Minnesota State University Moorhead MHA 625 Health Program Planning and Evaluation Needs Assessment and Process Theory Activity– Worth 50 points Purpose: The purpose of this activity is to determine a health problem supported by needs assessment data to determine an appropriate program plan/project, as well as draft an appropriate Effect and Process Theory Diagram. Assignment Details: In this assignment you will determine a health problem, look at how the need would be determined (discuss needs assessment data/processes), discuss what data would be extracted to determine need, draft a summary of a program plan/project and diagram a program theory/logic model of effect theory related to that program plan. 1. Background of organization – discuss the organization that is impacted by this problem. 2. Brief summary of problem – what is an existing problem within an organization (or that you found interesting in a literature review/article)? 3. Discuss how the need was assessed. What determined that a problem existed? The purpose of the need assessment in relation to program planning/evaluation is briefly summarized and supported by literature. 4. Discuss what data would need to be extracted to determine the need. State what data sources would be utilized/accessed in during the needs assessment. The role of data in relation to program planning/evaluation is briefly summarized and supported by literature. 5. Provide a brief summary of the potential program plan/project (what is the intended intervention)? 6. Draft a diagram of the Effect and Process Theory related to this program plan/project. Refer to page 193 – figure 7-4 for elements/example of the diagram to include (your diagram would relate to your proposed plan/project). Make sure you include organizational plan inputs and service utilization plan inputs as well as intervention theory. 7. Utilize at least 3 scholarly references when completing this activity. 8. Utilize APA format when completing this activity – paper should have title page and reference page and follow APA format. 9. The paper should be approximately 2-4 pages without title and reference pages. 10. Submit to the assignment dropbox per the calendar due dates. 11. Utilize this information in your final narrated Health Program Project PowerPoint Course Learning Outcomes (CLO) that apply to this assignment: • CLO 1: Identify methods to assess the needs of the community to improve the health of a population http://www.mnstate.edu/ • CLO 2: Analyze models of program development in order to identify the essential elements of effective program evaluation • CLO 7: Critique assessment and evaluation data Program Domains and Competencies that apply to this assignment: Domain #1: Leadership – the ability to inspire individual and organizational excellent, create and attain a shared vision and successfully manage change to attain the organization’s strategic ends and successful perf ...

1. Minnesota State University Moorhead
MHA 625
Health Program Planning and Evaluation
Needs Assessment and Process Theory Activity– Worth 50
points
Purpose: The purpose of this activity is to determine a health
problem supported by needs assessment data to determine an
appropriate program plan/project, as well as draft an appropriate
Effect and Process Theory Diagram.
Assignment Details: In this assignment you will determine a
health problem, look at how the need would be determined
(discuss
needs assessment data/processes), discuss what data would be
extracted to determine need, draft a summary of a program
plan/project and diagram a program theory/logic model of effect
theory related to that program plan.
1. Background of organization – discuss the organization that is
impacted by this problem.
2. Brief summary of problem – what is an existing problem
within an organization (or that you found interesting in a
literature
review/article)?
3. Discuss how the need was assessed. What determined that a
problem existed? The purpose of the need assessment in

2. relation to program planning/evaluation is briefly summarized
and supported by literature.
4. Discuss what data would need to be extracted to determine
the need. State what data sources would be utilized/accessed in
during the needs assessment. The role of data in relation to
program planning/evaluation is briefly summarized and
supported
by literature.
5. Provide a brief summary of the potential program
plan/project (what is the intended intervention)?
6. Draft a diagram of the Effect and Process Theory related to
this program plan/project. Refer to page 193 – figure 7-4 for
elements/example of the diagram to include (your diagram
would relate to your proposed plan/project). Make sure you
include
organizational plan inputs and service utilization plan inputs as
well as intervention theory.
7. Utilize at least 3 scholarly references when completing this
activity.
8. Utilize APA format when completing this activity – paper
should have title page and reference page and follow APA
format.
9. The paper should be approximately 2-4 pages without title
and reference pages.
10. Submit to the assignment dropbox per the calendar due
dates.
11. Utilize this information in your final narrated Health
Program Project PowerPoint
Course Learning Outcomes (CLO) that apply to this assignment:

3. • CLO 1: Identify methods to assess the needs of the community
to improve the health of a population
http://www.mnstate.edu/
• CLO 2: Analyze models of program development in order to
identify the essential elements of effective program evaluation
• CLO 7: Critique assessment and evaluation data
Program Domains and Competencies that apply to this
assignment:
Domain #1: Leadership – the ability to inspire individual and
organizational excellent, create and attain a shared vision and
successfully manage change to attain the organization’s
strategic ends and successful performance.
Competencies:
1. Utilize a systems approach as an organizational leader to
effectively plan resource use
5. Provide innovative thinking and critical reasoning on issues
that impact health care organizations
Domain #2: Professionalism – the ability to align personal and
organizational conduct with ethical and professional
standards that include a responsibility to the patient and
community, a service orientation, and a commitment to lifelong
learning and improvement.
Competencies:
2. Advocate for optimal health care in communities and
populations

4. Domain #3: Communication and Relationship Building – the
ability to communicate clearly and concisely with internal and
external customers, establish and maintain relationships, and
facilitate constructive interactions with individuals and groups.
Competencies:
1. Develop clear and concise communication methods as an
emerging healthcare leader
5. Collaborate with community stakeholders to enhance
healthcare decision making
Domain #4: Knowledge of the Healthcare Environment – the
understanding of the health care system and the
environment in which health care managers and providers
function.
Competencies:
4. Evaluate, advocate for, and support
organizational/governmental policy to improve health care
delivery and
population health outcomes
5. Utilize evidence for establishment of standards, practices and
innovative patient care models within an organization
Domain #5: Business Skills- the ability to apply business
principles, including systems thinking, to the healthcare
environment.
Competencies:
1. Utilize data and information management to drive business
decisions
4. Demonstrate strategic resource to effectively lead projects
within an organization and/or community

5. 5. Demonstrate operations management through problem solving
skills that impact employees, the patient, the
organization and the environment
6. Analyze healthcare market demands of organizations,
communities and populations
MHA 625– Individual Assignment – Needs Assessment and
Process Theory Activity -Grading Rubric
Criterion High Level
(92%-100%)
Competent Level
(84%-91%)
Developing
(<83%)
No points Pts
Earned/Comments
Overall Content
2 pts. possible
No (or minimal)
grammar and spelling
errors
Double spaced, APA
format

6. Moderate grammar and
spelling errors
Double spaced, and/or
APA formatting issues
Major grammar and
spelling errors
Double spaced, and/or
APA formatting issues
Unprofessional,
lacking
in APA format
Background of
Organization/Summary of
Problem
9 pts. possible
Background of
organization with clear
identification of the
problem is presented
Unclear or missing
background of
organization and/or
unclear identification of
the problem is
presented.

7. Unclear or missing
background of
organization and
unclear identification
of the problem is
presented.
Element missing
Assessing Need
9 pts. possible
Clear description of the
assessment of need in
determining the
problem. The purpose of
the need assessment in
relation to program
planning/evaluation is
briefly summarized and
supported by literature.
Unclear description of
the assessment of need
in determining the
problem; and/or the
purpose of the need
assessment in relation to
program
planning/evaluation is
not summarized or
supported by literature.

8. Unclear description of
the assessment of need
in determining the
problem; and the
purpose of the need
assessment in relation
to program
planning/evaluation is
not summarized or
supported by
literature.
Element missing
Data Extraction/Utilized
9 pts. possible
Clear discussion of data
extraction, including
what data sources would
Unclear discussion of
data extraction; data
sources that would need
Unclear discussion of
data extraction; data
sources that would
Element missing
need to be

9. utilized/accessed to
determine need. The
role of data in relation to
program
planning/evaluation is
briefly summarized and
supported by literature.
to be utilized/accessed
to determine need are
not discussed or limited
in discussion; and/or the
role of data in relation to
program
planning/evaluation is
not summarized or
supported by literature.
need to be
utilized/accessed to
determine need are
not discussed; and the
role of data in relation
to program
planning/evaluation is
not summarized or
supported by
literature.
Summary of the potential
program plan/project
(intended intervention(s)
identified)

10. 9 pts possible
Clear summary of the
program plan/project
with intended
intervention(s) identified
Unclear summary of the
program plan/project
and/or intended
intervention(s) are not
identified
Unclear summary of
the program
plan/project and
intended
intervention(s) are not
identified
Element missing
Effect and Process Theory
Diagram
9 pts possible
Effect and process
theory diagram present,
represents/correlates to
project.
Effect and process
theory diagram present,

11. unclear correlation to
project.
Effect and process
theory diagram
present, limited in
scope/development
and unclear correlation
to project.
Element missing
EBP/references are
utilized
3 pts. possible
Clearly utilizes at least 3
evidence-based, peer
reviewed references
and/or reputable sites in
completing project
Utilizes 2 references
and/or lacking peer-
review journals and/or
reputable sites
Utilizes 1 reference
and/or lacks peer-
reviewed journals
and/or reputable sites
No references
utilized in
completing

