1) Gallese's research into mirror neurons found that observing another person's actions activates the same areas of the observer's brain that are involved in performing those actions. This suggests humans simulate others' intentional actions unconsciously through an "embodied simulation" mechanism.
2) Gallese argues this embodied simulation allows for direct, non-conceptual understanding of others' intentions. More cognitive elaboration is needed to understand complex social stimuli.
3) Sterelny argues folk psychology is an automated skill acquired through perceptual priming and a carefully engineered social learning environment, not innate conceptual knowledge. This challenges claims of a specialized "theory of mind module."
The document discusses the cognitive science perspective on the origins of mathematical ideas. It argues that mathematics arises from human cognition and ideas, which are grounded in sensory-motor experience. Research shows infants have innate abilities to discriminate quantities and perform basic arithmetic. The brain regions involved in these abilities are the inferior parietal cortex and areas linked to language processing like the supramarginal gyrus. Conceptual metaphors imported from sensory experiences may provide a bridge between perception, language and mathematical reasoning. The nature of mathematical ideas can therefore only be understood through empirical study of human cognition.
When should two minds be considered versionsKarlos Svoboda
- Two minds can be considered versions of one another if there exists a "nice" mapping between sequences of states in the first mind to sequences of states in the second mind.
- For two minds to be considered distant versions, there must be a series of intervening minds that connect the two minds, where each intervening mind is a close version of the next.
- Category theory provides a mathematical framework to represent minds and define mappings between them using functors that preserve the composition of mind paths. Approximate functors allow for comparison of minds where the mapping is not perfect but close on average.
1) The document discusses Planet 7 lodges as operating under a system of informal social control through psychological manipulation and coercion.
2) Membership in lodges fosters curiosity but provides no real answers, instead encouraging ongoing participation and control through an atmosphere of secrecy, suspicion, and shifting value systems.
3) Intelligence agencies ultimately coordinate and oversee the lodges to establish control and further their agenda of a "new world order" through infiltration and exclusion of undesirable members.
1. The document discusses the need for a biophotonic route to better understand the relationship between mind, brain, and the world. Current models make assumptions about their separate identities and roles that have not been established.
2. It proposes examining experiences related to measurable aspects of the world using biophoton signals spontaneously emitted by humans. Analysis of these signals reveals quantum signatures and holistic properties that contain biological information about the emitter.
3. Biophoton signals have been measured from 33 sites on the human body. Analysis of signal time series shows fluctuations containing finer details that establish the quantum nature of the signals and specify the quantum state of the dominant component.
This conference volume paper spells out the fundamental mechanism behind consciousness in lay terms and examines the implications upon our cosmology, beliefs, and social institutions.
Captain Power and the Soldiers of the Future, 1987: "Lord Dread's apocalyptic Project New Order, and the slow revelation that Lord Dread himself isn't completely committed to his own plan..." Dread is the ouroboros Saturn-Serpent: luciferian intellect. Captain Power is the Christian resurrection phoenix bird... the Sun/Heart. The fallen, lost son Anti-Christ re-unites with his brother Christ, unleashing incredible energy in the process that enlightens the world.
“If one wants to explain something completely new to "ordinary people", one must be able to express this new knowledge also in the official scientifically recognized language, otherwise one will only be met with rejection. But how can a Windows operating system make it clear to a Basic operating system that it is actually much more powerful when Basic thinking labels every innovation by virtue of its limited syntax as "wrong" and "illogical"? If there is no will for spiritual growth, all efforts are in vain. "Normal science" therefore regards every real innovation always as an impossibility! Your world will change "for the better" only if "all experts" in your world are synthesizing their efforts with a "single goal in mind". This goal should be Heaven on Earth (= the one and only, real "Great Work", and extremely hard work it is!). Do not say rashly "impossible" again!
A scientist will learn so much from me that his dogmas will "crumble." Whether or not he really will allow his "Tower of Babel" to collapse in order to build a different tower with the same building blocks, which really reaches to heaven and thus to me, he will determine with his own behavior. All your decisions are always an "expression" of your spiritual maturity. This maturity, however, has nothing to do with rational intellect, with knowledge in the conventional sense. I would have created an unjust creation if only "sages" were to enter the kingdom of heaven. You do not need to know "how" a plane works if you want to fly into "holy"days. It is enough "to believe" that it works.
You should be master over technology and not its addicted slave. For this I ultimately created your world, so that you try to free yourself out of all captivity. All human fears are based only on your ignorance. With this revelation, unprecedented technological possibilities are opening up to your mankind. With the help of the HOLO-FEELING equation and with a new understanding of the real laws of the "true nature of all things", science will be able to perform real miracles in your world. Only narrow-minded, self-sacred salvific teachings - regardless, whether religious or political - try to force your soul into a cage of undifferentiated categories as good and evil, useful and harmful, or worthy and unworthy of life and death." ― HOLOFEELING (1996)
This document discusses the theory of metacognition. It was introduced in the 1970s by John Flavell to refer to one's knowledge and cognition about their own cognitive processes, like thinking and learning. Metacognition involves thinking about and regulating one's own thinking. It has grown in importance for education as it can help students learn how to learn. The document reviews different definitions and historical understandings of metacognition from philosophers like Plato and Locke.
This document summarizes recent advances in understanding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). It discusses how studying changes in consciousness during sleep, anesthesia, and seizures has provided insights. It also examines paradigms used to study the NCC for specific percepts and the role of different brain regions. Finally, it discusses dynamic neural activity patterns like sustained vs phasic activity and their relation to the NCC.
The document discusses the cognitive science perspective on the origins of mathematical ideas. It argues that mathematics arises from human cognition and ideas, which are grounded in sensory-motor experience. Research shows infants have innate abilities to discriminate quantities and perform basic arithmetic. The brain regions involved in these abilities are the inferior parietal cortex and areas linked to language processing like the supramarginal gyrus. Conceptual metaphors imported from sensory experiences may provide a bridge between perception, language and mathematical reasoning. The nature of mathematical ideas can therefore only be understood through empirical study of human cognition.
When should two minds be considered versionsKarlos Svoboda
- Two minds can be considered versions of one another if there exists a "nice" mapping between sequences of states in the first mind to sequences of states in the second mind.
- For two minds to be considered distant versions, there must be a series of intervening minds that connect the two minds, where each intervening mind is a close version of the next.
- Category theory provides a mathematical framework to represent minds and define mappings between them using functors that preserve the composition of mind paths. Approximate functors allow for comparison of minds where the mapping is not perfect but close on average.
1) The document discusses Planet 7 lodges as operating under a system of informal social control through psychological manipulation and coercion.
2) Membership in lodges fosters curiosity but provides no real answers, instead encouraging ongoing participation and control through an atmosphere of secrecy, suspicion, and shifting value systems.
3) Intelligence agencies ultimately coordinate and oversee the lodges to establish control and further their agenda of a "new world order" through infiltration and exclusion of undesirable members.
1. The document discusses the need for a biophotonic route to better understand the relationship between mind, brain, and the world. Current models make assumptions about their separate identities and roles that have not been established.
2. It proposes examining experiences related to measurable aspects of the world using biophoton signals spontaneously emitted by humans. Analysis of these signals reveals quantum signatures and holistic properties that contain biological information about the emitter.
3. Biophoton signals have been measured from 33 sites on the human body. Analysis of signal time series shows fluctuations containing finer details that establish the quantum nature of the signals and specify the quantum state of the dominant component.
This conference volume paper spells out the fundamental mechanism behind consciousness in lay terms and examines the implications upon our cosmology, beliefs, and social institutions.
Captain Power and the Soldiers of the Future, 1987: "Lord Dread's apocalyptic Project New Order, and the slow revelation that Lord Dread himself isn't completely committed to his own plan..." Dread is the ouroboros Saturn-Serpent: luciferian intellect. Captain Power is the Christian resurrection phoenix bird... the Sun/Heart. The fallen, lost son Anti-Christ re-unites with his brother Christ, unleashing incredible energy in the process that enlightens the world.
