This document summarizes a presentation on changes and continuities in economic levers in Northern Ireland. It discusses how Northern Ireland has historically been the poorest UK region and relied heavily on the public sector. While more fiscal levers were introduced after 1945, their results were mixed in promoting economic progress. The 1920 Government of Ireland Act created powers for Northern Ireland's government, but in practice revenues often fell short of expenditures, limiting what could be done to stimulate the economy. Politics often took priority over efficiency concerns in areas like public spending. Continuing issues around low policy capacity and a reliance on public sector spending are also noted.
The Great Depression lasted from 1929 to 1939, and was the worst economic downturn in the history of the industrialized world. It began after the stock market crash of October 1929, which sent Wall Street into a panic and wiped out millions of investors.
Heritage Foundation has issued a set of five simple actions Congress must take in order to meet the electoral mandate of the American people. These five priorities represent the bare minimum of what is expected of our new representatives.
The Great Depression lasted from 1929 to 1939, and was the worst economic downturn in the history of the industrialized world. It began after the stock market crash of October 1929, which sent Wall Street into a panic and wiped out millions of investors.
Heritage Foundation has issued a set of five simple actions Congress must take in order to meet the electoral mandate of the American people. These five priorities represent the bare minimum of what is expected of our new representatives.
Chinese Economic Reform: Past, Present, Future by Prof. Lawrence LauCUHK Business School
Prof. Lawrence Lau is the former Vice-Chancellor of The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) and currently served as the Ralph and Claire Landau Professor of Economics at CUHK. He specialises in economic development, economic growth, and the economies of East Asia, including that of China. Prof. Lau has authored, co-authored, or edited seven books and published more than 190 articles and notes in international professional journals. On his recent publication The China-U.S. Trade War and Future Economic Relations, Prof. Lau will share his insights on the economic relationship between mainland China and the United States at the conference.
Prof. Lawrence Lau, Ralph and Claire Landau Professor of Economics, Lau Chor Tak Institute of Global Economics and Finance, CUHK
Action plan needed to avoid the economic and social debacle of brazil as a re...Fernando Alcoforado
To avoid the economic and social debacle in Brazil that will result from the measures adopted by the federal government, state governments and municipal governments aiming to combat the coronavirus, an action plan with economic and social measures should be developed to be adopted immediately during the economic depression that it will occur during the spread of the coronavirus, as well as economic measures to reactivate the Brazilian economy and social measures after the economic depression with the end of the spread of the coronavirus.
Bee Workshop, Contact Rosaline on 074 996 4255 or Russell on 083 997 4027
Book now to avoid disappointment...sample material of World Class Multi Media Workshop...great networking opportunities, great food and cut to the chase info on how B-BBEE can work for you!
Economics made Simple 2019 week 1 - Concepts and Irish Economic DevelopmentNevinInstitute
Dr Tom McDonnell, Senior Economist at the NERI presented at week 1 of the "Economics made Simple" series of Lectures in the Teacher's Club on Monday 21st October. The Lectures are run in conjunction with The People's College. Tom presented on "Concepts and Irish Economic Development".
Chinese Economic Reform: Past, Present, Future by Prof. Lawrence LauCUHK Business School
Prof. Lawrence Lau is the former Vice-Chancellor of The Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) and currently served as the Ralph and Claire Landau Professor of Economics at CUHK. He specialises in economic development, economic growth, and the economies of East Asia, including that of China. Prof. Lau has authored, co-authored, or edited seven books and published more than 190 articles and notes in international professional journals. On his recent publication The China-U.S. Trade War and Future Economic Relations, Prof. Lau will share his insights on the economic relationship between mainland China and the United States at the conference.
Prof. Lawrence Lau, Ralph and Claire Landau Professor of Economics, Lau Chor Tak Institute of Global Economics and Finance, CUHK
Action plan needed to avoid the economic and social debacle of brazil as a re...Fernando Alcoforado
To avoid the economic and social debacle in Brazil that will result from the measures adopted by the federal government, state governments and municipal governments aiming to combat the coronavirus, an action plan with economic and social measures should be developed to be adopted immediately during the economic depression that it will occur during the spread of the coronavirus, as well as economic measures to reactivate the Brazilian economy and social measures after the economic depression with the end of the spread of the coronavirus.