12. assignment.
Total (out of 50 points):
PRAISEFOR
Gettingto
YES
“GettingtoYEShasanunrivaledplaceintheliteratureofdisputeresol
ution.Nootherbookinthefieldcomesclosetoitsimpacton
thewaypractitioners,teachers,researchers,andthepublicapproachn
egotiation.”
—NATIONALINSTITUTEFORDISPUTERESOLUTIONFORUM
“GettingtoYESisahighlyreadableandpracticalprimeronthefundam
entalsofnegotiation.Allofus,asnegotiatorsdealingwith
personal,community,andbusinessproblems,needtoimproveourskil
lsinconflictresolutionandagreementmaking.Thisconcise
volumeisthebestplacetobegin.”
—JOHNT.DUNLOP
“Thissplendidbookwillhelpturnadversarialbattlingintohardheade
dproblemsolving.”
—AVERELLHARRIMAN
“GettingtoYESisahighlyreadable,uncomplicatedguidetoresolving
conflictsofeveryimaginabledimension.Itteachesyouhowto

13. winwithoutcompromisingfriendships.IwishIhadwrittenit!”
—ANNLANDERS
“GettingtoYESispowerful,incisive,persuasive.Notabagoftricksbu
tanoverallapproach.Perhapsthemostusefulbookyouwill
everread!”
—ELLIOTRICHARDSON
“Simplebutpowerfulideasthathavealreadymadeacontributionatthe
internationallevelareheremadeavailabletoall.Excellent
adviceonhowtoapproachanegotiatingproblem.”
—CYRUSVANCE
PENGUINBOOKS
Gettingto
YES
Theauthorsofthisbookhavebeenworkingtogethersince1977.
ROGERFISHERisWillistonProfessorofLawEmeritusatHarvardLa
wSchool,FounderandDirectorEmeritusoftheHarvardNegotiation
Project,andtheFoundingChairoftheProgramonNegotiationatHarv
ardLawSchool.RaisedinIllinois,heservedinWorld WarIIwiththe
U.S.ArmyAirForce,inPariswiththeMarshallPlan,andinWashingto
n,D.C.,withtheDepartmentofJustice.Hehasalsopracticedlawin
WashingtonandservedasaconsultanttotheDepartmentofDefense.H
ewastheoriginatorandexecutiveeditoroftheaward-winning
televisionseriesTheAdvocates.Hehasconsultedwidelywithgovern
ments,corporations,andindividuals.Heistheauthororcoauthorof
numerousprize-

14. winningscholarlyandpopularbooks,includinghismostrecent:Beyo
ndReason:UsingEmotionsasYouNegotiate.
WILLIAMURYiscofounderofHarvard’sProgramo nNegotiationan
dDistinguishedFellowoftheHarvardNegotiationProject.Raisedin
CaliforniaandSwitzerland,heisagraduateofYaleandHarvard,witha
doctorateinsocialanthropology.Uryhasservedasamediatorand
advisorinnegotiationsrangingfromwildcatstrikestoethnicwarsaro
undtheworld.HewasaconsultanttotheWhiteHouseonestablishing
nuclearriskreductioncentersinWashingtonandMoscow.Hismostre
centprojectisAbraham’sPath,arouteofcross-culturaltravelinthe
MiddleEastthatretracesthefootstepsofAbraham,theprogenitorofm
anyculturesandfaiths.Ury’smostrecentbookisThePowerofa
PositiveNo:SavetheDeal,SavetheRelationship,andStillSayNo.
BRUCEPATTONisCofounderandDistinguishedFellowoftheHarv
ardNegotiationProject,cofounderoftheProgramonNegotiationat
HarvardLawSchool,andafounderandpartnerofVantagePartner s,L
LC,aconsultingfirmthathelpsGlobal2000companiesnegotiateand
managetheirmostcriticalrelationships.Asamediator,hehelpedstruc
turethesettlementoftheU.S.–Iranianhostageconflict,workedwith
NobelPeacePrizewinnerÓscarAriastoensurethesuccessoftheArias
PeacePlanforCentralAmerica,andworkedwithallpartiesin
SouthAfricahelpingtocreatetheconstitutionalprocessthatendedap
artheid.AgraduateofHarvardCollegeandHarvardLawSchool,heis
alsocoauthoroftheNewYorkTimesbestsellerDifficultConversatio
ns:HowtoDiscussWhatMattersMost.
BOOKSBYROGERFISHER
BeyondReason:UsingEmotionsasYouNegotiate
(withDanShapiro,2005)
LateralLeadership:GettingThingsDoneWhenYou’reNOTtheBoss

15. (withAlanSharp,1998)
CopingwithInternationalConflict:ASystematicApproachtoInflue
nceinInternationalNegotiation(withAndreaKupferSchneider,
ElizabethBorgwardt,andBrianGanson,1996)
BeyondMachiavelli
(withElizabethKopelmanandAndreaKupferSchneider,1994)
GettingTogether:BuildingRelationshipsAsWeNegotiate
(withScottBrown,1988)
ImprovingCompliancewithInternationalLaw(1981)
InternationalMediation:AWorkingGuide;IdeasforthePractitioner
(withWilliamUry,1978)
InternationalCrisesandtheRoleofLaw:PointsofChoice(1978)
DearIsraelis,DearArabs:AWorkingApproachtoPeace(1972)
InternationalConflictforBeginners(1969)
InternationalConflictandBehavioralScience:TheCraigvillePapers
(editorandcoauthor,1964)
BOOKSBYWILLIAMURY
ThePowerofaPositiveNo:
SavetheDeal,SavetheRelationship,andStillSayNo(2007)
MustWeFight?(editorandcoauthor,2001)
TheThirdSide:WhyWeFightandHowWeCanStop(2000)
GettingPastNo:NegotiatinginDifficultSituations(1991,revisededi

16. tion1993)
WindowsofOpportunity:FromColdWartoPeacefulCompetitionin
U.S.–SovietRelations
(editedwithGrahamT.AllisonandBruceJ.Allyn,1989)
GettingDisputesResolved:DesigningSystemstoCuttheCostsofCon
flict
(withJeanneM.BrettandStephenB.Goldberg,1988)
BeyondtheHotline:HowCrisisControlCanPreventNuclearWar(19
85)
BOOKSBYBRUCEPATTON
DifficultConversations:HowtoDiscussWhatMattersMost
(withDouglasStoneandSheilaHeen,1999,2ndEdition2010)
Gettingto
YES
NEGOTIATINGAGREEMENT
WITHOUTGIVINGIN
byROGERFISHER
andWILLIAMURY
withBRUCEPATTON,EDITOR
•REVISEDEDITIONSBY•
FISHER,URY,ANDPATTON
PENGUINBOOKS

17. PENGUINBOOKS
PublishedbythePenguinGroup
PenguinGroup(USA)Inc.,375HudsonStreet,NewYork,NewYork1
0014,U.S.A.
PenguinGroup(Canada),90EglintonAvenueEast,Suite700,Toront
o,
Ontario,CanadaM4P2Y3(adivisionofPearsonPenguinCanadaInc.)
PenguinBooksLtd,80Strand,LondonWC2R0RL,England
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fPenguinBooksLtd)
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Victoria3124,Australia(adivisionofPearsonAustraliaGroupPtyLt
d)
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NewDelhi–110017,India
PenguinGroup(NZ),67ApolloDrive,Rosedale,Auckland0632,
NewZealand(adivisionofPears onNewZealandLtd)
PenguinBooks(SouthAfrica)(Pty)Ltd,24SturdeeAvenue,
Rosebank,Johannesburg2196,SouthAfrica
PenguinBooksLtd,RegisteredOffices:
80Strand,LondonWC2R0RL,England
FirstpublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyHoughtonMifflinC
ompany1981
PublishedinPenguinBooks1983
Secondeditionpublished1991
Thisthirdeditionpublished2011

18. 13579108642
Copyright©RogerFisherandWilliamUry,1981,1991
Copyright©RogerFisher,WilliamUry,andBrucePatton,2011
Allrightsreserved
ResearchatHarvardUniversityisundertakenwiththeexpecta tionofp
ublication.Insuchpublicationtheauthorsaloneareresponsiblefor
statementsoffact,opinions,recommendations,andconclusionsexpr
essed.PublicationinnowayimpliesapprovalorendorsementbyHarv
ard
University,anyofitsfaculties,orbythePresidentandFellowsofHarv
ardCollege.
LIBRARYOFCONGRESSCATALOGING-IN-
PUBLICATIONDATA
Fisher,Roger,1922–
Gettingtoyes:negotiatingagreementwithoutgivingin/byRogerFish
er,WilliamUry,
andBrucePatton.—3rded.
p.cm.
ISBN9781101539545
1.Negotiation.I.Ury,William.II.Patton,Bruce.III.Title.
BF637.N4F572011
158'.5—dc222011006319
ExceptintheUnitedStatesofAmerica,thisbookissoldsubjecttotheco
nditionthatitshallnot,bywayoftradeorotherwise,belent,resold,
hiredout,orotherwisecirculatedwithoutthepublisher’spriorconsen
tinanyformofbindingorcoverothertha nthatinwhichitispublished

