This document provides information about an upcoming course on commons research. It lists the class schedule, locations, and topics that will be covered. Requirements for the course include attending lectures, completing readings and summaries, writing a short essay on a commons-related topic, and participating in seminar discussions. The document provides guidance on assignments and access to course materials through the instructor's website. It also outlines the institutional, physical, educational, cultural and communicative contexts in which the commons aspects of the university environment will be examined.

1. Juhana
Venäläinen
Researcher,
PhD
Student
University
of
Eastern
Finland
School
of
Humanities
juhana.venalainen@uef.fi
5516126
New
Commons
/
Juhana
Venäläinen
/
University
of
Eastern
Finland
/
Spring
2013

2. ¡ Mon
28
January,
12–14
@
M102:
Introduction
to
commons
research
¡ Wed
30
January,
14–16
@
M103:
The
ecological
commons
(a
guest
lecture
by
Tuomo
Alhojärvi
&
Otto
Bruun)
¡ Tue
5
February,
14–16
@
M102
(NB!
Time
&
place
changed!):
Ownership
and
the
urban
commons
¡ Wed
6
February,
14–16
@
M103:
Authorship
and
the
cultural
commons
¡ Mon
11
February,
12–14
@
M102:
Peer
production
and
the
networking
commons
¡ Wed
13
February,
14–16
@
M103:
Capitalizing
(on)
the
common
¡ Thu
7
March,
17:00:
Deadline
for
essays
¡ Wed–Thu
13–14
March,
10–14
@
N105:
Seminar
sessions
(discussion
on
the
course
essays)

3. ¡ Course
requirements:
§ Attending
the
lectures
(6
x
2
h)
§ Four
compulsory
readings
+
short
reflective
summaries
§ A
short
essay
+
feedback
for
another
essay
§ Attending
the
seminar
sessions
(2
x
4
h)
¡ Readings
and
slides
available
from
the
course
website
(www.juhanavenalainen.net/teaching/new-­‐commons/)

4. ¡ Reflective
summaries
of
the
readings
§ 150–250
words
(about
½
page)
§ The
point
of
the
text
as
your
understood
it
(or
didn’t)
§ Optionally:
questions,
remarks
§ Send
it
to
juhana.venalainen@uef.fi
before
the
lecture
¡ Texts
§ 3:
Midnight
Notes
Collective
(1990):
The
New
Enclosures
§ 4:
David
Bollier
(2004):
Why
We
Must
Talk
about
the
Information
Commons
§ 5:
Michel
Bauwens
(2005):
The
Political
Economy
of
Peer
Production
§ 6:
Michael
Hardt
(1999):
Affective
Labor

5. ¡ Course
essay
§ Choose
one:
▪ A)
Case
study
or
a
plan
for
a
case
study
▪ B)
Critical
commentary
of
a
chosen
text
▪ C)
Reflective
comparison
of
two
texts
§ Use
concepts,
ideas,
and
tools
introduced
during
the
course
§ Use
texts
from
the
reading
lists
or
elsewhere
§ Length:
5–8
pages
§ Topic
chosen
by:
end
of
February
§ Deadline
for
the
essay:
Thu
7
March
17:00

6. ¡ 1.
The
commons
–
what
and
why?
¡ 2.
A
brief
history
of
commons
research
¡ 3.
The
tragedy
of
the
commons
¡ 4.
The
institutional
framework
¡ 5.
A
quick
glance
towards
the
“New
Commons”
¡ Q
&
A

