Osama bin Laden created a global jihadi financial network by leveraging his personal wealth and donors from Muslim organizations. He decentralized al-Qaeda's funding sources to diversify revenue and protect the organization if any single source was disrupted. Al-Qaeda used both legitimate businesses and illicit activities like money laundering through alternative banking systems to self-fund its operations. Bin Laden's financial model inspired other terrorist groups and his ideology ensured al-Qaeda's mission would continue for generations through ongoing global insurgencies. Efforts to counter terrorist financing have increased international cooperation but challenges remain due to the evolving and adaptive nature of such networks.

1. OSAMA’S LEGACY:
A JIHADI GLOBAL FINANCIAL NETWORK
Patricia Levy, PhD
Fort Hays State University

2. Understand the Man,
Understand the Vision
 Life experiences shape the man – a child of
immigrants & wealthy family, academic background
in: business & public administration, and economics
 Radicalized by teachers belonging to the Muslim
Brotherhood - a transformation through violence for
moderate Muslim regimes to Orthodox Islam (Winer 2003) –
mentor Abdullah Azzam at King Abd al-Aziz
University (Hamas founder & beginnings of
muhajideen fighters in Afghanistan against the
Soviet Union (own wealth, donors, Muslim
Brotherhood a conduit to transferring of funds
raised by Muslim charitable organizations in Gulf
states. Until 9/11 seemed to be major part of al-
Qaeda’s funding . Meanwhile construction of
infrastructure, forming of Arab platoon, soldiering

3. Ideology & Funding
 The shift from traditional to non-traditional illicit funding
 Insurgent organization funding: Secrecy + propaganda,
pose a threat to nation states , global international aim
Jihad - institutional worldwide concept + internal
organizational structure: e.g. Sept. 1988 – 9 of group’s 15
founders administrative specialists  Shura Council – 4
components: military assistance, administrative finance
unit, religious issues, media/propaganda + later field
commanders for actual attack strategies & execution
 Budgetary costs: transport, recruitment, training,
weaponry, technical equipment, counterfeit documentation, political,
financial processing & influence, maintenance of members/martyrs,
schools, medical clinics, safe houses, Social media/Information
Committee
 Mentoring & seed money for foreign groups: e.g. Somalia
- local members under local authority – Al Shabab

6. “The Business of Terror: A
Multinational Corporate Model(Vittori,2005)
An estimated $35 million + $5-10 million/year
Bin Laden decentralizes, funding components & diversifies
funding - no single revenue could destroy the
organization. Businesses worldwide – some legitimate
and others through money laundering, some by plane -
camel, boat and courier
Free from control of a state sponsored terrorist
organization, maintains its own infrastructure using the
international banking systems until U.S. freezing
accounts and assets. Has used under-regulated regional
banking systems in the Middle East (in the past Lebanon,
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain & Pakistan.The
hawala system of alternative banking, centered in Dubai
unregulated, anonymous and efficient. Fund own banks
e.g. ash-Shamal bank in Sudan partly by bin Laden and
Bank atTaqwa in 1988 backed by the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, fraudulent loan applications

7. Islamic Terrorist Organizations: a
Learning & Evolving Organizations
 Lessons from the past: Omar’s story – U.S. a target & global
economic domination (Scheuer, M. , 2011)
 Islamic terrorist enterprises evolve & adapt to changing
socioeconomic, cultural & political realities worldwide
 Choreographed attacks of mass violence driven by religious
rationale & sanction for illicit, criminal activities
 “Money is a natural centrifugal force” (McCaffey & Basso, 2006) that
include money laundering, assassination, extortion, human
trafficking, drug running, credit card fraud, internet law-
breaking ventures (e.g. gambling, video games) counterfeit
cigarettes, DVDs, medications, other transnational profit-
making - a blurred nexus between criminal and terrorist
organizations (The House Committee Task Force to Investigate Terrorism Financing, May 21, 2015) (Kaplan
2008; Makarenko 2004; Winer 2003) conflicts in aims, control, trust & security
concerns, cyber terrorism, digital currency transfers e.g.
bitcoin, paypal anonymous, low detection, no bank (Irwin, et al., 2014)
 terrorist organizations need in-house produced sources of
revenue and business – selling antiquities