19. andwithoutasimilarconditionincludingthisconditionbeingimpose
donthesubsequentpurchaser.
Thescanning,uploading,anddistributionofthisbookviatheInternet
orviaanyothermeanswithoutthepermissionofthepublisherisillegal
andpunishablebylaw.Pleasepurchaseonlyauthorizedelectronicedit
ions,anddonotparticipateinorencourageelectronicpiracyof
copyrightedmaterials.Yoursupportoftheauthor’srightsisappreciat
ed.
Toourfathers,
WALTERT.FISHER,MELVINC.URY,
andWILLIAME.PATTON,
whobyexampletaughtusthepowerofprinciple.
PrefacetotheThirdEdition
ThirtyyearshavenowpassedsincetheinitialpublicationofGettingto
YES.Wearedelightedand
humbledthatsomanypeoplefromsomanyplacesaroundtheworldcon
tinuetofindithelpfulin
transformingtheirconflictsandnegotiatingmutuallysatisfyingagre
ements.Littledidweknowatthetime
ofitspublicationthatthisslenderbookwouldbecomeareferencepoint
inaquietrevolutionthathasover
thecourseofthreedecadeschangedthewaywemakedecisionswithino
urfamilies,organizations,and
societies.
Thenegotiationrevolution
Agenerationago,theprevailingviewofdecision-

20. makinginmostplaceswashierarchical.Thepeopleat
thetopofthepyramidsofpower—atwork,inthefamily,inpolitics —
weresupposedtomakethe
decisionsandthepeopleatthebottomofthepyramidstofollowtheorde
rs.Ofcourse,therealitywas
alwaysmorecomplicated.
Intoday’sworld,characterizedbyflatterorganizations,fasterinnova
tion,andtheexplosionofthe
Internet,itisclearerthaneverthattoaccomplishourworkandmeetour
needs,weoftenhavetorelyon
dozens,hundreds,perhapsthousandsofindividualsandorgani zation
soverwhomweexercisenodirect
control.Wesimplycannotrelyongivingorders—
evenwhenwearedealingwithemployeesorchildren.
Togetwhatwewant,wearecompelledtonegotiate.Moreslowlyinsom
eplaces,morerapidlyinothers,
thepyramidsofpowerareshiftingintonetworksofnegotia tion.Thisq
uietrevolution,whichaccompanies
thebetter-
knownknowledgerevolution,couldwellbecalledthe“negotiationre
volution.”
WebeganthefirsteditionofGettingtoYESwiththesentence:“Likeito
rnot,youareanegotiator.”
Backthen,formanyreaders,thatwasaneyeopener.Nowithasbecome
anacknowledgedreality.Back
then,theterm“negotiation”wasmorelikelytobeassociatedwithspeci
alizedactivitiessuchaslabor
talks,closingasale,orperhapsinternationaldiplomacy.Nowalmosta
llofusrecognizethatwenegotiate
inaninformalsensewithjustabouteveryonewemeetfrommornington
ight.
Agenerationago,theterm“negotiation”alsohadanadversarialconno
tation.Incontemplatinga

21. negotiation,thecommonquestioninpeople’smindswas,“Whoisgoin
gtowinandwhoisgoingto
lose?”Toreachanagreement,someonehadto“givein.”Itwasnotaplea
santprospect.Theideathat
bothsidescouldbenefit,thatbothcould“win,”wasforeigntomanyofu
s.Nowitisincreasingly
recognizedthattherearecooperativewaysofnegotiatingourdifferen
cesandthatevenifa“win-win”
solutioncannotbefound,awiseagreementcanstilloftenbereachedth
atisbetterforbothsidesthanthe
alternative.
WhenwewerewritingGettingtoYES,veryfewcoursestaughtnegotia
tion.Nowlearningtonegotiate
wellisacceptedasacorecompetencewithmanycoursesofferedinlaw
schools,businessschools,
schoolsofgovernment,andeveninquiteafewprimary,ele mentary,an
dhighschools.
Inshort,the“negotiationrevolution”isnowinfullswayaroundthewor
ld,andwetakeheartthatthe
commonsensetenetsofprinciplednegotiationhavespreadfarandwid
etogoodeffect.
Theworkahead
Still,whileprogresshasbeenconsiderable,theworkisfarfromdo ne.I
ndeed,atnotimeinthelastthree
decadescanwerecallagreaterneedfornegotiationbasedonajointsear
chformutualgainsand
legitimatestandards.
Aquicksurveyofthenewsonalmostanydayrevealsthecompellingnee
dforabetterwaytodeal

22. withdifferences.Howmanypeople,organizatio ns,andnationsarestu
bbornlybargainingoverpositions?
Howmuchdestructiveescalationresultsinbitterfamilyfeuds,endles
slawsuits,andwarswithoutend?
Forlackofagoodprocess,howmanyopportunitiesarebeinglosttofind
solutionsthatarebetterforboth
sides?
Conflictremains,aswehavenoted,agrowthindustry.Indeed,theadve
ntofthenegotiationrevolution
hasbroughtmoreconflict,notless.Hierarchiestendtobottleupconfli
ct,whichcomesoutintotheopen
ashierarchiesgivewaytonetworks.Democraciessurfaceratherthans
uppressconflict,whichiswhy
democraciesoftenseemsoquarrelsomeandturbulentwhencompared
withmoreauthoritariansocieties.
Thegoalcannotandshouldnotbetoeliminateconflict.Conflictisanin
evitable—anduseful—partof
life.Itoftenleadstochangeandgeneratesinsight.Fewinjusticesaread
dressedwithoutseriousconflict.
Intheformofbusinesscompetition,conflicthelpscreateprosperity.A
nditliesattheheartofthe
democraticprocess,wherethebestdecisionsresultnotfromasuperfic
ialconsensusbutfromexploring
differentpointsofviewandsearchingforcreativesolutions.Strangea
sitmayseem,theworldneeds
moreconflict,notless.
Thechallengeisnottoeliminateconflictbuttotransformit.Itistochan
gethewaywedealwithour
differences—fromdestructive,adversarialbattlingtohard-
headed,side-by-sideproblem-solving.We
shouldnotunderestimatethedifficultyofthis task,yetnotaskismoreu
rgentintheworldtoday.

23. Wearelivinginanagethatfutureanthropologistsmightlookbackonan
dcallthefirsthumanfamily
reunion.Forthefirsttime,theentirehumanfamilyisintouch,thanksto
thecommunicationsrevolution.
Allfifteenthousandorso“tribes”orlanguagecommunitiesonthispla
netareawareofoneanother
aroundtheglobe.Andaswithmanyfamilyreunions,itisnotallpeacean
dharmony,butmarkedbydeep
dissensionandresentmentofinequitiesandinjustices.
Morethanever,facedwiththechallengesoflivingtogetherinanuclear
ageonanincreasingly
crowdedplanet,forourownsakeandthesakeoffuturegenerations,we
needtolearnhowtochangethe
basicgameofconflict.
Inshort,thehardworkofgettingto“yes”hasjustbegun.
Thisedition
WehaveoftenheardfromreadersthatGettingtoYEScontinuestoserv
easanaccessibleguideto
collaborativenegotiationinawidevarietyoffields.Atthesametime,
werealizeayoungeraudienceis
sometimespuzzledbystoriesandexamplesthatwerecommonknowle
dgethirtyyearsago,andmany
readersarecuriousaboutcontemporarycases.Sointhiseditionwehav
eundertakenacarefulrevision
andupdatingofexamplesandaddedsomenewoneswhereappropriate.
Wehaveaddedtoourtoolboxconsiderablyinthirtyyears,ascapturedi
nsuchbooksasGettingPast
No,DifficultConversations,BeyondReason,andThePowerofaPosit
iveNo,eachofwhichexplores

