payee M setup Similar to the payer, each payee M intitally register with the Bank B to obtain a certified public key XP P = g1 where XP ∈ Gq . CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.12/19
  • 29. PEEC - Registration Protocol Payer U Bank B I u I = g1 1 → k, [k1 , k2 , .kj ., kn ], t ∈R Zq ′ ∀ n: Ei = H(Ig bact g i ) ′ ∀ n: SE ′ = Ei XB + kj mod q i t y = g1 ; Y = Iy SY = Y XB + k2 mod q Y,SY ,y,t, ← ′ ′ [Ei ,...,Ei+n ], ← [S ′ ,...,S ′ E i E ← ] i+n VerifySign(SY ′ ) ∀ n: VerifySign(SE ′ ) CEC2005,July2005i Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.13/19
  • 30. PEEC - Payment Protocol Payer U Payee M {amt,d/t,M N ame}S ← M s, w ∈R Zq u A = Y s ; A1 = g1 1 s , A2 = y s O = H(d/t||M N ame||amt) r = u1 s2 t − O.u1 .s ′ r = r.s ′ r ,A1 ,A2 ,A,O → ′ Ei ,S ′ ,Y,SY ,SU ′ E i E → i ′ O = H(d/t||M N ame||amt) ? VerifySign(SY ) ; A = A1 A2 ? CEC2005,July2005 ′ ′ A = Cheque r AO Y System – p.14/19 1 Privacy Enhanced Electronic
  • 31. PEEC - Deposit Protocol Payee M Bank B k3 ∈R Zq SMO′ = O′ XM + k3 mod q amt,d/t,M N ame,O ′ → SMO′ ,r ′ ,SY ,Y, → ′ SIE ′ ,Ei ,A,A1 ,A2 i → O′′ = H(d/t||M N ame||amt) ? ? O′′ = O′ = O VerifySign(SY ), VerifySign(SIE ′ ) i VerifySign(SMOrder′ ) ? VerifySign(SY ) ; A = A1 A2 CEC2005,July2005 (I, bact, i) = ObtainIdbasenum(Y ) Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.15/19
  • 32. PEEC Characteristics Security (a) There exists no polynomial-time algorithm to solve the discrete log problem, (b) Schnorr signatures are unforgeable and (c) Hash functions are cryptographically secure. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.16/19
  • 33. PEEC Characteristics Security (a) There exists no polynomial-time algorithm to solve the discrete log problem, (b) Schnorr signatures are unforgeable and (c) Hash functions are cryptographically secure. Privacy - The payer’s identity remains protected by an anonymous identity. - No communication with the bank to create an anonymous identity A - There is a provable linkage between the original identity and the anonymous identity. - The anonymous identity is guaranteed to be secure as long as the linkage value t remains known only to the payer and the bank. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.16/19
  • 34. PEEC Characteristics Authentication - Based on public key verification. - The proof for anonymous identity is essential a Schnorr identification protocol in a non-interactive setting. - From Schnorr identification and the payer’s signature on the PEE-cheque presented to the payee, authentication of the payer is guaranteed. - The Bank authenticates the payee by verifying the digital signature on the Order′ that is sent by the payee during the deposit protocol. - The authentication of the payee towards the payer and the bank is based on verification of the payee’s public key identity M. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.17/19
  • 35. PEEC Characteristics Authentication - Based on public key verification. - The proof for anonymous identity is essential a Schnorr identification protocol in a non-interactive setting. - From Schnorr identification and the payer’s signature on the PEE-cheque presented to the payee, authentication of the payer is guaranteed. - The Bank authenticates the payee by verifying the digital signature on the Order′ that is sent by the payee during the deposit protocol. - The authentication of the payee towards the payer and the bank is based on verification of the payee’s public key identity M. Unforgeability - Every e-cheque created by the bank uses a cryptographically secure hash function with inputs, payer’s identity I, payer’s unique bank account (bact) and a unique e-cheque number generated by the bank (i). - The e-cheque is digitally signed. - For a e-cheque to be forgeable by the payer, the payer must be able to forge the digital CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.17/19
  • 36. PEEC - Extension Multiple Payers and Payees. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.18/19
  • 37. PEEC - Extension Multiple Payers and Payees. Multiple Account withdraws and deposits. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.18/19
  • 38. PEEC - Extension Multiple Payers and Payees. Multiple Account withdraws and deposits. Mobile payments. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.18/19
  • 39. PEEC - Extension Multiple Payers and Payees. Multiple Account withdraws and deposits. Mobile payments. Point of sale payments. CEC2005,July2005 Privacy Enhanced Electronic Cheque System – p.18/19