8. Commons = something that we share
→ what “something”?
→ who “we”?
→ in which sense “to share”?
→ why does it matter?

9. ¡ Institutional
settings:
university
§ Legal
status:
a
“public
entity”
(public-­‐law
institution)
§ Funded
mostly
by
the
state
(Ministry
of
Education)
§ “Autonomously”
governed
§ Decision-­‐making
based
on
a
complex
mix
of
legislation,
government
control,
economic
incentives,
representative
democracy,
collegial
(horizontal)
agreements,
etc.
¡ Physical
settings:
classroom
§ Open
access
and
free
entrance
§ Has
measurable
boundaries
and
capacity
§ Premises
and
movables
owned
by
a
private
enterprise
§ Use
of
spaces
regulated
by
a
complex
administrative
system
¡ Educational
settings:
curriculum
§ Includes
the
students
of
the
program
/
university,
excludes
others
§ Rules:
The
curriculum
grants
a
certain
amount
of
freedom
(individual
choice)
but
excepts
a
certain
amount
of
compliance
to
a
predetermined
plan
§ Incentives
and
sanctions:
The
use
of
resources
is
measured,
controlled
and
guided
by
“credits”
¡ Cultural
settings:
teaching
§ The
tradition
of
delivering,
sharing
and
constructing
knowledge
§ Social
norms
and
codes
of
conduct
§ Formulations
of
ideas
as
“intellectual
property”?
¡ Communicative
settings:
speech
§ English
language
as
an
assumed
lingua
franca,
a
common
basis
of
communication

10. ¡ Many
kinds
and
levels
of
(possible)
commons:
§ public
services
commons
§ venue
and
infrastructure
commons
§ educational
commons
§ cultural
and
intellectual
commons
§ communication
commons
¡ What
difference
does
it
make
to
add
the
word
“commons”?
§ Emphasis
on
social
interaction,
common
objectives,
rules
and
norms,
practices
of
sharing,
distribution
of
power
relations,
institutions
of
decision-­‐making,
sources
of
governance…
§ A
general
figure:
1)
resource
+
2)
field
of
action

11. ¡ Commons
=
§ Resources
shared
by
a
group
of
people
§ Traditionally
associated
with
plots
of
land,
but
now
refers
to
a
plenitude
of
phenomena
§ Subject
to
social
dilemmas
and
conflicts
§ A
third
form
of
“property”
outside
the
market
and
the
state
§ The
inheritance
of
humanity
in
whole
(e.g.
land,
air,
water)
§ The
results
of
social
production
(e.g.
knowledge,
codes,
affects)
¡ A
commons
/
the
commons
§ A
commons:
a
specific
resource
system
(such
as
a
park,
playground,
or
a
river)
–
plural:
commons
§ The
commons:
an
analytical
concept
comparable
to
“the
market”
or
“the
state”
§ The
common:
a
philosophical
and
political
idea:
the
world
as
a
co-­‐habited
and
co-­‐produced
whole
(Hess
&
Ostrom
2007;
Hardt
&
Negri
2009)

12. ¡ A
new
“catch-­‐all”
term?
§ intellectual
property
rights
(IPRs)
§ computer
codes
and
networking
infrastructure
§ academic
libraries
§ invention
and
creativity
§ open-­‐source
software
§ collaborative
science
§ citizenship
and
democracy
§ collective
action
§ information
economics
§ managing
scholarly
information
§ globalization
§ westernization
of
knowledge
§ indigenous
knowledge
and
rights
§ computer
waste
(Ostrom
&
Hess
2007)

13. "A
commons
arises
whenever
a
given
community
decides
that
it
wishes
to
manage
a
resource
in
a
collective
manner,
with
a
special
regard
for
equitable
access,
use
and
sustainability.
It
is
a
social
form
that
has
long
lived
in
the
shadows
of
our
market
culture,
but
which
is
now
on
the
rise.”
– David Bollier, founder of the webzine On the Commons
(onthecommons.org), author of Silent Theft (2002), Viral
Spiral (2009) and The Wealth of the Commons (2012)
Joi
Ito
(Bollier
2011)

14. The
commons
Material
commons
Ecological
commons
Constructed
commons
Immaterial
commons
Social
commons
Networking
commons
(Hardt
&
Negri
2009)

15. ¡ David
Bollier:
Commons
is
a
“rather
simple
and
obvious
concept”
§ A
more
pervasive
and
widespread
regime
than
we
usually
think
§ Seems
exotic
because
of
the
conceived
economic
conceptions
▪ Private
property
▪ Free
market
▪ A
heroic
individual,
the
rational
“self-­‐made
man”
(homo
economicus)
separated
from
social
and
cultural
contexts
§ →
understanding
the
commons
requires
dismissing
many
prevailing
categories
of
thought
¡ The
collapse
of
the
Soviet
Union
–
an
obvious
(but
misinformed)
source
for
the
distrust
in
collective
property
regimes
§ Communism
/
Commonism
(Bollier
2007)

