Although the U.S. Navy has yet to make a formal announcement that the nuclear Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile (TLAM/N) has been retired, a new updated navy instruction shows that the weapon is gone.
The evidence comes not in the form of an explicit statement, but from what has been deleted from the U.S. Navy’s instruction Department of the Navy Nuclear Weapons Responsibilities and Authorities (SECNAVINST 8120.1A).
While the previous version of the instruction from 2010 included a whole sub-section describing TLAM/N responsibilities, the new version published on February 15, 2013, contains no mentioning of the TLAM/N at all and the previous sub-section has been deleted.
Navy security enterprise secnav 5500-36AnonDownload
This document establishes the Department of the Navy Security Enterprise (DON SE) and assigns responsibilities. It defines the DON SE as an integrated framework that provides central oversight and governance over security policies relating to personnel, information, physical security, operations, and more. It establishes the DON SE Executive Committee to provide strategic administration and policy coordination for the DON SE. It assigns the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy as the DON Security Executive and chair of the DON SE Executive Committee.
US Public law - Research on effects of Ocean Disposal of MunitionsGeoffrey Carton
This document discusses the Department of Defense's efforts to research and address risks from disposed military munitions in coastal waters. It requires the DOD to:
1) Conduct a review to identify locations where munitions were disposed of in coastal waters and the types of munitions.
2) Provide information to help identify navigation and safety hazards and continue informing ocean users of risks.
3) Research effects of disposed munitions on the ocean environment through sampling, analysis and health investigations at representative coastal sites.
4) Monitor specific sites if the research finds contamination or significant health risks.
Jonathan Larrew has over 20 years of experience as a United States Army Diver and Combat Engineer, including experience supervising diving operations and managing teams of divers. He has expertise in areas such as underwater construction, salvage operations, demolition, and safety management. Currently seeking new opportunities after retiring from the military on March 31, 2015 with a Secret security clearance.
The document summarizes the first annual report of the Interagency Coordination Group of Inspectors General for Guam Realignment. It provides an overview of the Defense Posture Review Initiative that establishes the framework for realigning US forces from Japan to Guam. It also summarizes programs and operations funded for military construction on Guam in 2009, including obligations and expenditures from the DoD, other federal agencies, and revenues provided by the government of Japan. The report identifies projects, programs, operating expenses, contracts, and grants related to the realignment.
Smp2 part b policy statements newport-usk only_finalSevern Estuary
This document summarizes the local coastal management plan for an area along the Severn Estuary in South Wales, including the city of Newport. It outlines 5 policy units - NEW 1 to NEW 5 - and describes the preferred coastal management policies for each over the next 100 years to balance flood risk management with nature conservation and development needs. The key drivers are international nature sites, critical infrastructure like railways and ports, and residential areas. For units NEW 1 and NEW 2, which border Newport, the preferred long-term policy is to "Hold the Line" and maintain existing flood defenses to protect properties and infrastructure. For unit NEW 3 along the River Usk, the plan shifts to "No Active Intervention" and then "Managed
Smp2 part b policy statements caldicot only_finalSevern Estuary
This document summarizes the preferred policies for three policy units in the Caldicot Levels area of the Severn Estuary:
- CALD 1 (Uskmouth Power Station point to Sudbrook point) will have a Hold the Line policy to protect coastal defences and maintain flood protection for infrastructure and development.
- CALD 2 (Sudbrook point to Black Rock) will have a No Active Intervention policy as high ground and geology limit flood and erosion risks.
- CALD 3 (Black Rock to River Wye) is not described.
Smp2 part b policy statements glos-haw bridge only_finalSevern Estuary
The document provides local details for several policy units along the Severn Estuary between Gloucester and Haw Bridge. For policy unit MAI 1, the preferred policy is managed realignment for the first epoch to allow habitat creation by establishing a new set back defense line, then hold the line for the next two epochs to maintain the new defenses. For policy unit MAI 2, the preferred policy is hold the line for all three epochs to maintain existing and new defenses along this reach. For policy unit MAI 3, the preferred policy for the first epoch is no active intervention since there is limited flood risk, but mitigation may be considered for some properties.
Appendix c baseline understanding final_dec2010Severn Estuary
This document contains three parts that provide baseline information for the Severn Estuary Shoreline Management Plan Review (SMP2):
Part A assesses coastal processes and evolution in the estuary based on geology, geomorphology, hydrodynamics, and sediment transport.
Part B details existing coastal defences along the shoreline based on surveys and updates from local authorities. It considers residual life of defences over 20, 50, and 100 years.
Part C develops baseline scenarios of shoreline change under conditions of No Active Intervention (NAI) and With Present Management (WPM), taking into account climate change and potential defence failure over different time periods. It aims to improve understanding of coastal risks to inform SMP
Navy security enterprise secnav 5500-36AnonDownload
This document establishes the Department of the Navy Security Enterprise (DON SE) and assigns responsibilities. It defines the DON SE as an integrated framework that provides central oversight and governance over security policies relating to personnel, information, physical security, operations, and more. It establishes the DON SE Executive Committee to provide strategic administration and policy coordination for the DON SE. It assigns the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy as the DON Security Executive and chair of the DON SE Executive Committee.
US Public law - Research on effects of Ocean Disposal of MunitionsGeoffrey Carton
This document discusses the Department of Defense's efforts to research and address risks from disposed military munitions in coastal waters. It requires the DOD to:
1) Conduct a review to identify locations where munitions were disposed of in coastal waters and the types of munitions.
2) Provide information to help identify navigation and safety hazards and continue informing ocean users of risks.
3) Research effects of disposed munitions on the ocean environment through sampling, analysis and health investigations at representative coastal sites.
4) Monitor specific sites if the research finds contamination or significant health risks.
Jonathan Larrew has over 20 years of experience as a United States Army Diver and Combat Engineer, including experience supervising diving operations and managing teams of divers. He has expertise in areas such as underwater construction, salvage operations, demolition, and safety management. Currently seeking new opportunities after retiring from the military on March 31, 2015 with a Secret security clearance.
The document summarizes the first annual report of the Interagency Coordination Group of Inspectors General for Guam Realignment. It provides an overview of the Defense Posture Review Initiative that establishes the framework for realigning US forces from Japan to Guam. It also summarizes programs and operations funded for military construction on Guam in 2009, including obligations and expenditures from the DoD, other federal agencies, and revenues provided by the government of Japan. The report identifies projects, programs, operating expenses, contracts, and grants related to the realignment.
