This document provides an overview of the NSA's ECHELON signals intelligence program. It traces the program's origins back to the 1970s and describes how ECHELON uses a global network of satellites and intercept stations controlled by the US and other partners to intercept vast amounts of electronic communications data worldwide. The document discusses how ECHELON uses keyword filtering to identify targets and shares data with partner agencies. It also notes debates around the program's effectiveness and impact on privacy.
1. Cyberwarfare involves using computers to attack other networks or computers through electronic means, often disguising the attacker, to support military operations and enhance national security.
2. Cyber terrorism uses cyber attacks to disrupt critical infrastructure like financial and air traffic control systems to intimidate or coerce governments, similar to physical terrorist attacks.
3. The document discusses examples of cyber attacks like Stuxnet and Ghostnet, and analyzes Nigeria's preparedness for cyber threats given increasing cyber crime and the potential for terrorist groups to conduct cyber attacks.
This document provides a briefing on cyberwarfare. It begins with definitions of cyber, warfare, and cyberwarfare. It then discusses three recent cyberwarfare events: 1) Russia attacking Georgia in 2008 through DDoS and hacking, 2) An unknown agency attacking US military networks in 2008 through an infected USB drive, and 3) An unknown attacker (allegedly Israel) targeting Iran's nuclear facilities in 2010 through the Stuxnet virus. It analyzes the impacts and countermeasures for each event. Finally, it concludes with questions around regulating cyber groups and establishing protocols for cyberweapons.
The document discusses how recent NSA surveillance program revelations have negatively impacted the technology industry and cloud computing. It summarizes that the NSA collected data from major tech companies without consent, details some of their surveillance programs, and reviews the legal and economic fallout, including two conflicting court rulings on the programs' constitutionality. Recent estimates suggest the NSA actions could cost the US tech industry between $35-180 billion over the next three years due to lost foreign business and erosion of trust in US cloud services.
A computer network connects computers and devices together to share resources and transmit data. It uses either analog or digital signals transmitted over wired or wireless connections. Wired networks use cables like coaxial, twisted pair, or fiber optic cables. Wireless networks transmit signals via Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, radio waves, or infrared waves. Common network types are local area networks (LANs) within an office or home, and wider area networks (WANs) between multiple locations. Security risks on networks include data hacking, virus attacks, data corruption, and unauthorized access to web servers.
This paper presents suggestions for an exploratory approach to understanding cybercrime that we call “cybercartography” using a set of tools that have not been frequently applied to this domain. We refer to 1) fifty-plus years of experience by scientists and governments in integrating socioeconomic and political data organized by administrative boundaries with satellite raster and global gridded global data sets 2) gridded global models 3) global event data sets 4) centuries of experience with the art and science of cartography. To make this less abstract, consider the broad generalization that most current generation cyberthreat maps involve lots of blinking dots and network graphs superimposed over an outline or “blue marble” view of the world. Then compare some of the cartographic techniques that are often used to map other knowledge domains—for example, National Geographic-style cartography, high-resolution administrative boundary maps produced using the US census, and gridded global data sets. A deeper level of insight into the world of cybercrime can be gained in combining the standard cyberthreat network analyses with place-specific variables which can lead to greater insights into who the cybercriminals are, what makes a particular region fertile ground for these activities, why some regions are less susceptible to developing cybercriminals, and where new criminal activities are likely to spring-up and flourish. These different approaches are not superior to one another, but they can be complementary.
Warrantless governmental surveillance through the use of emerging technology ...Vania_Chaker
Abstract: Warrantless Governmental Surveillance through the Use of Emerging Technology Has Become a Mainstay of Governmental Investigation
The United States government enjoys awesome technological capabilities. It can facilely monitor electronic communications and surreptitiously retrieve stored information on private computer systems through the use of emerging technology. Indeed, technology that was once the stuff of science fiction is now routinely used in real life to monitor the activities of citizens, corporations, even foreign nationals in foreign nations.
This blog post raises the question as to whether such powerful governmental capabilities have been tempered by the countervailing protective judicial or legislative safeguards necessary to offset the greatly increased potential for improper government intrusiveness. The word count is 449 words (1,396 words including footnotes).
Cyber war netwar and the future of cyberdefense David Sweigert
This document provides an updated definition of "Netwar" based on the original concept introduced in 1993 by Arquilla and Ronfeldt.
1. The document summarizes the original definitions of "Cyberwar" and "Netwar", noting that Cyberwar targets information systems while Netwar targets societal perceptions.
2. It then proposes a new working definition of modern Netwar as intentional activities to influence human perception through overt or hidden channels, with the goal of facilitating changes in another actor's perceptions for one's own benefit.
3. Netwar does not necessarily involve physical force, illegal data modification, or law violations, but can utilize legal speech, economic actions, and information manipulation to influence perceptions
1. Cyberwarfare involves using computers to attack other networks or computers through electronic means, often disguising the attacker, to support military operations and enhance national security.
2. Cyber terrorism uses cyber attacks to disrupt critical infrastructure like financial and air traffic control systems to intimidate or coerce governments, similar to physical terrorist attacks.
3. The document discusses examples of cyber attacks like Stuxnet and Ghostnet, and analyzes Nigeria's preparedness for cyber threats given increasing cyber crime and the potential for terrorist groups to conduct cyber attacks.
This document provides a briefing on cyberwarfare. It begins with definitions of cyber, warfare, and cyberwarfare. It then discusses three recent cyberwarfare events: 1) Russia attacking Georgia in 2008 through DDoS and hacking, 2) An unknown agency attacking US military networks in 2008 through an infected USB drive, and 3) An unknown attacker (allegedly Israel) targeting Iran's nuclear facilities in 2010 through the Stuxnet virus. It analyzes the impacts and countermeasures for each event. Finally, it concludes with questions around regulating cyber groups and establishing protocols for cyberweapons.
The document discusses how recent NSA surveillance program revelations have negatively impacted the technology industry and cloud computing. It summarizes that the NSA collected data from major tech companies without consent, details some of their surveillance programs, and reviews the legal and economic fallout, including two conflicting court rulings on the programs' constitutionality. Recent estimates suggest the NSA actions could cost the US tech industry between $35-180 billion over the next three years due to lost foreign business and erosion of trust in US cloud services.
