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Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son
Michael Constantino. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point
that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the
months of September, October and November, 1974. More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan and their
repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit
herself with Ivan.
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita Constantino and against
defendant Ivan Mendez, ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral
damages; and, thesum of P3,000.00, as and by way of attorney's fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.SO
ORDERED. From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration. Ivan Mendez anchored his
motion on the ground that the award of damages was not supported by evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other hand,
sought the recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.In its resolution
dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted Amelita Constantino's motion for reconsideration, and amended the
dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976.
#39 Gashem Shookat Baksh Vs. Court of Appeals
219 SCRA 115 (1993)
FACTS:
Marilou Gonzales filed with the trial court a complaint against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement
of marriage. Respondent alleged that she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community. Petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges.
Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her. She accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married. Petitioner then visited the respondent’s parents in Banaga, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the
marriage. Sometime on August 20, 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartment. She was a
virgin before she began living with him. A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her started
to change. He maltreated her and threatened to kill her, and as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries.
During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already
married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
damages in the amount not less than P45,000, reimbursement for actual expenses of their family who gathered pigs and
chickens for the wedding, attorney’s fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as maybe just and
equitable, which then rendered decision by court in favor of private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not damages is recoverable for breach of promise to marry.
HELD:
In the light of the Article 21, the Supreme Court held that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain
her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
#40 SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997]
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant
vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
Facts:
Simeon Barranco, petitioner, was a bar exam passer. However, before he could take his oath, Patricia Figueroa, respondent,
petitioned that respondent be denied admission. Her complaint was that respondent and she had been sweethearts, a child
of them was born out of wedlock, and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry. Furthermore,
respondent married and settled with another woman. Complainant further claimed that respondent forced complainant into
sexual relations with him.
Issue:
Are the charges set against the respondent enough to disbar him from taking the lawyer’s oath?
Ruling:](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/persons-digested-cases2-231013230610-a04d6ceb/85/Persons-Digested-Cases-2-docx-10-320.jpg)
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#71 G.R. No. L-34954 February 20, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
OPERIANO OPEÑA, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Maura Hiponia was first married to Vicente Madarcos with whom she had two children (Noni and Ansonia). In 1954, Maura
married Operiano Opeῆa (previously convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide) and bore him six (6) children. The
spouses, their children, and Maura’s children by her first marriage lived in a small one-room hut.
On May 1, 1968, Ansonia – 15 years old at that time – went to sleep beside one wall of the house while the spouses slept at
the other end of the house. That night, Opeῆa raped Ansonia three times having a drawn knife on hand. He refused to
listen to the pleadings of Maura. The following morning, the accused warned Ansonia and his wife not to tell anyone about
the incident otherwise, he will kill all of them. Then he goes to Puerto Princesa leaving instructions to Maura to follow him.
Maura, however, went instead to Aborlan to report to the Chief of Police and to seek protection bringing along all the children
except Noni. When Operiano returned to find only Noni was there he killed Noni with a knife. As a result Operiano was
accused of homicide which he pleaded guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether the appellant is not legally married to Maura, therefore there is no abuse of parental authority.
HELD:
The appellant and Maura had represented themselves as husband and wife since 1954. Accordingly, it must be presumed
that "a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Rule
131, Sec. 5 (bb), Rules of Court; Sison vs. Amblada, 30 Phil. 118 [1915].) A mere denial of marriage by the appellant is
utterly insufficient to overcome the presumption. (In re Manare, 23 SCRA 292, 295 [April 29, 19681.) Moreover, when the
appellant testified he described himself as married and he could have been married only to Maura for he referred to her as
his wife in the course of his testimony. He also acknowledged Noni Madarcos to be his step-son several times during his
direct examination.
#72 Aranes vs. Judge Occiano
AM No. MTJ 02-1309, April 11, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law. Occiano is the
presiding judge in Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and Dominador Orobia
on February 17, 2000 at the couple’s residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and
without the requisite of marriage license.
It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of marriage license on January 5, 2000 and was
stamped that it will be issued on January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record also appeared
with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for the alleged marriage.
Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and first refused to conduct the marriage
and advised them to reset the date considering the absence of the marriage license. However, due to the earnest pleas of
the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the postponement of the wedding might aggravate the physical condition of
Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the assurance of the couple that they will provide the
license that same afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the couple that their marriage is valid.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and conducting
it outside his territorial jurisdiction.
HELD:
The court held that “the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized
the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage”.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur, is fined P5, 000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
#77 G.R. No. 186571 . August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/persons-digested-cases2-231013230610-a04d6ceb/85/Persons-Digested-Cases-2-docx-19-320.jpg)
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#91
Jose Reynaldo B. Ochosa, petitioner, vs. Bona J. Alano and Republic of the Philippines, respondent, G.R. No. 167459,
January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 517
Facts:
Bona and Jose got married on October 27, 1973. They acquired no properties and no offspring, but they had a
foundling named Ramona. Jose, being a member of the AFP was often assigned to different places.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup d’ etat and was incarcerated
in Camp Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse and had illicit relations with other men even at the onset of their
marriage while Jose was assigned to various parts of the country. While living in Fort Bonifacio, Bona did not change her
ways and rumours of her sexual infidelity circulated the military community. Jose then got a military pass from his jail
warden to confront Bona, and she and the other man, Gagarin, admitted their act. Jose drove Bona away from their living
quarters and she went to Basilan with their foundling Ramona. In 1994, Ramona came to live with Jose and was supported
by him.
Jose filed a petition seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground her psychological incapacity to fulfil the
essential obligations of marriage.
Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist testified that after conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that
respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder. Rondain further stated that respondent’s psychological
disorder was traceable to her family history. There was no possibility of a cure since respondent does not have an insight of
what is happening to her and refused to acknowledge the reality.
Issue:
Whether or not the Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
Held:
No. There is inadequate evidence that her defects were already present at the inception of, or prior to the marriage.
It did not satisfy the second requisite to constitute psychological incapacity which is juridical antecedence.
Dr. Rondain’s testimony and psychiatric evaluation report do not provide evidentiary support to cure the doubtful
veracity of Jose’s one-sided assertion which might have been tainted with bias for Jose’s cause.
It is stressed that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the
celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles
68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
#92
CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO, Petitioner, vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES andPATRICIO E. YAMBAO,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at the Philamlife Church in Quezon City. On July 11,2003,
after 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC, Makati City, praying that the marriage be declared null
and void by reason of respondent’s psychological incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.]
In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and respondents married life had been
marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latter’s inability to comply with the essential obligations of
married life. She averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and took
care of the children. Respondent, she alleged, did nothing but eat and sleep all day, and spend time with friends.
In his Answer, respondent denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent job, but
was always unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence establishes respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage?
HELD:
NO. The marriage was beset by difficulties, or as petitioner puts it, marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination. It is
a fact, however, that all marriages suffer through the same trials at one point or another, with some going through more
rough patches than others. The Court concedes that petitioner and respondents marriage, as characterized by the former,
may indeed be problematic, even tumultuous. However, that they had gone through 35 years together as husband and wife
is an indication that the parties can, should they choose to do so, work through their problems. None have been shown to
amount to a psychological abnormality. Moreover, even assuming that respondent’s faults amount to psychological
incapacity, it has not been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
#93) Rep. vs. Galang, G.R. No. 168335 (June 6, 2011)
Facts:](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/persons-digested-cases2-231013230610-a04d6ceb/85/Persons-Digested-Cases-2-docx-26-320.jpg)
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Nestor filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage
because she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler. According to the respondent, Juvy suffers from ―mental deficiency, innate
immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection towards him and their child. He posited that
Juvy‘s incapacity was ―extremely serious and ―appears to be incurable. The Prosecutor found no evidence of collusion
between the parties. The RTC set the case for trial. The respondent presented testimonial and documentary evidence to
substantiate his allegations.
Aside from his testimony, the respondent also hired a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological test on
the respondent. According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not respond.
The RTC nullified the party’s marriage. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto explaining that Juvy‘s indolence and lack
of responsibility coupled with her gambling and swindling undermined her capacity to comply with her marital obligations.
The testimony of the psychologist characterized Juvy‘s condition as permanent, incurable and existing at the time of
celebration of her marriage with respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent‘s psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
No. The testimony of the petitioner only showed isolated incidents, not recurring acts. Psychological incapacity must be
more than difficulty, refusal or neglect. It is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of complying with the
responsibility and duty as a married person because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a
fatal or supervening disabling factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage – had to be
shown. The psychological test was uncorroborated and one-sided; therefore, biased towards Juvy‘s negative traits. Simply
put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvy‘s psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
#94 AURELIO V. AURELIO
G.R. No. 175367, [June 06, 2011]
FACTS:
On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of
performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state
of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays
that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. It alleged among others that said
psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to
discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods
alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance of the family.
On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change very
quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was
very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her
needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility
towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life
led to the breakdown of their marriage.
On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed
to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation
of Article 36 of the Family Code.
RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null and void?
HELD:
Petition denied. Marriage is null and void.
RATIO:
First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and
alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and
respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and
expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes.
Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability
for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/persons-digested-cases2-231013230610-a04d6ceb/85/Persons-Digested-Cases-2-docx-27-320.jpg)
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Glenn saw "a loving [,] caring and well[-]educated person" in Mary Grace. We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s
conclusions about the respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side – the
petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.
The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses who can attest to the
antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with
what the law requires. While the Court also commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented
provides inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with
her obligations
#102 Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson Marcos
G.R. No. 13649, Oct. 19, 2000
FACTS: Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos were married twice and had five children. After the
downfall of President Marcos, the respondent left the military service in 1987. Consequently, due to the respondent’s failure
to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and the respondent would hit and beat the petitioner. As a
result, in 1992 they were already living separately. Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of marriage assailing Art. 36 of the
Family Code. The court a quo found the respondent to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC because psychological incapacity had not been established
by the totality of the evidence presented.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Respondent’s violent attitude towards Petitioner Brenda Marcos and their children constituted psychological
incapacity due to his failure to find work to support his family.
RULING:
No. The totality of the respondent’s acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence
presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for such declaration.
PF103 NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA,
respondents. G.R. NO. 127449, MARCH 31, 2005; 454 SCRA 261
FACTS:
Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife were
psychologically incapacitated.
The Regional Trial Court in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and void
ab initio and ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support
in favor of his son in the amount of Php15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded
the care and custody of the minor to his mother.
Petitioner appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals, upon
respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendent lite to Php20,000.00.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the Regional Trial Court decision.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
2. Whether or not it gravely abused its discretion in refusing the increased for support of the child.
RULING:
The provision of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule applies,
which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both
by the RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-
ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution.
With regard to the issues on support raised, these would now be moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, has attained the age of majority.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/persons-digested-cases2-231013230610-a04d6ceb/85/Persons-Digested-Cases-2-docx-31-320.jpg)
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Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law
was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of
the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.
#107 [G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000]
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN, respondent.
The Facts The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial courts judgment, as follows: From the evidence
adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got
married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract
was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was single. There is no
dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man,
having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge
Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was
further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In
the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29,
1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated
when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by
accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of
Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr.
Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused filed an
action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated
May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second marriage with
herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage
with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As shown
by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that the offender
has been previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x
While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been
judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accuseds
prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any judicial
declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva.Since no declaration of the nullity of
his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when
he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his first
wife.
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
A
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.
B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in
relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt.[6]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
#110 Case No.110
TENEBRO vs. CA
(G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004)
FACTS: Petitioner Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The
two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together
continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been
previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage
contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which
he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed
that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/persons-digested-cases2-231013230610-a04d6ceb/85/Persons-Digested-Cases-2-docx-33-320.jpg)
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During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two
children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony
took place to solemnize their union. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment
from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the
Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said
marriage.
ISSUE: 1.Whether or not Marriage between parties can be proved absence of a Marriage Certificate.
2. Whether the Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the second marriage will absolve petitioner from
bigamy.
HELD: The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its
validity are present. There is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the
civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage.
To prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes, documentary evidence presented was
in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen
on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified
to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994,
informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.
On the other hand, that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are
concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is criminally liable for bigamy.
#111 ANTONE V. BERONILLA G.R. No. 183824, [December 8, 2010], 637 SCRA 615.
FACTS: Myrna Antone alleged in her Affidavit-Complaint, filed in March 2007, that she and Leo were married in 1978.
However, Leo contracted a second marriage with Cecile Maguillo in 1991. The prosecution filed the Information in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a criminal case of Bigamy.
Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, Leo moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense because his marriage with Myrna was declared null and void as of April 2007 and became final
and executory on May 2007. Leo argues that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning, there
was actually no first marriage to speak of. Thus, absent the first marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not
constitute the crime of bigamy. The prosecution argued that the marriage of Myrna and Leo on 1978 was not severed prior
to his second marriage on 1991, for which bigamy has already been committed before the court declared the first marriage
null and void on 2007.
The RTC sustained the motion to quash relying on Morigo v. People. Similarly, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether a subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage only after contracting the subsequent marriage is
immaterial in the crime of bigamy.
HELD: Yes.
RULING:
Article 40 of the Family Code has reversed the previous ruling of People v. Mendoza (under the Civil Code) declaring that:
(a) a case for bigamy based on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper because there is no need fora judicial decree to
establish that a void ab initio marriage is invalid; and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect such
that there would be no first valid marriage to speak of after all, which renders the elements of bigamy complete.
In fact, this was exhaustively discussed in Mercado v. Tan. It stated that, under the Family Code a subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then the crime had already been
consummated. Otherwise stated, a person who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity
of a previous marriage is guilty of bigamy.
While, Morigo v. People was promulgated after Mercado, the facts are different. In Mercado, the first marriage was actually
solemnized, although later declared void ab initio. While in Mendoza, no marriage ceremony was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer, because what occurred was a mere signing of a marriage contract through a private act.
Thus, there is no need to secure a judicial declaration of nullity before Morigo can contract a subsequent marriage. The
ruling of Morigo is not applicable to this case.
#113
NOLLORA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES
FACTS:
While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her husband of two years has another wife.
She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., contracted second marriage with a certain
Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/persons-digested-cases2-231013230610-a04d6ceb/85/Persons-Digested-Cases-2-docx-34-320.jpg)
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On November 17, 1988, petitioner Francisco Lim (petitioner) executed an Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney3 in favor of
his brother, Franco Lim (Franco), authorizing the latter to mortgage his share in the property covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 57176,4 which they co-owned.
On February 9, 1989, Banco De Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank released a loan in the amount of P8.5 million by virtue of
the said Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney, which was entered in the Register of Deeds of San Juan, Metro Manila.
On December 28, 1992, the loan was fully paid by Franco.
On June 14, 1996, petitioner, Franco, and their mother Victoria Yao Lim (Victoria) obtained from respondent Equitable PCI
Bank (respondent; formerly Equitable Banking Corporation) a loan in the amount of P30 million in favor of Sun Paper
Products, Inc. To secure the loan, petitioner and Franco executed in favor of respondent a Real Estate Mortgage8 over the
same property.9 However, when the loan was not paid, respondent foreclosed the mortgaged property.
On September 29, 1999, TCT No. 947011 and Tax Declaration No. 96-3180712 were issued in the name of respondent.
Thereafter, a Writ of Possession14 in favor of respondent was issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch
158, in LRC Case No. R-5818.
On January 11, 2001, petitioner filed before the RTC of Pasig a Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO)15 and a Complaint16 for Cancellation of Special Power of Attorney, Mortgage Contract, Certificate of Sale, TCT No.
9470, and Tax Declaration No. 96-31807, with Damages and Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, docketed as
Civil Case No. 68214 and raffled to Branch 267, against respondent, Franco, and Victoria. Petitioner alleged that he did
not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject property to respondent and that his signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage
and the Surety Agreement17] were forged.
On January 19, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 granting petitioner’s Motion for the issuance of a TRO to prevent
respondent from enforcing the Writ of Possession. Thus:
Respondent, for its part, filed an Answer Cum Motion to Dismiss20 contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction to
issue a TRO or a preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the Writ of Possession issued by a co-equal court.21
Respondent also argued that it is not privy to the execution of the Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney22 and that since
there is no allegation that the foreclosure was defective or void, there is no reason to cancel TCT No. 9470 and Tax
Declaration No. 96-31807.23
The writ of preliminary injunction which was issued by the Court as per Order dated 19 April 2001 is hereby made
permanent.
ISSUES:
Hence, this recourse by petitioner raising the following questions:
Did the [CA] err when it held that no evidence was presented to support Petitioner’s claim that his signature was forged
Corollary to the issue above, is the presentation of expert evidence indispensable in order that forgery may be sufficiently
proven in this case
Did the [CA] err when it set aside the Decision rendered by the Trial Court on 04 April 2005 and forthwith dismissed the
complaint filed by Francisco Lim against Equitable PCI Banking Corporation for lack of merit
Did Respondent Bank exercise the diligence required of it in the subject mortgage transaction; if it did not, did Respondent
Bank’s failure violate the rights of Petitioner
In a nutshell, the issues boil down to whether petitioner was able to prove that his signature was forged.
RULING:
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioner failed to prove that his
signature was forged.
Petitioner failed to prove negligence on
the part of respondent.
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in upholding the validity of the mortgage contract.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/persons-digested-cases2-231013230610-a04d6ceb/85/Persons-Digested-Cases-2-docx-42-320.jpg)
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2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara. Trial court granted petition for declaration of Nullity and dissolved
the regime of absolute community of property. Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the
dissolution of the absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Trial court partially granted the motion.
ORIGINAL RULING: “
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the
Family Code.”
NEW ONE:
“A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partitionand distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.”
Petitioner assails the (new) ruling as well arguing that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
WoN the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only
be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of theFamily Code.
HELD:
YES (they erred). Sec 19 (1) of the Rule does not apply. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of
the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
(bigamous) and 45 (voidable) of the Family Code. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under
Art 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common
by petitioner.
#168 Epinosa Vs. Omaña
AC. 9081, Oct. 12, 2011 659 SCRA1
FACTS:
On 17 November 1997, The petitioner Rodolfo Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought Omaña the respondent, a
legal advice on whether they could dissolve their marriage and live separately. Omaña prepared a document entitled
“Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Espinosa and Marantal started implanting the conditions of the said contract. However,
Marantal took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the conjugal property. Espinosa sought the advice
of Glindo, his fellow employee who is a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omana was not valid.
They hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña before the IBP-CBD. Omaña denied that she prepared
the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told
him that it was illegal. Omaña alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to
persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, Omaña violated the CPR in notartizing the “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Whether or not the
Kasunduaan ng Paghihiwalay is valid.
HELD:
The Supreme Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval
is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family
by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what
Omaña did in this case.
#170 THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR., petitioners
vs.
ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, respondents.
G.R. No. 157537
September 7, 2011
Facts:Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio Jr.). Twenty three years later Protacio, Jr.
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go Sr.
(Protacio Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property). Marta Barola Go died wife of Protacio, Sr.
Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio). The petitioners, Heirs of
Go Sr., demanded the return of the property, but Servacio did not follow their demand in which the petitioners decided to
sue Servacio. According to the petitioners,they contend that with the Protacio Jr.‘s renunciation, the property became
conjugal property of thespouses Go Sr. and his wife. They also contend that the sale of the property to Servacio without the](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/persons-digested-cases2-231013230610-a04d6ceb/85/Persons-Digested-Cases-2-docx-50-320.jpg)
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establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion,disallow a DNA
testing.
#209 DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL, respondents. [G.R. No.
122906. February 7, 2002]
Facts:
On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth[2] to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter
with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner was then a nursing student while private respondent was a licensed
physician. They cohabited for a time and lived with private respondents parents and sister in the latters house in Quezon
City where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family.
A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America where she found work as a registered
nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents.
On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-
92-11053, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On March 9, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing
private respondent as legal guardian of the minor, Gardin Faith.
Petitioner avers that she learned of the judgment of the trial court rendered in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 only on April 1,
1992. Accordingly, on May 27, 1992, she filed a petition for relief from judgment. In a resolution dated September 15, 1992,
the trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed tion.
Held: Petitioner thus interposed the instant appeal after the appellate court denied her motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution[4] dated November 29, 1995.
Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of
Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin Faith
cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The trial court is directed to immediately proceed with hearing Sp.
Proc. No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
#210 GUY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Guy v. CA
502 SCRA 151
G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
FACTS:
1. October 29, 1992, Sima Wei, who died intestate, living an estate. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley
Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy.
2. June 13, 1997, Private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, alleged that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition
for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138.
3. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition
alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The
other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by
Remedios and not by counsel.
4. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating
that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged
the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities.
