This document discusses the relationship between phenomenology and behaviorism from the perspectives of Ortega y Gasset and B.F. Skinner. It proposes that Ortega's emphasis on "life as action" and "historical reason" transforms classical phenomenology in a way that has affinities with behaviorism. Skinner's radical behaviorism is also presented, particularly its view of operant behavior in terms of final causality and its approach to private events. The document suggests a "mutual correction" where behaviorism adopts phenomenology's view of the lived-world and phenomenology takes on behaviorism's dialectical perspective. Implications for understanding psychopathology are discussed.
This document provides an overview and analysis of Alexis Karpouzos's book "The self-criticism of science". It discusses some of the key arguments and criticisms addressed against positivism in the contemporary philosophy of science, including criticisms of scientism, empiricism, and the idea that science can provide value-neutral or objective knowledge. It also summarizes some of the alternative perspectives proposed, such as phenomenology and conventionalism.
This document summarizes Jung's key ideas regarding the body and proposes ways to integrate the somatic dimension into Jungian clinical practice. It reviews Jung's interest in the word association test and its demonstration of the physiological correlates of unconscious complexes. It also discusses Jung's view of the body-mind relationship and importance of the body in working with psychotic patients. The document proposes that nonverbal, implicit processes are important for psychotherapeutic change and that modifications in patient-therapist interaction patterns can allow for a widening of the patient's relational knowledge. It suggests Jungian therapists can benefit from more fully incorporating the bodily dimension of the therapeutic relationship.
The document discusses the key concepts of phenomenology as a sociological orientation. Phenomenology studies common sense, conscious experience, and routine daily life. It seeks to understand the world from the point of view of individuals rather than external observers. Edmund Husserl developed phenomenology in the early 20th century as a descriptive method focused on structures of consciousness and experience. Phenomenology aims to understand individual meanings and social interactions through descriptive analysis rather than establishing absolute truths.
This document summarizes an article that considers the relationship between phenomenology and behaviorism from a new perspective, using the philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset. It presents key aspects of Ortega's phenomenology, including his emphasis on "life as action" and "historical reason" as a form of explanation. It also discusses B.F. Skinner's behaviorism and proposes ways phenomenology and behaviorism could mutually inform each other, such as conceptualizing the environment through the phenomenological notion of the "lived-world." The document suggests these perspectives have implications for understanding psychopathology.
This document is a makalah (paper) reviewing the journal article "Existential Philosophy and Sport". It was written by Tiffanny Tessantya Utami, a student at the University of Surabaya, for her class on the Philosophy and History of Sports taught by Dr. Made Pramono. The makalah provides an overview of existential philosophy and discusses how existential ideas have been applied to understanding sport. It examines sources that have explored existential perspectives on topics like the meaning of human existence, freedom and responsibility, and the experience of the body in sport.
Presentation at HEA-funded workshop 'A dialogue between phenomenology and realism in pedagogical and educational research '.
The workshop aimed to stimulate debate around the philosophical underpinnings of different research methodologies, whose shared terminology is often interpreted in radically contrasting ways, and in particular, to encourage dialogue between realist and phenomenological research traditions. The workshop was aimed at pedagogical and educational researchers who are looking to expand their methodological repertoire and to explore new ways of teaching research methods.
This presentation is part of a related blog post that provides an overview of the event: http://bit.ly/1oww6m1
For further details of the HEA's work on teaching research methods in the Social Sciences see: http://bit.ly/RIZtTz
Maurice Merleau-Ponty challenged dualisms in Western philosophy through a phenomenology of the lived, embodied experience. He argued perception is based in the body's interaction with the world, not the mind's interaction with sense data. Language too is grounded in our embodied interaction with others. Merleau-Ponty saw meaning as arising from differences between signs in structural relationships, not from ideas or history. His work aimed to understand consciousness as always perceptual and situated through our incarnate existence.
This document provides an overview and analysis of Alexis Karpouzos's book "The self-criticism of science". It discusses some of the key arguments and criticisms addressed against positivism in the contemporary philosophy of science, including criticisms of scientism, empiricism, and the idea that science can provide value-neutral or objective knowledge. It also summarizes some of the alternative perspectives proposed, such as phenomenology and conventionalism.
This document summarizes Jung's key ideas regarding the body and proposes ways to integrate the somatic dimension into Jungian clinical practice. It reviews Jung's interest in the word association test and its demonstration of the physiological correlates of unconscious complexes. It also discusses Jung's view of the body-mind relationship and importance of the body in working with psychotic patients. The document proposes that nonverbal, implicit processes are important for psychotherapeutic change and that modifications in patient-therapist interaction patterns can allow for a widening of the patient's relational knowledge. It suggests Jungian therapists can benefit from more fully incorporating the bodily dimension of the therapeutic relationship.
The document discusses the key concepts of phenomenology as a sociological orientation. Phenomenology studies common sense, conscious experience, and routine daily life. It seeks to understand the world from the point of view of individuals rather than external observers. Edmund Husserl developed phenomenology in the early 20th century as a descriptive method focused on structures of consciousness and experience. Phenomenology aims to understand individual meanings and social interactions through descriptive analysis rather than establishing absolute truths.
This document summarizes an article that considers the relationship between phenomenology and behaviorism from a new perspective, using the philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset. It presents key aspects of Ortega's phenomenology, including his emphasis on "life as action" and "historical reason" as a form of explanation. It also discusses B.F. Skinner's behaviorism and proposes ways phenomenology and behaviorism could mutually inform each other, such as conceptualizing the environment through the phenomenological notion of the "lived-world." The document suggests these perspectives have implications for understanding psychopathology.
This document is a makalah (paper) reviewing the journal article "Existential Philosophy and Sport". It was written by Tiffanny Tessantya Utami, a student at the University of Surabaya, for her class on the Philosophy and History of Sports taught by Dr. Made Pramono. The makalah provides an overview of existential philosophy and discusses how existential ideas have been applied to understanding sport. It examines sources that have explored existential perspectives on topics like the meaning of human existence, freedom and responsibility, and the experience of the body in sport.
Presentation at HEA-funded workshop 'A dialogue between phenomenology and realism in pedagogical and educational research '.
The workshop aimed to stimulate debate around the philosophical underpinnings of different research methodologies, whose shared terminology is often interpreted in radically contrasting ways, and in particular, to encourage dialogue between realist and phenomenological research traditions. The workshop was aimed at pedagogical and educational researchers who are looking to expand their methodological repertoire and to explore new ways of teaching research methods.
This presentation is part of a related blog post that provides an overview of the event: http://bit.ly/1oww6m1
For further details of the HEA's work on teaching research methods in the Social Sciences see: http://bit.ly/RIZtTz
Maurice Merleau-Ponty challenged dualisms in Western philosophy through a phenomenology of the lived, embodied experience. He argued perception is based in the body's interaction with the world, not the mind's interaction with sense data. Language too is grounded in our embodied interaction with others. Merleau-Ponty saw meaning as arising from differences between signs in structural relationships, not from ideas or history. His work aimed to understand consciousness as always perceptual and situated through our incarnate existence.
.There are different paths to reality, they are determined by the knower, being instrumental methodological study object, epistemological axis, among others. Reality presents several faces, what is observable and what is perceived sensory empirical data obtained correspond to the visible, the main thing is to discover the hidden side, which is behind the perceptible or data. Epistemology is the whole process of obtaining scientific knowledge, ranging from the pre knowledge to get to know the hidden side, one thing is what is seen and what is not, and one that is not seen, is really it is.
This document provides an overview of Gestalt theory and its use in visual communication and art. Some key points:
- Gestalt theory proposes that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and that perception involves organizing visual elements into meaningful patterns and structures.
- Gestalt principles were developed in Germany in the early 1900s and influenced fields like visual communication, art, design, and psychology. Theorists like Wertheimer, Koffka, and Kohler established foundations of Gestalt.
- Rudolf Arnheim was a leading scholar on applying Gestalt theory to understanding art. He argued Gestalt provided scientific methods for analyzing art compared to psychoanalytic approaches dominant in the 20th century.
Aristotle's epistemology is naturalistic, holistic and empiricist. It is naturalistic in that human knowledge arises from our natural capacities and striving to understand. It is empiricist in that understanding comes through experience of sensory forms which allows us to grasp intelligible forms. Knowledge of a thing involves understanding its formal cause (essence), final cause (purpose), material cause (constitution) and efficient cause (origin of change). True knowledge is demonstrated by comprehending all four causes as a unified whole. Aristotle's method involves examining existing views to intuit the underlying rational principles that integrate them.
Hegel developed a comprehensive philosophical system using his dialectical method to account for the relationships between mind and nature, subject and object, and the various domains of reality. He believed that reality is in a constant state of becoming through contradiction and negation, ultimately reaching a rational unity. Some of Hegel's most influential works included The Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of Logic, and The Philosophy of Right. While difficult to understand, Hegel aimed to develop a new form of speculative reason to overcome limitations in traditional philosophy. His work was an important influence on later continental philosophy and Marxism.