A computer network connects computers and devices together to share resources and transmit data. It uses either analog or digital signals transmitted over wired or wireless connections. Wired networks use cables like coaxial, twisted pair, or fiber optic cables. Wireless networks transmit signals via Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, radio waves, or infrared waves. Common network types are local area networks (LANs) within an office or home, and wider area networks (WANs) between multiple locations. Security risks on networks include data hacking, virus attacks, data corruption, and unauthorized access to web servers.
This paper presents suggestions for an exploratory approach to understanding cybercrime that we call “cybercartography” using a set of tools that have not been frequently applied to this domain. We refer to 1) fifty-plus years of experience by scientists and governments in integrating socioeconomic and political data organized by administrative boundaries with satellite raster and global gridded global data sets 2) gridded global models 3) global event data sets 4) centuries of experience with the art and science of cartography. To make this less abstract, consider the broad generalization that most current generation cyberthreat maps involve lots of blinking dots and network graphs superimposed over an outline or “blue marble” view of the world. Then compare some of the cartographic techniques that are often used to map other knowledge domains—for example, National Geographic-style cartography, high-resolution administrative boundary maps produced using the US census, and gridded global data sets. A deeper level of insight into the world of cybercrime can be gained in combining the standard cyberthreat network analyses with place-specific variables which can lead to greater insights into who the cybercriminals are, what makes a particular region fertile ground for these activities, why some regions are less susceptible to developing cybercriminals, and where new criminal activities are likely to spring-up and flourish. These different approaches are not superior to one another, but they can be complementary.
Warrantless governmental surveillance through the use of emerging technology ...Vania_Chaker
Abstract: Warrantless Governmental Surveillance through the Use of Emerging Technology Has Become a Mainstay of Governmental Investigation
The United States government enjoys awesome technological capabilities. It can facilely monitor electronic communications and surreptitiously retrieve stored information on private computer systems through the use of emerging technology. Indeed, technology that was once the stuff of science fiction is now routinely used in real life to monitor the activities of citizens, corporations, even foreign nationals in foreign nations.
This blog post raises the question as to whether such powerful governmental capabilities have been tempered by the countervailing protective judicial or legislative safeguards necessary to offset the greatly increased potential for improper government intrusiveness. The word count is 449 words (1,396 words including footnotes).
Cyber war netwar and the future of cyberdefense David Sweigert
This document provides an updated definition of "Netwar" based on the original concept introduced in 1993 by Arquilla and Ronfeldt.
1. The document summarizes the original definitions of "Cyberwar" and "Netwar", noting that Cyberwar targets information systems while Netwar targets societal perceptions.
2. It then proposes a new working definition of modern Netwar as intentional activities to influence human perception through overt or hidden channels, with the goal of facilitating changes in another actor's perceptions for one's own benefit.
3. Netwar does not necessarily involve physical force, illegal data modification, or law violations, but can utilize legal speech, economic actions, and information manipulation to influence perceptions
Russia's Defense Technologies Newswire provides a daily feed in English summarizing Russia's defense industry, armed forces activities, military exports, expert opinions, and corporate news from defense enterprises. The feed includes up to 30 items per day covering topics like weapons development, military exercises, arms sales, and military-political events. It has been published online on weekdays since September 2015.
Snipers provide roof-top support for ground troops in Iraq while Marines clear houses to prevent attacks from behind. The U.S. Military also uses F-22s for air patrols, designs new stealth ships, and employs the latest F-35 aircraft as well as attack helicopters and tanks like the M1A1 that are capable of taking out large enemy forces. Aircraft carriers like the Nimitz class, the biggest in the world, carry advanced weapons and over 150 airplanes alongside an onboard "small army".
The document provides instruction on operating an AK-47 assault rifle. It discusses the history and development of the AK-47, safety procedures, parts of the rifle, and how to disassemble and assemble it. It also covers shooting fundamentals, including proper grip, stance, sight alignment, trigger squeeze, and readiness positions. The overall purpose is to teach students to safely handle, operate, and shoot the AK-47 rifle according to standard procedures.
The document discusses three modern main battle tanks:
The French Leclerc MBT utilizes advanced hybrid armor and active defensive systems.
The Merkava Mk4, produced by Israel, has been improved with new armor, gun, and electronics systems and can carry infantry soldiers or casualties in addition to its crew. Major contractors involved in its production include Elbit Systems, Israel Military Industries, and Urdan Industries.
The US M1A1/2 Abrams is manufactured by General Dynamics Land Systems and has been produced in several versions for the US Army as well as exported to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.
A Javelin missile was fired at a fully operational T72 tank. The missile hit the tank, damaging its road wheels, track, turret, gun and engine from 65 meters away. The engine at the front of the tank was also damaged by the impact of the missile.
Russia will supply 14 Yak-130 combat trainers to Bangladesh in 2015, fulfilling an existing contract. Belarus will receive 4 Yak-130s under a separate 2012 contract. The Russian defense company Irkut will deliver a total of 61 combat aircraft and trainers in 2015, including Su-30SM and Yak-130 models. Russia is also upgrading several of its An-124 transport aircraft to extend their service life. Russian arms exports exceeded $15 billion in 2014 and are projected to remain at similar levels in 2015 despite Western sanctions.
The document discusses various combat systems developed by Research and Production Corporation "Uralvagonzavod", including tanks, artillery systems, flamethrower systems, and combat engineer equipment. It provides details on the T-72, T-80U, T-90S, T-90S Modernized and BMPT tanks, as well as artillery systems such as the 2B25 mortar and D-30A howitzer. It also describes flamethrower systems like the TOS-1A and combat engineer vehicles IMR-2MA and BMR-3M.
This document discusses electronic warfare and is divided into three main sections: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. Electronic attack involves jamming, deception, and destructive techniques to interfere with an enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic protection techniques are used to protect friendly forces from electronic attack. Electronic warfare support passively detects and analyzes emissions to gather intelligence and provide situational awareness. Specific electronic warfare systems and techniques discussed include jamming, chaff, flares, anti-radiation missiles, frequency hopping, and ELINT/COMINT collection.
This document provides an overview of Russia's theory and practice of information warfare. It discusses how Russia has developed its information warfare theory in opposition to Western concepts, drawing on Soviet-era psychological warfare techniques. It also examines the role of Russian geopolitical schools in popularizing and participating in information warfare. The document analyzes how Russia employed extensive propaganda in its recent operations related to Ukraine and Crimea to influence domestic and international public opinion.