5. The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not
the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the
petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards
RULING:
● Repudiate the inheritance
o A guardian CAN NOT validly repudiate the inheritance the wards because parents and guardians must necessarily
obtain judicial approval that pass through the court's scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having
been authorized by the court, the release or waiver is therefore void.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/persons-digested-cases2-231013230610-a04d6ceb/85/Persons-Digested-Cases-2-docx-63-320.jpg)
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other on October 10, 2002, and the birth certificates of the children, including CCC were amended to legitimated by virtue
of marriage. Citing economic and psychological abuse, AAA filed a petition for issuance of a temporary restraining order
against BBB before the RTC of Pasig City. She alleged in her petition that BBB was an incessant womanizer, who instead of
admitting it, denied it, even cursing her. FFF, BBB’s alleged mistress, humiliated her in public, but BBB did nothing to stop
her, and this became the breaking point. AAA decided to leave the conjugal house, but returned with DDD and EEE, leaving
CCC at a friend’s house. She learned later that BBB stopped paying for the rentals in the condominium, forcing her to move
out; he also became remiss in his support, thus she was forced to seek employment and to secure loans from friends. BBB
also engaged in stalking her, seeking the help of GGG who lives in the same compound with her, and monitoring her every
move, such as examining the guard’s logbook. It also hurt her that BBB exhibited bias in favour of DDD and EEE and
against CCC, when he promised to treat them equally. In his defence, BBB alleged that it was AAA’s irrational jealousy that
caused their frequent arguments, she being suspicious of his female colleagues which contrary to AAA’s suspicions, were
all professional acquaintances of BBB.
The RTC, finding basis in the petition, issued a Temporary Protection Order, giving among others, sole custody to AAA of
the children; for BBB to render support to AAA and the children; visiting rights to him, and to stay away from AAA,
designated family in view of the protection order. BBB challenged the issuance of the TPO insofar as it gave sole custody to
AAA of the children, for him to pay attorney’s fees; cost of litigation, and to post a bond; and the factual findings on his
alleged abusive character.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC order, but remanded it to the RTC to determine sole custody of the children, who
were then more than 7 years of age. Like the RTC, the CA found BBB liable for causing psychological and economic abuse
on AAA with his marital infidelity which exposed AAA to public ridicule and humiliation. BBB also abused AAA in person
and thru text messages. It also brushed aside BBB’s claim to financial incapacity. Thus, BBB appealed to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF SUPPORT SHOULD BE DELETED AS THE SPOUSES’ COMMON BIOLOGICAL
CHILDREN, DDD AND EEE, ARE ALREADY UNDER BBB’S ACTUAL CARE AND CUSTODY SINCE AUGUST 2010 WHEN
AAA LEFT TO WORK AS A NURSE IN THE UNITED STATES
RULING:
BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody, which allegedly renders moot the provision in the
PPO relative to support. BBB points out that CCC is not his biological son. Impliedly then, BBB justifies why CCC is not
entitled to receive support from him.
This Court is not persuaded.
Article 177 of the Family Code provides that “[o]nly children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.”
Article 178 states that “[l]egitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents.”
In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC’s biological father. Such being the case, it was
improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA’s marriage. Clearly then, the legal process of
legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code
pertinently provides:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot
be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB
from making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He should not be allowed to evade a responsibility
arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBB’s
son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child,
including the receipt of his father’s support.
Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from raising before the proper court the issue of CCC’s
status and filiation. However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant petition before this Court now. In Tison v. CA[14], the
Court held that “the civil status [of a child] cannot be attacked collaterally.” The child’s legitimacy “cannot be contested by
way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.”[15] The instant petition sprang out of AAA’s
application for a PPO before the RTC. Hence, BBB’s claim that CCC is not his biological son is a collateral issue, which this
Court has no authority to resolve now.
All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB’s petition, but there exists a necessity to remand the case for the RTC to resolve
matters relative to who shall be granted custody over the three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights,
and the amount and manner of providing financial support.
.
#232 OBEDENCIO VS. MURILLO
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1753 February 5 2004
Nature of action: Complaint against a judge for Unjustly Dismissing Criminal case.
Facts:](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/persons-digested-cases2-231013230610-a04d6ceb/85/Persons-Digested-Cases-2-docx-74-320.jpg)
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- 1. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 #1146 SCRA 446 April 24, 1985 Tañada vs. Tuvera FACTS: Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette. RULING: Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided ” The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. #5 Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., petitioner vs. Republic of the Philippines, respondent GR No. 180705, November 27, 2012, 686 SCRA 472 Facts: In 1971, RA No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company to administer the Coconut Investment Fund. The declaration of martial law on September 1972 saw the issuance of several presidential decrees, purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. One of the issued presidential decrees is PD 755 which declared that the policy of the state is to provide readily available credit facilities to coconut farmers at preferential rates. It also provided for the implementation of the Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the benefit of Coconut farmers. Relevant to the position is the acquisition of the First United Bank (FUB), which was renamed as United Coconut Planters Bank. Concerning the intended acquisition, FUB was the bank of choice which Pedro Cojuangco’s group had control of. Later, a simple direct sale from Pedro to Philippine Coconut Administration (PCA) did not ensue as it was made to appear that Cojuango ahd the exclusive option to acquire the former’s FUB controlling interests. Two deeds emerged from the agreement, one between Pedro Cojuangco group and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and the other between PCA and Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. The PCA-ECJ agreement allegedly contains, inter alia, Cojuangco’s personal and exclusive option to acquire the FUB shares from Pedro and his group. The PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shows PCA’s acquisition of the said option from Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. Issue: Whether or not PCA-Cojuangco agreement cannot be accorded the statute of a law for the lack of the requisite publication. Held: Section 1 of PD No. 755 incorporated by reference, the “Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers” executed by the PCA. It bears to stress that the PCA – Cojuangco Agreement referred to in Section 1 of PD 755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law. And it is well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law. The publication, as further held in Tañada, must be of the full test of the law since the purpose of the publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere date of effectivity would not satisfy the publication requirement. In this case, while it incorporated the PCA – Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1 of PD 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was a copy thereof attached to the decree when published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said Agreement the status of a law. Consequently, we join the Sandiganbayan in its holding that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the Civil Code. #6 NMSMI VS. DND, G.R. NO. 187587 (JUN 5, 2013) FACTS: On January 7, 1986, Pres. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of RA Nos. 274 and 730. At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads: This includes Western Bicutanâ. Proclamation No. 2476 however was published in the Official Gazette without the handwritten addendum. On Aug 27, 1999, members of the Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) praying among others, for the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476. The COSLAP granted the petition. Respondent MSS-PVAO filed a MR with the COSLAP but was denied. It then filed a petition with the CA which granted it. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law. HELD:
- 2. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 UnderArt. 2 of the Civil Code, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase unless otherwise provided refers to a different effectivity date other than fifteen days following the completion of the laws publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. As held in Tanada vs. Hon. Tuvera, A Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. xxx We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect. Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, the publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority. Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. #7) Roy vs CA, G.R. No. 80718 (Jan 29, 1988) Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioner, collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop of private respondents, resulting in injuries to the family and death of their daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop but the former failed to do so. Given the facts, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. This decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. On the last day of the 15-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court. They again filed for a motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied. Petitioner filed for a special civil action for certiorari to declare null and void the previous decision and claimed that the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion. They contended that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette. Issue: Whether or not the rule in the Habaluyas decision, stating that the 15-day period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended, could be applied to the case at bar. Ruling: Yes. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the duty of the counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court, which are published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.’s) and in publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals. #8 Marcella – Bobis vs. Bobis GRN 138509 July 31, 2000 336 SCRA 747 FACTS: Respondent contracted his second marriage to petitioners notwithstanding the subsistence of a previous marriage. A third marriage was allegedly contracted by respondent thus petitioner filed for a bigamy case. Thereafter, respondent filed an action for the absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes prejudicial question. RULING: A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. In this case, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. #10 Republic vs Miller 306 SCRA 183, G.R. No. 125932, April 21, 1999 FACTS: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC of Angeles City a verified petition to adopt Michael Magno Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended
- 3. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 approvalof the petition on the basis of its evaluation. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption. On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens. The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino child when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same. HELD: Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code. (Republic vs Claude A. Miller and Jumrus E. Miller, G.R. No. 125932. April 21, 1999) FINAL JUDGMENT AND SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS #12 TY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000 Facts: In 1977, private respondent Edgardo Reyes married Ana Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony. A church wedding ensued. However, the Juvenile and Domestic Relatives want to declare their marriage null and void ab initio lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. In 1979, before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, Edgardo Reyes married Ofelia Ty in a ceremony officiated by a judge, then a church wedding followed. In 1991,Edgardo reyes filed a civil case with the Regional Trial Court praying that his marriage with Ofelia be declared null and void on the ground that here was no marriage license when they got married. He also averred at that time he married Ofelia, the decree of nullity of the marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only when his civil marriage to petitioner, Ofelia Ty, null and void ab initio. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision Issue: Whether or not the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly Ruling: The second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before the case of Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon, wherein there was no need for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage for lack of license and consent, before such person may contract a second marriage. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case therefore, the Court concluded that private respondent‘s second marriage to Ofelia Ty is valid. Moreover, the provision of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied where to do so would prejudice the vested rights of a party and her children. As held in Jison versus Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there is impairment of vested rights. Petition granted, judgment and resolution declared valid and subsisting. #13 Systems Factors Corporation and Modesto Dean, petitioners, vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Ronaldo Lazaga and Luis C. Singson, respondents, G.R. No. 143789. November 27, 2000 Facts: Petitioner Systems Factors Corporation is a corporation engaged in the business of installing electrical system in buildings and infrastructure projects wherein it employs electricians, engineers and other personnel. Private respondents Ronaldo Lazaga and Luis Singson were employed by petitioner corporation as electricians in one of its projects. Private respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for illegal dismissal and non-payment of backwages, service incentive fees, premium pay, separation pay and other allowances. The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering petitioners to reinstate private respondents to their former positions and to pay them backwages. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA-decision. Petitioners allegedly received the NLRC judgment on August 10, 1999 and a motion for reconsideration thereto was filed on August 20, 1999 On November 25, 1999, petitioners received the NLRC-Resolution dated November 11, 1999 denying their motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari and motion for reconsideration filed was out of time. Held: No. Petition for certiorari was filed within the allotted time which is sixty-day period and was reckoned from receipt of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration should be deemed applicable. Remedial statutes or statutes relating
- 4. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 toremedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes. Statutes regulating to the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to nor arise from procedural laws. It is, therefore, in consonance with the provision in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that these Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. #16 G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971 FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN, defendants, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, defendant-appellant. FACTS: Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00 from defendant Bank dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944. As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in the amount of P1,294.00. Defendant then instituted extra- judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both defendants on August 10, 1959, his main allegation being that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity, July 19, 1944. He sought and was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was made permanent in the decision now on appeal. Defendant Bank in its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 32 and RA 342 unconstitutional ? HELD: Art. 7 of the Civil Code declares that , " When the Courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern." At the time of the issuance of the above Executive Order in 1945 and of the passage of such Act in 1948, there was a factual justification for the moratorium. The Philippines was confronted with an emergency of impressive magnitude at the time of her liberation from the Japanese military forces in 1945. Business was at a standstill. Her economy lay prostrate. Measures, radical measures, were then devised to tide her over until some semblance of normalcy could be restored and an improvement: in her economy noted. No wonder then that the suspension of enforcement of payment of the obligations then existing was declared first by executive order and then by legislation. The Supreme Court was right therefore in rejecting the contention that on its face, the Moratorium Law was unconstitutional, amounting as it did to the impairment of the obligation of contracts. As stated in the opinion of Justice Bautista Angelo: "But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result of the issuance of Executive Order No. 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could affect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured.” Indeed, it would be unjust to punish the creditor who could not collect prior to 1953 because the Debt Moratorium Law was effective, only to be told later that his respect for an apparently valid law made him lose his right to collect. WHEREFORE, the decision is reversed and the suit of plaintiff filed August 10, 1959 dismissed. #17 PF017. BENJAMIN G. TING, petitioner, versus CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, respondent. G.R. NO. 166562, MARCH 31, 2009. FACTS: Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting wed on July 26, 1975. On October 21, 1993, respondent filed a petition before the RTC praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Carmen’s basis of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations: (a) alcoholism; (b) violent nature; (c) his compulsive gambling habit; and (d) Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity. Petitioner denied all these allegations. On January 28, 1998, RTC declared their marriage null and void. Petitioner appealed to Courts of Appeal then on October 19, 2000, CA reversed the trial’s court ruling. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina Case guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997. She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis, Respondent filed a petition for ji resolve respondent’s motion for reconsideration. On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. On November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision. A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by the petitioner, but the same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.
- 5. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 ISSUES: 1.Whether or not the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases; 2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized; and 3. Whether or not the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence. RULING: 1. No, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. 2. No. Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. 3. No. Evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychological unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as the date of marriage eighteen (18) years ago. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari in GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERESED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED #18 Floresca vs Philex Mining Corp. case G.R. No. 30642 April 30, 1985 Perfecto Floresca, petitioner Versus Philex Mining Corporation, respondent Fact: Several miners who while working at the copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Allegedly, Philex was in violation of government rules and regulations for negligently and deliberately failing to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. The heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitioned to the regular court and sued the said company for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions for remedies. Issue: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue Philex? Held: Under the law, petitioner could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the WCA before the WCC, then they will be prohibited from proceeding with a civil case before the regular court. On the contrary, if they sued before the civil court (Article 9 of the civil code) then they would also be prohibited from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. The court also ruled that the dismissal of the case in the lower court be reversed and case is remanded for further proceedings. However, if in case the petitioner won in the lower court, whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. #21 NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014, THIRD DIVISION,(Peralta, J.) Foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. Facts: Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for
- 6. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 thelatter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien. ISSUE: Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law? RULING: Yes, since Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015 the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto. # 24 Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera (GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989; 174 SCRA 653) FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”. ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued. HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. #25 Recio vs. Recio GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437 FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989. On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson. ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy. HELD: The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a
- 7. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 foreigndocument was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either: (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be: (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy. PFR027 #27 Morigo vs. People GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004 FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They got married in 1990 with no actual marriage ceremony. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arrangement since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith ISSUE: Whether or not Morigo must have filed declaration for the utility of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case HELD: Morigo’s Marriage with Barrete is void abinitio considering that there was no actual marraige ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy ad is acquitted in the case filed. #28 G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent. FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code. HELD: The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law. #29 Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010 FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas, a Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to work commitments. He returned to Philippines on April 2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an affair with another man. Gerbert returned to Canada to file a divorce that took effect on January 2006.Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the Philippines. He went to Pasig City Registrar's Office
- 8. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 toregister his Canadian divorce decree but was denied considering that his marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that the foreign divorce must be recognized judicially by the Philippine court. Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of foreign divorce but was subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a Filipino spouse can avail the remedy. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of the foreign divorce decree HELD: The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor of Filipino spouses. The legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the marital status of the Filipino spouse. However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce decree as it is a conclusive presumption of evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with conformity to the alien's national law. The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the foreign divorce decree without judicial order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed to be void. #34 G.R. No. 160600 . January 15, 2014 DOMINGO GONZALO, Petitioner, vs. JOHN TARNATE, JR., Respondent. FACTS: After the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) had awarded on July 22, 1997 the contract for the improvement of the Sadsadan-Maba-ay Section of the Mountain Province-Benguet Road in the total amount of 7,014,963.33 to his company, Gonzalo Construction, petitioner Domingo Gonzalo (Gonzalo) subcontracted to respondent John Tarnate, Jr. (Tarnate) on October 15, 1997, the supply of materials and labor for the project under the latter business known as JNT Aggregates. Their agreement stipulated, among others, that Tarnate would pay to Gonzalo eight percent and four percent of the contract price, respectively, upon Tarnate first and second billing in the project. In furtherance of their agreement, Gonzalo executed on April 6, 1999 a deed of assignment whereby he, as the contractor, was assigning to Tarnate an amount equivalent to 10% of the total collection from the DPWH for the project. This 10% retention fee (equivalent to P233,526.13) was the rent for Tarnate’s equipment that had been utilized in the project. The deed of assignment was submitted to the DPWH on April 15, 1999. During the processing of the documents for the retention fee, however, Tarnate learned that Gonzalo had unilaterally rescinded the deed of assignment by means of an affidavit of cancellation of deed of assignment dated April 19, 1999 filed in the DPWH on April 22, 1999; and that the disbursement voucher for the 10% retention fee had then been issued in the name of Gonzalo, and the retention fee released to him. Tarnate demanded the payment of the retention fee from Gonzalo, but to no avail. Thus, he brought this suit against Gonzalo on September 13, 1999 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mountain Province to recover the retention fee of P233,526.13, moral and exemplary damages for breach of contract, and attorney’s fees. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC because: (1) both parties were in pari delicto; (2) the deed of assignment was void; and (3) there was no compliance with the arbitration clause in the subcontract. RULING: The Court regards the grant of moral damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to Tarnate to be inappropriate. We have ruled that no damages may be recovered under a void contract, which, being nonexistent, produces no juridical tie between the parties involved. It is notable, too, that the RTC and the CA did not spell out the sufficient factual and legal justifications for such damages to be granted. Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on February 18, 2003, but DELETE the awards of moral damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses; IMPOSE legal interest of 6% per annum on the principal of P233,526.13 reckoned from September 13, 1999; and DIRECT the petitioner to pay the costs of suit. #36 ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN MENDIONA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S. BALTAO, respondents. G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993 FACTS: Albenson Ent. delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking Corporation Check was paid and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Check was later dishonored for the reason “Account Closed.” Company traced source of check and later discovered that the signature belonged to one Eugenio Baltao. Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or that the signature was his. Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22. It was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the business establishment, EL Woodworks. No effort from the father to inform Albenson of such information. Rather the father filed complaint for damages against Albenson. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court erred in concluding that private respondent's cause of action is not one based on malicious prosecution but one for abuse of rights under Article 21 of the Civil Code. RULING:
- 9. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 No.Based on Art 19, 20, 21 of the civil code, petitioners didn’t have the intent to cause damage to the respondent or enrich themselves but just to collect what was due to them. There was no abuse of right on the part of Albenson on accusing Baltao of BP 22. In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of petitioners to vex or humiliate private respondent by instituting the criminal case against him. While petitioners may have been negligent to some extent in determining the liability of private respondent for the dishonored check, the same is not so gross or reckless as to amount to bad faith warranting an award of damages. No damages can be awarded in the instant case, whether based on the principle of abuse of rights, or for malicious prosecution. The questioned judgment in the instant case attests to the propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis. Lower courts are hereby cautioned anew against awarding unconscionable sums as damages without bases therefor. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent Baltao. # 37) RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILS., INC. (RCPI), petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LORETO DIONELA, respondents. G.R. No. L-44748 August 29, 1986 Loreto Dionela received a telegram via the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). However, at the end of the telegram were the following: SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN WALA KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO The said portion of the telegram was not intended for Loreto. Loreto sued RCPI for damages based on Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which provides: ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. In its defense, RCPI averred that there was no intention to malign Loreto and that the attached message was an insider joke between RCPI employees which was not meant to be attached. RCPI also disclaimed liability as it insisted it should be held liable for the libelous acts of its employees. Loreto however averred that the said message was read by his employees and it affected greatly his business reputation. The trial court ruled in favor of Loreto. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of RCPI is predicated under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The cause of action of private respondent is based on Articles 19 and 20 of the new Civil Code as well as respondent’s breach of contract thru negligence of its own employees. RCPI is not being sued for its subsidiary liability. RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the humiliating incident now complained of. The company had not imposed any safeguard against such eventualities and this void in its operating procedure does not speak well of its concern for their clientele’s interests. Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is imputable to appellant and not to its employees. RCPI should be held liable for the acts of its employees. As a corporation, RCPI acts and conducts its business through its employees. It cannot now disclaim liability for the acts of its employees. To hold that the RCPI is not liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of its business is to deprive the general public availing of the services of RCPI of an effective and adequate remedy. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the appellate court is hereby AFFIRMED #38 CONSTANTINO VS MENDEZ FACTS: Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita, her mother, sought monthly support from Ivan Mendez including Amelia’s complaint on damages. The latter and Amelita met in a restaurant in Manila where she was working asa waitress. Ivan invited him at his hotel and through promise of marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Amelita,afterwards, he admitted being a married man. In spite of that, they repeated their sexual contact. Subsequently, she becamepregnant and had to resign from work. Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral damages, acknowledging Michael as Ivan’s illegitimate child andgiving monthly support to the latter which was set aside by CA. ISSUE: WON the alleged illegitimate child is entitled for the monthly support. HELD:
- 10. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 AmelitaConstantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael Constantino. Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974. More so, Amelita admitted that she was attracted to Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and not alleged promise to marriage was the moving force to submit herself with Ivan. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Amelita Constantino and against defendant Ivan Mendez, ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages; and, thesum of P3,000.00, as and by way of attorney's fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.SO ORDERED. From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration. Ivan Mendez anchored his motion on the ground that the award of damages was not supported by evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other hand, sought the recognition and support of her son Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted Amelita Constantino's motion for reconsideration, and amended the dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976. #39 Gashem Shookat Baksh Vs. Court of Appeals 219 SCRA 115 (1993) FACTS: Marilou Gonzales filed with the trial court a complaint against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement of marriage. Respondent alleged that she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. Petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges. Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her. She accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. Petitioner then visited the respondent’s parents in Banaga, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. Sometime on August 20, 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartment. She was a virgin before she began living with him. A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated her and threatened to kill her, and as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount not less than P45,000, reimbursement for actual expenses of their family who gathered pigs and chickens for the wedding, attorney’s fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as maybe just and equitable, which then rendered decision by court in favor of private respondent. ISSUE: Whether or not damages is recoverable for breach of promise to marry. HELD: In the light of the Article 21, the Supreme Court held that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. #40 SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997] PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent. Facts: Simeon Barranco, petitioner, was a bar exam passer. However, before he could take his oath, Patricia Figueroa, respondent, petitioned that respondent be denied admission. Her complaint was that respondent and she had been sweethearts, a child of them was born out of wedlock, and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry. Furthermore, respondent married and settled with another woman. Complainant further claimed that respondent forced complainant into sexual relations with him. Issue: Are the charges set against the respondent enough to disbar him from taking the lawyer’s oath? Ruling:
