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While the previous version of the instruction from 2010 included a whole sub-section describing TLAM/N responsibilities, the new version published on February 15, 2013, contains no mentioning of the TLAM/N at all and the previous sub-section has been deleted.
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This email exchange summarizes communications between John Young and Cindy B of the NSA regarding Mr. Young's FOIA request. Cindy B informs Mr. Young that his original request is too broad and requires clarification. Mr. Young then narrows the scope of his request to only include communications between specific journalists and government agencies regarding getting pre-publication review of Edward Snowden materials. Cindy B acknowledges that the narrowed request should be sufficient.
Nsa responds snowden media contacts with usgAnonDownload
The document is an email exchange between John Young and Cindy B from the NSA regarding Mr. Young's FOIA request. Cindy informs Mr. Young that his request is too broad and burdensome in its current form. She asks him to narrow the scope by specifying a particular media outlet, journalist, timeframe, and topic of correspondence to make the search more reasonable. Alternatively, she suggests piggybacking on a similar pending request that is being processed for other media outlets between June 2013-August 2014 regarding NSA surveillance programs. Cindy places the request on hold until Mr. Young can further clarify or narrow the scope within 30 days.
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The document describes several positions within the US military involving signals intelligence analysis and reporting. Key responsibilities included conducting analysis on complex intelligence using various databases and tools like MESSIAH, OILSTOCK, ANCHORY and producing reports to support military operations. Experience ranged from 2001 to the present and involved supporting missions like Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Global War on Terrorism.
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Similar to Navy security enterprise secnav 5500-36 (20)
1. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20350-1000
SECNAVINST 5500.36
DUSN (P)
19 MAY 2015
SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5500.36
From: Secretary of the Navy
Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY SECURITY ENTERPRISE
Ref: See enclosure (1).
Encl: (1) References
(2) Department of the Navy Security Enterprise Governance
(3) Senior Director for Security
(4) Definitions
(5) Responsibilities
1. Purpose
a. Define the Department of the Navy (DON) Security
Enterprise (SE) and assign responsibilities.
b. Establish and issue policy to guide and manage the
implementation of the DON SE pursuant to references (a) through
(ak) located in enclosure (1).
c. Provide a framework and guidance to promote efficiency
and facilitate consistent security policies and practices across
the DON.
d. Establish the DON Security Enterprise Executive
Committee (DON SE EXCOM) and provide direction for comprehensive
DON SE policy, oversight framework, and governance structure
that supports safeguarding personnel, information, operations,
resources, technologies, and facilities against harm, loss, or
hostile acts and influences. See enclosure (2) for information
regarding the DON SE governance and enclosure (3) for
information regarding the Senior Director for Security.
e. Provide a common lexicon for the DON SE.
2. Definitions. See enclosure (4).
3. Applicability. This instruction:
2. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
2
a. Applies to Total Force, personnel employed by, detailed
to, or assigned to the DON, including Government Civilians (both
appropriated and non-appropriated funds); members of the active
and reserve components of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps;
temporarily assigned forces performing a full-time or training
role or function of security, e.g., Auxiliary Security Force and
Ship’s Self Defense Force; experts or consultants performing
services for the DON through personnel appointments or
contractual arrangements; industrial or commercial contractor,
licensee, certificate holder, or grantee, including
subcontractors.
b. Shall not alter or supersede the existing authority and
policies of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
regarding the protection of intelligence sources, methods, and
activities pursuant to reference (s), or the authorities
delegated by the DNI to the Heads of the Intelligence Community
Element.
c. Does not apply to Nuclear Weapons Security Programs
which are administered per references (r) and (ak).
d. Does not alter or supersede oversight, management, and
authority over resources for Special Access Programs (SAP) found
in references (aa) and (ac).
e. Does not supersede or change responsibilities and
authorities of the Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
(N00N), established by 50 U.S.C. § 2406 and § 2511 (codifying
Executive Order 12344, 1 February 1982).
f. Does not apply to the authorities of the DON SE EXCOM
regarding law enforcement policy and antiterrorism and/or force
protection, and will not alter or supersede existing service or
organizational missions specifically assigned to those entities,
e.g. Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), Headquarters
Marine Corps.