Analysis for Radar and Electronic WarfareReza Taryghat
This document discusses techniques for measuring pulsed RF signals used in radar and electronic warfare applications. It begins with an overview of common radar applications and measurement types. It then discusses tools for measuring pulse parameters like pulse width, repetition interval, and power. These tools include power meters, oscilloscopes, spectrum analyzers, and specialized pulse analyzers. It also covers vector signal analysis and its ability to analyze modulation embedded on pulses. The rest of the document provides examples of measuring pulses with these various tools and techniques like pulse building, frequency hopping analysis, and analyzing LFM chirps.
Aviation History & How an Aircraft fliesshankar11122
The document provides an introduction to aviation history and aeronautics. It discusses key figures and inventions in the development of flight such as the Wright Brothers' first powered flight in 1903. The document also covers aerodynamic principles such as lift, drag, angle of attack and stall. It describes aircraft parts including wings, engines, tail and control surfaces such as ailerons, elevators and rudder. Finally, it discusses different types of aircraft including variations in speed from subsonic to hypersonic flight.
A massive computer worm called Stuxnet targeted Iran's nuclear facilities and spread globally. Stuxnet code samples have raised concerns it could be used to target other countries' critical infrastructure systems. The sophisticated Stuxnet code has reportedly been offered for sale on underground forums, potentially enabling cyber terrorists to adapt it for disruptive purposes. A major global cyber espionage operation dubbed "Operation Shady RAT" targeted over 70 organizations for years and is believed to have been masterminded by China to steal military, economic and diplomatic secrets.
Surveillance of communication by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA)Klamberg
The document summarizes legislation passed in Sweden in 2008 that allows the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) to conduct surveillance of communications. Key points include:
- Telecom operators must transfer all international communications to nodes controlled by FRA for signal intelligence collection.
- FRA is authorized to intercept communications and collect data to monitor external threats like terrorism and weapons proliferation.
- FRA shares information with government agencies and may partner with intelligence organizations in other countries like the NSA and GCHQ.
- A defense intelligence court and committee provide oversight of FRA's activities and access to databases of communications metadata.
Information Sharing, Dot Connecting and Intelligence Failures.docxannettsparrow
Information Sharing, Dot Connecting and Intelligence Failures:
Revisiting Conventional Wisdom
By
Russell Travers
Deputy Director, Information Sharing and Knowledge Development
National Counterterrorism Center
This paper, written in August 2009, was submitted to the Director of National Intelligence
2009 Galileo Awards Program. The Galileo Awards Program is an annual Intelligence
Community-wide competition designed to encourage and recognize innovative workforce
ideas that address current challenges and help shape the future of U.S. Intelligence.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not
reflect the official positions or views of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) or
any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as
implying U.S. Government or NCTC endorsement of the author’s views. This material has
been reviewed to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
The year is 2014. The Intelligence Community is ten years into its efforts to
implement the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). While
change has been evident on many fronts, nothing was more closely identified with
intelligence reform than information sharing; ever since the 9/11 Commission
declared that “the biggest impediment to all-source analysis – to a greater
likelihood of connecting the dots – is the human or systemic resistance to sharing
information”1, the two had been inextricably linked. And while we were pushing
more electrons than ever before, dissatisfaction continued: in 2014, as in 2009,
no analyst in the IC had effective access to all information; analysts in many parts
of the Community complained that they couldn’t get operational traffic or law
enforcement information; we had little ability to do large scale processing of
foreign and domestic data sets; our non Federal partners were still dissatisfied
with the quality of information sharing. A dizzying array of directives had been
issued. Arbitration procedures had been established. And yet organizations
weren’t getting the information they claimed to “need.” Legitimate issues
coexisted with tripe. According to the critics, we still couldn’t connect those dots.
The reality, however, was far more complex: the only question was whether it
took a major intelligence failure to realize that fact.
This is the path we’re on. We will continue to hear claims that information sharing has
“barely improved since 9/11.” Such hyperbole is unmitigated nonsense. The robust sharing of
information between and among the key organizations has undoubtedly contributed to the fact
that we haven’t suffered a major attack. And by any objective standard, the level of sharing
1 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States; U.S. Government Print.
Surveillance of communication by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA)Klamberg
The document summarizes Sweden's legislation authorizing surveillance of communications by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA). It discusses how the law requires telecom operators to transfer all international communications to FRA nodes for intercept. FRA can then intercept communications and collect data for signal intelligence purposes. The document also reviews similar intelligence laws and programs in other countries like the US, UK, France and Germany.
Electronic Surveillance of Communications 100225Klamberg
The document discusses electronic surveillance of communications and legislation around signal intelligence. It provides context on changes in technology and threats that created demands for new legislation. It describes how signal intelligence works, including intercepting messages and metadata, as well as traffic analysis and social network analysis. Legislation in Sweden and other countries regulates agencies conducting signal intelligence and their mandates, clients, and oversight. Key aspects of Swedish law include the Defence Radio Establishment's mandate for surveillance, its clients and review mechanisms, methods like traffic analysis, and the scope of interception and data collection.
250 words agree or disagreeFusion CentersFollowing the 91.docxvickeryr87
250 words agree or disagree
Fusion Centers
Following the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent reform of the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies, the Department of Homeland Security created fusion centers throughout the country in order to facilitate information sharing for tribal, local, state, and federal government agencies (Khan, 2012). According to Khan (2012), the centers “have ‘not produced useful intelligence to support federal counterterrorism efforts’ and have ‘too often wasted money and stepped on American civil liberties’” (Khan, 2012). However, these figures and statements should be corroborated with the multiple intelligence overseeing committees within the Senate and Congress to inform the public of the real information at hand. Yet, Senator Levin states that these centers “’may provide valuable services in fields other than terrorism’ like criminal investigations, public safety or disaster response” (Khan, 2012). Overall, these centers have access to classified information and when other analysts upload their products and reports in SIPR and JWICS systems, then it enables others to search through these products through Intelink.com on the classified systems.