Smp2 part b policy statements newport-usk only_finalSevern Estuary
This document summarizes the local coastal management plan for an area along the Severn Estuary in South Wales, including the city of Newport. It outlines 5 policy units - NEW 1 to NEW 5 - and describes the preferred coastal management policies for each over the next 100 years to balance flood risk management with nature conservation and development needs. The key drivers are international nature sites, critical infrastructure like railways and ports, and residential areas. For units NEW 1 and NEW 2, which border Newport, the preferred long-term policy is to "Hold the Line" and maintain existing flood defenses to protect properties and infrastructure. For unit NEW 3 along the River Usk, the plan shifts to "No Active Intervention" and then "Managed
Smp2 part b policy statements caldicot only_finalSevern Estuary
This document summarizes the preferred policies for three policy units in the Caldicot Levels area of the Severn Estuary:
- CALD 1 (Uskmouth Power Station point to Sudbrook point) will have a Hold the Line policy to protect coastal defences and maintain flood protection for infrastructure and development.
- CALD 2 (Sudbrook point to Black Rock) will have a No Active Intervention policy as high ground and geology limit flood and erosion risks.
- CALD 3 (Black Rock to River Wye) is not described.
Smp2 part b policy statements glos-haw bridge only_finalSevern Estuary
The document provides local details for several policy units along the Severn Estuary between Gloucester and Haw Bridge. For policy unit MAI 1, the preferred policy is managed realignment for the first epoch to allow habitat creation by establishing a new set back defense line, then hold the line for the next two epochs to maintain the new defenses. For policy unit MAI 2, the preferred policy is hold the line for all three epochs to maintain existing and new defenses along this reach. For policy unit MAI 3, the preferred policy for the first epoch is no active intervention since there is limited flood risk, but mitigation may be considered for some properties.
Appendix c baseline understanding final_dec2010Severn Estuary
This document contains three parts that provide baseline information for the Severn Estuary Shoreline Management Plan Review (SMP2):
Part A assesses coastal processes and evolution in the estuary based on geology, geomorphology, hydrodynamics, and sediment transport.
Part B details existing coastal defences along the shoreline based on surveys and updates from local authorities. It considers residual life of defences over 20, 50, and 100 years.
Part C develops baseline scenarios of shoreline change under conditions of No Active Intervention (NAI) and With Present Management (WPM), taking into account climate change and potential defence failure over different time periods. It aims to improve understanding of coastal risks to inform SMP
Appendix a development of the smp2 final_dec2010Severn Estuary
This document provides background information on the development of the second generation Shoreline Management Plan (SMP2) for the Severn Estuary. It discusses the purpose and process of SMPs, including considering longer timescales and factors like climate change. It also describes the relationship between the SMP2 and the parallel Flood Risk Management Strategy (SEFRMS) study. The SEFRMS will develop the policies in the SMP2 into more detailed coastal defence options. Finally, it briefly outlines the progress that has been made nationally on shoreline management planning since the first generation of SMPs.
The document summarizes long-term stewardship activities at Amchitka Island in Alaska. Major activities include soil and groundwater monitoring to ensure restrictions on access to subsurface contamination are enforced. The site covers 30,000 hectares and long-term stewardship is estimated to cost $23,000 annually and will continue in perpetuity. Monitoring involves sampling soil and groundwater every 5 years to restrict access to nuclear test sites on the island and ensure contaminants remain isolated.
This document provides an executive summary of the Guam and CNMI Military Relocation (2012 Roadmap Adjustments) SEIS Final from July 2015. It summarizes the purpose and need for the proposed action to establish an operational U.S. Marine Corps presence on Guam to support a reduced number of Marines relocating from Okinawa per the 2012 Roadmap Adjustments. Key aspects of the proposed action include construction of a smaller cantonment area and family housing, as well as a live-fire training range complex. The summary discusses the reduced scale of the proposed action and associated population impacts compared to the previous proposal in the 2010 EIS. It also provides an overview of the project alternatives considered.
Cleanup of munitions contamination from military sites poses major environmental challenges for the EPA. Thousands of former military sites covering millions of acres are contaminated with munitions. Cleanup is estimated to cost over $13 billion. In addition, underwater munitions sites present technical and funding issues. Public lands transferred from the military also contain munitions that endanger employees and the public. There are longstanding policy disagreements between the EPA and Department of Defense around cleanup requirements and oversight of munitions sites.
This document summarizes an economic appraisal of the preferred plan for the Severn Estuary Shoreline Management Plan Review (SMP2). It finds that:
1) Allowing natural coastal evolution with no active intervention would result in significant economic damages from flooding and loss of assets over time.
2) Implementing the preferred plan of maintaining or improving coastal defences would cost an estimated $15 million but would prevent substantial economic damages estimated at $30 million.
3) A high-level benefit-cost assessment finds the preferred plan is economically viable, with benefits expected to outweigh the costs. However, more detailed analysis will be required to justify specific future schemes.
Jonathan Larrew has over 20 years of experience as a United States Army Diver and Combat Engineer, including experience supervising diving operations and managing safety programs. He has extensive experience in areas such as underwater construction, salvage operations, explosive demolitions, and hyperbaric medicine. Currently seeking new opportunities after retiring from the Army in March 2015 with the rank of Master Sergeant, where he most recently supervised a team of 25 divers.
Smp2 part b policy statements cardiff only_finalSevern Estuary
The document outlines policies for three policy units along the Cardiff coastline in Wales:
1) CAR 1 focuses on Cardiff Bay Barrage and prefers a long-term policy of holding the line to maintain defences and manage flood risk.
2) CAR 2 covers an area west of Cardiff Bay and also prefers holding the line to maintain earth embankments and manage flood risk to urban areas.
3) CAR 3 covers both banks of the River Rhymney and prefers holding the line to maintain defences and manage flood risk, including to a landfill site.
The policies aim to balance flood protection for communities with potential environmental impacts like coastal squeeze over the long term.
Augments crisis communication case study of Air Force's reaction to having lost six nuclear missiles in 2007. Find the presentation at http://storify.com/higginbomb/lost-missiles-and-lost-messages
This is my presentation to the AFCEA Course in Fairfax, VA. This course is put on by AFCEA to give insight into where the GCCS system is going in regard to transitioning to Joint Command and Control Capabilities (JC2C).
The 2008 hurricane season was active, with 16 named storms, 8 hurricanes, and 5 major hurricanes in the Atlantic basin. Six storms made landfall in the US, causing $24 billion in damages. The eastern North Pacific season was below average with 16 storms, 7 hurricanes, and 2 major hurricanes. Official forecasts from the National Hurricane Center set new records for accuracy. The 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron flew 1150 hours during the season in support of forecasts. The NOAA Aircraft Operations Center flew 26 missions with its WP-3Ds and G-IV to monitor storms.
Capt. Ash Evans relieved Capt. Michael Angove as commanding officer of the Joint Typhoon Warning Center in May. Rear Adm. Jonathan White presided over the change of command ceremony and retirement ceremony for Angove, who will take a new position at NOAA. Cmdr. Richard Kennedy also relieved Cmdr. Bill Sommer as commanding officer of the Naval Oceanography Anti-Submarine Warfare Center. Several oceanography officers were selected for promotion. The Fleet Survey Team conducted hydrographic surveys in Albania and the Naval Oceanographic Office participated in a mine warfare exercise. A new boat maintenance facility was opened at Stennis Space Center.