24. importantchallengesi ndealingcollaborativelyandeffectivelywiths
eriousdifferences.We’vemadeno
attempttosummarizeallofthatmaterialhere,sinceoneofthevirtuesof
GettingtoYESisthatitisshort
andclear.Instead,inthisrevisionwehaveaddedafewrelevantideasw
heretheyhelpclarifyourintent,
andinotherplacesmadeslightrevisionstoupdateourthinking.Forexa
mple,wehavemadeouranswer
tothefinalquestioninthebookaboutnegotiationpowerfullyconsiste
ntwiththe“sevenelementsof
negotiation”frameworkweteachatHarvardLawSchool.
Oneadjustmentweconsidered,butultimatel yrejected,wastochanget
heword“separate”to
“disentangle”in“separatethepeoplefromtheproblem,”thepowerful
firststepinthemethodof
principlednegotiation.Somereadershavetakenthisphrasetomeanle
aveasidethepersonaldimension
ofnegotiationandjustfocusonthesubstantivepr oblem,ortoignoree
motionalissuesand“berational.”
Thatisnotourintent.Negotiatorsshouldmakedealingwithpeopleiss
uesapriorityfromthebeginningto
theendofanegotiation.Asthetextstatesatthestart,“Negotiatorsarep
eoplefirst.”
Ourbeliefisthatbydisentanglingthepeoplefromtheproblemyoucan
be“softonthepeople”while
remaining“hardontheproblem.”Solongasyouremainrespectfuland
attentivetopeopleissues,you
shouldbeabletostrengthenarelationshipevenasyoudisagreeabouts
ubstance.
Finally,wehaveaddedabitofmaterialontheimpactofthemeanso fco
mmunicationinnegotiation.
Thegrowthofemailandtextingandthecreationofglobal“virtual”org
anizationshasmadethisan

25. importantvariable,especiallyinlightofresearchshowingitsimpacto
nnegotiationdynamicsandresults.
Ourhumanfuture
Weareeachparticipantsinapioneeringgenerationofnegotiators.Wh
ilenegotiationasadecision-
makingprocesshasbeenaroundsincethebeginningofthehumanstory
,neverhasitbeensocentralto
humanlifeandthesurvivalofourspecies.
Asthenegotiationrevolutionunfolds,ouraspirationisthattheprincip
lesinthisbookcontinuetohelp
people—individuallyandcollectively—
negotiatethemyriaddilemmasintheirlives.Inthewordsofthe
poetWallaceStevens:“Afterthefinalnotherecomesayesandonthaty
esthefutureworlddepends.”
Wewishyoumuchsuccessingettingtothatyes!
RogerFisher
WilliamUry
BrucePatton
PrefacetotheSecondEdition
Duringthelasttenyearsnegotiationasafieldforacademicandprofessi
onalconcernhasgrown
dramatically.Newtheoreticalworkshavebeenpublished,casestudie
shavebeenproduced,and
empiricalresearchhasbeenundertaken.Tenyearsagoveryfewpr ofes
sionalschoolsofferedcourseson
negotiation;nowtheyareallbutuniversal.Universitiesarebeginning
toappointfacultywhospecializein
negotiation.Consultingfirmsnowdothesameinthecorporateworld.

26. Againstthischangingintellectuallandscape,theideasinGettingtoY
EShavestoodupwell.They
havegainedconsiderableattentionandacceptancefromabroadaudie
nceandarefrequentlycitedas
startingpointsforotherwork.Happily,theyremainpersuasivetothea
uthorsaswell.Mostquestionsand
commentshavefocusedonareasinwhichthebookhasprovenambiguo
us,orwherereadershavewanted
morespecificadvice.Wehavetriedtoaddressthemostimportantofthe
setopicsinthisrevision.
Ratherthantamperingwiththetext(andaskingreaderswhoknowittos
earchforchanges),wehave
chosentoaddnewmaterialinaseparatesectionattheendoftheseconde
dition.Themaintextremains
completeandunchangedfromtheoriginal,exceptforupdatingthefigu
resinexamplestokeeppacewith
inflationandrephrasinginafewplacestoclarifymeaningandeliminat
esexistlanguage.Wehopethatour
answersto“TenQuestionsPeopleAskAboutGettingtoYES”provehe
lpfulandmeetsomeofthe
interestsreadershaveexpressed.
Weaddressquestionsabout(1)themeaningandlimitsof“principled”
negotiation(itrepresents
practical,notmoral,advice);(2)dealingwithsomeonewhoseemstob
eirrationalorwhohasadifferent
valuesystem,outlook,ornegotiatingstyle;(3)questionsabouttactics
,suchaswheretomeet,whoshould
makethefirstoffer,andhowtomovefrominventingoptionstomaking
commitments;and(4)theroleof
powerinnegotiation.
Moreextensivetreatmentofsometopicswillhavetoawaitotherbooks
.Readersinterestedinmore
detailabouthandling“peopleissues”innegotiationinwaysthattendt

27. oestablishaneffectiveworking
relationshipmightenjoyGettingTogether:BuildingRelationshipsas
WeNegotiate,byRogerFisherand
ScottBrown,alsoavailablefromPenguinBooks.Ifdealingwithdiffic
ultpeopleandsituationsismore
yourconcern,lookforGettingPastNo:NegotiatinginDifficultSituati
ons,byWilliamUry,published
byBantamBooks.Nodoubtotherbookswillfollow.Thereiscertainly
muchmoretosayaboutpower,
multilateralnegotiations,cross-
culturaltransactions,personalstyles,andmanyothertopics.
OnceagainwethankMartyLinsky,thistimefortakingacarefuleyeand
asharppenciltoournew
material.OurspecialthankstoDougStoneforhisdiscerningcritique,
editing,andoccasionalrewriting
ofsuccessivedraftsofthatmaterial.Hehasanuncannyknackforcatchi
ngusinanunclearthoughtor
paragraph.
RogerFisher
WilliamUry
BrucePatton
Formorethanadozenyears,BrucePattonhasworkedwithusinformul
atingandexplainingallofthe
ideasinthisbook.Thispastyearhehaspulledthelaboringoarinconver
tingourjointthinkingintoan
agreedtext.ItisapleasuretowelcomeBruce,editorofthefirstedition,
asafullcoauthorofthissecond
edition.
R.F.

28. W.U.
Acknowledgments
Thisbookbeganasaquestion:Whatisthebestwayforpeopletodealwit
htheirdifferences?For
example,whatisthebestadviceonecouldgiveahusbandandwifegetti
ngdivorcedwhowanttoknow
howtoreachafairandmutuallysatisfactoryagreementwithoutending
upinabitterfight?Perhapsmore
difficult,whatadvicewouldyougiveoneofthemwhowantedtodothes
amething?Everyday,families,
neighbors,couples,employees,bosses,businesses,consumers,sal es
men,lawyers,andnationsfacethis
samedilemmaofhowtogettoyeswithoutgoingtowar.Drawingonourr
espectivebackgroundsin
internationallawandanthropologyandanextensivecollaborationov
ertheyearswithpractitioners,
colleagues,andstudents,wehaveevolvedapracticalmethodfornegot
iatingagreementamicablywithout
givingin.
Wehavetriedoutideasonlawyers,businessmen,governmentofficial
s,judges,prisonwardens,
diplomats,insurancerepresentatives,militaryofficers,coalminers,
andoilexecutives.Wegratefully
acknowledgethosewhorespondedwithcriticismandwithsuggestion
sdistilledfromtheirexperience.
Webenefitedimmensely.
Intruth,somanypeoplehavecontributedsoextensivelytoourlearnin
govertheyearsthatitisno
longerpossibletosaypreciselytowhomweareindebtedforwhichidea
sinwhatform.Thosewho

29. contributedthemostunderstandthatfootnoteswereomittednotbecau
sewethinkeveryideaoriginal,but
rathertokeepthetextreadablewhenweowesomuchtosomany.
Wecouldnotfailtomention,however,ourdebttoHowardRaiffa.Hisk
indbutforthrightcriticism
hasrepeatedlyimprovedtheapproach,andhisnotionsonseekingjoint
gainsbyexploitingdifferences
andusingimaginativeproceduresforsettlingdifficultissueshaveins
piredsectionsonthesesubjects.
LouisSohn,deviserandnegotiatorextraordinaire,wasalwaysencour
aging,alwayscreative,always
lookingforward.Amongourmanydebtstohim,weoweourintroductio
ntotheideaofusingasingle
negotiatingtext,whichwecalltheOne-
TextProcedure.AndwewouldliketothankMichaelDoyleand
DavidStrausfortheircreativeideasonrunningbrainstormingsession
s.
Goodanecdotesandexamplesarehardtofind.Wearegreatlyi ndebtedt
oJimSebeniusforhis
accountsoftheLawoftheSeaConference(aswellasforhisthoughtful
criticismofthemethod),toTom
Griffithforanaccountofhisnegotiationwithaninsuranceadjuster,an
dtoMaryParkerFollettforthe
storyoftwomenquarrelinginalibrary.
Wewantespeciallytothankallthosewhoreadthisbookinvariousdraft
sandgaveusthebenefitof
theircriticism,includingourstudentsintheJanuaryNegotiationWor
kshopsof1980and1981atHarvard
LawSchool,andFrankSander,JohnCooper,andWilliamLincoln,wh
otaughtthoseworkshopswithus.
Inparticular,wewanttothankthosemembersofHarvard’sNegotiatio
nSeminarwhomwehavenot
alreadymentioned;theylistenedtouspatientlytheselasttwoyearsand