“If one wants to explain something completely new to "ordinary people", one must be able to express this new knowledge also in the official scientifically recognized language, otherwise one will only be met with rejection. But how can a Windows operating system make it clear to a Basic operating system that it is actually much more powerful when Basic thinking labels every innovation by virtue of its limited syntax as "wrong" and "illogical"? If there is no will for spiritual growth, all efforts are in vain. "Normal science" therefore regards every real innovation always as an impossibility! Your world will change "for the better" only if "all experts" in your world are synthesizing their efforts with a "single goal in mind". This goal should be Heaven on Earth (= the one and only, real "Great Work", and extremely hard work it is!). Do not say rashly "impossible" again!
A scientist will learn so much from me that his dogmas will "crumble." Whether or not he really will allow his "Tower of Babel" to collapse in order to build a different tower with the same building blocks, which really reaches to heaven and thus to me, he will determine with his own behavior. All your decisions are always an "expression" of your spiritual maturity. This maturity, however, has nothing to do with rational intellect, with knowledge in the conventional sense. I would have created an unjust creation if only "sages" were to enter the kingdom of heaven. You do not need to know "how" a plane works if you want to fly into "holy"days. It is enough "to believe" that it works.
You should be master over technology and not its addicted slave. For this I ultimately created your world, so that you try to free yourself out of all captivity. All human fears are based only on your ignorance. With this revelation, unprecedented technological possibilities are opening up to your mankind. With the help of the HOLO-FEELING equation and with a new understanding of the real laws of the "true nature of all things", science will be able to perform real miracles in your world. Only narrow-minded, self-sacred salvific teachings - regardless, whether religious or political - try to force your soul into a cage of undifferentiated categories as good and evil, useful and harmful, or worthy and unworthy of life and death." ― HOLOFEELING (1996)
This document discusses the theory of metacognition. It was introduced in the 1970s by John Flavell to refer to one's knowledge and cognition about their own cognitive processes, like thinking and learning. Metacognition involves thinking about and regulating one's own thinking. It has grown in importance for education as it can help students learn how to learn. The document reviews different definitions and historical understandings of metacognition from philosophers like Plato and Locke.
This document summarizes recent advances in understanding the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). It discusses how studying changes in consciousness during sleep, anesthesia, and seizures has provided insights. It also examines paradigms used to study the NCC for specific percepts and the role of different brain regions. Finally, it discusses dynamic neural activity patterns like sustained vs phasic activity and their relation to the NCC.
Michael Wheeler's presentation in Sorbonne, "Philosophy of the Web" seminar, ...PhiloWeb
This document discusses the idea of cognitive extension and the web-enabled mind. It examines how technologies like the internet and smartphones may extend human cognition by allowing information to be stored externally. The document discusses several views on cognitive extension, including the embedded cognition view that thinking depends on bodily structures and the environment, and the extended cognition view that in some cases cognition is distributed across brain, body and world. It also examines issues like how memory works in the digital age, the role of self-generated inputs in cognitive processes, and implications for education and technology.
This document discusses the methodological puzzle of determining the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness versus cognitive accessibility. It argues that to determine if unreportable representations inside modules are conscious, we need to separate phenomenal consciousness from the neural basis of reportability in clear cases. However, doing so requires already answering whether phenomenal consciousness includes reportability mechanisms. The document then provides two illustrations of this puzzle and argues that empirical evidence can help break out of this circular methodological problem by identifying neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness that overflow cognitive accessibility.
Ben Goertzel is the CEO of Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC, and CTO of Genescient Corp. He is also the co-founder of the OpenCog Project and Vice Chairman of Humanity+. OpenCog is an open source software framework and design for advanced artificial general intelligence (AGI). It uses a cognitive architecture based on multiple interacting cognitive processes that act on a shared knowledge representation. Key algorithms in OpenCog include MOSES for probabilistic evolutionary learning, probabilistic logic networks for declarative knowledge, and economic attention allocation for resource management. The goal is to develop AGI with high efficient pragmatic general intelligence relative to relevant goals and environments.
This document provides an overview of the Hong Kong Programs course PHIL 250: Philosophy of Mind. It introduces the instructor, textbook, and topics that will be covered in the first lecture, including ideas, concepts, science, theory, and the nature of theories. It also includes two related readings on mapping the brain and the mystery of consciousness. The summaries focus on key concepts that will be discussed in the course rather than providing a comprehensive summary of the document.
This document is Timothy Joseph Murphy's final paper for an epistemology seminar at the University of Cincinnati. It examines the concept of simplicity and its relationship to symmetry. Murphy argues that simplicity is a cognitive virtue realized through the application of symmetry in neural representation and processing. The paper discusses previous approaches to justifying simplicity, defines key concepts like symmetry, and proposes experiments to better understand how the brain represents and processes symmetry.
John Anderson was born in 1947 in Vancouver, British Columbia. He earned his PhD from Stanford University in 1972 and has been a professor at several universities, including Carnegie Mellon University since 1978. ACT* is a cognitive theory developed by Anderson that describes a spreading activation model of semantic memory combined with a production system for executing higher-level operations. It distinguishes three types of memory - declarative, procedural, and working memory - and three types of learning.
This document discusses the role of phenomenology in psychiatry and its relationship to cognitive neuroscience. It argues that phenomenology, which aims to describe the basic structures of conscious experience, is indispensable for understanding psychiatric disorders. Phenomenology can help identify the points where a person's experience of and relation to the world becomes disturbed, as in conditions like schizophrenia. The document outlines the phenomenological method and discusses how it can provide insights into areas like embodiment, time-consciousness, and intersubjectivity that are particularly relevant to psychopathology. It argues that phenomenology and empirical science should cooperate to further knowledge in psychiatry.
This study used signal detection theory to examine how neuroscientists identify the default mode network compared to other prominent resting-state networks. Twenty participants were asked to distinguish the default mode network from three other networks in a rapid forced-choice task, where the networks were presented at different signal thresholds. Results showed that participants more accurately identified the default mode network when it was presented at the most stringent threshold, and made the most conservative decisions when networks were not thresholded. These findings suggest that thresholding fMRI data improves accuracy in identifying brain networks.
1. The document discusses several approaches to cognitive science including connectionism, neural networks, supervised and unsupervised learning, Hebbian learning, the delta rule, backpropagation, and responses to Descartes from Gelernter, Penrose, and Pinker.
2. Connectionism models mental phenomena using interconnected networks of simple units like neural networks. Learning involves adjusting connection weights between neurons.
3. Supervised learning uses input-output pairs to adjust weights to minimize error, while unsupervised learning only uses inputs to find patterns in the data.
This document provides an introduction to artificial intelligence and cognitive science. It defines intelligence and AI, discusses different approaches to AI like thinking like humans, thinking rationally, acting like humans and acting rationally. It also summarizes the history of AI from early neural networks to modern applications. Key concepts covered include the Turing test, knowledge representation, rational agents, intelligent environments and knowledge-based systems.
This document discusses the idea that natural minds are information-processing virtual machines that have been produced by evolution. It argues that to truly understand natural minds, we need to describe them with sufficient precision to enable the design of artificial minds. The key challenges are determining what concepts to use in theories of the mind and deciding whether producing artificial minds similar to natural ones will require new computing machinery. The document also discusses how virtual machines in computers can have causal powers and how psychotherapy can be viewed as debugging the "virtual machine" of the mind.
Artificial intelligence and cognitive modeling have the same problem chapter2sabdegul
This document discusses the similarities between artificial intelligence research and cognitive modeling in addressing the "intelligence problem" - how relatively simple components like neurons or transistors can generate intelligent behavior. While cognitive science has made progress on many goals, the author argues its existing methods are not sufficient to fully understand human-level intelligence. Cognitive modeling is important but driven by fitting models to data, which does not guarantee insights into human intelligence. A new "intelligence science" field with different standards may be needed to make more progress on this challenge.