Scientism, or the unity of scientific method. The positivist
methodology does not see any difference between the
natural and the social sciences. The adoption however, of
the unity of the scientific method is accepted in tandem
with the notion of the predominant role of the natural
sciences, in which the social sciences see their model.
The outcome is what we call scientism, that is the view
that only the natural sciences can produce the semantic
interpretation of knowledge.
The document discusses several key concepts in sociological theory, including:
1) Auguste Comte, regarded as the founder of sociology, who argued that human thought progresses through theological, metaphysical, and positive/scientific stages of development.
2) Phenomenology, which studies conscious experience and how individuals construct the social world, influencing sociologists like Alfred Schutz.
3) Theories, concepts, propositions, hypotheses, and paradigms as important components of sociological frameworks for understanding social phenomena.
4) Emile Durkheim's study of suicide, which hypothesized that stronger social integration leads to stronger social cohesion within a society.
Applebaum: Themes in phenomenological psychological researchMarc Applebaum, PhD
Description of Event (150 words maximum): Descriptive phenomenology is a well-established approach to qualitative research in which the researcher develops the ability to carefully analyze participants’ descriptions of their experiences. Researchers learn to attend carefully to interview data, setting aside their preconceptions about participants’ experiences, and deepening their own ability to empathically listen and discover essential psychological meanings. This presentation accompanied a 2-day overview of the method and discussion of its applications. Students were introduced to the descriptive phenomenological method, which Giorgi, Wertz, Halling, and Englander have applied to a range of important psychological themes.
THE SELF CRITICISM OF SCIENCE - ALEXIS KARPOUZOSalexis karpouzos
The neoteric human being is now being cut off from the order of nature and establishes itself as the rationally re- flecting and acting subject which is now posited against the object of its cognitive and practical activity. Civiliza- tion is constituted as the product of human activity, as an artifact and technical construct. iWth this development, human civilization is transformed to a ‘quasi nature’, aim- ing to correct and replace nature, and man assumes the nature of a technical existence. By ‘technical existence’ we mean the prevalence of a one-dimensional image of the human person as the producer of rational hypotheses and interpretations and the downgrading and degrada- tion of the non-rational element of human existence, i.e. the radical imagination as a creative capacity, which forms the a priori condition and prerequisite for social activity. This constitutive element of the modern world (man, as the producer of rational hypotheses) and its ar- ticulation with the ideology of techno-scientific progress and the evolution of the machine that transforms the methods and theories of natural sciences, arming these with new tools and constantly renovating their research and experimental capabilities, finally led to the replace- ment of religious and metaphysical dogmas by the blind faith to the dogma of technical and scientific progress.
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention (IJHSSI) is an international journal intended for professionals and researchers in all fields of Humanities and Social Science. IJHSSI publishes research articles and reviews within the whole field Humanities and Social Science, new teaching methods, assessment, validation and the impact of new technologies and it will continue to provide information on the latest trends and developments in this ever-expanding subject. The publications of papers are selected through double peer reviewed to ensure originality, relevance, and readability. The articles published in our journal can be accessed online.
The contemporary philosophy of science & the problem of the scientific consciousness.
...The understanding of scientific knowledge requires reflective thinking. The reflective thinking could restore the communication between subject and object, between social sciences and natural sciences. Only then, communication between facts and values can achieved. In other words, communication between reason and myth, science and art, knowledge and wisdom, empirical research and the existential question for the meaning of life.
...the problem of scientific consciousness (liability) requires the transformation of the structures of the same knowledge. The sovereignty of uncontrolled scientism-positivism leads to brutalization and the reaction to it, leads to metaphysical obscurantism and madness. The researcher should be aware of the complex and reciprocal relationships between the scientific, technical, social and political worlds...
This passage discusses the nature of reality through an examination of how the Azande people of Africa understand their oracles. It makes three key points:
1. The Azande's belief in their oracles is an "incorrigible proposition" that is assumed to be true regardless of any contradictory experiences, similar to mathematical axioms.
2. Their reality is constructed through ritual practices that transform tree bark into a vessel for the oracle's messages. Contradictions only exist from an outside Western scientific perspective, not from within their own reality.
3. When contradictions occur, the Azande employ "secondary elaborations of belief" to explain them while still maintaining the absolute reality of their or
1. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was a major German philosopher in the 19th century who developed an all-encompassing philosophical system called German idealism.
2. Hegel believed his system represented the culmination of all previous philosophical thought and used dialectics to explain the history of philosophy.
3. Key aspects of Hegel's system included logic, nature, and spirit, which led some followers to believe in a foreordained destiny where individuals are parts of a greater whole like the state.
This document provides an introduction and overview of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's book Sense and Non-Sense. It summarizes Merleau-Ponty's key philosophical insights and how they are applied in the essays collected in the book. Specifically, it discusses how Merleau-Ponty builds on phenomenology to argue that rationality emerges from our embodied experience of the world and is always incomplete and open to change, rather than being predetermined. The introduction also summarizes the book's structure and themes and places Merleau-Ponty's work in historical context.
PERGAMON New Ideas in Psychology 17 (1999) I ~~ 15 NEW IDE.docxdanhaley45372
This document discusses the functions of knowledge in psychology and proposes three subsystems - scientia, cultura, and critica - based on these functions. Scientia focuses on producing analytic knowledge about psychological objects and events. Cultura focuses on producing meaning-knowledge about the human psyche for subjects. Critica focuses on critically evaluating and constructing psychological knowledge through deconstruction, reconstruction, and construction. Each subsystem is nourished by an implicit utopian notion - scientia by the idea of producing better cumulative knowledge, cultura by improving the human condition, and critica by changing psychological knowledge practices. The document argues this framework can be used heuristically to understand psychology's complexity without being prescriptive.
This document summarizes a study on spirit possession from five individuals in Indonesia. The study explored the psychological experiences and dynamics of pathological, religious, curative, and entertainment types of spirit possession. Testing revealed that those experiencing pathological possession reported acute psychological pain during possession, while those experiencing religious possession reported intense spiritual elation. Those experiencing entertainment possession attributed their possession episodes to music and rituals triggering supernatural beings. Overall, the study supports the perspective that spirit possession serves as a mechanism for expressing hidden and unfulfilled psychological needs and desires in real life.
Differences Between Informal Logic, And Theoretical...Claudia Brown
- Theoretical philosophy categorizes philosophical questions into metaphysics, ontology, philosophy of language, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and logic. It provides an introduction to human reasoning and knowledge.
- Informal logic focuses on reasoning found in everyday exchanges like debates and media, rather than formal logic. Symbolic logic uses mathematical concepts to address problems not solvable through traditional logic.
- Jack Whitehead developed the "living educational theory" approach where practitioners improve their work by communicating the educational values they embody in practice and creating their own educational theories.
A Short Essay Explicating The Nature Of The Hegelian Conception Of Thinking-O...Jennifer Daniel
This document summarizes Hegel's concept of "thinking-it-over" and its relation to dialectic and sublation. It explains that thinking-it-over involves differentiating the universal from the particular in an object by moving from sense experience to representation to conceptual understanding. This reveals the thesis (particular) and antithesis (universal), which are then synthesized in objective thought. For Hegel, the dialectic process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis describes all things and underlies thinking-it-over. It concludes that through thinking-it-over and the dialectic, everything is revealed to be finite and to sublate itself by contradicting its inner nature and passing into its opposite.
This document provides a brief overview of Aristotle and his philosophy:
1) Aristotle died in 322 BC at the age of 62, having made immense contributions to learning through his wide-ranging scientific explorations and profound philosophical speculations.
2) As a teacher, Aristotle enchanted and inspired the brightest Greek youth, and as a public figure he lived a turbulent life in turbulent times.
3) Throughout his life, Aristotle was driven by a desire for knowledge above all else, seeking to promote truth and increase human knowledge through his career activities and writings.
.There are different paths to reality, they are determined by the knower, being instrumental methodological study object, epistemological axis, among others. Reality presents several faces, what is observable and what is perceived sensory empirical data obtained correspond to the visible, the main thing is to discover the hidden side, which is behind the perceptible or data. Epistemology is the whole process of obtaining scientific knowledge, ranging from the pre knowledge to get to know the hidden side, one thing is what is seen and what is not, and one that is not seen, is really it is.
This document provides an overview of Gestalt theory and its use in visual communication and art. Some key points:
- Gestalt theory proposes that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and that perception involves organizing visual elements into meaningful patterns and structures.
- Gestalt principles were developed in Germany in the early 1900s and influenced fields like visual communication, art, design, and psychology. Theorists like Wertheimer, Koffka, and Kohler established foundations of Gestalt.
- Rudolf Arnheim was a leading scholar on applying Gestalt theory to understanding art. He argued Gestalt provided scientific methods for analyzing art compared to psychoanalytic approaches dominant in the 20th century.
Aristotle's epistemology is naturalistic, holistic and empiricist. It is naturalistic in that human knowledge arises from our natural capacities and striving to understand. It is empiricist in that understanding comes through experience of sensory forms which allows us to grasp intelligible forms. Knowledge of a thing involves understanding its formal cause (essence), final cause (purpose), material cause (constitution) and efficient cause (origin of change). True knowledge is demonstrated by comprehending all four causes as a unified whole. Aristotle's method involves examining existing views to intuit the underlying rational principles that integrate them.