16. ¡ The
commons
is
a
useful
concept,
because
it
helps
to…
§ …identify
and
analyze
problems
in
collective
decision-­‐making
§ …sketch
a
more
“holistic”
understanding
of
issues
related
to
the
management
of
collective
resources
§ …explain
how
social
and
economic
value
can
be
created
and
sustained
outside
of
the
market
and
the
state
(Bollier
2007)

17. ¡ A
model
for
balancing
economic,
social
and
ethical
concerns
§ Balancing
rights
of
producers
vs.
rights
of
users
§ Safeguarding
the
rights
of
the
commoners
in
policy-­‐making
§ Preserving
the
vitality
of
the
resource
system
for
future
generations
¡ Commons
framework
can
be
used
for…
§ …designing
institutions,
incentives
and
legislation
§ …proposing
effective
solutions
and
alternatives
(Bollier
2007)

18. ¡ Protecting
and
restoring
the
”gifts
of
nature”
for
future
generations
¡ Underlining
the
importance
of
sustainable
social
organizations
along
with
sustainable
resource
usage
¡ Framing
the
nature
as
non-­‐commodificable
(not-­‐for-­‐sale)

19. ¡ The
rise
of
the
(new)
commons
discourse
~
the
post-­‐industrial
turn
of
capitalism
§ “Knowledge
economy”,
“Information
economy”,
“Immaterial
economy”,
“Post-­‐Fordism”,
“The
new
economy”,
“Cognitive
capitalism”
§ General
argument:
new
sources
of
economic
growth
are
to
be
found
from
shared
and
uncountable
assets
(→
the
commons)
rather
than
from
proprietary
and
delimited
(physical)
resources
§ Commons
provide
an
effective
way
to
create
economic
and
social
wealth

20. ¡ Ever-­‐growing
commodification
of
human
life
§ Continuous
expansion
of
capitalism
both
extensively
and
intensively
§ More
and
more
resources
are
produced
directly
to
be
sold
in
the
market
▪ E.g.
education,
public
health
services,
child
and
elderly
care,
experiences,
personalities,
culture
¡ Alienability:
what
resources
should
be
allowed
to
be
privatized?
§ Medicine
patents?
Seedlines?
Animal
species?
The
human
genome?
§ A
continuous
struggle
that
involves
▪ Extending
capitalism
-­‐>
new
enclosures
of
the
common
-­‐>
reclaiming
the
commons
▪ Extending
common
-­‐>
new
“disclosures”
of
capitalism
(“quasi-­‐commons”)
-­‐>
new
tactics
of
commodification
(Bollier
2007;
see
also
Nonini
2007)

21. ¡ Commons
as
a
claim
for
equal
access
to
and
autonomous
governance
of…
§ …means
of
subsistence
§ …means
of
production
¡ These
are
not
secured
in
any
existing
political
system
§ →
Libertarian
answer:
less
regulation
of
the
market,
more
privatization
of
resources
§ →
Socialist
answer:
more
intervention
by
the
state
and
supranational
institutions
§ →
“Commonist”
answers:
autonomous
communities
and
resource
pools
independent
from
the
market
and
the
state,
global
public
domain
of
immaterial
commons,
subsidiarity-­‐based
decision-­‐making,
site-­‐specific
solutions
¡ The
market
and
the
state
–
enemies
or
allies
for
commons-­‐based
political
initiatives?

22. ¡ Property,
contracts,
markets
¡ Legal
mechanisms
¡ Social
norms
and
rules,
social
capital
¡ Sustainability,
equity
¡ Institutional
change
¡ Conflicts
and
problem-­‐solving
¡ →
commons
research
as
a
multi-­‐/inter-­‐/trans-­‐
disciplinary
field
of
inquiry

23. ¡ Some
fields
of
study
in
commons
research
–
a
sample
from
the
reading
list
of
this
course:
§ Anthropology
(6)
§ Activist
/
Independent
Researcher
(4)
§ Law
(4)
§ Geography
(3)
§ Economics
(2)
§ Environmental
Ethics
(2)
§ Information
Science
(2)
§ Literature
(2)
§ Media
Studies
(2)
§ Ecology
§ Global
and
Latin
American
Studies
§ Philosophy
§ Political
Philosophy
§ Political
Science
§ Sociology
¡ Major
branches:
§ 1.
Environmental
economics
/
Environmental
social
sciences
§ 2.
Intellectual
property
law
/
Legal
philosophy
§ 3.
Critical
theory
(Philosophy
/
Sociology
/
Critical
political
economy)