- 11. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 No,the charges required to constitute a disbarment not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. In the case at hand, the allegation on respondent merely suggest a doubtful moral character. Furthermore, complainant continued to see respondent for a while, even after giving birth to the child, thus suggesting that the sexual relations were consensual and not forced. #43 WILLEM BEUMER, , vs. AVELINA AMORES, FACTS : Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC declared the nullity of their marriage. Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated praying for the distribution of properties claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage. During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots W, X, Y, and Z, parcels of land, were registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit since respondent did not have sufficient income. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid. The RTC ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots W, X, Y and Z, petitioner could not have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still attempted to acquire them notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands. This was made evident by the sworn statements petitioner executed purporting to show that the subject parcels of land were purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the herein respondent. Petitioner’s plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase the foregoing properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not having come to court with clean hands. CA affirmed. Petitioner appealed. ISSUE: W/N a foreigner may reimburse his investment in the purchase of Filipino land. HELD: The Court AFFIRMED the rulings of the RTC and CA. In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner against his former Filipina spouse. It held that the foreigner cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latter’s name. Clearly, petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling. The time-honored principle is that he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has-been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. It does not apply if the actionis proscribed by the Constitution. #44 G.R. No. 183026 November 14, 2012 NESTOR N. PADALHIN and ANNIE PADALHIN vs. NELSON D. LAVINA Facts: Laviña and Nestor were both Filipino diplomats assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul General, respectively. In the course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of Laviña was raided twice. Prior to the raids, Bienvenido Pasturan delivered messages to the Filipino household helpers in the ambassador’s residence instructing them to allow the entry of an officer who would come to take photographs of the ivory souvenirs kept therein. Defendant Nestor N. Padalhin admitted in his sworn statement that he caused the taking of pictures of the raw elephant tusks in the official residence of the ambassador. Laviña filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Nestor and his wife. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT NESTOR’S PARTICIPATION IN THE RAID CONDUCTED ON LAVIÑA’S RESIDENCE WAS PROVEN BY CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AS TO WARRANT THE AWARD OF MORAL, EXEMPLARY AND NOMINAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE LATTER’S FAVOR. Ruling: Nestor himself admitted that he caused the taking of the pictures of Lavina's residence without the latter's knowledge and consent. Nestor reiterates that he did so sans bad faith or malice. However, Nestor's surreptitious acts negate his allegation of good faith. If it were true that Lavina kept ivories in his diplomatic residence, then, his behavior deserves condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at bar. Nestor violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of
- 12. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 one'sresidence and he cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion. Hence, the award of damages and attorney's fees in Lavina's favor is proper #48 Emilio Tuason, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Maria Victoria L. Tuason, respondents GR No. 116607, April 10, 1996, 63 SCRA 97 Facts: Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason, respondent, was married to Emilio R. Tuason, petitioner, on June 3, 1972 and had two children. Respondent filed petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity which became manifest only after the celebration of their marriage. Petitioner denied allegations against him and contented that after ten years of marriage, it was only in 1982 that they began to have serious personal differences when he was not accorded the respect due him as a husband. During presentation of respondent’s evidence, petitioner filed his opposition to respondent’s petition for appointment as administrator of the conjugal partnership of gains. Respondent rested her case and the trial court scheduled reception of petitioner’s evidence on May 11, 1990 but was postponed because original counsel was out of the country. It was rescheduled on June 8, 1990 and petitioner still failed to appear. The court declared upon oral motion of respondent, that he had waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented. On June 29, 1990, the trial court declared the nullity of respondent’s marriage to petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the defendant under Section 36 of the Family Code, and the custody of the children was awarded to the respondent. A petition for relief from judgment on the June 29, 1990 decision was filed by herein petitioner. The petition was denied by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not petitioner can invoke Articles 48 and Article 60 of the Family Code. Held: No. Article 48 provides that “In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.” lrriages. He contends that during his absence at the hearings, the court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene and inquire as to the reason of his absence. The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal was only to prevent collusion between the parties and the fabrication of evidences, which was clearly not present due to petitioner’s vehement opposition to the annulment proceeding. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion. Article 60 provides, “No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.” The testimonies of the witnesses presented by respondent were considered factual since the petitioner had failed to attend to the scheduled hearings. The court was bound to render judgment based on the evidence presented by the respondent alone and was final and executory. #49 LEONORA PERIDO,et al,petitioners v. MARIA PERIDO et al, respondents G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975 FACTS: Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot 3 children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had 5 children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943. Margarita is the only living child of the first marriage. The children and grandchildren of the first marriage and second marriage filed a case regarding the partition of the properties of Lucio Perido. Margarita et al asserted that the children and grandchildren of the second marriage were illegitimate. ISSUE: Whether or not the children and grandchildren of the second marriage of Lucio Perido were legitimate, entitling them for the partition of lands. HELD: Yes. The five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate. A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the marriage did not take place. In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place a man and a woman living together as husband and wife are presumed married. #50) People vs. Casao, 220 SCRA 362 Facts: Accused was charged with rape after forcing a 17-old girl to have sexual intercourse with him. The Accused had pointed a "balisong" at victim's neck while satisfying his lust, weakened the victim's resistance and deprived her of the will to escape
- 13. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 andfree herself from accused's lecherous act. The victim did not report the criminal assault on her person by accused until the discovery of her pregnancy by her mother. For his part, accused alleged that he and the victim were sweethearts and that they had been engaging in the sexual act for several times. He contends that he never forced her to have sex with him because he loves her and said act was free and voluntary. He further alleged that he offered marriage but her parents turned down said offer. The Lower court rendered a decision convicting him of rape and thereafter accused filed an appeal. Issue: Whether or not Accused is guilty of the crime charged against him. Ruling: Yes. The attempt by the victim's parents to marry her with the accused-appellant in order to conceal the embarrassment caused to the victim and her family, and for the latter to take responsibility for the consequences of his actions were all proved to be in vain. Accused-appellant never made good his promise to marry the victim. He would not have anything to do with the child born out of his shameful and shameless lechery. This resulted in the delay in filing the complaint for rape against accused-appellant. But it does not, in any way, imply that victim consented to having sexual act with the latter. Needless to say, accused-appellant's offer of marriage to the victim is an admission of his guilt. #51 People Vs. Borromeo 133 SCRA 106 (Persons and Family Relations) Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told Matilde Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her. Taborada told her to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and together, they went to Susana’s hut. There they found Susana’s lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accused-appellant, Elias, said that because they were legally and validly married, he should only be liable for “homicide” and not “parricide”. He thinks such because there was no marriage contract issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that they were married in a chapel by a priest. Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void? Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are presumed married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society. Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the marriage which are : legal capacity and consent. The absence of the record of such marriage does not invalidate the same as long as the celebration and all requisites are present. Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000 #53 SPOUSES JAIME AND TEODORA VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CATALINA I. SANCHEZ, respondents. FACTS: In her complaint below, herein private respondent Catalina Sanchez, claiming to be the widow of Roberto Sanchez, averred that her husband was the owner of a 275 sq. meter parcel of land located at Rosario, Cavite, which was registered without her knowledge in the name of the herein petitioners on the strength of an alleged deed of sale executed in their favor by her late husband on February 7, 1968. Involving the report of a handwriting expert from the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, who found that the signature on the document was written by another person, she prayed that the deed of sale be annulled, that the registration of the lot in the name of the petitioners be cancelled, and that the lot be reconveyed to her. The Court has itself examined the signatures of Roberto Sanchez in the several instruments among the records of this case, including those dating back to before 196811 and is inclined to accept the findings of the handwriting experts. The case invoked by the petitioners is not applicable because the differences in the signatures compared in the case at bar were, as the trial judge found, caused not by time but by the tension gripping Roberto Sanchez when he signed the deed of sale. Our own finding is that the petitioners have not proved the validity and authenticity of the deed of sale or even the circumstances that supposedly led to its execution by the late Roberto Sanchez. On the contrary, we are convinced from the testimonies of the handwriting experts that his signature had been forged on the questioned document and that he had not conveyed the subject land to the petitioners. The deed of sale being a forgery, it was totally void or inexistent and so could be challenged at any time, the action for its nullification being imprescriptible. The private respondent, as the widow of Roberto Sanchez, has the capacity to sue for the recovery of the land in question and is not estopped from doing so.
- 14. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 ISSUE: Whetheror not the vendor's signature on the questioned document had indeed been forged. RULING: The Regional Trial Court of Cavite dismissed a complaint for the annulment of a deed of sale, holding that it was not spurious. It was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which found that the vendor's signature on the questioned document had indeed been forged. #55 PEOPLE vs BORROMEO 133 SCRA 106, 110 (1984) Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo told Matilde Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was killing her. Taborada told her to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in turn, told his father and together, they went to Susana’s hut. There they found Susana’s lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias mumbling incoherently still with the weapon in his hands. The accused-appellant, Elias, said that because they were legally and validly married, he should only be liable for “homicide” and not “ parricide”. He thinks such because there was no marriage contract issued on their wedding day and after that. However, in his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that they were married in a chapel by a priest. Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void? Ruling: In view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married, are presumed married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order of society. Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence of the requisites of the marriage which are: legal capacity and consent. The absence of the record of such marriage does not invalidate the same as long as the celebration and all requisites are present. Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. Thereason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law.(Son Cui vs Guepangco, 22Phil 216). And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exixts in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs Trias, 4 SCRA 849). The appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from 12,000 to 30,000. #56 Fabian Pugeda, plaintiff-appellee vs. Rapael Trias, Miguel Trias, Soledad Trias, assisted by her husband Angel Sanchez, Clara Trias, assisted by her husband Victoriano Salvanera, Gabriel Trias, minors Romulo Viniegra, Gloria Viniegra and Fernando Viniegra, Jr., assisted by guardian-ad-litem, Rafael Trias, Teofilo Pugeda, and Virginia Pugeda, assisted by her husband Ramon Portugal, defendants-appellants, G.R. No. L-16925 March 31, 1962 Facts: The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias are the children of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda are children of the plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer. The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with conjugal partnership funds. lots Nos. 273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate. Upon the death of Maria C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-owners of said properties and defendants managed the properties in trust as co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties above described, acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and one-half thereof be given as share therein of plaintiff. The defendants denied the claims of the plaintiff. Issue: Whether or not Fabian Pugeda is entitled to receive properties on their conjugal property with his wife. Held: The plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed. The express omission of the name of plaintiff here in the above deed of partition as one of the heirs of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer was enough notice to plaintiff that defendants had intended
- 15. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 todeprive him of any share or participation in the properties left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, even of the usufruct that the law assigns to him. The judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio C. Lucero, presiding, decreeing the division of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer among her eight children and plaintiff, is hereby modified in the sense that all of her properties be divided among her eight children at the rate of one-eight per child. As thus modified, the judgment of Judge Lucero is hereby affirmed. Without costs. # 58. Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76, Dec.08, 1999 FACTS: Lucita and Marcio met in Philippine Christian University in Dasmarinas when lucita was Marcio’s teacher for two consecutive semesters. Lucita was 5 years older than Marcio. They later on became sweethearts and eventually got married. They also had a child. Lucita supported the family as her husband continued studying, supported by his parents. The first few years of their marriage went okay. But this eventually changed. Marcio had an extra-marital relation with another student who was also married. When Lucita discovered this, he asked Lucio to end it. He promised to but did not fulfill it and left their conjugal home and child. After some time, he returned to Lucita and she accepted him. However, his attitude worsened when he got employed to Reynold Philippines, Inc. He engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them. On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity. RTC and CA denied the petition. Hence, this case. ISSUE: W/N Marcio is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations HELD: The psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse. Certainly, petitioner-appellant’s declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husband’s character was on the “borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go- lucky,” could not constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. #59 G.R. NO. 178221 DECEMBER 1, 2010 MAY D. AÑONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS AND JOHN DESANTIS NERI, Petitioners vs.. INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, REPRESENTED BY BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, Respondent FACTS: Rodolfo Jalandoni died. His brother filed at the RTC a petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration for the property of Rodolfo. On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation before the intestate court. In the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)--who, in turn, was revealed to be the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis. The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmother--Isabel--was, at the time of Rodolfo's death, the legal spouse of the latter. For which reason, Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo. Both Sylvia and Isabel are dead at the time of the manifestation. The petitioners pray that they may be allowed to intervene on behalf of Isabel. Rodolfo’s brother opposed their intervention because the birth certificate of Sylvia states that Isabel and John were married. Therefore, Isabel’s marriage to Rodolfo was null and void. Petitioners argue, however, that such statement in the birth certificate was not enough evidence to prove a valid marriage between Isabel and John. Further, it was only done to save face and is customary. ISSUE: Do the petitioners have legal standing to intervene in the proceedings? RULING: No, they do not have standing to intervene. The Birth Certificate of Sylvia, which shows that she and John were married, is sufficient proof that indeed they were married. Although there were no marriage certificates given as proof, it is not considered as the sole source of evidence marriage. Sylvia’s birth certificate hold prima facie weight and the petitioners showed no contrary evidence. The reason of ‘face saving / customary’ holds no merit and the courts cannot take judicial notice of a folkway.
- 16. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Therefore,Isabel’s marriage to Rodolfo is void seeing that at the time of the marriage, Isabel was still married to John.. Thus, the descendants of Isabel have no share in the Estate of Rodolfo. #60 PF060 MANUEL VILLATUYA, complainant vs. ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, respondent A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012 FACTS: In her complaint for disbarment against Atty. Rogelio Celera, Rose alleged that Rogelio married his sister Gracemarie on May 8, 1997; despite the subsistence of the marriage, however, Rogelio married one Ma. Ceilo Paz Torres Alba on January 8, 1998, as shown by the certified xerox copies of both certificates of marriages. She posits that Rogelio’s act of contracting marriage while his marriage is still subsisting, constitute immoral and grossly immoral conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar. Despite receipt of an order by the Court requiring him to comment on the complaint, Rogelio failed to do so, hence the Court required him to show cause why he should be held liable. Bansig, meanwhile filed an Omnibus Motion to submit the case for resolution for failure of Rogelio to comment. However, in a Motion, Rogelio alleged that he did not receive a copy of the complaint, alleging that the address indicated was his brother’s address, despite the fact that complainant knew his address when he was their erstwhile counsel. He alleged that the complaint was a ploy to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal case they filed against the complainant, who owes her sister P2M. He requested that he be furnished a copy of the complaint at his new address in Angeles City. Acting on this motion, the Court required Rose to furnish Rogelio with a copy of the complaint, which she did. Again, Rogelio failed to file his comment, thus the Court required him to explain why he should not be held administratively liable. In his Explanation, Rogelio alleged that he had yet to receive a copy of the complaint and requested Rose to furnish him anew of a copy of the complaint. Rose lamented the dilatory tactics being employed by Rogelio and submitted an affidavit of mailing to show she mailed s copy of the complaint to Rogelio. The Court also noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order, indicating that Rogelio had moved out of the address. Rose also manifested that in a case in Tuguegarao City, Rogelio had indicated his office address as Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. Copy of the Show Cause Order was again sent to the said address. Eventually, for failure of Rogelio to file his comment, his comment was dispensed with and the case referred to the IBP for investigation and report. Even with a warrant of arrest issued against him, the return of the warrant proved negative as he cannot be found in the last address he used, which turned out to be a vacant lot. The IBP, after investigation and report, recommended that be suspended from the practice of law for two years. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice. HELD: The Supreme Court have consistently held that the disbarment case is sui generis. It focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing the case. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rest upon the complainant. In this case, complainant submitted NSO- certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latter’s first marriage was still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and third marriages, he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. What was clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still subsisting. Respondent exhibited deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. WHEREFORE, this Court resolves that Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED. #61 Carino vs Carino case G.R. No. 132529 February 2, 2001 SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner versus SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent Fact:
- 17. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Duringthe lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first was in 1969 with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño without marriage license, with whom he had two offspring; and the second was in 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño, with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982. He passed away on November 23 1992. The two Susans filed with the RTC of Quezon City the claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao collected a total of P146,000 while Yee received a total of P21,000. Respondent admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. In 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of Yee. Nicdao appealed to the CA, which the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: 1. Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void? 2. Whether or not, if yes to above, the wife be entitled to collect the death benefits from government agencies despite the nullity of their marriage? Held: Under the Civil Code, when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage as void ab initio. However, since the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. #62 Restituto M. Alcantara, Petitioner, v Rosita A. Alcantara and Hon. Court of Appeals, Respondents G.R. No. 167746: August 28, 2007 FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent got married without securing a marriage license through a fixer. On March 26, 1983, they went to another marriage before a priest in Tondo, Manila without again securing a marriage license. The two parted ways and herein petitioner filed a petition for annulment on the grounds that they were wed without a valid marriage license. Responded denied the claim and said that they did have a marriage license supported by the evidence of a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. The RTC dismissed the petition which was affirmed by the CA. On the appeal, petitioner contends that, even if there was indeed a marriage license, he contends that it holds no bearing because neither he nor respondent has a domicile in Cavite and also there is a discrepancy in the marriage license number and the marriage contract number. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be held void ab initio due to discrepancies in the marriage license. HELD: Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error. It does not detract from the conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. #64 Sy v. CAGR GR 127263 / APR. 12, 2000 330SCRA 550 The facts: Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983,Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the custody of their mother. On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of property. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed acriminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4,1992. RTC and Court of Appeals denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and marriage certificate is contained in their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before
- 18. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 thetrial court. The date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous. Issues: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony? Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity? Held: A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Codeis clearly applicable in this case, there being no claim of exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining issue on the psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized. Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973between petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration # 67 HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANOvs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ (A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001) FACTS: Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. Nonetheless, an investigation of the Judge’staff revelas that there was a prior affidavits of David Manzano and LUzviminda Payao expressly stating that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. On the basis of those affidavits, respondent Judge alleges that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the Marriage solemnized by the respondent judge is valid. HELD: No. Although no license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, such is without any legal impediment to marry each other Also, The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. #68 Ninal vs Bayadog 328 SCRA 122, March 14,2000 FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void? 2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage after his death? HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void. Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
- 19. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 #71G.R. No. L-34954 February 20, 1981 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. OPERIANO OPEÑA, accused-appellant. FACTS: Maura Hiponia was first married to Vicente Madarcos with whom she had two children (Noni and Ansonia). In 1954, Maura married Operiano Opeῆa (previously convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide) and bore him six (6) children. The spouses, their children, and Maura’s children by her first marriage lived in a small one-room hut. On May 1, 1968, Ansonia – 15 years old at that time – went to sleep beside one wall of the house while the spouses slept at the other end of the house. That night, Opeῆa raped Ansonia three times having a drawn knife on hand. He refused to listen to the pleadings of Maura. The following morning, the accused warned Ansonia and his wife not to tell anyone about the incident otherwise, he will kill all of them. Then he goes to Puerto Princesa leaving instructions to Maura to follow him. Maura, however, went instead to Aborlan to report to the Chief of Police and to seek protection bringing along all the children except Noni. When Operiano returned to find only Noni was there he killed Noni with a knife. As a result Operiano was accused of homicide which he pleaded guilty. ISSUE: Whether the appellant is not legally married to Maura, therefore there is no abuse of parental authority. HELD: The appellant and Maura had represented themselves as husband and wife since 1954. Accordingly, it must be presumed that "a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Rule 131, Sec. 5 (bb), Rules of Court; Sison vs. Amblada, 30 Phil. 118 [1915].) A mere denial of marriage by the appellant is utterly insufficient to overcome the presumption. (In re Manare, 23 SCRA 292, 295 [April 29, 19681.) Moreover, when the appellant testified he described himself as married and he could have been married only to Maura for he referred to her as his wife in the course of his testimony. He also acknowledged Noni Madarcos to be his step-son several times during his direct examination. #72 Aranes vs. Judge Occiano AM No. MTJ 02-1309, April 11, 2002 FACTS: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and Dominador Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the couple’s residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite of marriage license. It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of marriage license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record also appeared with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for the alleged marriage. Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and first refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset the date considering the absence of the marriage license. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the postponement of the wedding might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the assurance of the couple that they will provide the license that same afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the couple that their marriage is valid. ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction. HELD: The court held that “the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage”. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5, 000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely. #77 G.R. No. 186571 . August 11, 2010 GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
- 20. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 FACTS:Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. In its October 30, 2008 decision, the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. ISSUE: whetherthe second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. RULING: No. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs. #79 ISIDRO ABLAZA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010 BERSAMIN, J.: FACTS: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner, Isidro Ablaza filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother. HELD: The petition is meritorious. The presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresencianos surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact. The Court Ruled that, being good for no legal purpose other than remarriage, a void marriage invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
- 21. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 WHEREFORE,the petition for review on certiorari is granted. We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals. #87) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MOLINA G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 Facts: On April 14, 1985, Roridel Olaviano Molina, respondent was married to Reynaldo Molina at the Church of Saint Augustine, Manila. From their marriage was borne a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo started exhibiting signs of immaturity and irresponsibility. He preferred to spend more time with the company of his friends and peers on whom he squandered money, he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, ;and he was never honest with the family finances. These circumstances led to frequent quarrels between the petitioner and respondent. In February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, making Roridel the sole breadwinner. On October 1986, they were both estranged from each other. In February 1986, Roridel moved back to Baguio with her parents and a few weeks later Reynaldo abandoned Roridel and left Albert in her custody. Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife because of Roridel‘s strange behavior and insistence to leave his group of friends eve after their marriage, Roridel‘s refusal to perform some of her marital duties like cooking meals, and Roridel‘s failure to run the household and handle their finances. On May, 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Baguio rendered judgment and declared the marriage void. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Regional Trial Court‘s decision. Issue: Whether or not opposing and conflicting personalities is equivalent to psychological Incapacity. Ruling: No. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. In this case, there was no clear showing of the psychological incapacity but the mere showing of difficulty, refusal, neglect and irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities which do not constitute psychological incapacity. In this case, it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. Essentially, it must be shown that they are incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. Although there was evidence that the couple could not get along or are incompatible with each other, there was no evidence of the gravity of the psychological incapacity; neither its juridical antecedence nor incurability. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. #81CARLOS V. SANDOVAL , G.R. NO. 179922, DECEMBER 16, 2008 FACTS: Spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De DiosCarlos. Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Upon Teofilo’s death, 2 parcel of land were registered in the name ofrespondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. An action was instituted by the petitioner against respondents regarding the shares of the land which lead to compromise agreements in relation to the divisions of proceeds in the sale of the lands. Subsequently, in 1995, petitioner commenced an action against respondents before the RTCfor,among others,declaration of nullity of marriage of his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad in view of the absence of the required marriage license. Thereason for the action is that petitioner alleges that the marriage is null and void, thus the lands should be re conveyed to him. Respondents contended in their answer that the lack of details regarding the requisitemarriage license did not invalidate Felicidad’s marriage to Teofilo. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdictionover subject matter.RTC rendered judgment, granting petitioner’s counter motion for summary judgment. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos null and voidab initiofor lack of the requisite marriage license. In the appeal, respondents argued,inter alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad.CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling. Basis: The Civil Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Hence this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos is a real party interest in theannulment of the marriage between his brother Teofilo and Felicidad. RULING: No. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) which became effective on March 15,2003, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. Exceptions: 1. Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (or before March 15, 2003); and
- 22. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 2.Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. #82 Bolos Vs. Bolos G.R. No. 186400, Oct. 20, 2010 634 SCRA 429 FACTS: Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy of said decision was received by respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order declaring its decision declaring the marriage null and void as final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children.The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC declaring the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. Such that petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. ISSUE: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench. HELD: No. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads: "Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily." The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. #83 G.R. No. 106429 June 13, 1994 JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner, vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the RTC, Quezon City, Br. 107, and ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents. Facts: Erwin Espinosa, resopondent, and Joselita Salita, petitioner, were a married couple whose union turned sour. Respondent then filed for annulment on the ground of petitioner’s psychological incapacity. In a bill of particulars, respondent claimed that petitioner was incapacitated in that she was unable to understand the demands by his profession, and by her disturbance, caused respondent to lose his job, amongst other claims. Dissatisfied with this bill of particulars, petitioner argued that the assertions in the same bill where merely legal conclusions and not an averment of ultimate facts as required by the Rules of Court. Thus, without these same facts, petitioner could not intelligently prepare her answer to the petition. Issue: Whether the Bill of Particulars submitted by respondent is of sufficient definiteness or particularity as to enable petitioner to properly prepare a responsive pleading for trial. Ruling: Yes, the bill submitted by the respondent constituted of the ultimate facts and the plaintiff’s cause of action. Ultimate facts has been defined as "those facts which the expected evidence will support." To require more details from private respondent would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. However, a motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. #85 VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner, vs. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent. G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015 Read the 2011 Kalaw v. Fernandez case digest HERE.
