The document discusses how strengthening the institutional capacity of fragile states through e-learning can help reduce threats to US security. It argues that fragile states with weak institutions struggle to provide basic services and exert control over their territory. This undermines state legitimacy and allows extremist groups to fill the gaps. The document proposes that the US incentivize its universities to create an online curriculum in areas like financial management, project management, and strategic planning for civil servants in fragile states. This low-cost approach could boost human capital and help fragile states build resilience without a large US presence, complementing other aid programs. Stronger institutions are key to development, stability, and reducing threats from issues spilling over borders like terrorism and pandemic diseases.
Poverty Alleviation: A Challenge for the Indian Governmentbeenishshowkat
I prepared this term paper project in my third semester of Masters in Political Science. Also, I referred to a number of other philosophers works in order to create a better project. I hope this will be of great help to anyone who views it. Thanks.
Despite the fact that the global poverty rate has been halved since 2000, intensified efforts are required to boost the incomes, alleviate the suffering and build the resilience of those individuals still living in extreme poverty, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa. Social protection systems need to be expanded and risks need to be mitigated for disaster-prone countries, which also tend to be the most impoverished. (Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals, 2017)
The purpose of this short paper is to raise an argument that corruption plays a major role in preventing the world from achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), in this paper I particularly focus on corruption on poverty. This is also the same with the former Millennium Development Goals (MDG) that were never met.
The United States of America is in the midst of an enormous demographic and economic transformation; effects are witnessed through decreased labor force participation, stagnant economic growth, and financially strained government programs. Layered within the demographic change is a system morphed through partisan interests and inequitable assumptions. The country’s social insurance programs perpetuate on guarantees that supporters receive similar benefits as needed. Academics and government officials have warned of the coming population wave for decades, yet little action has been taken to mitigate associated problems.
Safety nets are critical for developed nations to maintain minimum living standards and some forms are sustainable. U.S. social insurance programs are underfunded by $39.698 trillion dollars, net of assets and future tax revenue, if continued under the current structure. The following research is provided to raise awareness of the existing system’s insolvency, generational inequity, and long-term costs in hope of instigating the necessary discussion of realigning economic, fiscal, and social policies onto a sustainable trajectory.
Suburban poverty affects over 16.4 million people across the U.S. and is growing rapidly, significantly outpacing the growth rate of urban poverty over the last decade (64% vs. 29%). Experts suggest that the problem of suburban poverty is “the new normal.” While the basic needs of the poor in the suburbs are similar to those of the urban poor (e.g. education inequity, poor access to quality healthcare etc.), there are some critical systemic differences (e.g. limited transportation options, jurisdictional challenges etc.). These challenges are further exacerbated by the lack of awareness and understanding of the problem and
potential solutions.
This dissertation examines whether refugee influxes into fragile democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa increase levels of xenophobia. It analyzes South Africa, Kenya, and Uganda as case studies. The literature review discusses research on the economic and social impacts of refugees on host communities and links between refugee presence and xenophobic behavior. The methodology section outlines a qualitative comparative case study approach. The structure previews chapters on refugee terms/trends in SSA, links between xenophobia/fragile states, economic impacts of refugees, roles of regional economic unions, and responses in the three case study countries.
From Needs To Assets Charting A Sustainable Path Towards Development In Sub S...Cormac Russell
This document discusses alternative approaches to development in Sub-Saharan Africa, arguing that an asset-based community development (ABCD) approach combined with participatory rural appraisal (PRA), sustainable livelihoods approaches (SLA), and rights-based approaches can help address socio-economic challenges more effectively than traditional needs-based approaches. It outlines how ABCD identifies and builds on community assets rather than just focusing on needs, empowering communities to drive their own development. When combined with PRA, SLA, and rights-based approaches, ABCD can generate sustainable, citizen-led solutions superior to those resulting from outside interventions or needs assessments alone.
The document discusses restricting immigrant access to welfare programs in the United States. It makes three key points:
1) Most economists agree that immigration increases the size of the economy and productivity, and benefits both destination and source countries. Restricting immigrant welfare access would further improve the fiscal impact of immigration.
2) Data shows that non-citizens currently use around 6.7% of total welfare expenditures while making up 7.1% of the population. Limiting their access to programs like Medicaid, SNAP and SSI would have a small positive fiscal effect.
3) Cutting off welfare benefits to non-citizens would affect some immigrants but not as many as expected, since immigrant welfare use is already
This document summarizes a student paper analyzing the concentration of poverty in Charlotte, North Carolina. It discusses how poverty has become concentrated in urban areas due to historical and current factors such as historic housing policies, minimum wage laws, lack of access to good jobs and education, and income inequality. The paper will focus specifically on how these factors apply to Charlotte and have resulted in high levels of poverty among certain demographics, despite the city's overall economic growth. It will analyze poverty statistics in Charlotte and North Carolina and discuss attempts to address urban poverty through policies and programs.
Poverty Alleviation: A Challenge for the Indian Governmentbeenishshowkat
I prepared this term paper project in my third semester of Masters in Political Science. Also, I referred to a number of other philosophers works in order to create a better project. I hope this will be of great help to anyone who views it. Thanks.
Despite the fact that the global poverty rate has been halved since 2000, intensified efforts are required to boost the incomes, alleviate the suffering and build the resilience of those individuals still living in extreme poverty, in particular in sub-Saharan Africa. Social protection systems need to be expanded and risks need to be mitigated for disaster-prone countries, which also tend to be the most impoverished. (Progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals, 2017)
The purpose of this short paper is to raise an argument that corruption plays a major role in preventing the world from achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), in this paper I particularly focus on corruption on poverty. This is also the same with the former Millennium Development Goals (MDG) that were never met.
The United States of America is in the midst of an enormous demographic and economic transformation; effects are witnessed through decreased labor force participation, stagnant economic growth, and financially strained government programs. Layered within the demographic change is a system morphed through partisan interests and inequitable assumptions. The country’s social insurance programs perpetuate on guarantees that supporters receive similar benefits as needed. Academics and government officials have warned of the coming population wave for decades, yet little action has been taken to mitigate associated problems.
Safety nets are critical for developed nations to maintain minimum living standards and some forms are sustainable. U.S. social insurance programs are underfunded by $39.698 trillion dollars, net of assets and future tax revenue, if continued under the current structure. The following research is provided to raise awareness of the existing system’s insolvency, generational inequity, and long-term costs in hope of instigating the necessary discussion of realigning economic, fiscal, and social policies onto a sustainable trajectory.
Suburban poverty affects over 16.4 million people across the U.S. and is growing rapidly, significantly outpacing the growth rate of urban poverty over the last decade (64% vs. 29%). Experts suggest that the problem of suburban poverty is “the new normal.” While the basic needs of the poor in the suburbs are similar to those of the urban poor (e.g. education inequity, poor access to quality healthcare etc.), there are some critical systemic differences (e.g. limited transportation options, jurisdictional challenges etc.). These challenges are further exacerbated by the lack of awareness and understanding of the problem and
potential solutions.
This dissertation examines whether refugee influxes into fragile democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa increase levels of xenophobia. It analyzes South Africa, Kenya, and Uganda as case studies. The literature review discusses research on the economic and social impacts of refugees on host communities and links between refugee presence and xenophobic behavior. The methodology section outlines a qualitative comparative case study approach. The structure previews chapters on refugee terms/trends in SSA, links between xenophobia/fragile states, economic impacts of refugees, roles of regional economic unions, and responses in the three case study countries.
From Needs To Assets Charting A Sustainable Path Towards Development In Sub S...Cormac Russell
This document discusses alternative approaches to development in Sub-Saharan Africa, arguing that an asset-based community development (ABCD) approach combined with participatory rural appraisal (PRA), sustainable livelihoods approaches (SLA), and rights-based approaches can help address socio-economic challenges more effectively than traditional needs-based approaches. It outlines how ABCD identifies and builds on community assets rather than just focusing on needs, empowering communities to drive their own development. When combined with PRA, SLA, and rights-based approaches, ABCD can generate sustainable, citizen-led solutions superior to those resulting from outside interventions or needs assessments alone.
The document discusses restricting immigrant access to welfare programs in the United States. It makes three key points:
1) Most economists agree that immigration increases the size of the economy and productivity, and benefits both destination and source countries. Restricting immigrant welfare access would further improve the fiscal impact of immigration.
2) Data shows that non-citizens currently use around 6.7% of total welfare expenditures while making up 7.1% of the population. Limiting their access to programs like Medicaid, SNAP and SSI would have a small positive fiscal effect.
3) Cutting off welfare benefits to non-citizens would affect some immigrants but not as many as expected, since immigrant welfare use is already
This document summarizes a student paper analyzing the concentration of poverty in Charlotte, North Carolina. It discusses how poverty has become concentrated in urban areas due to historical and current factors such as historic housing policies, minimum wage laws, lack of access to good jobs and education, and income inequality. The paper will focus specifically on how these factors apply to Charlotte and have resulted in high levels of poverty among certain demographics, despite the city's overall economic growth. It will analyze poverty statistics in Charlotte and North Carolina and discuss attempts to address urban poverty through policies and programs.
High coordination costs are often identified as the reason for the low quality of public goods available to the poor. We report findings from a unique combination of a village-randomized controlled trial and a lab-in-the-field experiment. An in-depth survey of 1,600 women before and after an intervention establishing membership-based organizations in one of the poorest districts in India shows that the presence of these groups increased villagers’ capacity to address water delivery problems, and improved access to, and quality of, water service. Public goods games with over 200 participants in a subset of control and treatment villages show that the presence of village groups increased cooperation among both members and non-members in treated villages. We find little evidence that cooperation is facilitated by more common tastes among group members. These results suggest that, in contrast to traditional community development programs, membership groups can help poor communities build social capital.
The document provides a summary of the impact of economic sanctions on poverty and economic growth. It finds that sanctions generally fail to achieve their aims and negatively impact ordinary citizens more than political leaders. Specifically:
- Sanctions increase poverty and the poverty gap by harming important economic sectors that employ many low-skilled workers. This disproportionately impacts the most deprived sections of society.
- Sanctions damage income equality and living standards more than they change government behavior. Elites can better negotiate the effects while poorer citizens suffer more.