Hegel developed a comprehensive philosophical system using his dialectical method to account for the relationships between mind and nature, subject and object, and the various domains of reality. He believed that reality is in a constant state of becoming through contradiction and negation, ultimately reaching a rational unity. Some of Hegel's most influential works included The Phenomenology of Spirit, The Science of Logic, and The Philosophy of Right. While difficult to understand, Hegel aimed to develop a new form of speculative reason to overcome limitations in traditional philosophy. His work was an important influence on later continental philosophy and Marxism.
Scientism, or the unity of scientific method. The positivist
methodology does not see any difference between the
natural and the social sciences. The adoption however, of
the unity of the scientific method is accepted in tandem
with the notion of the predominant role of the natural
sciences, in which the social sciences see their model.
The outcome is what we call scientism, that is the view
that only the natural sciences can produce the semantic
interpretation of knowledge.
The document discusses several key concepts in sociological theory, including:
1) Auguste Comte, regarded as the founder of sociology, who argued that human thought progresses through theological, metaphysical, and positive/scientific stages of development.
2) Phenomenology, which studies conscious experience and how individuals construct the social world, influencing sociologists like Alfred Schutz.
3) Theories, concepts, propositions, hypotheses, and paradigms as important components of sociological frameworks for understanding social phenomena.
4) Emile Durkheim's study of suicide, which hypothesized that stronger social integration leads to stronger social cohesion within a society.
Applebaum: Themes in phenomenological psychological researchMarc Applebaum, PhD
Description of Event (150 words maximum): Descriptive phenomenology is a well-established approach to qualitative research in which the researcher develops the ability to carefully analyze participants’ descriptions of their experiences. Researchers learn to attend carefully to interview data, setting aside their preconceptions about participants’ experiences, and deepening their own ability to empathically listen and discover essential psychological meanings. This presentation accompanied a 2-day overview of the method and discussion of its applications. Students were introduced to the descriptive phenomenological method, which Giorgi, Wertz, Halling, and Englander have applied to a range of important psychological themes.
THE SELF CRITICISM OF SCIENCE - ALEXIS KARPOUZOSalexis karpouzos
The neoteric human being is now being cut off from the order of nature and establishes itself as the rationally re- flecting and acting subject which is now posited against the object of its cognitive and practical activity. Civiliza- tion is constituted as the product of human activity, as an artifact and technical construct. iWth this development, human civilization is transformed to a ‘quasi nature’, aim- ing to correct and replace nature, and man assumes the nature of a technical existence. By ‘technical existence’ we mean the prevalence of a one-dimensional image of the human person as the producer of rational hypotheses and interpretations and the downgrading and degrada- tion of the non-rational element of human existence, i.e. the radical imagination as a creative capacity, which forms the a priori condition and prerequisite for social activity. This constitutive element of the modern world (man, as the producer of rational hypotheses) and its ar- ticulation with the ideology of techno-scientific progress and the evolution of the machine that transforms the methods and theories of natural sciences, arming these with new tools and constantly renovating their research and experimental capabilities, finally led to the replace- ment of religious and metaphysical dogmas by the blind faith to the dogma of technical and scientific progress.
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention (IJHSSI) is an international journal intended for professionals and researchers in all fields of Humanities and Social Science. IJHSSI publishes research articles and reviews within the whole field Humanities and Social Science, new teaching methods, assessment, validation and the impact of new technologies and it will continue to provide information on the latest trends and developments in this ever-expanding subject. The publications of papers are selected through double peer reviewed to ensure originality, relevance, and readability. The articles published in our journal can be accessed online.
The contemporary philosophy of science & the problem of the scientific consciousness.
...The understanding of scientific knowledge requires reflective thinking. The reflective thinking could restore the communication between subject and object, between social sciences and natural sciences. Only then, communication between facts and values can achieved. In other words, communication between reason and myth, science and art, knowledge and wisdom, empirical research and the existential question for the meaning of life.
...the problem of scientific consciousness (liability) requires the transformation of the structures of the same knowledge. The sovereignty of uncontrolled scientism-positivism leads to brutalization and the reaction to it, leads to metaphysical obscurantism and madness. The researcher should be aware of the complex and reciprocal relationships between the scientific, technical, social and political worlds...
This passage discusses the nature of reality through an examination of how the Azande people of Africa understand their oracles. It makes three key points:
1. The Azande's belief in their oracles is an "incorrigible proposition" that is assumed to be true regardless of any contradictory experiences, similar to mathematical axioms.
2. Their reality is constructed through ritual practices that transform tree bark into a vessel for the oracle's messages. Contradictions only exist from an outside Western scientific perspective, not from within their own reality.
3. When contradictions occur, the Azande employ "secondary elaborations of belief" to explain them while still maintaining the absolute reality of their or
1. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was a major German philosopher in the 19th century who developed an all-encompassing philosophical system called German idealism.
2. Hegel believed his system represented the culmination of all previous philosophical thought and used dialectics to explain the history of philosophy.
3. Key aspects of Hegel's system included logic, nature, and spirit, which led some followers to believe in a foreordained destiny where individuals are parts of a greater whole like the state.
This document provides an introduction and overview of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's book Sense and Non-Sense. It summarizes Merleau-Ponty's key philosophical insights and how they are applied in the essays collected in the book. Specifically, it discusses how Merleau-Ponty builds on phenomenology to argue that rationality emerges from our embodied experience of the world and is always incomplete and open to change, rather than being predetermined. The introduction also summarizes the book's structure and themes and places Merleau-Ponty's work in historical context.
PERGAMON New Ideas in Psychology 17 (1999) I ~~ 15 NEW IDE.docxdanhaley45372
This document discusses the functions of knowledge in psychology and proposes three subsystems - scientia, cultura, and critica - based on these functions. Scientia focuses on producing analytic knowledge about psychological objects and events. Cultura focuses on producing meaning-knowledge about the human psyche for subjects. Critica focuses on critically evaluating and constructing psychological knowledge through deconstruction, reconstruction, and construction. Each subsystem is nourished by an implicit utopian notion - scientia by the idea of producing better cumulative knowledge, cultura by improving the human condition, and critica by changing psychological knowledge practices. The document argues this framework can be used heuristically to understand psychology's complexity without being prescriptive.
This document summarizes a study on spirit possession from five individuals in Indonesia. The study explored the psychological experiences and dynamics of pathological, religious, curative, and entertainment types of spirit possession. Testing revealed that those experiencing pathological possession reported acute psychological pain during possession, while those experiencing religious possession reported intense spiritual elation. Those experiencing entertainment possession attributed their possession episodes to music and rituals triggering supernatural beings. Overall, the study supports the perspective that spirit possession serves as a mechanism for expressing hidden and unfulfilled psychological needs and desires in real life.
Differences Between Informal Logic, And Theoretical...Claudia Brown
- Theoretical philosophy categorizes philosophical questions into metaphysics, ontology, philosophy of language, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and logic. It provides an introduction to human reasoning and knowledge.
- Informal logic focuses on reasoning found in everyday exchanges like debates and media, rather than formal logic. Symbolic logic uses mathematical concepts to address problems not solvable through traditional logic.
- Jack Whitehead developed the "living educational theory" approach where practitioners improve their work by communicating the educational values they embody in practice and creating their own educational theories.
A Short Essay Explicating The Nature Of The Hegelian Conception Of Thinking-O...Jennifer Daniel
This document summarizes Hegel's concept of "thinking-it-over" and its relation to dialectic and sublation. It explains that thinking-it-over involves differentiating the universal from the particular in an object by moving from sense experience to representation to conceptual understanding. This reveals the thesis (particular) and antithesis (universal), which are then synthesized in objective thought. For Hegel, the dialectic process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis describes all things and underlies thinking-it-over. It concludes that through thinking-it-over and the dialectic, everything is revealed to be finite and to sublate itself by contradicting its inner nature and passing into its opposite.
This document provides a brief overview of Aristotle and his philosophy:
1) Aristotle died in 322 BC at the age of 62, having made immense contributions to learning through his wide-ranging scientific explorations and profound philosophical speculations.
2) As a teacher, Aristotle enchanted and inspired the brightest Greek youth, and as a public figure he lived a turbulent life in turbulent times.
3) Throughout his life, Aristotle was driven by a desire for knowledge above all else, seeking to promote truth and increase human knowledge through his career activities and writings.
Walmart Business+ and Spark Good for Nonprofits.pdfTechSoup
"Learn about all the ways Walmart supports nonprofit organizations.
You will hear from Liz Willett, the Head of Nonprofits, and hear about what Walmart is doing to help nonprofits, including Walmart Business and Spark Good. Walmart Business+ is a new offer for nonprofits that offers discounts and also streamlines nonprofits order and expense tracking, saving time and money.
The webinar may also give some examples on how nonprofits can best leverage Walmart Business+.