- 23. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 PONENTE:Bersamin, J. TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage FACTS: In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD. However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity. HELD: YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case. #86 ROBERT F. MALLILIN v. LUZ G. JAMES OLAMIN & REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: Robert and Luz were married on 1972. In 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Robert disclosed that Luz was already living in California, USA, and had married an American. He also revealed that when they were still engaged, Luz continued seeing and dating another boyfriend, a certain Lt. Liwag. He also claimed that from the outset, Luz had been remiss in her duties both as a wife and as a mother as shown by the following circumstances: (1) it was he who did the cleaning of the room because Luz did not know how to keep order; (2) it was her mother who prepared their meal while her sister was the one who washed their clothes because she did not want her polished nails destroyed; (3) it was also her sister who took care of their children while she spent her time sleeping and looking at the mirror; (4) when she resumed her schooling, she dated different men; (5) he received anonymous letters reporting her loitering with male students; (6) when he was not home, she would receive male visitors; (7) a certain Romy Padua slept in their house when he was away; and (6) she would contract loans without his knowledge. In addition, Robert presented the testimony of Myrna Delos Reyes Villanueva (Villanueva), Guidance Psychologist II of Northern Mindanao Medical Center. While the case was pending before RTC, Robert filed a petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal) which was granted and, later on, affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT). The RTC declared the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz. The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which, later on, reversed the RTC decision. ISSUE: Did the totality of the evidence adduced by Robert prove that Luz ism psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code? RULING: No. The Court has repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to perform one's duties is another. Other than his allegations, however, no other convincing evidence was adduced to prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania, and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological incapacity embodied in Article 36. To stress, Robert’s testimony alone is insufficient to prove the existence of psychological incapacity. The psychological report of Villanueva was insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. There was nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was subjected to a psychological examination. The finding as to her psychological incapacity was based entirely on hearsay and the self-serving information provided by Robert. The decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological incapacity of Luz. The Court stated that interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive should be given great respect by our courts; still it is subject to the law on evidence. To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36 would be legislating from the bench. #87 Republic vs. CA and Molina G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 FACTS: The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
- 24. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 finances.In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity. HELD: The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. #87 G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents. FACTS: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years. On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse. ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity HELD:The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage. The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State. The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. #87 RA 198, February 13, 1997Panganiban Facts : On April 14, 1985, plaintiff Roridel O Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a son. After a year of marriage, Reynaldo show signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and father as he preferred to spend more time with his friends, depended on his parents for assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances resulting in frequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage which was affirmed by CA. Issue : Do irreconcilable differences and conflicting personality constitute psychological incapacity?
- 25. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Ruling: There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be more of a “difficulty” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitute psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness. The evidence merely adduced that Roridel and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem, neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: ● The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. ● The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. ● The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. ● Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically of clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. ● Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. ● The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non- complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven be evidence and included in the text of the decision. ● Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from the 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983. ● The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. Judgment reversed and set aside. #88 G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent. FACTS: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their child. Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation. HELD: The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshio’s illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
- 26. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 #91 JoseReynaldo B. Ochosa, petitioner, vs. Bona J. Alano and Republic of the Philippines, respondent, G.R. No. 167459, January 26, 2011, 640 SCRA 517 Facts: Bona and Jose got married on October 27, 1973. They acquired no properties and no offspring, but they had a foundling named Ramona. Jose, being a member of the AFP was often assigned to different places. In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the failed coup d’ etat and was incarcerated in Camp Crame. It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse and had illicit relations with other men even at the onset of their marriage while Jose was assigned to various parts of the country. While living in Fort Bonifacio, Bona did not change her ways and rumours of her sexual infidelity circulated the military community. Jose then got a military pass from his jail warden to confront Bona, and she and the other man, Gagarin, admitted their act. Jose drove Bona away from their living quarters and she went to Basilan with their foundling Ramona. In 1994, Ramona came to live with Jose and was supported by him. Jose filed a petition seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground her psychological incapacity to fulfil the essential obligations of marriage. Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist testified that after conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder. Rondain further stated that respondent’s psychological disorder was traceable to her family history. There was no possibility of a cure since respondent does not have an insight of what is happening to her and refused to acknowledge the reality. Issue: Whether or not the Bona should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations Held: No. There is inadequate evidence that her defects were already present at the inception of, or prior to the marriage. It did not satisfy the second requisite to constitute psychological incapacity which is juridical antecedence. Dr. Rondain’s testimony and psychiatric evaluation report do not provide evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Jose’s one-sided assertion which might have been tainted with bias for Jose’s cause. It is stressed that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. #92 CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO, Petitioner, vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES andPATRICIO E. YAMBAO, Respondents. FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at the Philamlife Church in Quezon City. On July 11,2003, after 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC, Makati City, praying that the marriage be declared null and void by reason of respondent’s psychological incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.] In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and respondents married life had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latter’s inability to comply with the essential obligations of married life. She averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and took care of the children. Respondent, she alleged, did nothing but eat and sleep all day, and spend time with friends. In his Answer, respondent denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent job, but was always unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications. ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence establishes respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage? HELD: NO. The marriage was beset by difficulties, or as petitioner puts it, marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination. It is a fact, however, that all marriages suffer through the same trials at one point or another, with some going through more rough patches than others. The Court concedes that petitioner and respondents marriage, as characterized by the former, may indeed be problematic, even tumultuous. However, that they had gone through 35 years together as husband and wife is an indication that the parties can, should they choose to do so, work through their problems. None have been shown to amount to a psychological abnormality. Moreover, even assuming that respondent’s faults amount to psychological incapacity, it has not been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. #93) Rep. vs. Galang, G.R. No. 168335 (June 6, 2011) Facts:
- 27. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Nestorfiled with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage because she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler. According to the respondent, Juvy suffers from ―mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection towards him and their child. He posited that Juvy‘s incapacity was ―extremely serious and ―appears to be incurable. The Prosecutor found no evidence of collusion between the parties. The RTC set the case for trial. The respondent presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his allegations. Aside from his testimony, the respondent also hired a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not respond. The RTC nullified the party’s marriage. The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto explaining that Juvy‘s indolence and lack of responsibility coupled with her gambling and swindling undermined her capacity to comply with her marital obligations. The testimony of the psychologist characterized Juvy‘s condition as permanent, incurable and existing at the time of celebration of her marriage with respondent. Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent‘s psychological incapacity. Ruling: No. The testimony of the petitioner only showed isolated incidents, not recurring acts. Psychological incapacity must be more than difficulty, refusal or neglect. It is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of complying with the responsibility and duty as a married person because of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a fatal or supervening disabling factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage – had to be shown. The psychological test was uncorroborated and one-sided; therefore, biased towards Juvy‘s negative traits. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvy‘s psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage. #94 AURELIO V. AURELIO G.R. No. 175367, [June 06, 2011] FACTS: On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In her petition, respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital obligations. In addition, respondent alleged that such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and even during the time of the marriage ceremony. Hence, respondent prays that her marriage be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. It alleged among others that said psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband; his lack of drive and incapacity to discern the plight of his working wife. The husband exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife. His moods alternated between hostile defiance and contrition. He refused to assist in the maintenance of the family. On the side of the wife on the other hand, is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely. Her feelings change very quickly – from joy to fury to misery to despair, depending on her day-to-day experiences. Her tolerance for boredom was very low. She was emotionally immature; she cannot stand frustration or disappointment. She cannot delay to gratify her needs. She gets upset when she cannot get what she wants. Self-indulgence lifts her spirits immensely. Their hostility towards each other distorted their relationship. Their incapacity to accept and fulfill the essential obligations of marital life led to the breakdown of their marriage. On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner principally argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action and that it failed to meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC denied the petition. CA affirmed. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage shall be declared null and void? HELD: Petition denied. Marriage is null and void. RATIO: First, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. We agree with the manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of their psychological incapacity. Moreover, a competent and expert psychologist clinically identified the same as the root causes. Second, the petition likewise alleged that the illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The psychologist reported that respondent suffers from Histrionic
- 28. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 PersonalityDisorder with Narcissistic Features. Petitioner, on the other hand, allegedly suffers from Passive Aggressive (Negativistic) Personality Disorder. The incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable. Lastly, this Court also finds that the essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition. As can be easily gleaned from the totality of the petition, respondent’s allegations fall under Article 68 of the Family Code which states that “the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.” CASE #96 TORING vs. TORING G.R. No. 165321 August 3, 2010 Facts: Petitioner Ricardo P. Toring was introduced to Teresita M. Toring in 1978 at his aunt‘s house in Cebu. Teresita was then his cousin‘s teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at his aunt‘s house. They became sweethearts after three months of courtship and eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant, to get Ricardo to marry her. Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio Zari of the City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson, Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson. On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. Before the RTC, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran, andhis and Dr. Albaran‘s respective testimonies. Ricardo alleged that Teresita was an adulteress and a squandererthat she was very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularlysent money to his wife to cover the family‘s living expenses and their children‘s tuition. However,not only did she fail at paying the rent, utilities and other living expenses, she also she incurred debts from other people and failed to remit amounts collected as sales agent of a plastic ware and cosmetics company. Also, during oneof his visits to the country, he noticed that Teresita‘s stomachwas slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to have a medical examination but she refused. Her miscarriage five months into her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita werecharacterized by ―withdrawals‖; other than these, no other sexual contacts with his wife transpired,as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a month of living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his wife represented herself to others as single, and went out on dates with other men when he was not around. Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran diagnosed Teresita with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Issue: Whether or not Teresita should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with essential marital obligations. Ruling: No.Dr. Albaran‘s psychological evaluation merely relied on Ricardo and Richardson‘stestimonies. The mere narration of the statements of Ricardo and Richardson, coupled with theresults of the psychological tests administered only on Ricardo, without more, does not constitute sufficient basis for the conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. #98 GUIDELINES IN DETERMINING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY: AGRAVIADOR vs. AGRAVIADORG.R. No. 170729 December 8, 2010 Facts: In 1971, Petitioner Enrique A. Agraviador met respondent Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador at a beerhouse where Erlinda worked. The petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress. They soon entered a common-law relationship. On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent married in a ceremony officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo Manila. The petitioner‘s family was apprehensive because of the nature of the respondent‘s work and that she came from a broken family. They begot four (4) children. On March 1, 2001, Enrique filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition of the nullity of his marriage with Erlinda. Petitioner alleged that Erlinda was carefree, irresponsible immature and whimsical, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their conjugal dwelling for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. Enrique also claimed that Erlinda refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became ―very close‖ to a male tenant in their house, discovered their love notes, and even caught them inside his room several times. Respondent denied that she engaged in extra-marital affairs and maintained that it was Enrique who refused to have sex with her. She claimed that the petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry former household helper, Gilda Camarin. She added that she was the one who took care of their son at the hospital before he died. The Regional Trial Court ordered to investigate if collusion existed between parties. On November 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court then allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence as well as a
- 29. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 certifiedtrue copy of their marriage contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac which found that respondent was afflicted with Mixed Personality Disorder. The Appellate Court, however, reversed and set aside the Regional Trial Court‘s decision on the grounds that the psychiatric evaluation report failed to establish that the mental incapacity was serious, grave and permanent. Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence established the respondent‘s psychological incapacity. Ruling: No. The petitioner‘s testimony established ―difficulty‖, ―refusal‖, and ―neglect‖. However, it did not reveal utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Moreover, Dr. Patac‘s psychological report only enumerated the respondent‘s behavioral defects butfailed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be judged according to: (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Additionally, the Molina case set stricter guidelines in establishing psychological incapacity: (1)The burden of proof to show nullity of the marriage lies in the plaintiff; (2)The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a. Medically or clinically identified, b.Alleged in the complaint, 225 c. Sufficiently proven by experts, and d.Clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological, not physical. (3)The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ―the time of the celebration‖ of the marriage. (4)Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. (5)Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. (6)The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. (7)Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. (8)The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. These guidelines were incorporated with the basic requirements established in Santos. InMarcos v. Marcos, it was no longer necessary for the defendant or respondent spouse to be personally examined by a physician or psychologist. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion under Article 36 of the Family Code so long as gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, Ting vs. Velez-Ting, and Suazo vs. Suazo. The Molina precedent was flexibly applied (yet never abandoned) instead of used as a strict criteria or ―straightjacket‖. #99 Arabelle J. Mendoza, petitioner, vs. Republic of the Philippines and Dominic C. Mendoza, respondents, G.R. No. 157649 November 12, 2012 Facts: Petitioner and Dominic met in 1989 upon his return to the country from his employment in Papua New Guinea. After a month of courtship, they became intimate and their intimacy ultimately led to her pregnancy with their daughter whom they named Allysa Bianca. They got married on her 8th month of pregnancy in civil rites after which they moved to her place, although remaining dependent on their parents for support. Dominic remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished his college and started to work as a car salesman for Toyota Motors. 3 Ironically, he spent his first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends. In September 1994, Arabelle discovered his husbands illicit affair with his co-employee which affects their relationship. They started to sleep in separate rooms affecting their sexual relationship. Dominic was fired from his employment after he ran away with P164,000.00 belonging to his employer. He was criminally charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa. When was bailed, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because petitioner asked him for "time and space to think things over." A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. At that, she and her family immediately left the house to live in another place concealed from him. Issue: Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code. HELD: The appeal has no merit. The CA correctly indicated that the ill-feelings that the petitioner harbored against Dominic furnished the basis to doubt the findings of the expert witness; that such findings were one-sided and that he did not participate in the proceedings. The findings and conclusions on his psychological profile were solely based on the self- serving testimonial descriptions of him by the petitioner and her witnesses. The court finds the totality of evidence adduced by the petitioner insufficient to prove that Dominic was psychologically unfit. Accordingly, the RTC’s findings that Dominic’s psychological incapacity was characterized by gravity, antecedence and incurability could not stand scrutiny. His alleged immaturity, deceitfulness and lack of remorse did not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. The court denies the petition for certiorari and affirms that decision of the Court of Appeals.
- 30. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 101.Glenn Vinas vs Mary Grace- Vinas GR no. 208790 january 21 2015 FACTS : On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got married in civil rites held in LipaCity, Batangas. Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant, however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the infant’s death was caused by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy. Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet. On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. He alleged that Mary Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and drank and smoked heavily even whenshe was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused toperform even the most essential household chores of cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not exhibited the foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind courtship. Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality through the data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo(Rodelito), who knew Mary Graceway back in college. Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage. On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity. On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to cite the root cause of Mary Grace’s disorder. Further, the RTC did not state its own findings and merely relied on Dr. Tayag’s statements anent the gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The RTC resorted to mere generalizations and conclusions details. Besides, what psychological incapacity contemplates is downright incapacity to assume marital obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown, but these do not warrant the grant of Glenn’s petition. Mary Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this does not translate into a psychological illness. On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting. ISSUE : Whether or not sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. RULING : NO. The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to." In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance ofand to assume basic marital obligations. M ere"difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity orperversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule. Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the former’s condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn’s testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn’s statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to Mary Grace’s traits and acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the antecedence of Mary Grace’s alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that,six months before they got married, they saw each other almost everyday.
- 31. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Glennsaw "a loving [,] caring and well[-]educated person" in Mary Grace. We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the law requires. While the Court also commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her obligations #102 Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson Marcos G.R. No. 13649, Oct. 19, 2000 FACTS: Petitioner Brenda Marcos and Respondent Wilson Marcos were married twice and had five children. After the downfall of President Marcos, the respondent left the military service in 1987. Consequently, due to the respondent’s failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and the respondent would hit and beat the petitioner. As a result, in 1992 they were already living separately. Thus, petitioner filed for annulment of marriage assailing Art. 36 of the Family Code. The court a quo found the respondent to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC because psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent’s violent attitude towards Petitioner Brenda Marcos and their children constituted psychological incapacity due to his failure to find work to support his family. RULING: No. The totality of the respondent’s acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. PF103 NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents. G.R. NO. 127449, MARCH 31, 2005; 454 SCRA 261 FACTS: Noel Buenaventura filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated. The Regional Trial Court in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio and ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the amount of Php15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother. Petitioner appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals, upon respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendent lite to Php20,000.00. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the Regional Trial Court decision. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage. 2. Whether or not it gravely abused its discretion in refusing the increased for support of the child. RULING: The provision of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co- ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. With regard to the issues on support raised, these would now be moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, has attained the age of majority.