This document summarizes Vincent Terrell's military experience and training from 2011 to 2016. He served as a Chemical Operations Specialist and Infantryman in the Army National Guard, with duties including operating smoke generating and NBC detection equipment and performing infantry tasks. His training included courses in antiterrorism, Arabic language, hazardous materials handling, chemical operations specialist skills, combat lifesaver techniques, and basic combat training.
1) The study examined interventions to prevent common lower-limb injuries in the New Zealand Defense Force.
2) Ankle sprains and knee sprains were the most common injuries, and ankle instability was identified as a common causal factor.
3) Ankle bracing and stability training were identified as strategies targeting ankle instability, but stability training was considered more appropriate for the military due to lower ongoing costs and better effectiveness under varying physical demands.
David Zanni served in the Navy from 2011 to 2014, holding roles including Seaman Recruit, Seamen, and Logistics Specialist. He completed various military training courses covering topics such as firefighting, supply operations, security force techniques, and weapons handling. His military experience and training would relate to civilian occupations involving logistics, stock handling, and maritime roles.
George Currier is seeking a position in law enforcement. He has 14 years of experience in law enforcement, including serving in the U.S. Navy for over 11 years. His experience includes roles as a training petty officer, watch commander, field training officer, and coxswain on patrol boats. He has extensive training and certifications in areas such as homeland security, hazardous materials handling, and emergency response. He has a secret security clearance and references available upon request.
Psychological research on radar observer trainingClifford Stone
This document provides a summary of psychological research conducted on the selection and training of radar observers in the Army Air Forces during World War II. It describes job analyses of radar observers' duties, the development of standardized proficiency tests and performance checks, methods for measuring bombing accuracy, studies of selection tests and their validity, and suggestions for future research. The research aimed to improve the training and evaluation of radar observers.
This is the document that people have had many questions about. It is the US Army's unclassified version released in 2005. Some people this document has something to do with Fema prison camps or Jade Helm but it doesn't appear to be.
The document discusses various topics related to naval warfare areas, operations, teams, and systems. It describes the missions and purposes of anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, information warfare, air warfare, strike warfare, and naval special warfare. It also discusses how the reserve component integrates with the active component, the purpose of direct support assets and mobile detachment teams, and the roles of various deployable meteorology and oceanography teams. Finally, it defines blue and red teams, explains the purpose of fleet electronic support, and discusses the purposes of the cryptologic carry-on program, navy integrated tactical environmental subsystem, and joint deployable intelligence support system.
'Foreign Policy' Exclusive: The Pentagon Has a Plan to Stop the Zombie Apocalypse. Seriously.
Everything you need to know about the U.S. military’s defense strategy to protect humanity from the walking dead.
Global Village in Dubai is an award-winning festival that showcases the cultures and heritages of many countries around the world. Visitors can experience different country pavilions and enjoy games and activities for all ages in a comfortable and fun atmosphere. The global village is located in Dubailand on Emirates Road in Dubai.
Global Village in Dubai is an award-winning festival that showcases the cultures and heritages of many countries around the world. Visitors can experience different country pavilions and enjoy games and activities for all ages in a comfortable and fun atmosphere. The global village is located on Emirates Road in Dubailand.
Appendix a development of the smp2 final_dec2010Severn Estuary
This document provides background information on the development of the second generation Shoreline Management Plan (SMP2) for the Severn Estuary. It discusses the purpose and process of SMPs, including considering longer timescales and factors like climate change. It also describes the relationship between the SMP2 and the parallel Flood Risk Management Strategy (SEFRMS) study. The SEFRMS will develop the policies in the SMP2 into more detailed coastal defence options. Finally, it briefly outlines the progress that has been made nationally on shoreline management planning since the first generation of SMPs.
The document summarizes long-term stewardship activities at Amchitka Island in Alaska. Major activities include soil and groundwater monitoring to ensure restrictions on access to subsurface contamination are enforced. The site covers 30,000 hectares and long-term stewardship is estimated to cost $23,000 annually and will continue in perpetuity. Monitoring involves sampling soil and groundwater every 5 years to restrict access to nuclear test sites on the island and ensure contaminants remain isolated.
This document provides an executive summary of the Guam and CNMI Military Relocation (2012 Roadmap Adjustments) SEIS Final from July 2015. It summarizes the purpose and need for the proposed action to establish an operational U.S. Marine Corps presence on Guam to support a reduced number of Marines relocating from Okinawa per the 2012 Roadmap Adjustments. Key aspects of the proposed action include construction of a smaller cantonment area and family housing, as well as a live-fire training range complex. The summary discusses the reduced scale of the proposed action and associated population impacts compared to the previous proposal in the 2010 EIS. It also provides an overview of the project alternatives considered.
Cleanup of munitions contamination from military sites poses major environmental challenges for the EPA. Thousands of former military sites covering millions of acres are contaminated with munitions. Cleanup is estimated to cost over $13 billion. In addition, underwater munitions sites present technical and funding issues. Public lands transferred from the military also contain munitions that endanger employees and the public. There are longstanding policy disagreements between the EPA and Department of Defense around cleanup requirements and oversight of munitions sites.
This document summarizes an economic appraisal of the preferred plan for the Severn Estuary Shoreline Management Plan Review (SMP2). It finds that:
1) Allowing natural coastal evolution with no active intervention would result in significant economic damages from flooding and loss of assets over time.
2) Implementing the preferred plan of maintaining or improving coastal defences would cost an estimated $15 million but would prevent substantial economic damages estimated at $30 million.
3) A high-level benefit-cost assessment finds the preferred plan is economically viable, with benefits expected to outweigh the costs. However, more detailed analysis will be required to justify specific future schemes.
Jonathan Larrew has over 20 years of experience as a United States Army Diver and Combat Engineer, including experience supervising diving operations and managing safety programs. He has extensive experience in areas such as underwater construction, salvage operations, explosive demolitions, and hyperbaric medicine. Currently seeking new opportunities after retiring from the Army in March 2015 with the rank of Master Sergeant, where he most recently supervised a team of 25 divers.
Smp2 part b policy statements cardiff only_finalSevern Estuary
The document outlines policies for three policy units along the Cardiff coastline in Wales:
1) CAR 1 focuses on Cardiff Bay Barrage and prefers a long-term policy of holding the line to maintain defences and manage flood risk.
2) CAR 2 covers an area west of Cardiff Bay and also prefers holding the line to maintain earth embankments and manage flood risk to urban areas.
3) CAR 3 covers both banks of the River Rhymney and prefers holding the line to maintain defences and manage flood risk, including to a landfill site.
The policies aim to balance flood protection for communities with potential environmental impacts like coastal squeeze over the long term.
Augments crisis communication case study of Air Force's reaction to having lost six nuclear missiles in 2007. Find the presentation at http://storify.com/higginbomb/lost-missiles-and-lost-messages
This is my presentation to the AFCEA Course in Fairfax, VA. This course is put on by AFCEA to give insight into where the GCCS system is going in regard to transitioning to Joint Command and Control Capabilities (JC2C).