- In Sudan, sanctions have not changed government actions and poverty is used as a political tool. Sanctions also reduce aid delivery, exacerbating poverty. While oil exports boosted growth, overall
The document discusses the problems caused by inequality in Nepal. It argues that large income disparities inhibit the development of an effective public and divide society into two groups with different priorities. This undermines collective action on common problems and public resources. The author believes that no one should face destitution and all should have access to basic necessities. However, inequality persists in Nepal due to lack of strong leadership, prolonged political instability, and failure to develop the national economy.
This document provides information about the Supportive Services for Veteran Families (SSVF) program. It discusses who is at risk of homelessness among veterans and the challenges of prevention efforts. Key points include that 10% of veterans in poverty become homeless each year, and rates are higher for Hispanic/Latino and African American veterans. Younger veterans aged 18-30 also face higher risks. Nearly half of all homeless veterans are located in just four states. The document outlines eligible services and financial assistance provided through SSVF to help veterans obtain and maintain permanent housing. It distinguishes SSVF from other VA programs by focusing on short-term housing stabilization rather than long-term treatment. The overall goals are to prevent and reduce
1) Rural poverty is often unseen by urban-based professionals due to various biases. They tend to visit areas near cities and roads, missing more remote rural communities where some of the poorest people live. 2) Their brief rural visits are rushed and focused on visible projects, failing to engage with or understand the realities of poorer residents. 3) Multiple factors contribute to these professionals' lack of awareness of rural poverty, including their urban upbringings and training, as well as pressures of time during visits that prioritize activities over learning about people.
How do political elites prepare the civilian population for participation in violent conflict? We empirically investigate this question using village-level data from the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Every Saturday before 1994, Rwandan villagers had to meet to work on community infrastructure, a practice called Umuganda. This practice was highly politicized and, in the years before the genocide, regularly used for spreading political propaganda. To establish causality, we exploit cross-sectional
variation in meeting intensity induced by exogenous weather fluctuations. We find that an additional rainy Saturday resulted in a five percent lower civilian participation rate in genocide violence. These results pass a number of indirect tests of the exclusion restriction as well as other robustness checks and placebo tests.
Higher levels of economic segregation are associated with lower incomes, particularly for black residents. Higher levels of racial segregation are associated with lower incomes for blacks, lower educational attainment for whites and blacks, and lower levels of safety for all area residents.”
A Necessary Good- U.S. Leadership on Preventing Mass Atrocities (1) (1)William Hassall
This document is the final report of an Experts Committee on Preventing Mass Violence convened by the Prevention and Protection Working Group. The report makes 10 recommendations for the next US administration to strengthen efforts to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. The recommendations fall under three themes: 1) recommit to making prevention a priority, 2) prioritize early prevention strategies, and 3) properly implement prevention policies and tools. Specific recommendations include demonstrating strong leadership, increasing funding for early prevention, strengthening policy coordination through the Atrocities Prevention Board, and involving US embassies more in at-risk countries. The overall aim is to further institutionalize genocide and atrocity prevention within the US national security framework.
RPA Spatial Planning and Inequality Fourth Regional Plan RoundtableJonathan Dunnemann
The document summarizes a briefing paper for a roundtable discussion on spatial planning and inequality in the New York metropolitan region. Some key points:
1) Income inequality in the region is at its highest in decades, with incomes declining for the bottom three-quarters of households since 1990 while rising for the top quarter. Poverty has also increased, especially in the suburbs.
2) The region has high levels of both economic and racial segregation. The percentage of lower-income residents living in majority lower-income neighborhoods has increased.
3) Past federal, state and local policies have often deepened inequality unintentionally, through practices like redlining and exclusionary zoning. Spatial planning choices around infrastructure,
In 2015, the world pledged to ‘leave no one behind’ as part of the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development. But millions of people are left behind in humanitarian crises.
Precise figures remain elusive (given measuring need is an inexact art), but the UN Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ Global Humanitarian Overview (OCHA,
2018a) estimates that some 134 million people will require humanitarian assistance worldwide
in 2018. It further estimates that approximately 97 million people would be selected
for international assistance under the joint humanitarian response plans, leaving a 27% gap
which would only be partially met by domestic authorities or other organizations including
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement1
. In a number of the major
operations of 2017, fewer than half of the people estimated to be in need were actually
known to be reached by internationally supported humanitarian assistance.
2016 Citizen's Committee for Children of New York - Community Risk RankingJonathan Dunnemann
This document summarizes a report from the Citizens' Committee for Children of New York that ranks New York City's 59 community districts based on their level of risk to child well-being. It analyzes data across six domains - economic security, housing, health, education, youth, and family/community - to determine where risks are most concentrated. The highest risk districts tend to be in upper Manhattan, the South Bronx, and central Brooklyn. It provides the overall risk ranking and profiles two example districts - Hunts Point in the Bronx, which ranks as highest risk, and Murray Hill/Stuyvesant in Manhattan, which ranks as the lowest risk.
A place-conscious approach can strengthen integrated strategies in poor neigh...Jonathan Dunnemann
Ample research evidence establishes that conditions in severely depressed neighborhoods undermine both the quality of daily life and the long-term life chances of parents and children. Policymakers and practitioners working to improve well-being and economic mobility in poor neighborhoods generally agree on the need for integrated approaches.
Provision of Health Care in Sierra Leone- Answering the trend toward centrali...Emilia Calma
This document discusses health care provision and governance in Sierra Leone. It provides background on Sierra Leone emerging from civil war with limited resources. It then discusses theories of clientelism, where political support is gained through favors and material benefits. Clientelism is argued to be prevalent in highly presidential systems with concentrated power, like in many African countries. This allows leaders to maintain power through directing resources to loyal supporters. The document suggests Sierra Leone's failure to evenly distribute health care and other resources may be due to clientelistic practices that enrich political elites at the public's expense.
This document is the annual report of the Robert Sterling Clark Foundation for 2012. It provides an overview of the Foundation's grants and activities that year across its three program areas: promoting international arts engagement, protecting reproductive rights, and improving the performance of public institutions in New York. A total of $4.78 million was appropriated to 53 grantees. The report describes the goals and strategies within each program area, and provides details on several specific grants made to organizations such as Art21, Bang on a Can, and the Brooklyn Academy of Music.
11.five decades of development aid to nigeria the impact on human developmentAlexander Decker
This document summarizes a journal article that analyzes the impact of development aid on human development in Nigeria over five decades (1960-2010). The article employs statistical analysis of data and finds a negative relationship between development aid and human development in Nigeria, implying that aid has tended to worsen human development outcomes. It reviews literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid and presents an empirical model to analyze the effect of aid on human development and economic growth in Nigeria. Key variables in the model include development aid, human development index, gross domestic product per capita, inflation, life expectancy, and infant mortality.
Five decades of development aid to nigeria the impact on human developmentAlexander Decker
This document analyzes the impact of development aid on human development in Nigeria over five decades from 1960 to 2010. It finds that there is a negative relationship between development aid and human development in Nigeria, implying that aid tends to worsen human development outcomes. The study uses two-stage least squares estimation to analyze data on development aid flows to Nigeria and indicators of human development. It provides context on levels of poverty, education, health, and human development in Nigeria despite large amounts of development aid received.
The Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative (NRI) is a place-based federal approach launched in 2010 to address concentrated poverty through coordinated efforts across five federal agencies: Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, and Treasury. The initiative takes a holistic approach to reducing poverty through initiatives focused on education, housing, public safety, health, and economic development. Key programs under NRI include Choice Neighborhoods, Promise Neighborhoods, and Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation grants.
Socioeconomic Inequality in Brazil and South AfricaAshS1
An exploration of the key factors perpetuating extreme socioeconomic inequality in Brazil and South Africa today and the social policies designed to combat it, using Celso Furtado's understanding of Dependency and development as an analytical guide.
CIHA Blog Conference PP PresententationIsrael Laizer
This document summarizes the key arguments made in a research paper about the impact of foreign aid and faith-based organizations (FBOs) on African governance. It argues that foreign aid and FBOs have historically undermined African sovereignty and governance in several ways: (1) They have weakened accountability by pressuring countries to adopt certain reforms; (2) They have weakened democracy; and (3) They have increased exploitation and undermined the rule of law. Regarding FBOs specifically, the document notes they have undermined governance through their nature of operations, historical roles in Africa, lack of autonomy due to reliance on Western donors, and failure to prioritize governance. It concludes that while FBOs provide important services
Silent Suffering_ How Poor Governance Shapes the Lives of Africa's People (1)...GladstoneShashaoka
The article "Silent Suffering: How Poor Governance Shapes the Lives of Africa's People" delves into the profound impact of inadequate governance on the lives of individuals across Africa. It sheds light on various aspects such as economic hardships, social inequalities, lack of access to basic services like healthcare and education, and the prevalence of corruption. Through real-life stories and data-driven analysis, the article paints a vivid picture of the challenges faced by ordinary Africans due to poor governance. It emphasizes the urgent need for effective leadership, transparency, and accountability in governance to alleviate the silent suffering endured by many on the continent.
The document discusses principles and guidelines for establishing an effective civilian self-defense force (CSDF) to support counterinsurgency efforts. The CSDF aims to involve the local population in protecting their communities from insurgents while freeing up security forces for offensive operations. Key aspects of a successful CSDF program outlined in the document include establishing popular support among those affected, ensuring protections are in place to prevent abuse, and coordinating CSDF activities with security forces and civic projects to consolidate gains.
High coordination costs are often identified as the reason for the low quality of public goods available to the poor. We report findings from a unique combination of a village-randomized controlled trial and a lab-in-the-field experiment. An in-depth survey of 1,600 women before and after an intervention establishing membership-based organizations in one of the poorest districts in India shows that the presence of these groups increased villagers’ capacity to address water delivery problems, and improved access to, and quality of, water service. Public goods games with over 200 participants in a subset of control and treatment villages show that the presence of village groups increased cooperation among both members and non-members in treated villages. We find little evidence that cooperation is facilitated by more common tastes among group members. These results suggest that, in contrast to traditional community development programs, membership groups can help poor communities build social capital.
The document provides a summary of the impact of economic sanctions on poverty and economic growth. It finds that sanctions generally fail to achieve their aims and negatively impact ordinary citizens more than political leaders. Specifically:
- Sanctions increase poverty and the poverty gap by harming important economic sectors that employ many low-skilled workers. This disproportionately impacts the most deprived sections of society.
- Sanctions damage income equality and living standards more than they change government behavior. Elites can better negotiate the effects while poorer citizens suffer more.