Bee Workshop, Contact Rosaline on 074 996 4255 or Russell on 083 997 4027
Book now to avoid disappointment...sample material of World Class Multi Media Workshop...great networking opportunities, great food and cut to the chase info on how B-BBEE can work for you!
Economics made Simple 2019 week 1 - Concepts and Irish Economic DevelopmentNevinInstitute
Dr Tom McDonnell, Senior Economist at the NERI presented at week 1 of the "Economics made Simple" series of Lectures in the Teacher's Club on Monday 21st October. The Lectures are run in conjunction with The People's College. Tom presented on "Concepts and Irish Economic Development".
Tips for making funding applications and an overview of some funders who provide grants in Northern Ireland - from NICVA's Members Day session on 1 November 212
Richard Woolhouse, Senior Economist at Centre for Cities, delivered this presentation at the West Midlands Regional Observatory's Annual Conference, 20th October 2009 in Sutton Coldfield, UK. Richard looks at the global recession, government debt, how the recession has impacted different cities and areas of the UK differently, and regional unemployment rates in the UK.
Whose Welfare State Now? - Adrian SinfieldOxfam GB
Professor Adrian Sinfield, Emeritus Professor of Social Policy at the University of Edinburgh, talks about the welfare state.
Stephen Boyd, Assistant Secretary of the Scottish Trade Unions Congress, talks about how the Scottish economy works.
The Whose Economy? seminars, organised by Oxfam Scotland and the University of the West of Scotland, brought together experts to look at recent changes in the Scottish economy and their impact on Scotland's most vulnerable communities.
Held over winter and spring 2010-11 in Edinburgh, Inverness, Glasgow and Stirling, the series posed the question of what economy is being created in Scotland and, specifically, for whom?
To find out more and view other Whose Economy? papers, presentations and videos visit:
http://www.oxfamblogs.org/ukpovertypost/whose-economy-seminar-series-winter-2010-spring-2011/
Click here to access the section of the Center for Democracy and T.docxmonicafrancis71118
Click here to access the section of the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) website devoted to health privacy. CDT is, by the way, a champion of online civil liberties and human rights and is dedicated to keeping the Internet open and free. Review the insights, posts, and press releases posted in CDT's health privacy section and respond to the following:
1
ECON3600
TOPIC 4 – 1929-1974: ‘New model’ economic development
The 1930s Depression
While one can play around with the figures, the magnitude of the Depression is
indicated in broad terms by the fact that, over the (relatively few) years during which
the Depression was at its most severe aggregate GDP declined, on average, by 3 per
cent per annum.
The total number of people that this had to be shared around (i.e. the total population)
grew at a markedly slower rate than had been the case in the previous decade, due
largely to an almost complete cessation of immigration and a fall in the birth rate – the
latter a reaction to economic circumstances. The population still grew, however, at
around 1 per cent per annum on average, with the result that economic growth
(defined in terms of GDP/head) declined at an average yearly rate, over the early
years of the 1930s, of 4 per cent. In the worst year of the Depression (1931) this
figure was around 10 per cent.
The very obvious manifestation of this decline was the rate of unemployment. The
level of unemployment rose markedly from about the middle of 1929 to reach a peak
of 30 per cent in the June quarter of 1932. In other words at this time nearly 1 in 3
people looking for employment was unable to find it.
Not surprisingly the economic downturn had a fundamental social effect. In personal
terms, for many people, it was a traumatic experience, in both a material and
emotional sense. For many the effects were prolonged, and for some stayed with
them, influencing their attitudes for the rest of their lives.
Causes of the Depression
As previously noted, by the closing years of the 1920s Australia was already on a
downhill path in terms of the major economic indicators. Old model economic
development, which had received a second wind, enabling the development of rural
industries that made even more intensive use of land, and which seemed to provide
the basis for the much-sought economic expansion and increase in population, was
running out of steam.
There is little doubt, however, that events in the rest of the world are the major
explanation for the Depression and certainly for its severity. As one economic
historian has put it ‘the primacy of external factors is not in doubt’.