24. Jean-­‐François
Millet:
Des
Glaneuses
(1857)

25. ¡ Common
→
lat.
communis
→
com-­‐munus
§ 1.
“shared
by
all
/
many”
§ 2.
”a
duty
/
service
performed
for
the
community
▪ shared
by
the
society
for
the
society
¡ Historical
pinpoints:
§ Platonic
communism
§ Christian
”Proto-­‐Communism”
§ Rural
Commons
§ Info-­‐Commons
§ Post-­‐Marxist
Commonism
(see
e.g.
Hemmungs
Wirtén
2008)

26. “That
city
is
best
ordered
in
which
the
greatest
number
use
the
expression
‘mine’
and
‘not
mine’
of
the
same
things
in
the
same
way.
[…]
For
example,
if
a
finger
of
one
of
us
is
wounded,
the
entire
community
of
bodily
connection
stretches
the
soul
for
‘integration’.”
– Plato, Republic, Book 5,
1261b

27. ¡ 1950s:
§ H.
Scott
Gordon:
research
on
fisheries,
§ Concepts
of
“common
property”
and
“open
access”
¡ 1960s:
§ Mancur
Olson:
The
Logic
of
Collective
Action
(1965)
§ Garrett
Hardin:
The
Tragedy
of
the
Commons
(1968)
(Laukkanen
2011;
Ostrom
1990)

28. ¡ Influential
works:
§ Elinor
Ostrom
(1990):
Governing
the
Commons
§ The
Ecologist
(1993
special
issue):
Whose
Common
Future?
Reclaiming
the
Commons
§ Susan
J.
Buck
(1998):
The
Global
Commons:
An
Introduction
§ Peter
Barnes
(2000):
Who
Owns
the
Sky?
Our
Common
Assets
and
the
Future
of
Capitalism
¡ Key
ideas:
§ Nature
as
a
public
resource
§ Natural
resources
as
global
commons
to
be
managed
for
the
benefit
of
all
§ E.g.
the
atmosphere,
oceans,
fisheries,
freshwater
supplies,
wilderness,
beaches
§ Precautionary
principle
as
a
guiding
rule
for
preserving
the
commons

29. ¡ Influential
works:
§ James
Boyle
(1997):
Shamans,
Software
and
Spleens:
Law
and
Construction
of
Information
Society
§ Lawrence
Lessig
(2000):
Code
and
Other
Laws
of
Cyberspace
§ Jessica
Litman
(2001):
Digital
Copyright:
Protecting
Intellectual
Property
on
the
Internet
§ Eva
Hemmungs
Wirtén
(2004):
No
Trespassing:
Authorship,
Intellectual
Property
Rights,
and
the
Boundaries
of
Globalization
¡ Key
ideas:
§ The
global
“infosphere”
as
analogous
to
“the
environment”
§ Inspired
by
the
thought
of
the
early
environments
(Rachel
Carson,
Aldo
Leopold
etc.)

30. ¡ Influential
works:
§ Nick
Dyer-­‐Witheford
(2006):
Cyber-­‐Marx:
Cycles
and
Circuits
in
High-­‐Technology
Capitalism
§ Matteo
Pasquinelli
(2008):
Animal
Spirits:
A
Bestiary
of
the
Commons
§ Michael
Hardt
&
Antonio
Negri
(2009):
Commonwealth
¡ Key
ideas:
§ Commons
(or
“the
common”)
as
a
new
site
of
political
struggle
§ Commons-­‐based
production
as
a
revolutionary
social
form

31. ¡ Heinrich-­‐Böll-­‐Stiftung
/
Silke
Helfrich
¡ P2P
Foundation
/
Michel
Bauwens
¡ Creative
Commons
/
Lawrence
Lessig
¡ On
the
Commons
/
David
Bollier
¡ The
Commoner
/
Massimo
De
Angelis
¡ Commons.fi
¡ http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=k0ZWFPVBTws
¡ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L7jaSjkd0jM