1) Intelligence is defined as the ability to act appropriately in uncertain environments in order to achieve goals and succeed.
2) Natural intelligence evolved through natural selection to produce behaviors that increase survival and reproduction.
3) More intelligent individuals and groups are better able to sense their environment, make decisions, and take actions that provide biological advantages over less intelligent competitors.
920 the cognitive neuroscience of creativityMarch Lin
1. The document discusses the cognitive neuroscience of creativity and proposes there are four basic types of creativity based on two modes of processing (deliberate vs spontaneous) and two types of structures (cognitive vs emotional).
2. It analyzes the role of different brain regions like the prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and hippocampus in different aspects of creativity.
3. The framework suggests distinguishing different types of creativity can help resolve controversies in the field and guide future research incorporating specific cognitive processes and brain areas.
A New Approach to the Hard Problem by Klee IrwinKlee Irwin
This document proposes a theory that reality is made up of primitive "units of consciousness" that operate as a quasi-crystalline language at the Planck scale. It suggests that these units cooperate to observe and interpret their environment mathematically, expressing the patterns of physical reality through their linguistic rules and choices. By organizing in this way, the units are able to actualize the information that makes up the universe and allow for non-deterministic expressions like consciousness to emerge from larger cooperative structures. The theory aims to address both the hard problem of consciousness and fundamental questions in physics by grounding reality in a system of primitive conscious entities following an algorithmic language at the smallest scales.
This document provides an overview of key concepts in sensation and perception. It begins by defining sensation as the process by which sensory receptors receive stimulation from the environment and transmit that information to the brain. Perception is defined as the process of selecting, organizing, and interpreting sensory information to recognize meaningful objects and events. The document then discusses several principles of perception, including that perception is an active constructive process, not a passive recording of external stimuli. It presents examples of perceptual illusions and organization to illustrate this. Subsequent sections discuss theories of perception, the distinction between active and passive touch, and Gibson's theory of affordances. The document emphasizes that perception involves an engagement with the world through action and exploration, not just internal representations in the
The document discusses neural computing and artificial neural networks. It provides an overview of several key topics, including the aims of investigating biological nervous systems and designing artificial systems that emulate biological principles. The document outlines several planned lectures on topics like the differences between natural and artificial intelligence, neurobiology, neural processing and signaling, stochasticity in neural codes, neural operators for vision, cognition and evolution, and artificial neural networks. It also lists some reference books and provides examples for exercises on neural computing concepts.
This document presents a study that examined the effect of typicality and organization on word recall. It aimed to analyze memory recall based on how typical the presented information was and how it was organized. It was hypothesized that more typical information and information presented in an organized/chunked format would have higher recall than less typical or randomly presented information. The study involved 203 participants who were shown word lists under different conditions of typicality and organization and asked to recall the words. Results were expected to show better recall for more typical and chunked/organized information, and an interaction between typicality and organization.
Extending the Mind with Cognitive Prosthetics? PhiloWeb
The key claim of the extended mind hypothesis is that the mechanisms of the mind are not confined to processes occurring within the brain or head, but can include processes that extend into and make use of the environment. The document discusses several examples to illustrate this, such as using a calculator on a computer or smartphone as an extension of one's cognitive abilities. It also discusses potential future cognitive augmentations using technologies like augmented reality glasses that could integrate information from the external world and blur the boundaries between mind and technology. However, some philosophers argue the extended mind hypothesis is implausible as it lacks a clear definition of cognition and fails to distinguish between causal influences on the mind versus actual extensions of cognitive processes.
This document discusses logical syntax and well-formed formulas (WFFs). It defines what constitutes a WFF and covers logical operators like negation, conjunction, disjunction, conditionals, and biconditionals. It also discusses identifying the dominant operator of compound statements and paraphrasing sentences into symbolic logic by replacing statements with letters according to a dictionary. Exercises are provided to help students practice determining if strings are WFFs and symbolizing English sentences.
This week's lesson will cover the differences between descriptive and prescriptive grammar, explore syntactic structure theory, distinguish syntactic structures and their functions, examine the impact of syntax on language teaching, and discuss syntactic challenges of academic English. Key concepts include descriptive and prescriptive grammar, phrase structure, modals, comparatives, logical connectors, and relative clauses. Challenges of academic English syntax for English language learners include structures involving passive voice, modals, prepositional phrases, and relative clauses. Teachers should scaffold instruction to address these challenges and promote students' cognitive academic language proficiency.
Michael Wheeler's presentation in Sorbonne, "Philosophy of the Web" seminar, ...PhiloWeb
This document discusses the idea of cognitive extension and the web-enabled mind. It examines how technologies like the internet and smartphones may extend human cognition by allowing information to be stored externally. The document discusses several views on cognitive extension, including the embedded cognition view that thinking depends on bodily structures and the environment, and the extended cognition view that in some cases cognition is distributed across brain, body and world. It also examines issues like how memory works in the digital age, the role of self-generated inputs in cognitive processes, and implications for education and technology.
This document discusses the methodological puzzle of determining the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness versus cognitive accessibility. It argues that to determine if unreportable representations inside modules are conscious, we need to separate phenomenal consciousness from the neural basis of reportability in clear cases. However, doing so requires already answering whether phenomenal consciousness includes reportability mechanisms. The document then provides two illustrations of this puzzle and argues that empirical evidence can help break out of this circular methodological problem by identifying neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness that overflow cognitive accessibility.
Ben Goertzel is the CEO of Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC, and CTO of Genescient Corp. He is also the co-founder of the OpenCog Project and Vice Chairman of Humanity+. OpenCog is an open source software framework and design for advanced artificial general intelligence (AGI). It uses a cognitive architecture based on multiple interacting cognitive processes that act on a shared knowledge representation. Key algorithms in OpenCog include MOSES for probabilistic evolutionary learning, probabilistic logic networks for declarative knowledge, and economic attention allocation for resource management. The goal is to develop AGI with high efficient pragmatic general intelligence relative to relevant goals and environments.
This document provides an overview of the Hong Kong Programs course PHIL 250: Philosophy of Mind. It introduces the instructor, textbook, and topics that will be covered in the first lecture, including ideas, concepts, science, theory, and the nature of theories. It also includes two related readings on mapping the brain and the mystery of consciousness. The summaries focus on key concepts that will be discussed in the course rather than providing a comprehensive summary of the document.
This document is Timothy Joseph Murphy's final paper for an epistemology seminar at the University of Cincinnati. It examines the concept of simplicity and its relationship to symmetry. Murphy argues that simplicity is a cognitive virtue realized through the application of symmetry in neural representation and processing. The paper discusses previous approaches to justifying simplicity, defines key concepts like symmetry, and proposes experiments to better understand how the brain represents and processes symmetry.
John Anderson was born in 1947 in Vancouver, British Columbia. He earned his PhD from Stanford University in 1972 and has been a professor at several universities, including Carnegie Mellon University since 1978. ACT* is a cognitive theory developed by Anderson that describes a spreading activation model of semantic memory combined with a production system for executing higher-level operations. It distinguishes three types of memory - declarative, procedural, and working memory - and three types of learning.
This document discusses the role of phenomenology in psychiatry and its relationship to cognitive neuroscience. It argues that phenomenology, which aims to describe the basic structures of conscious experience, is indispensable for understanding psychiatric disorders. Phenomenology can help identify the points where a person's experience of and relation to the world becomes disturbed, as in conditions like schizophrenia. The document outlines the phenomenological method and discusses how it can provide insights into areas like embodiment, time-consciousness, and intersubjectivity that are particularly relevant to psychopathology. It argues that phenomenology and empirical science should cooperate to further knowledge in psychiatry.
This study used signal detection theory to examine how neuroscientists identify the default mode network compared to other prominent resting-state networks. Twenty participants were asked to distinguish the default mode network from three other networks in a rapid forced-choice task, where the networks were presented at different signal thresholds. Results showed that participants more accurately identified the default mode network when it was presented at the most stringent threshold, and made the most conservative decisions when networks were not thresholded. These findings suggest that thresholding fMRI data improves accuracy in identifying brain networks.