- In Sudan, sanctions have not changed government actions and poverty is used as a political tool. Sanctions also reduce aid delivery, exacerbating poverty. While oil exports boosted growth, overall
The document discusses the problems caused by inequality in Nepal. It argues that large income disparities inhibit the development of an effective public and divide society into two groups with different priorities. This undermines collective action on common problems and public resources. The author believes that no one should face destitution and all should have access to basic necessities. However, inequality persists in Nepal due to lack of strong leadership, prolonged political instability, and failure to develop the national economy.
This document provides information about the Supportive Services for Veteran Families (SSVF) program. It discusses who is at risk of homelessness among veterans and the challenges of prevention efforts. Key points include that 10% of veterans in poverty become homeless each year, and rates are higher for Hispanic/Latino and African American veterans. Younger veterans aged 18-30 also face higher risks. Nearly half of all homeless veterans are located in just four states. The document outlines eligible services and financial assistance provided through SSVF to help veterans obtain and maintain permanent housing. It distinguishes SSVF from other VA programs by focusing on short-term housing stabilization rather than long-term treatment. The overall goals are to prevent and reduce
1) Rural poverty is often unseen by urban-based professionals due to various biases. They tend to visit areas near cities and roads, missing more remote rural communities where some of the poorest people live. 2) Their brief rural visits are rushed and focused on visible projects, failing to engage with or understand the realities of poorer residents. 3) Multiple factors contribute to these professionals' lack of awareness of rural poverty, including their urban upbringings and training, as well as pressures of time during visits that prioritize activities over learning about people.
How do political elites prepare the civilian population for participation in violent conflict? We empirically investigate this question using village-level data from the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Every Saturday before 1994, Rwandan villagers had to meet to work on community infrastructure, a practice called Umuganda. This practice was highly politicized and, in the years before the genocide, regularly used for spreading political propaganda. To establish causality, we exploit cross-sectional
variation in meeting intensity induced by exogenous weather fluctuations. We find that an additional rainy Saturday resulted in a five percent lower civilian participation rate in genocide violence. These results pass a number of indirect tests of the exclusion restriction as well as other robustness checks and placebo tests.
Higher levels of economic segregation are associated with lower incomes, particularly for black residents. Higher levels of racial segregation are associated with lower incomes for blacks, lower educational attainment for whites and blacks, and lower levels of safety for all area residents.”
A Necessary Good- U.S. Leadership on Preventing Mass Atrocities (1) (1)William Hassall
This document is the final report of an Experts Committee on Preventing Mass Violence convened by the Prevention and Protection Working Group. The report makes 10 recommendations for the next US administration to strengthen efforts to prevent genocide and mass atrocities. The recommendations fall under three themes: 1) recommit to making prevention a priority, 2) prioritize early prevention strategies, and 3) properly implement prevention policies and tools. Specific recommendations include demonstrating strong leadership, increasing funding for early prevention, strengthening policy coordination through the Atrocities Prevention Board, and involving US embassies more in at-risk countries. The overall aim is to further institutionalize genocide and atrocity prevention within the US national security framework.
RPA Spatial Planning and Inequality Fourth Regional Plan RoundtableJonathan Dunnemann
The document summarizes a briefing paper for a roundtable discussion on spatial planning and inequality in the New York metropolitan region. Some key points:
1) Income inequality in the region is at its highest in decades, with incomes declining for the bottom three-quarters of households since 1990 while rising for the top quarter. Poverty has also increased, especially in the suburbs.
2) The region has high levels of both economic and racial segregation. The percentage of lower-income residents living in majority lower-income neighborhoods has increased.
3) Past federal, state and local policies have often deepened inequality unintentionally, through practices like redlining and exclusionary zoning. Spatial planning choices around infrastructure,
In 2015, the world pledged to ‘leave no one behind’ as part of the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development. But millions of people are left behind in humanitarian crises.
Precise figures remain elusive (given measuring need is an inexact art), but the UN Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ Global Humanitarian Overview (OCHA,
2018a) estimates that some 134 million people will require humanitarian assistance worldwide
in 2018. It further estimates that approximately 97 million people would be selected
for international assistance under the joint humanitarian response plans, leaving a 27% gap
which would only be partially met by domestic authorities or other organizations including
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement1
. In a number of the major
operations of 2017, fewer than half of the people estimated to be in need were actually
known to be reached by internationally supported humanitarian assistance.
2016 Citizen's Committee for Children of New York - Community Risk RankingJonathan Dunnemann
This document summarizes a report from the Citizens' Committee for Children of New York that ranks New York City's 59 community districts based on their level of risk to child well-being. It analyzes data across six domains - economic security, housing, health, education, youth, and family/community - to determine where risks are most concentrated. The highest risk districts tend to be in upper Manhattan, the South Bronx, and central Brooklyn. It provides the overall risk ranking and profiles two example districts - Hunts Point in the Bronx, which ranks as highest risk, and Murray Hill/Stuyvesant in Manhattan, which ranks as the lowest risk.
A place-conscious approach can strengthen integrated strategies in poor neigh...Jonathan Dunnemann
Ample research evidence establishes that conditions in severely depressed neighborhoods undermine both the quality of daily life and the long-term life chances of parents and children. Policymakers and practitioners working to improve well-being and economic mobility in poor neighborhoods generally agree on the need for integrated approaches.
Provision of Health Care in Sierra Leone- Answering the trend toward centrali...Emilia Calma
This document discusses health care provision and governance in Sierra Leone. It provides background on Sierra Leone emerging from civil war with limited resources. It then discusses theories of clientelism, where political support is gained through favors and material benefits. Clientelism is argued to be prevalent in highly presidential systems with concentrated power, like in many African countries. This allows leaders to maintain power through directing resources to loyal supporters. The document suggests Sierra Leone's failure to evenly distribute health care and other resources may be due to clientelistic practices that enrich political elites at the public's expense.
This document is the annual report of the Robert Sterling Clark Foundation for 2012. It provides an overview of the Foundation's grants and activities that year across its three program areas: promoting international arts engagement, protecting reproductive rights, and improving the performance of public institutions in New York. A total of $4.78 million was appropriated to 53 grantees. The report describes the goals and strategies within each program area, and provides details on several specific grants made to organizations such as Art21, Bang on a Can, and the Brooklyn Academy of Music.
11.five decades of development aid to nigeria the impact on human developmentAlexander Decker
This document summarizes a journal article that analyzes the impact of development aid on human development in Nigeria over five decades (1960-2010). The article employs statistical analysis of data and finds a negative relationship between development aid and human development in Nigeria, implying that aid has tended to worsen human development outcomes. It reviews literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid and presents an empirical model to analyze the effect of aid on human development and economic growth in Nigeria. Key variables in the model include development aid, human development index, gross domestic product per capita, inflation, life expectancy, and infant mortality.
Five decades of development aid to nigeria the impact on human developmentAlexander Decker
This document analyzes the impact of development aid on human development in Nigeria over five decades from 1960 to 2010. It finds that there is a negative relationship between development aid and human development in Nigeria, implying that aid tends to worsen human development outcomes. The study uses two-stage least squares estimation to analyze data on development aid flows to Nigeria and indicators of human development. It provides context on levels of poverty, education, health, and human development in Nigeria despite large amounts of development aid received.
The Neighborhood Revitalization Initiative (NRI) is a place-based federal approach launched in 2010 to address concentrated poverty through coordinated efforts across five federal agencies: Education, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Justice, and Treasury. The initiative takes a holistic approach to reducing poverty through initiatives focused on education, housing, public safety, health, and economic development. Key programs under NRI include Choice Neighborhoods, Promise Neighborhoods, and Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation grants.
Socioeconomic Inequality in Brazil and South AfricaAshS1
An exploration of the key factors perpetuating extreme socioeconomic inequality in Brazil and South Africa today and the social policies designed to combat it, using Celso Furtado's understanding of Dependency and development as an analytical guide.
CIHA Blog Conference PP PresententationIsrael Laizer
This document summarizes the key arguments made in a research paper about the impact of foreign aid and faith-based organizations (FBOs) on African governance. It argues that foreign aid and FBOs have historically undermined African sovereignty and governance in several ways: (1) They have weakened accountability by pressuring countries to adopt certain reforms; (2) They have weakened democracy; and (3) They have increased exploitation and undermined the rule of law. Regarding FBOs specifically, the document notes they have undermined governance through their nature of operations, historical roles in Africa, lack of autonomy due to reliance on Western donors, and failure to prioritize governance. It concludes that while FBOs provide important services
Silent Suffering_ How Poor Governance Shapes the Lives of Africa's People (1)...GladstoneShashaoka
The article "Silent Suffering: How Poor Governance Shapes the Lives of Africa's People" delves into the profound impact of inadequate governance on the lives of individuals across Africa. It sheds light on various aspects such as economic hardships, social inequalities, lack of access to basic services like healthcare and education, and the prevalence of corruption. Through real-life stories and data-driven analysis, the article paints a vivid picture of the challenges faced by ordinary Africans due to poor governance. It emphasizes the urgent need for effective leadership, transparency, and accountability in governance to alleviate the silent suffering endured by many on the continent.
The document discusses principles and guidelines for establishing an effective civilian self-defense force (CSDF) to support counterinsurgency efforts. The CSDF aims to involve the local population in protecting their communities from insurgents while freeing up security forces for offensive operations. Key aspects of a successful CSDF program outlined in the document include establishing popular support among those affected, ensuring protections are in place to prevent abuse, and coordinating CSDF activities with security forces and civic projects to consolidate gains.
This document reviews literature on government support for volunteering to inform future community development directions. It identifies key challenges like increasing demand for services due to population growth and aging putting pressure on existing volunteers. Engaging new volunteers is difficult as expectations have changed from long-term commitments to short-term, episodic volunteering. Community organizations are heavily reliant on volunteers but their traditional recruitment methods may not reach potential volunteers. The literature shows volunteering provides economic and social benefits but the traditional model of sustained volunteering is becoming less viable requiring government support to address these issues.
Role of PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION in Developing and Developed Countries.pdfRakeshKumar54547
Public administration in developing countries has helped facilitate modernization through mechanisms established by colonial powers and development theories, though many lacked adequate administrative structures at independence. Developed countries have large, specialized bureaucracies that provide many services but face issues like incoherence between agencies and overbearing politicians. International organizations worked to establish training programs that helped developing countries build administrative skills in the post-colonial period.