30. offeredmanyhelpfulsuggestions:
JohnDunlop,JamesHealy,DavidKuechle,ThomasSchelling,andLa
wrenceSusskind.Toallofour
friendsandassociatesweowemorethanwecansay,butthefinalrespon
sibilityforthecontentofthis
booklieswiththeauthors;iftheresultisnotyetperfect,itisnotforlacko
fourcolleagues’efforts.
Withoutfamilyandfriends,writingwouldbeintolerable.Forconstruc
tivecriticismandmoralsupport
wethankCarolineFisher,DavidLax,FrancesTurnbull,andJaniceUr
y.WithoutFrancisFisherthisbook
wouldneverhavebeenwritten.Hehadthefelicityofintroducingthetw
oofussomefouryearsago.
Finersecretarialhelpwecouldnothavehad.ThankstoDeborahReime
lforherunfailingcompetence,
moralsupport,andfirmbutgraciousreminders,andtoDeniseTrybula,
whoneverwaveredinher
diligenceandcheerfulness.AndspecialthankstothepeopleatWordPr
ocessing,ledbyCynthiaSmith,
whometthetestofanendlessseriesofdraftsandnearimpossibledeadli
nes.
Thenthereareoureditors.Byreorganizingandcuttingthisbookinhalf
,MartyLinskymadeitfar
morereadable.Tospareourreaders,hehadthegoodsensenottospareo
urfeelings.ThanksalsotoPeter
Kinder,JuneKinoshita,andBobRoss.Junestruggledtomakethelang
uagelesssexist.Wherewehave
notsucceeded,weapologizetothosewhomaybeoffended.Wealsowa
nttothankAndreaWilliams,our
adviser;JulianBach,ouragent;andDickMcAdooandhisassociatesat

31. HoughtonMifflin,whomadethe
productionofthisbookbothpossibleandpleasurable.
Finally,wewanttothankBrucePatton,ourfriendandcolleague,editor
andmediator.Noonehas
contributedmoretothisbook.Fromtheverybeginninghehelpedbrain
stormandorganizethesyllogism
ofthebook.Hehasreorganizedalmosteverychapterandeditedevery
word.Ifbooksweremovies,this
wouldbeknownasaPattonProduction.
RogerFisher
WilliamUry
ForthesecondeditionofthisbookwewouldliketothankJanevonMehr
en,ourlong-timeeditorat
PenguinBooks,forhersupport,encouragement,andenthusiasminma
kingthesecondeditionhappen.
Withthethirdedition,RickKothasadmirablyfilledthatroleandweare
gratefulforhispatience,good
sense,andfineeditorialhand.WithoutRick,thisupdatemightnothave
seenthelightofday.
WealsothankMarkGordon,ArthurMartirosyan,andourfriendsatMe
rcyCorpsfortheaccountof
Iraqifarmersnegotiatingwiththenationaloilcompany.
R.F.
W.U.
B.P.
Contents
PrefacetotheThirdEdition

32. PrefacetotheSecondEdition
Acknowledgments
Introduction
ITHEPROBLEM
1Don’tBargainOverPositions
IITHEMETHOD
2SeparatethePeoplefromtheProblem
3FocusonInterests,NotPositions
4InventOptionsforMutualGain
5InsistonUsingObjectiveCriteria
IIIYES,BUT...
6WhatIfTheyAreMorePowerful?
(DEVELOPYOURBATNA—
BESTALTERNATIVETOANEGOTIATEDAGREEMENT)
7WhatIfTheyWon’tPlay?
(USENEGOTIATIONJUJITSU)
8WhatIfTheyUseDirtyTricks?
(TAMINGTHEHARDBARGAINER)
IVINCONCLUSION
VTENQUESTIONSPEOPLEASKABOUTGETTINGTOYES
QUESTIONSABOUTFAIRNESSAND“PRINCIPLED”NEGOTIA
TION
QUESTIONSABOUTDEALINGWITHPEOPLE
QUESTIONSABOUTTACTICS
QUESTIONSABOUTPOWER
ANALYTICALTABLEOFCONTENTS

33. ANOTEONTHEHARVARDNEGOTIATIONPROJECT
Introduction
Likeitornot,youareanegotiator.Negotiationisafactoflife.Youdi scu
ssaraisewithyourboss.You
trytoagreewithastrangeronapriceforhishouse.Twolawyerstrytoset
tlealawsuitarisingfromacar
accident.Agroupofoilcompaniesplanajointventureexploringforoff
shoreoil.Acityofficialmeets
withunionleaderstoavertatransitstrike.TheUnitedStatesSecretary
ofStatesitsdownwithhis
Russiancounterparttoseekanagreementlimitingnucleararms.Allth
esearenegotiations.
Everyonenegotiatessomethingeveryday.LikeMolière’sMonsieurJ
ourdain,whowasdelightedto
learnthathehadbeenspeakingproseallhislife,peoplenegotiateeven
whentheydon’tthinkof
themselvesasdoingso.Younegotiatewithyourspouseaboutwhereto
gofordinnerandwithyourchild
aboutwhenthelightsgoout.Negotiationisabasicmeansofgettingwha
tyouwantfromothers.Itisback-
and-
forthcommunicationdesignedtoreachanagreementwhenyoua ndthe
othersidehavesomeinterests
thataresharedandothersthatareopposed(aswellassomethatmaysim
plybedifferent).
Moreandmoreoccasionsrequirenegotiation;conflictisagrowthindu
stry.Everyonewantsto
participateindecisionsthataffectthem;fewerandfewerpeoplewillac
ceptdecisionsdictatedby
someoneelse.Peoplediffer,andtheyusenegotiationtohandletheirdif

34. ferences.Whetherinbusiness,
government,orthefamily,peoplereachmostdecisionsthroughnegoti
ation.Evenwhentheygotocourt,
theyalmostalwaysnegotiateasettlementbeforetrial.
Althoughnegotiationtakesplaceeveryday,itisnoteasytodowell.Sta
ndardstrategiesfor
negotiationoftenleavepeopledissatisfied,wornout,oralienated—
andfrequentlyallthree.
Peoplefindthemselvesinadilemma.Theyseetwowaystonegotiate:s
oftorhard.Thesoftnegotiator
wantstoavoidpersonalconflictandsomakesconcessionsreadilytore
achagreement.Heorshewants
anamicableresolution;yetoftenendsupexploitedandfeelingbitter.T
hehardnegotiatorseesany
situationasacontestofwillsinwhichthesidethattakesthemoreextre
mepositionsandholdsoutlonger
faresbetter.Heorshewantstowin;yetoftenendsupproducinganequal
lyhardresponsethatexhausts
thenegotiatorandhisorherresourcesandharmstherelationshipwitht
heotherside.Otherstandard
negotiatingstrategiesfallbetweenhardandsoft,buteachinvolvesana
ttemptedtrade-offbetweengetting
whatyouwantandgettingalongwithpeople.
Thereisathirdwaytonegotiate,awayneitherhardnorsoft,butratherb
othhardandsoft.The
methodofprinciplednegotiationdevelopedattheHarvardNegotiatio
nProjectistodecideissueson
theirmeritsratherthanthroughahagglingprocessfocusedonwhateac
hsidesaysitwillandwon’tdo.It
suggeststhatyoulookformutualgainswheneverpossible,andthatwh
ereyourinterestsconflict,you
shouldinsistthattheresultbebasedonsomefairstandardsindependen
tofthewillofeitherside.The

35. methodofprinciplednegotiationishardo nthemerits,softonthepeopl
e.Itemploysnotricksandno
posturing.Principlednegotiationshowsyouhowtoobtainwhatyouar
eentitledtoandstillbedecent.It
enablesyoutobefairwhileprotectingyouagainstthosewhowouldtak
eadvantageofyourfairness.
Thisbookisaboutthemethodofprinciplednegotiation.Thefirstchapt
erdescribesproblemsthat
ariseinusingthestandardstrategiesofpositionalbargaining.Thenext
fourchapterslayoutthefour
principlesofthemethod.Thelastthreechaptersanswerthequestions
mostcommonlyaskedaboutthe
method:Whatiftheothersideismorepowerful?Whatiftheywillnotpl
ayalong?Andwhatiftheyuse
dirtytricks?
Principlednegotiationcanbeusedbydiplomatsinarmscontroltalks,i
nvestmentbankersnegotiating
corporateacquisitions,andbycouplesindecidingeverythingfromwh
eretogoforvacationtohowto
dividetheirpropertyiftheygetdivorced.Itisevenastapleofhostagene
gotiatorsseekingthereleaseof
kidnapvictims.Anyonecanusethismethod.
Everynegotiationisdifferent,butthebasicelementsdonotchange.Pri
nciplednegotiationcanbeused
whetherthereisoneissueorseveral;twopartiesormany;whetherthere
isaprescribedritual,asin
collectivebargaining,oranimpromptufree-for-
all,asintalkingwithhijackers.Themethodapplies
whethertheothersideismoreexperiencedorless,ahardbargaineroraf
riendlyone.Principled
negotiationisanall-