32. National
Oceanic
and
Atmospheric
Administration

33. ¡ Professor
in
Human
Ecology
(UCLA,
Santa
Barbara)
¡ Main
focus:
issue
of
human
overpopulation
§ “Tragedy
of
the
Commons”
(Science,
1968)
§ 9
books,
a
plenty
of
articles
§ Summation
of
the
works:
Living
Within
Limits
(1993)

34. ¡ Assume
a
world
with
two
persons
breeding
cattle
in
a
shared
plot
of
land
§ Until
the
maximum
capacity
of
the
land,
the
breeder
A
gets
extra
profit
(P)
for
each
added
animal
§ The
same
is
true
for
the
breeder
B
§ Because
both
of
the
breeders
try
to
maximize
their
profit,
the
land
gets
overpopulated,
and
the
cattle
do
not
have
enough
to
eat
§ The
breeders
together
will
now
gain
less
profit
than
they
would
if
the
land
was
not
overpopulated
¡ →
“Freedom
in
a
commons
brings
ruin
to
all.”
§ Actions
that
are
rational
for
an
individual
can
be
harmful
for
all
of
the
participants
(→
a
“lose–lose”
situation)
§ These
kind
of
problems
cannot
be
solved
by
appealing
to
the
goodwill
or
the
conscience
of
the
participants,
because
taking
alternative
action
would
be
risky,
suboptimal
and
thus
irrational
from
the
individual
standpoint
§ Limitless
growth
of
population
in
a
limited
world
is
one
of
such
problems
§ The
solution
requires
an
“extended
morality”
→
enforced
restrictions
on
individual
freedom
¡ Reflects
similar
scepticism
on
human
nature
as
already
Aristotle,
Thomas
Hobbes,
David
Hume
etc.
(Hardin
1968)

35. “Property
that
is
common
to
the
greatest
number
of
owners
receives
the
least
attention;
men
care
most
for
their
private
possessions,
and
less
for
what
they
own
in
common
[…]
They
think
less
of
it
on
the
ground
that
someone
else
is
thinking
about
it
[…]”
– Aristotle, Politics, Book 2,
1261b

36. “Unless
the
number
of
individuals
is
quite
small,
or
unless
there
is
coercion
or
some
other
special
device
to
make
individuals
act
in
their
common
interest,
rational,
self-­‐interested
individuals
will
not
act
to
achieve
their
common
or
group
interests.”
– Mancur Olson, The Logic of
Collective Action (1965)
(cited
in
Ostrom
1990,
p.
6)

37. ¡ Hardin’s
assumptions
§ There
is
no
communication,
cooperation,
or
management
system,
among
the
participants,
or
any
external
regulation
or
coercion
that
limits
their
activity
§ The
decisions
of
the
herders
are
based
only
on
maximizing
their
profit
through
extending
their
herd
¡ Conceptual
confusions
§ Tragedy
of
the
commons
vs.
Tragedy
of
open
access?
(see
Kyllönen
2011)

38. ¡ Example:
§ The
carrying
capacity
of
the
meadow
is
100
cows
§ →
In
a
cooperative
situation,
both
breeders
A
and
B
would
graze
50
cows
each
§ The
profit
of
an
individual
breeder
would
be
maximized
at
80
cows
§ Both
of
the
breeders
have
full
information
on
this
situation
§ Will
the
breeders
stick
to
the
cooperative
scheme
(by
grazing
50
cows
each)
or
try
to
maximize
their
individual
profit
(by
grazing
80
cows
each,
thus
exceeding
the
capacity
of
the
meadow)?
Scenario
Profit
for
A
Profit
for
B
Total
profit
Both
A
and
B
graze
moderately
10
10
20
A
overgrazes
11
-­‐1
10
B
overgrazes
-­‐1
11
10
Both
A
and
B
overgraze
0
0
0
(see
Ostrom
1990)

39. ¡ Whatever
B
decides
to
do,
it’s
better
for
A
to
“cheat”
(and
gain
0–
11
units
of
profit)
than
to
seek
cooperation
(and
gain
–1–10
units
of
profit)
§ The
same
is
true
for
A
§ This
is
why
both
end
up
cheating,
if
they
act
for
their
rational
self-­‐
interest
§ →
The
“Prisoner’s
Dilemma”
(Albert
Tucker
1950)
¡ Solutions
for
the
dilemma
§ Checking
the
assumptions
(capabilities
of
cooperation,
other
sources
of
motivation
than
self-­‐interest,
etc.)
§ A
strict
coercive
political
body
(Heilbroner:
“a
military
government”)
§ Voluntary
institutions
for
the
enforcement
of
a
binding
contract
between
the
participants
(see
Ostrom
1990)