Role of PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION in Developing and Developed Countries.pdfRakeshKumar54547
Public administration in developing countries helped facilitate modernization but struggled with a lack of trained civil servants after independence. International organizations worked to establish training programs for civil servants in underdeveloped nations. Public administration in developed countries is characterized by specialized bureaucracies that provide extensive government services and face challenges from incoherence between agencies and overbearing politicians.
The document outlines the key differences between state and non-state institutions. It defines state institutions as those endorsed and controlled by the central government, while non-state institutions are not owned or controlled by the government but can support it. Some examples of state institutions provided are the Department of Agriculture and examples of non-state institutions are banks, corporations, and trade unions. The functions of state institutions include governance, security, infrastructure, and others.
Chapter 1. Substantive Equality for Women the Challenge for Public PolicyDr Lendy Spires
This document discusses substantive equality for women and the challenge for public policy. It makes three key points:
1. International human rights standards define substantive equality, which goes beyond formal equality to emphasize women's enjoyment of rights in practice. Achieving equality requires addressing power inequalities, social norms, and discrimination.
2. Progress on substantive equality requires action in three interrelated areas: redressing socio-economic disadvantage, addressing stereotyping/violence, and strengthening women's agency, voice and participation.
3. Public policies need to work in tandem across economic and social areas to effectively realize women's rights in a holistic way. Macroeconomic policies can support goals like gender equality when designed properly.
This document discusses corruption, including its definition, types, causes, and impacts. In 3 sentences: Corruption is the misuse of power for private gain, which can take many forms like bribery, nepotism, and theft. It is caused by factors like lack of oversight and accountability. The impacts of corruption are wide-ranging, as it undermines democracy, distorts economies, damages public infrastructure and services, and disproportionately harms the poorest people.
Development Social Sector in Ethiopia.pptxJaafar47
Here are some of the key challenges facing the education sector in Ethiopia:
- Shortage of qualified teachers: There is a lack of enough qualified teachers at all levels of education to meet the growing demand. Teacher training programs need to be expanded.
- Inadequate infrastructure and facilities: Schools lack adequate classrooms, furniture, water and sanitation facilities, laboratories and other teaching/learning materials. Rapid expansion of the system has strained infrastructure.
- Poor quality of education: Overcrowded classrooms and shortage of teachers has negatively impacted the quality of education. Learning outcomes need to be improved.
- High dropout and repetition rates: Dropout rates remain high especially for girls and children from poor households. Repetition rates indicate
Good Judgement And Shared Commitment To Long-range Educational Objectivesnoblex1
College and university leaders may recognize that realistic solutions will require an end to "business as usual," and may be reluctant to explore options that will be painful and disruptive on campus. And yet, the growing numbers of young people wanting and needing higher education are (and will be) there, and it is foolish to think that denial is an effective long-run strategy. The ideas advanced later in this paper may ultimately be easier for an outsider to propose than for those enmeshed in the system.
A case can be made for increased student fees in public institutions that enroll large numbers of students from high-income families, provided the higher fees are accompanied by increased need-based aid directed to students from low-income families. This policy calls for the state to redirect some of the savings achieved from reduced institutional appropriations into student financial aid.
The patterns are consistent with short-run decision making under financial duress, not guided by an overarching policy. While "muddling through" might suffice for a few years with limited damage to student access and institutional quality, it is a recipe for disaster if continued, given the demographic tidal wave about to wash over the states. The time has clearly come for a longer view, before what remains of the promise imbedded in the master plan is lost.
Clearly, we face a budget crisis - not a transitory problem that likely economic growth or the usual policy changes can address, but a fundamental and long-term change in the options we can choose from. A small set of essentially fixed demands will soon consume virtually all of the state's unrestricted income. Only a few basic options seem to present themselves, and none appears attractive.
The most one can say about economic projections is that they are subject to considerable uncertainty, and thus the course of wisdom lies in not fixing a policy based on any single estimate of funds likely to be available in future years. The sensitivity analyses of the technical report and the research demonstrate convincingly, however, that higher education is not going to be able to meet its obligations to the next generation of students through increased state support.
Although it would be easy to criticize the actions (or lack thereof) of state and university leaders over the past ten years, there is no point in such a negative exercise. Given human fallibility, several years' experience may have been necessary before the enduring nature of the financial crisis facing higher education could truly sink in. College and university leaders reacted to the events of the last five years defensively and protectively, seeking to preserve educational quality and minimize damage to the institutions.
Source: https://ebookschoice.com/good-judgement-and-shared-commitment-to-long-range-educational-objectives/
500 Words Essay On How Corruption Works in Society500 Word Essay
Corruption is a pervasive phenomenon that plagues societies across the globe. It undermines the rule of law, distorts economic systems, erodes public trust in institutions, and exacerbates inequality. Defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, corruption manifests in various forms, from bribery and embezzlement to nepotism and cronyism. Its detrimental effects are felt in both developed and developing nations, hindering progress, impeding development, and perpetuating poverty.
Poverty is defined as lacking essential resources for a minimum standard of living. It can refer to lacking material resources like food, water, and shelter, or social resources like education, healthcare, and social connections. Poverty may also be defined relatively based on income or wealth disparities. Definitions and measurements of poverty have evolved over time based on changing views of socioeconomic well-being. Poverty is caused by many interrelated factors including lack of resources, illness, natural disasters, wars, and unequal economic structures between developing and developed countries. Alleviating poverty requires both economic growth and investment in people through education, health, and other social services.
1) Violence undermines citizenship by fracturing peoples' sense of identity and access to basic services, weakening the state's authority.
2) Citizens can build democracy by contributing to more effective states through increasing legitimacy, responsiveness, capability, and accountability of institutions.
3) Participatory communication in contexts of violence can both constructively increase interaction and understanding, but also destructively exacerbate divisions and power imbalances if not approached carefully.
Microfinance and poverty reduction nexus among rural women in selected distri...Alexander Decker
This document summarizes a study on the relationship between microfinance and poverty reduction among rural women in Ghana. The study used changes in asset ownership as a proxy for well-being. A survey of 200 women found that access to microfinance was positively associated with acquiring assets, which can improve living standards. Educational attainment and marital status also positively correlated with asset accumulation, while number of dependents correlated negatively. The study concludes that microfinance can empower women financially and contribute to their families and communities by enabling asset building.
Untapped Potential – An Analysis of Online Newsrooms on State Emergency Manag...Dawn Dawson
This document analyzes the online presence of state emergency management agency websites. It finds that these websites are not fully utilizing the potential of the internet and social media to communicate with the public during crises. The document reviews literature on crisis communication and the role of the internet. It examines how emergency management agencies have changed since 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. The analysis suggests that while the internet proved useful for information sharing during crises, many government websites are not strategically designed and lack key journalist-friendly features like centralized newsrooms. Overall, the document concludes that emergency management agencies have more work to do in order to effectively use online tools for crisis communication.
This document provides an overview of stabilization efforts in Afghanistan from 2006-2013 by International Relief & Development (IRD). It defines stabilization as restoring resilient societies through key institutions and practices that ensure continuity of security, governance, rule of law, livelihoods, and services even during shocks. When nations become unstable and lose resilience, outside assistance may be needed to restore these functions. The document discusses IRD's community stabilization programs in Afghanistan, which aimed to increase security, build government capacity, and improve livelihoods through activities like cash for work programs, grants, and capacity building. It concludes with lessons learned, emphasizing the importance of prioritizing security, managing expectations, and investing in local staff.
The document discusses three key factors that influence levels of violence and instability in the Sahel region: 1) the legitimacy of government and political will to combat corruption, 2) marginalization through exclusion from public services and institutions leading to feelings of abandonment, and 3) national and regional instability in largely ungoverned rural areas that have become safe havens for extremists and illicit trafficking. Countering violent extremism (CVE) programs in the region must consider these contextual drivers and protect local autonomy to have sustainable impacts.
The document discusses social inequality in the Philippines and the government's role in addressing it. It defines social inequality as differences in opportunity, status, and treatment among members of society. It also notes that the government has identified widening inequality between rich and poor regions. The government has established several programs through different agencies to help alleviate inequality, such as conditional cash transfers, education initiatives, health networks, and agrarian reform. Reducing social inequality requires combined efforts from the government, organizations, and individuals.
Ethos Insights - Social Mobility Talk Summary by Dr Richard ReevesPeh Gao Xian
Dr. Richard Reeves discussed factors that influence social mobility and policy options to promote it. He argued that relative social mobility decreases over time as societies become more rigid, so governments should prioritize improving mobility. Several factors beyond an individual's control, like parents' education and neighborhood, influence mobility. Broadening the definition of "merit" and increasing access to diverse opportunities could make societies both more meritocratic and just. Experience in the UK showed that clear goals and accountability help policymaking. Governments must balance promoting mobility versus redistribution and consider how policies impact access to opportunities.
American Public Policy An Introduction 11th Edition Cochran Test Bank
PIPS.2014-2015.WhitePaper.JustinDeShazor
1. R. Justin DeShazor
P I P S
The Project on International Peace and Security
Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations
The College of William and Mary
Brief No. 7.2
Reform from a Distance
Strengthening Fragile State Institutions with E-Learning
3. The Project on International Peace and Security
Launched in 2008, the Project on International Peace and Security (PIPS) is an undergraduate
think tank based at the College of William and Mary. PIPS represents an innovative approach to
undergraduate education that highlights the value of applied liberal arts training to producing the
next generation of foreign policy analysts, leaders, and engaged citizens.
PIPS is premised on two core beliefs: (1) rigorous policy-relevant research is a core component
of a student’s education; and (2) when guided by faculty and members of the foreign policy
community, undergraduates can make meaningful contributions to policy debates; their creativity
and energy are untapped resources. To this end, PIPS each year selects six research fellows and
six research interns. Research fellows identify emerging international security challenges and
develop original policy papers. Research interns support the work of the fellows and learn the
craft of conducting policy research and writing briefs.
For more on PIPS, visit www.wm.edu/pips.