The 2008 hurricane season was active, with 16 named storms, 8 hurricanes, and 5 major hurricanes in the Atlantic basin. Six storms made landfall in the US, causing $24 billion in damages. The eastern North Pacific season was below average with 16 storms, 7 hurricanes, and 2 major hurricanes. Official forecasts from the National Hurricane Center set new records for accuracy. The 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron flew 1150 hours during the season in support of forecasts. The NOAA Aircraft Operations Center flew 26 missions with its WP-3Ds and G-IV to monitor storms.
Capt. Ash Evans relieved Capt. Michael Angove as commanding officer of the Joint Typhoon Warning Center in May. Rear Adm. Jonathan White presided over the change of command ceremony and retirement ceremony for Angove, who will take a new position at NOAA. Cmdr. Richard Kennedy also relieved Cmdr. Bill Sommer as commanding officer of the Naval Oceanography Anti-Submarine Warfare Center. Several oceanography officers were selected for promotion. The Fleet Survey Team conducted hydrographic surveys in Albania and the Naval Oceanographic Office participated in a mine warfare exercise. A new boat maintenance facility was opened at Stennis Space Center.
This document summarizes Vincent Terrell's military experience and training from 2011 to 2016. He served as a Chemical Operations Specialist and Infantryman in the Army National Guard, with duties including operating smoke generating and NBC detection equipment and performing infantry tasks. His training included courses in antiterrorism, Arabic language, hazardous materials handling, chemical operations specialist skills, combat lifesaver techniques, and basic combat training.
1) The study examined interventions to prevent common lower-limb injuries in the New Zealand Defense Force.
2) Ankle sprains and knee sprains were the most common injuries, and ankle instability was identified as a common causal factor.
3) Ankle bracing and stability training were identified as strategies targeting ankle instability, but stability training was considered more appropriate for the military due to lower ongoing costs and better effectiveness under varying physical demands.
David Zanni served in the Navy from 2011 to 2014, holding roles including Seaman Recruit, Seamen, and Logistics Specialist. He completed various military training courses covering topics such as firefighting, supply operations, security force techniques, and weapons handling. His military experience and training would relate to civilian occupations involving logistics, stock handling, and maritime roles.
George Currier is seeking a position in law enforcement. He has 14 years of experience in law enforcement, including serving in the U.S. Navy for over 11 years. His experience includes roles as a training petty officer, watch commander, field training officer, and coxswain on patrol boats. He has extensive training and certifications in areas such as homeland security, hazardous materials handling, and emergency response. He has a secret security clearance and references available upon request.
Psychological research on radar observer trainingClifford Stone
This document provides a summary of psychological research conducted on the selection and training of radar observers in the Army Air Forces during World War II. It describes job analyses of radar observers' duties, the development of standardized proficiency tests and performance checks, methods for measuring bombing accuracy, studies of selection tests and their validity, and suggestions for future research. The research aimed to improve the training and evaluation of radar observers.
This is the document that people have had many questions about. It is the US Army's unclassified version released in 2005. Some people this document has something to do with Fema prison camps or Jade Helm but it doesn't appear to be.
The document discusses various topics related to naval warfare areas, operations, teams, and systems. It describes the missions and purposes of anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, information warfare, air warfare, strike warfare, and naval special warfare. It also discusses how the reserve component integrates with the active component, the purpose of direct support assets and mobile detachment teams, and the roles of various deployable meteorology and oceanography teams. Finally, it defines blue and red teams, explains the purpose of fleet electronic support, and discusses the purposes of the cryptologic carry-on program, navy integrated tactical environmental subsystem, and joint deployable intelligence support system.
'Foreign Policy' Exclusive: The Pentagon Has a Plan to Stop the Zombie Apocalypse. Seriously.
Everything you need to know about the U.S. military’s defense strategy to protect humanity from the walking dead.
Global Village in Dubai is an award-winning festival that showcases the cultures and heritages of many countries around the world. Visitors can experience different country pavilions and enjoy games and activities for all ages in a comfortable and fun atmosphere. The global village is located in Dubailand on Emirates Road in Dubai.
Global Village in Dubai is an award-winning festival that showcases the cultures and heritages of many countries around the world. Visitors can experience different country pavilions and enjoy games and activities for all ages in a comfortable and fun atmosphere. The global village is located on Emirates Road in Dubailand.
This document discusses managed metadata in SharePoint 2010. It covers the taxonomy tree structure including term stores, groups, term sets and terms. It then discusses CRUD operations for creating, updating, and deleting these taxonomy elements. It also covers exporting and importing taxonomy through CSV files. Next, it discusses the term picker control for selecting terms and setting up taxonomy fields to store term references. Finally, it ends with a Q&A section.
National Institute of Foundry and Forget Technology (NIFFT), RanchiNIFFT Ranchi
This presentation highlights the legacy of National Institute of Foundry and Forge Technology (NIFFT) as a premier research institute in metallurgical, manufacturing, foundry, and forging sectors. This presentation was presented on 23rd December 2013 to JS (NIT's) MHRD, Govt. of India.
CDBs are required for all Sailors upon reporting to a command, after six months on board, at 12-months on board and at 12-month intervals thereafter. Official guidance is contained in OPNAVINST 1040.11D, Navy Enlisted Retention and Career Development Program.
Typical topics covered during a CDB include watch-standing qualifications, continued education goals, advancement, short- and long-term career objectives, Perform-to-Serve (PTS) and Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) scores. Leadership can use CDBs to learn the priorities of the Sailor and align the Sailor’s priorities to the needs of the Navy.
Following the CBD, the detailed minutes and recommendations are captured in CIMS by the career counselor or member of the chain of command authorized by the command for documentation. This includes what was discussed and is used to help keep the current and future commands informed of the Sailor’s progress and career goals.
Click the latest Career Development Program Navy instruction: http://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/01000%20Military%20Personnel%20Support/01-01%20General%20Military%20Personnel%20Records/1040.11D.pdf
This document provides guidance for the Command Master Chief program in the Navy. It outlines the selection process and responsibilities for Fleet Master Chiefs, Force Master Chiefs, Command Master Chiefs, Chiefs of the Boat, and Command Senior Chiefs. It details eligibility requirements and discusses assignments, entitlements, and the roles of commanders in the program. The Command Master Chief program is intended to ensure effective leadership and development of sailors.
Vice Admiral Johnny Wolfe testified before the House Armed Services Committee about the priorities for the Department of Defense's nuclear forces. He discussed the importance of the sea-based leg of the nuclear triad provided by Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines armed with Trident II missiles. Wolfe emphasized that sustaining and modernizing this capability through programs like the Trident II Life Extension Program and Columbia-class submarine program are top priorities due to growing threats and the return of Great Power competition. He also stressed the importance of safety, security, and maintaining excellence in all aspects of the nuclear weapons program.