The event will cover the following::
Walmart Business + (https://business.walmart.com/plus) is a new shopping experience for nonprofits, schools, and local business customers that connects an exclusive online shopping experience to stores. Benefits include free delivery and shipping, a 'Spend Analytics” feature, special discounts, deals and tax-exempt shopping.
Special TechSoup offer for a free 180 days membership, and up to $150 in discounts on eligible orders.
Spark Good (walmart.com/sparkgood) is a charitable platform that enables nonprofits to receive donations directly from customers and associates.
Answers about how you can do more with Walmart!"
Leveraging Generative AI to Drive Nonprofit InnovationTechSoup
In this webinar, participants learned how to utilize Generative AI to streamline operations and elevate member engagement. Amazon Web Service experts provided a customer specific use cases and dived into low/no-code tools that are quick and easy to deploy through Amazon Web Service (AWS.)
Communicating effectively and consistently with students can help them feel at ease during their learning experience and provide the instructor with a communication trail to track the course's progress. This workshop will take you through constructing an engaging course container to facilitate effective communication.
LAND USE LAND COVER AND NDVI OF MIRZAPUR DISTRICT, UPRAHUL
This Dissertation explores the particular circumstances of Mirzapur, a region located in the
core of India. Mirzapur, with its varied terrains and abundant biodiversity, offers an optimal
environment for investigating the changes in vegetation cover dynamics. Our study utilizes
advanced technologies such as GIS (Geographic Information Systems) and Remote sensing to
analyze the transformations that have taken place over the course of a decade.
The complex relationship between human activities and the environment has been the focus
of extensive research and worry. As the global community grapples with swift urbanization,
population expansion, and economic progress, the effects on natural ecosystems are becoming
more evident. A crucial element of this impact is the alteration of vegetation cover, which plays a
significant role in maintaining the ecological equilibrium of our planet.Land serves as the foundation for all human activities and provides the necessary materials for
these activities. As the most crucial natural resource, its utilization by humans results in different
'Land uses,' which are determined by both human activities and the physical characteristics of the
land.
The utilization of land is impacted by human needs and environmental factors. In countries
like India, rapid population growth and the emphasis on extensive resource exploitation can lead
to significant land degradation, adversely affecting the region's land cover.
Therefore, human intervention has significantly influenced land use patterns over many
centuries, evolving its structure over time and space. In the present era, these changes have
accelerated due to factors such as agriculture and urbanization. Information regarding land use and
cover is essential for various planning and management tasks related to the Earth's surface,
providing crucial environmental data for scientific, resource management, policy purposes, and
diverse human activities.
Accurate understanding of land use and cover is imperative for the development planning
of any area. Consequently, a wide range of professionals, including earth system scientists, land
and water managers, and urban planners, are interested in obtaining data on land use and cover
changes, conversion trends, and other related patterns. The spatial dimensions of land use and
cover support policymakers and scientists in making well-informed decisions, as alterations in
these patterns indicate shifts in economic and social conditions. Monitoring such changes with the
help of Advanced technologies like Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems is
crucial for coordinated efforts across different administrative levels. Advanced technologies like
Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems
9
Changes in vegetation cover refer to variations in the distribution, composition, and overall
structure of plant communities across different temporal and spatial scales. These changes can
occur natural.
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Chapter wise All Notes of First year Basic Civil Engineering.pptxDenish Jangid
Chapter wise All Notes of First year Basic Civil Engineering
Syllabus
Chapter-1
Introduction to objective, scope and outcome the subject
Chapter 2
Introduction: Scope and Specialization of Civil Engineering, Role of civil Engineer in Society, Impact of infrastructural development on economy of country.
Chapter 3
Surveying: Object Principles & Types of Surveying; Site Plans, Plans & Maps; Scales & Unit of different Measurements.
Linear Measurements: Instruments used. Linear Measurement by Tape, Ranging out Survey Lines and overcoming Obstructions; Measurements on sloping ground; Tape corrections, conventional symbols. Angular Measurements: Instruments used; Introduction to Compass Surveying, Bearings and Longitude & Latitude of a Line, Introduction to total station.
Levelling: Instrument used Object of levelling, Methods of levelling in brief, and Contour maps.
Chapter 4
Buildings: Selection of site for Buildings, Layout of Building Plan, Types of buildings, Plinth area, carpet area, floor space index, Introduction to building byelaws, concept of sun light & ventilation. Components of Buildings & their functions, Basic concept of R.C.C., Introduction to types of foundation
Chapter 5
Transportation: Introduction to Transportation Engineering; Traffic and Road Safety: Types and Characteristics of Various Modes of Transportation; Various Road Traffic Signs, Causes of Accidents and Road Safety Measures.
Chapter 6
Environmental Engineering: Environmental Pollution, Environmental Acts and Regulations, Functional Concepts of Ecology, Basics of Species, Biodiversity, Ecosystem, Hydrological Cycle; Chemical Cycles: Carbon, Nitrogen & Phosphorus; Energy Flow in Ecosystems.
Water Pollution: Water Quality standards, Introduction to Treatment & Disposal of Waste Water. Reuse and Saving of Water, Rain Water Harvesting. Solid Waste Management: Classification of Solid Waste, Collection, Transportation and Disposal of Solid. Recycling of Solid Waste: Energy Recovery, Sanitary Landfill, On-Site Sanitation. Air & Noise Pollution: Primary and Secondary air pollutants, Harmful effects of Air Pollution, Control of Air Pollution. . Noise Pollution Harmful Effects of noise pollution, control of noise pollution, Global warming & Climate Change, Ozone depletion, Greenhouse effect
Text Books:
1. Palancharmy, Basic Civil Engineering, McGraw Hill publishers.
2. Satheesh Gopi, Basic Civil Engineering, Pearson Publishers.
3. Ketki Rangwala Dalal, Essentials of Civil Engineering, Charotar Publishing House.
4. BCP, Surveying volume 1
Philippine Edukasyong Pantahanan at Pangkabuhayan (EPP) CurriculumMJDuyan
(𝐓𝐋𝐄 𝟏𝟎𝟎) (𝐋𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐨𝐧 𝟏)-𝐏𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐢𝐦𝐬
𝐃𝐢𝐬𝐜𝐮𝐬𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐄𝐏𝐏 𝐂𝐮𝐫𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐮𝐥𝐮𝐦 𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐏𝐡𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐩𝐩𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬:
- Understand the goals and objectives of the Edukasyong Pantahanan at Pangkabuhayan (EPP) curriculum, recognizing its importance in fostering practical life skills and values among students. Students will also be able to identify the key components and subjects covered, such as agriculture, home economics, industrial arts, and information and communication technology.
𝐄𝐱𝐩𝐥𝐚𝐢𝐧 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐍𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐒𝐜𝐨𝐩𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐧 𝐄𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐞𝐮𝐫:
-Define entrepreneurship, distinguishing it from general business activities by emphasizing its focus on innovation, risk-taking, and value creation. Students will describe the characteristics and traits of successful entrepreneurs, including their roles and responsibilities, and discuss the broader economic and social impacts of entrepreneurial activities on both local and global scales.
How to Setup Warehouse & Location in Odoo 17 InventoryCeline George
In this slide, we'll explore how to set up warehouses and locations in Odoo 17 Inventory. This will help us manage our stock effectively, track inventory levels, and streamline warehouse operations.
2. 200 ■ PPP / Vol. 15, No. 3 / September 2008
a similar line, Woolfolk and Sass (1988) speak of
‘conduct-in-the world’ as the “medium through
which humans define what they are” (p. 113).
Like Heidegger and Sartre, Ortega offers an all-
encompassing vision of human life and experience
that has implications on many levels, including the
ontological, epistemological, and ethical.
The article first presents relevant aspects of
Ortega’s approach to phenomenology and then
of Skinner’s behaviorism. Next we propose some
mutual readjustments of both P&B; finally, we con-
sider some implications for clinical psychology’s ap-
proach to psychopathology and psychotherapy.
Phenomenology According to
Ortega
Although Ortega did not identify himself as
a phenomenologist or existentialist, his philoso-
phy does respond to questions raised by these
movements. Indeed, Ortega can almost be con-
sidered an existential phenomenologist avant la
lettre (Silver 1978). Starting with his first work,
Meditations on Quixote in 1914 (Ortega y Gas-
set 1914/2000), Ortega was critical of aspects of
transcendental phenomenology, which he saw as
being entangled with the problems of traditional
idealist philosophy (Ortega y Gasset 1923/1961).
Ortega considered the “modern theme”—his la-
bel for the task of contemporary thought—to be
that of overcoming idealism without falling into
realism, which led him to postulate his principles
of Vital Reason and Historical Reason (Ortega y
Gasset 1941/1962). As we shall see, both these
principles give Ortega’s phenomenology a certain
affinity with behaviorism.