Intelligence Reform
The National Security Act of 1947 established different agencies and positions regarding the military and intelligence community. Throughout the years, different policies and laws have been enacted to ensure that intelligence agencies follow established procedures and all laws so they do not run into issues or violate these laws. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was signed and “is the most recent legislative action to reform the community’s performance and management. While the IRTPA has contributed to intelligence improvements, such as increased sharing of data on terrorism, most in and around the intelligence community would assert that managing the intelligence enterprise is still a work in progress” (Strickland & Whitlock, 2012). National intelligence managers were created in order to facilitate integration of “intelligence strategies that support national security outcomes” (Strickland & Whitlock, 2012). Another significant change is that the person holding the position of the Director of National Intelligence keep an important relationship with the President due to the President being a consumer of intelligence (Strickland & Whitlock, 2012).
Three Philosophical Lessons
There are 3 philosophical lessons concerning intelligence that include Simpson’s Paradox, Skyrms’ Resiliency Theory, and Casual Inference. Simpson’s Paradox “has immediate consequences for the development of optimal strategies for the sharing of data, and for the targeted deployment of intelligence-gathering resources” (Mole, 2012). Overall, it is best to share the data different entities have to be able to better plan and coordinate efforts to where it is most likely to get the best out of. Skyrms’ Resiliency Theory d.
This document discusses several challenges facing signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection systems, including rapid changes in technology, the vast quantity of data collected, the need for skilled linguists, and issues around ethics, privacy, information sharing, and politicization of intelligence. Some of the key challenges mentioned are the rise of encryption tools, social media monitoring, maintaining foreign language capabilities, and balancing national security needs with privacy concerns.
Privacy is being threatened by new technologies that collect and track personal data. Companies are developing facial recognition in phones and cameras, location tracking in vehicles, and smart home meters. The NSA also engages in mass surveillance programs like collecting cell phone metadata and infecting millions of devices with malware. While governments and businesses claim this data is used for security and research, it often leads to abuses of power over individuals. Strong privacy laws and oversight of data collection are needed to curb these threats and restore trust between technology and users.
Russia's Defense Technologies Newswire provides a daily feed in English summarizing Russia's defense industry, armed forces activities, military exports, expert opinions, and corporate news from defense enterprises. The feed includes up to 30 items per day covering topics like weapons development, military exercises, arms sales, and military-political events. It has been published online on weekdays since September 2015.
Snipers provide roof-top support for ground troops in Iraq while Marines clear houses to prevent attacks from behind. The U.S. Military also uses F-22s for air patrols, designs new stealth ships, and employs the latest F-35 aircraft as well as attack helicopters and tanks like the M1A1 that are capable of taking out large enemy forces. Aircraft carriers like the Nimitz class, the biggest in the world, carry advanced weapons and over 150 airplanes alongside an onboard "small army".
The document provides instruction on operating an AK-47 assault rifle. It discusses the history and development of the AK-47, safety procedures, parts of the rifle, and how to disassemble and assemble it. It also covers shooting fundamentals, including proper grip, stance, sight alignment, trigger squeeze, and readiness positions. The overall purpose is to teach students to safely handle, operate, and shoot the AK-47 rifle according to standard procedures.
The document discusses three modern main battle tanks:
The French Leclerc MBT utilizes advanced hybrid armor and active defensive systems.
The Merkava Mk4, produced by Israel, has been improved with new armor, gun, and electronics systems and can carry infantry soldiers or casualties in addition to its crew. Major contractors involved in its production include Elbit Systems, Israel Military Industries, and Urdan Industries.
The US M1A1/2 Abrams is manufactured by General Dynamics Land Systems and has been produced in several versions for the US Army as well as exported to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.
A Javelin missile was fired at a fully operational T72 tank. The missile hit the tank, damaging its road wheels, track, turret, gun and engine from 65 meters away. The engine at the front of the tank was also damaged by the impact of the missile.
Russia will supply 14 Yak-130 combat trainers to Bangladesh in 2015, fulfilling an existing contract. Belarus will receive 4 Yak-130s under a separate 2012 contract. The Russian defense company Irkut will deliver a total of 61 combat aircraft and trainers in 2015, including Su-30SM and Yak-130 models. Russia is also upgrading several of its An-124 transport aircraft to extend their service life. Russian arms exports exceeded $15 billion in 2014 and are projected to remain at similar levels in 2015 despite Western sanctions.
The document discusses various combat systems developed by Research and Production Corporation "Uralvagonzavod", including tanks, artillery systems, flamethrower systems, and combat engineer equipment. It provides details on the T-72, T-80U, T-90S, T-90S Modernized and BMPT tanks, as well as artillery systems such as the 2B25 mortar and D-30A howitzer. It also describes flamethrower systems like the TOS-1A and combat engineer vehicles IMR-2MA and BMR-3M.
This document discusses electronic warfare and is divided into three main sections: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. Electronic attack involves jamming, deception, and destructive techniques to interfere with an enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Electronic protection techniques are used to protect friendly forces from electronic attack. Electronic warfare support passively detects and analyzes emissions to gather intelligence and provide situational awareness. Specific electronic warfare systems and techniques discussed include jamming, chaff, flares, anti-radiation missiles, frequency hopping, and ELINT/COMINT collection.
This document provides an overview of Russia's theory and practice of information warfare. It discusses how Russia has developed its information warfare theory in opposition to Western concepts, drawing on Soviet-era psychological warfare techniques. It also examines the role of Russian geopolitical schools in popularizing and participating in information warfare. The document analyzes how Russia employed extensive propaganda in its recent operations related to Ukraine and Crimea to influence domestic and international public opinion.
Analysis for Radar and Electronic WarfareReza Taryghat
This document discusses techniques for measuring pulsed RF signals used in radar and electronic warfare applications. It begins with an overview of common radar applications and measurement types. It then discusses tools for measuring pulse parameters like pulse width, repetition interval, and power. These tools include power meters, oscilloscopes, spectrum analyzers, and specialized pulse analyzers. It also covers vector signal analysis and its ability to analyze modulation embedded on pulses. The rest of the document provides examples of measuring pulses with these various tools and techniques like pulse building, frequency hopping analysis, and analyzing LFM chirps.
Aviation History & How an Aircraft fliesshankar11122
The document provides an introduction to aviation history and aeronautics. It discusses key figures and inventions in the development of flight such as the Wright Brothers' first powered flight in 1903. The document also covers aerodynamic principles such as lift, drag, angle of attack and stall. It describes aircraft parts including wings, engines, tail and control surfaces such as ailerons, elevators and rudder. Finally, it discusses different types of aircraft including variations in speed from subsonic to hypersonic flight.