This document provides guidance on commissioning programs available to enlisted Navy personnel, including the U.S. Naval Academy, Officer Candidate School, Medical Enlisted Commissioning Program, Medical Service Corps In-service Procurement Program, Limited Duty Officer and Chief Warrant Officer programs, and Seaman to Admiral-21 Program. It outlines eligibility requirements and application procedures for each program. The document cancels OPNAVINST 1420.1A and directs commanding officers to follow the application procedures in the enclosure, which provides a manual on applying for enlisted commissioning programs.
What CMCs do and Programs they support (CTF20 CMC memo).pdfGlenn Mallo
The document outlines 25 authorities and responsibilities that Command Master Chiefs (CMCs) must perform according to Navy instruction, as well as 69 programs that CMCs are responsible for supporting. Some of the key duties of CMCs include providing leadership to the enlisted force, advising on policies concerning personnel issues, and upholding high standards of conduct. CMCs are also expected to support a wide range of programs focused on areas such as career development, family support, equal opportunity, and command readiness.
SSP is responsible for the submarine-launched ballistic missile system, which forms the survivable leg of America's nuclear triad. SSP has developed six generations of SLBMs since 1960, most recently the Trident II D5 missile. The Trident II D5 is undergoing life extension to serve into the 2040s and will arm both current Ohio-class submarines and their future replacement. SSP ensures the safety and security of all Navy nuclear weapons and works closely with submarine forces and international partners like the UK to maintain nuclear deterrence from the sea.
This instruction establishes requirements for Navy enlisted warfare qualification programs. It cancels previous instructions and consolidates requirements, specifying that each warfare program must maintain strict qualification procedures. It lists 11 current warfare programs overseen by various Navy commands and requires all sailors assigned to qualifying commands to become qualified within 30 months. Records will be managed according to Navy regulations.
Safety and Occupational Health Performance ProgramCrystal Guliford
Safety Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) researched,compiled,written and edited by CPT Crystal Guliford 2013 for military petroleum operations organization.
This document summarizes key aspects of U.S. Navy organization and command structure. It defines mission areas and locations for various combatant commands, fleet commands, and naval intelligence organizations. It also outlines the operating areas of numbered fleets and defines common naval task force organizational terms and identification ratings for meteorology and oceanography experts.
This document provides guidance on operation assessment techniques and procedures. It discusses:
1) Standardizing assessment terminology to ensure shared understanding.
2) Describing assessment as commander-centric, informing the commander's decision cycle through organized staff assessment efforts.
3) Presenting an assessment framework for organizing, analyzing, and communicating assessment data to decision makers. The framework includes examples from recent operations.
4) Guidance for planning assessments and integrating them into the operations process to identify emerging opportunities and risks and enable adaptation to accomplish objectives.
Donald McCutchen is seeking career opportunities in telecommunications and electromagnetic spectrum planning and operations. He has 23 years of experience in DoD telecommunications policy, planning and operations including terrestrial transmission systems, long haul high frequency transmission systems, and satellite communications systems. His experience over the past 12 years has focused on electromagnetic spectrum operation and radio frequency management and policy as a Communications Officer and enlisted communicator in the U.S. Marine Corps. He has held positions as a Spectrum Management Officer for U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe and Africa, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6 for U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe and Africa, and Spectrum Management Officer for U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command and I Marine
John D. Bennett has over 26 years of experience in the Navy as a submarine sonar technician and acoustic intelligence specialist. He has extensive operational experience completing over 35 global operations aboard U.S. submarines providing tactical support to commanding officers. Bennett has comprehensive experience in acoustic analysis, data collection and reporting as well as training on sonar systems and acoustic detection. Currently he serves as the Assistant Leading Chief Petty Officer for COMSUBLANT providing intelligence support.
This document discusses concepts for Marine Corps support to domestic civil authorities through Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations. It outlines key DSCA concepts including command relationships, pre-scripted mission assignments, sea-based responses, and pre-staging of equipment. The document also provides details on Marine Expeditionary Force Liaison Officer assignments to FEMA regions and "dual-use" Marine Corps and Navy capabilities that support emergency support functions.
The document provides a summary of Arthur P. McGregor's work experience, including his current role as Associate Director for Kinetic Weapons Technologies at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, where he oversees $750M in annual spending on kinetic weapons science and technology programs. It details his participation in reviews of major defense acquisition programs and technology assessments. The document also outlines his prior experience in university research programs at the Department of Defense and engineering roles related to night vision and electro-optical systems.
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US Navy Instruction Confirms Retirement of Nuclear Tomahawk Cruise Missile
1. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
1000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 2 0350-1000 SECNAVINST 8120.1A
DNS
15 February 2013
SECNAV INSTRUCTION 8120.1A
From: Secretary of the Navy
Subj: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY NUCLEAR WEAPONS RESPONSIBILITIES
AND AUTHORITIES
Ref: (a) 42 U.S.C. §2011 et seq
(b) DoD Directive 3150.2 of 23 Dec 1996
(c) DoD Manual 3150.2-M, DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety
Program, of 23 Dec 1996
(d) Navy Nuclear Weapons Oversight Council Charter, of 24
Feb 09 (NOTAL).
(e) DoD Manual S-5210.41-M Nuclear Weapon Security
Manual: DoD Nuclear Weapon Environment-Specific
Requirements (U), of July 13, 2009
(f) DoD Regulation 5210.42-R, Nuclear Weapons Personnel
Reliability Program, Incorporating Change 1, of 10
Nov 2009
(g) SECNAVINST S8126.1
(h) CJCSI 6811.01B (SECRET)
(i) CJCSI 3263.05
(j) DoD Instruction 3150.10 of 2 Jul 2010
(k) DoD Manual 3150.8-M, Nuclear Weapon Accident Response
Procedures, of 22 Feb 2005
(l) CJCSI 3150.04 (FOUO)
(m) DoD Directive 3150.08 of 20 Jan 2010
Encl: (1) Summary of Nuclear Weapon Activities Functional
Responsibilities
(2) OPNAV Nuclear Weapons Resource Sponsorship Areas
1. Purpose. To define policy, responsibilities, and
authorities for the safe, secure, and reliable stewardship of
Department of the Navy (DON) nuclear weapons (NW) and NW
systems.
2. Cancellation. SECNAVINST 8120.1
3. Policy. In support of Department of Defense (DoD) policy,
DON policy requires special considerations be given to NW and NW
systems because of their political and military importance,
2. SECNAVINST 8120.1A
15 February 2013
their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an
accident or unauthorized act.
4. Objective. A key objective of the DON is to ensure that NW
and NW systems are designed, maintained, transported, stored,
and employed to maximize safety, security, and reliability
consistent with operational requirements.
5. Application and Scope. This instruction applies to all U.S.
Navy commands, activities, units, and forces having
responsibility for custody or supporting operations, life cycle
support, development, or acquisition of NW or NW systems and to
all U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) units providing direct support and
those specific activities required for security of DON NW.