‘Life as Execution’
For Ortega, the fundamental reality that is
life can be considered above all as “execution,”
in the practical sense of living, of finding one-
self immersed in the world and of having to do
something with one’s own life (Ortega y Gasset
1931/2002). The implication of ‘life as execution’
for phenomenology is twofold. Reality basically
consists not of pure consciousness, but of action
or execution. The object is not conceived as exist-
ing as a kind of mental representation within the
subject. Subject and object are understood to be
mutually constitutive, and based on life (rather
than purely cognitive), acknowledging that being
world oriented or ‘aware of the world’ is more
fundamental than self-consciousness.
Ortega thereby revises the very concept of ex-
perience (Erleben) by eradicating all traces of an
intellectualist or ‘idealist’ approach. The human
being, for Ortega, is not res cogitans, but rather
res dramatica. He exists only insofar as he presents
himself in action and expression, and in a public,
or potentially public, space. Ortega’s famous
formula, ‘I am myself and my circumstances,’
as expressed in his 1914 book, Meditations on
Quixote, must be understood in this sense. This
formula clearly anticipates Heidegger’s notion of
‘being-in-the-world’ as set out in Being and Time
in 1927 (Heidegger 2003). Some years later, in fact,
Ortega became perhaps the first major Spanish-
language writer to acknowledge the importance of
Heidegger, whom he recognized as an intellectual
fellow traveler and described as the thinker who
“had most advanced the analysis of human life”
(Ortega y Gasset 1929/1964, 228). But Ortega was
also concerned about emphasizing both his own
independence and a certain intellectual priority.
In the Prologue to the third German edition of
Ortega’s book, The Modern Theme, published
in 1934, Ortega notes that, since early 1914, he
had already been criticizing Husserl’s idealism and
advocating a more grounded, existence-oriented
kind of phenomenology.
Historical Reason
Historical reason is the perfect complement to
vital reason. Whereas natural phenomena in the
sphere of natural sciences have causes, the hu-
man phenomena studied by human sciences have
reasons. Ortega applied this conceptualization,
introduced by Dilthey, to rectify what he saw as the
a-historicity of Husserlian phenomenology, with
its emphasis on essences and ‘things themselves’
rather than on genetic questions. (Ortega was
responding primarily to Husserl’s earlier work,
in which he had not yet emphasized ‘genetic phe-
nomenology.’)1
In this view, human sciences are open not only
to understanding, but also to forms of explana-
3. Pérez-Álvarez & Sass / Phenomenology and Behaviorism ■ 201
tion involving reasons or motives, what Ortega
referred to as historical reasoning or history as a
system (Ortega y Gasset 1941/1962). At the bio-
graphical level, historical reasoning is understood
as accounting for the perspective and personal
circumstances with which a person conducts and
makes sense of his or her life. Ortega’s prologue to
his book, ‘Goethe from within,’ is an exemplary
study of this (Ortega y Gasset 1932/1982). ‘From
within’ refers, of course, not to a world understood
as existing within oneself, but rather to oneself
as a perspective on the world. The biographer
or clinician, as the case may be, would attempt
to enter the perspective and circumstances of the
person being studied to reconstruct the orientation
and projects that give that life its meaning. Ortega
particularly emphasized moments of personal or
historical crisis in which the world or system of
convictions in a previous phase of life is shaken
and called into question, thereby creating dis-
orientation and anguish, but also opening new
possibilities.
‘Aesthetic Sense of Life’
What Ortega refers to as the aesthetic sense of
life is ‘the joyful acceptance of what is real,’ not
in the sense of accommodation or resignation
but as the affirmation of life in all its possibilities
(Ortega y Gasset 1995). It should be recalled here
that after the famous line, ‘I am myself and my
circumstances,’ Ortega continued by saying, ‘if I
do not save them, I do not save myself.’ Saving
one’s circumstances implies understanding them
and attempting to transform them within the limits
of what is possible (Lasaga 2005). Of relevance
here is the conception of life as a project. Man is
in some sense what he is yet to be. This implies
that his life necessarily contains a component
of both freedom and fiction—although the free-
dom in question is limited by contingencies and
circumstances that we have not chosen and that
restrict our sphere of possibilities (Ortega y Gasset
1929/1964). In this regard, Ortega distinguishes
two models of existence, what he calls the bour-
geois model, whose ideal is a minimal kind of
life, characterized by security; and the maximal
or “sporting” model, characterized by adventure
and receptiveness to opportunity.
All of the conditions in which both the real
and the possible, including life’s contradictions,
must be dealt with, lead Ortega to make what
may sound like a surprising statement, although
well articulated in his philosophy, concerning the
notion of man as a metaphorical being. He is re-
ferring to the power of the metaphor to describe
new features in the world, founding a new reality
in which we live. The emphasis Ortega placed on
metaphor as the essence of both art and life can
perhaps be understood in the context of a reality
highlighted by metaphor. As he himself noted,
metaphors are transformative. They reveal new
perspectives, which are not, however, created out
of nothing by a wholly autonomous subject or
through some kind of mystical communion with
the beyond. Rather, they derive from the union of
two familiar objects or viewpoints that are already
part, perhaps even a very familiar part, of the
person’s circumstances or cultural milieu.
In this regard, Ortega goes so far as to say that
the ultimate work of art is life itself—life as a work
of art (Pérez-Álvarez and García-Montes 2004),
which would be a work of art with a dramatic tex-
ture: The plot of the drama is a person’s struggle to
realize the imaginary character who, in some sense,
is his true self and represents his true vocation. It
is no coincidence that Ortega considers theater the
‘embodied metaphor’ of human existence.
Ortega’s notion of the aesthetic sense of life
implies a capacity for seeing oneself and the world
from a kind of ironic distance. For Ortega, the
authentic major theme of life need not be anguish
and awareness of mortality (being-toward-death).
Instead, he projects a sunnier sense of opportunity,
including the potential for both heroic action and
aesthetic delight. Furthermore, he does not see
technology primarily as representing the loss of
being that it does for Heidegger, but rather as of-
fering new possibilities for being. It is also worth
noting that Ortega always strove to express his
viewpoint in everyday vocabulary and speech,
with a complete absence of esoteric or technical
vocabulary or any hint of a mystical or mystifying
aura. Indeed, as Ortega used to say, ‘clarity is the
courtesy of the philosopher.’ A number of these
features of Ortega’s thought—his optimism, his
openness to technical innovation, and his bracing
4. 202 ■ PPP / Vol. 15, No. 3 / September 2008
clarity—make his approach especially useful in a
psychiatric or mental health context.
Behaviorism According to
Skinner
Of all the varieties of behaviorism, Skinner’s
radical behaviorism is, perhaps surprisingly, the
most pertinent for establishing affinities with
phenomenology. If for Ortega the modern theme
of philosophy was overcoming idealism without
falling into realism, for Skinner in psychology it
would be overcoming mentalism without falling
into physicalism. Skinner himself did not perceive
these similarities—his own interest lay in the de-
velopment of a science of behavior rather than in
seeking philosophical affinities. To approach the
question of philosophical affinities, we need to
consider at least two fundamental questions. In
radical behaviorism, the ‘things themselves’ that
psychology has to study are behaviors. But what
is “behavior”? And does behavior exhaust the
domain of what needs to be considered by a phi-
losophy of psychology worthy of the name? The
first question involves a consideration of operant
behavior, the second, of private events.
Operant Behavior in Terms of Final
Causality
Behavior is anything organisms do. Operant
behavior is behavior that can be modified by its
consequences. The technical term for a conse-
quence of behavior is “reinforcer.” It is important
to bear in mind that, for Skinner, both behavior
and reinforcer are defined generically as classes
of behavior and of reinforcers (Skinner 1935).
Discrete behavior, defined by its topography, is
not what is important to an analysis of behavior
but, rather, the class of behavior as defined by its
function. Nor is it necessary for the reinforcer to
appear after each occurrence of the behavior.
The behavior–reinforcer relationship is, in
fact, a relationship of mutual implication, akin,
for example, to heads and tails on a coin or an
uncle and nephew, or the subject and object when
these are understood in an appropriately dialectic
rather than substantialist manner. The key point is
that operant behavior involves not a mechanistic
causality linking distinct Ss with distinct Rs, but
rather final causality (Rachlin 1992). To see final
causation in Skinner’s psychology, the concepts
of reinforcement contingency and reinforcement
history must be introduced.
The first concept—reinforcement contingency—
refers to the relationship between operant behavior
and the consequences of that behavior (Skinner
1969). The main point that should be empha-
sized here is that this relationship of behavior-to-
consequence (reinforcer) is in turn correlated with
some prior stimulus (the discriminative stimulus)
that establishes the occasion and opportunity for
certain behavior (the operant) to trigger its effect.
The behavior of greeting a friend on the street, for
instance, occurs on the occasion of his presence
at a certain distance, in a certain position and at-
titude, and so on. However, what reinforces the
‘greeting behavior’ is the subsequent reply from
the other, which is yet to occur. But this ‘event yet
to happen’ (the reinforcer) correlates (by virtue of
history) with some present stimulus (the friend’s
presence) that discriminates the appropriate be-
havior. Note that a reinforcement contingency
involves the relationship between something pres-
ent (the discriminative stimulus) and something
that is yet to happen (the anticipated reinforcer).