- 32. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 WHEREFORE,the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449) are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The Order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals Resolution of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendent lite in favor of the parties son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED. No Costs. SO ORDERED. #104 Ninal vs Bayadong case G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000 Babyline Ninal, Ingrid Ninal and Archie Ninal, petitioners Versus Norma Bayadong, respondent Fact: Pepito married his second wife Norma a year and eight months after his first wife Teodulfa’s death. They got married without any marriage license for they instituted an affidavit stating that they lived together for at least 5 years and thus exempt from securing a said license. Some years after, Pepito died in a car accident. The heirs as petitioners, fearing problems in successional rights due to the second marriage, filed a ‘petition for declaration for nullity of marriage’ between Pepito (deceased) and Norma using the absence of a marriage license as a legal basis. Issue: 1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void? 2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage after his death? Held: The second marriage of Pepito is void for absence of the marriage license. Though they instituted an affidavit which claimed that they cohabited for at least 5 years, they are not exempted since from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage to Norma, it only took 20 months lapsed. Although, Pepito and his first wife were separated, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living together which lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation has a legal impediment. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void. Void marriages cannot be a source of any legal rights. Therefore, the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of nullity for the second marriage. #105 Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, v Republic of the Philippines, respondent. G.R. No. 158298: August 11, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother, Cresenciano Ablaza, and Leonila Honato. He alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. The RTC dismissed the petition due to the fact that petitioner is not a party of the marriage and the said decision was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother. HELD: Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
- 33. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Consideringthat the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted. #107 [G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000] VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. CONSUELO TAN, respondent. The Facts The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial courts judgment, as follows: From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan. On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993. On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void. Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City, without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused. It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva.Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his first wife. The Issues In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues: A Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner. B Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner. C Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt.[6] The Courts Ruling The Petition is not meritorious. #110 Case No.110 TENEBRO vs. CA (G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004) FACTS: Petitioner Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
- 34. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Duringthe trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage. ISSUE: 1.Whether or not Marriage between parties can be proved absence of a Marriage Certificate. 2. Whether the Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the second marriage will absolve petitioner from bigamy. HELD: The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. There is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. To prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes, documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila; and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married. On the other hand, that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy. #111 ANTONE V. BERONILLA G.R. No. 183824, [December 8, 2010], 637 SCRA 615. FACTS: Myrna Antone alleged in her Affidavit-Complaint, filed in March 2007, that she and Leo were married in 1978. However, Leo contracted a second marriage with Cecile Maguillo in 1991. The prosecution filed the Information in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a criminal case of Bigamy. Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, Leo moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense because his marriage with Myrna was declared null and void as of April 2007 and became final and executory on May 2007. Leo argues that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Thus, absent the first marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the crime of bigamy. The prosecution argued that the marriage of Myrna and Leo on 1978 was not severed prior to his second marriage on 1991, for which bigamy has already been committed before the court declared the first marriage null and void on 2007. The RTC sustained the motion to quash relying on Morigo v. People. Similarly, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether a subsequent declaration of nullity of the first marriage only after contracting the subsequent marriage is immaterial in the crime of bigamy. HELD: Yes. RULING: Article 40 of the Family Code has reversed the previous ruling of People v. Mendoza (under the Civil Code) declaring that: (a) a case for bigamy based on a void ab initio marriage will not prosper because there is no need fora judicial decree to establish that a void ab initio marriage is invalid; and (b) a marriage declared void ab initio has retroactive legal effect such that there would be no first valid marriage to speak of after all, which renders the elements of bigamy complete. In fact, this was exhaustively discussed in Mercado v. Tan. It stated that, under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, a person who contracts a subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is guilty of bigamy. While, Morigo v. People was promulgated after Mercado, the facts are different. In Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized, although later declared void ab initio. While in Mendoza, no marriage ceremony was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer, because what occurred was a mere signing of a marriage contract through a private act. Thus, there is no need to secure a judicial declaration of nullity before Morigo can contract a subsequent marriage. The ruling of Morigo is not applicable to this case. #113 NOLLORA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES FACTS: While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her husband of two years has another wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., contracted second marriage with a certain Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001.
- 35. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Jesusafiled an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy. When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for return of her money in the amount of P 50,000. Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back to 1992. He presented Certificate of Conversion and Pledge of Conversion, proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992. And as a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry wives as allowed under the Islam belief. ISSUE: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous. RULING: Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and as such, the second marriage is considered null and void ab initio under Article 35 of the Family Code. The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is legally married to Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence of his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Atilano due to his prior marriage. PFR113 NOLLORA VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES FACTS: While Jesusa Pinat Nollora was still in Saudi Arabia, she heard rumors that her husband of two years has another wife. She returned to the Philippines and learned that indeed, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., contracted second marriage with a certain Rowena Geraldino on December 8, 2001. Jesusa filed an instant case against Atilano and Rowena for bigamy. When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared that money is not enough to assuage her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for return of her money in the amount of P 50,000. Atilano admitted having contracted 2 marriages, however, he claimed that he was a Muslim convert way back to 1992. He presented Certificate of Conversion and Pledge of Conversion, proving that he allegedly converted as a Muslim in January 1992. And as a Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry wives as allowed under the Islam belief. ISSUE: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous. RULING: Yes, the marriage between the Nollora and Geraldino is bigamous under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and as such, the second marriage is considered null and void ab initio under Article 35 of the Family Code. The elements of the crime of bigamy are all present in the case: that 1) Atilano is legally married to Jesusa; 2) that their marriage has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; 3)that Atilano admitted the existence of his second marriage to Rowena; and 4) the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack of capacity of Atilano due to his prior marriage. #114 G.R. No. 136467 April 6, 2000 ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO,petitioner, vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO,respondent. FACTS: Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second husband of Marietta who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.
- 36. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 AntoniaArmas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly bigamous is thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled. ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of presumptive death. HELD: The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958 where the law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then Marrieta’s marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate. #115 Republic vs. Nolasco 220 SCRA 20 FACTS: Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that, Janet started living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January 1982. Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his son had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s whereabouts. He did so by securing another seaman’s contract going to London. He wrote several letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a declaration of presumptive death of Janet. ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract. More so, while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife. #120 G.R. No. 187512 . June 13, 2012 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent. FACTS: This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent. In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada met Cyrus Granada at Sumida Electric Philippines where both were then working. The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son. In May 1994, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail. After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead. On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in an Order dated 29 June 2007, the RTC denied the motion. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable. In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. ISSUE: 1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
- 37. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 2.Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent presented RULING: 1. Yes. The RTC Decision therein is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code. The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing. Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republic’s Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondent’s spouse was immediately final and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal. 2. The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, "nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law." WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED. #122 FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY* and HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge, Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondents. G.R. No. 132524 December 29, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabel’s Petition for Letters of Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabel’s father Emilio, had predeceased his mother Cristina. The marriage of Isabel’s parents had previously been declared by the CFI as “null and void.” Federico anchors his opposition on this fact, alleging based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation as she is an illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federico’s Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the decision declaring the marriage of Isabel’s parents “null and void” be upheld. ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Isabel’s parents a case of a void or voidable marriage? HELD: it is a case of voidable marriage. Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its judgment. While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be “declared null and void,” the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as noted by the Supreme Court. Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of respondent Isabels parents based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal consequences as to the rights of the children are therefore governed by the first clause of the second paragraph of Article 89. A contrary interpretation would be anathema to the rule just above- mentioned. Based on said provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered legitimate. #123) EMILIO R. TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996 Facts: Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3,1972. Lopez alleged that at the time of the marriage. Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations that became manifested afterwards. The same resulted in violent fights. Emilio was also said to be using prohibited drugs, he was a womanizer and gave minimal support to the family. Likewise, he became spendthrift and abusive of his administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets without Victoria‘s consent. Attempts for reconciliation failed because Emilio‘s refusal to reform. In the prayer of Victoria for annulment of marriage, she further prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation. At variance, Emilio denied the imputation against him. Thereafter, trial ensued and Victoria presented four witnesses including documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of Emilio‘s relationship with other women, his apprehension for illegal possession of drugs and copies of prior church annulment decree. After Victoria rested her case, reception for Emilio‘s evidence was scheduled. It was postponed and on
- 38. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 thereset date, he failed to appear. The court then declared Emilio to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision. On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of Victoria‘s marriage to Emilio and awarded custody of the children to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition for relief from judgment but was denied. Issue: Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstance of the case where petitioner was declared in default due to non-appearance during the hearing. Ruling: Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition for relief from judgment. Under the rules, a final and executor judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. Furthermore, the failure of counsel to notify his client on time of an adverse judgment to enable the latter to appeal there from is negligence that is not excusable. Similarly inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to inform the trial court of his client‘s confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Indeed, a petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy, allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is affirmed. SO ORDERED. #124 ONE ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner vs.LUCITA ONG, Respondent, October 2006 PONENTE:J. Austria-Martinez FACTS: William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13, 1975. Union was blessed with 3 children. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Art 55 (1) of FC on grounds of physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner. RTC granted prayer for legal separation. CA upheld RTC’s decision when herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The climax of the couple’s drama was on December 14, 1995when the respondent asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their son, back from Bacolod which turned into a violent quarrel with the petitioner hitting the respondent on the head, left cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately pointing a gun at respondent’s head asking her to leave the conjugal house. ISSUES: Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTC’s decision granting legal separation to Lucita when she herself has given ground for legal separation when abandoned her family. HELD:No.It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted when both parties have given ground for legal separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, the abandonment referred to in the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. Also, it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct which does not constitute the abandonment contemplated in the said provision.Petition denied for lack of merit. #125 Manzano vs. Sanchez A.M. No. 00-1329,Mar. 08,2001 354 SCRA 1 FACTS: The petitioner, Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated” thus, respondent Judge Sanchez ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels. ISSUE:
- 39. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Whetherthe solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code. HELD: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both “separated” is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. #126 G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006 SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs. ROSANNA H. AGUAS, JANET H. AGUAS, and minor JEYLNN H. AGUAS, represented by her Legal Guardian, ROSANNA H. AGUAS, Respondents. Facts: Pablo Aguas, deceased, was married to Rosanna H. Aguas, respondent,when he died. As an SSS pensioner, the deceased had death benefits which were claimed by respondent, indicating his surviving minor child. Sometime later, Laticia Aguas- Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contested the claim, alleging that Rosanna abandoned the family abode six year before, and lived with another man with whom she has been dependent on support. Furthermore, she claimed the deceased had no legitimate sons with the deceased as he was infertile. To counter the claim, respondent provided copies of her marriage certificate with respondent, the children’s live birth certificates and the deceased certificate of death. Issue: Whether Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Ruling: Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS benefits by reason of her father’s signature in her birth certificate being a competent evidence of paternity. Furthermore, the legitimacy of a child may only be challenged by the husband, or in exceptional cases, the heirs. There was no showing that the deceased challenged the same during his life. Janet is not entitled to the benefits, as it while it was shown that she was adopted, there was a lack of legal papers to prove it. Rossana is not entitled because she failed to show evidence that at the time of the Pablo’s death, she was dependent on him even though they were already apart. #128 LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR.,respondent G.R. No. L-34132 July 29, 1972 FACTS:Petitioner Lucy Somosa- Ramos, filed an action for legal separation based on the ground of concubinageon the part of respondent Clemen Ramos. She also sought for the issuance of a writ of preliminarymandatory injunction for the return to her of her paraphernal and exclusive property. The hearing on themotion was opposed by respondent Ramos alleging that if the motion for preliminary injunction wereheard, the prospect of reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim. Respondent judgeVamonte thereafter granted the motion of respondent Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for awrit of mandatory preliminary injunction.Hence, this petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legalseparation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a suit HELD:NO.The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the viewof the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to beacted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codalprovision. . That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power toassert itself is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of thepetition for legal separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and managetheir respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case theadministrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court." #130 Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012 FACTS: Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977. They had no separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced four children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal age), the three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.
- 40. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Aftermore than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling. ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couple’s property relations. HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange of martial vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property relations between them is the system of relative community or the conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, “the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work and industry. The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains. #134 Romana Locquiao Valencia and Constancia L. Valencia, petitioners, vs. Benito A. Locquiao, now deceased and substituted by Jimmy Locquiao, Tomasa Mara and Registrar of Deeds of Pangasinan, respondents, G.R. No. 122134, October 3, 2003, 412 SCRA 600 Facts: On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation propter nuptias denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut, in favour of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao and his future bride, Tomasa Mara. The donees were gifted four parcels of land, including the land in question, a male cow and one third portion of the conjugal house of the donor parents. The donees marriage took place and the fact of their marriage was inscribed at the back of OCT No. 18383. When the parents died, six heirs were left including herein petitioner Romana and respondent, Benito. The respondent and his wife registered the Inventario Ti Sagut in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan sometime in 1970. The original title was cancelled and they were issued a Transfer Certificate Title No. 84897, in their name. Later on, Constancia, Romana’s daughter, filed an action for annulment of title against respondents but it was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan. Romana and Constancia alleged that the issuance of the transfer certificate of title was fraudulent, that the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious, that the notary public who notarized the document had no authority to do so and that the donation did not observe the form required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public instrument. The RTC dismissed the complaint for annulment of title on the grounds of prescription and laches. The court also ruled that the Inventario Ti Sagut is a valid public instrument. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Issues: 1. Whether or not the donation propter nuptias is authentic 2. Whether or not written acceptance of the donation propter nuptias is required. 3. Whether or not the action is barred by prescription. Held: 1. Yes. The claim of the petitioners that the document was falsified rely mainly on the Certification of the Records Management and Archives Office that there was no notarial record of the lawyer who notarized the document. The certification is not sufficient to prove the alleged inexistence or spuriousness of the challenged document. The absence of notarial record does not prove that the notary public does not have a valid notarial commission neither does the absence of a file copy of the document with the archives effect evidence of falsification. The court ruled that the failure of the notary public to furnish a copy of the deed is a ground of disciplining him but not invalidating the document. 2. No. The celebration of the marriage took place in 1944, before the implementation of the New Civil Code, it is a settled rule that only laws existing at the time of the celebration of a contract are applicable thereto, unless the latter statutes are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. The case at hand is governed by the Old Civil Code which states that donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described. In Article 1330 of the same Code, it provides that acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts. The celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in compliance with the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias. Even if the New Civil Code is to be applied, the case would still collapse since Article 129, in relation to the Statute of Frauds which governs donations propter nuptias, express acceptance is not necessary for the validity of these donations. Implied acceptance is sufficient. 3. Yes. It is definitely barred by prescription. The right of petitioners to file an action for reconveyance already accrued in 1944 upon execution of the Inventario Ti Sagut. Under the Old Code of Civil Procedure, an action for recovery of the title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be brought within 10 years. The petitioners filed the action more on 1985, more than 40 years from the time of the execution of the donation. Even under the petitioners’ theory that the prescriptive period should commence from the time of the discovery of the alleged fraud, the conclusion would still be the same. When the deed of donation was made on 1970 and was registered and a transfer certificate of title was issued, petitioners were considered to have knowledge of the fraud following jurisprudential rule that registration of a deed in the public real estate registry is constructive notice to the whole world. #135 ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents. FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel
- 41. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 attemptedto Divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with Carlina and stayed alone in a house in Pozzorubio Pangasinan. The 63-year-old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia. Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the agricultural land and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay. HELD: The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co- ownership and no presumption of equal shares. Erlinda failed to prove that she actually contributed money for the said property, so, the court found no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang. With respect with the house and lot, the transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage #136) Arcaba vs. Batocael, G.R. No. 146683 (Nov 22, 2001) Facts: Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of two lots in Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima, Francisco and his mother-in-law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her ¼ share of the property. Thereafter, Francisco registered the lot in his name. Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia, the latter‘s cousin Luzviminda and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, to take care of his house and store. Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia said that the previous party was lovers since they slept in the same room while Erlinda claimed that Francisco told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was mere helper and that Francisco was too old for her. A few months before Francisco‘s death, he executed an instrument denominated ―Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in which he ceded a portion of the lot together with is house to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of the ―faithful services she had rendered over the past ten years. Thereafter, Francisco died and the respondents filed a complaint against Cirila for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession and damages. Respondents, who are nieces, nephews and heirs by intestate succession of Francisco, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inert vivos is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille be declared void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Ruling: Yes. Where it has been established by preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. Therefore, respondents having proven by preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the donation inter vivos is considered null and void. #139 FRANCISCO LIM, Petitioner, v. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, NOW KNOWN AS THE BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC.,*Respondents. FACTS:
- 42. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 OnNovember 17, 1988, petitioner Francisco Lim (petitioner) executed an Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney3 in favor of his brother, Franco Lim (Franco), authorizing the latter to mortgage his share in the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 57176,4 which they co-owned. On February 9, 1989, Banco De Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank released a loan in the amount of P8.5 million by virtue of the said Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney, which was entered in the Register of Deeds of San Juan, Metro Manila. On December 28, 1992, the loan was fully paid by Franco. On June 14, 1996, petitioner, Franco, and their mother Victoria Yao Lim (Victoria) obtained from respondent Equitable PCI Bank (respondent; formerly Equitable Banking Corporation) a loan in the amount of P30 million in favor of Sun Paper Products, Inc. To secure the loan, petitioner and Franco executed in favor of respondent a Real Estate Mortgage8 over the same property.9 However, when the loan was not paid, respondent foreclosed the mortgaged property. On September 29, 1999, TCT No. 947011 and Tax Declaration No. 96-3180712 were issued in the name of respondent. Thereafter, a Writ of Possession14 in favor of respondent was issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158, in LRC Case No. R-5818. On January 11, 2001, petitioner filed before the RTC of Pasig a Motion for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)15 and a Complaint16 for Cancellation of Special Power of Attorney, Mortgage Contract, Certificate of Sale, TCT No. 9470, and Tax Declaration No. 96-31807, with Damages and Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 68214 and raffled to Branch 267, against respondent, Franco, and Victoria. Petitioner alleged that he did not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject property to respondent and that his signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety Agreement17] were forged. On January 19, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 granting petitioner’s Motion for the issuance of a TRO to prevent respondent from enforcing the Writ of Possession. Thus: Respondent, for its part, filed an Answer Cum Motion to Dismiss20 contending that the trial court has no jurisdiction to issue a TRO or a preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the Writ of Possession issued by a co-equal court.21 Respondent also argued that it is not privy to the execution of the Irrevocable Special Power of Attorney22 and that since there is no allegation that the foreclosure was defective or void, there is no reason to cancel TCT No. 9470 and Tax Declaration No. 96-31807.23 The writ of preliminary injunction which was issued by the Court as per Order dated 19 April 2001 is hereby made permanent. ISSUES: Hence, this recourse by petitioner raising the following questions: Did the [CA] err when it held that no evidence was presented to support Petitioner’s claim that his signature was forged Corollary to the issue above, is the presentation of expert evidence indispensable in order that forgery may be sufficiently proven in this case Did the [CA] err when it set aside the Decision rendered by the Trial Court on 04 April 2005 and forthwith dismissed the complaint filed by Francisco Lim against Equitable PCI Banking Corporation for lack of merit Did Respondent Bank exercise the diligence required of it in the subject mortgage transaction; if it did not, did Respondent Bank’s failure violate the rights of Petitioner In a nutshell, the issues boil down to whether petitioner was able to prove that his signature was forged. RULING: The Petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner failed to prove that his signature was forged. Petitioner failed to prove negligence on the part of respondent. All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in upholding the validity of the mortgage contract.
