The document discusses civil law, focusing on personal and family relations, property rights, and the effects of obligations and contracts. It elaborates on the Philippine Civil Code, its sources, and the importance of publication for laws and regulations to be valid and enforceable. Key court rulings are presented, emphasizing that publication in the official gazette is a crucial requirement for the effectivity of laws, including those considered of public nature.

1. P E R S O N S A N D
F A M I L Y
R E L A T I O N S
P R E L I M I N A R Y
T I T L E
1st Semester
A.Y. 2023-2024

2. C I V I L L A W
Branch of Law that treats the personal and family relations of a person, his property
and successional rights, and the effects of obligation and contracts.
C O N C E P T O F L A W
General Sense (derecho) – science of moral laws based on the rational nature of
man,
which governs his free activity for the realization of
his individual and social ends, and which by its
very nature is demandable and reciprocal
Specific Sense (ley) - rule of conduct, just, obligatory, promulgated by
legitimate authority, and of common observance and
benefit

3. C O N C E P T O F C I V I L L A W
The mass of precepts which determines and regulates those relations of
assistance, authority, and obedience existing among members of a family as
well as among members of a society for the protection of private interests
C O N C E P T O F C I V I L C O D E
A collection of laws, which regulates the private relations of the members of civil
society, determining the respective rights and obligations, with reference to
persons, things, and civil acts.

4. S O U R C E S O F T H E
P H I L I P P I N E C I V I L
C O D E
 Civil Code of Spain of 1889 – in effect from 1889 until the Civil Code took effect in
1950
 Codes and laws of other countries, such as Spain, the various States of the United
States of America, like California and Louisiana, France, Argentina, Mexico,
Switzerland, England and Italy
Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, of the U.S.A., Spain and
other
countries;
 Philippine laws or statutes – e.g. Domestic Adoption (R.A. 8043), Inter-Country
Adoption Law (R.A. No. 8043), Special Protection of Children (R.A. 7610), Solo Parents’
Act (R.A. 8972); Anti-Violence Against Women and Children, among others;
 Works of jurists and commentators of various nations; and
 Filipino customs and traditions

5. Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazzette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect on year after publication.
LORENZO M. TANADA v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA (G.R. No. 63915; April 24, 1985
Facts: Tañada, et al., seek a writ of mandamus to compel Hon. Tuvera, et al., to publish or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette various unpublished presidential decrees by invoking the right to be informed
on matters of public concern enshrined in Section 6, Article 4 of the 1973 constitution. However, respondent
public officials contended that publication in the official gazette is not a sine qua non requirement when
the law itself provides for its own effectivity date.
Issue: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is a requirement for laws and acts to be valid and
enforceable.
Ruling: Yes, publication in the Official Gazzette is a requirement for laws and acts to be valid and enforceable.
Article 2 of the New Civil Code does not dispense with the publication requirement in the Official
Gazette of laws that provide for its own effectivity date.
Publication is an indispensable requirement for laws to be valid and enforceable. Publication of
presidential decrees which are “of public nature” or “general in application” shall be published in the
Official Gazette, otherwise it would violate the due process clause because it would be unjust for people
to be not given a
notice of the existence of laws which restrict and regulate their acts. Presidential decrees that provide
for

6. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative
and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Furthermore, non-publication will result in the ineffectivity of the law.
FACTS: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
The Court affirmed the bnecessity for publicarion of some of the decrees in the 1985 decision.
Petitioners, through a Motion for Reconsideration sought to be clarified as regard some matters relevant
to the nature of law that needs to be published and the circumstances surrounding the required publication.
Resolving their doubts, petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of
general applicability and those whish are not, that publication means complete publication, and that the
publication must be made in the Official Gazzette.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, claimed that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion
and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in
Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that
publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette
LORENZO M. TANADA v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA (G.R. NO. 63915, DECEMBER 29,
1986)

7. ISSUE: 1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by “publication”
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
RULING:
1. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.
Therefore, all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules
or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

8. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. It is not correct to say that under
the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such
omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern the l egislature could validly provide that a law becamee effective immediately
upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they
would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence,
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many
non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons
they may affect before they can begin to operate.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of
such decree, its whereabouts, the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the
Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.
3. The publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect to the law
pursuant to the said Article 2.

9. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. QUE PO LAY (G.R. No. 6791; March 29, 1954)
FACTS: Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty
of
violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265,
and sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of Fl,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U. S.
dollars, U. S. checks and U. S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the
Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required
by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the
Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular
had no force and effect
It is contended that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be
published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor
General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act No. 638 and 2930 do not require the q
publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have
force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether penal laws and regulations imposing penalties need be published in the Official Gazette
before it may become effective.
RULING: Yes, penal laws and regulations imposing penalties need to be published in the Official Gazzette.

10. Although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until
November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that
said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its
publication in the Official Gazette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable
for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign
exchange in his possession thereof.
Circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a
penalty for its violation, should be published before becoming effective. Before the public may be bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must be published, and the
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and penalties.
If, as a matter of fact, Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its violation,
then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently the accused
committed no violation of the circular, and the trial court may be said to have no jurisdiction.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL (G.R. No. 176006; March 26, 2010)
FACTS: NPC Circular No. 99-755 dated October 8, 1999 set the guidelines in the “disposal of scrap aluminum
conductor steel-reinforced or ACSRs in order to decongest and maintain good housekeeping in NPC
installations to generate additional income for NPC”. Items 3 and 3.1 of t the circular provide:

11. 3. Qualified Bidders
3.1 Qualified bidders envisioned in this circular are partnerships or corporations that directly use
aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products either purely or partly out of
aluminum, or their duly appointed representatives. These bidders may be based locally or
overseas
In April 2003, NPC published an invitation for the pre-qualification of bidders for the public sale of
its scrap ACSR7 cables. Respondent Pinatubo Commercial, a trader of scrap materials such as copper,
aluminum, steel and other ferrous and non-ferrous materials, submitted a pre- qualification form
to NPC. Pinatubo, however, was informed in a letter dated April 29, 2003, that its application for pre-
qualification had been denied. Petitioner asked for reconsideration, but NPC denied it. The RTC
upheld Pinatubo’s position and declared items 3 and 3.1 of the circular unconstitutional.
The RTC ruled that it was violative of substantive due process because while it created rights in
favor of third parties, the circular had not been published. It also pronounced that the circular violated the
equal protection clause since it favored manufacturers and processors of aluminum scrap vis-à-vis
dealers/traders in the purchase of aluminum ACSR cables from NPC. Lastly, the RTC found that the
circular denied traders the right to exercise their business and restrained free competition
inasmuch as it allowed only a certain sector to participate in the bidding.
NPC insists that there was no need to publish the circular since it was not of general application. It
was addressed only to particular persons or class of persons, namely the disposal committees,
heads of offices, regional and all other officials involved in the disposition of ACSRs. NPC also contends
that there was a substantial distinction between manufacturers and traders of aluminum scrap
materials specially viewed in the light of RA 7832.13 According to NPC, by limiting the prospective