36. purposestrategy.Unlikealmostallotherstrategies,iftheothersidelea
rnsthisone,it
doesnotbecomemoredifficulttouse;itbecomeseasier.Iftheyreadthi
sbook,allthebetter.
ITHEPROBLEM
1.Don’tBargainOverPositions
1Don’tBargainOverPositions
Whetheranegotiationconcernsacontract,afamil yquarrel,orapeaces
ettlementamongnations,
peopleroutinelyengageinpositionalbargaining.Eachsidetakesapos
ition,arguesforit,andmakes
concessionstoreachacompromise.Theclassicexampleofthisnegoti
atingminuetisthehagglingthat
takesplacebetweenacustomerandtheproprie torofasecondhandstor
e:
Customer Shopkeeper
Howmuchdoyouwantforthisbrassdish?
Thatisabeautifulantique,isn’tit?IguessIcouldletitgofor$75.
Ohcomeon,it’sdented.I’llgiveyou$15.
Really!Imightconsideraseriousoffer,but$15certainlyisn’tserious.
Well.Icouldgoto$20,butIwouldneverpayanythinglike$75.
Quotemearealisticprice.
Youdriveahardbargain,younglady.$60cash,rightnow.

37. $25. Itcostmeagreatdealmorethanthat.Makemeaseriousoffer.
$37.50.That’sthehighestIwillgo.
Haveyounoticedtheengravingonthatdish?Nextyearpieceslikethat
willbe
worthtwicewhatyoupaytoday.
Andsoitgoes,onandon.Perhapstheywillreachagreement;perhapsno
t.
Anymethodofnegotiationmaybefairlyjudgedbythreecriteria:Itsho
uldproduceawiseagreement
ifagreementispossible.Itshouldbeefficient.Anditshouldimproveor
atleastnotdamagethe
relationshipbetweentheparties.(Awiseagreementcanbedefinedaso
nethatmeetsthelegitimate
interestsofeachsidetotheextentpossible,resolvesconflictingintere
stsfairly,isdurable,andtakes
communityinterestsintoaccount.)
Themostcommonformofnegotiation,illustratedbytheaboveexampl
e,dependsuponsuccessively
taking—andthengivingup—asequenceofpositions.
Takingpositions,asthecustomerandstorekeeperdo,servessomeusef
ulpurposesinanegotiation.It
tellstheothersidewhatyouwant;itprovidesananchorinanuncertaina
ndpressuredsituation;anditcan
eventuallyproducethetermsofanacceptableagreement.Butthosepu
rposescanbeservedinotherways.
Andpositionalbargainingfailstomeetthebasiccriteriaofproducinga
wiseagreement,efficientlyand
amicably.
Arguingoverpositionsproducesunwiseoutcomes
Whennegotiatorsbargainoverpositions,theytendtolockthemselves

38. intothosepositions.Themoreyou
clarifyyourpositionanddefenditagainstattack,themorecommittedy
oubecometoit.Themoreyoutry
toconvincetheothersideoftheimpossibilityofchangingyouropenin
gposition,themoredifficultit
becomestodoso.Youregobecomesidentifiedwithyourposition.You
nowhaveanewinterestin
“savingface”—inreconcilingfutureactionwithpastpositions—
makingitlessandlesslikelythatany
agreementwillwiselyreconciletheparties’originalinterests.
Thedangerthatpositionalbargainingwillimpedeanegotiationwasw
ellillustratedin1961bythe
breakdownofthetalksunderPresidentJohnF.Kennedyforacompreh
ensivebanonnucleartesting,
which,ifenacted,mighthaveheadedoffmuchofthesuperpowerarmsr
acethatensuedoverthenextthree
decades.Acriticalquestionarose:Howmanyon-
siteinspectionsperyearshouldtheSovietUnionand
theUnitedStatesbepermittedtomakewithintheother’sterritorytoinv
estigatesuspiciousseismic
events?TheSovietUnionfinallyagreedtothreeinspections.TheUnit
edStatesinsistedonnolessthan
ten.Andtherethetalksbrokedown—overpositions—
despitethefactthatnooneunderstoodwhetheran
“inspection”wouldinvolveonepersonlookingaroundforoneday,ora
hundredpeopleprying
indiscriminatelyforamonth.Thepartieshadmadelittleattempttodes
ignaninspectionprocedurethat
wouldreconciletheUnitedStates’sinterestinverificationwiththedes
ireofbothcountriesforminimal
intrusion.

39. Focusingonpositionsnearlyledtounnecessarybloodshedinadispute
betweenfarmersandthe
nationaloilcompanyinIraqafterthefalloftheSaddamHusseinregime
.Displacedfarmersinthesouth
ofIraqhadbandedtogether,leasedarablelandfromthegovernment,a
ndusedtheirlastsavingsand
borrowingstoplantcrops.Unfortunately,onlyafewmonthslaterthef
armersreceivedalettercallingfor
themtovacatethelandimmediatelyinaccordwiththefineprintoftheir
lease,becauseoilhadbeen
discoveredunderit.Theoilcompanysaid,“Getoffourland.”Thefarm
ersreplied,“It’sourland,and
we’renotleaving.”Theoilcompanythreatenedtocallthepolice.Thef
armerssaid,“Therearemoreof
us,”sothenationaloilcompanythreatenedtobringinthearmy.“Weha
vegunstoo;wearen’tleaving,”
camethereply.“Wehavenothinglefttolose.”
Astroopsgathered,bloodshedwasavertedonlybythelast-
minuteinterventionofanofficialfresh
fromatrainingprograminalternativestopositionalbargaining.“How
longwillitbebeforeyouexpectto
produceoilonthisland?”heaskedthenationaloilcompany.“Probably
threeyears,”theyreplied.“What
doyouplantodoonthelandoverthenextfewmonths?”“Mapping;alitt
leseismicsurveyingofthe
undergroundlayers.”Thenheaskedthefarmers,“What’stheproblem
withleavingnow,asthey’ve
asked?”“Theharvestisinsixweeks.Itrepresentseverythingweown.”
Shortlythereafteranagreementwasreached:Thefarmerscouldharve
sttheircrops.Theywouldnot
impedetheoilcompany’spreparatoryactivities.Indeed,theoilcompa
nyhopedsoontohiremanyofthe
farmersaslaborersforitsconstructionactivities.Anditdidnotobjecti
ftheycontinuedtoplantcropsin

40. betweenoilderricks.
Asillustratedintheseexamples,themoreattentionthatispaidtopositi
ons,thelessattentionis
devotedtomeetingtheunderlyingconcernsoftheparties.Agreement
becomeslesslikely.Anyagreement
reachedmayreflectamechanicalsplittingofthedifferencebetweenfi
nalpositionsratherthanasolution
carefullycraftedtomeetthelegitimateinterestsoftheparties.Theresu
ltisfrequentlyanagreementless
satisfactorytoeachsidethanitcouldhavebeen,ornoagreementatall,
whenagoodagreementwas
possible.
Arguingoverpositionsisinefficient
Thestandardmethodofnegotiationmayproduceeitheragreement,as
withthepriceofabrassdish,or
breakdown,aswiththenumberofon-
siteinspections.Ineitherevent,theprocesstakesalotoftime.
Bargainingoverpositionscreatesincentivesthatstallsettlement.Inp
ositionalbargainingyoutryto
improvethechancethatanysettlementreachedisfavorabletoyoubyst
artingwithanextremeposition,
bystubbornlyholdingtoit,bydeceivingtheotherpartyastoyourtruevi
ews,andbymakingsmall
concessionsonlyasnecessarytokeepthenegotiationgoing.Thesamei
struefortheotherside.Eachof
thosefactorstendstointerferewithreachingasettlementpromptly.Th
emoreextremetheopening
positionsandthesmallertheconcessions,themoretimeandeffortitwi
lltaketodiscoverwhetherornot
agreementispossible.