1. The document discusses several approaches to cognitive science including connectionism, neural networks, supervised and unsupervised learning, Hebbian learning, the delta rule, backpropagation, and responses to Descartes from Gelernter, Penrose, and Pinker.
2. Connectionism models mental phenomena using interconnected networks of simple units like neural networks. Learning involves adjusting connection weights between neurons.
3. Supervised learning uses input-output pairs to adjust weights to minimize error, while unsupervised learning only uses inputs to find patterns in the data.
This document provides an introduction to artificial intelligence and cognitive science. It defines intelligence and AI, discusses different approaches to AI like thinking like humans, thinking rationally, acting like humans and acting rationally. It also summarizes the history of AI from early neural networks to modern applications. Key concepts covered include the Turing test, knowledge representation, rational agents, intelligent environments and knowledge-based systems.
This document discusses the idea that natural minds are information-processing virtual machines that have been produced by evolution. It argues that to truly understand natural minds, we need to describe them with sufficient precision to enable the design of artificial minds. The key challenges are determining what concepts to use in theories of the mind and deciding whether producing artificial minds similar to natural ones will require new computing machinery. The document also discusses how virtual machines in computers can have causal powers and how psychotherapy can be viewed as debugging the "virtual machine" of the mind.
Artificial intelligence and cognitive modeling have the same problem chapter2sabdegul
This document discusses the similarities between artificial intelligence research and cognitive modeling in addressing the "intelligence problem" - how relatively simple components like neurons or transistors can generate intelligent behavior. While cognitive science has made progress on many goals, the author argues its existing methods are not sufficient to fully understand human-level intelligence. Cognitive modeling is important but driven by fitting models to data, which does not guarantee insights into human intelligence. A new "intelligence science" field with different standards may be needed to make more progress on this challenge.
1) Intelligence is defined as the ability to act appropriately in uncertain environments in order to achieve goals and succeed.
2) Natural intelligence evolved through natural selection to produce behaviors that increase survival and reproduction.
3) More intelligent individuals and groups are better able to sense their environment, make decisions, and take actions that provide biological advantages over less intelligent competitors.
920 the cognitive neuroscience of creativityMarch Lin
1. The document discusses the cognitive neuroscience of creativity and proposes there are four basic types of creativity based on two modes of processing (deliberate vs spontaneous) and two types of structures (cognitive vs emotional).
2. It analyzes the role of different brain regions like the prefrontal cortex, amygdala, and hippocampus in different aspects of creativity.
3. The framework suggests distinguishing different types of creativity can help resolve controversies in the field and guide future research incorporating specific cognitive processes and brain areas.
A New Approach to the Hard Problem by Klee IrwinKlee Irwin
This document proposes a theory that reality is made up of primitive "units of consciousness" that operate as a quasi-crystalline language at the Planck scale. It suggests that these units cooperate to observe and interpret their environment mathematically, expressing the patterns of physical reality through their linguistic rules and choices. By organizing in this way, the units are able to actualize the information that makes up the universe and allow for non-deterministic expressions like consciousness to emerge from larger cooperative structures. The theory aims to address both the hard problem of consciousness and fundamental questions in physics by grounding reality in a system of primitive conscious entities following an algorithmic language at the smallest scales.
This document provides an overview of key concepts in sensation and perception. It begins by defining sensation as the process by which sensory receptors receive stimulation from the environment and transmit that information to the brain. Perception is defined as the process of selecting, organizing, and interpreting sensory information to recognize meaningful objects and events. The document then discusses several principles of perception, including that perception is an active constructive process, not a passive recording of external stimuli. It presents examples of perceptual illusions and organization to illustrate this. Subsequent sections discuss theories of perception, the distinction between active and passive touch, and Gibson's theory of affordances. The document emphasizes that perception involves an engagement with the world through action and exploration, not just internal representations in the
The document discusses neural computing and artificial neural networks. It provides an overview of several key topics, including the aims of investigating biological nervous systems and designing artificial systems that emulate biological principles. The document outlines several planned lectures on topics like the differences between natural and artificial intelligence, neurobiology, neural processing and signaling, stochasticity in neural codes, neural operators for vision, cognition and evolution, and artificial neural networks. It also lists some reference books and provides examples for exercises on neural computing concepts.
This document presents a study that examined the effect of typicality and organization on word recall. It aimed to analyze memory recall based on how typical the presented information was and how it was organized. It was hypothesized that more typical information and information presented in an organized/chunked format would have higher recall than less typical or randomly presented information. The study involved 203 participants who were shown word lists under different conditions of typicality and organization and asked to recall the words. Results were expected to show better recall for more typical and chunked/organized information, and an interaction between typicality and organization.
Extending the Mind with Cognitive Prosthetics? PhiloWeb
The key claim of the extended mind hypothesis is that the mechanisms of the mind are not confined to processes occurring within the brain or head, but can include processes that extend into and make use of the environment. The document discusses several examples to illustrate this, such as using a calculator on a computer or smartphone as an extension of one's cognitive abilities. It also discusses potential future cognitive augmentations using technologies like augmented reality glasses that could integrate information from the external world and blur the boundaries between mind and technology. However, some philosophers argue the extended mind hypothesis is implausible as it lacks a clear definition of cognition and fails to distinguish between causal influences on the mind versus actual extensions of cognitive processes.
This document discusses logical syntax and well-formed formulas (WFFs). It defines what constitutes a WFF and covers logical operators like negation, conjunction, disjunction, conditionals, and biconditionals. It also discusses identifying the dominant operator of compound statements and paraphrasing sentences into symbolic logic by replacing statements with letters according to a dictionary. Exercises are provided to help students practice determining if strings are WFFs and symbolizing English sentences.
This week's lesson will cover the differences between descriptive and prescriptive grammar, explore syntactic structure theory, distinguish syntactic structures and their functions, examine the impact of syntax on language teaching, and discuss syntactic challenges of academic English. Key concepts include descriptive and prescriptive grammar, phrase structure, modals, comparatives, logical connectors, and relative clauses. Challenges of academic English syntax for English language learners include structures involving passive voice, modals, prepositional phrases, and relative clauses. Teachers should scaffold instruction to address these challenges and promote students' cognitive academic language proficiency.
Machine translation is an easy tool for translating text from one language to another. You've probably used it. But do you know what machine translation really is? Or when you should or shouldn't use it? Navigate through this presentation to learn more!
This document discusses simulation theory as an approach to understanding how people attribute mental states to others, known as theory of mind or mind reading. It reviews evidence from developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience that mind reading involves simulating or re-experiencing the mental processes of the person being read. Specifically, it discusses how low-level mind reading of basic emotions like disgust is facilitated by "mirror neurons" that cause the observer to unconsciously simulate the emotion they see in another person, enabling them to attribute that mental state. The document also suggests memory and future thinking involve similar simulation processes of re-experiencing past events or pre-experiencing possible future events.
Mirror Neurons - A Key to Understanding Social Behaviour and CognitionThe Sprouts
Mirror neurons are believed to be involved in a wide range of social and cognitive processes.
Prasad Amore is a qualified and experienced Psychologist with extensive experience in different settings, age ranges, and populations. He is a licensed mental health practitioner who provides his services as the Managing Director of Softmind Wellness Pvt. Ltd. in Kerala.
www.prasadamore.com
This article reviews brain imaging studies that examine the hypothesis that perception and action share a common representational framework based on behavioral evidence. The authors discuss evidence from behavioral studies that suggest observers understand actions by applying the same neural representations they use to produce those actions. However, the authors argue that current neurophysiological evidence does not conclusively demonstrate a clear neural substrate that supports a common coding between perception and action. The article examines what is known about the functional organization of the visual system from primate and human studies and discusses models of the dorsal and ventral visual pathways and their different roles in perception and action.