40. Formal
monitoring
• Regular
inspections
• Randomized
surveys
Informal
monitoring
• Self-­‐regulation
• Own-­‐checks
• Social
control
Formal
arenas
• Legislatures
• Regulatory
agencies
• Courts
Informal
arenas
• Gatherings
• Appropriation
teams
• Private
associations
Operational
rules-­‐in-­‐use
(Ostrom
1990,
54–55)

41. José
Zugasti
(2003):
A
la
deriva

42. ¡ Political
economist,
professor
(Indiana
University
&
Arizona
State
University)
¡ Associated
with
the
New
Institutional
Economics
(NIE)
approach
¡ Ground-­‐breaking
research
in
economic
governance
&
the
commons
§ Design
principles
of
common
pool
resource
(CPR)
management,
1977
(with
V.
Ostrom)
§ Governing
the
Commons,
1990
§ Understanding
Institutional
Diversity,
2005
¡ Nobel
Prize
in
Economics,
2009
¡ Case
studies:
fisheries,
agriculture,
forestry,
irrigation
systems
in
Switzerland,
Turkey,
Japan,
Philippines,
Sri
Lanka,
etc.
Indiana
University

43. ¡ Focuses
on
§ organizational
arrangements
§ credible
commitments
§ modes
of
governance
§ social
norms
§ social
capital
§ ideological
values
§ strategic
behavior
¡ Using
concepts
such
as
§ incentives
§ transaction
costs
§ asymmetric
information
§ opportunism
§ moral
hazard
§ bargaining
strength
§ monitoring
costs

44. ¡ Typically
thought:
“The
only
way
to
solve
a
commons
dilemma
is
X”
§ The
content
of
X
varies,
but
the
trust
to
an
universal
solution
prevails
§ E.g.
▪ X
=
A
strong
central
authority
▪ X=
Privatization
and
free
market
¡ Ostrom:
Many
solutions
exist
to
cope
with
many
different
problems
(both
in
theory
and
in
practice)
(Ostrom
1990;
Hess
&
Ostrom
2007)

45. ¡ The
Institutional
Analysis
and
Development
(IAD)
Framework
§ Seeks
to
answer
fundamental
political
and
social
questions…
▪ How
do
humans
come
together
and
create
organizations?
▪ How
do
they
make
decisions
and
rules
for
achieving
social
goals?
§ …by
analyzing
rules,
norms,
strategies
and
behaviours
▪ Helpful
for
understanding
and
explaining
individual
and
group
decision
in
“public
choice”
problems
▪ Not
a
specific
“model”
or
methodology
▪ Can
be
applied
into
a
variety
of
different
cases
§ Practical
goal:
to
develop
tools
for
designing
effective
institutions
of
commons
management
(Ostrom
&
Hess
2007)

46. A.
Underlying
factors
• 1.
Properties
of
the
resource
system
• 2.
Properties
of
the
community
• 3.
Rules-­‐in-­‐use
B.
Action
arenas
• 4.
Action
situations
• 5.
Actors
C.
Outcomes
• 6.
Objectives
• 8.
Evaluation
criteria
• 7.
Patterns
of
interaction
(Ostrom
&
Hess
2007,
46,
slightly
modified)

47. ¡ The
assets,
capacities
and
constraints
of
a
resource
system
§ Biological
§ Physical
§ Technological
§ Intellectual
¡ The
properties
of
the
community
§ Users
(“appropriators”)
§ Producers
(“providers”)
§ Policymakers
(“regulators”)
¡ Rules-­‐in-­‐use
§ Operational
§ Policy-­‐level
§ Constitutional
(Ostrom
&
Hess
2007)

48. Rules
Constitutional
rules
Collective
rules
Operational
rules
Levels
of
analysis
Constitutional
choice
Collective
choice
Operational
choice
Processes
• Formulation
• Governance
• Adjudication
• Modification
• Policy-­‐making
• Management
• Adjudication
• Appropriation
• Provision
• Monitoring
• Enforcement
(Ostrom
1990,
53)