41. Thestandardminuetalsorequiresalargenumberofindividualdecisio
nsaseachnegotiatordecides
whattooffer,whattoreject,andhowmuchofaconcessiontomake.Dec
ision-makingisdifficultand
time-
consumingatbest.Whereeachdecisionnotonlyinvolvesyieldingtoth
eothersidebutwilllikely
producepressuretoyieldfurther,anegotiatorhaslittleincentivetomo
vequickly.Draggingone’sfeet,
threateningtowalkout,stonewalling,andothersuchtacticsbecomec
ommonplace.Theyallincreasethe
timeandcostsofreachingagreementaswellastheriskthatnoagreeme
ntwillbereachedatall.
Arguingoverpositionsendangersanongoingrelationship
Positionalbargainingbecomesacontestofwill.Eachnegotiatorasser
tswhathewillandwon’tdo.The
taskofjointlydevisinganacceptablesolutiontendstobecomeabattle.
Eachsidetriesthroughsheer
willpowertoforcetheothertochangeitsposition.“I’mnotgoingtogiv
ein.Ifyouwanttogotothe
movieswithme,it’sAvatarornothing.”Angerandresentmentoftenre
sultasonesideseesitselfbending
totherigidwilloftheotherwhileitsownlegitimateconcernsgounaddr
essed.Positionalbargainingthus
strainsandsometimesshatterstherelationshipbetweentheparties.C
ommercialenterprisesthathave
beendoingbusinesstogetherforyearsmaypartcompany.Neighbors
maystopspeakingtoeachother.
Bitterfeelingsgeneratedbyonesuchencountermaylastalifetime.
Whentherearemanyparties,positionalbargainingisevenworse
Althoughitisconvenienttodiscussnegotiationintermsoftwopersons
,youand“theotherside,”infact,
almosteverynegotiationinvolvesmorethantwopersons.Severaldiff

42. erentpartiesmaysitatthetable,or
eachsidemayhaveconstituents,higher-
ups,boardsofdirectors,orcommitteeswithwhomtheymust
deal.Themorepeopleinvolvedinanegotiation,themoreseriousthedr
awbackstopositionalbargaining.
Ifsome150countriesarenegotiating,asinvariousUnitedNationscon
ferences,positionalbargaining
isnexttoimpossible.Itmaytakealltosayyes,butonlyonetosayno.Rec
iprocalconcessionsare
difficult:towhomdoyoumakeaconcession?Yeteventhousandsofbil
ateraldealswouldstillfallshort
ofamultilateralagreement.Insuchsituations,positionalbargainingl
eadstotheformationofcoalitions
amongpartieswhosesharedinterestsareoftenmoresymbolicthansub
stantive.AttheUnitedNations,
suchcoalitionsoftenproducenegotiationsbetween“the”Northand“t
he”South,orbetween“the”East
and“the”West.Becausetherearemanymembersinagroup,itbecomes
moredifficulttodevelopa
commonposition.Whatisworse,oncetheyhavepainfullydevelopeda
ndagreeduponaposition,it
becomesmuchhardertochangeit.Alteringapositionprovesequallydi
fficultwhenadditional
participantsarehigherauthoritieswho,whileabsentfromthetable,m
ustneverthelessgivetheir
approval.
Beingniceisnoanswer
Manypeoplerecognizethehighcostsofhardpositionalbargaining,pa
rticularlyonthepartiesandtheir
relationship.Theyhopetoavoidthembyfollowingamoregentlestyle
ofnegotiation.Insteadofseeing

43. theothersideasadversaries,theyprefertoseethemasfriends.Ra thert
hanemphasizingagoalofvictory,
theyemphasizethenecessityofreachingagreement.Inasoftnegotiati
nggamethestandardmovesareto
makeoffersandconcessions,totrusttheotherside,tobefriendly,andt
oyieldasnecessarytoavoid
confrontation.
Thefollowingtableillustratestwostylesofpositionalbargaining,sof
tandhard.Mostpeoplesee
theirchoiceofnegotiatingstrategiesasbetweenthesetwostyles.Look
ingatthetableaspresentinga
choice,shouldyoubeasoftorahardpositionalbargainer?Orshouldyo
uperhapsfollowastrategy
somewhereinbetween?
Thesoftnegotiatinggameemphasizestheimportanceofbuildingand
maintainingarelationship.
Withinfamiliesandamongfriendsmuchnegotiationtakesplaceinthis
way.Theprocesstendstobe
efficient,atleasttotheextentofproducingresultsquickly.Aseachpar
tycompeteswiththeotherinbeing
moregenerousandmoreforthcoming,anagreementbecomeshighlyli
kely.Butitmaynotbeawiseone.
TheresultsmaynotbeastragicasintheO.Henrystoryaboutanimpover
ishedcoupleinwhichthe
lovingwifesellsherhairinordertobuyahandsomechainforherhusban
d’swatch,andtheunknowing
husbandsellshiswatchinordertobuybeautifulcombsforhiswife’sha
ir.However,anynegotiation
primarilyconcernedwiththerelationshiprunstheriskofproducingas
loppyagreement.
Problem
PositionalBargaining:WhichGameShouldYouPlay?

44. Soft Hard
Participantsarefriends. Participantsareadversaries.
Thegoalisagreement. Thegoalisvictory.
Makeconcessionstocultivatetherelationship.
Demandconcessionsasaconditionoftherelationship.
Besoftonthepeopleandtheproblem.
Behardontheproblemandthepeople.
Trustothers. Distrustothers.
Changeyourpositioneasily. Digintoyourposition.
Makeoffers. Makethreats.
Discloseyourbottomline. Misleadastoyourbottomline.
Acceptone-sidedlossestoreachagreement. Demandone-
sidedgainsasthepriceofagreement.
Searchforthesingleanswer:theonetheywillaccept.
Searchforthesingleanswer:theoneyouwillaccept.
Insistonagreement. Insistonyourposition.
Trytoavoidacontestofwill. Trytowinacontestofwill.
Yieldtopressure. Applypressure.
Moreseriously,pursuingasoftandfriendlyformofpositionalbargain
ingmakesyouvulnerableto
someonewhoplaysahardgameofpositionalbargaining.Inpositional
bargaining,ahardgamedominates

45. asoftone.Ifthehardbargainerinsistsonconcessionsandmakesthreat
swhilethesoftbargaineryieldsin
ordertoavoidconfrontationandinsistsonagreement,thenegotiating
gameisbiasedinfavorofthehard
player.Theprocesswillproduceanagreement,althoughitmaynotbea
wiseone.Itwillcertainlybe
morefavorabletothehardpositionalbargainerthantothesoftone.Ifyo
urresponsetosustained,hard
positionalbargainingissoftpositionalbargaining,youwillprobablyl
oseyourshirt.
Thereisanalternative
Ifyoudonotlikethechoicebetweenhardandsoftpositionalbargainin
g,youcanchangethegame.
Thegameofnegotiationtakesplaceattwolevels.Atonelevel,negotiat
ionaddressesthesubstance;
atanother,itfocuses—usuallyimplicitly—
ontheprocedurefordealingwiththesubstance.Thefirst
negotiationmayconcernyoursalary,thetermsofalease,orapricetobe
paid.Thesecondnegotiation
concernshowyouwillnegotiatethesubstantivequestion:bysoftposit
ionalbargaining,byhard
positionalbargaining,orbysomeothermethod.Thissecondnego tiati
onisagameaboutagame—a
“meta-
game.”Eachmoveyoumakewithinanegotiationisnotonlyamovethat
dealswithrent,salary,or
othersubstantivequestions;italsohelpsstructuretherulesofthegame
youareplaying.Yourmovemay
servetokeepthenegotiationswithinanongoingmode,oritmayconstit
uteagame-changingmove.
Thissecondnegotiationbyandlargeescapesnoticebecauseitseemsto

46. occurwithoutconscious
decision.Onlywhendealingwithsomeonefromanothercountry,parti
cularlysomeonewithamarkedly
differentculturalbackground,areyoulikelytoseethenecessit yofesta
blishingsomeacceptedprocess
forthesubstantivenegotiations.Butwhetherconsciouslyornot,youa
renegotiatingproceduralruleswith
everymoveyoumake,evenifthosemovesappearexclusivelyconcern
edwithsubstance.
Theanswertothequestionofwhethertousesoftpositionalbargaining
orhardis“neither.”Change
thegame.AttheHarvardNegotiationProjectwehavebeendeveloping
analternativetopositional
bargaining:amethodofnegotiationexplicitlydesignedtoproducewi
seoutcomesefficientlyand
amicably.Thismethod,calledprinciplednegotiationornegotiationo
nthemerits,canbeboileddown
tofourbasicpoints.
Thesefourpointsdefineastraightforwardmethodofnegotiationthatc
anbeusedunderalmostany
circumstance.Eachpointdealswithabasicelementofnegotiation,an
dsuggestswhatyoushoulddo
aboutit.
People: Separatethepeoplefromtheproblem.
Interests: Focusoninterests,notpositions.
Options:
Inventmultipleoptionslookingformutualgainsbeforedecidingwhat
todo.
Criteria: Insistthattheresultbebasedonsomeobjectivestandard.
Themethodofprinciplednegotiationiscontrastedwithhardandsoft p
ositionalbargaininginthetable
below,whichshowsthefourbasicpointsofthemethodinboldfacetype