Amy Oakes
Dennis A. Smith
Co-directors
4. Reform from a Distance
Strengthening Fragile State Institutions with E-Learning
APRIL 2015
R. Justin DeShazor
P I P S
The Project on International Peace and Security
Institute for the Theory and Practice of International Relations
The College of William and Mary
5. 2
Reform from a Distance
Strengthening Fragile State Institutions with E-Learning
The underdeveloped institutional capacity of fragile states limits their long-term ability to exert
effective administrative authority throughout their territory. If fragile states fail to strengthen
this capacity, they will be unable to meet the basic needs of citizens, prevent extremist and
criminal organizations from filling power vacuums, or facilitate sustainable economic
development. To enhance their institutional capacity and reduce the risk of state failure,
Washington should incentivize U.S. universities to create a comprehensive e-learning curriculum
for civil servants in financial management, project management, and strategic planning.
Introduction
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there was a paradigm shift in how the
United States viewed fragile states—governments that have difficulty administering their own
territory and providing basic services as a result of conflict or ineffective institutions.1
Traditionally, Washington approached the task of strengthening fragile states as primarily a
humanitarian mission designed to assist populations vulnerable to political and social violence,
economic deprivation, and corruption. However, the realization that fragile and failed states pose
a threat to U.S. security and interests has necessitated greater involvement.2
Although shifts in
funding and strategy have not always mirrored rhetoric, there has been a tentative consensus
among U.S. policymakers that strengthening the institutional capabilities of fragile states
prevents the spread of terrorist, insurgent, and criminal networks, and encourages economic
growth.3
Because social services are a highly-visible expression of government efficacy, they are essential
for maintaining popular legitimacy and reducing the risk of civil strife. The weak civil
administrations of fragile states often lack the capability and requisite human capital to carry out
core state functions and provide services. These deficiencies threaten state legitimacy and
prevent states from building public trust.
The United States’ traditional capacity-strengthening efforts have been concentrated in a few
post-conflict states, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan, and tend to wane over the long term. As a
result, the United States’ desire for economic, humanitarian, and strategic progress in fragile
states is frequently undermined by institutional mismanagement, inefficiency, and apathy.4
Because competent civil administrations are necessary for sustainable development and state
legitimacy, achieving and consolidating this progress requires a long-term investment in the
institutional capabilities of fragile states.
In order to strengthen the long-term capacities of fragile state institutions, so that they are
equipped to manage limited resources and build popular legitimacy, Washington should provide
financial incentives to U.S. universities to develop a comprehensive e-learning curriculum for
6. 3
civil servants in fragile states. By leveraging the strengths of the United States’ best universities
and the scalability of an e-learning model, Washington can enhance the human capital in fragile
states at low marginal cost and without stationing U.S. personnel in country. In conjunction with
traditional capacity-strengthening programs, developmental investment, and humanitarian
assistance, this e-learning approach will enhance the resilience of fragile states and reduce the
risk of destabilizing social violence and state failure.
Weak Public Institutions and Fragile States
Within states, the nexus of weak governance and widespread grievance allows extremism
to take root, violent non-state actors to rise up, and conflict to overtake state structures.
– U.S. National Security Strategy, 20155
Strong institutional capabilities—particularly with regards to financial reporting, operations
management, strategic planning, and budgetary development—help prevent popular discontent
and violent instability in fragile states.6
By planning and implementing healthcare, education,
infrastructure, and other social services, a successful civil service demonstrates the ability of
governments to provide tangible benefits to their citizens. These benefits, and the resulting belief
that the state is acting in the interest of its citizens, represent a critical pillar of regime
legitimacy. If fragile state institutions lack the capacity or will to provide these public goods and
services, the resulting vulnerabilities can delegitimize governments in several ways.7
• Spiraling humanitarian crises. In the absence of a capable civil service, unexpected
humanitarian crises may strain limited state resources and disproportionately impact
vulnerable social groups.8
Much like the institutional missteps that delayed cholera
vaccination during Haiti's 2012 epidemic, administrative inefficiencies may complicate
international relief efforts.9
Moreover, limited institutional capacity diminishes the ability
of states to cope with the demands of population growth, extreme weather events, and
refugee influxes—all of which are sources of instability. As with the conflict in Darfur,
described by Nobel Peace laureate Wangari Maathai as “a struggle over controlling an
environment that can no longer support all of the people who must live on it,”
government agents unable to assist affected citizens can exacerbate scarcity-driven
conflicts.10
• Endemic economic underdevelopment. Ineffective public institutions have difficulty
promoting broad-based economic activity through social welfare spending, infrastructure
projects, and effective regulation.11
In many fragile states, public institutions create
inefficient procedural hurdles that prevent citizens from opening businesses or buying
land. For example, the Institute for Liberty and Democracy found that it takes Egyptians
an average of 189 working days and $1,550 to complete the 86 steps required to acquire a
business permit. Though wealthy individuals often use their social connections or
finances to speed up this process, poorer citizens are unable to do so and are forced to
pursue risky extralegal enterprises. 12
The resulting anemic economic growth and
economic disenfranchisement of poor citizens harms the legitimacy of the state and
7. 4
increases demands for destabilizing regime changes, such as those seen during the Arab
Spring, which was caused in part by widespread economic grievances.13
• Lack of public trust. A lack of popular faith in the ability of governments to manage and
provide public resources undermines state legitimacy. Under such circumstances, social
cohesion is reduced and potentially undesirable actors, such as “strongmen” and
extremist groups, are able to win popular support at the expense of the current regime.14
For example, by filling the welfare gap left by the notoriously weak Lebanese state,
Hezbollah has been able to leverage its reputation as a capable service provider to expand
its base of support beyond the Shiite community, maintain a highly-effective militia, and
become a dominant political actor.15
Poor management of government resources may be
particularly harmful if one social group suffers disproportionately and believes that
government services are directed elsewhere.16
The Consequences of Instability in Fragile States on U.S. Security
[Al Qaeda recruits] operate freely in the disaffected communities and disconnected
corners of our interconnected world–the impoverished, weak, and ungoverned states that
have become the most fertile breeding grounds for transnational threats like terror and
pandemic disease and the smuggling of deadly weapons.
– President Barack Obama17
America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.
– President George W. Bush18
Without the social stability facilitated by capable governance, fragile states are more vulnerable
to economic downturns, humanitarian crises, and insurgent or extremist activity. As a result,
fragile states, such as Myanmar, Zimbabwe, and Yemen, regularly descend into civil violence
and are unable to create a secure environment for citizens.19
Such violence further limits the
capacity of government to exert administrative authority throughout its territory and provide
public goods. This instability poses a clear threat to U.S. economic, strategic, and security
interests by stifling economic growth and encouraging extremist, terrorist, and criminal
activities.20
Furthermore, internal instability may have wider regional impacts due to ethnic,
religious, or political linkages, enabling unrest to spread and threaten broader U.S. interests.
• Safe havens for terrorist and extremist organizations. Without comprehensive
administrative control and a reliable security infrastructure, fragile states afford terrorist
organizations safe havens and operational bases. Close proximity to local populations,
particularly those with social grievances, facilitates recruitment and the acquisition of
combat and logistical material.21
Furthermore, the potential development of parallel
institutions, particularly taxation infrastructure and illicit enterprises, may afford
extremist and terrorist organizations deeper and more reliable financial resources.22
In
2012, after reestablishing itself in Afghanistan from its safe havens in Pakistan, the
Taliban raised an estimated $400 million. It taxed economic activity in areas under its
8. 5
control, extorting money from narcotics producers and providing “protection” to aid
contractors.23
• Emergence of transnational criminal networks. Criminal organizations are able to
engage in a variety of illicit enterprises in fragile states unhindered, such as the $435
billion global narcotics trade, the transportation of illicit arms, or the conflict mineral
trade.24
These activities are particularly difficult to combat in states with porous borders
and large urban populations. The propagation of these resources jeopardizes public
health, corrupts public officials, and facilitates violent conflict.25
As seen with the FARC
in Colombia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and ethnic nationalists in Myanmar, criminal
organizations also form mutually beneficial partnerships with terrorist or insurgent
forces.26
• Spread of violent instability. Fragile states, particularly post-conflict states, have limited
capacity to prevent violent extremists, arms, and illicit drugs from crossing their borders.
As a result, previously localized social strife may cause regional instability. In this
manner, the Syrian Civil War unleashed sectarian violence, radicalized repressed citizens,
and empowered extremist organizations, facilitating the rise of ISIS. The violence from
this conflict then spread to neighboring Iraq, where ISIS wrested control of strategic areas
from the Iraqi government in an attempt to create a quasi-state.27
Challenges to Civil Administration in Fragile States
While the Afghan National Army will battle your nation's foes, the battle for Afghanistan
will be won by righteous law enforcement, a functioning judiciary, and an unambiguous
commitment to the rule of law.
– U.S. General John Allen28
Civil administrations in fragile states are often unable to implement effective policy due to
endemic corruption, fiscal difficulties, a lack of legitimacy, and severe shortages of human
capital. These issues reduce the resources available to provide social services, impede reform
efforts, and cause popular disillusionment with fragile state governments. Because public
institutions are necessary for preventing or mitigating destabilizing social conflict, it is in the
United States’ interest to consider these challenges when crafting foreign policy.