The plunge into Depression by the United States in 1929, and the knock-on effects of
this in just about every major industrialised country (including Great Britain) had
some fundamental implications for the small Australian economy, heavily dependent
as it was on rural exports.
.
KCIs - EXAMPLE WILLIAM RICHMOND ‘old model’ econom.docxDIPESH30
KCIs - EXAMPLE
WILLIAM RICHMOND
‘old model’ economic development
The term has been used to describe Australian economic development (as measured by
the European yardstick of increases in GDP) up to the end of the 1920s. The central
characteristic of the period is that rural industries (i.e. those based on the use of land)
provided the main basis of economic development (i.e. increases in GDP). Three phases
of ‘old model’ have been identified: the first, until about 1860 when new land was being
brought into use; the second, until about 1890 when capital was being applied to land so
that land could be used more intensively for the grazing of sheep and the production of
wool; and the third, until the end of the 1920s when the more intensive use of land was
based on the ‘new rural industries, i.e. those involving the use of land for agriculture
rather than the grazing of sheep. It was the second of these phases that resulted in a rapid
increase in production) and a level of GDP per head considerably in excess of any other
comparable country.
trade protection
This term refers to a policy of protecting (or shielding) producers within an economy
from competition from overseas producers. In Australian economic history it refers
particularly to the protection of producers within the manufacturing sector, in order that
the Australian manufacturing sector could develop. The main instrument of the policy
was the tariff (in effect a tax on imports) which made overseas produced goods less
competitive relative to domestically produced goods. The policy was implemented in the
1920s when there were major increases in tariff levels, and in the context of the 1930s
Depression, this being one factor in the relatively rapid recovery from the Depression.
The policy continued to characterise the Australian economy in post-WWII decades. In
so far as trade protection resulted in the extensive development of industries that were
economically inefficient it has been held to be one of the main factors underlying the
poor economic performance of the Australian economy for most of the twentieth century.
the price of iron ore since the year 2000
The price of iron ore was approximately $12-$14 per tonne in the early 2000s then started
to increase sharply after 2004, reaching a peak of nearly $180 per tonne in 2011. After
this time it fell steadily to about $50 - $60 per tonne. The significance of this lies in the
fact that iron ore is the largest export commodity. There were major positive economic
effects through linkages to other industries, both through the expenditure of incomes
made by owners and employees and (‘backwards’) through the supply of inputs to
producers of iron ore. There was also large-scale investment associated with the
development of new mines and on infrastructure associated with mining projects. A
further effect was that the value of the Australian dollar (because ...
A presentation on charity fundraising through lotteries, public collections, fundraising events and trading. Presentation given at NICVA's Charity Finance Conference on 8 November 2016.
Charity Reserves: the good, the bad and the uglyNICVA
A presentation from Gemma Woodward, Executive Director and Director of Responsible Investment at Quilter Cheviot on charity reserves. Presentation given at NICVA's Charity Finance Conference for Trustees.
Financial governance and the role of the boardNICVA
A presentation from Peter McBride, CEO of Niamh and Charit of NICVA's Resources Committee on Financial governance and the role of the board. Presentation given at NICVA's Charity Finance Conference for Trustees on 8 November.
New charity accounting and reporting regulationsNICVA
Presentation from the Charity Commission for Northern Ireland on the charity accounting and reporting regulations for NI charities. Presentation given at NICVA's Charity Finance Conference for Trustees.
Fundraising regulator: A New System of Self-RegulationNICVA
A presentation from the Fundraising Regulator on their role as the new Fundraising Regulator: Upholding the Code of Fundraising Practice and implementing the Fundraising Preference Service.
Independent examination and the role of an independent examinerNICVA
A presentation from the Association of Charity Independent Examiners (ACIE) on what is involved in an independent examination and the role of the independent examiner.
how to swap pi coins to foreign currency withdrawable.DOT TECH
As of my last update, Pi is still in the testing phase and is not tradable on any exchanges.
However, Pi Network has announced plans to launch its Testnet and Mainnet in the future, which may include listing Pi on exchanges.
