This document discusses several rulings by the European Court of Human Rights regarding national minority associations in Greece and Bulgaria. 1. The Court convicted Greece twice for violating Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights by refusing to register national minority youth associations in Western Thrace. The Court found that merely using the terms "Turkish" or "minority" in the associations' names was not enough to establish a threat to public order. 2. The Court has emphasized that the existence of minorities is a historical fact that democracies should protect and support. While states have discretion over how they recognize minorities, the Court does not accept restrictions on minority associations unless they advocate violence or rejection of democracy. 3.

1. 1
Paper prepared by
Kalampakou Eleni
Lawyer, MA, PhD Candidate in Constitutional Law,
Scholar of the State Scholarships Foundation of Greece (I.K.Y.),
ekalampa@econ.auth.gr.
Faculty of Law, Department of Public Law and Political Science,
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece.
“Towards a pluralistic conception of citizenship: the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights”.
1. National minority associations: from state ban to «Strasbourg’s» protection.
Article 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights1
protects the freedom
of assembly and the right to form trade unions, but it has been interpreted by the
European Court of Human Rights (the Court) in such a way to protect also the right to
form an association and establish a political party2
. Restrictions on the exercise of this
right are legitimate only if they are intended to prevent crime or protect national
security, public safety and the freedoms of others, and only if the measures taken are
proportionate and necessary in a democratic society.
Recently, the Court convicted twice the Greek state on the violation of this
right. The domestic judicial authorities refused to register the “Association of the
minority youth in Evros”, and also ordered the dissolution of the “Turkish Union in
Xanthi”, both located in the Northeast part of Greece(Western Thrace). The reasons
they invoke were that both the titles of these associations, as well as the words and
actions of their members, declared a national minority consciousness and implied the
existence of an oppressed Turkish minority in Greece. Thus, they threatened public
order and violated the international treaty signed in Lausanne in 1923 by Greece and
Turkey, which regulates only for a Muslim religious minority in the area. However,
the Court considered that only the titles and the use of the word “Turkish” or
“minority” were not reasons enough for the Greek authorities to establish that the
associations threatened public order, since the use of these terms were not placed in
the context of the associations’ aims and real activities3
.
This was not the first time that the Greek state was convicted in a similar case.
In fact, it was the case Sidiropoulos v. Greece, ten years ago, which first gave the
Court the opportunity to create its case law in the field. On the northwest part of
1
Article 11 ECHR. Freedom of assembly and association. 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join
trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2 No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these
rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the
imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the
police or of the administration of the State.
2
Sidiropoulos and others v. Greece, (57/1997/841/1047), ECHR, 10 July 1998,§ 40: The Court points
out that the right to form an association is an inherent part of the right set forth in Article 11, even if
that Article only makes express reference to the right to form trade unions. That citizens should be able
to form a legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of mutual interest is one of the most
important aspects of the right to freedom of association, without which that right would be deprived of
any meaning. The way in which national legislation enshrines this freedom and its practical application
by the authorities reveal the state of democracy in the country concerned.
3
Bekir-Ousta et autres c. Grece (35151/05), ECHR, 11 Octobre 2007, § 44, 45, & Tourkiki Enosi
Xanthis et autres c. Grece (26698/05),ECHR, 27 Mars 2008, § 51.

2. 2
Greece, an association named “Home of Macedonian civilization” was refused
registration, because, according to authorities, its actual and implied aim was to
promote the idea of an oppressed “Macedonian” minority4
. On the contrary, the Court
asserted that “the aims of the association regarded only the preservation and the
development of the traditions and the folk culture of the region”; therefore, they were
clear and legitimate. Besides, “although it cannot be ruled out that an organisation’s
programme may conceal objectives and intentions different from the ones it
proclaims, to verify that it does not, the content of the programme must be compared
with the organisation’s actions and the positions it defends”. Most importantly,
according to the Court, the statements of the applicants of having a “Macedonian”
national consciousness couldn’t justify the restrictions on their right to associate, since
they had not advocated the use of violent, undemocratic, or unconstitutional means5
.