4. Policy. It is DON Policy that:
a. DON SE is an integrated framework providing central
oversight, governance of, and feedback from, each security
pillar: personnel, information, physical (including law
enforcement policy and antiterrorism/force protection),
3. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
3
industrial, operations security (OPSEC), chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, high explosive (CBRNE), critical program
information (CPI) protection, critical infrastructure protection
(CIP), as well as coordination with SAP and sensitive
compartmented information (SCI). The DON SE is also responsible
for mission assurance, as well as security-related training that
facilitates synchronized, seamless, and efficient implementation
of programs, priorities, and initiatives of the DON SE.
b. Security is a mission critical function of the
Department of Defense (DoD) and the DON. The proper execution
of all security-related functions directly impacts all DON
missions and capabilities, and the national defense. Therefore:
(1) The Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Policy)
(DUSN (Policy)), per references (b) and (c), as the DON Security
Executive, leads the DON SE and shall represent the DON on the
Defense Security Enterprise Executive Committee (DSE EXCOM).
The DSE EXCOM, head of the DSE, governs the implementation of
the Security Enterprise framework and strategic plan, in order
to provide an integrated, risk-managed structure to guide
security policy implementation and investment decisions, as well
as provide a sound basis for oversight and evolution.
(2) The DON SE EXCOM, chaired by DUSN (Policy), shall
provide governance for strategic administration and policy
coordination of the DON SE. The DON SE EXCOM membership and
functions are described in enclosure (2) of this instruction.
(3) To the maximum extent possible, standardized
security processes shall be implemented and best practices
identified, with appropriate provisions for unique missions and
security environments across the DON SE to ensure maximum
interoperability, consistent quality assurance, and cost-
savings.
(4) Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant
of the Marine Corps (CMC) shall appoint an executive leader at
the General Officer/Flag Officer/Senior Executive Service
(GO/FO/SES) level who will ensure service-level oversight,
coordination, and implementation of security policies,
initiatives, activities, and actions.
4. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
4
(5) All security programs and policies shall be guided
by the principle of achieving maximum efficiency, reducing
redundancy, and administrative overhead, as well as identifying
opportunities for cost-savings through leveraging best
practices.
(6) A core of highly qualified security and management
professionals, certified per reference (t), shall manage
execution of DON SE policy.
(7) DON SE investments shall be guided by a capital
planning and investment control process that is risk-managed, is
results-based, and informs the DON’s planning, programming,
budgeting, and execution processes.
c. The DON SE shall measure performance in relation to DON
mission impact.
(1) Security risk management practices shall focus on
the potential for and degree of risk of loss in relation to the
cost or process burden accrued.
(2) Performance measurement requires recognition that
the absence of an unwanted event may be evidence of a positive
mission impact.
d. The DON will consider all means in preventing harm to
its resources, to include cybersecurity, intelligence, and all
security required for protection of mission assurance functions.
e. Security is the personal professional responsibility of
all DON personnel (military, civilian, and contractor) and its
proper implementation will be directed by commanders and other
leaders at each level of the DON. It shall be fostered through
awareness, education, training, and leadership.
5. Responsibilities. See enclosure (5).
5. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
5
6. Records Management. Records created as a result of this
instruction, regardless of media and format, shall be managed
per SECNAV Manual M-5210.1 of January 2012.