• Acute corruption. Corruption, or “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain,” inhibits
institutional efficacy, economic growth, and government legitimacy in fragile states.29
By
capturing revenue streams and diverting government funds away from legitimate
enterprises, corruption reduces the capacity of civil administrations to affect positive
change. Even more concerning, corruption may become entrenched within the structural
processes of governance, leading to kleptocratic systems with little interest in civil
administration, much like those found in Yanukovych-era Ukraine and pre-Arab Spring
Tunisia.30
Because the norms of an institution are readily passed on, the resulting apathy
is difficult to alter.31
9. 6
• Fiscal difficulties. Due to a legacy of corruption, economic underdevelopment, and
ineffective administrative and taxation infrastructure, fragile states often suffer from
fiscal difficulties. As a result, fragile state governments have difficulty hiring and paying
skilled workers, procuring equipment, and providing the basic health, education, and
security required to maintain popular legitimacy.32
Such fiscal crises are particularly
acute in post-conflict states because their economic foundations and human capital are
often degraded by emigration, loss of life, the destruction of productive infrastructure,
and a lack of foreign investment.33
For example, Afghanistan collected less than one
percent of its GDP in revenue in 2000, limiting the state’s annual budget to $27 million,
or roughly $1 per person. As a result, many ministries ceased to function because they
lacked the resources for even rudimentary tasks.34
• Local rejection of national authority. Fragile states, particularly those with a history of
government excess or social violence, face difficulties projecting effective authority
throughout their territory. Fragile states often contend with local groups that reject state
interference or demand near-complete autonomy. Consequently, public institutions in
these states struggle to provide services that build social cohesion.35
Though efforts to
provide social services often suffer from other issues, chiefly corruption and a lack of
local input, public perceptions of government action as an “imposition” hamper efforts.36
Such attitudes have plagued Myanmar’s recent attempts to secure a ceasefire with ethnic
groups and promote development in peripheral regions—both policies that are high
priorities of Thein Sein’s government.37
• Lack of administrative human capital. The capabilities of civil administrations in fragile
states are often limited by a combination of emigration by skilled workers, insufficient
training and education for civil servants, poor institutional incentives for skills
development, and wartime instability in post-conflict states. Therefore, many fragile state
institutions lack the institutional human capital to provide critical services to citizens,
craft reasonable and effective budgets, and develop strategic plans.38
In Pakistan, these
deficiencies have crippled the activities of the National AIDS Control Program (NACP)
since its 2011 devolution to the provincial level. As a result of federal financial
mismanagement and a lack of organizational capacity, Pakistan’s primary AIDS-fighting
body has been unable to organize awareness campaigns, provide services to high-risk
groups, or monitor the early spread of the disease.39
Furthermore, when human capital is lacking, the sustainability of fragile state institutions
is hampered by a lack of experienced staff who could transmit departmental best
practices, public responsibility as an institutional norm, and critical skills to future civil
service cadres.40
Low levels of human capital also make public institutions especially
vulnerable to crises. For example, Haiti’s 2010 earthquake killed an estimated 18 percent
of its civil service and destroyed all but one of its 29 government ministry buildings.
Since Haiti’s institutional capacity was already weak, the loss of experienced civil
servants hindered reconstruction efforts and could limit administrative capabilities over
the long term.41
10. 7
Current U.S. Policies to Strengthen Civil Administration Capabilities
Until recently, capacity building has not been a primary objective of USAID projects.
And what has occurred has been more ad hoc and ‘spotty’ rather than systematic and
strategic.
– Assessment of the Impact of USAID Funded Technical Assistance-Capacity Building, 200742
The United States currently devotes 18 percent of its official development assistance to technical
capacity-strengthening projects; however, these efforts have been heavily concentrated in a few
countries, namely Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.43
For example, the United States partnered
with other donors to help strengthen the ability of 22,000 Afghan community development
councils to plan, manage, and monitor local development projects.44
In spite of these efforts, the
United States’ long-term commitment to capacity-strengthening and governance programs is
questionable, with U.S. foreign assistance frequently shifting to emerging hotspots rather than
solidifying gains.
• Current programs are overly concentrated. States with a recent U.S. military
intervention or humanitarian crisis tend to receive the most development and capacity-
related foreign assistance.45
The Center for Global Development concluded in 2007 that
non-HIV/AIDS foreign assistance to the 49 most fragile states, excluding Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and Iraq, amounted to only $1.1 billion out of the $24 billion foreign aid
request.46
Given that Iraq and Afghanistan were the largest recipients of bilateral aid
overall—and that the State Department and USAID are currently spending $1.25 billion
on Afghan capacity-strengthening programs alone—it is apparent that the United States’
aid posture in fragile states is often reactive and crisis-driven rather than proactive.47
• Long-term U.S. commitment to capacity strengthening is uncertain. Even in the small
subset of fragile states that have attracted funding for capacity-strengthening programs,
such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States’ long-term commitment is uncertain. For
instance, Washington’s total aid disbursements in Iraq have declined from $837.7 million
in 2009 to $133.9 million in 2014, and its democracy and governance-related assistance
to Iraq has declined from $372.7 million to $81.6 million over the same time period.48
This decrease is indicative of a broader trend, particularly among governance-related
projects, of assistance pipelines drying up as the foreign policy priorities of the U.S.
government change.
Without a long-term commitment to capacity strengthening, the United States will continue to
face difficulties preventing popular discontent and civil violence in fragile states. Therefore,
Washington should craft policies designed to strengthen the administrative capabilities of fragile
states over the long term, rather than respond reactively to crises. By doing so, the United States
can enhance fragile state legitimacy and reduce the risk of devastating state failure, especially as
new technologies enable information to be shared cheaply and effectively through online
platforms.
11. 8
E-Learning: Bolstering Public Institutions to Strengthen States
It’s absolutely the case that when I sit here, whether I’m talking to the transitional
Liberian leadership or whether I’m talking with people about Haiti... I mean it’s just
capacity, capacity, capacity, and it’s the same issues time and time again.
– Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice49
We have to be democratic about choices and education. Education shouldn’t be limited to
institutions. It should be open to all.
– Professor Hossam Haick, Israel Institute of Technology50
E-learning has generated excitement among education professionals seeking to expand global
access to high-quality skills training and university-level courses. The same tools may be used to
strengthen government institutions in fragile states. At a fraction of the cost of brick-and-mortar
institutions or traditional capacity-strengthening programs, e-learning is an inexpensive and
politically-expedient means to train civil servants in fragile states remotely through an online
platform. Targeted skills could include best practices in financial reporting, operations
management, strategic planning, and budgetary development. With access to world-class
capability-development courses through an e-learning platform, civil servants will gain the
requisite skills to manage public funds, facilitate economic development, and build public trust
more effectively. By enhancing human capital through such an e-learning program, civil servants
will make better use of fiscal resources, enhancing state legitimacy. Additionally, a focus on
proper and accurate financial reporting, which would empower honest officials to track financial
flows, may reduce the ability of corrupt officials to siphon public funds.
Producing and Evaluating an E-Learning Curriculum
To strengthen the capabilities of fragile state civil servants, the United States should incentivize
U.S. universities to develop a comprehensive e-learning curriculum that targets financial
management, project management, and strategic planning. The selected U.S. universities should
also partner with local universities in target countries in order to tailor the curriculum to local
contexts. Further, public institutions in target countries should incentivize program participation,
as well as adopt a rigorous monitoring and evaluation mechanism. The deployment of this e-
learning curriculum would not replace traditional capacity-strengthening programs, but rather
work in conjunction with them.
• How can the United States incentivize universities to develop an e-learning curriculum?
The United States could provide a variety of financial incentives to U.S. universities to
develop a comprehensive e-learning curriculum for civil servants in fragile states. First,
the United States could provide grant funding for the program, as it currently does in a
variety of national security, development, and education-related spheres.51
Once a pool
of funding has been allocated for this purpose, the United States could begin accepting
grant proposals for developing individual courses within this broader curriculum, or,
alternatively, for producing the curriculum in its entirety. Funding would then be
12. 9
distributed to the university or universities with the strongest and most economical
proposals, perhaps making use of each school’s academic comparative advantage.
Second, if there is significant interest within developed countries for a similar e-learning
program for their own civil servants, the United States could consider granting these
universities the ability to license and sell their curriculum and educational materials
outside of targeted states. Such licensing would provide an additional long-term financial
incentive to produce and maintain quality e-learning products.
• How should the e-learning curriculum be tailored to individual states?
To provide local context for this program, as well as acquire a physical presence in-
country, the United States should provide additional financial resources to facilitate
partnerships between U.S. universities and educational institutions in fragile states. These
partnerships, which would include financial incentives for both the American and local
universities, would enable participating U.S. universities to gain an understanding of
critical customs and institutional inefficiencies, as well as language assistance. Large-
scale country-specific curriculum modifications may not be necessary, but some degree
of local knowledge would improve the quality of the e-learning product. Additionally,
local partners could provide civil servants with further technical and educational
assistance as they complete the e-learning module. Preliminary evidence suggests that
this hybrid model meets the needs of the average student better than those without a
physical complement, while also providing a potential mechanism for meaningful
teacher-student and peer interaction.52
• How can civil servant participation be incentivized?
Public institutions in target countries should create incentives that encourage program
participation.53
Although completion rates for e-learning programs tend to be higher for
professional skill-development courses than courses targeted at the general public, overall
completion rates remain low. There are several strategies to encourage course
completion.54
While mandated completion is one approach, it may be more effective for
these governments to offer financial incentives or preference in promotion decisions. To
ease the financial strain on the target country, the United States could offer to fund all or
part of these incentives. Online and offline civil servant peer networks could be
facilitated to promote cooperation, communication, and course completion. Additionally,
the U.S. universities producing the e-learning curriculum could offer certificates for
course completion, leveraging the strength and prestige of their brand name.
• How should progress be evaluated?
To evaluate the skills of students and detect areas of the e-learning curriculum where
students are lagging, a robust monitoring and evaluation mechanism is required. To
facilitate monitoring and evaluation, core learning objectives, key metrics for student
evaluation, and data gathering and reporting, mechanisms should be developed as the
program is implemented.55
Though “soft” skill attainment and institutional impact are
13. 10
difficult to measure, pre and post-tests on core competencies and student end-of-course
feedback would provide useful data.
Furthermore, partnerships with local educational institutions and government agencies
could facilitate evaluation. Local educational institutions could provide a physical
location for in-person student evaluations and examinations, thus creating safeguards
against cheating. Workplace evaluation of core skills, such as financial reporting, could
also help to determine effectiveness.56
Advantages of an E-Learning Framework
Though this e-learning program for civil servants should not replace traditional capacity-
strengthening and development programs, it possesses several cost and implementation
advantages. Because these programs do not require the United States to maintain a physical
presence in-country, personnel costs and criticisms of U.S. political interference will be low.
Additionally, the United States and its partner institutions can scale-up this program to additional
civil servants at a low marginal cost.
• Minimal on-the-ground implementation. Because e-learning programs do not require
face-to-face interaction between educational professionals and students, capacity-
strengthening programs and their implementing agents are less vulnerable to deteriorating
security situations. These programs may then target areas where they will have the
greatest impact with fewer concerns for the safety of personnel, particularly foreign
nationals. Exemplifying this worry, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction has stated that ten USAID projects with a cumulative value of $899
million are at risk of cancellation due to an unstable security situation.57
Reducing the
need for in-country staff, each of whom carries significant personnel, security, and
logistical expenses, would also serve as a cost-controlling measure.