This article reviews brain imaging studies that examine the hypothesis that perception and action share a common representational framework based on behavioral evidence. The authors discuss evidence from behavioral studies that suggest observers understand actions by applying the same neural representations they use to produce those actions. However, the authors argue that current neurophysiological evidence does not conclusively support a clear neural basis for this common coding between perception and action. The article examines what is known about the functional organization of the visual system into the ventral and dorsal pathways and discusses models of their different roles in recognition versus action guidance.
1. The document discusses neural mechanisms underlying the perception of human actions. It reviews brain imaging studies that have examined areas activated during the observation of human movement.
2. A key area found to be activated across studies is V5, which is involved in visual motion processing. Other areas activated include the superior temporal gyrus and ventral and dorsal areas of V3.
3. The studies provide some evidence for the involvement of both the dorsal and ventral visual pathways during action perception, though the specific contributions of each pathway require further investigation.
(1) Information processing theory analyzes how humans learn new information through a series of cognitive events that occur quickly in the mind similar to how computers process data. It claims the human mind functions like a computer by analyzing new information, testing it against existing knowledge, and storing it in memory.
(2) Behaviorism is a psychological theory that focuses on observable and measurable behaviors and excludes internal mental processes. It views organisms as responding to environmental stimuli and inner biological drives.
(3) Cognitivism emerged in response to behaviorism to study inner mental processes like thinking, memory, and problem solving. It views cognition as essential to understanding behavior rather than just a behavior itself. Cognitive psychologists study how people
The document discusses several key aspects of constructivist learning theory:
- Constructivist learning theory holds that learners construct new understandings based on their experiences and interactions.
- The brain is complex and adaptive, shaped by experiences, and capable of growth throughout life.
- Learning involves actively making meaning and patterns from experiences in relation to prior knowledge and emotions.
- Effective education recognizes that the brain perceives parts and wholes simultaneously.
Cognitive Psychology Essay
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Cognitive Behavioral Psychology In Inside Out
Cognitive psychology is the study of mental processes such as attention, memory, perception, problem solving and thinking. It developed as a field in response to behaviorism, which could not adequately explain complex human behaviors and abilities like language use. Cognitive psychologists study topics like how people learn and remember information, perceive different shapes, and acquire language. Understanding cognition can help fields like education, medicine, AI and interface design. The human mind is complex and cognition involves acquiring, storing, retrieving and processing knowledge.
The document discusses the three parts of the coping brain: the reptilian brain, emotional brain, and neocortex. The reptilian brain governs survival instincts like aggression, fear, revenge, and territorial behavior. The emotional brain is responsible for emotional expression and social identity formation. The neocortex, also called the thinking brain, is the largest part and coordinates responses during stress by drawing on memory and developing new coping strategies using reasoning and learning abilities.
Imagination may be more important than knowledge:The eight types of imaginati...Murray Hunter
The document discusses 8 types of imagination:
1. Effectuative imagination combines information to create new concepts and ideas.
2. Intellectual imagination develops hypotheses by considering different pieces of information.
3. Imaginative fantasy creates stories, pictures, poems, and other artistic works.
4. Empathy allows us to understand others' perspectives.
5. Strategic imagination envisions opportunities and evaluates resources needed to pursue them.
6. Emotional imagination manifests feelings and moods.
7. Dreams occur unconsciously during sleep using images and sensations.
8. Memory reconstruction retrieves and reconstructs memories in a selective way.
Coalescing Minds: Brain Uploading Related Group Mind ScenariosKarlos Svoboda
This document discusses the hypothetical concept of mind coalescence, where artificial connections are created between two or more brains, merging their minds to varying degrees. It proposes one way this could occur is through an exocortex, a prosthetic extension of the biological brain that integrates with it. An exocortex could allow minds to be linked together and gradually take over brain functions, providing a potential route for mind uploading over time as the biological brain ages. Direct brain connections or first doing a full upload are also mentioned as alternative paths to coalescence.
The document provides an editorial note regarding an article by Susan Hurley on the shared circuits model. It explains that Hurley passed away after completing her target article but before being able to respond to commentaries. Two colleagues, Andy Clark and Julian Kiverstein, helped compose the response in her place. The note thanks all involved for continuing the discussion in a thoughtful way.
218
Perceiving visually presented objects: recognition, awareness,
and modularity
Anne M Treisman* and Nancy G Kanwisherf
Object perception may involve seeing, recognition,
preparation of actions, and emotional responses-functions
that human brain imaging and neuropsychology suggest are
localized separately. Perhaps because of this specialization,
object perception is remarkably rapid and efficient.
Representations of componential structure and interpolation
from view-dependent images both play a part in object
recognition. Unattended objects may be implicitly registered,
but recent experiments suggest that attention is required to
bind features, to represent three-dimensional structure, and to
mediate awareness.
Addresses
*Department of Psychology, Princeton University, Princeton,
New Jersey 08544-1010, USA;
e-mail: [email protected]
tDepartment of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, El O-243,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts
02138, USA; e-mail: [email protected]
Current Opinion in Neurobiology 1998, 8:218-226
http://biomednet.com/elecref/0959438800800218
0 Current Biology Ltd ISSN 0959-4388
Abbreviations
ERP event-related potential
fMRl functional magnetic resonance imaging
IT inferotemporal cortex
Introduction
It is usually assumed that perception is mediated by
specific patterns of neural activity that encode a selective
description of what is seen, distinguishing it from other
similar sights. When we perceive an object, we may form
multiple representations, each specialized for a different
purpose and therefore selecting different properties to
encode at different levels of detail. There is empirical
evidence supporting the existence of six different types
of object representation. First, representation as an ‘object
token’-a conscious viewpoint-dependent representation
of the object as currently seen. Second, as a ‘structural de-
scription’- a non-visually-conscious object-centered rep-
resentation from which the object’s appearance from other
angles and distances can be predicted. Third, as an
‘object type’-a recognition of the object’s identity (e.g. a
banana) or membership in one or more stored categories.
Fourth, a representation based on further knowledge
associated with the category (such as the fact that the
banana can be peeled and what it will taste like). Fifth, a
representation that includes a specification of its emotional
and motivational significance to the observer. Sixth, an
‘action-centered description’, specifying its “affordances”
[l], that is, the properties we need in order to program
appropriate motor responses to it, such as its location,
size and shape relative to our hands. These different
representations are probably formed in an interactive
fashion, with prior knowledge facilitating the extraction of
likely features and structure, and vice versa.
Evidence suggests that the first four t ...
The term "cognitive psychology" was first used in 1967 by American psychologist Ulric Neisser in his book Cognitive Psychology. According to Neisser, cognition involves "all processes by which the sensory input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used.
It is concerned with these processes even when they operate in the absence of relevant stimulation, as in images and hallucinations. Given such a sweeping definition, it is apparent that cognition is involved in everything a human being might possibly do; that every psychological phenomenon is a cognitive phenomenon."
Contents lists available at ScienceDirectBrain and Cogniti.docxdonnajames55
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Brain and Cognition
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/b&c
Neuroscience and everyday life: Facing the translation problem
Jolien C. Franckena,⁎, Marc Slorsb
a Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, P.O. Box 15915, 1001 NK Amsterdam, Netherlands
b Faculty of Philosophy, Theology and Religious Studies, Radboud University Nijmegen, P.O. Box 9103, 6500 HD Nijmegen, Netherlands
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Concepts
Constructs
Taxonomy
Cognitive ontology
Folk psychology
Phenomenology
Eliminativism
A B S T R A C T
To enable the impact of neuroscientific insights on our daily lives, careful translation of research findings is
required. However, neuroscientific terminology and common-sense concepts are often hard to square. For ex-
ample, when neuroscientists study lying to allow the use of brain scans for lie-detection purposes, the concept of
lying in the scientific case differs considerably from the concept in court. Furthermore, lying and other cognitive
concepts are used unsystematically and have an indirect and divergent mapping onto brain activity. Therefore,
scientific findings cannot inform our practical concerns in a straightforward way. How then can neuroscience
ultimately help determine if a defendant is legally responsible, or help someone understand their addiction
better? Since the above-mentioned problems provide serious obstacles to move from science to common-sense,
we call this the 'translation problem'. Here, we describe three promising approaches for neuroscience to face this
translation problem. First, neuroscience could propose new 'folk-neuroscience' concepts, beyond the traditional
folk-psychological array, which might inform and alter our phenomenology. Second, neuroscience can modify
our current array of common-sense concepts by refining and validating scientific concepts. Third, neuroscience
can change our views on the application criteria of concepts such as responsibility and consciousness. We believe
that these strategies to deal with the translation problem should guide the practice of neuroscientific research to
be able to contribute to our day-to-day life more effectively.