The same line of argument was used also in the cases concerning “United
Macedonian Organisation Ilinden”, an association based on the south-west of the state
of Bulgaria. Domestic courts refused its registration three times, banned rallies of its
members and ordered the dissolution of the relevant political party, because they
considered that its aims were directed against the unity of the nation, advocating
national and ethnic hatred. This leaded to a series of cases6
brought to Strasbourg,
where the Court repeatedly convicted Bulgaria for violations of article 11 of the
Convention. It stressed that even “the fact that a group of persons calls for autonomy
or even requests secession of part of the country’s territory(…)cannot automatically
justify a prohibition of its assemblies” because it cannot “amount to a threat to the
country’s territorial integrity and national security”. The only “essential factor to be
taken into consideration is the question whether there has been a call for the use of
violence, an uprising, or any other form of rejection of democratic principles” 7
.
2. National minorities as an expression of cultural pluralism.
a. The fact of plurality within and between states.
European judges also contended that the existence of minorities and different
cultures in a country is an historical fact, which a democracy should not only tolerate,
but protect and support8
. Nevertheless, the question is who has the authority to
interpret history and decide if a minority exists and whether it is a national, religious
or linguistic one. For example, the Greek judicial authorities assert that there are no
national minorities in Greece, neither a Macedonian nor a Turkish one. The only
minority is the Muslim one in western Thrace, as it is the only one recognised in an
4
Sidiropoulos and others v. Greece & Ouranio Toxo and others v. Greece (74989/01), ECHR, 20
October 2005,a judgement concerning the dissolution of the relevant minority political party.
5
Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, § 41-44.
6
Stankov and the United Macedonian organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria (29221/95 and 29225/95),
ECHR, 2 October 2001, The United Macedonian organisation (UMO) Ilinden – Pirin and others v.
Bulgaria (59489/00), ECHR, 20 October 2005, The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and
Ivanov v. Bulgaria (44079/98), ECHR, 20 October 2005, Ivanov and others v. Bulgaria (46336/99),
ECHR, 24 November 2005, The United Macedonian organisation Ilinden and others v. Bulgaria
(59491/00) 19 January 2006, Zhechev v. Bulgaria (57045/00), ECHR, 21 June 2007
7
Zhechev v. Bulgaria, § 47 “An organisation may campaign for a change in the legal and constitutional
structures of the State if the means used to that end are in every respect legal and democratic and if the
change proposed is itself compatible with fundamental democratic principles”. See also, The UMO
Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria, § 61, Stankov and the UMO Ilinden v. Bulgaria, §90, 97-98.
8
Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis et autres c. Grèce, § 51. This was emphasised also in the «Sidiropoulos»
judgment, when for the fist time pluralism and democracy were connected to the function of minority
associations.

3. 3
international treaty. Equally, the Bulgarian courts have judged that “there is no
Macedonian ethnos in Bulgaria”9
.
The European Court of Human Rights confronted this issue vigorously in the
case of the “Union of People of Silesian Nationality” v. Poland. Domestic authorities
refused to register the association, because, by doing so, they would be de facto
recognising the existence of a Silesian national minority, which could affect the
implementation of the country’s electorate law, which provides that associations and
parties of national minorities have an advantage in the distribution of parliament seats.
European judges explained that they are not in a position to give a legal definition of
national minority, since such a definition is not to be found in any international legal
text. They also pointed out that states are not obliged by international law to adopt a
particular concept of “national minority”, or to introduce a certain procedure for the
official recognition of minority groups10
. Hence, the state of Poland won the case,
because a de facto recognition of a Silesian minority might have had consequences on
the regular implementation of the electorate system.
This decision is an example of the subsidiarity principle which binds the Court
and dictates that domestic legislation and case law should not be judged according to
distrait legal principles. The Court is an international judicial mechanism and in order
for its decisions to be respected, it must take into account the different historical,
economic, social and political conditions in every state. It must keep a balance
between the enactment of universal human rights and the consideration for the varied
characteristics of each particular democracy. Thus, it pays attention to the state-
plurality, the so called “external pluralism”11
of the states, allowing them a margin of
appreciation for the regulation of internal matters. This is why it has repeatedly
emphasised that when it “carries out its scrutiny, its task is not to substitute its own
view for that of the relevant national authorities, but rather to review the decisions
they delivered in the exercise of their discretion”12
.