The current method for selling pi coins involves exchanging them with a pi vendor who purchases pi coins for investment reasons.
If you want to sell your pi coins, reach out to a pi vendor and sell them to anyone looking to sell pi coins from any country around the globe.
Below is the what'sapp information for my personal pi vendor.
+12349014282
where can I find a legit pi merchant onlineDOT TECH
Yes. This is very easy what you need is a recommendation from someone who has successfully traded pi coins before with a merchant.
Who is a pi merchant?
A pi merchant is someone who buys pi network coins and resell them to Investors looking forward to hold thousands of pi coins before the open mainnet.
I will leave the what'sapp contact of my personal pi merchant to trade with
+12349014282
how to sell pi coins in South Korea profitably.DOT TECH
Yes. You can sell your pi network coins in South Korea or any other country, by finding a verified pi merchant
What is a verified pi merchant?
Since pi network is not launched yet on any exchange, the only way you can sell pi coins is by selling to a verified pi merchant, and this is because pi network is not launched yet on any exchange and no pre-sale or ico offerings Is done on pi.
Since there is no pre-sale, the only way exchanges can get pi is by buying from miners. So a pi merchant facilitates these transactions by acting as a bridge for both transactions.
How can i find a pi vendor/merchant?
Well for those who haven't traded with a pi merchant or who don't already have one. I will leave the what'sapp number of my personal pi merchant who i trade pi with.
Message: +12349014282 VIA Whatsapp.
#pi #sell #nigeria #pinetwork #picoins #sellpi #Nigerian #tradepi #pinetworkcoins #sellmypi
when will pi network coin be available on crypto exchange.DOT TECH
There is no set date for when Pi coins will enter the market.
However, the developers are working hard to get them released as soon as possible.
Once they are available, users will be able to exchange other cryptocurrencies for Pi coins on designated exchanges.
But for now the only way to sell your pi coins is through verified pi vendor.
Here is the what'sapp contact of my personal pi vendor
+12349014282
Financial Assets: Debit vs Equity Securities.pptxWrito-Finance
financial assets represent claim for future benefit or cash. Financial assets are formed by establishing contracts between participants. These financial assets are used for collection of huge amounts of money for business purposes.
Two major Types: Debt Securities and Equity Securities.
Debt Securities are Also known as fixed-income securities or instruments. The type of assets is formed by establishing contracts between investor and issuer of the asset.
• The first type of Debit securities is BONDS. Bonds are issued by corporations and government (both local and national government).
• The second important type of Debit security is NOTES. Apart from similarities associated with notes and bonds, notes have shorter term maturity.
• The 3rd important type of Debit security is TRESURY BILLS. These securities have short-term ranging from three months, six months, and one year. Issuer of such securities are governments.
• Above discussed debit securities are mostly issued by governments and corporations. CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSITS CDs are issued by Banks and Financial Institutions. Risk factor associated with CDs gets reduced when issued by reputable institutions or Banks.
Following are the risk attached with debt securities: Credit risk, interest rate risk and currency risk
There are no fixed maturity dates in such securities, and asset’s value is determined by company’s performance. There are two major types of equity securities: common stock and preferred stock.
Common Stock: These are simple equity securities and bear no complexities which the preferred stock bears. Holders of such securities or instrument have the voting rights when it comes to select the company’s board of director or the business decisions to be made.
Preferred Stock: Preferred stocks are sometime referred to as hybrid securities, because it contains elements of both debit security and equity security. Preferred stock confers ownership rights to security holder that is why it is equity instrument
<a href="https://www.writofinance.com/equity-securities-features-types-risk/" >Equity securities </a> as a whole is used for capital funding for companies. Companies have multiple expenses to cover. Potential growth of company is required in competitive market. So, these securities are used for capital generation, and then uses it for company’s growth.
Concluding remarks
Both are employed in business. Businesses are often established through debit securities, then what is the need for equity securities. Companies have to cover multiple expenses and expansion of business. They can also use equity instruments for repayment of debits. So, there are multiple uses for securities. As an investor, you need tools for analysis. Investment decisions are made by carefully analyzing the market. For better analysis of the stock market, investors often employ financial analysis of companies.