A massive computer worm called Stuxnet targeted Iran's nuclear facilities and spread globally. Stuxnet code samples have raised concerns it could be used to target other countries' critical infrastructure systems. The sophisticated Stuxnet code has reportedly been offered for sale on underground forums, potentially enabling cyber terrorists to adapt it for disruptive purposes. A major global cyber espionage operation dubbed "Operation Shady RAT" targeted over 70 organizations for years and is believed to have been masterminded by China to steal military, economic and diplomatic secrets.
Surveillance of communication by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA)Klamberg
The document summarizes legislation passed in Sweden in 2008 that allows the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA) to conduct surveillance of communications. Key points include:
- Telecom operators must transfer all international communications to nodes controlled by FRA for signal intelligence collection.
- FRA is authorized to intercept communications and collect data to monitor external threats like terrorism and weapons proliferation.
- FRA shares information with government agencies and may partner with intelligence organizations in other countries like the NSA and GCHQ.
- A defense intelligence court and committee provide oversight of FRA's activities and access to databases of communications metadata.
Information Sharing, Dot Connecting and Intelligence Failures.docxannettsparrow
Information Sharing, Dot Connecting and Intelligence Failures:
Revisiting Conventional Wisdom
By
Russell Travers
Deputy Director, Information Sharing and Knowledge Development
National Counterterrorism Center
This paper, written in August 2009, was submitted to the Director of National Intelligence
2009 Galileo Awards Program. The Galileo Awards Program is an annual Intelligence
Community-wide competition designed to encourage and recognize innovative workforce
ideas that address current challenges and help shape the future of U.S. Intelligence.
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not
reflect the official positions or views of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) or
any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as
implying U.S. Government or NCTC endorsement of the author’s views. This material has
been reviewed to prevent the disclosure of classified information.
The year is 2014. The Intelligence Community is ten years into its efforts to
implement the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). While
change has been evident on many fronts, nothing was more closely identified with
intelligence reform than information sharing; ever since the 9/11 Commission
declared that “the biggest impediment to all-source analysis – to a greater
likelihood of connecting the dots – is the human or systemic resistance to sharing
information”1, the two had been inextricably linked. And while we were pushing
more electrons than ever before, dissatisfaction continued: in 2014, as in 2009,
no analyst in the IC had effective access to all information; analysts in many parts
of the Community complained that they couldn’t get operational traffic or law
enforcement information; we had little ability to do large scale processing of
foreign and domestic data sets; our non Federal partners were still dissatisfied
with the quality of information sharing. A dizzying array of directives had been
issued. Arbitration procedures had been established. And yet organizations
weren’t getting the information they claimed to “need.” Legitimate issues
coexisted with tripe. According to the critics, we still couldn’t connect those dots.
The reality, however, was far more complex: the only question was whether it
took a major intelligence failure to realize that fact.
This is the path we’re on. We will continue to hear claims that information sharing has
“barely improved since 9/11.” Such hyperbole is unmitigated nonsense. The robust sharing of
information between and among the key organizations has undoubtedly contributed to the fact
that we haven’t suffered a major attack. And by any objective standard, the level of sharing
1 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States; U.S. Government Print.
Surveillance of communication by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA)Klamberg
The document summarizes Sweden's legislation authorizing surveillance of communications by the National Defence Radio Establishment (FRA). It discusses how the law requires telecom operators to transfer all international communications to FRA nodes for intercept. FRA can then intercept communications and collect data for signal intelligence purposes. The document also reviews similar intelligence laws and programs in other countries like the US, UK, France and Germany.
Electronic Surveillance of Communications 100225Klamberg
The document discusses electronic surveillance of communications and legislation around signal intelligence. It provides context on changes in technology and threats that created demands for new legislation. It describes how signal intelligence works, including intercepting messages and metadata, as well as traffic analysis and social network analysis. Legislation in Sweden and other countries regulates agencies conducting signal intelligence and their mandates, clients, and oversight. Key aspects of Swedish law include the Defence Radio Establishment's mandate for surveillance, its clients and review mechanisms, methods like traffic analysis, and the scope of interception and data collection.
250 words agree or disagreeFusion CentersFollowing the 91.docxvickeryr87
250 words agree or disagree
Fusion Centers
Following the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent reform of the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies, the Department of Homeland Security created fusion centers throughout the country in order to facilitate information sharing for tribal, local, state, and federal government agencies (Khan, 2012). According to Khan (2012), the centers “have ‘not produced useful intelligence to support federal counterterrorism efforts’ and have ‘too often wasted money and stepped on American civil liberties’” (Khan, 2012). However, these figures and statements should be corroborated with the multiple intelligence overseeing committees within the Senate and Congress to inform the public of the real information at hand. Yet, Senator Levin states that these centers “’may provide valuable services in fields other than terrorism’ like criminal investigations, public safety or disaster response” (Khan, 2012). Overall, these centers have access to classified information and when other analysts upload their products and reports in SIPR and JWICS systems, then it enables others to search through these products through Intelink.com on the classified systems.
Intelligence Reform
The National Security Act of 1947 established different agencies and positions regarding the military and intelligence community. Throughout the years, different policies and laws have been enacted to ensure that intelligence agencies follow established procedures and all laws so they do not run into issues or violate these laws. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was signed and “is the most recent legislative action to reform the community’s performance and management. While the IRTPA has contributed to intelligence improvements, such as increased sharing of data on terrorism, most in and around the intelligence community would assert that managing the intelligence enterprise is still a work in progress” (Strickland & Whitlock, 2012). National intelligence managers were created in order to facilitate integration of “intelligence strategies that support national security outcomes” (Strickland & Whitlock, 2012). Another significant change is that the person holding the position of the Director of National Intelligence keep an important relationship with the President due to the President being a consumer of intelligence (Strickland & Whitlock, 2012).
Three Philosophical Lessons
There are 3 philosophical lessons concerning intelligence that include Simpson’s Paradox, Skyrms’ Resiliency Theory, and Casual Inference. Simpson’s Paradox “has immediate consequences for the development of optimal strategies for the sharing of data, and for the targeted deployment of intelligence-gathering resources” (Mole, 2012). Overall, it is best to share the data different entities have to be able to better plan and coordinate efforts to where it is most likely to get the best out of. Skyrms’ Resiliency Theory d.