However, it should be emphasised that what determined this judgement was
not, in general, the danger of a de facto recognition of a national minority, but the risk
of abuse of the electorate system, a field where states enjoy a wide margin of
appreciation13
. The denial of the members of the association to “compromise” with
the authorities and change its name, as well as a provision in its memorandum that
was allowing the enactment of the electoral privilege, was considered by the Court as
inconsistent with the expectations of democracy and pluralism14
.
b. The principle of cultural pluralism in the case-law of the ECHR.
Nevertheless, the very implementation of pluralism and democracy has also
guided the Court to rule differently in all other cases concerning national minority
9
Bekir-Ousta et autres c. Grèce, § 8, and, The UMO Ilinden – Pirin and others v. Bulgaria, §25.
10
Not even in the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. See Gorzelik and
others v. Poland, (44158/98), ECHR, 17 February 2004, § 67, 68 “(…) practice regarding official
recognition by States of national, ethnic or other minorities within their population varies from country
to country or even within countries. The choice as to what form such recognition should take and
whether it should be implemented through international treaties or bilateral agreements or incorporated
into the Constitution or a special statute must, by the nature of things, be left largely to the State
concerned, as it will depend on particular national circumstances”.
11
Sudre Frederick, « Le pluralisme saisi par le juge européen », in Droit et pluralisme, Laureline
Fontaine (dir.), Droit et justice 76, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2007, p. 261 –286.
12
UMO Ilinden and others v. Bulgaria, §57, 62.
13
Gorzelik and others v. Poland, § 106. See also the critique by the judges that disagreed.
14
Gorzelik and others v. Poland, §101-103

4. 4
associations. In all these cases, the Court did not examine whether there was a legal
recognition and definition of the minority concerned, either within an international
treaty or in any other way. Besides, a possible de facto recognition of a national
minority was not considered danger enough to legitimise restrictions under article 11.
In general, in the field of national minority associations, the Court seems to
mark a common framework of protection and leaves a small margin of appreciation to
states. This stance is generated by a commitment to pluralism, which, although is not
established expressly, it is recognised by the Court as an inherent value in a
democratic society and as a principle that leads the interpretation of the European
Convention of Human Rights15
. According to the Court, pluralism suggests that a
democratic society does not only tolerate, but also supports and protects minority
associations. It calls for the non intervention of the state in the function and free
expression of the associations, except for the cases in which, there are convincing and
compelling reasons. Also, it entails positive measures, in order to ensure the effective
enjoyment of this right16
. Besides, the Court stated that “pluralism cannot be
implemented, unless an association can freely express its ideas and opinions; freedom
of expression is one of the objectives of the freedom of association” and it “is
applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or
regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend,
shock or disturb”17
.
Consequently, the Court recognises that freedom of association is particularly
important for persons belonging to national and ethnic minorities, because “forming
an association in order to express and promote its identity may be instrumental in
helping a minority to preserve and uphold its rights”18
. In their turn, minority
associations are important for the implementation of pluralism and democracy. The
Court stressed that the associations formed “for the protection of cultural heritance
and the quest for a national identity or the affirmation of a minority consciousness are
very important for the good function of democracy”19
, and that “pluralism is also built
on the genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and the dynamics of cultural
traditions, ethnic and cultural identities (…)”. In this way, pluralism is construed as
“cultural”, as a principle that promotes the recognition and protection of different
cultural and national identities. This principle leads to an interpretation of the right to
associate in a way that can be exercised freely by the members of national minorities;
“only convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on that freedom, and
any interference must correspond to a “pressing social need”20
.
15
Sudre Frederick, « Le pluralisme saisi par le juge européen », p.281-286. The author mentions the
case law regarding the principles of non discrimination, the rule of law, human dignity and pluralism as
bases for the interpretation of ECHR.
16
Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis et autres c .Grèce, §51 & Ouranio Toxo and others v. Greece, § 37: «It
follows from that finding that a genuine and effective respect for freedom of association cannot be
reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere; a purely negative conception would not
be compatible with the purpose of Article 11 nor with that of the Convention in general. There may
thus be positive obligations to secure the effective enjoyment of the right to freedom of association”.
17
UMO Ilinden and others v. Bulgaria, §60.