In this sense, the reinforcement contingency can be
said to have a temporal structure that is essentially
oriented toward the future, akin in many ways
to Heidegger’s ‘temporalizing of everydayness’
(Scharff 1999).
The second concept—reinforcement history—
refers to the reinforcement contingencies to which
a person has been exposed throughout his or her
life, implying that, in a certain sense, past and
present are contemporaneous. All functions, both
reinforcing and discriminative, are in fact rooted in
the history of learning and are continually updated
by reinforcement contingencies. Each learning ex-
perience involves not merely ‘storing experience,’
but a change in the organism that reorganizes
later possibilities for interaction. This notion of
reinforcement history is close to Aristotle’s concept
of ‘soul,’ which stresses the notion of potentiality.
In Aristotelian terms, reinforcement history could
be said to change the potential as a condition of
possibility for new acts, according to an analysis
5. Pérez-Álvarez & Sass / Phenomenology and Behaviorism ■ 203
of change based on the theory of potentiality and
actuality (Lear 1988, ch. 1). Aristotle (1999) gives
the example of the act of playing the zither, point-
ing out that the act of playing the instrument modi-
fies one’s ability to play, which in turn influences
successive acts (Metaphysics IX, 8, 30–5).
The concepts of operant behavior, reinforce-
ment contingency, and reinforcement history
lead to the conception of final causation (Rachlin
1992). Considered in isolation, a reinforcer could
not be a final cause. But for Skinner, a particular
behavior is correlated with previous behaviors
and together they constitute a functional class. As
a result, the consequences of the entire class (its
“goal” or anticipation of future reinforcement) are
prefigured in individual behavior. This concept of
final causality (in Aristotelian terms) implies a kind
of teleological holism that embraces an organism’s
past and future as well as current behavior.
Skinner’s emphasis on final causality could
even be said to imply the existence of a subjective
dimension. It is, after all, primarily from the point
of view of the organism, embedded in its environ-
ment, that a set of behaviors that are heteroge-
neous in purely physical terms, can form a class
of actions that is defined by the particular purpose
these actions serve for the organism and from the
organism’s standpoint. The ‘point of view’ in ques-
tion is not, however, something private or occult,
nor should it be conceived in terms of inner ‘rep-
resentations’ of an outer world. The organism is,
after all, world directed. And the world itself, we
might say, constitutes its own best representation.
This brings us to the second point.
Private Events as Behavioral Reality
To understand the Skinnerian position on what
are called private events, his distinction between
methodological and radical behaviorism must be
understood. This distinction, which Skinner made
at a symposium organized by Edwin G. Boring in
1945 (Skinner 1945), is considered a landmark in
the history of behaviorism (Malone and Cruchon
2001; Moore 1995).
According to methodological behaviorism,
Skinner says, “the world is divided into public and
private events, and psychology, in order to meet
the requirements of a science, must confine itself
to the former.” Skinner continues, “This was never
good behaviorism, but it was an easy position to
expound and defend, and was often resorted to
by the behaviorists themselves” (Skinner 1945,
292). According to radical behaviorism, by con-
trast, private events do not constitute a separate
reality beyond observation, because they are in
fact observable, although only by one person.
The problem for Skinner is how society teaches
each person to have the subjective experience he
or she has. As Skinner says, “What is lacking is
the bold and exciting behavioristic hypothesis that
what one observes and talks about is always the
‘real’ or ‘physical’ world (or at least ‘one’ world),
and that ‘experience’ is a derived construct to be
understood only through an analysis of verbal
(not, of course, merely vocal) processes” (1945,
p. 293). “The only problem,” he goes on to say,
“which a science of behavior must solve in connec-
tion with subjectivism is in the verbal field. How
can we account for the behavior of talking about
mental events? The solution must be psychologi-
cal, rather than logical, and I have tried to suggest
one approach in my present paper” (1945, p. 294).
Skinner refers to at least four means by which the
verbal community teaches us to account for private
events (see below; also Skinner 1957).
Skinner’s words came as a surprise to those
attending that symposium organized by Boring.
Along with other behaviorists, he had been invited
to present his form of operationalizing ‘psycholog-
ical terms,’ on the assumption (according to Bor-
ing) that ‘Science does not consider private data.’
“It is an amusing bit of irony,” says Skinner, “that
while Boring must confine himself to an account of
my external behavior, I am still reasonably inter-
ested in what might be called Boring-from-within”
(1945, 294). Radical behaviorism can still surprise
us today, given the misunderstandings on the basis
of which it is usually dismissed (as something ob-
solete), and in particular, if it is not distinguished
from methodological behaviorism. This said, three
basic questions emerge. These concern ontological
issues, the nature of construction, and the role of
private events.
Concerning ontological issues, radical behav-
iorism grants to private phenomena the same
status of reality as it does to public phenomena
6. 204 ■ PPP / Vol. 15, No. 3 / September 2008
(Moore 2001). “We need not suppose,” Skinner
says, “that events which take place within an
organism’s skin have special properties for that
reason. A private event may be distinguished
by its limited accessibility but not, so far as we
know, by any special structure or nature” (1953,
257–8). When Skinner does speak of mental life as
a mere fiction (e.g., Skinner 1977), he is referring
to conceptualizations of the mind that would set
it apart from behavior. In this sense, for Skinner,
cognitive structures are simply explanatory fic-
tions that at best are unnecessary and at worst
highly misleading. In his conception, ‘mental life’
would consist of a continuous flow of behavior,
both overt and covert, in which one is always
doing something and that is best captured in the
form of a gerund—feeling, thinking, and so on.
The essence of ‘behavior’ should be understood
as performance of a process or action. This need
not involve physical movement (Skinner is not, in
this sense, a materialist). It may also be a matter
of thinking, feeling, or perceiving.
As far as the nature of construction is con-
cerned, recall the constructive–operant nature of
radical behaviorism, whereby ‘radical’ has pre-
cisely the sense of going to the root of things, in
this case, of private events. The ‘internal world,’
including experience and awareness, would not be
self-originated, but would involve the world itself,
as a condition of its possibility. In this respect,
Skinner points out several ways this so-called
“internal world” is formed (Skinner 1945). Basi-
cally, these involve processes of verbal labeling by
which society teaches individuals to discriminate
otherwise-undifferentiated private experiences—
as, for example, when a child learns to speak of
being “bored” or “sad” when she no longer par-
ticipates, or participates pleasurably, in activities
previously done with interest.
Private events, when viewed in Skinner’s
perspective, are considered in relation to the
contingency of three terms: occasion, behavior,
and consequences (corresponding to discrimina-
tive stimulus, operant behavior, and reinforcer).
In general, it could be argued that private events
are not the cause of behavior in the sense that
cognitive psychology assumes, but rather form
part of the context in which the behavior occurs,
and can therefore alter the relationships between
the three terms of the equation. Thinking, for
example, could help to improve the performance
of behavior, but would not be its cause, because
the supposed cause would have to be explained
in terms of prior contingencies. Thus, feelings
(anxiety, sadness, guilt, etc.) can certainly alter
one’s relationships with the world, but they would
not themselves be thought of as the cause of such
alteration; once more, they themselves would de-
pend on previous conditions (Moore 2001).
The propensity to focus on private events, par-
ticularly thoughts and feelings, is often supported
by the cultural context of understanding in which
we live, where “Cartesian” notions about the in-
nerness, privacy, and primacy of the mental tend
to be prevalent. This propensity can, however, be
psychologically problematic and may even give
rise to serious psychological disorders. This oc-
curs when people try to control certain private
events that might otherwise just spontaneously
attenuate or disappear (such as intrusive thoughts
or fears), but that, as a result of such attempts at
control, can sometimes come to be experienced as
even more prominent and dominating. This con-
stitutes the disorder of “experiential avoidance”
(García-Montes et al 2008; Hayes, Strosahl, and
Wilson 1999).
Mutual Readjustments of
Phenomenology and Behaviorism
The key affinities between P&B can best be
summarized in terms of two concepts: first, adual-
ism, and second, the centrality of practical life.
Both P&B clearly attempt to overcome the
mind–world dualism typical of Cartesianism.
In both cases, the mind is not understood as
something internal, opposed to the world, but in
relational terms, as intentionality in phenomenol-
ogy and as operant behavior in behaviorism. On
the other hand, the world is not understood as
something external, opposed to the mind, but as a
kind of medium: circumstances or the lived world
in phenomenology, contingencies or functional
contexts in behaviorism.
Similarly, phenomenology and behaviorism
take practical life as their central theme. This
point deserves emphasis, given philosophy’s
7. Pérez-Álvarez & Sass / Phenomenology and Behaviorism ■ 205
general tendency to emphasize abstraction over
the concrete realities of life, and psychology’s
propensity to stress nomothetic generalizations
(the average person) rather than the specific facts
of a single individual or life. With these basic af-
finities in mind, we consider some possible mutual
readjustments.