12. bidders to manufacturers, it could easily monitor the market of its scrap ACSRs. There was rampant
fencing of stolen NPC wires. NPC likewise maintains that traders were not prohibited from
participating in the pre- qualification as long as they had a tie-up with a manufacturer
.
ISSUE: Whether or not National Power Corporation (NPC) Circular No. 99-75 had to be published?
RULING: No, NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published.
NPC Circular No. 99-75 was merely an internal rule or regulation. It did not purport to enforce or
implement an existing law but was merely a directive issued by the NPC President to his
subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders.
Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the responsibilities of the different NPC personnel in the
disposal, pre-qualification, bidding and award of scrap ACSRS.
It also provided for the deposit of a proposal bond to be submitted by bidders, the approval of the
award, mode of payment and release of awarded scrap ACSRs. All these guidelines were addressed
to the NPC personnel involved in the bidding and award of scrap ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the
rights of the public in general or of any other person not involved in the bidding process. Assuming it affected
individual rights, it did so only remotely, indirectly and incidentally

13. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE (G.R. No. 187714; March
8, 2011
FACTS: On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, which directed the Senate Ethics Committee
to investigate the alleged double insertion of P200 million by Senator Manny Villar into the C5 Extension Project.
After the election of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as Senate President, the Ethics Committee was reorganized, but the
Minority failed to name its representatives to the Committee, prompting a delay in the investigation. Thereafter, the
Senate adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee.
In another privilege speech, Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and not with
the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee, then moved that the
responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by
the majority. In the hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned the quorum, and proposed amendments
to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the issue on the need to publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole.
ISSUE: Is publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole required for their effectivity?
RULING: No, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is not required for said Rules to be effective.
The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the
House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be
published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect. Hence, in this
particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published before
the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication.

14. Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
When a law is passed by the Congress, duly approved by the President of the Philippines, properly
published, and consequently becomes effective pursuant to its effectivity clause or to some
provision of a general law on the effectivity of statutes, the public is always put on constructive
notice of the law’s existence and effectivity.
Article 3 applies only to mandatory and prohibitory laws.
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS v. ISAGANI D. BOBIS (G.RL. No. 138509; July 31, 2000)
FACTS: On October 21, 1985 the respondent and Maria Dulce Javier got married. This was the first marriage
of the respondent which was not judicially declared as nullified before the second marriage contracted by the
respondent with the petitioner which was celebrated on January 25, 1996. It was also alleged that there is a
third marriage contracted by the respondent with some Julia Hernandez.
On February 25, 1998, the petitioner filed bigamy, a criminal case, against his husband respondent.
Thereafter, the respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the grounds that this was celebrated without a marriage license which is a formal requisite for a
valid marriage. The respondent also contends of his ignorance of the requirement of judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage before contracting in a new marriage. Thus, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
suspended the proceedings of the criminal case pending the decision of the civil case. The petitioner then files this
case for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent can invoke his ignorance of the requirement under Article 40 of the Family

15. RULING: No, the respondent cannot invoke his ignorance of the requirement for the judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage before contracting a new marriage.
Article 3 of the Civil Code states that, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Thus, the respondent is presumed to have a conclusive knowledge of the requisites of a valid marriage
since the Family Code is already in effect and force during the celebration of his second marriage
with the petitioner.
Hence, the decision of the RTC in suspending the criminal case pending the civil case was reversed
because it is wrong to invoke ignorance of a law which is already in effect and force like the Family Code.
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided.
The law looks to the future and has no retroactive effect unless the legislature may have given that
effect to some legal provisions, and that statutes are to be construed as having only prospective
operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the same
must be resolved against the retrospective effect.

16. Instances when a lay may be given a retroactive effect:
1. When the law expressly provides for retroactivity;
Exception:
Ex post facto laws - a criminal statute that punishes actions retroactively, thereby
criminalizing
conduct that was legal when originally performed
When retroactive effect will impair the obligation of contract
ASIATIC PETROLEUM CO., LTD. v. A. LLANES (G.R. No. 25386;October 20, 1926)
FACTS: Asiatec Petroleum appealed at the Supreme Court against Llanes for the purpose of recovering the
sum of P3,523.02 from the Provincial Treasurers of Cebu. Way back August 22, 1919 plaintiff and the
defendants made a contract of lease of the Shell Island. The said island owned by Asiatec Petroleum Co.
whereby Government leased to said company for the term of fifty years a piece of land, having an area of one
and one- half hectares, situated adjacent to the Island of Mactam, municipality of Opon, Province of Cebu. The
plaintiff made some improvements At the time of the making of the lease, the land referred to was
accustomed to be covered by water at high tide; but it was needed by the lessee as a site for tanks to be
used in the storage of petroleum. In order to reclaim the site and protect the improvements thereon from
the sea, it was necessary for the company to build a concrete and cement foundation, protected by retaining
walls of the same material.
Under section 344 of the Administrative Code especially exempts from local taxation property owned

17. homesteads, shall be subject to the ordinary taxes which shall be paid by the grantee even though the
title remains in the Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law Act No. 2874 section 113 which provides all the lands granted by virtue of
said Act, except homesteads, shall be subject to the ordinary taxes which shall be paid by the grantee even
though the title remains in the Government. be given a retroactive effect.
RULING: No, Act No. 2874 section 113 should not be given a retroactive effect .
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature, approved November 29, 1919, was given retroactive
effect from July 1 of the same year. While this retroactive provision might be given effect with
respect to the administrative features of the statute, it cannot be given effect the extent of impairing the
obligation of a lease executed in the interval between July 1, 1919, and the date when the law in fact
became effective, since our Organic Law prohibits the enactment of laws impairing the obligation of
contract.
2. When the law is curative in nature;

18. 3. When the law is remedial or procedural;
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (G.R. No. 104528, January 18,
1996)
FACTS: Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc.
(represented by spouses Antonio and Susana Astudillo). Notwithstanding the land purchase agreements, it
executed over said lots, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the petitioner,
Philippine National Bank. Unaware of this mortgage, private respondents duly complied with their
obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on the lots in question.
Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As
highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots. Acting on suits brought by
private respondents (which were later consolidated), the HLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and
Legal Affairs (OAALA) in a decision rendered on October 28, 1988 ruled that PNB—without prejudice to
seeking relief against Marikina Village, Inc.—may collect from private respondents only the “remaining
amortizations, in accordance with the land purchase agreements they had previously entered into with”
Marikina Village, Inc., and cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again for the lots they had
already bought from said subdivision developer.
On May 2, 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board affirmed this decision. On March 10,
1992, the Office of the President, invoking P.D. 957, likewise concurred with the HLURB.
ISSUE: Whether P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages executed prior to its
enactment.