1. Introduction
Can brain scans read thoughts? If so, can they detect lies? Questions
such as these are frequently being asked today, and jurors seriously
consider the use of neuroimaging data in court (Costandi, 2013;
McCabe, Castel, & Rhodes, 2011; Roskies, Schweitzer, & Saks, 2013).
This example illustrates, on the one hand, the quick rise of the field of
neuroscience. On the other hand, however, it highlights the demand for
translation of scientific findings about the brain into language that is
appropriate to improve practices outside of cognitive neuroscience.
Usually this is the language of common-sense cognitive concepts (‘CC-
Cs’, such as ‘lying’). The use of CCCs to report research findings suggests
that these terms have the same meaning in scientific and non-scient.
An introduction into contemporary cognitive psychology. It breaks down the details of cognitive psychology as a discipline from the textbook written by Ronald T Kellogg
About Possible Benefits From Irrational Thinking In Everyday LifeKaela Johnson
This document discusses potential benefits of irrational thinking in everyday life. It begins by noting the difficulties in clearly distinguishing rational from irrational thinking given the complex, interconnected nature of human cognition. The document then reviews some general reasons for irrational thinking based on evolutionary psychology and brain structure/functioning, such as the need for quick decision-making in dangerous situations and mental shortcuts that conserve effort. Specific examples of irrational thinking that could provide benefits are then considered, drawing on research in behavioural economics showing systematic cognitive biases and errors in decision-making that, while departing from strict rationality, may still help achieve goals in everyday contexts.
This document reviews research on social attention in nonhuman primates. It discusses theoretical issues regarding how social attention may reflect dominance hierarchies and influence social learning. It describes the sensorimotor constraints of primates, particularly their reliance on vision. Ethological studies are reviewed that examine the functions of social attention in communication and relationships. Experimental work is organized based on the social relationships - solicitous, competitive, collaborative - established between subjects. Tasks examine gaze following, food sharing, competition over resources, and collaboration. The document concludes by discussing differences between observational and experimental approaches and how integrating methods may advance the field.
1. Theory of mind, mirror neurons, and the massive modularity hypothesis
"Are there other areas of human competence where one might hope
to develop a fruitful theory, analogous to generative grammar?
Although this is a very important question, there is very little that
can be said about it today. One might, for example, consider the
problem of how a person comes to acquire a certain concept of three
dimensional space, or an implicit 'theory of human action', in similar
terms. Such a study would begin with the attempt to characterize the
implicit theory that underlies actual performance and would then turn
to the question of how this theory develops under the given conditions
of time and access to data- that is, in what way the resulting system of
beliefs is determined by the interplay of available data, 'heuristic procedures',
and the innate schematism that restricts and conditions the form of the
acquired system. At the moment, this is nothing more than a sketch of a
program of research."
Noam Chomsky (1975) Linguistic contributions: Future1
Carl Mair
Introduction
Chomsky's 'sketch of a program of research' as outlined in the above quote has since
blossomed into the 'modularity hypothesis'; a program comprising both a moderate and a
strong stance. 'Moderate modularity', as argued for by Fodor, breaks human cognitive
competences into 'input mechanisms' and 'central systems', and contends that the former are
hard-wired, encapsulated, inaccessible, domain-specific modules2. The 'central systems' on the
other hand, which are equivlant to the higher cognitive faculties, are serviced by a domain-
general intelligence. 'Strong' or 'massive modularity' differs from Fodor's account by
contending that the 'central systems' themselves are also Fodorean modules. This position has
found its most forceful proponents in a group of psychologists who base their arguments on
an appeal to evolutionary considerations3. The position prides itself in a certain scientific
'toughmindedness'4, and on its reliance on empirical data. One of the earliest and most
thoroughly researched 'modular' 'central systems' is the cognitive competence of
understanding other agents, or 'theory of mind'. This essay will engage a critical discussion of
the so-called 'theory of mind module' by relying on two main approaches. The first approach
will be to examine the very recent neurological studies of Gallese5 et al into the 'mirror-
neurone' systems involved in intentional attunement. Gallese's argument that other agents'
intentional states are made understandable through autonomous and non-propositional
embodied simulation will be presented as an alternative to the existence of a content-rich
innate module, although its relationship to nativism will be shown to be more complex. The
second approach will follow Sterelny in seeking to undercut the logical arguments for a
theory of mind module, by presenting sophisticated exogenous scaffolding as a substitute for
rich conceptual nativism. A third, shorter section will draw on the work of Arbib and
Tomasello in order to shed some light on how these two approaches can be frutifully
1
N. Chomsky Language and Mind (Harcourt Brace, 1975) p 73-74
2
J Fodor There and Back Again in In Critical Condition (MIT, 1998) p 128
3
cosmides and tooby but also Pinker
4
Fodor review of Pinker
5
V. Gallese Embodied simulation: From neurons to phenomenal experience
1
2. synthesised. The conclusion will then seek a reconciliation of these two approaches in order
to suggest a novel hypothesis of this crucial human cognitive competence.
Embodied simulation: mirror neurones and intentional attunement
It is important at the outset to distinguish Gallese's theory of embodied simulation from
Simulation Theory as argued for by Gordon and Goldman in the philosophy of mind.6
While the latter involves a willed cognitive effort aimed at interpreting agents' intentions,
Gallese conceives embodied simulation as an 'automatic, unconscious, and pre-reflexive
functional mechanism'7. Furthermore, in contrast to simulation theory, Gallese's model of
embodied simulation is not a product of a priori reasoning about the nature of the mind, but an
hypothesis which arose from detailed neurobiological studies into the brain. Before this
hypothesis can be explained, a brief introduction to mirror neuron systems is needed.
Gallese was among the original researchers who discovered the systems, and gives the
following account8:
About ten years ago a new class of pre-motor neurons discharging not
only when the monkey executes goal-related hand actions like grasping
objects, but also when observing other individuals (monkeys or humans)
executing similar actions, was discovered in the macaque monkey brain.
These neurons were called "mirror neurons".
Since then, numerous brain-scan experiments have found mirror system homologues in the
brains of human agents. The micro-patterning of neural activation in the observer have been
demonstrated to correspond to the activation patterns in the performing agent. Furthermore,
the mirroring is not just restricted to grasping, but is also found in facial and speech-related
mouth actions9, and in the expression of emotions10. The key requirement for mirror neuron
activation seems to be intentional agentive actions11:
Mirror neurons constitutively map an agentive relation; the mere observation
of an object not acted upon indeed does not evoke any response at all.
Moreover, only actions which belong to the motor 'repertoire' of the observer (or are closely
related) are mapped on the observer's motor systems. Experiments involving humans'
mirroring responses to monkeys, dogs and other humans have shown that though neural
mirroring occurs in response to human silent-speech (i.e in 'repertoire' actions) and monkey
lip-smacking (i.e. 'closely-related'), there is no mirroring in response to dog barking. Put
another way, humans are perceptually tuned to salient actions by conspecifics.