9. Efforts to Stem Terror Financing
 Post 9/11 freezing assets & “following the money” (Weiss 2005,
Lormel 2002) FBITerrorism Financing Operations Section (TFOS)
track & stop terrorist financing, use financial information
To locate terrorist groups activities. TFOS builds on FBI’s
history of relationships “with the financial services sector”
to carry out “criminal financial investigations…in tracking
and freezing terrorists‘ assets ((http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ten-years-after-the-fbi-since-9-
11/just-the-facts-1/counterterrorism-1)
 E.g. Hezbollah Lebanese Canadian Bank money
laundering. Assets frozen, stopped access to criminals
DEA,Treasury, State Department ,law enforcement
interagency cooperation.Limited media reporting on
financial information on terrorist-financing sources & self
funding schemes by lone actors & small cells (Keatinge & Keen,2017)

10. Efforts to Stem the Tide (Examples)
“U.S.’s legal & regulatory enforcement framework for
counter threat finance has not kept up with scale, scope,
& sophistication of terrorism financing”? … Not enough.
(Asher, 2015 – testimony to House CommitteeTask Force to InvestigateTerrorism Financing)
 Need better coordination between all American agencies
to combat terrorist financing” . own policies & priorities
 Designation of metrics for measuring checking
domestic charities – need a more unified strategy
 International partners non-enforcement of anti-terror
financing laws to stop Saudi donors ($40 million 2013-
2014 ) – e.g. to ISIS (Stopping the Money Flow:TheWar onTerror Finance, Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, andTrade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs & Subcommittee on EmergingThreats
and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, June 9, 2016)
 Money laundering: Placement (most vulnerable to
detection), Layering & Integration – a synergistic
collaboration in “real-time” - law enforcement , financial
institutions, intelligence, regulators (Irwin, Kim-Kwang, & Choos, 2012)

12. Al-Qaeda’s Multigenerational Jihad
 Bin Laden – passing on the torch for decades to
come with insurgencies worldwide
 Next generation more educated, more from
middle and upper classes & technologically
adept at using modern weapons –e.g.
improvised explosive devices, car bombs, etc.
communication tools, internet streaming
propaganda
 Bin Laden their present day inspirational figure
rejectingWestern culture – more devout ,
youthful idealistic suicide bombers
 Bin Laden’s legacy: reignited a Muslim culture
that served as a reminder of the underlying
resentment against memories of the colonial &
ethnocentric imperialistic West

13. Bibliography
 Asher, D. (May 21, 2015). CongressionalTestimony, A Dangerous Nexus:
Terrorism, Crime, and Corruption. The House Committee on Financial
Services:Task Force to InvestigateTerrorism Financing.Washington, DC
 Irwin,A.S., Kim-Kwang, R., & Choo, Liu. (2012). Modeling of money
laundering and terrorism financing typologies. Journal of Money Laundering
Control; London, 15.3, 316-335.
 Irwin,A.S., Kim-Kwang, R., & Choo, Liu. (2014). Money laundering and
terrorism financing in virtual environments: a feasibility study. Journal of
Money Laundering Control; London, 17.1, 50-75.
 Kaplan, D.E. (2008/2009) Paying for terror: How jihadist groups are using
organized-crime tactics – and profits – to finance attacks around the globe.
InT.J. Badey (Ed.), Annual Editions (11th ed), pp. 28-33. Dubuque, IA: Mc-
Graw Hill Higher Education.
 Keating,T. & Keen, F. (2017, January). Lone-Actor and small cell terrorist
attacks: A new front in counter-terrorist finance? The Royal United Services
Institute (RUSI); London.
 Lormel, D.M. (2002, February 12). CongressionalTestimony – Financing
patterns associated with Al Qaeda & global terrorist networks, Federal
Bureau of Investigation at
www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/lormel021202.htm

14. Bibliography continued
 Makarenko,T. (2004, February).The Crime-Terror Continuum:Tracing the
interplay between transnational organized crime and terrorism. Global
Crime, 6, No. 1, pp. 129-145.
 McCaffrey, B.R., & Basso, J.A. (2006). Narcotics, terrorism, and international
crime:The convergence phenomenon. In R.D. Howard, & R.L. Sawyer (eds.),
Terrorism and counterterrorism: Understanding the new security environment,
pp. 322-336. Dubuque, IA: McGraw-Hill Contemporary Learning Series.
 Scheuer, M. (2011). Osama Bin Laden. NewYork:Oxford University Press.
 Vittori, J.M. (2005) Analysis-the business of terror. Financially al-Qaeda
operates like a multinational corporation. IP Global/Published by the German
Council on Foreign Relations – www.ip-
global.or/archiv/volumes/2005/summer2005/the-bus...
 Weiss, M.A. (2005, February 25).Terrorist financing:The 9/11 Commission
Recommendation
 Winer, J. (2003, July).Testimony: Origins, organization, and prevention of
Terrorist Finance. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs at
www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/2003_h/030