This document discusses several challenges facing signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection systems, including rapid changes in technology, the vast quantity of data collected, the need for skilled linguists, and issues around ethics, privacy, information sharing, and politicization of intelligence. Some of the key challenges mentioned are the rise of encryption tools, social media monitoring, maintaining foreign language capabilities, and balancing national security needs with privacy concerns.
Privacy is being threatened by new technologies that collect and track personal data. Companies are developing facial recognition in phones and cameras, location tracking in vehicles, and smart home meters. The NSA also engages in mass surveillance programs like collecting cell phone metadata and infecting millions of devices with malware. While governments and businesses claim this data is used for security and research, it often leads to abuses of power over individuals. Strong privacy laws and oversight of data collection are needed to curb these threats and restore trust between technology and users.
This document summarizes the history and evolution of government surveillance and data collection programs related to counterterrorism efforts since the 1960s. It discusses early programs like COINTELPRO and the development of enabling technologies like databases, data mining, and facial recognition. It then outlines several post-9/11 US government programs aimed at identifying terrorists, the privacy and legal concerns they raised, and reasons for the cancellation of some programs.
China has developed extensive cyber warfare capabilities since the mid-1990s. They have intelligence and military organizations dedicated to cyber warfare and conduct frequent exercises. These capabilities include penetrating other networks and planting viruses. However, China's own networks remain vulnerable. As a result, China has adopted a pre-emptive cyber strategy of unleashing its capabilities at the start of potential conflicts to disrupt enemy systems, though these are still relatively unsophisticated. It is difficult to attribute many Chinese cyber activities to official agencies due to use of private actors.
On How the Darknet and its Access to SCADA is a Threat to National Critical I...Matthew Kurnava
This document analyzes how the darknet poses a threat to national critical infrastructure. It begins with an introduction that defines the darknet and describes some of the illegal activities that occur there. The research question asks how the darknet threatens critical infrastructure and how vulnerable different sectors are. The hypothesis is that the darknet poses a primary threat to US cyber critical infrastructure due to criminal, hacktivist, and terrorist use that could significantly damage health and welfare. A literature review discusses research on darknet cyber attacks, hacktivist and terrorist groups using the darknet, and critical infrastructure's growing dependency on technology and vulnerability. The methodology will use an analytical approach to examine threats to each of the 16 US critical infrastructure sectors.
This paper aims to develop a methodology for investigating the impact of surveillance technologies on privacy by viewing security and privacy as economic goods. The paper draws on concepts from macroeconomics to propose this methodology. It applies Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety to conclude that current surveillance policies will not achieve their intended goal of full protection and will instead erode individual privacy over time. The paper suggests an alternative strategic decision-making approach could help balance surveillance and privacy in a more effective manner.
This document discusses the concepts of cyberwar and netwar as outlined in a 1993 paper by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. It provides an updated definition of netwar as the intentional activities to influence human perception through overt or hidden channels in order to facilitate changes that benefit the actor. The document examines netwar concepts from Russian and Chinese perspectives, including information-psychological operations, united front theory, and legal warfare. It concludes by suggesting cyber defense organizations may need to adapt to counter modern forms of netwar.
This document discusses the concepts of cyberwar and netwar as outlined in a 1993 paper by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. It provides an updated definition of netwar as the intentional activities to influence human perception through overt or hidden channels in order to facilitate changes that benefit the actor. The document examines netwar concepts from Russian and Chinese perspectives, including information-psychological operations, united front theory, and legal warfare. It concludes by suggesting cyber defense organizations may need to adapt to counter modern forms of netwar.
Challenges from the Cyber Domain: Cyber Security and Human RightsAdam David Brown
This paper explores the key tensions between human rights and state-implemented cyber security. It examines three key tensions, attribution versus anonymity, international norms and cyber war.
This document provides guidance for organizations on implementing video surveillance systems in accordance with privacy laws. It discusses factors to consider such as justifying the need for surveillance, minimizing privacy intrusion, developing policies around equipment use and data handling, and consulting stakeholders. Guidelines are provided around designing systems to only collect necessary information for legitimate public safety purposes.
Information Gathering in Intelligence AgenciesNora A. Rahim
Information gathering and sharing between agencies is critical for preventing threats like terrorism, yet involvement of classified information makes studying the relationship between information science and intelligence work difficult. The document discusses the differences between information and intelligence, the intelligence cycle of collecting, analyzing and using information to produce finished intelligence for policymakers, and various types of intelligence including current, estimative, warning, research, and scientific/technical intelligence. It concludes by recommending better information retrieval and an understanding of information science to provide timely intelligence while reducing pressure on analysts.
1. NSA'S ECHELON PROGRAM
This article traces the historical
development of the NSA ECHELON
program. Aspects include non-
classified information on how
ECHELON works as well as the
impact seen today from the system
NSA's ECHELON
Program
INTL621 – M.A. Intelligence Studies
Mark Raduenzel – INTL647 Dec. 2014
2. NSA'S ECHELON PROGRAM
MARK RADUENZEL – INTL647 DEC. 2014 1
Introduction
The ECHELON program created by the National Security Agency (NSA) was first revealed in a New
Statesman article on August 12, 1988 by British investigative reporter Duncan Campbell, a former
employee at the United Kingdom’s main listening station at Menwith Hill (Dover 2014, 127). Even at that
time, it was clear ECHELON was a mature system which may have already existed for at least a decade, if
not longer. In 1996, Nicky Hager provided a more detailed description in his book, Secret Power: New
Zealand’s Role in the International Spy Network, shining a spotlight on this highly classified and
controversial system (Richelson 2000, 49). Both authors wrote in detail regarding ECHELON’s
interception of telecommunications traffic all across the globe by the UKUSA (United States, Great
Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) alliance.
Political controversy soon followed, especially in Europe. According to Richelson, fear of monitoring by
the government led to a January 1998 report for the European Parliament in which an Appraisal of
Technologies of Political Control committee, claimed "within Europe, all e-mail, telephone, and fax
communications are routinely intercepted by the United States National Security Agency, transferring all
target information from the European mainland ... to Fort Meade in Maryland” (Richelson 2000, 47).
This public suspicion of government surveillance continues to this day. But what exactly is ECHELON and
what is it capable of?
