Pr. Gilbert EGGERMONT, the Belgian Health Council, Belgium "Presenta on of the report of the Belgian Health Council on emergency planning " SEMINAR ON PUBLIC INFORMATION IN EP&R: http://www.nuclear-transparency-watch.eu/activities/nuclear-emergency-preparedness-and-response/seminar-on-public-information-in-epr.html

1. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
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Recommendation 9235
Nuclear accidents, environment and health in the
post-Fukushima era: emergency response
Gilbert Eggermont, chairman WG EP&R, SHC
Seminar EC-NTW “BSS and Public Information in EP&R“
Luxemburg, December 1, 2016

2. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
Fukushima Report on EP&R has finally forced Belgian
safety authority and crisis centre to take action
7 experts with minor conflicts of interest (+2*)
7 disciplines: risk analysis, nuclear safety, radiation protection, en-
vironment, radiobiology, (nuclear )medicine, psychology, extended with
• Medical subgroup on Iodine profylaxis: 1°advice 2015 (SHC 9275)
• Ad hoc meetings with specific experts (4+2+3*)
 Communication and perception
 Crisis centre (1) Ministry Internal affairs, SCK.CEN/NERIS (1)
 International: EC (1), Nl (1), Fr (2) (FANC and other safety authorities*)
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3. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
Key safety question analysed in BSS context of
information, communication and involvement
How might a process of careful preparation prevent or re-
duce as much as possible the detrimental effects to man and
the environment in the event of a serious nuclear accident?
regarding the high population density in Belgium
the high density of NPP’s: 20 within 100 km
the learning lessons from earlier accidents worldwide
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4. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
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Output: an 120p report with executive summary,
20 transversal messages/conclusions, 200 references
presented 9/3/16 to policy makers, press, scientists; www.css-hgr.be
It offers a Precautionary Strategy for Nuclear EP&R
with more
Awareness, Preparedness and Completeness
in a Cross Border Dimension
Belgian EP & R change process ongoing

5. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
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EP & R report SHC at a glance (1):
much more than direct response phase
1. Serious nuclear accident can happen in EU
2. Radioactive dispersion can affect a large region and
create anxiety
3. Serious consequences can last for many years
4. Prevention of health effects must include psycho-
social impact

6. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
SHC Report at a glance (2): more awareness on
risks in broader health perspective
5. Enlarge risk analysis with vulnerability analysis
• Complexity of technology as well as of the organisation
• Scenarios with low probability and large consequences
such as aquatic dispersion in ground water and river
• Care population density, traffic, chemical risks, siting,
human interaction
• Care vulnerable people
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7. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
Prepare more adequate intervention measures over
distances of relevance – transparency (3)
6. Extend planning zones
• Sheltering to at least 100km
• Iodine fast distribution strategy over at least 100 km
• Evacuation strategy over at least 20km  mobility?
7. Care for communication with population
• Bilateral with 2 directions + active role social media
• Transparent and balanced RISCOM model
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8. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
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Improve coordination and develop a long term
strategy for recovery and relocation (4)
8. More attention for medical coördination: >Iodine
• Psychological effects of rupture of living conditions
• Social concerns (family, animals in evacuated areas,..)
9. Social tissue can be disturbed over decennia
after direct threats and transition period long recovery
• Cleaning contaminated areas and nuclear waste
• Return of evacuees

9. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
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Involve citizen in emergency preparation to make
response more adequate (5)
10. Crisis can become worser by interaction with
other risks and due to failing communication
11. EP is continuous participative learning proces of
transdisciplinary nature
• Should start at school
• Integrate concerns and indications of people
vulnerability analysis with citizen
12. Revise crisis response - evaluate periodically crisis centre

10. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
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A response to a serious nuclear accident requires
more Europe and international support (6)
13. A serious nuclear accident will have a cross
border impact: role international collaboration
14. More Europe in nuclear safety (and EP&R)
• Strenghten collaboration with EU Nu safety authority
• Cross border harmonisation of liability and insurances
• Nuclear waste policy approach for serious accidents
• Protect external intervention and clean-up workers

11. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
Psycho-Social health effects for population, helpers and
crisis staff can affect adequacy of emergency response
•Health impact broader than exposure effects of IR
•Psychiatric disorders related to crisis stress and concern
• Anxiety for long term exposure , depression, alcohol, sleep
• Uncertainty on future, stress duration ~ time of unpredictible risk
• Sheltering enforces threat of loss of safe reliable environment
• Evacuation: problems of leaving
• relatives, house, goods, care, clothing, medication
• animals and cattle ref. Nobel Prize Svetl.Aleksijevitsj
• Uncertainty on return, confusion also on iodine
• Stigma’s related to exposure food, products, people, reception evacuees
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12. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
Perception is real: threats and fear dominate on facts
(for experts as well as citizen), while values are crucial
Risk: a situation or event in which something of human value (including
humans themselves) has been put at stake and the outcome uncertain
more than facts
• Different value references --> range of risk perception
• Citizen and experts colour risk differently: ex. fear for panic
• plurality of expert views useful
At stake: responsibility supervising authority to guarantee common good
(CI procedure, review reactor siting & options (German Eth. Com.),
Quality, impartiality and critical reflection has influence on confidence
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13. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
Risk communication is more than information (BSS
annexe XI) and should address also affective elements
• How to adapt to new reality, to live with radioactive contamination
• Communication fails if not offering perspectives
• Confidence for crisis response should be build in peace time
• Emergency communication needs planning
• Preliminary process with long term dimension care contradictions!
• With active use of new social media
• Vulnerability analysis to identify public concerns, dilemnas, needs
• Avoid confusion, distrust, incoherence, incredibility
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14. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
Risk communication(in crisis): Confrontation/attempt
to bridge opposing perceptions in open dialogue
• Continuing ethical justification of technological risk
• starting in normal times and aiming to increase awareness
• Part of decision making at three levels:
• within the crisis centre, public response and helpers
• Only effective when bilateral, legitimate and authentic
• Not only telling the facts or truth but also discuss context
• (dis)advantages, hidden agenda, interests
• challenge is how to guarantee transparency
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15. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
Public participation creates new opportunities
for accident response and indicates vulnerabilities
• Legally structured involvement on nuclear safety with
resources for critical expertise  (A)NCLI
• Allows local vulnerability analysis, identifying people problems
• Allows to better define a long term strategy at all levels
• Who pays? Under which circumstances can people work, live, play
in contaminated areas. How can men adapt to new reality?
• Traffic infrastructure, energy vulnerability, industrial risks?
• What are the opportunities when return becomes impossible?
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16. SUPERIOR HEALTH COUNCIL
Conclusion: EP&R is finishing touch of Nuclear Safety
Communication and involvement shape the result
In nuclear energy, nuclear safety and EP&R, complex questions and
interactions arise with numerous uncertainties confronting values of people
For such policy issues the Superior Health Council is opting for a precaution
strategy enlarging public information to reliable communication and public
involvement, as required by BSS (ann.XI)
Such approach necessitates a legal frame for dialogue,
independant expertise and a EU nuclear safety authority