Readjustments of Behaviorism
by Phenomenology
World Rather Than Environment
To begin with, behaviorism’s notion of the
environment could be better conceptualized as
phenomenology’s notion of the world. As Ortega
argues, animals have environment, but man has
world. After all, the discriminative and reinforc-
ing stimuli that constitute the human environment
are made up of historically constructed configu-
rations of meaning. The same forest presents a
different configuration to the poet, the hunter, the
lumberjack, the forester, or the forest dweller. As
the Spanish philosopher Fuentes-Ortega (1993)
noted, the notion of ‘discriminative contingency’
refers to the configuration of a world experienced
in accordance with personal meanings. From this
viewpoint, reinforcers are not just things that fol-
low behavior, but also, and above all, values that
guide our life. Of relevance here is the express
consideration of values by Acceptance and Com-
mitment Therapy, an approach much indebted to
Skinner’s radical behaviorism (Hayes, Strosahl,
and Wilson 1999). In the context of these advances
(discriminative contingency and values), behavior-
ism might adopt an interpretation of the world in
terms of phenomenology.
The main idea that must be grasped is that
(what might be called) stimulus and response are
complementary on the most fundamental, onto-
logical level; indeed, they are mutually constitu-
tive. Dewey made this point many years ago in
a famous (but insufficiently influential) critique
called “The Reflex-Arc Concept in Psychology”
(Dewey 1896). Perhaps the point has been most
richly elaborated in the phenomenological concept
of the lived-body. As Merleau-Ponty points out,
at the most basic and immediate level, our experi-
ence of the world is imbued with affordances and
vectors of meaning that derive from our primal
experience of bodily abilities, limitations, and
needs. Distance and weight, for example, are not
experienced as neutral dimensions, but rather in
relation to one’s experience of reaching or lifting.
At the most fundamental level, the lived-body is
not an inert material substance in focal awareness,
but an implicit articulation of propensities and
abilities directed at the world.
To recognize this condition of mutual constitu-
tion is (as Dewey noted) to give up the positivist
dream of a world of clear-cut entities or atomic
facts that can be easily recognized by all observ-
ers. It suggests, instead, that the very recognition
of a stimulus or a response is already an act of
pattern recognition that can be highly complex.
This is especially true of the human domain, where
the symbolic functions of culture and language
multiply the possible interfaces of organism and
world, and where, in the words of Merleau-Ponty
(1962), “ambiguity is of the essence” (p. 169).
To see this point is to recognize a hermeneutic
aspect at the core of Skinner behaviorism. This
hermeneutic aspect of behaviorism is certainly less
widely recognized than is the scientific–technical
aspect. It has, however, been pointed out in recent
years by behaviorists themselves (e.g., Day 1988;
Dougher 1993; Miller 1994; Moxley 2001; Roche
and Barnes-Holmes 2003; Scharff 1999).
Under the label “behavioural hermeneutics,”2
Dougher (1993) and Roche and Barnes-Holmes
(2003) stress the methodological dimension of
hermeneutics (they refer to the distinction between
three dimensions of hermeneutics—methodolog-
ical, ontological, and critical—that is described
in Woolfolk, Sass, and Messer 1988). Behavioral
hermeneutics can, however, also be understood
as having ontological and critical aspects, for it
also implies a certain vision of the intrinsic nature
of both behavior and environment, and it can be
used to criticize, for example, cognitive psychology
(e.g., Skinner 1977).
In any case, behavioral hermeneutics is well
documented in Skinner’s own writings. In this
respect, according to Moxley (2001), “Skinner’s
shift to interpretation” must be recognized start-
ing in 1945 in precisely the paper cited above
(Skinner 1945). Skinner’s most important books
8. 206 ■ PPP / Vol. 15, No. 3 / September 2008
from this time on are, as Skinner himself says, in-
terpretations. Thus, referring to Verbal behavior,
he says (1979): “I was interpreting a complex
field, using principles that had been verified under
simple, controlled conditions” (p. 282). At this
time, while writing about behaviorism, Skinner
states, “I am concerned with interpretation rather
than prediction and control” (Skinner 1974, 21).
Finally, he says in another place, “My treatment
of human behavior was largely an interpretation,
not a report of experimental data. Interpretation
was a common scientific practice, but scientific
methodologists had paid little attention to it”
(Skinner 1983, 27). He continues, “I chose ex-
amples of behavioral processes from history and
literature” (1983, 27). Beyond Skinner, behavioral
hermeneutics has been applied in the behavioral
approach to the ego (Kohlenberg and Tsai 1995),
in behavioral memory analysis (Palmer 1991), and
in child development (Schlinger 1992), to give a
few references. Our intention here is to emphasize
the hermeneutic dimension of behaviorism, with-
out denying its better known scientific–technical
side.
The Question of ‘Private Events’
As noted, Skinner did not, in fact, reject the
relevance or potential interest of the subjective
or first-person dimension but, rather, wanted to
support this, as much as possible, with publicly
available data. But despite some forceful com-
ments (such as those quoted above in reference
to E. G. Boring), Skinner’s views on inner experi-
ence or private events remain somewhat obscure.
We believe that they can be illuminated through
a comparison with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s well-
known remarks on the myths of private language
and inner experience and with certain traditional
phenomenological arguments.
Wittgenstein was concerned about the shared
nature of language, the way linguistic concepts
are learned in social situations involving public
ostensive definition. As he noted, even the rec-
ognition of affective states such as anger, love,
or anxiety—whether in others or in oneself—is
bound up with the observation of certain ways
of behaving and modes of expression, as well
as characteristic contexts that (at least in typical
cases) can be publicly identified. The very nature of
a given emotion—its status as anger or love, shame
or pride, for instance—is inseparable both from
certain physiological states or ways of behaving,
and from certain contexts and attitudes toward
the world. Wittgenstein was not, however, a meth-
odological or an ontological behaviorist—he did
not deny the accessibility, relevance, or reality of
subjective life, but only the idea that it constitutes
an autonomous sphere of independent or inac-
cessible events. His position is, in fact, perfectly
congruent with that of most phenomenologists.
As Merleau-Ponty wrote:
We must reject the prejudice which makes ‘inner
realities’ out of love, hate or anger, leaving them
accessible to one single witness: the person who
feels them. Anger, shame, hate and love are not
psychic facts hidden at the bottom of another’s
consciousness: they are types of behavior or styles
of conduct which are visible from the outside.
They exist on this face or in those gestures, not
hidden behind them. (1962, 52–3)
Dilthey (2002, 213ff) made a similar point
when he described the interdependence of experi-
ence, expression, and comprehension. Expression,
he pointed out, is not the revelation of something
fully formed that was already present in some pri-
vate interior space, but rather something intrinsic
to the very act of experiencing a situation.
We see, then, that P&B are highly compat-
ible. Phenomenology, however, offers a far more
detailed and sophisticated account of the actual
nature of lived experience (Erlebnis), and thus
can offer an enriching perspective that is lacking
in behaviorism.
Readjustments of
Phenomenology by
Behaviorism
From Intentionality to behavior
Although the notion of intentionality involves
progress in overcoming dualism, it has sometimes
remained tied to a certain type of Cartesian men-
talism. When Husserl, in his Cartesian Medita-
tions, describes the objective world as ‘deriv[ing]
its whole sense and its existential status, which
it has for me, from me myself, from me as the
9. Pérez-Álvarez & Sass / Phenomenology and Behaviorism ■ 207
transcendental Ego’ (1969, 26), he seems to be
advocating the kind of subjectivism or subjective
idealism that Ortega criticized in transcendental
phenomenology, as pointed out.
Nevertheless, intentionality also has a kind of
operative relationship with things, and therefore,
must be reconsidered in the light of operant be-
havior (both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty [1962,
xviii] use the phrase “operant intentionality”).
And as mentioned, the notion of operant behavior,
if properly understood in terms of final causality,
incorporates intentionality. The traditional empha-
sis on intentionality probably involves a certain
intellectualist prejudice, as pointed out, whereby
the mind thinks and then acts. Emphasizing the
notion of behavior would be more in consonance
with the concept of being-in-the-world, and with
the notion that living is fundamentally a matter
of acting rather than of having mere intentions.
Understood in this way, intentionality is embodied
and embedded in behavior and its context.
The notion of behavior proposed here has much
in common with Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of ha-
bitus. As the reader will recall, habitus refers to the
patterns of behavior and experiencing, acquired
during upbringing, that structure the relationships
within any particular situation. The notion of
operant behavior has the advantage, however, of
stressing the active nature of living.
The Dialectic Constructive Point of
View
From a behavioristic standpoint, phenomenol-
ogy contains certain limitations that behaviorism
can help to overcome. We are referring to phenom-
enology’s emphasis on the primacy of perception,
sometimes to the exclusion of other forms of
being-in-the-world, and also to phenomenology’s
focus on subjective experience without question-
ing its origins.
The problem with phenomenology’s focus on
perception is that this can emphasize passive over
active processes, despite the fact that phenomenol-
ogy (at least in its Heideggerian form) claims to
view engaged activity as the most fundamental
mode of being in the world (Sass 1988). The
notion of operant behavior as activity directed
toward the world does, in any case, focus more
clearly on what people actually do (on “life as ex-
ecution,” as Ortega termed it). In the final analysis,
human beings act on the world—eating, walking,
doing things with their hands, talking—and in so
doing they change the world, including their own
perceptions and experience of their environment.