• Expandable at low cost. Although e-learning curriculums have two to three times more
development costs than classroom-based courses, they can be maintained and expanded
at a low marginal cost.58
For instance, the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School
estimates that its Operations Management course, one of its 14 e-learning programs, had
one-time faculty-related and video-production costs of $70,000. However, the
maintenance costs per offering for this 250,000 student course were approximately
$7,000, including $2,000 for a teaching assistant and $5,000 for technology and
support.59
While language barriers and cultural sensitivities would delay expanding an
established e-learning curriculum designed for foreign civil servants, such an initiative
could be extended at low cost once these issues are overcome.
• Limits perceptions of undue U.S. political influence. By incentivizing prominent U.S.
universities to create an e-learning curriculum, particularly in partnership with respected
local universities in targeted countries, Washington can maintain distance from the
program’s implementation. Potential negative perceptions of U.S. involvement should be
taken seriously and mitigated, especially considering the political overtones of public
14. 11
institution capacity-strengthening and the 2012 and 2013 expulsions of USAID from
Russia and Bolivia, allegedly due to meddling in internal affairs.60
If the United States
were to create and implement a public institution-strengthening e-learning program
independent from universities, the program would be open to such criticism.
Cost Projections
Traditionally, e-learning programs have high start-up costs if content producers do not partner
with an existing distributor, but the costs of enrolling additional students and maintaining courses
tend to be exceptionally low. As a result, tens or hundreds of thousands of students frequently
take part in e-learning courses at little-to-no personal cost for content. Though the individual
costs of accessing computer infrastructure and suitably fast internet should also be taken into
account, the audience for this e-learning program tends to reside in urban areas, where internet
availability is highest and constantly expanding. Furthermore, this e-learning program for civil
servants could be facilitated by in-office access to internet, with time set aside for skills
development.
• E-learning module cost projections. For most e-learning programs, production costs are
paid for by the schools creating course content, the distributor, and third parties. Costs
vary widely depending on the quality of the services offered and whether design and
consulting services are used. At the lower end of the cost spectrum, the University of
Edinburgh’s six online courses each cost $45,000 to develop, followed by $70,000 per
course at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School. Both of these schools
pursued partnerships with the e-learning distributor Coursera.61
At the upper end of the
cost spectrum, Udacity and EdX, the latter run jointly by MIT and Harvard, budget
between $200,000 and $250,000 for each course developed. Partnerships with established
distributors, such as Coursera or EdX, enable content developers to avoid paying for
expensive start-up infrastructure.62
• Expected end-user bandwidth and computer infrastructure requirements. Depending on
the video and interactive functionalities specified for this e-learning curriculum during
development, real-time use over the internet could require connection speeds between
70KB per second and 500KB per second.63
Internet penetration and speed vary between
and within countries. However, internet access that meets these specifications is often
available, or is rapidly becoming available, within the urban areas where many of the
targeted national, regional, and local-level civil servants reside. For instance, in both
Mexico and the Philippines, an internet connection transmitting 6000KB per second can
be purchased for between $25 and $40 per month.64
Even in Pakistan, which held its first
3G and 4G telecom spectrum auction in 2014, a 1000KB per second internet connection
with unlimited data access can be acquired for $15 per month.65
Additionally, the computer infrastructure requirements of most e-learning platforms are
low enough to be within range of many in developing countries. Since 31 percent of all
households in developing countries are connected to the internet and most computers
made within the last decade can run major e-learning platforms, personal capacity for
15. 12
using e-learning platforms is high. As a result, upwards of one-third of participants in
popular e-learning programs already come from the developing world. 66
Conclusion
Public institutions are responsible for providing social services and implementing effective
developmental policies. However, the capabilities of civil servants in fragile states are often
limited by insufficient training and education for civil servants, emigration of educated workers,
post-conflict instability, and poor institutional incentives for skill development. Without
sufficient capacity to perform critical tasks, governments in fragile states lose legitimacy and
have difficulty maintaining social stability. As a result, these governments are more vulnerable to
extremist activity, economic downturns, and humanitarian crises, and may also face popular
discontent that descends into civil violence. By further limiting the capacity of governments to
combat extremist and criminal networks, patrol their borders, and promote sustainable economic
development, this governance-related instability threatens the interests of the United States.
By incentivizing U.S. universities to create a comprehensive e-learning curriculum for national,
regional, and local civil servants in fragile states, the United States can strengthen the financial
reporting, operations management, strategic planning, and budgetary development capabilities of
civil servants. Because these skills have a visible impact on the ability of civil servants to
manage public funds, facilitate economic development, and build public trust, such a program
would significantly increase the legitimacy and resilience of governments in fragile states. And
because Washington would not directly implement this program, but rather incentivize
prominent U.S. universities to develop the curriculum, the program would avoid the political
criticisms that have plagued traditional capacity-strengthening programs. Furthermore, e-learning
programs do not require costly and potentially unsafe on-the-ground implementation and can be
expanded to additional students remotely at an extremely low marginal cost. Therefore, an e-
learning curriculum for fragile state civil servants represents an inexpensive and politically
expedient means to strengthen the stability and legitimacy of fragile states, thus reducing
potential threats to U.S. interests.
1
Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown. Fragile States and US Foreign Assistance: Show Me the Money: Center for
Global Development (2006), 1-2. http://www.cgdev.org/files/9373_file_WP96_final.pdf; Susan E. Rice. The New
National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States: Brookings Institute, 2003.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2003/02/terrorism-rice.
2
"The National Security Strategy of the United States of America: September 2002." White House, accessed
February 17, 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.
3
Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown. Fragile States and US Foreign Assistance: Show Me the Money: Center for
Global Development (2006), 1-2. http://www.cgdev.org/files/9373_file_WP96_final.pdf.; "State Department
Spokeswoman: Call for using Jobs to Combat Terror ‘too Nuanced’ for Critics." Fox News, accessed March 12,
2015, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/02/18/state-department-spokeswoman-call-for-using-jobs-to-combat-
terror-too-nuanced/.
4
Paul Miller. "Finish the Job: How the War in Afghanistan can be Won." Foreign Affairs (January 2011).
16. 13
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67028/paul-d-miller/finish-the-job.
5
"The National Security Strategy of the United States of America: September 2002." White House, accessed
February 17, 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.
6
Ibid
7
Joseph Siegle. "Stabilising Fragile States." Africa Center for Strategic Studies, accessed February 17, 2014,
http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Stabilizing_Fragile_States_Global_Dialogue.pdf.
8
Didrik Schanche. "Scarce Resources, Ethnic Strife Fuel Darfur Conflict." National Public Radio, accessed March
12, 2015, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6425093.
9
Richard Knox. "As Cholera Season Bears Down on Haiti, Vaccination Program Stalls." National Public Radio,
accessed February 18, 2014, http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/03/13/148473966/as-cholera-season-bears-
down-on-haiti-vaccination-program-stalls.
10
Mark Thirlwell and Alan Dupont. "A New Era of Food Insecurity?" Survival 51, no. 3 (2009): 77-88.;Didrik
Schanche. "Scarce Resources, Ethnic Strife Fuel Darfur Conflict." National Public Radio, accessed March 12, 2015,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6425093.
11
Joseph Siegle. "Stabilising Fragile States." Africa Center for Strategic Studies, accessed February 17, 2014,
http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Stabilizing_Fragile_States_Global_Dialogue.pdf.
12
Hernando De Soto. "Key Concepts: Bureaucracy and Corruption." Globalization at the Crossroads: The Power of
the Poor, accessed March 15, 2015, http://www.thepowerofthepoor.com/concepts/c7.php.
13
Susan Rice, "The Threat of Global Poverty," The National Interest no. 83 (2006): 78-80.
14
Melanie Cammett. How Hezbollah Helps (and what it Gets Out of it). Monkey Cage. Washington Post.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/02/how-hezbollah-helps-and-what-it-gets-out-of-
it/.
15
Marc Lynch. Islamists and their Charities. Monkey Cage. Washington Post.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/15/islamists-and-their-charities/.
16
Joseph Siegle. "Stabilising Fragile States." Africa Center for Strategic Studies, accessed February 17, 2014,
http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Stabilizing_Fragile_States_Global_Dialogue.pdf.
17
Barack Obama. "Remarks of Senator Barack Obama to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs." Chicago, Council
on Foreign Relations, April 2007. http://www.cfr.org/elections/remarks-senator-barack-obama-chicago-council-
global-affairs/p13172.; Stewart Patrick. Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3.
18
"The National Security Strategy of the United States of America: September 2002." White House, accessed
February 17, 2014, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf.
19
Vincent Chetail, ed. Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon. (New York: Oxford UP, 2009), 4-13.
20
Ibid
21
Susan E. Rice. The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States: Brookings Institute, 2003.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2003/02/terrorism-rice.
22
Stewart Patrick. "Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?" Washington Quarterly 29, no. 2 (2006): 27.
http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/7034_file_06spring_patrickTWQ.pdf; Juan C. Zarate and Thomas M.
Sanderson. "Opinion: How the Terrorists Got Rich: In Iraq and Syria, ISIS Militants are Flush with Funds." The
New York Times, 2014, sec. Opinion. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/opinion/sunday/in-iraq-and-syria-isis-
militants-are-flush-with-funds.html?_r=0.
23
Rachel Kleinfield. The Corruption Connection. Congress Blog: The Hill's Forum for Lawmakers and Policy
Professionals. The Hill, 2013. http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/312941-the-corruption-
connection; Michelle Nichols. "Taliban Raked in $400 Million from Diverse Sources: U.N." Reuters, accessed
March 12, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/11/us-afghanistan-un-taliban-idUSBRE88A13Y2012091.
24
Holly Ellyatt. "Global Drugs Trade 'as Strong as Ever' as Fight Fails." CNBC, accessed February 24, 2015,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100957882#.
25
David M. Luna. "The Destructive Impact of Illicit Trade and the Illegal Economy on Economic Growth,
Sustainable Development, and Global Security." Paris, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
October 26, 2012. http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rm/199808.htm.
26
Danielle Renwick and Stephanie Hanson. FARC, ELN: Colombia's Left-Wing Guerrillas: Council for Foreign
Relations, 2014. http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272.; "White House
Acknowledges -- but also Denies -- that Taliban are a Terrorist Group." Fox News, accessed March 12, 2015,
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/01/30/white-house-acknowledges-but-also-denies-that-taliban-are-terrorist-
group/.; Barbara Crossette. "Shadowy Militias Spread Terror in Rural Myanmar." PassBlue, accessed March 12,
17. 14
2015, http://passblue.com/2014/10/07/shadowy-militias-spread-terror-in-rural-myanmar/.