- 43. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 WHEREFORE,the Petition is hereby DENIED. The July 30, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 85139 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. #142 Sps. Lita De Leon and Felix Rio tarrosa vs. Anita De Leon, Danilo B. De Leon, and Vilma B. Delego G.R. No. 185063, July 23, 2009 FACTS: Respondent judge rendered a final decision in Civil Case No. 2012 for lack of an appeal. A project of partition was submitted to him, which he later approved. Among the parties thereto was petitioner Macariola. One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot was adjudicated t the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five (5) lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. The fifth lot, Lot 1184-E, was sold to a Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of the lot to respondent Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria. Spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc, owned and managed by Judge Asuncion. Macariola then filed an instant complaint in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion charging him with "Acts Unbecoming of a Judge" invoking Art 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, pars.1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of RA No. 3019, Section 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. A certain Judge Nepomuceno however dismissed such complaints. Hence, the case at bar. ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Asuncion's act does not violate the above-mentioned provisions. HELD: The Court held that respondent Judge Asuncion's acts did not constitute an "Act Unbecoming of a Judge" but he was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities for next time. Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. Respondent judge purchased the said lot after the decision rendered was already final because no party filed for an appeal within the reglementary period which makes the lot in question no longer the subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from plaintiffs, rather from a Dr. Arcadio Galapon. Petition is hereby DENIED. #144. ALFONSO TAN and ETERIA TEVES TAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES CELESTINO U. TAN and ROSARIO DY KUSHIN and SPOUSES MAXIMO U. TAN and TERESITA SY TAN, respondents. G.R. No. 120594. June 10, 1997 273 SCRA 229, 236 Facts: Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37224 dated June 20, 1994 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 10. On April 17, 1989, a case for partition and accounting was instituted by the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan against herein private respondents who are the Alfonsos brothers, Celestino and Maximo, and their respective wives, Rosario and Teresita. It was alleged in the complaint that the parties are co-owners of a 906-square meter residential lot with improvements thereon situated at Banaue, Cebu City acquired sometime in 1970. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 494 of the New Civil Code, the spouses Alfonso and Eteria Tan, being co-owners to the extent of one-third (1/3) portion of the aforesaid lot, sought partition of the same. Anent the action for accounting, the spouses claimed that on August 15, 1963, the brothers together with other siblings put up a business which they registered as Bel Air Auto Supply Company and was engaged in the sale and distribution of auto spare parts. They alleged that they are entitled to the fruits, proceeds and profits of the said family business, so that, an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the partnership, as well as the interests and participation of each member, is proper in the premises. Issues: WON the undivided one-third (1/3) of the parcel of land in question is not the conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan and Eteria Teves Tan. HELD: Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 20, 1994 is AFFIRMED. In the case at bar, conclusive evidence points to the fact that the undivided one-third (1/3) of the parcel of land in question is not the conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan and Eteria Teves Tan. It is the former's exclusive property which he had inherited from his mother, Trinidad Uy, the original owner of the property. The property is registered in the name of Alfonso U. Tan, married to Eteria Teves, Celestino U. Tan, married to Rosario Dy Kuchin and Maximo U. Tan, There can be no doubt then, that although acquired during Alfonso's marriage to Eteria, the one-third portion of the property should be regarded as Alfonso's own exclusively, as a matter of law pursuant to Article 148 of the Civil Code which provides that: #145 G.R. No. 187023 November 17, 2010
- 44. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 EVANGELINED. IMANI,* Petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Respondent. On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) and her co-sureties signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (Metrobank). As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00). Later, CPDTI obtained loans.. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes signed co-sureties. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. Metrobank then filed with the RTC a motion for execution, which was granted. A writ of execution was issued against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff levied on a property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-27957 P(M) and registered in the name of petitioner. A public auction was conducted and the property was awarded to Metrobank, as the highest bidder. Petitioner argued that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be subject of levy on execution or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of the levy on execution and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in favor of Metrobank. Issue: Whether or not the declared the property levied upon as conjugal, be held answerable for petitioner’s personal liability with respondent. Decision: Yes. the auction sale, and the certificate of sale are AFFIRMED. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." However, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Unfortunately for petitioner, the said Affidavit can hardly be considered sufficient evidence to prove her claim that the property is conjugal. The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay. Stated differently, the declarants of written statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-examination. #146: JESSIE V. PISUEÑA, petitioner vs. HEIRS OF PETRA UNATING and AQUILINO VILLAR, Represented by Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista, respondent. G.R. No. 132803 August 31, 1999. FACTS: Petra Unating inherited Lot No. 1201 from her mother. During her marriage to Aquilino Villar, she registered the lot in her name. They had two (2) children Felix and Catalina. In 1948, Petra died. Sometime in 1950, Aquilino Villar entered into an oral partnership agreement for ten (10) years with Agustin Navarra involving the portion of lot of four (4) hectares to develop it into fishpond. Whatever the excess there was in the capital invested shall be used to make the fishpond productive. While alive, Agustin Navarra, who managed the partnership, religiously gave Aquilino Villar and co-heirs their share. The arrangement continued until Aquilino Villar died in 1953. Thereafter, his share in the income of the partnership was delivered by Agustin Navarra to Felix and Catalina Villar. In 1958, Felix and Catalina repossessed the lot upon the latter’s death. They maintained their possession up to the time Felix and Catalina Villar died, thereafter, the children of the latter continued the possession of their predecessor-in-interest until petitioner disturbed their possession sometime in 1974 particularly the fishpond portion. Defendant counters that the whole land in dispute was sold by Felix Villar and Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra on February 2, 1949. In 1982, defendant Jessie Pisueña, son-in-law of Agustin wrested possession of the property from the heirs of Felix and Catalina. The latter filed a complaint for its recovery, assailing the validity of the deed of sale in favor of Agustin. On June 24, 1992, the trial court ruled that since the disputed lot was the conjugal property of Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, its purported sale by Felix and Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra was valid. The court ruled that its validity pertained only to the share of the late Petra Unating, considering that at the time of the sale Aquilino Villar was still alive. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the lot in question belongs to the paraphernal or conjugal partnership of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar. 2. Whether or not the Deed of Sale in 1949 transfer the whole lot in favor of Agustin despite the fact that Aquilino did not consent to the sale of his share. HELD:
- 45. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 1.The disputed lot was paraphernal. Since Petra Unating did not leave any other property, will or debt upon her demise in 1948, the property in question was thus inherited by her children, Felix and Catalina Villar; and her husband, Aquilino Villar. The two (2) children were entitled to two-thirds of their mothers estate, while the husband was entitled to the remaining one-third. 2. No. In 1949, Felix and Catalina’s interest in the share of their father is still inchoate. They cannot dispose such share without the consent of their father. At most they conveyed only their 2/3 share over the lot. However, when Aquilino died in 1953 without disposing of his 1/3 share, Felix and Catalina’s interest on it was actualized because succession vested in them the title of their father’s share and consequently, the entire lot. Thus, the title passes to Agustin pursuant to Article 1434 of the present Civil Code, which provides: “When a person who is not the owner of the thing sells or alienates or delivers it, and later, the seller of grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.”Consequently, upon the death of Aquilino Villar, the ownership of the whole of Lot No. 1201 became vested in Jesssie Piesueña and his wife. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jessie Pisueña and his wife, Rosalie Navarra, are hereby declared the owners of Lot No. 1201, Cadastral 228 of the Cadatral of Ivisan, Capiz. The Register of Deeds of Capiz is AUTHORIZED to cancel the Original Certificate of Title in the name of Petra Unating and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Spouses Jessie Pisueña and Rosalie Navarra. No costs. SO ORDERD. #147 Ferrer vs Ferrer case G.R. No. 166496 November 29, 2006 Josefa Bautista Ferrer, petitioner Versus Sps. Manuel Ferrer and Virginia Ferrer and Sps. Ismael Ferrer and Flora Ferrer, repondents Fact: Petitioner is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer, a half-brother of respondents Manuel M. Ferrer and Ismael M. Ferrer. Before their marriage, Alfredo acquired a piece of lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 67927. He applied for a loan with the SSS to build improvements thereon, including a residential house and a two-door apartment building. However, it was during their marriage that payment of the loan was made using the couples’ conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, petitioner posited, they constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, the respondent Manuel occupied one door of the apartment as well as the warehouse. However, in September 1991, he stopped paying rentals, alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents. The TCT No. 67927 was cancelled and TCT No. 2728 was issued and registered in the names of respondents. The petitioner seeks the reimbursement for the cost of the improvements on her husbands’ lot. Issue: Whether or not, Petitioner has the right to be reimbursed for the cost of improvements under Article 120 of the Family Code? Held: No. The right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120 of Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse. #150 Ayala Investments vs. CA G.R. No. 118305 February 12, 1998 Facts: Article 73; Philippine Blooming Mills loan from petitioner Ayala Investment. As an added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching–Exec. VP, executed security agreements and making himself jointlyand severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to Ayala Investments.PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, Ayala Investments filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. The lower court issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. Thereafter, deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties. Private respondents, spouses Ching, filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon application of private respondents, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction. Issue: Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. Ruling: The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful enterprise or profession. While it is but natural for the husband and the wife to consult each other, the law does not make it a requirement that a spouse has to get the prior consent of the
- 46. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 otherbefore entering into any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity. The exercise by a spouse of a legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity is always considered to redound to the benefit of the family. But an isolated transaction of a spouse such as being guarantor for a third person’s debt is not per seconsidered as redounding to the benefit of the family. Therefore, to hold the absolute community or the conjugal partnership property liable for any loss resulting from such isolated activity, proofs showing a direct benefit to the family must be presented. # 153 SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. MAR TIERRA CORP, ET AL., G.R. No. 143382, November 29, 2006 (508 SCRA 419) FACTS: Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company. Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. Respondent corporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent corporation and individual respondents. RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of the spouses but it found that it did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez. Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision so that Petitioner went to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party HELD: No. SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for “all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party. In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” In other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden. #154 Ros v. PNB Laoag Br., G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011 647 FACTS: Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the CFI of Ilocos Norte. The information disclosed that Jose Ros (petitioner) obtained a loan of P115,000 from ONB and executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land as security thereof. Upon maturity, the loan remained unpaid and as a result, PNB initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the said property. After which, the lot was sold to PNB as the highest bidder. Petitioner claims that she had no knowledge of the loan incurred by her husband nor did she consent to the mortgage instituted on their conjugal property. She then filed a complaint to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property (after the lapse of 1 year). The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners but was later reversed by the appellate court upon appeal. ISSUE: WON the property is considered as redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. HELD: Yes. Petition denied.
- 47. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Thehusband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. #156 MENDOZA, Petitioner, vs. AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN, Respondent. Leonardo G. Mendoza (Leonardo), allegedly married to petitioner Serconsision R. Mendoza, died on November 25, 1986. In the testate proceedings of her father’s estate, respondent Aurora Mendoza Fermin, being the legitimate and eldest daughterof Leonardo, was appointed as one of the administratix.4 In March 1989, petitioner submitted to the probate court an inventory of Leonardo’s properties and included therein a parcel of land, specifically described as Lot 39, Block 12 of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-04-00250 located inParañaque City.Sometime in 1990,when respondent was the one preparing an inventory of the properties of her late father as directed by the probate court, she discovered that her father and petitioner purportedly sold the said property to one Eduardo C. Sanchez as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 22, 1986 (the Deed of Absolute Sale), for and in consideration of the amount of P150,000.00.However, the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds for the City of Parañaque only on April 30, 1991, or five (5) years after the alleged transfer.7 Meanwhile, petitioner did not inform the tenants of the property that a certain Eduardo C. Sanchez already owned the same; and in fact, continued to collect the rentals of the property even after the alleged sale. On March 19, 1992, convinced that the signatures appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale did not fit that of the genuine signature of her father, respondent filed a case for Annulment ofDeed of Absolute Sale, ISSUE: whether or not the signature of her father on the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged Ruling: judgment is hereby rendered in favour of the defendants and against the plaintiff. The instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED. trial court reasoned that there was no forgery in the instant case #157 G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014 SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, Respondents. Facts: Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna were legally married and begot seven (7) children. After almost two decades of marriage, they agreed to live apart from each other and agreed to separation of property. On June 12, 1976, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree in Dominican Republic and at the same date contracted another marriage with Soledad. Thereafter, they returned to the Philippines and live together as husband and wife. During their marriage, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm (LUPSICON) and purchased a condominium unit to be used as law office. On 1992 this was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners in which Atty. Luna has a share of 25/100 share. Thereafter, Atty. Luna established another law firm and it lasted until his death on 1997. After the death of Atty. Luna, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, Atty. Luna’s son of the first marriage. Hence, Soledad filed a complaint against the heirs of Atty Luna. Issue: (1) Whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna had validly dissolved the first marriage. (2) Whether the second marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Held:
- 48. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 (1)No. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death. From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad. (2) Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,was void; properties acquired during their marriagewere governed by the rules on co-ownership conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code. In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact.1âwphi1To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contention in this case. As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. #158 Tinitigan vs. Tinitigan Facts: Payuran and her 3 children leased to United Elec Corp a factory building with the land. The consent of Tinitigan Sr. (husband of Payuran) was not secured. Consequently he filed a complaint for Annulment of Ownership & Contract of Lease at CFI Rizal. The complaint was later amended to include “restrain defendants from encumbering or disposing property in the name of Molave Development Corp & those in their name as husband and wife. Te court enjoined Payuran from doing any act to dispose the property. The case was then set for hearing primarily on the the issue of preliminary injunction. The contract of lease was settled amicably. However Tinitigan Sr. sought judicial approval of sale of 2 rented house and lot which are conjugal which was tenanted by Quintin Lim. The court granted. An MR was filed by Payuran because allegedly the Loring property is suitable for condo site therefore command a higher price. Two days thereafter, Payuran filed a legal separation case at CFI Pasay. The parties agreed to the continuation of the administration of the conjugal property by Payuran subject to certain conditions, one of which the Loring property shall be subject to the decision of CFI Rizal. Meanwhile Judge of CFI Rizal denied petitioners MR for lack of merit. They appealed but was denied on the ground that the order appealed from is merely interlocutory. Payuran and children then filed a petition for certiorari at the CA which affirmed the same, hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not the court where respondent Judge (judge of CFI Rizal) sits did not acquire jurisdiction over the Loring property hence cannot grant authority to sell. Held: CFI Rizal did acquire jurisdiction over the Loring property. The amended complaint prayed among others to restrain defendant from encumbering or disposing of the property. This in effect brings the Loring property under the jurisdiction of the court (CFI Rizal). Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. It cannot be made dependent upon the defenses. The Filing of the legal separation case after the order of denial is a tactical maneuver to frustrate the order. The administration of property is given to Payuran but such is not absolute. It was subject to a condition. The CFI Pasay even recognized the jurisdiction primarily acquired by CFI Rizal. Jurisdiction once acquired continue until the case is finally terminated. #165 SPOUSES RENATO and FLORINDA DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES GIL and LEONILA SEGOVIA, Respondents. G.R. No. 149801 June 26, 2008 PRESENCE OF HUSBAND - without signing agreement may still mean consent of the husband FACTS Two sisters, who were both married, entered into an agreement regarding certain properties wherein one of the said sisters, Florinda of de la Cruz, entered into an agreement regarding the sale of one of the properties to the other sister and where she signed without the husband Renato de la Cruz signing the agreement. Thereafter, the spouses de la Cruz filed a case for Nullity of Contract/ Agreement with Damages and one of the grounds relied upon was that the agreement had no force and effect on account of the absence of the signature of the husband of Florinda, Renato. The case was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the RTC. ISSUE Whether or not the court of appeals with due respect seriously erred in holding that petitioner Renato Dela Cruz by his actuations had agreed and had given his conformity to the agreement.
- 49. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 RULING Thepresence of the husband even if he did not sign the agreement would show that he had consented to the agreement. The Supreme Court which ruled that as to the ground that the agreement had no force and effect because her husband did not sign the agreement cannot be upheld in view of the actuations of the husband which showed he agreed and gave his conformity to the agreement. Renatos consent to the Agreement was drawn from the fact that he was present at the time it was signed by the sisters and their witnesses; he had knowledge of the Agreement as it was presented to him for his signature, although he did not sign the same because his wife Florinda insisted that her signature already carried that of her husband; Renato witnessed the fact that Leonila contributed her hard earned savings in the amount of P36,000.00 to complete their share in the purchase price of the properties in question in the total amount of P180,000.00. # 166) METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO.vs. NICHOLSON PASCUAL G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008 Facts: Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga got married on 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot in with an apartment standing thereon. On year 1994, Florencia filed suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on part of Nelson under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC declared the marriage null and void. Also, it ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex- spouses' conjugal partnership of gains. The s pouses weren‘t able to liquidate their conjugal partnership even after the declaration of their legal separation. Sometime in 1997, Florencia with Sps. Norberto and Elvira Oliveros obtained a loan from petitioner, Metrobank secured the obligation several Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on their properties including one involving the lot bought from Sering and showed a waiver made in favor of Florencia, covering the conjugal properties with her ex-husband, but did not incidentally include the lot in question (bought from Sering). When Florencia and Sps. Oliveros failed to pay their loan due, Metrobank initiated foreclosure proceedings and caused the publication of auction sale on 3 issues of the REM‘s. Nicholson filed a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property alleging that the property, which is conjugal, was mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank in its answer: Alleged that the lot registered in the name of Florencia was paraphernalia. Metrobank also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith. Florencia was declared in default for failure to file an answer within reglementary period. RTc declared the REM Invalid and Metrobank is mortgagee in bad faith on account of negligence. The CA affirmed the RTC‘s decision. Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court. Issues: a) Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondents dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses. b)Whether the lot in question was conjugal and rendered the REM over the lot invalid. Ruling: No. The mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not automatically result in a regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal assets.While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. No.Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses, where: ―Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.‖ Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her ½ undivided interests in the disputed party even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half. #167 LAIN M. DIÑO, Petitioner, -versus– MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Promulgated: January 19, 2011 G.R. No. 178044 FACTS: On 14 January 1998, Petitioner and Respondent were married. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons, respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5 October
- 50. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 2001,respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara. Trial court granted petition for declaration of Nullity and dissolved the regime of absolute community of property. Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code. Trial court partially granted the motion. ORIGINAL RULING: “ A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.” NEW ONE: “A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partitionand distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.” Petitioner assails the (new) ruling as well arguing that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code. ISSUE: WoN the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of theFamily Code. HELD: YES (they erred). Sec 19 (1) of the Rule does not apply. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 (bigamous) and 45 (voidable) of the Family Code. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Art 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner. #168 Epinosa Vs. Omaña AC. 9081, Oct. 12, 2011 659 SCRA1 FACTS: On 17 November 1997, The petitioner Rodolfo Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought Omaña the respondent, a legal advice on whether they could dissolve their marriage and live separately. Omaña prepared a document entitled “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Espinosa and Marantal started implanting the conditions of the said contract. However, Marantal took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the conjugal property. Espinosa sought the advice of Glindo, his fellow employee who is a law graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omana was not valid. They hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint against Omaña before the IBP-CBD. Omaña denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told him that it was illegal. Omaña alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and notarized the contract. ISSUE: Whether or not, Omaña violated the CPR in notartizing the “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Whether or not the Kasunduaan ng Paghihiwalay is valid. HELD: The Supreme Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case. #170 THE HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR., petitioners vs. ESTER L. SERVACIO and RITO B. GO, respondents. G.R. No. 157537 September 7, 2011 Facts:Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land to Protacio B. Go, Jr. (Protacio Jr.). Twenty three years later Protacio, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it was his father, Protacio Go Sr. (Protacio Sr.), not he, who had purchased the two parcels of land (the property). Marta Barola Go died wife of Protacio, Sr. Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B. Go sold a portion of the property to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio). The petitioners, Heirs of Go Sr., demanded the return of the property, but Servacio did not follow their demand in which the petitioners decided to sue Servacio. According to the petitioners,they contend that with the Protacio Jr.‘s renunciation, the property became conjugal property of thespouses Go Sr. and his wife. They also contend that the sale of the property to Servacio without the
- 51. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 priorliquidation of the community property between spouses Go Sr. and his Marta was null and void. RTC affirmed the validity of the sale declaring that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio Sr. and Marta, not then exclusive property of Protacio Sr., because the sale includes the children of Marta, that the participation had been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta- that under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The law states that when the property all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is conjugal unless there is a proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively. Issue:Whether or not the sale by Protacio Sr with some of his children to Servacio was void because it was made without prior liquidation. Held:No. Since Protacio, Sr. and Marta were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.Their property relation was properly considered as a conjugal partnership governed by the CivilCode. With Marta‘s death, the conjugal partnership was dissolved pursuant to Article175 (1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its liquidation. Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect ofMarta‘s share in the conjugal partnership, could not claim title to any specific portion of Marta‘sshare without an actual partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta‘s share and as aco-owner he could sell his undivided share, he had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. #171 MAQUILAN vs. MAQUILAN FACTS: Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter's paramour. Consequently, both accused were convicted of the crime charged. Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages imputing psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner. During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE AGREEMENT. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for the repudiation of the AGREEMENT. This motion was denied. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property. The Petition was dismissed. ISSUE: Is the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery a disqualification for her to share in the conjugal property? HELD: No. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Article 34 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the consequences of civil interdiction: Art. 34. Civil Interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos. Under Article 333 of the same Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. The latter provides: Art. 43. Prision correccional — Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. It is clear, therefore, and as correctly held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos. #172 Valdes vs. RTC 260 SCRA 221 FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they prefer. Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father. ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership. HELD:
- 52. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 TheSupreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family. #176 SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño contracted two marriages. First with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño whom he had two offsprings, and the second with Susan Yee Cariño with whome he had no children in their almost ten year of cohabitation. SPO4 Cariño became ill and died under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both the petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased. Susan Nicdao collected P146,000 while respondent received P21,000. Respondent Susan Yee filed an instant case for the collection of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one half of the money that the latter received. Despite service summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default. Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner and deceased. She claimed that she did not know of the previous marriage and only became aware of it during the funeral where she met petitioner. The respondent further contented that the marriage of the petitioner and deceased was void ab inito because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favour of the respondent, Susan Yee. On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, hence this instant petition. Issue: 1. Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with the deceased is void ab initio. 2. Whether or not respondent can claim half of the death benefits. Held: 1. Yes. Under the Civil Code which was the law when the marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. The marriage of Nicdao and the deceased does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. 2. No. The marriage of Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage which was previously presumed to be valid, Article 148, which refers to property regime of bigamous marriages, will apply. It provides that “Only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common proportion to their respective contributions.” It does not mean that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits would now be awarded to Yee. Article 40 of the Family Code states that there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, otherwise, the subsequent marriage will also be void. The marriage of Yee and the deceased is likewise void ab initio. #177 G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. During his lifetime, Felicisimo, former Laguna Governor, contracted three marriages. From the first marriage in 1942 he had six children, twoof whom are the petitioners in this case. His first wife died in 1963 and his second marriage to anAmerican citizen ended in the wife getting a divorce in Hawaii (1971). In 1974 Felicismo married Felicidad, the respondent, in USA. They had no children but lived together for 18 years in Alabang, until his death in 1992. Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets andfiled a petition for letters of administration. Petitioners opposedthis on the grounds that respondent is only a mistress, the second marriage to the American wife subsisting.The petitioners claimed that Art. 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effectto validate the bigamous marriage because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimatechildren . Issue: 1.WON the venue was properly laid? 2 WON respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration? Ruling: 1. Yes. The cases relied upon by the petitioners were election cases. For purposes of fixing the venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 2. Yes. even if the family Code is not applied retroactively, it can sufficiently be based on the Van Dorn ruling which validates a divorce decree obtained by an alien spouse, thus capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry again. In this case, as Merry Lee obtained a divorce, Felicisimo now is capacitated to marry Felicidad. However, Even assuming that Felicisimo was not
- 53. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 capacitatedto marry respondent, she is considered a co-owner of properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. #178) Tuason vs. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996) Facts: Maria Victoria Lopez and Emilio Tuason were married. Lopez alleged that at the time of the marriage, Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations that became manifested afterwards. The same resulted in violent fights. Emilio was also said to be using prohibited drugs, he was a womanizer and gave minimal support to the family. Likewise, he became spendthrift and abusive of his administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of their assets without Victoria‘s consent. Attempts for reconciliation failed because Emilio‘s refusal to reform. In the prayer of Victoria for annulment of marriage, she further prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation. At variance, Emilio denied the imputation against him. Thereafter, trial ensued and Victoria presented four witnesses including documentary evidence consisting of newspaper articles of Emilio‘s relationship with other women, his apprehension for illegal possession of drugs and copies of prior church annulment decree. After Victoria rested her case, reception for Emilio‘s evidence was scheduled. It was postponed and on the reset date, he failed to appear. The court then declared Emilio to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of Victoria‘s marriage to Emilio and awarded custody of the children to Ms. Lopez. Emilio filed a petition for relief from judgment but was denied. Issue: Whether or not a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstance of the case where petitioner was declared in default due to non-appearance during the hearing. Ruling: No. Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, governs a petition for relief from judgment. Under the rules, a final and executor judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein. Furthermore, the failure of counsel to notify his client on time of an adverse judgment to enable the latter to appeal there from is negligence that is not excusable. Similarly inexcusable is the failure of a counsel to inform the trial court of his client‘s confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Indeed, a petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy, allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate remedy. #179 Hontiveros vs. RTC GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999 FACTS: Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion that while in the amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in Article 151. ISSUE: WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article 151. HELD: SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151. Case # 181 RUFINO MAGBALETA, ROMANA B. MAGBALETA, AND SUSANA G. BALDOVI, petitioners, vs. HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG AND CATALINO MAGBALETA, respondents. Gabino Magbaleta and Pacifico B. Tacub & Associates for petitioners. Castor Raval for private respondent.