Further experiments have also demonstrated that mirror neuron systems are predicitve, in the
sense of mediating inferences about the goals of the behaviour of others. In another
experiment involving monkeys, the patterns of activation were compared between the full
observation of a grasping action, and one where the final stage of the action was hidden
behind an occluder. In the latter case, the majority of the neurons recorded in the first case
6
S. Guttenplan A Companion to the philosophy of Mind (Blackwell, 1999) p 561
7
V Gallese, see n 5 above, p 41
8
V Gallese, see n 5 above, p 32
9
'The observation of human silent speech activated the...premotor sector of Broca's region', the same area
responsible for performance'. see V Gallese, see n5 above, p 35
10
The experiments to date have been restricted to that of 'disgust'
11
V Gallese, see n5 above, p 35
2
3. still responded, suggesting that 'by simulating the action, the gap can be filled'12, and that
simulations are in effect models of intentional goal-directed actions.
The significance of these findings for gaining some traction on the problem of how humans
interpret each other's actions and intentions should be clear. But first to summarise some main
points. Human brains (and to a lesser extent, primate brains13) contain populations of mirror
neurons which respond to the observation of agentive actions. Whatever pattern of neural
activation occurs in the performer's brain is mirrored in the corresponding loci of the
observer's brain. This holds true for both transitive actions (like grasping, biting) and non-
transitive actions (like speech-like mouth actions and the expression of emotion).Furthermore,
these 'embodied simulations' of performance can be used by the observer to make inferences
about the goals of intentional behaviour, as shown by the occluder experiments. Gallese is
alert to the philosophical implications of his findings for 'theory of mind', and indeed
explicitly engages with the literature. In many ways, the model Gallese suggests is analogous
to that of embodied cognition14 in the representation debate, since what he stresses is the real-
time coupled nature of agents interacting in the world.
In short, Gallese's conclusions are as follows. The folk-psychological approach to
understanding other agents is solipsistic in that it assumes one agent understands another by
giving an objective account of her behaviour according to propositional attitudes, like belief,
desire etc. But although we can and do give such 'objective' descriptions of agents when
asked to 'recognize, discriminate, parameterize, or categorize the emotions or sensations
displayed by others, we exert our cognitive operations by adopting a third-person perspective,
aimed exactly at objectifying the content of our perceptions'.15 Real-time online understanding
of other agents in interactive encounters is non-conceptual, non-declarative and non-
propositional:16
...to perceive an action is equivalent to internally simulating it.
This enables the observer to use her own resources to penetrate
the world of the other by means of a direct, automatic, and
unconscious process of motor simulation. Such simulation
processeses automatically establish a direct link between agent
and observer, in that both are mapped in a neutral fashion.
Gallese calls this automatically generated inter-agent link intentional attunement, and prefers
it to other epistemological approaches because 'it generates predictions about the intrinsic
functional nature of our social cognitive operations that cut across, and neither necessarily
depend on, nor are subordinate to any specific cognitive mind ontology, including that of Folk
Psychology.17
Notwithstanding the explanatory successes of this model, it is clear that intentional
attunement does not give the whole story of our ability to understand other agents. As
Gallese concedes, some social stimuli (particularly emotions) can only be understood by the
'explicit cognitive elaboration of their contextual aspects and previous information.'18
12
V Gallese, see n5 above, p 33s
13
Scientific american??
14
see Andy Clarke
15
V Gallese, see n5 above, p 31
16
V Gallese, see n5 above, p 35
17
V Gallese, see n5 above, p 31
18
V Gallese, see n5 above, p 43
3
4. But these two mechanisms taken together do give the whole story. Embodied simulation and
intentional attunement is the experience-based, non-propositional mechanism which
scaffolds19 the 'propositional, more sophisticated mentalizing mechanism'20. Although Gallese
uses the term 'mechanism' in the singular, it is unlikely by his own admission, that these
second tier sophisticated abilities would be restricted to any one specific region of the brain,
and would certainly be larger than a 'putative domain-specific Theory of Mind Module'21.
The important question now is to explain this secondary cognitively elaborate 'mechanism' for
understanding other agents. We now turn to Sterelny's account of folk psychology as an
'automated skill whose acquistion is scaffolded by downstream niche construction'22 for the
second half of this story.
Downstream epistemic engineering
Superficially, it may seem that Gallese and Sterelny's accounts of folk psychology are
incompatible. Gallese's model presents the ability to understand other agents as a brain
endowment, universal and innate. Sterelny, as we will see shortly, views folk psychology as a
perceptually primed automatic skill, gained by learning. The first account is avowedly
nativist; the second anti-nativist. However, Gallese's model differs from the usual nativist
accounts of folk psychology in that it does not specify innate representational content. The
mechanism is innate; but automatic, pre-reflexive intentional attunement is more like
perception than it is like knowledge. It is of a very different character from a putative theory
of mind module, and it is not one that suffers much from Sterelny's critique.
Sterelny's account provides that folk psychology is 'scaffolded by perceptual tuning'23. But it
is also further scaffolded by an engineered learning environment which helps the acquistion
of the highly sophisticated and cognitively elaborate set of interpretive skills. Here there is an
obvious parallel with Gallese's two mechanisms. But there is also one obvious clash. While
Sterelny's account views the perceptual mechanisms as merely biased towards picking up
salient information in respect of agents' intentions, emotions etc., Gallese's model suggests
that in addition to this bias (i.e a shared 'repertoire' between conspecifics), we also own those
intentions, emotions etc., in that our mirror systems actively simulate them. It seems that
Sterelny's account, like that of folk psychology which Gallese originally attacked, endorses a
kind of agentive solipsism. This is undeniable; it is only with something like a mirror system
that the kind of inter-subjectivity Gallese argues for becomes coherent. Though this is the
case, it has no bearing on the force of Sterelny's deeper point. For a start, the model he
develops is a hybrid between simulation theory and an account of how agents get the
information to guide the simulations.24 It will be recalled from the previous section that
simulation theory is really just a solipsistic account of embodied simulation, and one that
requires conscious cognitive effort as opposed to being unconscious and operationally
autonomous. However, in terms of the explanatory role that it plays in Sterelny's account
there is little difference between the two theories. The fact that intentional attunement sets up
a direct 'neural link' between agents does not mean that the strategic environment
19
Gallese suggests that the malfunctioning of this base mechanism may explain the failure of autistics to have a
fully functioning sophisticated mechanism. Experiments have shown that the mirror systems in autistics are
indeed impaired.
20
V Gallese, see n5 above, p 43
21
V Gallese, see n5 above, p 43
22
K. Sterelny Thought in a Hostile World (Oxford, 2002) p 220
23
K. Sterelny, see n 22 above, p 222
24
K. Sterelny, see n 22 above, p 217
4
5. miraculously becomes transparent. Agents still deceive, fake emotions, pretend to be other
than what they are. Even with embodied simulation, the strategic environment is still
translucent (though perhaps less so) rather than transparent. More information is required in
order to make accurate interpretive judgments.
What follows is Sterelny's hunch on how agents get that extra information, and thus how
Gallese's model acquires its second sophisticated tier. Furthermore, all of these arguments
undercut the position for the rich conceptual nativism of folk psychology.
Before Sterelny's account can be presented, a brief precis of the evolutionary psychology
position with respect to high order cognitive modules is required.
This position depends on three main arguments; two logical, and one 'just so' story. The
logical arguments are those of ‘poverty of the stimulus’ and the 'frame problem'. The
‘poverty of the stimulus’ argument was appropriated from Chomsky’s defence of his
innateness hypothesis. The argument runs: cognitive competence Z involves a multiplicity of
highly complex rules and parameters. A general-purpose learning mechanism could only
acquire Z after extensive tuition, and it would be slow. Since Z is acquired quickly and with
minimal tuition, a large amount of this cognitive structure must be endogenous. The second
logical argument, the ‘frame problem’, can be summarised like this. If the mind were an
homogenous domain-general learning mechanism, every cognitive ‘act’ would be
accompanied by a ‘combinatorial explosion’ as the possible inputs would be enormous, with
the result that cognition could not function. Since cognition does work, the possible inputs
accompanying a cognitive ‘act’ must be limited. Limitation of inputs means domain-specific
modules, not a single domain-general one. The third ‘just so’ story is a speculation on the
selection pressures that were extant in a hypothetical ancestral environment. Cosmides and
Tooby imagine a Pleistocene hunter-gatherer society and the kind of cognitive skills that they
might have needed, which would then have been modularized by the Baldwin effect. These
include: 'face recognition, friendship, child care, theory of mind, social-exchange, folk
biology, folk physics' etc25. Support for a theory of mind module generally follows the rough
contours of the above, though sometimes with the addition of developmental and dissociative
arguments from psychology as well.26
Though they will not be examined here, Sterelny devotes a fair amount of time to showing the
weaknesses in these last two arguments. However, the brunt of his thesis is addressed to the
classic Chomskyan arguments for innate structure, 'poverty of the stimulus' and the 'frame
problem'.