Nuclear command and control and employment planning authorities
and responsibilities remain in accordance with operational
commander requirements.
6. Organizational and General Responsibilities
a. Per reference (a), and as delineated in references (b)
and (c), the responsibility for ensuring the safety and security
of all NW and NW systems for which the DON has DoD life-cycle
management responsibility is assigned to the Secretary of the
Navy (SECNAV). Within the DON, the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) is the principal advisor to the President and to SECNAV in
all matters relating to NW and NW systems. CNO establishes the
overarching requirements for NW and NW systems. Commander, U.S.
Fleet Forces Command (USFLTFORCOM); Commander, U.S. Pacific
Fleet (COMPACFLT); and Director, Strategic Systems Programs
(DIRSSP) are responsible for the safe, secure, and reliable
technical operation and maintenance of NW and NW systems under
their cognizance.
b. CNO staff offices will support SECNAV within their
assigned functional areas in a supported/supporting relationship
with other offices as delineated in this instruction when those
responsibilities involve NW and NW systems programs.
7. Specific Responsibility and Authority
a. CNO. The CNO shall oversee safety, security, and
reliability of DON NW and NW systems, and will:
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3. SECNAVINST 8120.1A
15 February 2013
(1) Maintain the Navy Nuclear Weapons Oversight Council
(NNWOC) to provide comprehensive oversight and coordination of
DON NW and NW systems across supporting/supported organizations
in accordance with reference (d).
(2) Conduct comprehensive assessments, at periodicities
of at least every two years, of DON NW and NW systems programs
and activities to ensure safe, secure, and reliable stewardship.
b. Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC). CMC shall provide
units in direct support of NW security at strategic weapons
facilities (SWF) and as SECNAV directs, in accordance with
references (e), (f), and (g), and will:
(1) Select and train USMC personnel for assignment to
duties which involve NW security.
(2) Implement DON NW security policy provided in this
instruction and other NW security policy that has been issued by
higher authority.
c. Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve
Affairs) (ASN M&RA). ASN M&RA shall exercise responsibility for
community leadership of DON government civilian personnel
supporting DON NW and NW systems.
d. Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Plans, Policy,
Oversight and Integration (DUSN PPOI). DUSN PPOI is the DON
echelon 1 supported senior executive to SECNAV assigned the
responsibility for Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) policy
approval. Additionally, the DUSN PPOI will monitor DIRSSP
implementation of PRP policy, and supported by DIRSSP, will
conduct formal policy coordination external to the DON.
e. Director, Navy Staff (DNS). DNS is the single OPNAV
flag officer responsible for coordinating OPNAV responsibilities
for NW activities as summarized in enclosure (1). DNS will
chair and be supported in these responsibilities by the NNWOC in
accordance with reference (d). The NNWOC will:
(1) Assure Navy compliance with established DON and DoD
NW and NW systems safety, security, accident/incident (A/I)
response, reliability, and personnel policy.
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4. SECNAVINST 8120.1A
15 February 2013
(2) Coordinate OPNAV staff responsibilities for NW and
NW systems safety, security, A/I response, and personnel
programs.
(3) Direct action to resolve NW and NW systems policy
and oversight issues identified by internal and external Navy
inspections, assessments, and reports.
(4) Coordinate to strengthen ties between SECNAV and
OPNAV (for policy/oversight functions) and fleet (for NW and NW
systems program operations/material support functions).
(5) Coordinate with the CNO (N8) Resources and
Requirements Review Board, the CNO (N2/N6) Information
Technology Management Council, and the Program Integration
Division (OPNAV (N9I)) to resolve NW and NW systems program
requirements and resource issues.
(6) Direct the scope and conduct of an assessment of DON
NW and NW systems compliance with NW and NW systems safety,
security, reliability, A/I response, and personnel policy at
periodicities of every two years.
(7) Review the DON Annual NW security deviation report
prior to Vice Chief of Naval Operations’ review and approval.
f. CNO (N1). CNO (N1) is the echelon 1 supported flag
officer for community management of personnel supporting DON NW
and NW systems and is responsible for DON NW and NW systems
related personnel policy approval (other than PRP). CNO (N1)
will execute NW and NW systems community management of personnel
through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between CNO (N1) and
DIRSSP.
g. CNO (N3/N5). CNO (N3/N5) is the echelon 1 supported
flag officer responsible to plan, monitor, coordinate and advise
CNO on Navy NW and NW systems global employment, operational
strategy, policy, and plans; international politico-military
matters; and the operational status of Navy NW and NW systems
forces. CNO (N3/N5) coordinates Navy NW operational policy
issues with Office of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), Joint
Staff, DIRSSP, as well as other DoD and government agencies.
CNO (N3/N5) will:
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5. SECNAVINST 8120.1A
15 February 2013
(1) Provide the Navy voting representative to the Title
10 mandated NW council.
(2) Establish operational, employment, and strategic
force structure strategy and policy. Translate strategy into
planning to reflect the CNO’s strategic priorities for the
development of resource allocation plans for fleet and Navy NW
and NW systems.
(3) Participate in executing direction of the SECDEF,
Joint Staff, or National Military Command Center (NMCC) during
actual or exercise NW A/I events.
h. CNO (N4). CNO (N4) is the echelon 1 supported flag
officer for validating Military Construction (MILCON);
Facilities Sustainment, Restoration and Maintenance (FSRM); and
Base Operating Services (BOS) requirements for NW and NW systems
facilities and the NW Radiological Controls Program (NW RADCON).
CNO (N4) will:
(1) Approve NW and NW systems policy for NW RADCON in
accordance with DoD and Joint Staff direction.
(2) Assess and resource NW and NW systems requirements
for MILCON, FSRM, BOS, and supply support as summarized in
enclosure (2).
i. CNO (N2/N6). CNO (N2/N6) is the echelon 1 supported
flag officer responsible for validating requirements for systems
in the nuclear command, control and communications (NC3)
architecture, and is the resource sponsor, as summarized in
enclosure (2), for DON NW systems associated with NC3 in
accordance with reference (h).
j. CNO (N8). CNO (N8) is the echelon 1 supported flag
officer for allocation of resources for DON NW and NW systems as
summarized in enclosure (2) and will ensure integration of
planning, programming, budgeting, and assessments within OPNAV
and the management echelons subordinate to CNO.
k. CNO (N9). CNO (N9) is the echelon 1 supported flag
officer for DON NW and NW systems for safety, security,
technical inspections, and A/I response. Additionally, CNO (N9)
5
6. SECNAVINST 8120.1A
15 February 2013
is the echelon 1 supported flag officer for DON NW and NW
systems for program planning, program information, and
integration of programming of warfighting requirements. CNO
(N9) will:
(1) Approve DON NW and NW systems policy for safety,
security, and A/I response in accordance with DoD and Joint
Staff direction.