27
Robert Rabil. "The ISIS Chronicles: A History." The National Interest (July 17, 2014).
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-isis-chronicles-history-10895?page=2.
28
A Transformation: Afghanistan Beyond 2014, United States Senate. 113th Congress, 2nd sess., April 30, 2014.
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg91298/html/CHRG-113shrg91298.htm.
29
"FAQs on Corruption." Transparency International, accessed March 5, 2015,
https://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs_on_transparency_international/9/.
30
Sarah Chayes. Corruption: The Unrecognized Threat to International Security: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2014. http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/06/06/corruption-unrecognized-threat-to-
international-security/hcts.
31
Tessa Bold, Paul Collier, and Andrew Zeitlin. The Provision of Social Services in Fragile States: Independent
Service Authorities as a New Modality. (Centre for the Study of African Economics: University of Oxford, 2009), 2-
8. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCDRC/Resources/Provision_of_Social_Services_in_Fragile_States.pdf.
32
Paul Miller. "Finish the Job: How the War in Afghanistan can be Won." Foreign Affairs (January 2011).
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67028/paul-d-miller/finish-the-job.
33
Anna Bernasek. "Economic View: War Cut Iraq's National Income 40%." The New York Times, October 24, 2006,
sec. Business. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/24/business/worldbusiness/24iht-iraqcon.3267268.html?_r=1&.
34
Paul Miller. "Finish the Job: How the War in Afghanistan can be Won." Foreign Affairs (January 2011).
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67028/paul-d-miller/finish-the-job.
35
Seth Kaplan. "How Myanmar can Combat Ethnic Conflict." The Christian Science Monitor, accessed March 12,
2015, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Common-Ground/2014/0515/How-Myanmar-can-combat-ethnic-
conflict.
36
"Waiting for the Dividend: Despite Hopes of a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, the Trust Needed for Lasting
Peace Remains a Long Way Off." The Economist (October 5, 2013).
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21587272-despite-hopes-nationwide-ceasefire-agreement-trust-needed-
lasting-peace-remains-long.
37
Seth Kaplan. "How Myanmar can Combat Ethnic Conflict." The Christian Science Monitor, accessed March 12,
2015, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Common-Ground/2014/0515/How-Myanmar-can-combat-ethnic-
conflict.
38
"National Security Strategy: February 2015." White House, accessed March 12, 2015,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.
39
Sehrish Wasif. "Aids Fight in Pakistan Suffers from Bureaucratic Inefficiency." The Express Tribune, December
1, 2012. http://tribune.com.pk/story/473458/aids-fight-in-pakistan-suffers-from-bureaucratic-inefficiency/.
40
Tessa Bold, Paul Collier, and Andrew Zeitlin. The Provision of Social Services in Fragile States: Independent
Service Authorities as a New Modality. (Centre for the Study of African Economics: University of Oxford, 2009), 2-
8. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCDRC/Resources/Provision_of_Social_Services_in_Fragile_States.pdf
41
"Governance, Rule of Law, and Security." United States Agency for International Development, accessed March
12, 2015, http://www.usaid.gov/haiti/governance-rule-law-and-security.
42
Richard Blue. Assessment of the Impact of USAID Funded Technical Assistance-Capacity Building: Final Report.
(United States Agency for International Development, 2007), 8. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacn078.pdf
43
Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown. Fragile States and US Foreign Assistance: Show Me the Money: Center for
Global Development (2006), 1-2. http://www.cgdev.org/files/9373_file_WP96_final.pdf.
44
Capacity: Helping Countries Lead. (Oxfam America, 2010), 8.
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/oa3/files/capacity-helping-countries-lead.pdf.
45
"List of Fragile States and Economies used for Preparing the 2015 OECD Report on States of Fragility."
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, accessed March 2015,
http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/docs/List%20of%20fragile%20states.pdf.
46
Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown. Fragile States and US Foreign Assistance: Show Me the Money: Center for
Global Development (2006), 1-2. http://www.cgdev.org/files/9373_file_WP96_final.pdf.;"FY 07 US Foreign Aid
Budget Request for Fragile States (Bilateral)." Center for Global Development, accessed March 5, 2015,
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/weakstates/07BudgetRequests.pdf.
47
Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown. Fragile States and US Foreign Assistance: Show Me the Money: Center for
Global Development (2006), 1-2. http://www.cgdev.org/files/9373_file_WP96_final.pdf; Key Points – SFRC
Report: Evaluating U.S. Foreign Assistance to Afghanistan. Washington DC: United States Senate, 2012.
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Key%20Points%20on%20Afghanistan%20Assistance%20Report%20
18. 15
06-08-2011.pdf.
48
"Iraq." United States Agency for International Development, accessed March 5, 2015,
http://www.foreignassistance.gov/web/OU.aspx?OUID=167&FY=2009&AgencyID=3&budTab=tab_Bud_Spent&t
abID=tab_sct_Peace_Disbs#ObjAnchor.
49
"A Conversation with Condoleezza Rice." The American Interest 1, no. 1 (September 1, 2005). http://www.the-
american-interest.com/2005/09/01/a-conversation-with-condoleeza-rice/.
50
Mohamed E. Dashan. "How do You Say ‘MOOC’ in Arabic?" Foreign Policy, accessed February 26, 2015,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/11/how-do-you-say-mooc-in-arabic/.
51
"Higher Education Solutions Network (HESN)." United States Agency for International Development, accessed
March 5, 2015, http://www.usaid.gov/hesn.
52
Ronald Legon. “MOOCs and the Quality Question.” Inside Higher Ed. Inside Higher Ed, 2013.
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2013/04/25/moocs-do-not-represent-best-online-learning-essay.
53
Ronald Legon. “MOOCs and the Quality Question.” Inside Higher Ed. Inside Higher Ed, 2013.
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2013/04/25/moocs-do-not-represent-best-online-learning-essay.; Judith
Strother. "An Assessment of the Effectiveness of e-Learning in Corporate Training Programs." International Review
of Research in Open and Distance Learning 3, no. 1 (April, 2002): 1-15.
http://www.irrodl.org/index.php/irrodl/article/view/83/161.
54
Judith Strother. "An Assessment of the Effectiveness of e-Learning in Corporate Training Programs."
International Review of Research in Open and Distance Learning 3, no. 1 (April, 2002): 1-15.
http://www.irrodl.org/index.php/irrodl/article/view/83/161.
55
Ibid
56
Fiona M. Hollands and Devayani Tirthali. MOOCs: Expectations and Reality. Columbia University: Center for
Benefit-Cost Studies of Education (2004), 19-20. http://cbcse.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/MOOCs_Expectations_and_Reality.pdf.
57
Stephen J. Trent. Preliminary Observations and Suggested Actions before Transition of Security Services to
Afghan Public Protection Force: Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (2002), 5.
http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/alerts/2012-03-15-appf-alert.pdf.
58
Fiona M. Hollands and Devayani Tirthali. MOOCs: Expectations and Reality. Columbia University: Center for
Benefit-Cost Studies of Education (2004), 19-20. http://cbcse.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/MOOCs_Expectations_and_Reality.pdf.
59
Christian Terwiesch and Karl T. Ulrich. Will Video Kill the Classroom Star? The Threat and Opportunity of
Massively Open Online Courses for Full-Time MBA Programs. Wharton: University of Pennsylvania: William and
Phyllis Mack Institute for Innovation Management (2014), 9. http://mackinstitute.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Terwiesch_Ulrich_Threat-and-Opportunity-of-MOOCs-for-MBA-Programs.pdf.
60
Natasha Abbakumova and Kathy Lally. "Russia Boots Out USAID." The Washington Post, September 18, 2012,
sec. World. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russia-boots-out-usaid/2012/09/18/c2d185a8-01bc-11e2-b260-
32f4a8db9b7e_story.html; Mariano Castillo. "Bolivian President Evo Morales Orders Expulsion of USAID." CNN,
accessed February 26, 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2013/05/01/world/americas/bolivia-usaid-expelled/.
61
Rachelle Peterson. "What do MOOCS Cost?" Manhattan Institute’s Center for the American University, accessed
February 26, 2015, http://www.mindingthecampus.com/2013/09/what_do_moocs_cost/.; Christian Terwiesch and
Karl T. Ulrich. Will Video Kill the Classroom Star? The Threat and Opportunity of Massively Open Online Courses
for Full-Time MBA Programs. Wharton: University of Pennsylvania: William and Phyllis Mack Institute for
Innovation Management (2014), 9. http://mackinstitute.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Terwiesch_Ulrich_Threat-and-Opportunity-of-MOOCs-for-MBA-Programs.pdf.
62
Rachelle Peterson. "What do MOOCS Cost?" Manhattan Institute’s Center for the American University, accessed
February 26, 2015, http://www.mindingthecampus.com/2013/09/what_do_moocs_cost/.
63
"Bandwidth Requirements for Rosetta Stone® Online in a Networked Environment." Rosetta Stone, accessed
March 5, 2015, http://205.155.33.172/tech/RosettaStoneOnlineBandwidthReq.pdf; "System Requirements." Google,
accessed March 12, 2015, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/78358?hl=en
64
"Phone, Internet, Food – Living Costs in the Philippines." InterNations, accessed March 5, 2015,
http://www.internations.org/philippines-expats/guide/cost-of-living-in-the-philippines-17136/phone-internet-food-
living-costs-in-the-philippines-2.; "Cost of Living in Mexico." Numbeo, accessed March 5, 2015,
http://www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living/country_result.jsp?country=Mexico.
65
"Top 5 Internet Deals." SmartChoice, accessed March 5, 2015, http://www.smartchoice.pk/
66
Hannah Gais. "Is the Developing World ‘MOOC’d Out’?: The Limits of Open Access Learning." Al Jazeera, July
19. 16
17 2014, sec. Opinion. http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/mooc-education-
developingworldivyleave.html; ICT: Facts and Figures. Geneva: International Telecommunications Union, 2014.
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2014-e.pdf; "Average Installed Memory -
XP Vs. Vista." PC Pitstop, accessed March 5, 2015, http://techtalk.pcpitstop.com/2008/04/24/average-installed-
memory-vista-vs-xp/.; "Recommended Browsers and Devices." Coursera, accessed March 5, 2015,
https://learner.coursera.help/hc/en-us/articles/201522945-Recommended-Browsers-and-Devices.