Sterelny's argument for the scaffolding of folk psychology on a carefully constructed learning
environment is essentially one of 'wealth of the stimulus'. While something like embodied
simulation could form the primary mechanism for intentional understanding, the cognitively
elaborate and context-sensitive second tier 'mechanism' is learnt in an environment of high-fi
signal. The term Sterelny uses for this careful structuring of the learning environment is
‘downstream epistemic engineering’: the fact that the way the Nth generation structures its
environment affects the way the N+ 1 th generation interprets and perceives it, and so on to
the N+ Nth generation. Put another way, ‘We engineer the informational environment of our
downstream generation, thus making for more accurate and reliable acquisition of key
25
S. Mithen, The Prehistory of the Mind, (T&H, 1996), p 45
26
There is evidence that mindreading skills go through a maturation process much like language; and also that
mindreading skills dissociate from other high cognitive skills.
5
6. capacities’27. Furthermore, the character of these learning environments for interpretive skills
is determined by selection pressures28:
Selection for interpretive skills could lead to a different evolutionary trajectory:
selection on parents (and via group selection, on the band as a whole) for actions
which scaffold the development of interpretive capacities. Selection rebuilds
the epistemic environment to scaffold the development of those capacities.
Language would also be a crucial part of that learning environment in that it helps in the
identification of perceptually salient inputs29:
Labelling turns perceptual tasks into memory tasks…[it] makes aspects of the
world transparent by establishing a one-to-one correspondence between
sensory properties and functional ones.
By reducing the bewildering array of possible distinctions to only that set of salient inputs the
learner of interpretive skills would also avoid the computational 'frame problem'.
Before we go on to tie the threads of Sterelny's and Gallese's models together, it is useful to
summarise Sterelny's main points. Folk psychology is an acquired automatic skill. The
cognitively sophisticated and context-sensitive mechanisms of mind-reading are learned in a
'wealth of stimulus' environment that has been selected for its efficacy in making interpretive
capacities available to novices. Such exogenous scaffolding would make the skill of
mindreading immune to both 'poverty of the stimulus' and 'frame problem' critiques.
Furthermore, the learning process is aided by both perceptual tuning and internal simulation.
This essay has taken the liberty of substituting Sterelny's posited 'perceptual mechanisms' and
simulation theory by the single cognitve feature of embodied simulation which explains both
features under a single model: actions/gestures/emotions are salient because they are part of
the observers's 'repertoire'; intentions and goal-directed behaviour is understood by the
automatic, unconscious process of intentional attunement
Both Tomasello and Arbib have posited models which also explain higher human cognitive
faculties as a combination of innate brain capacities and human cultural history. We will
briefly review these before offering a conclusion on the matters discussed.
Tomasello and Arbib
The work of Tomasello puts down the singularity of human beings to their ability to
accumulate and modify cultural capital, according to the rachet effect.30 He traces this ability
to our cognitive skill to learn imitatively. Furthermore, Tomasello explains this ability as
dependent on a cognitive capacity which seems almost identical to Gallese's description of
miror neurons31:
Imitative learning does not just mean mimicking the surface structure
of poorly understood behaviour...it also means reproducing an instrumental
act understood intentionally, that is reproducing not just the behavioural
27
K Sterelny, The Evolution and Evolvability of Culture, p 25
28
K. Sterelny, THough in a Hostile world, p 221
29
K. Sterelny, Thought…,p 154
30
The pattern of accumulation and modification of cultural artifacts through time.
31
M Tomasello The Human adaptation for culture
6
7. means but also the intentional end for which the behavioural means was
formulated. This requires some specially adapted skills of social cognition.
It seems plausible that mirror neuron systems fit the bill of the 'specially adapted skills of
social cognition' which allow agentive actions to be understood intentionally. Risking over-
simplication, Tomasello seems to be suggesting the following hierarchy of competences to
explain human singularity:
Mirror neuron systems which allow agents to understand actions intentionally
X) which scaffolds imitative learning
1.) which scaffolds the group's accumulation of skills and practices; construction of niche
2.) which further scaffolds the accumulation/modification of increasingly complex skills
and practices.
X is the underlying skill which is the pre-condition for the accumulation of cultural capital.
The cultural capital acquired at step 1 by the Nth generation is modified at step 2 by the N+
1th generation. The greater the number of repetitions of this process- the greater the number
of turns of the rachet- (i.e the greater the value of N), the richer, more refined and more
advanced are the types of skills available. More cognitively demanding skills require a large
amount of exogenous scaffolding, and thus are more likely to come about later on unless they
are a pre-condition for this process32. Tomasello suggests that 'these facts provide a sufficient
explanation for the existence of many of the most distinctive cognitive products that human
beings produce'33. It should also be noted that Tomasello's model of cultural skill acquisition
is probably recapitulated on the level of the maturing skill-acquiring individual34. Sterelny's
significant contribution to Tomasello's story is his application of this process of cultural
learning to understanding other agents, and in particular to deceptive agents.
The work of Arbib into the relationship between mirror systems and language has suggested
similar conclusions, although his sketch of the chronology of evolved skills links up where
Tomasello's starts. Summarised briefly, Arbib sees sophisticated cognitive skills as the end
point of the following chronology in stages (s):35
s1: Grasping
s2: Mirror system for grasping shared with common ancestor of humans and monkey
s3 Simple imitation system for object directed grasping. Shared with humans and chimps
s4: Complex imitation system for grasping. Hominid line only.
The final stage is claimed to 'involve little if any biological evolution, but instead to result
from historical evolution (historical change)' and is specific to Homo Sapiens. It is clear that
this final stage is where Tomasello's and Sterelny's accounts of cultural evolution and
epistemic engineering enter the story.
The shared thesis between Sterelny, Tomasello and Arbib, in contrast to those who argue for
nativism with respect to cognitive capacities, is that many of these capacities are the product
of cultural learning scaffolded on general brain endowments.
32
perhaps such as language
33
M. Tomasello, see n 31 above, p 513
34
Although the repertoire of acquirable skills for the individual will obviously be composed of both self-directed
trial and error learning as well as culturally acquired skills
35
Arbib The Mirror System Hypothesis. Linking Language to Theory of Mind p2
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8. Conclusion
In contrast to the position of the evolutionary psychologists, this essay has argued that
domain-general learning mechanisms are sufficient for acquiring high-level cognitive skills,
and in particular the ability to understand other agents. But this argument only goes through if
the brain is granted some specific endowments. The empirical studies of Gallese which have
discovered the existence of mirror systems is such an endowment. This mechanism allows
agents to be perceptually tuned to interpretively salient behaviour of other agents; and
embodied simulation allows agents direct access to the intentions and goals of other agents.
However, this mechanism only makes other agents' intentions, emotions and sensations
translucent. The strategic environment is one where agents lie, fake emotions, and pretend to
be other than what they are. This mechanism thus needs to be supplemented by culturally
mediated learning which allows agents to interpret others. Mirror systems provide Homo
Sapiens with the ability to engage in imitative learning, which allows the accumulation of
cultural capital, including sophisticated interpretive strategies. Sterelny's model of epistemic
engineering allows these skills to be exogenously scaffolded such that they can be acquired
with the requisite high fidelity. Agents may lie, cheat and fake their intentions, but cultural
learning gives interpreting agents the skills to deal with these strategies.
8