(2) Appoint the chair for the DON Nuclear Weapons
Systems Safety Group (NWSSG) for NW and NW systems operational
safety reviews and safety studies.
(3) Assess and resource DON NW systems and systems
requirements for safety, security, A/I response, NW systems
facilities operations, manpower, and NW platform operations as
summarized in enclosure (2).
(4) Participate in executing direction of the SECDEF,
Joint Staff, or NMCC during actual or exercise NW A/I events.
(5) Review and approve NW security deviations effective
for the calendar year in accordance with reference (e).
l. Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED). BUMED is
the echelon 2 supporting flag officer to:
(1) DUSN PPOI for DON NW PRP policy.
(2) DIRSSP, and will provide technical guidance and
assistance for DON Radiation Health (RADHEALTH) matters by MOU.
m. Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (COMNAVSEASYSCOM).
COMNAVSEASYSCOM is the echelon 2 supporting flag officer to
DIRSSP and provides technical guidance and assistance for NW
RADCON through a MOA between COMNAVSEASYSCOM and DIRSSP.
n. Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command
(COMNAVSUPSYSCOM). COMNAVSUPSYSCOM is the echelon 2 supporting
flag officer to DIRSSP for supply support of NW and NW systems.
o. Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC). CNIC is
the echelon 2 supporting flag officer to CNO (N4), CNO (N9),
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7. SECNAVINST 8120.1A
15 February 2013
USFLTFORCOM, COMPACFLT, and DIRSSP for BOS for facilities,
facility/infrastructure sustainment, and military construction
in support of DON NW and NW system operations, and NW A/I
response. CNIC is also the DON echelon 2 supporting flag
officer to USFLTFORCOM for certification of all Response Task
Forces (RTFs).
p. USFLTFORCOM and COMPACFLT. USFLTFORCOM and COMPACFLT
are the echelon 2 supported Commanders for implementation of
fleet NW security and are responsible for command and control
for activities supporting NW security in their respective areas
of responsibility. USFLTFORCOM and COMPACFLT shall coordinate
with Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, for support of this mission
as applicable. USFLTFORCOM and COMPACFLT are responsible for
the safe, secure, and reliable technical operation and
maintenance of fielded NW and NW systems under their cognizance.
USFLTFORCOM is the echelon 2 supported commander for NW A/I
policy implementation and oversight for Atlantic Fleet ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs) and the RTF Commanders. COMPACFLT is
the echelon 2 Supported Commander for NW A/I policy
implementation and oversight for Pacific Fleet SSBNs.
(1) USFLTFORCOM is the NW certifying authority for all
Atlantic Fleet afloat nuclear weapons technical inspections
(NWTI). COMPACFLT is the NW certifying authority for all
Pacific Fleet afloat NWTIs. The NW certifying authority is, per
reference (i), the service authority determining that an NW unit
is capable of performing its assigned nuclear mission. This
authority may not be delegated. The NW certifying authority
will:
(a) Designate NWTI chief inspectors from their
respective areas in accordance with reference (i).
(b) Assign a chief inspector for each NWTI under
their cognizance.
(c) Assign qualified technical and security
inspectors for all NWTIs under their cognizance.
(d) Certify, recertify, or decertify NW capable
units to execute NW functions safely, securely, and reliably in
accordance with reference (i) and Navy directives.
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8. SECNAVINST 8120.1A
15 February 2013
(e) Schedule and execute all NWTIs under their
cognizance in accordance with reference (i) and Navy directives.
(f) Advise CNO (N9) and DIRSSP on trends and issues
of compliance with established DON and DoD NW and NW systems
safety, security, A/I response, reliability, and personnel
policy based on results of NWTIs.
(2) USFLTFORCOM is the certifying authority for Navy RTF
Commanders within the continental United States per reference
(j). As the RTF certifying authority, USFLTFORCOM will
implement procedures to determine if RTFs are mission ready.
This authority may not be delegated.
q. DIRSSP. DIRSSP is the program manager and technical
authority for technical operations, safety, security, and
maintenance of NW and NW systems. DIRSSP is the supporting flag
officer to CNO (N4), CNO (N9), USFLTFORCOM, and COMPACLFT for
developing and coordinating policies associated with safety,
security, supply support, NW RADCON and RADHEALTH, and A/I
response for NW and NW systems. DIRSSP is:
(1) The technical authority and program manager for NW
and NW systems safety, and will:
(a) Develop proposed NW safety rules for submission
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense via CNO (N9).
(b) Provide direction and guidance on NW safety to
Navy NW capable units and verify implementation.
(c) Serve as secretary for the DON NWSSG for
operational safety reviews and safety studies.
(d) Serve as the Executive Secretary for the NNWOC
as defined by the NNWOC Charter.
(e) Conduct liaison in formal coordination with CNO
(N9) and other Services and Agencies for DON NW A/I policy
development matters. Develop policy, guidance, and procedures
for Navy NW accident and incident response plans based on
technical authority, SWF and RTF operating requirements, and
guidance of CNO (N3/N5), CNO (N4), CNO (N9), USFLTFORCOM, and
COMPACFLT. As appropriate, incorporate other DON
8
9. SECNAVINST 8120.1A
15 February 2013
commands/organizations with special capabilities needed to
properly respond to an NW A/I into DON NW A/I response plans.
(f) Serve as the supporting flag officer to
USFLTFORCOM for NW A/I policy implementation and oversight at
all SWFS and as the supporting flag officer to USFLTFORCOM for
certification of all RTFs.
(g) Nominate to CNO (N9) a qualified individual for
assignment as NWSSG chair.
(h) Develop procedures incorporating CNIC, SWF, RTF,
and other DON commands/organizations as required with special NW
A/I response capabilities for certification of the combined
Immediate Response Force/RTF based on guidance from CNO and
USFLTFORCOM in accordance with reference (k).
(2) The technical authority and program manager for DON
NW and NW systems security, and will:
(a) Provide direction and guidance on NW and NW
systems security to Navy NW capable facilities and units, and
verify implementation.
(b) Analyze vulnerabilities and security risks to
DON NW and NW systems, and assist commanders ashore and afloat
having custody of DON nuclear weapons in their Localized Threat
Capabilities Assessments and Vulnerability Assessments.
(c) Develop and submit programmatic requirements for
NW and NW systems security to cognizant resource sponsors.
(d) Conduct liaison in formal coordination with CNO
(N9) and other services and agencies for DON NW security policy
development matters.
(e) Review and endorse NW security policy deviations
to CNO (N9), including the annual NW security deviation report.
(3) The echelon 2 supported flag officer and program
manager responsible for RADCON and RADHEALTH associated with
stowage, maintenance, or handling of DON NW ashore and afloat,
and will:
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10. SECNAVINST 8120.1A
15 February 2013
(a) Provide for control of radiation and
radioactivity associated with stowage, maintenance, or handling
of DON NW.
(b) Establish requirements associated with NW RADCON
and RADHEALTH in coordination with BUMED and COMNAVSEASYSCOM.