RAY MABUS
Distribution:
Electronic only, via Department of the Navy Issuances Web site
http://doni.documentservices.dla.mil/
6. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
Enclosure (1)
REFERENCES
(a) DoD Directive 5200.43 CH-1 of 1 October 2012
(b) SECNAV Memorandum, Department of the Navy Security
Executive, 25 April 2013 (NOTAL)
(c) SECNAV WASHINGTON DC 017926Z DEC 12 (ALNAV 072/12)
(d) DoD 5200.01-M Volume 1, DoD Information Security Program:
Overview, Classification, and Declassification,
24 February 2012
(e) DoD 5200.01-M Volume 2, DoD Information Security Program:
Marking of Classified Information, 24 February 2012
(f) DoD 5200.01-M Volume 3, DoD Information Security Program:
Protection of Classified Information, 24 February 2012
(g) DoD 5200.01-M Volume 4, DoD Information Security Program:
Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), 24 February 2012
(h) DoD 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program, January 1987
(i) DoD 5200.08-R, Physical Security Program, 9 April 2007
(j) DoD 5205.02-M, DoD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program
Manual, 3 November 2008
(k) DoD Instruction 5220.22 of 18 March 2011
(l) SECNAV M-5510.30, Department of the Navy Personnel Security
Program
(m) DoD Directive 5205.02E of 20 June 2012
(n) SECNAVINST 5510.36A
(o) SECNAVINST 5510.37
(p) DoD 5210.42-R, Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program
(PRP) Regulation, 30 June 2006
(q) SECNAVINST 5510.35B
(r) SECNAVINST 8120.1B
(s) E.O. 12333
(t) DoD 3305.13-M, DoD Security Accreditation and
Certification, 14 March 2011
(u) DoD Instruction 3305.13 of 13 February 2014
(v) SECNAVINST 5430.25E
(w) DoD Directive 5134.10 of 7 May 2013
(x) DoD Directive 5124.02 of 23 June 2008
(y) DoD Directive 5118.03 of 20 April 2012
(z) DoD Directive 5144.02 of 21 November 2014
(aa) SECNAVINST 5000.34E
(ab) DoD Instruction 8500.01 of 14 March 2014
(ac) SECNAVINST S5460.3G
(ad) SECNAVINST 3030.4C
(ae) SECNAVINST 3300.2B
(af) SECNAVINST 3501.1C
8. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
Enclosure (2)
DEPARTMENT OF NAVY SECURITY ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE
1. Purpose. The DON SE governance structure shall consist of
two bodies: the DON SE EXCOM and DON SE Advisory Group (DON SE
AG).
2. Executive Committee. The DON SE EXCOM shall be the senior-
level governance body responsible for administration, strategic
guidance, and policy authority for the DON SE. In that role,
the DON SE EXCOM shall:
a. Advise the DON Security Executive, per references (a)
through (c), on security policy and training, provide
recommendations on key policy decisions, and identify and review
opportunities for standardization throughout the DON to improve
effectiveness and efficiency across the DON SE. These functions
include:
(1) Development and implementation of a DON security
framework that integrates all security disciplines including,
but not limited to: personnel, physical, law enforcement,
mission assurance, CIP, CPI protection, antiterrorism, force
protection, industrial, information, OPSEC, CBRNE, and security
training. These functions also include coordination with SAP
and SCI security across all security disciplines. This
framework must align with, and be informed by, other security
and security-related functions, e.g., counterintelligence,
nuclear physical security, foreign disclosure, security
cooperation, technology transfer, export control, cybersecurity,
antiterrorism, force protection, mission assurance, CIP, and
insider threat policy.
(2) Development of a DON mission assurance governance
structure to synchronize existing protection-related risk
management programs. The DON SE EXCOM shall protect and ensure
continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets
critical to the performance of DON mission-essential functions
and provide senior leaders with increased visibility and
knowledge to assist in decision-making. Applicable programs
include CIP, antiterrorism, continuity of operations,
cybersecurity, installation emergency management, physical
security, and CBRNE protection.
9. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
2 Enclosure (2)
(3) Development and approval of the DON security
strategic plan and the monitoring and assessment of its
execution.
(4) Commission of reviews and in-depth studies of
security issues. Based on the results, the DON SE EXCOM shall
make recommendations for developing or improving policies,
processes, procedures, and products to address pervasive,
enduring, or emerging security challenges.
(5) Review of resources, investments and priorities, and
recommendation of changes to the DON security program through
the DON Security Executive to the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)
and Under Secretary of the Navy.
b. Provide a forum for identification, documentation, and
dissemination of best practices, including those associated with
security risk management, and the identification of performance
measures to be used to assess the effectiveness of the DON
security program and its contribution to mission success.
c. Endeavor to identify efficiencies and cost-saving
measures through the identification and elimination of redundant
administrative overhead, ineffective procedures, and promotion
of best security practices across the DON SE.
3. DON SE EXCOM Membership. The voting membership of the DON
SE EXCOM shall consist of:
a. The DON Security Executive, DUSN (Policy), who shall
serve as the Chair.
b. Representatives of:
(1) CNO
(2) CMC
(3) Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial
Management and Comptroller) (ASN (FM&C))
(4) Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development and Acquisition) (ASN (RD&A))
10. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
3 Enclosure (2)
(5) Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and
Reserve Affairs) (ASN (M&RA))
(6) Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy,
Installations and Environment) (ASN (EI&E))
(7) General Counsel of the Navy (GC)
(8) DON Chief of Information (CHINFO)
(9) DON Chief Information Officer (DON CIO)
(10) DON Assistant for Administration (DON/AA)
(11) Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Information
Dominance (N2/N6)) for SCI
(12) Director, DON SAP Central Office (DON SAPCO)
(13) Director, NCIS (DIRNCIS)
c. Representatives, invited by the Chair from the Office of
the Naval Inspector General and others, as appropriate, to
participate as non-voting members of the DON SE EXCOM.
d. Additional voting members, as necessary, upon
recommendation to, and agreement of, the DON SE EXCOM.