The behavior of a depressed person, for instance,
will modify the horizons of his life, altering the
person’s perceptions and thoughts as well as his
emotions and mood (Dimidjian et al. 2006).3
Concerning subjective experience, the problem
with phenomenology lies in its tendency to treat
subjectivity as something primary, foundational,
or autochthonous. Phenomenology should, in-
stead, give some attention to the ways in which
forms of experience are learned within particular
societal configurations. Here, the study of verbal
contexts within which private experiences are
labeled and grasped is of special significance.
In sum, we would argue that a dialectical–
constructivist perspective is highly relevant for
a phenomenology that aspires to offer not only
description, but also forms of explanation empha-
sizing cultural and historical contexts.
Clinical Implications
We conclude by listing some of the advantages
for clinical psychology of adopting Ortega’s phe-
nomenological/behavioral perspective, as outlined
above.
To begin with, Ortega’s existential phenomenol-
ogy offers a philosophy of life that is founded on
a positive and optimistic outlook, and which, for
this reason, is likely to be conducive to a more
vibrant or healthy way of life. Authentic life, in
Ortega’s account, is founded not on anguish, but
on a kind of ‘coincidence with oneself’ that he de-
fines as ‘being sure about what my sincere attitude
toward each thing is.’ The meaning of life is rooted
not (or not primarily) in being-toward-death, but
in life as a project, including the potential for a
heroic and aesthetic life of adventure. In practical
terms, this philosophy suggests that psychological
conflicts and even mental disorders would be open
to various solutions depending on the construc-
tion of new frames of meaning. Solutions would
consist more of promoting movement toward
valuable goals in life than in trying to eliminate
10. 208 ■ PPP / Vol. 15, No. 3 / September 2008
symptoms—a view that is consistent with the ten-
dency of current psychotherapies such as Behav-
ioral Activation and Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy, as mentioned.
Second, Ortega’s notion of crisis offers alterna-
tive ways of conceptualizing problems or propen-
sities that are too readily described in terms of a
deficit or dysfunction. The notion of crisis involves
a difficult situation owing to changes in life’s cir-
cumstances that disorder previous functioning and
re-order a new one. Thus, crisis is expression and
at the same time attempts to solve a problematic
situation. The disorder would be both a problem
and the effort to solve it. More than a deficit of
normality (anormality), the disorder would involve
a new normality. This conception of disorder as
crisis is congruent with Canguilhen’s (1966/1991)
position in The Normal and the Pathological—in
the sense that the pathological does not imply a
defective norm, but rather the development of
other norms owing to alterations in the environ-
ment. The notion of crisis may seem less relevant
to persons who suffer disorders that have become
chronic. But this chronic situation is, all the same,
a ‘liminal’ condition, so that the person in ques-
tion is always in a critical situation, or indeed, we
might say, in ‘permanent crisis.’
Third, understanding behavior in terms of final
causality has implications for our conception of
mental disorders. It is not merely a question of
recognizing that mental disorders are meaningful,
but that their key meanings would be, above all, fi-
nal, in an Aristotelian sense; that is, corresponding
more to the question “What for?” than “Why?” In
this regard, a classical author of reference would
be Alfred Adler, whose teleo-analysis is closer to
the existential psychoanalysis of Sartre than to the
psychoanalysis of Freud.4
As far as this work is
concerned, it could be said that phenomenology
combined with behaviorism helps to focus on the
operant intentionality of so-called disorders. Such
an approach emphasizes not only the extent to
which behavior (or symptom) has a purpose or
function, but also how the disorder as a whole can
become an entire life project in which the patient
may invest her whole self (even though it may be
neurotic or psychotic).
Fourth, as we have seen, behaviorism does not
view mental events, understood as private inner
phenomena, as the cause of either behavior in
general or mental disorders in particular. To fo-
cus on such events (i.e., on feelings and thoughts,
conceived in such terms) is likely, in fact, to have
deleterious effects involving a vicious or ‘neurotic
circle’ of vain efforts to remove them. A more
appropriate therapeutic approach is often to stop
fighting the symptoms (adopting active accep-
tance) and orient life toward worthwhile goals
(adopting the commitment to act in their direction
in spite of the symptoms). This, of course, is pre-
cisely what is proposed by Acceptance and Com-
mitment Therapy (Hayes, Strosahl, and Wilson
1999)—which, as mentioned, is a major example
of the ‘new wave’ of behavioral therapy (Hayes
2004). It is noteworthy that both Acceptance and
Commitment Therapy and Ortega’s ‘aesthetic
sense of life’ emphasize the relevance and power
of metaphor for transforming perspectives and
revealing new ones.
Finally, Ortega’s synthesis of phenomenology
with behaviorism can also be understood to have
implications for one’s attitude toward political
commitment and sociocultural transformation.
This philosophical significance is captured by Or-
tega’s formula, ‘I am myself and my circumstances,
and if I do not save them, I do not save myself.’
The salvation in question involves acceptance of
what one is and of responsibility for the direction
of one’s own life. But it also involves a commit-
ment to improving the general circumstances of
the world, a commitment that may be at odds with
contemporary trends toward viewing problems in
purely clinical and individualistic terms.
Acknowledgments
This work was financed with a research project
from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Tech-
nology (ref. SEJ2005-24699-E/PSIC) awarded to
the first author.
Notes
1. In 1913, Ortega published a series of short articles
on Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology by Husserl, which
are probably the first foreign comments on this work
(San Martín, 2005). These writings are more descrip-
tive than critical. Later, however (e.g., in 1934, in the
Prologue to the third German edition of The Modern
Theme), Ortega describes objections that he had then
already been feeling with regard to certain aspects of
11. Pérez-Álvarez & Sass / Phenomenology and Behaviorism ■ 209
phenomenology, including what he saw as an overem-
phasis on essence to the detriment of history and life
(see also Silver [1978, ch. 4]).
2. The expression “behavioral hermeneutics” was
also used by Glifford Geertz (1968, p. 379) to refer to
a variety of anthropological perspectives that study the
actions of subjects as actors submerged in a context of
reference (e.g., revitalistic rituals, curing ceremonies,
dramaturgical gestures).
3. Behavioral Activation is a new psychological
therapy for depression based on the functional analysis
of behavior and on behaviorism as philosophy (Dimi-
djian et al 2006). It also forms part of the new wave
or third generation of therapies mentioned in the note
above (Hayes, 2004).
4. Although Sartre said that existential psycho-
analysis had yet to find its Freud, Ellenberger (1970)
recognized this ‘existential’ Freud in Adler.
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in psychiatry. He can be contacted via e-mail at:
jli@lopez-ibor.com
María-Inés López-Ibor is Professor of Psychia-
try, Department of Psychiatry and Medical Psy-
chology, Complutense University, Madrid (Spain).
She can be contacted via e-mail at: mlopezibor@
med.ucm.es
Rogelio Luque is Senior Lecturer in the Depart-
ment of Psychiatry, University of Córdoba, Spain
and Consultant Psychiatrist in the Psychiatric
Hospitalization Unit, Hospital Reina Sofia. He
has a long-standing interest in psychopathology of
psychosis and philosophical and historical aspects
of psychiatry. He has published widely on these
topics. He can be contacted via e-mail at: rluque@
telefonica.net
Marino Pérez-Álvarez, clinical psychologist,
is Professor of Psychopathology and Interven-
tion and Treatment Techniques at the Psychology
Department of the University of Oviedo (Spain).
He participates in several doctoral programs at
different Spanish universities. He is co-editor of
the Guía de tratamientos psicológicos eficaces
(Guide to effective psychological treatments), in
3 volumes, and co-author of La invención de los
trastornos mentales ¿Escuchando al fármaco o
al paciente? (The invention of mental disorders:
Listening to the drug or to the patient?). He is As-
sociate Editor of the Spanish journal Psicothema.
His principal line of research at present focuses
on the development of a person-based contextual
therapy for psychoses. He can be contacted via
e-mail at: marino@uniovi.es
Louis A. Sass is Professor of Clinical Psychology
at Rutgers—the State University of New Jersey. He
is the author of Madness and Modernism and The
Paradoxes of Delusion, and of numerous articles
on schizophrenia, modernism/postmodernism,
phenomenology, and hermeneutics. He can be
contacted via e-mail at: lsass@rci.rutgers.edu
Roger Vilardaga is a doctoral student in clini-
cal psychology at the University of Nevada. He
can be contacted via e-mail at: roger.vilardaga@
gmail.com
José M. Villagrán is consultant psychiatrist,
Head of the Psychiatric Hospitalization Unit, Hos-
pital of Jerez, Cádiz, Spain. His research interests
include psychopathology, recovery from psychosis
and philosophy of psychiatry. He has published
widely on these topics and co-edited with Rogelio
Luque the book Psicopatología descriptiva: nuevas
tendencias (Madrid: Trotta; 2000). He can be
contacted via e-mail at: jmaria.villagran.sspa@
juntadeandalucia.es