STREETONOMICS: Exploring the Uncharted Territories of Informal Markets throug...sameer shah
Delve into the world of STREETONOMICS, where a team of 7 enthusiasts embarks on a journey to understand unorganized markets. By engaging with a coffee street vendor and crafting questionnaires, this project uncovers valuable insights into consumer behavior and market dynamics in informal settings."
BONKMILLON Unleashes Its Bonkers Potential on Solana.pdfcoingabbar
Introducing BONKMILLON - The Most Bonkers Meme Coin Yet
Let's be real for a second – the world of meme coins can feel like a bit of a circus at times. Every other day, there's a new token promising to take you "to the moon" or offering some groundbreaking utility that'll change the game forever. But how many of them actually deliver on that hype?
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024 - Ricerca sulle Startup e il Sistema dell'Innov...Quotidiano Piemontese
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024
Una ricerca de il Club degli Investitori, in collaborazione con ToTeM Torino Tech Map e con il supporto della ESCP Business School e di Growth Capital
Turin Startup Ecosystem 2024 - Ricerca sulle Startup e il Sistema dell'Innov...
Nicva economic levers presentation september 2011
1. Avoiding “Icebergs”: Changes and Continuities in Economic Levers NICVA “Masterclass” September 16th 2011 Dr Graham Brownlow (QUMS) graham.brownlow@qub.ac.uk
2. “There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order...”. Niccolo Machiavelli
3. IREP (2009) The 2009 report followed on from previous work. It identified a range of problems with Invest NI including: Poor productivity Over-reliance on subsidy (against backdrop of fall) Poor performance of Invest NI: not enough jobs created Poor performance of Invest NI: job quality not enough in those created Poor performance of Invest NI: 50% additionality
4. N. Ireland Here and Now (EAG, 2011) 3,000 jobs lost since 2008 (i.e. 2011 = 2005 levels). 150% increase in claimant count 2007-11. One in five (23%) working age adults have no qualifications which is nearly twice UK average rate (12%). Competitiveness has improved, but much more work needed.
5. The Institutional-Economic Situation 1 (Heald, 2003) Much of what was written in 2003 (and indeed earlier) remains the case as of 2011: Low policy capacity in 1999 not reversed? (Heald, 2003, p.75) -> CSR 2010? Populism/spending as a shared political ideology?-> CSR 2010? Path Dependence in Civil Service incentives after 1972 -> Emulation and/or “Green Book” Evaluation? Absence of Think Tanks ->EAG?
6.
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9. Some Headline Findings on Levers, Rebalancing and Rebuilding 2 After 1945, a range of fiscal levers unique to NI (or significantly modified) were developed; The record of these fiscal mechanisms was (for a number of reasons) decidedly mixed; HMT by 1964 was considering a new fiscal settlement, but this was never implemented; Hence civil unrest made an already difficult situation worse and postponed the development of levers that would promote economic progress.
10. Presentation Structure Some Empirical Evidence on the Long-Run Picture. Levers in the 1920 Act: a case of theory and practice. Some “Icebergs” from Outside: Depression, War and the Ratchet Effect. Some “Icebergs” from Inside: Civil Unrest and Levers. Q&A
11. Presentation Structure Some Empirical Evidence on the Long-Run Picture. Levers in the 1920 Act: a case of theory and practice. Some “Icebergs”: from Outside: Depression, War and the Ratchet Effect. Some “Icebergs”: from Inside: Civil Unrest and Levers. Q&A
12. Figure 1: Growth in per capita GDP since 1954: NI, SW, Wa and Sc
13. Figure 2: Net Output Per Head, 1912-92 (NI/GB, GB =100) (Birnie and Hitchens, 1999, p.34).
14. Table 1: Unemployment as a Proportion of the Civil Labour Force (expressed a multiple of the average UK ratio) Notes: Derived from British labour Statistics, 1886-1968 and later editions of the Department of Employment Gazette. Source: Simpson (1983, p. 82).
15. Table 2: Average Annual Percentage Increases in GDP (at constant prices) Notes: (a) 1958-62 for Northern Ireland Source: McClements (1981, p. 103).