4. Meetings. The DON SE EXCOM shall meet no less than
semiannually and as required at the call of the Chair. The
Chair shall set the agenda with input from the members.
5. Security Enterprise Advisory Group. DON SE AG, a GO/FO/SES-
level body, is subordinate to the DON SE EXCOM and shall
formulate and coordinate all security-related policy for
approval by the DON SE EXCOM. The DON SE AG shall meet on a
quarterly basis, or as needed, and will execute the strategic
vision and oversee the policy set forth by the DON SE EXCOM.
The DON SE AG shall discuss topics of interest with the DON SE
EXCOM, assist in overseeing the implementation of the DON SE
strategic framework, and prepare topics, as required, for the
semiannual DON SE EXCOM meetings. DON SE AG membership mirrors
that of the DON SE EXCOM. The Chair may call for participation
11. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
4 Enclosure (2)
from other offices, as approved by the DON SE AG membership, or
as directed by the Chair of the DON SE EXCOM.
6. Subgroups and Working Groups. The DON SE EXCOM and the DON
SE AG may establish standing subgroups or ad-hoc working groups
as deemed necessary. Each group shall have a charter or
specific tasking document which will include a termination date
of the subgroup or working group. Meeting minutes shall be
maintained and agreed to by the members of the subgroup or
working group and action items shall be tracked. Copies of
minutes and action items shall be provided to the DON SE EXCOM
Executive Secretary for tracking and archiving on behalf of the
DON SE EXCOM. Reports of progress or actions shall be provided
to the DON SE EXCOM or the DON SE AG as requested.
7. Administration
a. The DUSN (Policy), Senior Director for Security shall be
the Executive Secretary of the DON SE EXCOM and shall arrange
meetings; prepare, coordinate, and publish minutes; track action
items; and perform other duties as the Chair or DON SE EXCOM may
assign, including those specified in enclosure (3).
b. The DON SE EXCOM shall establish procedures for its
operation and the chartering of working groups.
12. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
Enclosure (3)
SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR SECURITY
The Senior Director for Security, under the authority,
direction, and control of the DUSN (Policy), and per references
(a) through (c), shall:
1. Develop policy and an integrated strategic framework for the
management, integration, oversight, and assessment of the DON
SE.
a. Be responsible for cross-functional security integration
and coordination.
b. Report to and advise the DUSN (Policy) on the
implications of strategic planning decisions and other security
significant issues, including those identified by the DON SE
EXCOM.
c. With advice from and coordination with the DON SE EXCOM,
develop, maintain, and implement an integrated, cohesive DON
security strategic framework; establish performance measures to
assess implementation; and provide oversight to ensure
compliance.
(1) Coordinate with and take guidance from the DON SE
EXCOM in the development of an integrated security framework for
the DON SE and recommend security policy and procedures to
facilitate its implementation.
(2) Ensure the security framework includes provisions
for access to integrated education, training, and professional
development opportunities for security professionals.
(3) Provide guidance on, and a methodology for a DON
framework that facilitates tracking security costs, estimating
future years' resource requirements, measuring return on
security investments, and making risk-managed resource
decisions.
(4) Develop, coordinate, maintain, and implement a DON
security strategic plan that describes how the integrated
security framework and the activities, functions, and processes
required for its execution will be implemented, measured, and
assessed.
13. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
2 Enclosure (3)
2. On behalf of the DUSN (Policy), propose DON resource
programs, formulate budget estimates, recommend resource
investments and priorities, and monitor the implementation of
approved programs in order to ensure adherence to approved
security policy and planning guidance.
3. Provide oversight of the DON SE and the individual security
disciplines, with a focus on identifying opportunities for
increased standardization, improved performance, effectiveness,
and efficiency.
4. Act as Executive Secretary for the DON SE EXCOM.
5. Collaborate with the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, Office of the Secretary of Defense , DoD
components, the Joint Staff, the Services and DNI, and
interagency and external organizations responsible for the
development and implementation of national security policy, and
raise appropriate issues to the DON SE EXCOM for their
consideration as necessary.
14. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
Enclosure (4)
DEFINITIONS
Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are
for the purpose of this Directive:
1. Antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the
vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to
include limited response and containment by local military and
civilian forces. Antiterrorism measures are taken to detect,
deter, defend, defeat, and mitigate acts of terror.
2. Department of Navy Security Enterprise. An integrated
framework providing central oversight, governance of, and
feedback from, each security pillar: personnel, information,
physical (including law enforcement policy and
antiterrorism/force protection), industrial, OPSEC, CBRNE, CPI
protection, CIP, as well as coordination with SAP and SCI. The
DON SE is also responsible for mission assurance, as well as
security-related training that facilitates synchronized,
seamless, and efficient implementation of security relevant DON
programs, priorities, and initiatives.
3. Department of Navy Security Program. The programmatic
planning, expenditures, and return on investment estimating
process for the DON SE.
4. Industrial Security. A multi-disciplinary security program
concerned with the protection of classified information
developed by or entrusted to U.S. industry.
5. Information. Any knowledge that can be communicated or
documentary material, regardless of its physical form or
characteristics, that is owned by, produced by or for, or is
under the control of the U.S. Government.
6. Information Security. The security discipline concerned
with implementation of a system of administrative policies and
procedures for identifying, controlling, and protecting from
unauthorized disclosure, information that is authorized
protection by executive order, statute, or regulation.
Information security includes protection of classified,
controlled unclassified, and SCI.
15. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
2 Enclosure (4)
7. Insider Threat. The threat that an insider will use his or
her authorized access to do harm to the security of the U.S.,
including damage through espionage, terrorism, or unauthorized
disclosure of information, or through the loss or degradation of
resources or capabilities.
8. Operations Security. A process of identifying critical
information and analyzing friendly actions attendant to military
operations and other activities to:
a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary
intelligence systems.
b. Determine indicators and vulnerabilities that adversary
intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or
pieced together to derive critical information in time to be
useful to adversaries, and determine which of these represent an
unacceptable risk.
c. Select and execute countermeasures that eliminate or
reduce to an acceptable level the risks to friendly actions and
operations or reduce it to an acceptable level.
9. Personnel Security. The security discipline that assesses
the loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness of individuals for
initial and continued eligibility for access to classified
information or assignment in sensitive positions.
10. Physical Security. Security concerned with physical
measures designed to safeguard personnel; prevent unauthorized
access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and
defend them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.
11. Research, Development, and Acquisition Protection. The
safeguarding of selected research, technology, information, and
associated support systems, during the research, development,
test, evaluation, and acquisition processes.
12. Security. Proactive measures employed to safeguard
personnel, information, operations, resources, technologies,
facilities, and other items deemed vital against harm, loss, or
hostile acts and influences.
16. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
3 Enclosure (4)
13. Security Framework. Structure or architecture describing
how security disciplines relate to and interact with each other.
14. Security Professional. A functional career occupation in
which the incumbent executes or manages Federal Government
agency or Industrial Security programs and related security
activities, ensuring compliance with government security
policies, directives, and procedures. Examples of
responsibilities and position titles include: Activity Security
Manager, Chief Security Officer, Field Security Officer, Area
Security Officer, Special Security Representative, Program
Security Officer, or Security Guard.
15. Sensitive Compartmented Information. Classified national
intelligence concerning or derived from intelligence sources
and/or methods that must be protected within formal control
systems established and overseen by the DNI.
16. Special Access Program. A program established for a
specific class of classified information that imposes
safeguarding and access requirements that exceed those normally
required for information at the same classification level.
17. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
Enclosure (5)
RESPONSIBILITIES
1. DUSN (Policy). The DUSN (Policy), serving as the DON
Security Executive under the direction and control of the SECNAV
and Under Secretary of the Navy, shall:
a. Exercise security responsibilities as described in
references (a) through (c) for the development and integration
of risk-managed security and protection policies and programs
across the DON.
b. Serve as the Senior Executive responsible for DON SE
management, accountability, and oversight decisions, and makes
security-related resource recommendations to the SECNAV.
c. Chair the DON SE EXCOM.
d. Advise the SECNAV on security policy and training
matters, and provide recommendations on key policy decisions
facilitating cross-functional security policy coordination.