- 54. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 FACTS: Petitionfor certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, against the orders of respondent judge in (Civil Case No. 633-IV of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dated August 31, 1916 and October 8, 1976 denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint filed against them notwithstanding that private respondent is the brother of petitioner Rufino Magbaleta, the husband of the other petitioner Romana B. Magbaleta, and the suit is to have a parcel of land, covered by a Free Patent Title in the name of Rufino, declared to be the property of private respondent, who claims in said complaint that the third petitioner Susana G. Baldovi is trying to take possession of said land from his representative, contending she had bought the same from the spouses Rufino and Romana, said orders having been issued allegedly in violation of Article 222 of the Civil Code and Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, there being no allegation in respondent's complaint that his suit, being between members of the same family, earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made before the same was filed. Respondent judge premised his refusal to dismiss the complaint upon the sole ground that one of the defendants, petitioner Susana G. Baldovi, the alleged buyer of the land in dispute, is a stranger. hence the legal provisions abovementioned do not apply. The Court holds that this ruling of respondent judge is correct. While indeed, as pointed out by the Code Commission "it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the same family" hence, "it is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family" and "it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between strangers" (Report of the Code Commission, p. 18), these considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it imperative that such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a necessary or indispensable one. It is not always that one who is alien to the family would be willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay and the complications that wranglings between or among relatives more often than not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a stranger to the family Who just happened to have innocently acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its members should be made to depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among themselves. We find no cause in the reason for being of the provisions relied upon by petitioners to give it broader scope than the literal import thereof warrants. ISSUE: Whether or not that the petition for certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus, with preliminary injunction, against the orders of respondent judge will be dismissed. RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the restraining order issued on November 3, 1976 is hereby lifted. Costs against petitioners. #183 FAMILY HOME: PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T.MORING and HUSBAND vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIGG.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999 Facts: As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (for recovery of property) in favor of privaterespondent, two (2) of petitioners' properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of aboutP5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit, Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental with an area of about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located at Igpit,Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 tothe private respondent as the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem thesame, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring,and conveying said properties to the private respondent. To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 (docketed asCivil Case No. 10407) to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with aprayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was alleged that petitioners are thechildren and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 andSeptember 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death, they left the subject property covered by OCTNo. P-12820 and Free Patent No. 548906. Considering that said property has been acquired throughfree patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for thepayment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Petitioners further alleged that they werein continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land and that on February 9, 1968. DeputyProvincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in favor of the privaterespondent over the subject property including their family home that was extra judiciallyconstituted in accordance with law. As a result of the
- 55. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 allegedillegal deed of conveyance, privaterespondent was able to obtain in his name Tax Declaration No. 851920 over the land, thus casting acloud of doubt over the title and ownership of petitioners over said property. Issue: Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution. Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the CivilCode where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the lawprovides certain instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale orattachment. The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house inquestion, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constitutingthe family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt" was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted bytheir father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243 (2). #184 Taneo vs Court of Appeals case G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999 Pablito Taneo, Jr., Jose Taneo, Nena T. Catubig and Husband, Cilia T. Moring and Husband, petitioners Versus Court of Appeals and Abdon Gilig, respondents Fact: Two of the petitioner’s properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about P5,000. One was a parcel of land located in Igpit, Opol and the other was the family home also located on the same. On February 1966, the said properties were sold at a public auction to the private respondent as the highest bidder. The petitioner failed to redeem the same so a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring and conveying said properties to the private respondent. On 1985, the petitioner filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. They argued that the property was acquired through free patent therefore it is inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to CA 141. The private respondent refuted the petitioner’s contentions alleging that he lawfully acquired the subject properties which were a private land, by virtue of a Sheriff’s Sale on February of 1966. RTC ruled in favor of Gilig. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. Issue: Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution by virtue under the Article 153 of the Family Code? Held: No. Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied in the family residence. It does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the said Code. In the case at bar, the trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the debt was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243(2). #186. Mondequillo vs Breva GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990 FACTS: The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member
- 56. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 ofa cultural minority. The residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153. ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home. HELD: The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the affectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the affectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the affectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the affectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC. As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed. #187 GR No. 170829 NOVEMBER 20, 2006 PERLA G.PATRICIO, Petitioner VS. MARCELINO V.DARIO III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND DIVISION, Respondents FACTS: Marcelino V. Dario died intestate and was survived by his wife and two children. The surviving heirs extrajudicially settled his estate. One of the properties he left was the family home. A new title for the said property was thereafter issued under the name of the wife and the two children as co-owners. After some time, the wife and one of the sons expressed their desire to partition the family home and terminate the co-ownership. The other son opposed the partition on the ground that the family home should remain despite the death of one or both the spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The supposed minor beneficiary is oppositor's son, the grandchild of the decedent. ISSUE: Whether or not the partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such a partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home. HELD: To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home Art. 159 and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term 'descendants' contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. The son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite. However, as to the third requisite, the grandson cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on his parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. #191 G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994 MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents. FACTS:
- 57. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 SpousesVicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989. Vicente’s sister and nephew filed a complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of the nephew, herein private respondent. The petitioner, Marissa, was raised and cared by the deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted. The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as her certificate of live birth where the spouses name were reflected as her parents. She even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses. ISSUE: WON petitioner’s certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy. HELD: No. The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document. It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they were the sole heirs of the deceased because “she died without descendants and ascendants”. In executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner where it appeared thathe was the petitioner’s father. #192 Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao 378 SCRA 563, March 7, 2002 Fact of the Case: Corazon G. Garcia is legally married but has been living separately from Ramon Yulo for more than 10 years. She cohabited with William Liyao from 1965 up to his death. Some witnesses, however, testified that Corazon and her husband were seen in each other’s company during the supposed time Corazon cohabited with William Liyao. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao Jr. Since birth, William Jr,also known as Billy, had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of are cognized and/ or acknowledge child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct and over tact. During William Liyao birthday he was carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his daughters, “Look, this is my son, very guapo and healty”. He talked about engrande plans for the baptism of Billy. Unfortunately, it did not happen due to his untimely death on December 2, 1975. On November 29, 1976, William Liyao, Jr, represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia filed a civil action for compulsory recognition as “the illegitimate son the late William Liyao. The Regional Trial Court granted his petition, however the Court of Appeals reversed the decision saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child. The petition was filed for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father William Liyao. Held: No. Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. Impugning the legitimacy of the child, is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal. Only in exceptional cases may his heirs allowed to contest such legitimacy. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of proceedings. The Court held that it is settle that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress; the child himself cannot choose his own affiliation – if the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child if fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s paramour. # 153 SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. MAR TIERRA CORP, ET AL., G.R. No. 143382, November 29, 2006 (508 SCRA 419) FACTS: Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company. Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan.
- 58. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Respondentcorporation was not able to pay all its debt balance as it suffered business reversals, eventually ceasing operations. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent corporation and individual respondents. RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties of respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez including the conjugal house and lot of the spouses but it found that it did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez. Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision so that Petitioner went to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party HELD: No. SC upheld the CA. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for “all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The court ruled in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party. In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term “obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” In other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. In the case at bar, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden. #196 Tison vs CA,276 SCRA 582 (1997) Facts: This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him and consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of representation from the property disputed property presenting documentary evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent contended that the documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never presented for cross-examination. Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible. Held: The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon. #198 ESTATE OF LOCSIN vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN G.R. No. 146737, December 10, 2001 Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.: FACTS: Eleven months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.died intestate on December 11, 1990, respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City , a "Petition for Letters of Administration" praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged that he is an acknowledged natural child. The trial court issued an order setting the petition for hearing which order was duly published,thereby giving notice to all persons who may have opposition to the said petition.
- 59. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Beforethe scheduled hearing, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition. They averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in his name. On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred by prescription or the statute of limitations. The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the deceased) also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings, joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and opposition of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial relationship between herein respondent and the deceased. To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased, respondent submitted a machine copy of his Certificate of Live Birth found in the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Clerk Registrar of Iloilo City which contains the information that respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures. To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth, respondent presented the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent claims, shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family members of the deceased. Petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy of Certificate of Live Birth found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila indicating that the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. The trial court found that the Certificate of Live Birth and the photograph are sufficient proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the order of the trial court. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, while respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Both motions were denied by the Appellate Court. ISSUE: Which of the two documents — Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine. HELD: Exhibit 8 for the petitioners. With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit "D," more convincing evidence than those considered by the trial court should have been presented by respondent. The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the record of respondent's birth which took place on October 22, 1956, on 37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that time was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's birth record allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil Registry in January, 1957 was based merely on her general impressions of the existing records in that Office. When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this regard, we find Vencer's explanation not convincing. Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "x x x during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form." The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It does not satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated December 1, 1958 could have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years earlier. Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No 102, revised in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely. There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries. The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit "D" is a carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore thumb because the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of all other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents of those other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars, such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and business. The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a purported signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and other details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up.
- 60. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Whenasked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer had no answer except to state, "I am not aware of this because I am not a bookbinder." The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given more faith and credence by the courts below. In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar that: "Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child." The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of Appealswhere this Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity." A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth. #199 G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007 Teofisto I. Verceles, Petitioner, vs. Maria Clarissa Posada, in her own behalf, and a mother of minor Verna Aiza Posada, Constantino Posada and Francisca Posada, respondents. FACTS: Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada, sometime in 1986 met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered Clarissa a job. Clarissa accepted petitioners offer and worked as a casual employee in the mayor’s office starting on September 1, 1986. On November 11, 1986, Teofisto tried to flirt with Clarissa while in a hotel restaurant when they were supposedly attending a conference, but Clarissa managed to escape and leave the hotel immediately. On December 22, 1986, Teofisto requested Clarissa to brief him on the progress of barangay projects in his hotel. Once again, Teofisto made his advances offered her a position. This time Clarissa succumbed. On September 23, 1987, Clarissa gave birth to Verna Aiza Posada. On October 23, 1987, Clarissa and her parents sued Teofisto for damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite. ISSUE: Whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for damages with support pendente lite HELD: Yes. The caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading. It is not the caption but the facts alleged which give meaning to a pleading. Courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance thereof. In determining the nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the averments in the petition and the character of the relief sought, that are controlling. A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite, Clarissas averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her demand for support for her child, all clearly establish a case for recognition of paternity. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. #200 De Asis vs. CA GR No. 127578, February 15, 1999 FACTS: Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in 1988 for maintenance and support against the alleged father Manuel De Asis who failed to provide support and maintenance despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial,
- 61. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 itseems useless to pursue the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the minor’s legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. He maintained that since the obligation to give support is based on existence of paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support. ISSUE: WON the minor is barred from action for support. HELD: The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person. The original agreement between the parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a compromise regarding future support which is prohibited by law. With respect to Manuel’s contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver. #205 G.R. No. 17468 . March 24, 2008 VICTORIA C. TAYAG, Petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD A. TAYAG-GALLOR, Respondent. FACTS: On 15 January 2001, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. She alleged that she is one of the three (3) illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester C. Angeles. The decedent was married to petitioner herein, Victoria C. Tayag, but the two allegedly did not have any children of their own. On 7 September 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real properties both of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give respondent and her brothersP100,000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. However, petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised. Respondent further averred that on 20 November 2000, petitioner has caused the annotation of 5 September 1984 affidavit executed by Ismael Tayag declaring the properties to be the paraphernal properties of petitioner. The latter allegedly intends to dispose of these properties to the respondent’s and her brothers’ prejudice. Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she purchased the properties subject of the petition using her own money. In a Motion dated 31 August 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary to allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child. To prevent further encroachment upon the court’s time, petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses. The Motion was denied in an Order dated 3 April 2003. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order dated 16 July 2003. ISSUE: Whether respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter. RULING: Yes. The allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the decedent suffices even without further stating that she has been so recognized or acknowledged. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 May 2006 and its Resolution dated 28 August 2006 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. #207 CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner, vs. DIVINA BULING, Respondent. G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012 VILLARAMA, JR. FACTS On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze claiming that he first had sexual contact with
- 62. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 therespondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s filiation. When the CA denied29 the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE Whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTC’s findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze. RULING The Supreme Court do not find any reversible error in the CA’s ruling. In Herrera v. Alba, the Court stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. The totality of the respondent's testimony positively and convincingly shows that no real inconsistency exists. The respondent has consistently asserted that she started intimate sexual relations with the petitioner sometime in September 1993. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support. #208 JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCASG.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011 FACTS: Petitioner, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before RTC of Valenzuela City. Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court and obtained a copy of the petition.Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued the Order setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to the petition to file his opposition.After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioner’s father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. ISSUE: Should a court order for DNA testing be considered a “search” which must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid? RULING: Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing,the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to
- 63. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 establishpaternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion,disallow a DNA testing. #209 DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL, respondents. [G.R. No. 122906. February 7, 2002] Facts: On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth[2] to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner was then a nursing student while private respondent was a licensed physician. They cohabited for a time and lived with private respondents parents and sister in the latters house in Quezon City where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family. A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents. On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q- 92-11053, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On March 9, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as legal guardian of the minor, Gardin Faith. Petitioner avers that she learned of the judgment of the trial court rendered in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 only on April 1, 1992. Accordingly, on May 27, 1992, she filed a petition for relief from judgment. In a resolution dated September 15, 1992, the trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed tion. Held: Petitioner thus interposed the instant appeal after the appellate court denied her motion for reconsideration in its Resolution[4] dated November 29, 1995. Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin Faith cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The trial court is directed to immediately proceed with hearing Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053 upon notice of this decision. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. #210 GUY VS. COURT OF APPEALS Guy v. CA 502 SCRA 151 G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006 FACTS: 1. October 29, 1992, Sima Wei, who died intestate, living an estate. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. 2. June 13, 1997, Private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138. 3. Petitioner who is one of the children of the deceased with his surviving spouse, filed for the dismissal of the petition alleging that his father left no debts hence, his estate may be settled without the issuance of letters administration. The other heirs filed a joint motion to dismiss alleging that the certification of non-forum shopping should have been signed by Remedios and not by counsel. 4. Petitioners further alleged that the claim has been paid and waived by reason of a Release of Claim or waiver stating that in exchange for financial and educational assistance from the petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharged the estate of the decedent from any and all liabilities. 5. The lower court denied the joint motion to dismiss as well as the supplemental motion ruling that the mother is not the duly constituted guardian of the minors hence, she could not have validly signed the waiver. It also rejected the petitioner's objections to the certificate of non-forum shopping. The Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the lower court. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not a guardian can validly repudiate the inheritance the wards RULING: ● Repudiate the inheritance o A guardian CAN NOT validly repudiate the inheritance the wards because parents and guardians must necessarily obtain judicial approval that pass through the court's scrutiny in order to protect the best interest of the ward. Not having been authorized by the court, the release or waiver is therefore void.
- 64. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 oMoreover, the private-respondents could not have waived their supposed right as they have yet to prove their status as illegitimate children of the decedent. It would be inconsistent to rule that they have waived a right which, according to the petitioner, the latter do not have. ● As to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the heirs o The court is not precluded to receive evidence to determine the filiation of the claimants even if the original petition is for the issuance of letters administration. Its jurisdiction extends to matters collateral and incidental to the settlement of the estate, with the determination of heirship included. As held in previous decision, two causes of action may be brought together in one complaint, one a claim for recognition, and the other to claim inheritance. (Briz v. Briz) #211 De la Cruz vs. Gracia 594 SCRA 648 G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009 FACTS: ● September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City. ● Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth ● Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased father, and “because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.” ● Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition of paternity. ISSUE: Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as recognition of paternity RULING: ● Yes, based on Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument. As amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in the private handwritten instrument. ● The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: o Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and o Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. #212 Uy Vs Chua 600 SCRA 806 G.R. No. 183965, Sept 18, 2009 FACTS: Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa (Irene). Respondent and Irene had two children, namely, petitioner and her brother, Allan.On April 27 1959, respondent attended the birth of the petitioner and the one instruct to put himself as the fatherRespondent financially supported petitioner and provide the latter her basic needs and even introduced the petitioner as his illegitimate children in the communityFebruary 21, 2000, petitioner and respondent entered into a Compromise Agreement in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB and approved by RTC-Branch 9 and with no appeal having been filed therefrom, it was declared final and executory.October 27, 2003, petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed before the RTC a Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation against respondent.December 9, 2003, respondent denied the decree of illegitimate filiationMarch 27, 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the Decision dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had already been barred by res judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24 but it turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on 27 October 2003, petitioner had already filed a similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate affiliation against respondent. April 15, 2008, petitioner filed her Opposition to respondents Demurrer to Evidence in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. Thereafter, RTC- Branch 24 issued its now assailed Resolution dated 25 June 2008 in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, granting respondents Demurrer. ISSUES:
- 65. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 1.Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the parties herein before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 09 of Cebu City effectively bars the filing of the present case. HELD: Compromise agreement in relation to filiation is considered as void ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1) The civil status of persons; (4) Future support; (6) Future legitime. Based on the above-mentioned article that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence and not be left to the will or agreement of the parties. #213 Blyth Abadilla vs. J. Jose Tabiliran 249 SCRA 447 A.M No. MTJ-92-716, October 25, 1995 FACTS: Repondent Judge Tabiliran was married to Teresita Banzuela. Sometime in 1965, Banzuela left and abandoned their family home in Zamboanga del Norte and thereafter her whereabouts could not be known. In 1970, tabiliran began cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan, with whom he had three children born in 1970, 1971 and 1975, respectively. In 1986, Tabiliran and Baybayan got married. In the marriage contract, Tabiliran represented himself as single. Petitioner is a clerk of court assigned in the sala of respondent, charging Tabiliran for gross immorality. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Tabiliran’s marriage to Baybayan was valid; 2. Whether or not their children were legitimated by their subsequent marriage. HELD: Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court and Article 390 of the Civil Code – “that after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent” The Supreme Court held Tabiliran culpable for gross immorality, having scandalously and openly cohabited with Baybayan during the existence of his marriage to Bazuela. Evidently, respondent and Baybayan had openly lived together even while respondent’s marriage to his (first) wife was still valid and subsisting Only four years had elapsed from the time Banzuela left the conjugal home in 1966 until the time that respondent started to cohabit with Baybayan in 1970. Respondent had no right to presume therefore that Banzuela was already dead for all purposes. Article 83 (2) of the Civil Code As to respondent’s act of eventually marrying Baybayan in 1986, the Supreme Court (SC) declared to be not in the position to determine the legality thereof, absent all the facts for proper determination; and Finds the Investigating Judge marriage is authorized Article 269 of the Civil Code states that: “Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by an impediment to marry each other, are natural.” Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations. The reasons for this limitation are as follows: i. rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; ii. it would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; iii. there will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; iv. it is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of the marriage; and v. it will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. #214 Republic Vs Vergara 270 SCRA 206 G.R. No. 95551, March 20, 1997 FACTS: ● On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr, a member of the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption.