History
The original design and specific capabilities of ECHELON are still classified, making research difficult but
not impossible. We can surmise that ECHELON originated in computerized processing and network
technologies from the 1970s. SIGINT systems which were created and implemented during the Cold War
tended to be geared towards intercepting diplomatic, espionage or military communications. ECHELON,
3. NSA'S ECHELON PROGRAM
MARK RADUENZEL – INTL647 DEC. 2014 2
on the other hand, was specifically designed for monitoring almost all electronic communications within
both public and private sectors across the globe (Rudner 2001, 111).
To make this capacity possible, the United States has placed a variety of geosynchronous, elliptically and
low-earth satellites into orbit which catch electronic communications, missile telemetry and emanations
from radar. Distributed ground stations in Britain, Germany, Australia and Colorado control the satellites
and receive the signals intercepted from the satellites (Richelson 2000, 48). These satellites are
maintained by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and work in concert with other
telecommunication links which “can be used to siphon off messages travelling by satellite, microwave
relay link or fibre optic cable, if they intercept such streams at a key node, and can work at a prodigious
rate of more than 2 million intercepts per hour” (Wright 2005, 199). With this infrastructure in place, it
is possible to intercept the vast majority of all electronic telecommunications including phone, fax and
emails practically anywhere around the world.
ECHELON is so extensive and intrusive that it does not discriminate which communications are siphoned
up. Instead, its design allows the UKUSA Signals Intelligence alliance (made up of the United States,
Great Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand) to use the system to intercept both military and non-
military government communications and private sector organizations and businesses. The UKUSA
nations designate which items are of intelligence value by providing selected keywords to monitor for
(Richelson 2000, 47). As we shall see, this keyword identification functionality is fundamental to how the
system operates.
The ECHELON system links an array of large-scale computer processing capabilities which enables the
various intercept sites to function as a single integrated SIGINT network. By sorting through vast flows of
telecommunications traffic, the interception and processing technologies identify specifically targeted
messaging. A messages is specifically identified as an item of interest through the use of ‘Dictionary’
computers. On each of these computers is stored a comprehensive database which contains designated
4. NSA'S ECHELON PROGRAM
MARK RADUENZEL – INTL647 DEC. 2014 3
targets, enumerated by explicit names, topics of interest, addresses, telephone numbers and other
factors necessary for target identification. The Dictionary computers are only kept at NSA SIGINT
interception facilities linked into the ECHELON system. (Rudner 2001, 111). At each interception facility,
the Dictionary computer contains not only the parent organization’s designated keywords, but also a list
of each cooperating SIGINT agency’s keywords. As the millions of intercepted messages are searched for
a keyword in the Dictionary, any match is then flagged as an item of interest and shipped off to the
computers of the requesting agency (Richelson 2000, 49).
Since there is not a system of accountability regarding ECHELON, it is extremely difficult to discover the
criteria used to determine who is or who is not a target. Certainly with the United States’ current focus
on terrorism, we can assume that much of the information gathered is about potential terrorists. In
addition to monitoring possible terrorists, Wright asserts “there is a lot of economic intelligence, notably
intensive monitoring of all countries participating in the GATT negotiations” (Wright 2005, 113).
Furthermore, intelligence-sharing arrangements increase the number of targets to include
“transnational targets of common interest: terrorism, proliferation, and organized crime” (Wippl 2012,
11). The targets can change as often as national security priorities change, made easier by the flexible
system design.
Issues
Does sifting through such a vast volume of collected data produce any valuable intelligence? While it
may be tempting to think it would be impossible to find something useful, former NSA Director William
Studeman noted in 1992 “one intelligence collection system alone can generate a million inputs per half
hour; filters throw away all but 6500 inputs; only 1,000 inputs meet forwarding criteria; 10 inputs are
normally selected by analysts and only one report is produced. These are routine statistics for a number
of intelligence collection and analysis systems which collect technical intelligence" (Dover 2014, 128).
5. NSA'S ECHELON PROGRAM
MARK RADUENZEL – INTL647 DEC. 2014 4
Even from the early days of the program, NSA seems equipped to produce intelligence from a massive
volume of data.
However, with the explosive growth of global telecommunications since 1992 analyzing the collected
data has become more challenging. Gill reports that twenty-two years later, in 2014, between 1 and 2
billion records a day are collected by the ECHELON system. The NSA and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI) claim the agency only touches “1.6% of internet traffic and that analysts
‘look at’ 0.00004%” (Gill 2014, 19). So, if we assume 2 billion records a day are collected by the system,
we can extrapolate that 1.6% of collected messages amounts to 32 million records which are actually
touched. However, out of the 32 million records, analysts will examine approximately 80,000, a
seemingly overwhelming task. It would appear that vacuuming up such a vast quantity of information
amounts to looking for a very small needle in a rather large haystack.
Perhaps due to the perception of information overload combined with the capability of collecting mass
amounts of data is why the ECHELON program came under fire for failing to prevent the terrorist attacks
in New York on September 11, 2001. Wright’s contention is that this highly invasive intelligence program
should only be able to justify its existence if it was able to detect and avert such atrocities (Wright 2005,
2014). In rebuttal to this assertion, however, Hughes-Wilson notes "the White House National
Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, Richard Clarke, had issued a warning of impending attack to all
agencies, and the National Security Agency (NSA) had collected clear intelligence from ECHELON (the
international electronic eavesdropping network) that the White House, Pentagon and WTC were Al-
Qa’ida targets" (Hughes-Wilson 2010, 67). This would indicate ECHELON had indeed done its part in
warning policy makers of this event.
ECHELON most likely paved the way for the proliferation of global SIGINT monitoring since now all
governments, except only the poorest, can take part in comprehensive surveillance of electronic
communications. The European Union has implemented its own signals intercept surveillance system
6. NSA'S ECHELON PROGRAM
MARK RADUENZEL – INTL647 DEC. 2014 5
named “Enfopol”. To give this surveillance system authority, the European Parliament passed the Legal
Intercept of Telecommunications Resolution in 1995. One key component of the Resolution was to
require satellite telephone operators to cooperate with European police forces in intercepting,
recording, and translating any electronic communication. Noticeably missing is language limiting the
collection to only communications within the European Union (Wettering 2001, 355). This places
Enfopol in the same league as the ECHELON program. France and Germany are known to have their own
SIGINT programs and intelligence sharing agreements on top of, and in addition to, the European Union
and Enfopol (Wettering 2001, 356).