18
Gorzelic and others v. Poland, §93
19
Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis et autres c. Grèce, §43.
20
Gorzelic and others v. Poland, § 95. The Court stresses that “the notion “necessary” does not have
the flexibility of such expressions as “useful” or “desirable”. Also, a limit to the right is the
safeguarding of other values of the democratic society;one cannot invoke the right to form an
association, in order to provoke hatred or race discrimination. See W.P et a. c. Pologne, (42264/98),
ECHR, 2/9/2004, which concerned the form of an association with racist and anti-Semitism character.

5. 5
3. The articulation of cultural pluralism with democracy.
a. The route from monoculturalism to multiculturalism.
In all its relevant judgments, the Court links pluralism to democracy. In fact it
refers to pluralism as an inherent value in a democratic society, while it has repeatedly
stressed that “pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are the hallmarks of a
“democratic society”, and “although individual interests must on occasion be
subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of
the majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair
and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position”21
.
Besides, in a society that functions in a healthy manner “the participation of citizens
in the democratic process is to a large extent achieved through belonging to
associations in which they may integrate with each other and pursue common
objectives collectively”22
.
The question that immediately arises, however, is how the enhancement of
national minority identities and associations can be reconciled with social cohesion in
a democratic society. The protection of the right to a minority association surely
promotes liberalism, but democracy does not equate to human rights23
. Rather, it
means a self governing political community and, like every community, it
presupposes membership, identity and exclusion. More specifically, in a democracy
of a nation state, the members of the demos, the citizens, are or should be also
members of a certain nation. Thus, they are presumed to be individuals with certain
characteristics, who belong to the same category: the category of people that make up
the nation. This notion of citizenship reflects the idea of a polity as a community of
ethnic similarities24
while nationality represents the symbolic borders of this
community; a person who does not have the mainstream national consciousness
threatens these symbolic borders and sometimes, also the territorial ones.
Accordingly, he must be either assimilated or excluded. A nation – state cannot easily
settle with the existence of national minority associations, because there is only one
right and harmless way of being Greek, or Polish or Bulgarian. As Hanna Arendt has
remarked “society always demands that its members act as though they were members
of one enormous family which has only one opinion and one interest”25
.
Against this strain for sameness, people who have a minority consciousness,
seek for a shelter in their cultural community and demand the recognition and
protection of their identity. National and cultural diversity then, becomes a matter of
justice and equality and calls for group-differentiated rights. In this perspective,
citizenship can be viewed as multicultural, as a legal status that allows for the
expression and protection of different national identities within one state. As Will
Kymlicka points out, the members of national minority communities are
“incorporated into the political community, not only as individuals, but also through
their group membership” while “the sense of solidarity and common purpose in a
21
Gorzelik and others v. Poland, § 90.This was asserted for the fist time in the case Young James and
Webster v. the United Kingdom, ECHR, 13 August 1981, § 63.
22
Gorzelik and others v. Poland, § 93, & The UMO Ilinden and others v.Bulgaria, § 58, 59.
23
Calhoun, Craig, Nations Matter. Culture History and the cosmopolitan dream. New York: Routledge,
2007, p. 147 : “Liberalism informs the notion of individual agency, but provides weak purchase at best
on membership and on the collective cohesion and capacity of the demos”. See also p. 149: “crucially,
we are poorly prepared to theorize democracy if we cannot theorize the social solidarity of democratic
peoples.”
24
Ibid. p.69-72
25
Arendt Hannah, The Human Condition. Chicago IL: University of Chicago press, 1958, p.39

6. 6
multinational state, will involve accommodating, rather than subordinating, national
identities”26
.
b. The choice of the ECHR: interculturalism.