16. Overall Lessons From Empirical “Time Travelling” A number of general points can be made about the long-run story of levers under Stormont (1920-72): NI was consistently the poorest UK region unclear if this was in spite of or because of devolution. Different answers pre and post 1945. Pre 1945 few levers at Stormont’s disposal; Post 1945 (especially post 1958/63) more effort/inputs; Mixed results in terms of efficiency.
17. The 1920 settlement 1 The 1920 Act was drafted for both Irish parliaments, but after the Treaty it was only implemented in NI (Green, 1979). The Act created three main categories: Imperial (aka excepted) services: Irish Parliaments had no authority (e.g. Making peace or war, foreign trade, trademarks and copyright etc) (public goods?); Reserved services: powers reserved to UK; Transferred services: powers transferred in theory to two Irish Parliaments.
18. The 1920 settlement 2 Green (1979) has noted that in theory NI was to have a balanced budget the idea being that revenue would first be applied to an Imperial Contribution, then to the cost of reserved services and only after this transferred services. In addition, after this was supposed to be paid a residuary share. JEB would decide the size of Imperial Contribution.
19. Reserved Services Reserved services included Post Office, Archives (though creation of PRONI not precluded), land purchases, policing (initially). Irish Parliaments lacked control over the scale or form but had to meet their costs. The rationale for what was reserved was ‘political’ rather than ‘economic’ (Gibson, 1996, p.16).
20. Transferred Services This was a residual category (i.e. What wasn’t excepted or reserved was transferred). It covered services in relation to agriculture, industry and commerce, employment and unemployment, insurance and pensions, health, housing, local government, education and law and order (police initially Supreme Court excepted). Not Public Goods (as excludable) but mixed goods/private goods.
21. Tax Assignment 1 Westminster retained power to levy existing taxes. This covered reserved taxation e.g: Income Tax Customs and Excise Duties Profit/corporate taxes Initially the Act (s.36) suggested Customs and Excises might be decided by an all-Ireland Parliament, but creation of Irish Free State made this redundant.
22. Tax Assignment 2 The co-existence of a land border with a lack of customs harmonization/co-operation -> inefficiencies. Corporation taxes levied at UK level: “Because of capital mobility, and the likelihood of competitive bidding between jurisdictions, efficient resource allocation suggests this [corporation tax responsibility] should fall to central government, as under the 1920 Act” (Gibson, 1996, p.20).
23. Transferred Taxation Examples of these transferred (devolved) under 1920 Act: Death duties; Stamp duties; Entertainment duties; Motor vehicle duties etc In theory the 1920 Act legally allowed to diverge, but in practice free trade in goods and need for harmonization: ‘...the desire to avoid friction, impels Ulster towards uniformity. Higher rates of tax in Northern Ireland could be partly avoided by transferring movable assets and activities to Great Britain, while lower rates could have the opposite effect’ (Lawrence, 1965, p.89).
24. Joint Exchequer Board (JEB) JEB was: Established under the 1920 Act; It was given the power to resolve operational and related fiscal/financial questions; It would decide the cost of a reserved service, suitability of a new tax. Three members one NI, one HMT, one Crown. Activities not made public.
25. Imperial Contribution Imperial Contribution always positive. However, most of the time this was due to accounting rather than economic outcome. Green notes that it was ‘genuinely positive’ in WW2 £36m in 1944-45, but slipped back post-war. Post 1945 further adjustments.
26. Equalization The Act did not discuss the adequacy of funding. Hence there is no discussion on bringing services into line with GB. In the context of NI issue of emigration/sectarian balance linked to public services (Gibson, 1996, p.27).
27. A Weak Start 1 NI government was financially in trouble from June 1921 as unemployment ↑ -> revenues ↓, expenditures ↑ Unemployment growth due to recession and decline of the staples (Johnson, 1985; 1989). ‘political imperative’ to pay benefits at GB levels (Green, 1979, p.6).
28. A Weak Start 2 NI government lobbied for equal ‘in step’ treatment. Deficits initially met by borrowing (deficit on the Unemployment Fund of £3.6m in 1925). A new settlement was negotiated on social services and this was based on the ratio of insured populations.