49. ¡ The
fields
and
settings
where
the
decisions
are
made
§ Different
spatial
scales
(local,
regional,
national,
global…)
§ Different
temporal
scales
(spontaneous,
ad
hoc,
temporary,
permanent)
§ Different
levels
of
rule-­‐making
¡ Consists
of
action
situations
and
actors
¡ A
flexible
and
dynamic
tool
of
analysis
¡ Important
in
analysing
institutional
change
(Ostrom
&
Hess
2007)

50. ¡ Objectives
§ What
is
the
purpose
(the
common
good)
of
the
resource?
¡ Evaluation
criteria
§ How
to
measure
whether
the
objectives
are
met
or
not?
¡ Patterns
of
interaction
§ Affected
by
underlying
factors
of
the
resource
system,
economic
incentives,
actions
made
by
other
actors
§ Strongly
affects
the
success
or
failure
of
the
commons
in
question
§ Can
be
highly
controversial
(Ostrom
&
Hess
2007)

51. VIRTUOUS
CIRCLE
VICIOUS
CIRCLE
Strong
social
capital
• Equality
• Solidarity
• Trust
Beneficial
attitudes
• Attentiveness
• Cooperation
• Fair
and
just
contribution
Balanced
resource
usage
• Sustainable
use
• Win-­‐win
• The
comedy
of
the
commons
Weak
social
capital
• Unjustified
hierarchies
• Fragmentation
(“Tribalism”)
• Distrust
Harmful
attitudes
• Carelessness
• Egoism
• Free
riding
Unbalanced
resource
usage
• Overuse
/
underuse
/
misuse
• Lose-­‐lose
• The
tragedy
of
the
commons
(partially
based
on
Ostrom
&
Hess
2007)

52. ¡ In
most
cases,
a
good
culture
of
commons
is
associated
with:
§ Clearly
defined
boundaries
§ Rules-­‐in-­‐use
matched
to
local
context
§ Subsidiarity
principle
in
decision-­‐making
§ Autonomy
of
the
community
to
devise
its
own
policies
§ A
system
for
self-­‐monitoring
members’
behaviour
§ A
system
of
sanctions
§ Low-­‐cost
conflict-­‐resolution
mechanisms
§ Nested
governance
structure
(Hess
&
Ostrom
2007);
Ostrom
1990

53. amg05k

54. ¡ Charlotte
Hess
(2008):
Mapping
the
New
Commons
§ A
shift
of
focus
from
the
traditional
commons
(land,
see,
air,
forests)
to
new
commons
(intellectual,
social,
affective,
“immaterial)
¡ “New”
in
which
sense?
§ New
approaches
and
lines
of
thought
§ New
kinds
of
commons
§ New
kinds
of
commons
conflicts
§ New
political
projects
¡ Analogies
with
traditional
commons:
§ congestion
§ free
riding
§ conflicts
§ overuse
§ pollution
(Hess
2008;
Hess
&
Ostrom
2007)

55. New
Commons
(NC)
Traditional
Commons
Neighborhood
Commons
Medical
and
Health
Commons
Knowledge
Commons
Markets
as
Commons
Global
Commons
Cultural
Commons
(Hess
2008)

56. ¡ Affluency
§ “The
Comedy
of
the
Commons”
(Rose
1986)
/
“The
Cornucopia
of
the
Commons”
(Bricklin
2006)
▪ Information
doesn’t
wear
out
or
run
out
in
use
§ “The
more,
the
merrier”
▪ The
total
social
value
of
the
immaterial
commons
increases
with
more
users
/
producers
sharing
with
each
other
§ Provides
a
strong
moral
and
economic
argument
for
granting
open
access

57. ¡ Constructed-­‐ness
§ Constructed
(“artificial”,
cultural)
commons
vs.
given
(natural)
commmons
§ NCs
have
to
be
continuously
produced
and
reproduced
by
human
effort
¡ Commoning
▪ The
work
done
upon
the
commons
by
the
commoners
▪ A
continuous
social,
cultural,
economic
and
material
process
of
constructing,
developing,
sustaining
and
renewing
the
common
wealth