e. Publish and implement security instructions.
f. Coordinate with Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy
(Management) (DUSN (Management)), ASN (FM&C), CNO, and CMC to
identify and program security-related requirements and
efficiencies.
g. Report to and advise the SECNAV on the security
implications of strategic planning decisions and other
significant issues raised by the DON SE EXCOM.
h. Oversee DON security policies, plans, programs, and
resources and ensure security policies and programs are aligned,
designed and managed to improve performance, economy, and
efficiency.
i. Ensure DON SE has timely access to appropriate
intelligence and counterintelligence products reporting threats
to the DON.
j. Ensure DON security policy and programs are implemented
per applicable laws, policies, regulations, and orders,
including, but not limited to, the need for a Privacy Impact
18. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
2 Enclosure (5)
Assessment and System of Records Notice prior to the retention
of any DON Insider Threat Program records in a database.
k. Facilitate oversight inspections by the Office of the
Naval Inspector General and other cleared officials.
l. Provide oversight over implementation of a security
framework within the DON.
m. Serve as the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) policy
approval authority, and maintain cognizance over Director,
Strategic Systems Programs implementation of PRP policy, as well
as conduct all formal policy coordination external to the DON,
per references (q) and (r).
n. Provide oversight of and coordinate DON law enforcement
and antiterrorism force protection policy per references (ah)
through (ai).
o. Coordinate with DUSN (Management), NCIS, ASN (RD&A), ASN
(FM&C), ASN (EI&E), and DON CIO, as appropriate, to establish
DON SE policy, procedures, and investment goals that align with
those established for nuclear physical security, foreign
disclosure, security cooperation, technology transfer, export
control, cybersecurity, antiterrorism, force protection and
mission assurance. Efforts shall be informed by other security-
related efforts, e.g., CIP, insider threat initiatives, and CPI
protection.
p. Coordinate with ASN (M&RA) to ensure DON SE policy,
procedures, and investment goals are in compliance with
workforce mix, personnel policy, and procedures.
q. Coordinate with ASN (RD&A), ASN (EI&E), ASN (FM&C), and
DON CIO, as appropriate, to achieve maximum efficiency, by
reducing redundancy, administrative overhead, and identifying
opportunities for cost-savings by leveraging best practices.
2. DUSN (Management), CNO, and CMC. DUSN (Management), CNO,
and CMC shall:
a. Appoint a representative at the GO/FO/SES level to serve
as a DON SE EXCOM member and fulfill the responsibilities
identified in enclosure (2) of this instruction.
19. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
3 Enclosure (5)
b. Review security programs, procedures, and management
structures to develop methodologies to quantify and document
cost data.
c. Assist with development of the DON security framework
and strategic plan.
d. Establish security education, training, certification,
and professional development programs that are integrated with
the DON SE policy, procedures, and investment goals.
e. Ensure DoD and DON security policies and guidance are
implemented.
f. Promote proactive, informed execution of security
requirements within the service, predicated upon the premise
that security is everyone’s responsibility, and provide
oversight to confirm all service personnel understand their
roles and responsibilities in ensuring DON security.
g. Establish programs to hire, train, and retain a
professional security workforce consistent with this instruction
and references (t) and (u).
h. Align service security investment portfolio with DSE and
DON SE policies and guidance.
i. The GO/FO/SES level designated single service security
program executive shall:
(1) Have knowledge of the security disciplines within
the DSE and DON SE necessary to facilitate and oversee
implementation of the DSE and DON SE security framework and
strategic plans and the requirements of this directive within
the service.
(2) Provide leadership for and maintain cognizance over
the service’s process for resourcing its security program, to
ensure adequate investment of resources to support an integrated
security program, and provide information on those efforts as
requested by the DON SE.
20. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
4 Enclosure (5)
(3) Share cost, schedule, and performance data regarding
the service’s security program and investments with the EXCOM as
needed for execution of its responsibilities.
i. Designate appropriate personnel for sub-groups when
requested by the DON SE Chair.
j. Identify efficiencies, redundancies, unnecessary
administrative overhead, and opportunities for remediation to
achieve cost-savings through leveraging best practices and other
measures.