However, if cultural pluralism is perceived as multiculturalism, “culture” is
interpreted as a fixed and unchangeable set of inherited disciplines, modes of
expression and practices particular to a group of people. Cultural communities are
presumed integral and solid, clearly demarcated from each other, with members who
share certain identifying features27
. Therefore, both monoculturalism and
multiculturalism present nations and cultures according to Seyla Benhabib “as realms
of familiarity and sameness, not as categories within which heterogeneous members
have rights of participation”28
. Thus, they both lead to suppression, since they “favour
the currently existing power structures” between majorities and minorities and within
minorities themselves29
. Likewise, in the cases examined, the domestic authorities
either deprive to people with national minority consciousness the exercise of the right
to associate, or they impose a certain cultural identity, recognised by the state. For
example, according to the Greek courts, members of associations in Western Thrace
should express themselves only as Muslim Greeks, since “there are no Turks, but only
Muslim Greek citizens», and there are “two Greek communities, the Christian and the
Muslim30
. With this stance they presume society either in terms of similarity, either as
juxtaposition of separate religious communities.
In contrast to assimilation and multiculturalism, the European Court of Human
Rights has stressed that “a pluralist and genuinely democratic society should not only
respect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each person belonging
to a national minority, but also create appropriate conditions enabling them to express,
preserve and develop this identity”31
. Everyone has the right to put in the public
democratic dialogue his opinion on its national identity, while the “harmonious
interaction of persons and groups with varied identities is essential for achieving
social cohesion”32
.
Therefore, the Court adopts cultural pluralism as inter-culturalism33
.
According to this principle, protection and respect for cultural identities is not equated
to special rights to groups or the guarantee of a peaceful co-existence of separate
cultural communities. Instead, intercultural society is presumed as a field of
continuous interaction and evolution of all cultural identities. Recognition and respect
of these identities do not entail a claim only to preserve, but also to develop them.
This means that these identities are considered as open and negotiable; they are not
just different, but varied, susceptible to various interpretations and to constant
changes.The goal should be the engagement of all persons with varied identities in an
open and dynamic34
process where they meet, oppose to, and complement each other.
Even if they decide to stay the same, they will surely have somehow changed through
this interaction. In this way all cultural identities are taking part in a process of
26
Kymlicka Will, Multicultural Citizenship. New York:Oxford University Press, 1995, p.174 &184.
27
Hannoun Hubert, L’ intégration des cultures. Paris: L’ Harmattan, 2004, p.21-23.
28
Benhabib S. The claims of culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 108, 110.
29
Ibid., p. 108.
30
Arios Pagos( the Greek Court of Cassation), decision no 4/2005.
31
Gorzelik and others v. Poland, § 92, 93.
32
Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis et autres c. Grèce, § 56.
33
Hannoun Hubert, L’ intégration des cultures, p.30-32.
34
Koubi Genevieve, «Brèves remarques a propos d’une distinction entre multiculturalisme et
pluriculturalisme», Revue Hellenique des droits de l’ homme, nο 28, 2005, p. 1177-1199.

7. 7
creating a new, common identity that includes and transforms them into something
new.
Consequently, there is a need for several institutions and procedures which
will permit people to meet, exchange ideas, agree or oppose to each other. Thus, the
function of national minority associations is necessary because it permits the
interaction within a minority group, between people who have a certain national
identity, but also the interaction of these people with the majority or other minorities.
This interaction is harmonious as long as there is no exercise of physical violence and
no use of undemocratic and unconstitutional means. For the European judges,
harmony doesn’t mean silencing of the different minority voices, not even when they
seek “to debate in public the situation of part of the State’s population” or they ask for
territorial autonomy. On the contrary, the essence of democracy is the capacity to
resolve problems through open debate, even when this entails the expression of views
that appear shocking and unacceptable to the majority35
. Hence, harmony comes
through engagement and communication, but also through antagonism and maybe
conflict. In this perspective, the role of the state is not to prohibit the expression of the
different voices, but to have, according to the Court, a conciliatory stance36
. In sum,
cultural pluralism as interculturalism calls for the public experience of opposition,
competition and the synthesis of all the views in a new aggregate that is able to invent
the future and not just reproduce the past.
4. The agonistic nature of interculturalism.Towards a pluralistic conception of
citizenship.
Hence, the Court promotes a pluralist democracy where every citizen can
declare in the open her identification to a national minority identity without being
presumed as “an internal enemy” threatening the unity of the state. In a pluralist
democracy, the demos cannot be defined according to a categorical notion of
citizenship. Instead, if politics is about finding creative ways of living together, then
an engagement is needed; an engagement in a public discourse, where all differences
and all the various cultural identities can be questioned, reconsidered, remain as they
are, or change37
.
