Questions about the future are very often probability questions. Probability is a fascinating field of philosophical enquiry. On the one hand the philosophy of probability has concentrated on the double face of the concept. It is statistical, concerning itself with stochastic laws of chance processes. It is also epistemological, dedicated to assessing reasonable degrees of belief in propositions quite devoid of statistical background. On the other hand, it has concentrated on the relation between probability estimations and decision theory, that is, the utility functions associated with a certain outcome when a subject has to decide how to act upon an estimate of the future. We argue here that a deeper and, surprisingly neglected, philosophical issue about the double face of probability is the following: the probability of a fact and its impact (objective or subjective) are two distinct phenomena, sometimes confused when talking about probability. I can have a precise measure of the impact of a fact (if a tsunami takes place in Jakarta, there will be 5000 deaths) and yet have a much less precise measure of its probability. Impact questions and probability questions are often confused. We will provide example of this distinction and also, if, possible, some remedies.