19. RULING: Yes, P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages executed prior to its
enactment.
Normally, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, “(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.” However, it is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even
those real estate mortgages, like the one at issue here, executed prior to its enactment, and such intent (as
succinctly captured in the preamble quoted below) must be given effect if the laudable purpose of
protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieved.
While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be plainly
inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming
subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial institutions which
the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law—as an instrument of social justice—must favor the
weak.
According to Justice isagani Cruz: “Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its
execution may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a
proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the contract. Into each contract are read the provisions
of existing law, and, always, a reservation of the police power as long as the agreement deals with a matter
affecting the public welfare.
Such a contract, it has been held, suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is its susceptibility to change
by the legislature as a postulate of the legal order.

20. 4. When the law is penal in character and favorable to the accused EXCEPT when he is a habitual
delinquent
or a recidivist.
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 164815; February
22, 2008)
FACTS: Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in the boarding house of his children
located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was roused from his slumber
when four (4) heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the room. They trained their guns at
him and pulled him out of the room.
They then tied his hands and placed him near the faucet. The raiding team went back inside and
searched and ransacked the room. SPO2 Disuanco stood guard outside with him. Moments later, an
operative came out of the room and exclaimed, “Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!” Petitioner
was told by Disuanco that if he was planning to do something, he might as well do it as they were authorized
to shoot him because there is a shoot-to-kill order against him. He was also told that there was a
standing warrant for his arrest. However, he was not shown any proof when he asked for it. Neither was
the raiding group armed with a valid search warrant. According to petitioner, the search done in
the boarding house was illegal. The gun seized from him was duly licensed and covered by necessary
permits. He was, however, unable to present the documentation relative to the firearm because it was
confiscated by the police. Petitioner further lamented that when he was incarcerated, he was not allowed
to engage the services of a counsel. Neither was he allowed tosee or talk to his family.
Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room adjacent to where petitioner was arrested, testified that on
July 10, 1996, two (2) policemen suddenly entered his room as he was preparing for school.They grabbed his
.

21. He was asked where petitioner was staying. Fearing for his life, he pointed to petitioner’s room.
Four (4) policemen then entered the room. He witnessed how they pointed a gun at petitioner, who was
clad only in his underwear. He also witnessed how they forcibly brought petitioner out of his room. While a
policeman remained near the faucet to guard petitioner, three (3) others went back inside the room. They
began searching the whole place. They forcibly opened his locker, which yielded the subject firearm.
ISSUE: Whether penal laws may have a retroactive application?
RULING: Yes, penal laws may have a retroactive application.
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of
an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused.
This is “not as a right” of the offender, “but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to
punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on
political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice.” Although an additional fine of
P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the
imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.
5. When it creates new substantive rights; and
6. When it is interpretative of the laws.

22. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC.,
G.R. No. 168129; April 24, 2007
FACTS: The Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., a corporation whose purpose is to establish, maintain, conduct and
operate a prepaid group practice health care delivery system or a health maintenance organization and to
provide for the administrative, legal, and financial responsibilities of the organization, filed a protest questioning
the assessment made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
E.O. 273 was issued amending the NIRC by imposing VAT on the sale of goods and services. Before the
effectivity of the said E.O., Philhealth inquired whether the services it provides to the participants in its health
care program are exempt from the payment of the VAT. On June 8, 1988, CIR issued a ruling stating that respondent,
as a provider of medical services, is exempt from the VAT coverage. However, on October 1, 1999, the BIR sent
respondent a Preliminary Assessment Notice for deficiency in its payment of the VAT and documentary stamp
taxes for taxable years 1996 and 1997. Subsequently, respondent filed a protest with the BIR.
Petitioner argued that it is entitled to the benefit of non-­
retroactivity of rulings guaranteed under Section 246
of the Tax Code, in the absence of showing of bad faith on its part. The CIR did not take any action on the protests.
Hence, a petition for review was filed with the CTA. The CTA declared CIR ruling coverage null and void.
ISSUE: Should a revocation, modification or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated be given a
retroactive effect?
RULING: No, a modification or reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated should not be given a
retroactive effect.

23. Section 246 of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended, provides that any revocation, modification or reversal of
rulings, circulars, rules and regulations promulgated by the CIR have no retroactive application if it would prejudice the
taxpayer. The exceptions to this rule are: (1) where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his
return or in any document required of him by the BIR;; (2) where the facts subsequently gathered by the BIR are
materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based, or (3) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
Good faith is defined as "that state of mind denoting honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all
information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious."
According to the Court of Appeals, respondent's failure to describe itself as a "health maintenance
organization," which is subject to VAT, is not tantamount to bad faith. The term "health maintenance organization"
was first recorded in the Philippine statute books only upon the passage of "The National Health Insurance Act of
1995" (Republic Act No. 7875). Section 4 (o) (3) thereof defines a health maintenance organization as "an entity
that provides, offers, or arranges for coverage of designated health services needed by plan members for a fixed
prepaid premium." Under this law, a health maintenance organization is one of the classes of a "health care
provider."
It is thus apparent that when VAT Ruling No. 231-88 was issued in respondent's favor, the term "health
maintenance organization" was yet unknown or had no significance for taxation purposes. Respondent, therefore,
believed in good faith that it was VAT exempt for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 on the basis of VAT Ruling No. 231-
88.
The rule is that the BIR rulings have no retroactive effect where a grossly unfair deal would result to the
prejudice of the taxpayer, as in this case.

24. Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall
be void, except
when the law itself authorizes their validity.
A mandatory provision of law is when the omission of which, renders the proceedings or acts, to
which it relates generally illegal or void. Prescriptive periods provided by the law for filing particular
suits are mandatory in character.
Prohibitory laws are those which contain positive prohibitions and are couched in the negative terms
importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated.
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public policy,
morals or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law
Waiver defined. – It is the relinquishment or refusal of a known right with both knowledge of its
existence and an
intention to relinquish it; may be express or implied
Waiver is implied when from the acts or conduct of a party the intention to relinquish a right can be
reasonably inferred; there must be a clear unequivocal, and decisive act of a party showing such
purpose; may also be implied from a failure or neglect to assert the right at the proper time.

25. GENERAL RULE: Rights may be waived.
Exceptions:
1. If such waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs; or
2. Prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law
Requisites of a valid waiver:
1) Must actually have the right which he renounces (cannot renounce future inheritance, liability
arising from future
fraud;
2) Must have capacity to make the renunciation; and
3) Renunciation must be made in a clear and unequivocal manner
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO
G.R. No. 137873; April 20, 2001
FACTS: At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14
floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. The victim was rushed to Rizal Medical Center in
Pasig, Metro Manila where investigation disclosed that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the platform
he was then on board and performing work, fell, and the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting
loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a
safety lock.

26. Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the
deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior
availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The petitioner argues that private respondent had
previously availed of the death benefits provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming
from the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil Code, the election being equivalent to a waiver.
ISSUE: Was there a valid waiver by the private respondent?
RULING: No, there was no valid waiver by the private respondent.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act of understanding that presupposes that
a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming
a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge
of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver
cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. It bears stressing that
what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact.
The “fact” that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s employees, of which
private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil
liability. There is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when she
accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the
remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent
testified that she was not aware of her rights. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court to determine
whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by the trial court
be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor
Code shall be deducted therefrom to prevent double recovery.

27. EMETERIO CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. L-15127; May 30, 1961
FACTS: Emeterio Cui was a law student in Arellano University from the school year 1948-1949 up to and including
the first semester of his fourth year. During his stay there, Cui received a scholarship from the university for
scholastic merit. Before Arellano University gave Cui the scholarship, however, the former was made to sign the
following: “In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to
transfer to another school without having refunded to the University the equivalent of my scholarship cash.”
On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, stating that scholarships
given to students for excellence in scholarship or for leadership in extra-curricular activities should be given because
of the merits of said students and not merely to keep them in the school. Francisco Capistrano, the brother of Cui’s
mother, was the dean of the college of law of Arellano University, but on Cui’s last semester in law school, Capistrano
transferred to the College of Law of Abad Santos University. Wishing to follow his uncle, Cui left Arellano and
enrolled in Abad Santos University. When he was about to take the bar exam, Cui needed the transcripts from
Arellano, but the latter would not give it to him unless he paid the sum Php1,033.87, the amount he got as
scholarship during his enrolment there. Cui had no choice but to pay the same so he could take the bar exam
but has since then petitioned the court for the reimbursement of the said amount.
ISSUE: Was the provision of the contract between Cui and Arellano University waiving the former’s right to transfer
to another school valid?
RULING: No, the provision of the contract between Cui and Arellano University was not valid.

28. The stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. under the principles
relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or
uphold a transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to
sound morality or to civic honesty. If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and
the motives which prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into
a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an
open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound
morality and civic honesty.
In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to
consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent with
sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. The policy
enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of
merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that
university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education
institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. The practice of
awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some
kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University.

29. Repeal of a law is the legislative act of abrogating through a subsequent law the effects of a
previous statute or portions thereof.
TWO KINDS OF REPEAL
1. Express Repeal – one which is literally declared by a new law, either in specific terms, as where
particular laws and provisions are named and identified and declared to be
repealed
2. Implied Repeal – takes place when a new law contains provision contrary to or inconsistent with
those of a former, without expressly repealing them
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom, or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

30. NOTE:
1. Where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will
be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld.
2. When a repealing law is repealed, the first law is not revived unless expressly provided.
3. A prior law which has been is revived if the law which impliedly repealed it is repealed, unless
otherwise provided.
ANTONIO A. MECANO v. COMMISSION ON
AUDIT
G.R. No. 103982;; December 11, 1992
FACTS: Antonio Mecano is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for
cholecystitis on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he
is claiming from the Commission on Audit.
Mecano requested for reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits
under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) which is a provision covering allowances of
government employees in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. Undersecretary of
Justice Bello III denied Mecano’s claim reasoning that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987 (Admin. Code). Mecano then re-­
submitted his claim with a copy of the opinion of
then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that the Admin. Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the
RAC, including the particular Section 699 of the latter as the repealing clause of the Admin. Code is merely a general
repealing provision. The request was approved by the Department of Justice and forwarded to the Commission on

31. However, COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo denied Mecano’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of
the RAC had been repealed by the Admin. Code, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor
re-­
enacted in the Admin. Code.
ISSUE: Did the Admin. Code repeal or abrogate Section 699 of the RAC?
RULING: No, the Admin. Code did not repeal or abrogate Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The Repealing Clause of the Admin. Code provides that “All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.” This is a general
repealing provision (implied repeal) for it failed to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to
be repealed.
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same
subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied
repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.
It is clear that there can be no implied repeal of Sec. 699 of the RAC by the Admin. Code. Under the first
category, it was not established that there is any irreconcilable conflict between the two codes.
Irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter;; they are so clearly
inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized;; and both
cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.
The new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code In fact, there
is no provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner in the Admin. Code. Nor is there
implied repeal under the second category for such is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended to

32. whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself and that it is clear intent of the legislature that
the later act be the substitute to the prior act. As stated in the opinion of Secretary Drilon, the Admin. Code
cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure.
It is a well-­
settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing
laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. Hence, Sec. 699 of the
RAC remains operative
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
Judicial decisions, although in themselves not laws, assume the same authority as the statute itself
and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the
criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also
those duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.
Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court are authoritative and precedent-setting, while those of the
inferior courts and the Court of Appeals are merely persuasive.
The application and interpretation placed by the Supreme Court upon a law is part of the law as of the
date of its enactment. There is not need to publish Supreme Court decision as there is no law that
requires the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazzette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective.

33. When a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. (People v. Jabinal)
Doctrine of stare decisis - enjoins adherence to judicial precedents
Whenever the Supreme Court lays down a principle, it becomes a part of the law forming part
of the contemporaneous interpretation of the law as of the time of its enactment. Once that
doctrine is laid down, it is almost always followed.
FACTS: On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint,
subscribed and sworn to by him, with the municipal court of the said municipality, charging Rafael Licera
with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August 13, 1966 the municipal
court rendered judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging five years and one day to six years and eight months of imprisonment.
Licera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro.
In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of the case for illegal
possession of firearm and another ease, likewise filed against Licera with the municipal court but
already forwarded to the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a person in
authority, the two offenses having arisen from the same occasion: apprehension of Licera by the Chief
of Police and a patrolman of Abra de Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession of the Winchester rifle
without the requisite license or permit therefor.
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. v. RAFAEL LICERA; G.R. No. L-39990 July 22,
1975

34. On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of assault upon an
agent of a person in authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of firearm, sentencing him to suffer five years
of imprisonment, and ordering the forfeiture of the Winchester rifle in favor of the Government. Licera’s appeal
to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16, 1974 to this Court as involving only one question of law.
Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his appointment as secret
agent on December 11, 1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims that as secret agent, he was a
“peace officer” and, thus, pursuant to People vs. Macarandang,1 was exempt from the requirements relating to the
issuance of license to possess firearms. He alleges that the court a quo erred in relying on the later case of
People vs. Mapa2 which held that section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons
appointed as secret agents by provincial governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.
ISSUE: Do court interpretations of law have the effect of laws?
RULING: Yes, court interpretations of law have the effect of laws.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws,
constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law
is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or
interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry
into effect.
At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for possession
of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the Macarandang rule — the
Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code - formed part of our jurisprudence and,
hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967.

35. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate
respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially
those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more especially true in the
application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in
any other, it is imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the
guidance of society
Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws.
Applicability – does not apply to criminal prosecutions, if no law punishing act, case must be
dismissed (nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege)
Duty of Court – a judge should not refrain from rendering a judgment just because there is no law
that governs a particular case. In the absence however of a law, the customs, and traditions of the
place can be applied, but they must be proved as facts according to the rules of evidence
When a law is vague or obscure, the court should clarify applying rules of statutory construction.
When a law is unjust, it is the duty of the court to apply it and not to tamper with it (Dura lex sed
lex.) If the law is unjust or harsh, the court may apply a soft hand, but it cannot refrain from
applying the law.

36. CHU JAN v. LUCIO BERNAS (G.R. No. L-10010; August 1, 1916
FACTS: A match was held in the cockpit of the municipality of Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks belonging to
the plaintiff and to the defendant respectively. Each of said persons had put up a wager of P160; and as the
referee of the cockpit had declared the defendant's cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff brought suit
against the defendant in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, asking that his own rooster be
declared the winner. The justice of the peace court decided that the bout was a draw. From this judgment
the defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of the province. The defendant denied each and all of
the allegations of the complaint and moved to dismiss with the costs against the plaintiff.
The said Court of First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the appeal on the grounds, to wit: the
court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with the rules governing
cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; that he does not know where to find the law on the subject and,
finally, that he knows of no law whatever that governs the rights to the plaintiff and the defendant in
questions concerning cockfights.
ISSUE: May a judge dismiss a case on the ground that he has no knowledge of applicable laws?
RULING: No, the judge may not dismiss a case on the ground that he has no knowledge of applicable laws.
The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case submitted to
him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules applicable to a certain matter that is the
subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his not knowing where to find the law relative to
the case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing
them without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing that a case
might arise to which no law would be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in the second paragraph of article 6,

37. Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed
that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
If there is ambiguity in the law, interpretation of the law requires fidelity to the legislative
purpose. What Congress intended is not to be frustrated. Its objective must be carried out.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, “is necessary so that it may tip the scales in
favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination
of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of
interpreting the law.”
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. JUDGE AMANTE PURISIMA
(GR No. L-42050-66; November 20, 1978)
FACTS: Pursuant to P.D. 9, penalizing the illegal possession of deadly weapons, a total of 26 people were
charged for the mere act of carrying deadly weapons. Respondent Judge Purisima, et. al. dismissed or
quashed all the informations filed in their respective courts for failing to allege that the carrying outside of the
accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance of or on the occasion of,
connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
Based on the literal import P.D. 9, the People argue that the prohibited acts need not be related to
subversive activities as such are essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mere carrying of deadly weapons constitute a crime under P.D. 9.

38. HELD: No, the mere carrying of deadly weapon does not constitute a crime under PD 9.
It is not the intention of P.D. No. 9 to punish the mere carrying of deadly weapons. In the construction or
interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and
spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the controlling factor. Whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within
the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions.
When P.D. No. 9 was promulgated, there was no intent to work a hardship or an oppressive result, a
possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on
another, and so on. The act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon must be with a motivation connected with the
desired result of Proclamation 1081 (suppressing criminality, etc.) that is within the intent of P.D. No. 9.
As regards the purpose of P.D. 9 contemplated in its preamble, the carrying of deadly weapons outside
the residence must be related to subversive or criminal activities to constitute a crime. Penalizing the mere
act of carrying deadly weapons would lead to injustice, hardships and unreasonable consequences, never
intended by a legislative measure. Hence, the mere carrying of deadly weapons do not constitute a crime
under P.D. 9.

39. Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced.
Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.
Custom – a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed/practiced as a social
rule,
legally binding and obligatory.
Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact according to the rules
of evidence
This provision, according to the Code Commission, “is necessary so that it may tip the scales in
favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination
of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of
interpreting the law.”
Requisites in Considering Customs.
(a) A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence; otherwise, the custom
cannot
be considered as a source of right. Thus, there is no judicial notice of custom.
(b) The custom must not be contrary to law (contra legem), public order, or public policy.
(c) There must be a number of repeated acts.
(d) The repeated acts must have been uniformly performed.
(e) There must be a juridical intention (convictio juris seu necessitatis) to make a rule of social
conduct,
i.e., there must be a conviction in the community that it is the proper way of acting, and that,

40. (f) There must be a sufficient lapse of time — this by itself is not a requisite of custom, but it gives
evidence
of the fact that indeed it exists and is being duly observed.
While ordinarily a law is written, consciously made, and enacted by Congress, a custom is unwritten,
spontaneous, and comes from society. Moreover, a law is superior to a custom as a source of right.
While the courts take cognizance of local laws, there can be no judicial notice of customs, even if
local.S.D. MARTINEZ vs.WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK (G.R. No. L-5691; December 27,
1910)
FACTS: On September 11, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on Calle Real, Ermita,
Manila, Philippines, when a delivery wagon belonging to William Van Buskirk, came along the street in the
opposite direction at a great speed, and run over to carromata severely wounding Carmen Ong with a serious cut
upon her head. Van Buskirk presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his
delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and
reliable cochero; that upon the delivery of some forage, the defendant’s cochero tied the driving lines of
the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside the wagon to unload the forage;
while unloading the forage, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other
noise, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away. The driver was thrown
out from the wagon and was unable to stop the horses resulting to a collision with the carromata.
Upon these facts the court found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment against him
for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day October, 1908,
and for the costs of the action. The case is before us on an appeal from that judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant may be held liable for the negligence of his cochero.

41. RULING: No, the defendant may not be held liable for the negligence of his cochero.
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in the Civil Code.
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a
trusty and capable driver is, under the last paragraph of Article 1903, liable for the negligence of
such driver in handling the team, the judgment must be reversed upon the ground that the evidence does
not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and
tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several
years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving
them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up
to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and
assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom
of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero
of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to
deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that
was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in
which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of
accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without
objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to
reverse the practice of decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and
assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom
of a people?

42. Article 13 has already been impliedly repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, thus:
Section 31. Legal Periods. - “Year” shall be understood to be twelve
calendar months; “month” of thirty days, unless it refers to a
specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed
according to the number of days the specific month contains;
“day” to a day of twenty-four hours and; “night” from sunrise to sunset.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC.
(G.R. No. 162255; August 28, 2007)
Facts: Gilbert Yap, Vice-Chairperson of Primetown, applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income tax
which
Primetown paid in 1997. The petitioner suffered losses due to the real estate slowdown therefore was entitled
ARTICLE 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that
years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of
twenty-four
hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number
of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.