- 66. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 ●On September 10, 1990 , the lower court rendered its decision granting the petition and declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption. Respondent Regional Trial Court disregarded the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses being only fifteen years and three months and fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the very philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child. The court also found that the petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good moral character, sufficient financial capability and love and affection for the intended adoptees. ● The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due HELD: The Court finds the petition meritorious and hereby grants it to Rosalina Due Dye Article 184 of the Family Code "Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt: xxx xxx xxx 3. An alien, except: a. former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; b. One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or c. One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law." PD 603, Article 29 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code That husband and wife may jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional character of joint adoption and making it now mandatory. Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Family Code, Article 185 – None of the spouse applies "Art. 185. Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other." #215.Republic vs. Miller 306 SCRA 183, G.R. No. 125932, April 21, 1999 FACTS: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC of Angeles City a verified petition to adopt Michael Magno Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation. On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption. On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens. The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC. ISSUE: Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino child when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same. HELD: Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. The enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.
- 67. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Therefore,an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code. (Republic vs Claude A. Miller and Jumrus E. Miller, G.R. No. 125932. April 21, 1999) #216.REPUBLIC vs. TOLEDANO GR.No. 94147 June 8, 1994 Facts: Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 upto the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. The RTC granted the petition. Issue: Whether or not the spouses can adopt Solomon. Ruling: Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala.Article 184, paragraph three of Executive Order No. 209expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph three of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184 #217.CANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981. During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couple‘s relationship was undisturbed. Not long thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husband‘s alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos. Upon learning of her husband‘s alleged illicit liaison, Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebuwhich rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they agreed to ―live separately and apart or from bed and board. Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie, reserving ―rights of visitation at all reasonable times and Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In 1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were ―too meager‖ compared to theirs, he could not ―in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children.‖ Pending resolution of the petition for adoption, petitioner moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging that Anna Marie had transferred to the United States thereby leaving custody of their children to private respondents. On January 11, 1988, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, issued an order finding that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and, therefore, such custody should be transferred to the father. The court then directed the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner. Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the the Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to petitioner. Issue: Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them? Held: This Court finds that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that should have elicited a different conclusion on the issue of whether petitioner has so abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption unnecessary. In its ordinary sense, the word ―abandon‖ means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of ―putting under a ban.‖ The emphasis is on the finality and publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one‘s rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports ―any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.‖ It means ―neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children.‖ In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner‘s conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. He maintained regular communication with
- 68. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 hiswife and children through letters and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims. t abandoned them.The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, are SET ASIDE thereby denying the petition for adoption of Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed Cang, by the spouse respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano. This Decision is immediately executory. #218 G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents. FACTS: Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat who had been living with her family since 4 months old. Salvador Condat, father of the child, and the social worker assigned was served with copies of the order finding that the petition was sufficient in form and substance. The copy was also posted on the bulletin board of the court. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. The judgment declared that surname of the child be changed to “Bobiles”. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only Zenaida filed the petition. HELD: The petition for adoption was filed when the law applicable was PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code), where such petition may be filed either of the spouses or both of them. After the trial court rendered its favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in CA, Family Code took effect where joint adoption of both spouses is mandatory. Non-joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. The Family Code will have retrospective application if it will not prejudice or impair vested rights. When Zenaida filed the petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law in force at the time and thus vested and must not be prejudiced. A petition must not be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with law not yet in force and effect at the time. Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually joined his wife in adopting Jayson. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of the pleadings. Hence, Petition was denied. #219 G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003 ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), respondent. FACTS: In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19). ISSUE: Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action prescribed. RULING: Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be pursued. An adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate. #220 MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. G.R. No. 125041. June 30, 2006.
- 69. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 FACTS: On17 March 1994, Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina were, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education. ISSUE: Whether or not Francisco is obliged to support Rica and Rina. HELD: As to the amount of support pendente lite, the court takes its bearings from the provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors. Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, the court deems it proper to award support pendente lite in arrears to be computed from the time they entered college until they had finished their respective studies. The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on petitioner and her twin daughters raised by respondent Francisco is best left for the resolution of the trial court. After all, in case it would be resolved that Rica and Rina are not entitled to support pendente lite, the court shall then order the return of the amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of actual payment. #221) Lim vs. Lim, G.R. No. 163209 (Oct 30,2009) Facts: Respondent Cheryl S. Lim married Edward Lim son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward‘s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim. Edward‘s family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income. Years later, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very compromising situation." Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite. Issue: Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents. Ruling: Yes, but petitioners liability is limited to the amount of monthly support needed by respondents. By statutory and jurisprudential mandate, the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much – they limit their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination or suspension during the children‘s minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children, petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter‘s offspring ends with them. ##223 GR No. 127578, February 15, 1999 MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES, respondents. FACTS: In 1988, Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an action in who failed to provide support and maintenance despite repeated demands. Vircel later on withdrew the complaint in 1989 for the reason that Manuel denied paternity of the said minor and due to such denial, it seems useless to pursue the said action. They mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint with the condition that Manuel will not pursue his counter claim. However in 1995, Vircel filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the minor’s legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res judicata for the dismissal of the case. He maintained that since the obligation to give
- 70. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 supportis based on existence of paternity between the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim support. ISSUE: Whether or not the minor is barred from action for support. HELD: Manuel’s contention for the lack of filial relationship between him and the child and agreement of Vircel in not pursuing the original claim, the Court held that existence of lack thereof of any filial relationship between parties was not a matter which the parties must decide but should be decided by the Court itself. While it is true that in order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown between the parties, but the presence or lack thereof must be judicially established and declaration is vested in the Court. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Hence, the first dismissal cannot bar the filing of another action asking for the same relief (no force and effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any compromise or waiver. It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon a compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of persons and future support, cannot be the subject of compromise. (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and cannot bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant. The petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. #224 LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995 FACTS: Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental. The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order. Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents. ISSUE: Who should properly be awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr. RULING: The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent. The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over the boy. So many men in uniform who are assigned to different parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children. Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him. #225 NERISSA Z. PEREZ,petitioner,
- 71. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 VS COURTOF APPEALS and RAY C. PEREZ, respondents. G.R. 118870 March 29, 1996 Facts: Respondent father, a doctor of medicine and petitioner mother, a registered nurse working in the US are married couples who are separated in fact with only one child. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of their son. The RTC issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. Upon appeal by the father, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and awarded custody of the boy to him ruling that there were enough reasons to deny petitioner custody over the child even under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the boy’s father would be for the child’s best interest and welfare. Article 213, par 2, provides in case of separation of parents that no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court also states that “No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefore. Issue: WON custody of the child is to be given to the father. Held: No. The provisions of the law clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Sec 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. Couples who are separated in fact are covered within the term separation. The Family Code in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven years old shall not be separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, par 3 of the Child and youth Welfare Code which reduced the child’s age to 5 years. #226 PARENTAL AUTHORITYREYMOND B. LAXAMANA, petitioner vs MA. LOURDES D.LAXAMANA, respondent G.R. No. 144763 September 3, 2002 Facts: Reymond B. Laxamana and Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met sometime in1983. Petitioner, who came from a well-to-do family, was a graduate of Bachelor of Laws, while respondent, a holder of a degree in banking and finance, worked in a bank. They got married and the union blesses with three children. All went well until petitioner became a drug dependent. Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened and it became difficult for respondent and her children to live with him. Petitioner allegedly became violent and irritable, thus respondent and her 3 children abandoned petitioner and transferred to the house of her relatives. Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, and the instant petition for habeas corpuspraying for custody of his three children. Respondent opposed the petition, citing the drug dependence of petitioner. RTC ordered to remain the custody under the respondent and parties are enjoined to comply with the terms and condition stated in the visitation arrangement. Issue: With in the court a Quo has resolved the issue of custody in a manner not in accord with law and with the applicable decision of this Honorable Supreme Court when it resolved the issue of custody without considering the paramount interest and welfare of herein parties three minor chidren Ruling: Petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering that saidpsychiatric report, which was the court’s primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth. While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is notyet “completely cured” may render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is noevidence to show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to live with. In its September 8, 1999 order, the trial court merely stated that:“Thechildren were asked as to whether they would like to be with petitioner but there are indications thatthey entertain fears in their hearts and want to be sure that their father is no longer a drug dependent.”There is no showing that the court ascertained the categorical choice of the children. These inadequacies could have been remedied by an exhaustive trial probing into the accuracy of Dr.Ocampo’s report and the capacity of both parties to raise their children. The trial court was remiss in the fulfillment of its duties when it approved the agreement of the parties to submit the case for decision on the basis of sketchy findings of facts. #227 GEOFFREY BECKETT, Complainant,
- 72. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Vs JUDGEOLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR.,Respondent. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326 (Formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3692-RTJ) January 30, 2013 Facts: Geoffrey Beckett, an Australian was previously married to Eltesa Densing Beckett, a Filipina and out of marriage, Geoffrey Beckett Jr. was born. In 2006, Eltesa filed a case against Beckett in violation of R.A 7160 followed by a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage. For his part, Beckett commenced criminal charges against Eltesa, one was for adultery. Both ended in sala of Judge Olegario Sarmiento Jr. The couple’s legal battle ended when Judge Sarmiento rendered judgment based on a compromise agreement and categorically agreed that Beckett shall have full and permanent custody over Geoffrey Jr, 5 years old, subject to visitation rights of Eltesa. Eltesa failed to return the custody of Geoffrey Jr. to Beckett prompting him to file a case against Eltesa in violation of R.A 7160 and for the turnover of Geoffrey Jr under his custody. After going through proceedings, Judge Sarmiento rendered a judgment granting the custody of Geoffrey Jr to Eltesa. Issue:Whether or not Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in granting the custody of Geoffrey Jr. to Eltesa. Ruling No. In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-settled rule is that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if already 7 years of age, the child’s choice as to which parents he prefers shall be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit. Further, in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a primary consideration. A custody agreement can never be regarded as a “permanent and unbending”, such that agreement would no longer be to the child’s best interest. #228 ST. MARYS ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents. G.R. No. 143363 FEBUARY 6, 2002 Facts: Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident. Issues: 1.Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. 2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against the petitioner. Held: CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for them to be held liable the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Further more, there was no evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner. #229 SAGALA-ESLAO VS. CA G.R. No. 116773 January 16 1997 Nature of Action: Petiition for the recovery of custody of her minor daughter. Facts: Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married of whom two children were begotten, namely, Leslie and Angelica Eslao. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of Maria, while Angelica stayed with the husband’s mother, Teresita. When Reynaldo died, Maria intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but Teresita prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, she reasoned out that her son just died and to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. Maria got married to certain Dr. James Ouye and migrated to San Francisco, California, USA, joining her new husband. Maria then returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the United States; she then informed Teresita about her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide
- 73. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 fortheir support and education. However, Teresita resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica. Issue: Whether or not the mother have the right to the custody of her daughter. Ruling: The court reiterated its ruling in Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, that parental authority is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children’s physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, ‘there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar. Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship. #230 CANG VS. CA G.R. No. 105308 September 25 1998 Nature of Action: Petition for legal Separation FACTS: Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's extramarital affairs, which the trial court approved the petition. Herbert sought a divorce from Anna Marie in the United States. The court granted sole custody of the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert. The brother and sister-in-law of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor children. Herbert contests the adoption, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC require the written consent of the natural parents of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay monthly support to his children. Herbert elevated the case to the Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the 3 minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that Herbert has abandoned them. RULING: Yes. Article 188 amended the statutory provision on consent for adoption, the written consent of the natural parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. Rule 99 of the Rules of the Court requires a written consent to the adoption signed by the child, xxx and by each of its known living parents who is not insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned the child. Article 256 of the Family Code requires the written consent of the natural parent for the decree of adoption to be valid unless the parent has abandoned the child or that the parent is "insane or hopelessly intemperate." In reference to abandonment of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children." In this case, however, Herbert did not manifest any conduct that would forego his parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his children. The Court find pieces of documentary evidence that he maintained regular communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and send them packages catered to their whims #231 BBB vs. AAA G.R. No. 193225 February 09, 2015 Nature of action: motion for the issuance of Temporary Protection Order. FACTS: AAA (female) and BBB (male) met each other in 1991 when AAA was a medical student and raising her child out of a previous relationship (CCC). As a result of their relationship, DDD and EEE were born. To legalize their union, they married each
- 74. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 otheron October 10, 2002, and the birth certificates of the children, including CCC were amended to legitimated by virtue of marriage. Citing economic and psychological abuse, AAA filed a petition for issuance of a temporary restraining order against BBB before the RTC of Pasig City. She alleged in her petition that BBB was an incessant womanizer, who instead of admitting it, denied it, even cursing her. FFF, BBB’s alleged mistress, humiliated her in public, but BBB did nothing to stop her, and this became the breaking point. AAA decided to leave the conjugal house, but returned with DDD and EEE, leaving CCC at a friend’s house. She learned later that BBB stopped paying for the rentals in the condominium, forcing her to move out; he also became remiss in his support, thus she was forced to seek employment and to secure loans from friends. BBB also engaged in stalking her, seeking the help of GGG who lives in the same compound with her, and monitoring her every move, such as examining the guard’s logbook. It also hurt her that BBB exhibited bias in favour of DDD and EEE and against CCC, when he promised to treat them equally. In his defence, BBB alleged that it was AAA’s irrational jealousy that caused their frequent arguments, she being suspicious of his female colleagues which contrary to AAA’s suspicions, were all professional acquaintances of BBB. The RTC, finding basis in the petition, issued a Temporary Protection Order, giving among others, sole custody to AAA of the children; for BBB to render support to AAA and the children; visiting rights to him, and to stay away from AAA, designated family in view of the protection order. BBB challenged the issuance of the TPO insofar as it gave sole custody to AAA of the children, for him to pay attorney’s fees; cost of litigation, and to post a bond; and the factual findings on his alleged abusive character. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC order, but remanded it to the RTC to determine sole custody of the children, who were then more than 7 years of age. Like the RTC, the CA found BBB liable for causing psychological and economic abuse on AAA with his marital infidelity which exposed AAA to public ridicule and humiliation. BBB also abused AAA in person and thru text messages. It also brushed aside BBB’s claim to financial incapacity. Thus, BBB appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF SUPPORT SHOULD BE DELETED AS THE SPOUSES’ COMMON BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN, DDD AND EEE, ARE ALREADY UNDER BBB’S ACTUAL CARE AND CUSTODY SINCE AUGUST 2010 WHEN AAA LEFT TO WORK AS A NURSE IN THE UNITED STATES RULING: BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody, which allegedly renders moot the provision in the PPO relative to support. BBB points out that CCC is not his biological son. Impliedly then, BBB justifies why CCC is not entitled to receive support from him. This Court is not persuaded. Article 177 of the Family Code provides that “[o]nly children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.” Article 178 states that “[l]egitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents.” In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC’s biological father. Such being the case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA’s marriage. Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC as his son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code pertinently provides: Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He should not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBB’s son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his father’s support. Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from raising before the proper court the issue of CCC’s status and filiation. However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant petition before this Court now. In Tison v. CA[14], the Court held that “the civil status [of a child] cannot be attacked collaterally.” The child’s legitimacy “cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.”[15] The instant petition sprang out of AAA’s application for a PPO before the RTC. Hence, BBB’s claim that CCC is not his biological son is a collateral issue, which this Court has no authority to resolve now. All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB’s petition, but there exists a necessity to remand the case for the RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be granted custody over the three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of providing financial support. . #232 OBEDENCIO VS. MURILLO A.M. No. RTJ-03-1753 February 5 2004 Nature of action: Complaint against a judge for Unjustly Dismissing Criminal case. Facts:
- 75. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 Ina letter-complaint, complainant Capistrano Obedencio, Jr., charged respondent Judge Joaquin M. Murillo, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Medina, Misamis Oriental, Branch 26, of unjustly dismissing Criminal Case No. 1401- M (2000) for rape, entitled People v. Dexter Z. Acenas. Complainant averred that on May 3, 2000, he and his wife assisted their 14-year-old daughter, Licel Acenas Obedencio, in filing with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Hall of Justice in Cagayan de Oro City, a criminal complaint for rape allegedly committed upon her when she was 11 years old by her uncle, Dexter Z. Acenas. After the preliminary investigation, which the accused did not attend, the case was filed in respondent judge sala. On May 25, 2001, following Licels abduction from their house, complainant sought to secure from the court a copy of the warrant of arrest issued against the accused. To his great surprise, respondent judge told him that the case had been dismissed three days earlier on May 22, 2001. According to respondent judge, Licel Obedencio had come to court, accompanied by her maternal grandparents and Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Emmanuel Hallazgo. There she was presented to affirm her affidavit of desistance. Complainant claims that the dismissal was marred by serious irregularities. He specifically lamented the absence of any subpoena or notice of hearing from the court to him, his wife, or their counsel. He believes that since Prosecutor Hallazgo, Licels maternal grandparents, and the accused are relatives, this fact contributed to the unjust dismissal of the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the complainant and his wife should be the rightful representative of Licel HELD: Article 220(6) of the Family Code gives to complainant and his wife the right and duty to represent Licel in all matters affecting her interest. Thus, they were entitled to be notified and to attend every hearing on the case. As a judge, respondent is duty-bound to acquaint himself with the cases pending before him. He should have known that Licel filed the criminal complaint with the assistance of her parents, who are her natural guardians. It was incumbent upon respondent judge to inquire into the reason behind their nonappearance before the court instead of simply relying on the bare explanation of the defense counsel that he and his client could not find Licels parents. Respondent judge ought to remember that the accused, Dexter Acenas, is the maternal uncle of the victim. That Licel came to court with her maternal grandparents, and not her parents, on the day she was examined to affirm her affidavit of desistance, should have alerted respondent judge to be more circumspect. Being still a minor, Licel cannot fully comprehend for herself the impact and legal consequence of the affidavit of desistance. Given her tender age, the probability is that Licel succumbed to illicit influence and undue pressure on her to desist from pursuing her complaint. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, found respondent judge liable for ignorance of the law for unjustly dismissing Criminal Case No. 1401-M (2000). OCA recommended that respondent judge be reprimanded with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense would be dealt with more severely. #237 G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000 JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents. FACTS: This case is a dispute between Teodoro L. Jardeleza against his mother Gilda L. Jardeleza, and sister and brother- in-law, the spouses Jose Uy and Glenda Jardeleza. The controversy came about as a result of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., the father of the respondent, suffering of a stroke on March 25, 1991, which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties. Upon learning that one piece of real property belonging to the senior Jardeleza spouses was about to be sold, petitioner Teodoro Jardeleza, on June 6, 1991, filed a petition before the R.T.C. of Iloilo City, Branch 25, in the matter that in order to prevent the loss and dissipation of the Jardelezas real and personal assets, there was a need for a court- appointed guardian to administer said properties. It was prayed that in the meantime, no property of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. be negotiated, mortgaged or otherwise alienated to third persons, particularly Lot No. 4291 and all the improvements thereon, located along Bonifacio Drive, Iloilo City, and covered by T.C.T. No. 47337. On June 13, 1991, respondent Gilda L. Jardeleza herself filed a petition, regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr., assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and authorization to sell the same. Therein, the petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred the physical and mental incapacity of her husband, who was then confined for intensive medical care and treatment at the Iloilo Doctors Hospital. She signified to the court her desire to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties. She also alleged that her husband medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up, accumulating to several hundred thousands of pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and its improvements. Thus, she prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property. ISSUE: Whether petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code. RULING: In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non- consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. #234 Neri vs Heirs of Hadji Yusop
- 76. Pag e | PAG E * ME RGE FOR MA T 25 FACTS: AnunciacionNeri had seven children: first marriage with Gonzalo Illut, namely: Eutropia and Victoria and second marriage with Enrique Neri, namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties located in Samal, Davao del Norte. In 1977, Anunciacion died intestate. Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor childrenRosa and Douglas, with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate withAbsolute Deed of Sale on 7/7/1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties and thereafter, conveying them to the late spouses Uy for a consideration of P 80,000.00. In June 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the homestead properties against spouses Uy before the RTC, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoria additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage. RTC RULING: Rendered the sale void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas. CA RULING: Reversed the RTC ruling and declared the extrajudicial settlement and sale valid. While recognizingRosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the sale when they failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority. It also found laches to have set in because of their inaction for a long period of time. ISSUES: Whether the father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, has the power to dispose or encumber the property of the minor? RULING: All the petitioners are legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and second marriages and consequently, they are entitled to inherit from her in equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of the Civil Code. In the execution of theExtra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa andDouglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them.While the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the properties made by Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the spouses is valid but only with respect to their proportionate shares.With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed withpowers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother. Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of fruits According to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any Reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of administration. Thus, A FATHER OR MOTHER, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ Prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court. Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable in accordance with Articles1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code. However, records show that Napoleon and Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale. In their Joint-Affidavit and Manifestation before the RTC, “they both confirmed, respect and acknowledge the validity of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in 1979.” The ratification thus purged all the defects existing at the time of its execution and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosa’s 1/16 share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.