29. Could They Have Done Better? “Could the province’s government have done more to persuade business to come to the province? This is doubtful. The Stormont administration perpetually teetered on the edge of financial insolvency [between 1921 and 1939]...Under the impressive sounding New Industries (Development) Acts of 1932 and 1937, with the exception of Short and Harland whose establishment in the province had very little to do with the government, only 279 jobs were created” (Johnson, 1989, p.35).
30. NI Slips Behind School expenditure in NI lagged GB (Green ,1979). Human capital legacy? Backwardness in housing, social services, hospitals, water and sewage etc. Agriculture an exception (politics?).
31. NI Public Expenditure By 1939 total expenditure was £11.5m. £7m on unemployment benefits, pensions and deratings etc only £2m on total education. Imperial Contribution payments made despite 20% unemployment.
32. Equity Trumps Efficiency “Government [in Northern Ireland] ...seemed more preoccupied with constitutional and equity aspects of cash social services than their consequences for economic efficiency and local economic activity” (Gibson, 1996, p.31). Westminster worried that cutting NI benefits (below GB levels) would lead to emigration to GB.
33. And Politics Trumps Equity... Public expenditure growth no longer linked to GB (pari pasu/in step) abandoned. As rates after 1934 made to pay for education (previously had been London). Token ‘Imperial Contribution’ paid and rates↑! Green argues that the damage done to the region’s ‘social capital’ lasted until the early 1960s and by 1979 he stated that ‘the effect on housing has never been overcome’ (p.8).
34. Simon Declaration 1 Named after the Chancellor this 1938 announcement made the UK exchequer foot the bill for agriculture and social services. Followed end of the ‘economic war’. Agricultural subsidies though a transferred service Charged to Whitehall.
35. Simon Declaration 2 Social service based more on needs than revenue. Consequently, this and other changes, stopped the Imperial Contribution being first claim on revenue. Little scope in the economic circumstances for greater autonomy (Johnson, 1985; Gibson, 1996).
36. WW2 as a Ratchet Effect The war demonstrated NI lagged in terms of housing, child welfare and TB prevention. Leeway was added to parity (i.e. Catch up expenditure allowed) as a principle. JEB formalised ‘leeway’ in 1954. This lasted until 1972.
37. The Development of an Expenditure Based System (1950-1972) 1 After the war NI saw leeway ensure the steady equalisation of public services and social standards as between NI and GB. By 1969-70 on one measure NI public expenditure per head was £284, higher than Wales though lower than Scotland (£339).
40. The Development of an Expenditure Based System (1950-1972) 2 In theory (as 1920 Act) NI had a revenue based system. In reality NI had an expenditure based system (Green, 1979, p.17; Gibson, 1996, p.65). “The principal criterion [in determining public expenditure after 1945] was whether a particular development was justified in itself, rather than the pressure exerted by the notional idea of balanced Northern Ireland budget” (Green, 1979, p.17).
41. Leeway in Action Examples of public expenditure growth (an input) 1945-63 (Green, 1979, p.15): Education (x3) Health and Welfare (x nearly3) Industrial promotion expenditure (x5) But in terms of efficiency (i.e. allowing for the relationship between inputs and outputs) we should be more careful (Brownlow, 2007).
42. A Greater Awareness of Economic Backwardness? After Isles and Cuthbert (1957) a range of reports produced considering the economic backwardness of NI (Birnie and Hitchens, 2001): Hall (1962) Matthew (1963) Wilson (1965) Matthew, Wilson and Parkinson (1970) But political interference was ever present (Gibson, 1996; Brownlow, 2002).
43. Green’s Assessment of Devolution, 1920-72 “...there were few Stormont policy initiatives that were genuinely innovative, and cost money. One thinks of incentives to industrialists or the problems of specific major firms. But normally Northern Ireland programmes involved spending more on what was already conventional: more secondary modern schools, for instance, rather than a decision to go comprehensive in advance of Great Britain. Northern Ireland was perpetually adapting policies which had some years earlier been adopted in Great Britain.” (Green, 1979, p.17).