(c) Enforce standards and regulations as they affect
the environment and safety and health of workers, operators, and
the general public.
(4) The echelon 2 supported flag officer and technical
authority for DON NW and NW systems policy development,
technical operations, maintenance, logistics, and supply
support, and is:
(a) The DON service logistics agent (SLA) for the
DON NW stockpile to fully support maintenance and logistics
requirements in accordance with reference (l).
(b) Responsible for establishment and oversight of
requirements associated with all supply support activities for
DON NW and NW systems.
(c) The authority for the management and control of
all DON nuclear weapons-related material (NWRM).
(5) The echelon 2 supporting flag officer to DUSN PPOI
for DON NW PRP policy development, and is:
(a) Responsible for oversight of DON NW PRP
execution and day-to-day policy implementation.
(b) Provide PRP policy clarification and
interpretation to DON end users.
(c) Directly liaise with other services and DoD
agencies on PRP policy clarification and interpretation.
(d) Act as SECNAV’s technical advisor for NW PRP
policy development matters both within the DON and with other
services, agencies, and OSD. Formal coordination authority
external to the DON is retained by DUSN PPOI.
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11. SECNAVINST 8120.1A
15 February 2013
(e) Responsible for formal coordination with
OPNAV (N1) and Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) on military
personnel action associated with DON NW PRP implementation.
(6) The echelon 2 supporting flag officer to CNO (N1)
for program-wide management of DON NW and NW systems personnel
and will execute NW and NW systems community management of
personnel through a MOU between CNO (N1) and DIRSSP, and will:
(a) Serve as subject matter expert for NW
subspecialty codes, additional qualification designator(s), and
Navy Enlisted Classifications (NEC).
(b) Establish training requirements, and provide
technical oversight of training and education programs and
supporting curricula for DON NW career fields and NW system-
related duties.
(7) Responsible for providing independent regulatory-
quality oversight of NW activities executed ashore and afloat,
and will:
(a) Provide the technical authority for NW and NW
systems shore and fleet activities to ensure operations and
maintenance activities are conducted in accordance with approved
procedures and by qualified personnel.
(b) Provide the technical authority for NW A/I
response to ensure that initial emergency response forces, based
on installation-specific capabilities, missions, and DON
requirements, are capable of dealing with the effects of a
radiological accident on-site and that preparations and
relationships with local civil authorities are adequate to
protect life, property, and environment during the initial
response phase of a nuclear accident in accordance with
reference (m).
(c) Establish, supervise, and maintain field offices
at Naval Base Kitsap, Washington, and Naval Submarine Base Kings
Bay, Georgia, to conduct day-to-day monitoring and standards
enforcement of NW activities at the SWFs and aboard SSBNs in
port.
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12. SECNAVINST 8120.1A
15 February 2013
(d) Establish and maintain inspection procedures and
criteria, review corrective actions, assess processes, and
identify and analyze trends.
(8) The echelon 2 supporting flag officer to NW
certifying authority in the conduct of NWTIs, and will:
(a) Develop and implement direction and guidance for
the conduct of DON NWTIs.
(b) Set criteria and standards to which DON NW
capable units are inspected.
(c) Provide technical assistance in operation and
inspection of DON NW capable units to fleet commanders. This
assistance shall pertain to all matters relating to safe,
secure, and reliable operation and maintenance of NW and NW
systems. Assistance will also be available across both fleets
to prepare for NWTIs as well as to correct deficiencies noted
during inspections.
(d) Set DON NWTI inspector training, qualification,
and certification standards.
(e) Certify DON NWTI inspectors.
(9) The NW certifying authority for all ashore NWTIs.
The NW certifying authority is, per reference (i), the service
authority determining that a NW unit is capable of performing
its assigned mission. This authority may not be delegated. The
NW certifying authority will:
(a) Designate the DON NWTI chief inspector from
their respective areas in accordance with reference (i).
(b) Assign a chief inspector for each NWTI under
their cognizance.
(c) Assign qualified technical, PRP, and security
inspectors for all DON NWTIs under their cognizance.
(d) Certify, recertify, or decertify SWFs to execute
NW functions safely, securely, and reliably in accordance with
reference (i) and applicable Navy directives.
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13. SECNAVINST 8120.1A
15 February 2013
(e) Schedule and execute all DON ashore NWTIs in
accordance with reference (i) and Navy directives.
(10) The echelon 2 supporting flag officer to ASN (M&RA)
for community management of DON government civilian personnel
supporting DON NW and NW systems.
8. Action
a. Organizations listed in paragraph 7 will issue formal
direction to implement responsibilities assigned in this
instruction, as required. All commands who possess a NW
capability under their cognizance or who are responsible for the
acquisition and life cycle support of a NW and NW system shall
ensure the implementation of this instruction.
b. All DON organizations with NW or NW systems related
responsibilities and authorities will conduct self-assessment to
ensure compliance with all applicable guidance and direction
associated with execution of assigned duties and missions.
9. Records Management. Records created as a result of this
instruction, regardless of media and format, shall be managed in
accordance with SECNAV Manual 5210.1.
10. Reports Control. Report requirements contained within this
instruction are exempt from Report Control per SECNAV Manual
5214.1.
RAY MABUS
Distribution:
Electronic only, via Department of the Navy Issuances Web site
http://doni.daps.dla.mil/
13
14. SECNAVINST 8120.1A
15 February 2013
SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR WEAPON ACTIVITIES FUNCTIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES
Single, Responsible Flag Officer for Coordination (DNS)
Safety and RADCON/
Supply
Accident/ Security RAD PRP Personnel NWTI SLA
Support
Incident HEALTH
N4 DPR DPR
N1 DPIR
DP Navy NW operations and employment policy
N3/N5
DPR validates NC3 architecture requirements and resource
N2/N6 sponsor
DR validates and assesses resourcing of NW systems programming
N8
and requirements
N9 DPR DPR DP
DUSN PPOI DP
ASN M&RA DP
BUMED GPI GP
COMNAVSEA-
GI
SYSCOM
GI
GPR DI
USFLTFORCOM/ (ashore)
(Accident/ DI
COMPACFLT DI
Incident)
(afloat)
GP
SSP GP DI GP DI DI GP DI GP DI GPI DI
DI
COMNAVSUP-
GI
SYSCOM
CNIC GPI
Key
D: Supported G: Supporting
R: Resources P: Policy I: Implementation
Enclosure (1)
15. SECNAVINST 8120.1A
15 February 2013
OPNAV NUCLEAR WEAPONS RESOURCE SPONSORSHIP AREAS
Resource Sponsorship Areas
Sponsor
N1 Navy military personnel
N4 NW facilities procurement
NW facilities maintenance
N2/N6 NC3
N8 NW and NW systems resource programming integration
N9 NW security ashore
NW security afloat
NW A/I response
NW platform operations
NW systems facilities operations
NW systems resource programming integration
NW and NW systems assessments
NW systems
Enclosure (2)