However, politics is also about defining “us” and “them”, that is, about a
common identity and exclusion. According to Chantal Mouffe, society is constructed
through power relations and all identities are created by power: “Since the
“constitutive outside is present within the inside as its always real possibility, every
identity becomes purely contingent. This implies that we should conceptualise power
not as an external relation taking place between two preconstituted identities but
rather as constituting the identities themselves”38
. Thus, every cultural identity is
certainly a political one, reflecting particular patterns of power that constitute the
majority and the minority communities39
. The interaction of these identities in an
open public discourse will certainly help to question these patterns of power.
35
Stankov v. Bulgaria §97.
36
Stankov v. Bulgaria § 42(…) The Court considers that the role of State authorities is to defend and
promote the values inherent in a democratic system, such as pluralism, tolerance and social cohesion.
In the present case, it would have been more in keeping with those values for the local authorities to
advocate a conciliatory stance, rather than to stir up confrontational attitudes.
37
Calhoun, Craig, Nations Matter, p.109.
38
Mouffe Chantal,“Democracy, Power, and the “Political”, in Democracy and Difference, Contesting
the boundaries of the political,ed Seyla Benhabib. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, p. 245-
256.
39
Calhoun, Craig, Nations Matter, p.107.

8. 8
Nevertheless, public interaction cannot erase them, because power itself cannot be
erased. “The political” equals to power and antagonism, two elements which are
inherent in every human relationship.
Therefore, an intercultural democratic society cannot set as its goal the
disappearance of the power constitutive of identities. There will always be a
distinction between “us” and “them”, between those who are members of the
community and those who are excluded. Instead, the goal must be the establishment
of a set of institutions through which, power and domination can be limited and
contested. What is needed is the reconciliation of power with the liberal and
democratic values; to see the “other” not as an enemy, but as a lawful, respectful rival
in the game of democracy.
In this perspective, interculturalism can come under the principle of agonistic
democratic pluralism, where all the voices are expressed, even the most radical ones,
because beyond the differences and arguments, all citizens are antagonists who battle
in the field of an open public sphere. The common political identity can be reconciled
with cultural pluralism because this identity is built in a process of communication,
disagreement and even conflict between people who battle to protect their differences,
as radical democratic citizens. The crucial point is to presume this battle not as an
opposition of enemies, but as a competition of adversaries in a “game” where
everybody is trying to gain using lawful and non violent means. Everybody respects
the other as a rival, to whom he is devoted, in a continuous struggle and negotiation
that every form of mutual life presupposes and demands40
. “In a democratic polity
conflicts and confrontations, far from being a sign of imperfection, indicate that
democracy is alive and inhabited by pluralism”41
.
Conclusion.
Consequently, the interpretation of the right to association in a way that people
with national minority consciousness can declare their identity and claim recognition
and respect, shows that the European Court of Human Rights adopts a pluralistic
conception of citizenship. It stresses that a democracy needs the expression of all
opinions, even the most radical ones that seek territorial autonomy or secession of part
of the country. In a pluralist democracy, the borders of citizenship are not drawn
according to a certain national identity, but according to the adherence in the
democratic principles and the respect of the “other”. The ultimate boundary that
cannot be trespassed is the call for uprising or the actual use of violence. Hence,
citizenship is conceived as inclusive of all the different national identities, as varied,
negotiable and agonistic in a common fied of democratic battle42
. Thus, the free
function of national minority associations is inextricably linked to a pluralist
conception of citizenship and does not threat the cohesion of a liberal political
community; it only challenges the symbolic-ideological borders of the nation-state.
40
Wenman Marc Antony, “Laclau or Mouffe? Splitting the Difference”, Philosophy & social criticism,
vol 29, no 5, 2003, Sage publications, p. 581–606, esp. p.599.
41
Mouffe Chantal,“Democracy, Power, and the “Political”, p.255.
42
Stevenson Nick,“Cultural Citizenship in the 'Cultural' Society: A Cosmopolitan Approach'”,
Citizenship Studies, 7:3, 2003, p.331– 348.&Delanty Gerard,“Two conceptions of cultural citizenship:
A review of recent literature on culture and citizenship”, Ethnopolitics, 1:3, 2002, p.60– 66.