3. ASN (RD&A). The ASN (RD&A) shall:
a. Appoint a representative at the GO/FO/SES level to serve
on the DON SE EXCOM.
b. Assist with development of the DON SE Strategic Plan.
c. Provide advice to the DON SE and the DON SE EXCOM within
assigned areas of responsibility, including procurement policy
and Defense Industrial Base implementation.
d. Identify efficiencies, redundancies, unnecessary
administrative overhead, and opportunities and identify
remediation to achieve cost-savings through leveraging best
practices and other measures.
e. Ensure policies, decisions, and recommendations
regarding modifications in security policy, programs, and
initiatives are issued and implemented across RDT&E Federal and
contract constituencies.
f. Assist with development of CPI protection governance
structure, to include applicable strategy, policy, and procedure
for CPI identification and program protection planning.
4. ASN (M&RA). The ASN (M&RA) shall:
a. Appoint a representative at the GO/FO/SES level to serve
on the DON SE EXCOM.
b. Assist with development of the DON SE Strategic Plan.
21. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
5 Enclosure (5)
c. Provide advice, as necessary or requested, to the DON SE
and DON SE EXCOM on civilian and military personnel issues,
including those related to position sensitivity designation,
performance standards, and evaluation criteria.
d. Program and plan for security-related education,
training, support, and oversight requirements.
e. Ensure requirements, training, and standards are issued
to Reserve and Active Components.
f. Support development and execute a methodology for
identifying and documenting DON security positions.
5. ASN (FM&C). The ASN (FM&C) shall:
a. Appoint a representative at the GO/FO/SES level to serve
on the DON SE EXCOM.
b. Provide advice, as necessary or requested, to the DON SE
and DON SE EXCOM on issues related to security funding, costs,
and performance measures.
c. Review DON resources, billet structure, and overhead to
identify potential efficiencies, reduce redundancy, and achieve
cost-savings.
d. Endeavor to identify efficiencies, redundancies,
unnecessary administrative overhead, opportunities, and
remediation to achieve cost-savings through leveraging best
practices and other measures.
6. GC. The GC shall:
a. Appoint a representative at the GO/FO/SES level to serve
on the DON SE EXCOM.
b. Provide legal advice and counsel, as necessary or
requested, to the DON Security Executive and DON SE EXCOM.
7. DON CIO. The DON CIO shall:
a. Appoint a representative at the GO/FO/SES level to serve
on the DON SE EXCOM.
22. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
6 Enclosure (5)
b. Assist with development of the DON security framework
and mission assurance governance structure, to include
applicable strategy, policy, procedures, and investment goals,
as the DON office of primary responsibility for cybersecurity
and CIP.
8. DIRNCIS. The DIRNCIS, shall:
a. Appoint a representative at the GO/FO/SES level to serve
on the DON SE EXCOM.
b. Provide advice, as necessary or requested, to the DON SE
and DON SE EXCOM on investigative, law enforcement, physical
security, technical surveillance countermeasures, and
counterintelligence programs with the DON.
9. DON SAPCO. The Director, DON SAPCO shall:
a. Appoint a representative at the GO/FO/SES level to serve
on the DON SE EXCOM.
b. Assist with development of the DON security framework
and strategic plan.
c. Develop SAP security policy that is coordinated with the
DON SE EXCOM as appropriate.
10. DNI. The DNI shall:
a. Appoint a representative at the GO/FO/SES level to serve
on the DON SE EXCOM.
b. Assist with development of the defense security
framework and strategic plan and coordinate with the DUSN
(Policy) to establish SCI policy that aligns with the DON SE
policy, procedures, and investment goals.
11. ASN (EI&E). The ASN (EI&E) shall:
a. Appoint a representative at the GO/FO/SES level to serve
on the DON SE EXCOM.
b. Support development of a methodology for identifying,
documenting, and quantifying security positions and costs.
23. SECNAVINST 5500.36
19 MAY 2015
7 Enclosure (5)
c. Endeavor to identify efficiencies, redundancies,
unnecessary administrative overhead, opportunities and
remediation to achieve cost-savings through leveraging best
practices and other measures.
12. CHINFO. The CHINFO shall:
a. Appoint a representative at the GO/FO/SES level to serve
on the DON SE EXCOM.
b. Provide public affairs and communication advice and
counsel, as necessary or requested, to the DON Security
Executive and DON SE EXCOM.
13. In addition to responsibilities listed above, all members
of the DON SE are responsible for supporting enhanced
accountability and documentation of security costs, capturing
and communicating capability shortfalls, and maintaining an
active OPSEC posture.