The document discusses three key factors that influence levels of violence and instability in the Sahel region: 1) the legitimacy of government and political will to combat corruption, 2) marginalization through exclusion from public services and institutions leading to feelings of abandonment, and 3) national and regional instability in largely ungoverned rural areas that have become safe havens for extremists and illicit trafficking. Countering violent extremism (CVE) programs in the region must consider these contextual drivers and protect local autonomy to have sustainable impacts.

1. KEY FACTORS
LEGITIMACY OF GOVERNMENT
Legitimacy of government refers to a government’s ability
to rule effectively and its capacity to ensure the rights and
protection of its citizens. It also refers to the political will
of leaders to participate in healthy, inclusive processes of
societal change and root out corruption. In the Sahel, the
legitimacy of government creates reinforcing relationships
with humanitarian aid, natural resource management,
instability, corruption, and the expansion of terrorism.
Pro-active governance and positive political will are major
determinants of levels of violence and instability.
MARGINALIZATION
In the Sahel, levels of marginalization are dependent on
exclusion from public and social services and institutions,
including the denial of political rights and civil liberties. In
this way, marginalization often leads to social and structural
forms of discrimination. This discrimination leads to individuals
feeling abandoned, as though they have no voice or power
to effect change. Considering these feelings, marginalization
leaves individuals vulnerable to extremist ideologies and
recruitment into violent extremist groups.
NATIONAL/REGIONAL INSTABILITY
TIn the Sahel, there are largely ungoverned, rural areas that
have historically been inhabited by pastoralists, nomads,
and farmers. With low population density, these spaces
have become safe havens for extremists, and facilitated the
growth of regional and international illicit drug and weapons
trafficking and increased levels of violent conflict in the
region. This key factor is also largely affected by the legacies
left by colonialism and decreased feelings of autonomy
because of increased border security.
Foreign interventions have the potential for both positive and negative
system-change. Outside actors becoming involved in the Sahel can help create
virtuous cycles, but they can also decrease system-wide resilience. Additionally,
international actors must be cognizant and cautious of the overlap between their
counterterrorism (CT) and CVE measures, and the mixed messaging that such engagement can create
among local, national, and regional stakeholders. CVE programs do not exist in a vacuum; they are part of an
ever-evolving complex system. CVE initiatives must protect and encourage stakeholders’ autonomy, and must be
created considering the local, contextual nature of VE. The relative nature of peacebuilding and an understanding
of international actors’ positionality in the system are vital to sustainable CVE measures in the Sahel.
Countering Violent Extremism:
An Analysis of the Drivers and Programming in the Sahel
This project was conducted on behalf of the Alliance for Peacebuilding as part of an MSP course on Evaluation & Adaptive Management. The authors would
like to thank Ursala Knudsen-Latta, Elizabeth Hume, and the staff at AfP for their support and guidance. Financial support was provided by the J.M. Kohler Fund for
Sustainable Peacebuilding at UWM. Thank you also to Dr. Tim Ehlinger and Rob Ricigliano for your continued guidance and encouragement.
Kayla Christopherson, Bridgette Flores,
Elodie Kassa, Hannah Kiger
This systems map allows for an analysis of the dynamics that perpetuate violent extremism in the Sahel
region and gives insight into key factors and leverage points for future change. Specifically, the system is
significantly impacted by three key factors: legitimacy of the government, regional and national instability,
and marginalization. In coordination with the map, the report looks at U.S. agencies’ and the United
Nations’ efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE) and makes recommendations for future engagement.
LOOKING
FORWARD
SUMMARY
Evolutionary Process As with all peacebuilding sectors, the CVE field is relentlessly
evolutionary. The map pictured here was created Fall 2015, and since then has seen
changes in dynamic relationships. This project is ongoing, and requires continued
research and systemic analysis.
Partnership for
Sustainability & Peacebuilding
psp
msp.uwm.edu
mspmaster of
sustainable peacebuilding
msp.uwm.edu
STAKEHOLDERS
UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT’S
By partnering with a variety of local actors, USAID’s CVE
efforts have downstream effects in the system, including
decreased forced migration, corruption, cross-border
organized crime, and the need for humanitarian agencies.
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S
Through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
(TSCTP), the State Department focuses on community
engagement and capacity building. TSCTP has a
direct effect on the system’s three key factors
and displays great potential for positive,
system-wide change.
THE UNITED NATIONS
The U.N.’s CVE strategy works to target two
primary factors: Legitimacy of Government and
National/Regional Instability. While it affects structural
factors, the downstream effects create attitudinal change
throughout the region.