43. Revenue Officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional documents to support
its claim.
Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a Petition for
Review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on
April 14, 1988. Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.
The CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a
judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit. The two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for
the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent
assert that the claim was filed within the period. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the CTA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition was filed within the two-year prescriptive period.
RULING: Yes, the petition was filed within the two-year prescriptive period.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted
return.
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods.
Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless
to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant. There obviously exists a
manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative
Code of 1987. For this reason, Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the
more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori (A later law takes

44. Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all
who live or
sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public
international law and to
treaty stipulations.
Citizens and foreigners are subject to penal laws and all other laws designed to maintain public
security and safety.
Exceptions: (Theory of Exterritoriality) Foreigners may be exempted from the operation of
Philippine laws when:
1. The offense is committed by a foreign sovereign while in Philippine territory;
2. The offense is committed by diplomatic representatives; and
3. The offense is committed in a public or armed vessel of a foreign country

45. “Status”, defined
The status of a person in civil law includes personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, and not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being married or not, or his being
legitimate or illegitimate.
It is the sum total of a person’s rights, duties, and capacities(Bouvier’s Law Dictionary)
Nationality Rule – Philippine Law applies to Philippine citizens even when residing abroad with respect
to family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity
Application of Article – purely persona relations and status and legal capacity (all questions relating to
family relations governed exclusively by Phil law, when Filipinos are involved)
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.

46. ALICE REYES VAN DORN v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. (L-68470; October 8, 1985)
FACTS: Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States.
They were
married in Hongkong in 1972. After their marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines. They begot two children. However the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States in 1982.
Petitioner has also remarried in Nevada.
In 1983, Private Respondent filed a suit against petitioner, stating that the latter’s business in Manila is
conjugal property of the parties. Respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to render an
accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada court wherein the respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no community property”.
Respondent averred that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive
laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy that the acts and declaration of a foreign
Court cannot,
especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding
in the

47. RULING:
1. Yes, the foreign divorce is binding in the Philippines. Owing to the Nationality Principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
2. No, an American granted absolute divorce cannot assert his rights over property allegedly held in
the Philippines as conjugal property.
Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.

48. IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL v. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA (G.R. No. 80116; June 30, 1989)
Facts: Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private respondent Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national, on Sept. 7, 1979 at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in
Malate, Manila and had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Unfortunately, after about three and a
half years of marriage such connubial disharmony eventuated in Erich initiating divorce proceeding
against Imelda in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been
living apart since April 1982.
On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in Manila on
January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to to Imelda, the latter had an affair
with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
Petitioner filed a petition asking to set aside the cases filed against her and be dismissed. Thereafter,
petitioner moved to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary
Ordoñez issued a resolution directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent Geiling can prosecute petitioner Pilapil on the ground of adultery
even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

49. RULING: In prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be
the offended spouse and nobody else. In this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended
spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned.
Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of the
petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
MANUELA BARRETTO GONZALEZ v. AUGUSTO C. GONZALES (G.R. No. L-37048; March 7, 1933)
Facts: Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippines and are residents of Manila. They were married on
January 19, 1919 and lived together as man and wife until 1926. They voluntarily separated and since that time
have not lived together as man and wife.
Of this union four children were born. Negotiations between the parties, both being represented by
attorneys, continued for several months, whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her
support and that of her children, five hundred pesos (P500) monthly; this amount to be increased in case of
illness or necessity, and the title of certain properties to be put in her name.
Shortly after this agreement the husband left the Islands, betook himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured
in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion, which decree was dated November 28,
1927. Shortly thereafter the defendant moved to California and returned to the Philippines in August1928,
where he has since remained. On the same date that he secured the divorce in Nevada, he went through
the forms of marriage with another Filipina and now has three children as a result of that marriage.
Defendant, after his departure from the Philippines, reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly
for the support of his wife and four minor children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as
alimony

50. . Shortly after his return his wife brought action in the Court of 'First Instance of Manila requesting
that the Philippine courts confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of the State of Nevada.
CFI granted the prayer by the plaintiff.
Issue: Whether or not the divorce decree obtained in Nevada is valid.
Ruling: No, the divorce decree obtained in Nevada is not valid.
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to
this court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a
purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a
change of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the
matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the
State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence
and did not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in
which he had entered in 1919.
Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit
the personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a
manner which our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals

51. WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, et. al. (G.R. No. 142820; June 20,
2003)
FACTS: Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on
December 11, 1980, in Germany. They had two daughters. On August 28, 1996, Carmen filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage at the Makati RTC, but the petition was denied.
Meanwhile, Wolfgang Roehr obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The custody of the two children was granted to
Wolfgang by the said court.
Because of this, Wolfgang filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999, on the ground that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the matter since there is already a divorce decree obtained abroad.
Judge Guevara-Salonga granted the motion to dismiss. Carmen, however, filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, praying that the case should proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of
custody of their children and the distribution of the properties. The judge issued an order partially
setting aside her order to dismiss for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the
spouses as well as the custody of the children.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine Courts can take cognizance over the issue on the custody of the children.
RULING: Yes, the Philippine Courts can take cognizance over the issue on the custody of the children
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner. In this case, the divorce decree has not been questioned
by either party. Only the custody of the children is doubted.
While the court in Germany that granted the divorce decree has decided regarding the custody of the
children, as a general rule, the legal effects of divorce, even if obtained abroad, must still be determined by

52. This includes issues on custody and care and support of children. Before our courts can give the
effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German
court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so
on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court.
It should be noted that the proceedings in the German court were merely summary. It cannot be said
that Carmen Rodriguez was given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court. While
Wolfgang was represented by two counsels, Rodriguez had no lawyers to assist her in the proceedings.
In addition, the divorce decree did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct
in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the provision in the Child and
Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody.

53. Lex Rei Sitae Principle – real and personal properties are governed by the laws of the country where
they are
situated
Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to
the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the
national law of the persons whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of the county wherein said
property may be found.
National law of the person whose succession is under consideration governs with regard to:
(1) the order of succession;
(2) the amount of successional rights;
(3) the intrinsic validity of the will (Art. 16, New Civil Code); and
(4) the legal capacity to succeed. (Art. 1039, New Civil Code).

54. TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS v. (G.R. No. L-23678; June 6, 1967)
FACTS: Amos G Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his death. He executed a will in the
Philippines, that a portion of his distributable asset amounting should be divided in the following order
and manner:
1. $240,000 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
2. Php 120,000 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, jr.; Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis, or Php 40,000.00 each; and
3. The remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wife,
Maria Cristina and Miriam filed their oppositions to the partition on the ground that they were deprived
of their legitimes, as illegitimate children, and therefore, complulsory heirs of the accused. The lower
court under Article 16 of the Civil Code applied the national law of the decedent, which is Texas Law
that did not provide the legitimes.
Appellants contend that (1) Art. 17(3) of the Civil Code stating that “Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their
acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country, prevails as the exception to Article 16 (2) of the Civil
Code; and (2) the decedent executed two wills – one to govern his Texas Estate and the other, his
Philippine Estate, arguing that he intended Philippine Law to govern his Philippine Estate.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Art. 17 (3) of the Civil Code prevails as the exception to Art. 16 (2) of the Civil
Code
2. Whether or not the will executed in the Philippines shall be governed by Philippine Law.

55. RULING:
1. No, Art. 17(3) is not an exception to Art. 16(2)/
Congress deleted the phrase, “notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding
article” when they incorporated Art. 11 of the Civil Code as Art. 17 of the New Civil Code while
reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16
in the new.
It must have been the purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself
which must be applied in testate and intestate succession As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision under ART. 1039, which decrees that the capacity to succeed is to be
government by the national law of the decedent
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
Legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
2. No, the will executed in the Philippines shall not be governed by Philippine Law.
Assuming that such was the decedent’s intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not
alter the law. In Miciano v. Brimo, a provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine Law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 – now Article 16 – of the Civil
Code states said national law should govern.

56. The parties admit that the decedent Amos G. Bellis, was acitizen of the State of Texas, USA, and that
under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the
provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas Law, the
Philippine Law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
JUAN MICIANO v. ANDRE BRIMO (G.R. No. L-22595; November 1, 1927)
FACTS: Joseph G. Brimo, a Turkish citizen, executed a will which provided that his properties be
disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippines. There is also a condition that, if any legatee who
must
disrespect the will, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed on the basis that the partition in question
puts into
effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code (now Article
16(2).
However, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator was violated in
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the approval of the scheme of partition on the ground that it is not in accordance with
the laws
of Joseph’s Turkish nationality is erroneous.
2. Whether or not the conditions as it is expressed in the will were legal and valid.
RULING: 1. No, the approval of the scheme of partition was not erroneous. No evidence in the record that the
national law of

57. The fact that the Andre did not prove that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and
in the
absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same asthose of the Philippines.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It
is discretionary on the part of the court to postpone or not to postpone a particular proceeding in a case,
and when the person applying for it has already been given ample opportunity to present the evidence
that he wishes to introduce, the court commits no abuse of discretion in denying it.
2. No, the conditions expressed in the will were not legal and not valid.
If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that he respect the testator’s order that his property be
distributed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines, and not in accordance with the laws of his
nation, said condtion is legal. According to Article 10 of the Civil Code, said laws govern his testamentary
disposition and bneing illegal, shall be considered unwritten. Thus, making the institution unconditional.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective, not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator’s national laws.

58. Renvoi takes place when the conflicts rule of the forum makes a reference to a foreign law, but the foreign
law is found to contain a conflict rule that returns or refers the matter back to the law of the forum
(Remission)
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the
conflict of laws as well. According to this theory "the law of a country" means the whole of its law.
The term renvoi includes two notions: the notion of a "return reference," that is, Ruckverweisung, and the
notion of a "forward reference," that is, Weiterverweisung.
Transmission Theory: If the foreign law refers it to a third country, the said country’s law shall govern.
Doctrine of Processual Presumption: The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be proved by the
proponent thereof; otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the law of the forum
Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.

59. Extrinsic validity (forms and solemnities of wills public instruments, contracts) - governed by laws
of country where executed (lex loci celebrationis)
Executed before diplomatic and consular officials of the Philippines in a foreign country = governed
by Philippine Law (extension of territory )
Par. 3 Prohibitive laws =prohibitive laws not rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated in foreign countries = e.g. absolute divorce between Phil. citizens
Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

60. RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL, INC., v. STOCKTON W. ROUZIE, JR., (G.R. NO. 162894 February
26, 2008)
Facts: Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the State of Connecticut, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a
contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several
government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. Then,
respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI.
After 4 years, respondent filed before the Arbitration branch of the NLRC a suit against BMSI and Rust
International, Inc. (RUST) for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of
employment contract. Labor Arbiter rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s
money claims. Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed
respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent elevated the case to the SC but was
dismissed.
Respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the RTC of La Union.
The Complaint named as defendants petitioner as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations
impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case that
respondent was not paid for his services. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as
petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.
In its Answer, petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it was a foreign corporation duly
licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with respondent
or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that
per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as “Special Sales
Representative Agreement,” the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the

61. RULING: Yes, the Philippine court can acquire jurisdiction over the case.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of
Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter,
are precluded from hearing the civil action.
Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a
defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a
substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties. The choice of law
stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after
hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on
its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded
from seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not
sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a
factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the
discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital
facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance

62. CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA , INC. v. JOSEPH BASSO (G.R. Nos. 178382-83, September 23,
2015)
Facts: Petitioner Continental Micronesia is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of and
domiciled in the United States of America. It is licensed to do business in the Philippines. Respondent, a US
citizen residing in the Philippines, accepted an offer to be a General Manager position by Mr. Braden,
Managing Director-Asia of Continental Airlines. On November 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine operations of
Continental, with respondent retaining his position as General Manager. Thereafter, respondent received a
letter from Mr. Schulz, who was then CMI’s Vice President of Marketing and Sales, informing him that he has agreed
to work in CMI as a consultant on an “as needed basis.” Respondent wrote a counter-proposal that was rejected by
CMI.
Respondent then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner corporation. Alleging the
presence of foreign elements, CMI filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of CMI and the subject matter of the controversy.
The Labor Arbiter agreed with CMI that the employment contract was executed in the US “since the letter-
offer was under the Texas letterhead and the acceptance of Complainant was returned there.” Thus,
applying the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws apply. Also, applying lex loci contractus, the Labor Arbiter ruled
that the parties did not intend to apply Philippine laws. The NLRC ruled that the Labor Arbiter acquired
jurisdiction over the case when CMI voluntarily submitted to his office’s jurisdiction by presenting evidence,
advancing arguments in support of the legality of its acts, and praying for reliefs on the merits of the case.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case and over the parties.
ISSUE: Whether or not labor tribunals have jurisdiction over the case.

63. Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide cases.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and by the
material allegations in the complaint, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or
some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the
omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. That the employment
contract of Basso was replete with references to US laws, and that it originated from and was returned to the
US, do not automatically preclude our labor tribunals from exercising jurisdiction to hear and try this
case. The case stemmed from an illegal dismissal complaint. The Labor Code, under Article 217, clearly vests
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving termination disputes to the Labor
Arbiter. Hence, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Basso, notwithstanding his citizenship, when he filed his complaint against CMI. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the person of CMI was acquired through the coercive process of service of summons.
We note that CMI never denied that it was served with summons. CMI has, in fact, voluntarily appeared
and participated in the proceedings before the courts. Though a foreign corporation, CMI is licensed to do
business in the Philippines and has a local business address here. The purpose of the law in requiring that
foreign corporations doing business in the country be licensed to do so, is to subject the foreign corporations to
the jurisdiction of our courts.

64. FACTS: Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and
management support in the infrastructure projects national permanently residing in the Philippines. The
agreement provides that Kitamaru was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year. Nippon assigned
Kitamaru to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) project. When the
STAR project was near completion, DPWH engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the
detailed engineering & construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project.
Kitamaru was named as the project manger in the contract.
Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed Kitamaru that the company
had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only
up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project. Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI
project. Nippon insisted that Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed
for specific performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending
that ICA had been perfected in Japan and executed by and between Japanese nationals, thus the RTC has no
jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the
proper courts of Japan following the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus. The RTC denied the motion
to dismiss. The CA ruled hat the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case, because
nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue. It held that the RTC was correct in
applying the principle of lex loci solutionis.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific performance &
damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals may be assailed on the
principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, “the state of the most significant relationship rule,” or
forum non conveniens.
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., LTD., v.
MINORU KITAMURA (G.R. No. 149177; November 23, 2007)

65. RULING: No, the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases involving contract executed outside the
country by foreign nationals may not be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus,
the state of the most significant relationship rule, or forum non conveniens.
In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of
law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts.
Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the
further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to
both parties. The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply
forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the “minimum contacts” for
one do not always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for the other. The question of whether the law of a
state can be applied to a transaction is different from the question of whether the courts of that state have
jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
In this case, only the first phase is at issue—jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various aspects. For a
court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have jurisdiction over the plaintiff/petitioner,
over the defendant/respondent, over the subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases
involving property, over the res or the thing w/c is the subject of the litigation.
In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction, Nippon is actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the sovereign authority w/c
establishes and organizes the court. It is given only by law and in the manner prescribed by law. It is further
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims asserted therein. To succeed in its motion for the dismissal of an action for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the claim, the movant must show that the court or tribunal cannot act on the matter

66. In the instant case, Nippon, in its MTD, does not claim that the RTC is not properly vested by law w/
jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for a civil case for specific performance and damages is one
not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather
raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction are the principles of lex loci
celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of the most significant relationship rule.” The Court finds the
invocation of these grounds unsound.
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the “law of the place of the ceremony” or the law of the place where a
contract is made. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractusmeans the “law of the place where a
contract is executed or to be performed.” It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the
contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by
them either expressly or implicitly.
Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to apply to a
dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the occurrence
and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the contract was made,
was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of incorporation of the
parties.This rule takes into account several contacts and evaluates them according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute, they
are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law is to be applied in
resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem. Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is
that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only inapplicable but also not yet called for.

67. Further, Nippon’s premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they have not yet
pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining which law should apply, first there
should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a
foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be
pleaded and proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or
administrative agency, there are 3 alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it: (1) dismiss the case,
either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case; (2) assume jurisdiction over
the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or (3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or
apply the law of some other State or States. The court’s power to hear cases and controversies is derived
from the Constitution and the laws. While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not
limited by foreign sovereign law short of treaties or other formalagreements, even in matters regarding rights
provided by foreign sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction.
First, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as
a ground. Second, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine
depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the RTC. In this
case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction. Third, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination; hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense.

68. SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES (SAUDIA) AND BRENDA J. BETIA v. MA. JOPETTE M. REBESENCIO, et. al.
(G.R. No. 198587, January 14, 2015)
FACTS: Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established and existing under the laws of
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited and hired
by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration.
Respondents continued their employment until they are separated from service on various dates in 2006.
Respondents contended that the termination of their employment was illegal. They alleged that the termination was
made solely because they were pregnant. They allege that they had informed Saudia of their respective
pregnancies and had gone through the necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves. Initially, Saudia
had given its approval but later informed respondents that its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had
disapproved their maternity leaves. In addition, it required respondents to file their resignation letters.
Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents’ maternity leaves and demand for their resignation on its
“Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants” (Unified Contract). Under the Unified Contract, the
employment of a Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered void. Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter. It claimed that all the determining points of contact referred to foreign law and insisted that the
Complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of forum non conveniens is applicable.
RULING: No, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is not applicable.

69. Forum non conveniens, like the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res judicata, is a means of
addressing the problem of parallel litigation. While the rules of forum shopping, litis pendentia, and res
judicata are designed to address the problem of parallel litigation within a single jurisdiction, forum non
conveniens is a means devised to address parallel litigation arising in multiple jurisdictions.
Consistent with the principle of comity, a tribunal’s desistance in exercising jurisdiction on account of
forum non conveniens is a deferential gesture to the tribunals of another sovereign. It is a measure that
prevents the former’s having to interfere in affairs which are better and more competently addressed by
the latter. Further, forum non conveniens entails a recognition not only that tribunals elsewhere are better
suited to rule on and resolve a controversy, but also, that these tribunals are better positioned to enforce
judgments and, ultimately, to dispense justice.
Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest Philippine tribunals of
jurisdiction and to require the application of foreign law. Saudia invokes forum non conveniens to supposedly
effectuate the stipulations of the Cabin Attendant contracts that require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia.
Forum non conveniens relates to forum, not to the choice of governing law. That forum non conveniens may
ultimately result in the application of foreign law is merely an incident of its application. In this strict sense,
forum non conveniens is not applicable. It is not the primarily pivotal consideration in this case.
Our law on contracts recognizes the validity of contractual choice of law provisions. Where such provisions
exist, Philippine tribunals, acting as the forum court, generally defer to the parties’ articulated choice. This is
consistent with the fundamental principle of autonomy of contracts. Article 1306 of the Civil Code expressly
provides that “[t]he contracting parties may establish ‘such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions
as they may deem convenient.” Nevertheless, while a Philippine tribunal (acting as the forum court) is called
upon to respect the parties’ choice of governing law, such respect must not be so permissive as to lose sight of
considerations of law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy that underlie the contract central to the
controversy.

70. As the present dispute relates to (what the respondents allege to be) the illegal termination of respondents’
employment, this case is immutably a matter of public interest and public policy. Consistent with clear
pronouncements in law and jurisprudence, Philippine laws properly find application in and govern this case. ‘
Moreover, as this premise for Saudia’s insistence on the application forum non conveniens has been shattered, it
follows that Philippine tribunals may properly assume jurisdiction over the present controversy.
Article 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their
deficiency shall be
supplied by the provisions of this Code.