44. But... Since 1979 a lot of archival material released and it would suggest that more innovative pressures did exist than Green would claim (Brownlow, 2002). Concentrated benefits/diffused crucial (as in public choice) -> scope for rent-seeking↑ E.g. “linen lobby” (Brownlow, 2007). HMT was increasingly fed up with NI’s public finance problems and reform was mooted in 1960s.
46. Estimating the Gap The gap shows the% reduction in GDP associated with violence. The results indicate a “V shape” (i.e. the gap ↑ then ↓) Early troubles 5% followed by recovery. 1975 onwards the gap ↑ steadily. Gap gains size and gathers pace 1985-90 peaks at 10%. Thereafter gap closes rapidly.
47. Figure 4: The estimated per capita GDP gap as a percentage
48. Some Tentative Points While violence did impact the economy it did simply do so in a I↓ way. The discrepancy between GDP gap and violence. provides clues. Delay of Thatcher reforms in NI. Public spending growth accelerated/displacement.
49. Calman (2009) Independent Expert Group downplayed it because of profit-shifting. They also noted that tax competition and compliance costs an issue (IEG, 2009, p.12). Corporation Tax ↓ -> (because of ECJ Azores ruling) -> block grant↓ Corporation Tax 1
50. Corporation Tax 2 Varney (2007, p.4, 46) was sceptical £300m ‘up front cost’ in terms of lost receipts and compliance costs. ERG NI (2010) far more supportive, but ERG uses a long range of assumptions (pp.50-62). Compliance costs etc not developed in this analysis. Assuming zero displacement/profit shifting (ERG NI, 2010, p.37) alone makes a difference.
52. Corporation Tax 3 PWC (2010c) driver is unemployment rather than a commitment to fiscal federalism. No “silver bullet” : 1958 and all that. PwC have suggested that headline tax parity with ROI is not necessary, but that matching the IDA focus on R&D and intellectual property is (PWC, 2010a, p.9). Similar to IREP approach.
53. References 1 Birnie, E. and D. Hitchens (1999), Northern Ireland Economy: Performance, Prospects, Policy (Aldershot, Ashgate,). Birnie, E. and D. Hitchens (2001), ‘Chasing the Wind? Half a Century of Economic Strategy Documents in Northern Ireland’, Irish Political Studies, Vol.16, pp.1-27. Brownlow, G. (2002), 'Institutional Change and the Two Irelands 1945-1990: an application of North's institutional economics‘ (Unpublished PhD thesis, Queen’s University Belfast, 2002). Brownlow, G. (2007), ‘The Causes and Consequences of Rent-Seeking in Northern Ireland’, Economic History Review, Vol. 60, pp.70-96. Economic Advisory Group, Annual Report, August 2011.
54. References 2 Gibson, N. (1996), ‘Northern Ireland and Westminster: Fiscal Decentralisation. A Public Economics Perspective’, in NIEC, Decentralised Government and Economic Performance in Northern Ireland (Belfast, NIEC), pp.10-90. Green, A.J. (1979), ‘Devolution and Public Finance: Stormont from 1921 to 1972’, Studies in Public Policy, No.48 (Glasgow, University of Strathclyde). Harris, R.I.D.(1991), Regional Economic Policy in Northern Ireland, 1945-1988 (Aldershot, Avebury). Johnson, D.S. (1985), ‘The Northern Ireland Economy, 1914-39’ in L. Kennedy and P. Ollerenshaw (eds.) An Economic History of Ulster, 1820-1940 (Manchester, Manchester University Press).
55. References 3 Johnson, D.S. (1989), The Interwar Economy in Ireland (Dublin, The Economic and Social History Society of Ireland). Lawrence, R.J. (1965), The Government of Northern Ireland: Public Finance and Public Services 1921-1964 (Oxford, Oxford University Press). McClements, L. (1981), Economic constraints’, in D. Watt, ed., The constitution of Northern Ireland: problems and prospects (London , Heinemann, 1981). Simpson, J. (1983), ‘Economic Development: Cause or Effect in the Northern Ireland Conflict’ in J. Darby ed., Northern Ireland: the Background to the Conflict (Belfast, Appletree Press).