58. Non-­‐free
nature
Scarcity,
selfishness
Appropriation
Material
commodities
Free
culture
Affluence,
cooperation
Recycling
Relations
1.
Modern
Economy
(Industrial
Production)
2.
Commons-­‐based
Economy
(“Cultural”
Production)

59. ¡ Cultural
Commons:
§ non-­‐private,
non-­‐public
§ shared
and
reproduced
within
local
and
global
communities
§ not
solely
‘symbolic’/‘immaterial’
but
also
relating
to
‘natural’,
‘biological’
and
‘physical’
§ platforms
for
new
ways
of
living
§ basis
for
wealth
creation
&
subsistence

60. amg05k
¡ Bollier,
David.
2011.
“The
Commons,
Short
and
Sweet.”
Retrieved
(http://bollier.org/commons-­‐short-­‐and-­‐sweet).
¡ Bollier,
David.
2007.
“The
Growth
of
the
Commons
Paradigm.”
Pp.
27–40
in
Understanding
Knowledge
as
a
Commons.
From
Theory
to
Practice,
edited
by
Charlotte
Hess
and
Elinor
Ostrom.
Cambridge
Mass.:
MIT
Press.
¡ Bricklin,
Dan.
2006.
“The
Cornucopia
of
the
Commons:
How
to
get
volunteer
labor.”
Retrieved
January
28,
2013
(http://bricklin.com/cornucopia.htm).
¡ Hardt,
Michael,
and
Antonio
Negri.
2009.
Commonwealth.
Cambridge,
Mass.:
Belknap
Press
of
Harvard
University
Press.
¡ Hess,
Charlotte.
2008.
“Mapping
the
New
Commons.”
SSRN
eLibrary.
Retrieved
March
19,
2012
(http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1356835).
¡ Hess,
Charlotte,
and
Elinor
Ostrom.
2007.
“Introduction:
An
Overview
of
the
Knowledge
Commons.”
Pp.
ix–xiii
in
Understanding
Knowledge
as
a
Commons.
From
Theory
to
Practice,
edited
by
Charlotte
Hess
and
Elinor
Ostrom.
Cambridge
Mass.:
MIT
Press.
¡ Kyllönen,
Simo.
2011.
“Vailla
teknistä
ratkaisua:
yhteislaidunten
tragedia,
yhteistoiminnan
ongelmat
ja
ympäristöpoliittinen
teoria.”
Pp.
73–111
in
Kiista
yhteismaista:
Garrett
Hardin
ja
selviytymisen
politiikka.
Tampere:
niin
&
näin.
¡ Laukkanen,
Marita.
2011.
“Yhteislaidunten
ongelma
ympäristö-­‐
ja
luonnonvarataloustieteessä.”
Pp.
61–72
in
Kiista
yhteismaista:
Garrett
Hardin
ja
selviytymisen
politiikka.
Tampere:
niin
&
näin.
¡ Nonini,
Donald
M.
2006.
“Introduction:
The
Global
Idea
of
‘the
Commons’.”
Social
Analysis
50(3):164–177.
¡ Ostrom,
Elinor.
1990.
Governing
the
Commons:
The
Evolution
of
Institutions
for
Collective
Action.
Cambridge
University
Press.
¡ Ostrom,
Elinor,
and
Charlotte
Hess.
2007a.
“A
Framework
for
Analyzing
the
Knowledge
Commons.”
Pp.
41–81
in
Understanding
Knowledge
as
a
Commons.
From
Theory
to
Practice,
edited
by
Charlotte
Hess
and
Elinor
Ostrom.
Cambridge
Mass.:
MIT
Press.
¡ Ostrom,
Elinor,
and
Charlotte
Hess.
2007b.
“Preface.”
Pp.
ix–xiii
in
Understanding
Knowledge
as
a
Commons.
From
Theory
to
Practice,
edited
by
Charlotte
Hess
and
Elinor
Ostrom.
Cambridge
Mass.:
MIT
Press.
¡ Rose,
Carol.
1986.
“The
Comedy
of
the
Commons:
Commerce,
Custom,
and
Inherently
Public
Property.”
Faculty
Scholarship
Series.
Retrieved
(http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1828).

61. ¡ www.onthecommons.org
¡ www.p2pfoundation.net
¡ www.thecommoner.co.uk
¡ www.commons.fi
(mostly
in
Finnish)