The Federal Agency of Government Communications and Information (FAPSI) is Russia’s closest
equivalent to the United States’ National Security Agency. In addition to FAPSI, Russia’s external
intelligence service (SVR), internal security service (FSB) and the military intelligence service (GRU) all
intercept and monitor electronic communications (Wettering 2001, 356). Keenan claims the Soviet
Union also had a network similar to ECHELON, named “Dozor” (Keenan 2005, 42f). Most likely, Dozor is
still active and operates under the auspices of the FAPSI today.
Not to be outdone, the Third (Technical) Department of the People’s Liberation Army General Staff
operates China’s own signal intercept program. The Third Department maintains satellite
communication stations which intercept messages from Russian, as well as American, satellites. China’s
Ministry of Public Security (the police force) also actively monitors telecommunications (Wettering 2001,
356). This is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to global electronic surveillance systems, especially
considering that Great Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand all take part in the ECHELON system.
Even small countries like Myanmar and Thailand have a SIGINT system which monitors e-mail and phone
calls (Wettering 2001, 353). In fact, it is increasingly harder to find a government which does not have
the capability to monitor telecommunications.
7. NSA'S ECHELON PROGRAM
MARK RADUENZEL – INTL647 DEC. 2014 6
Any discussion of ECHELON’s impact on SIGINT operations today must include the recent revelations of
PRISM by Edward Snowden in June 2013. Although the PRISM program allegedly only collects metadata
which may be analyzed for targets which require closer scrutiny, the controversy regarding the program
is reminiscent of ECHELON (Dover 2014, 128). In what may have been the impetus for PRISM, Müller
informs us President George Bush “admitted that he had ordered the National Security Agency (NSA), in
the wake of the 11 September attacks, to ‘listen in’ on communications between the USA and abroad”
ostensibly to find and track terrorists (Müller 2009, 529). It is not difficult to see how, due to its similar
capabilities, ECHELON was most likely a precursor to the PRISM program.
The many examples of electronic surveillance by governments around the world have given rise to
privacy concerns amongst the general public and even paranoia in some cases. For example, “Josef
Tarkowski, former head of German counter-espionage, told the press he avoids using the phone because
he knows every word is listened to” by ECHELON monitoring sites (Wettering 2001, 353). This claim may
be dubious because of ECHELON’S dictionary design, but it does serve to show how ECHELON has
increased paranoia even in the highest levels of government. Even though much of the data collected by
ECHELON is not considered private and therefore is not legally protected, the public remains concerned
about being so closely monitored by the government. Krapp notes that activists have gone so far as to
coordinate a “Jam Echelon Day”, attempting to disrupt surveillance while alerting the public to its
presence by intentionally sending tens of thousands of communications with the word “terrorist” in the
message (Krapp 2005, 72). It may be amusing to note the keyword list is highly classified, so there is no
way to know if the word “terrorist” is in the list. Since terrorists most likely do not refer to themselves as
such in communications, “jihad” may have been a better word to use in order to produce the desired
result of jamming the system. At any rate, until such indiscriminate monitoring is stopped, the public will
remain concerned about the lack of privacy.
8. NSA'S ECHELON PROGRAM
MARK RADUENZEL – INTL647 DEC. 2014 7
Conclusion
It is believed that ECHELON originated in the computerized processing and network technologies from
the 1970s; however, because the program is still classified it is impossible to know for sure. But we do
know that with a constellation of satellites and an array of listening stations, ECHELON is able to collect
electronic communications all across the globe by examining the messages for specific keywords. These
computer processing capabilities function as a single SIGINT collection and processing network. Given
the massive volume of telecommunications traffic, only a mere fraction is able to be analyzed and
processed.
While it has been implied that ECHELON failed to prevent the terrorist attacks in New York on 9/11,
there are conflicting reports which show ECHELON did, in fact, provide some warning as to the attacks.
The implementation of ECHELON is most likely directly responsible for the proliferation of global SIGINT
monitoring of all nations big and small. The European Union has implemented a signals intercept
surveillance system as well as France, Germany, Russia, China and even smaller countries like Myanmar
and Thailand. ECHELON is also most likely a precursor to the PRISM program which was revealed by
Edward Snowden in 2013.
Debate continues to this day as to whether this indiscriminate data collection is legal and the general
public still remains concerned by the invasion of privacy these systems represent. It should be noted
that avoiding use of specific keywords and using coded words to communicate may be an effective
means of circumventing surveillance by systems similar to ECHELON. Encrypted communication is
another facet which will make monitoring by ECHELON more difficult to achieve. Given the proliferation
of these types of systems by governments around the world, it is apparent that global electronic
surveillance systems such as ECHELON are not going away any time soon. The general public will either
have to rise up against indiscriminate monitoring, or accept the loss of their privacy.
9. NSA'S ECHELON PROGRAM
MARK RADUENZEL – INTL647 DEC. 2014 8
References
Dover, Robert. 2014. The World's Second Oldest Profession: The Transatlantic Spying Scandal and its
Aftermath. The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 2:117-133.
Gill, Peter. 2014. Should the Intelligence Agencies 'Show More Leg' or Have They Just Been Stripped
Naked? Information & Security: An International Journal vol. 30:11-28.
Hughes-Wilson, John. 2010. New Intelligence Blunders? The RUSI Journal 155, no. 1:64-71.
Keenan, Kevin M. 2005. Invasion of privacy: a reference handbook. ABC-CLIO: Santa Barbara.
Müller, Vincent C. 2009. Would you mind being watched by machines? Privacy concerns in data
mining. AI & Society 23, no. 4:529-544.
Richelson, Jeffrey. 2000. Desperately seeking signals. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 56, no. 2: 47-51.
Rudner, Martin. 2001. Canada's Communications Security Establishment from Cold War to Globalization.
Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 1: 97-128.
Wettering, Frederick L. 2001. The Internet and the Spy Business. International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence 14, no. 3:342-365.
Wippl, Joseph W. 2012. Intelligence Exchange through InterIntel. International Journal of Intelligence
and Counterintelligence 25, no. 1:1-18.
Wright, Steve. 2005. The ECHELON Trail: An Illegal Vision. Surveillance & Society 3, no. 2/3: 198-215.