47. .
Thefirstpointrespondstothefactthathumanbeingsarenotcomputers
.Wearecreaturesofstrong
emotionswhooftenhaveradicallydifferentperceptionsandhavediffi
cultycommunicatingclearly.
Emotionstypicallybecomeentangledwiththeobjectivemeritsofthep
roblem.Takingpositionsjust
makesthisworsebecausepeople’segosbecomeidentifiedwiththeirp
ositions.Makingconcessions“for
therelationship”isequallyproblematic,becauseitcanactuallyencou
rageandrewardstubbornness,
whichcanleadtoresentmentthatendsupdamagingtherelationship.H
ence,evenbeforeworkingonthe
substantiveproblem,the“peopleproblem”shouldbedisentangledfro
mitandaddressedonitsown.
Figurativelyifnotliterally,theparticipantsshouldcometoseethemse
lvesasworkingsidebyside,
attackingtheproblem,noteachother.Hencethefirstproposition:Sep
aratethepeoplefromtheproblem.
Thesecondpointisdesignedtoovercomethedrawbackoffocusingonp
eople’sstatedpositionswhen
theobjectofanegotiationistosatisfytheirunderlyinginteres ts.Aneg
otiatingpositionoftenobscures
whatyoureallywant.Compromisingbetweenpositionsisnotlikelyto
produceanagreementthatwill
effectivelytakecareofthehumanneedsthatledpeopletoadoptthosep
ositions.Thesecondbasic
elementofthemethodis:Focusoninterests,notpositions.
Thethirdpointrespondstothedifficultyofdesigningoptimalsolution
swhileunderpressure.Trying

48. todecideinthepresenceofanadversarynarrowsyourvision.Havingal
otatstakeinhibitscreativity.So
doessearchingfortheonerightsolution.Youcanoffsettheseconstrai
ntsbysettingasideadesignated
timewithinwhichtothinkupawiderangeofpossiblesolutionsthatadv
ancesharedinterestsand
creativelyreconciledifferinginterests.Hencethethirdbasicpoint:B
eforetryingtoreachagreement,
inventoptionsformutualgain.
Whereinterestsaredirectlyopposed,anegotiatormaybeabletoobtain
afavorableresultsimplyby
beingstubborn.Thatmethodtendstorewardintransigenceandproduc
earbitraryresults.However,you
cancountersuchanegotiatorbyinsistingthathissinglesay-
soisnotenoughandthattheagreementmust
reflectsomefairstandardindependentofthenakedwillofeitherside.T
hisdoesnotmeaninsistingthat
thetermsbebasedonthestandardyouselect,butonlythatsomefairstan
dardsuchasmarketvalue,
expertopinion,custom,orlawdeterminetheoutcome.Bydiscussings
uchcriteriaratherthanwhatthe
partiesarewillingorunwillingtodo,neitherpartyneedgiveintotheot
her;bothcandefertoafair
solution.Hencethefourthbasicpoint:Insistonusingobjectivecriteri
a.
Problem
PositionalBargaining:WhichGameShouldYouPlay?
Solution

49. ChangetheGame—NegotiateontheMerits
Soft Hard Principled
Participantsarefriends. Participantsareadversaries.
Participantsareproblem-solvers.
Thegoalisagreement. Thegoalisvictory.
Thegoalisawiseoutcomereachedefficientlyand
amicably.
Makeconcessionstocultivatethe
relationship.
Demandconcessionsasaconditionofthe
relationship.
Separatethepeoplefromtheproblem.
Besoftonthepeopleandtheproblem.
Behardontheproblemandthepeople.
Besoftonthepeople,hardontheproblem.
Trustothers. Distrustothers. Proceedindependentoftrust.

50. Changeyourpositioneasily. Digintoyourposition.
Focusoninterests,notpositions.
Makeoffers. Makethreats. Exploreinterests.
Discloseyourbottomline. Misleadastoyourbottomline.
Avoidhavingabottomline.
Acceptone-sidedlossestoreach
agreement.
Demandone-sidedgainsasthepriceof
agreement.
Inventoptionsformutualgain.
Searchforthesingleanswer:theonethey
willaccept.
Searchforthesingleanswer:theoneyouwill
accept.
Developmultipleoptionstochoosefrom;decide
later.

51. Insistonagreement. Insistonyourposition.
Insistonusingobjectivecriteria.
Trytoavoidacontestofwill. Trytowinacontestofwill.
Trytoreacharesultbasedonstandards
independentofwill.
Yieldtopressure. Applypressure.
Reasonandbeopentoreason;yieldtoprinciple,
notpressure.
Thefourpropositionsofprinciplednegotiationarerelevantfromtheti
meyoubegintothinkabout
negotiatinguntilthetimeeitheranagreementisreachedoryoudecidet
obreakofftheeffort.Thatperiod
canbedividedintothreestages:analysis,planning,anddiscussion.
Duringtheanalysisstageyouaresimplytryingtodiagnosethesituatio
n—togatherinformation,
organizeit,andthinkaboutit.Youwillwanttoconsiderthepeopleprob
lemsofpartisanperceptions,
hostileemotions,andunclearcommunication,aswellastoidentifyyo
urinterestsandthoseoftheother
side.Youwillwanttonoteoptionsalreadyonthetableandidentifyany

52. criteriaalreadysuggestedasa
basisforagreement.
Duringtheplanningstageyoudealwiththesamefourelementsasecon
dtime,bothgeneratingideas
anddecidingwhattodo.Howdoyouproposetohandlethepeopleprobl
ems?Ofyourinterests,which
aremostimportant?Andwhataresomerealisticobjectives?Youwill
wanttogenerateadditionaloptions
andadditionalcriteriafordecidingamongthem.
Againduringthediscussionstage,whenthepartiescommunicateback
andforth,lookingtoward
agreement,thesamefourelementsarethebestsubjectstodiscuss.Diff
erencesinperception,feelingsof
frustrationandanger,anddifficultiesincommunicationcanbeackno
wledgedandaddressed.Eachside
shouldcometounderstandtheinterestsoftheother.Bothcanthenjoint
lygenerateoptionsthatare
mutuallyadvantageousandseekagreementonobjectivestandardsfor
resolvingopposedinterests.

53. Tosumup,incontrasttopositionalbargaining,theprinciplednegotiat
ionmethodoffocusingonbasic
interests,mutuallysatisfyingoptions,andfairstandardstypicallyres
ultsinawiseagreement.Themethod
permitsyoutoreachagradualconsensusonajointdecisionefficiently
withoutallthetransactionalcosts
ofdiggingintopositionsonlytohavetodigyourselfoutofthem.Andse
paratingthepeoplefromthe
problemallowsyoutodealdirectlyandempatheticallywiththeothern
egotiatorasahumanbeing
regardlessofanysubstantivedifferences,thusmakingpossibleanami
cableoutcome.
Eachofthenextfourchaptersexpandsononeofthesefourbasicpoints.
Ifatanypointyoubecome
skeptical,youmaywanttoskipaheadbrieflyandbrowseinchapterssix
,seven,andeight,whichrespond
toquestionscommonlyraisedaboutthemethod.
IITHEMETHOD
2.SeparatethePeoplefromtheProblem
3.FocusonInterests,NotPositions

54. 4.InventOptionsforMutualGain
5.InsistonUsingObjectiveCriteria
2SeparatethePeoplefromtheProblem
Everyoneknowshowharditistodealwithaproblemwithoutpeoplemi
sunderstandingeachother,
gettingangryorupset,andtakingthingspersonally.
Aunionleadersaystohiscrew,“Allright,whocalledthewalkout?”
Jonesstepsforward.“Idid.ItwasthatbumforemanCampbellagain.Th
atwasthefifthtimeintwo
weekshesentmeoutofourgroupasareplacement.He’sgotitinforme,a
ndI’mtiredofit.WhyshouldI
getallthedirtywork?”
LatertheunionleaderconfrontsCampbell.“Whydoyoukeeppicking
onJones?Hesaysyou’veput
himonreplacementdetailfivetimesintwoweeks.What’sgoingon?”
Campbellreplies,“IpickJonesbecausehe’sthebest.IknowIcantrusth
imtokeepthingsfrom

55. foulingupinagroupwithoutitspointperson. Isendhimonreplacement
onlywhenit’sakeyperson
missing,otherwiseIsendSmithorsomeoneelse.It’sjustthatwiththefl
ugoingaroundthere’vebeena
lotofpointpeopleout.IneverknewJonesobjected.Ithoughthelikedth
eresponsibility.”
Inanotherreal-
lifesituation,aninsurancecompa nylawyersaystothestateinsurance
commissioner:
“Iappreciateyourtime,CommissionerThompson.WhatI’dliketotal
ktoyouaboutissomeofthe
problemswe’vebeenhavingwiththepresumptionclauseofthestrict-
liabilityregulations.Basically,we
thinkthewaytheclausewaswrittencausesittohaveanunfairimpacton
thoseinsurerswhoseexisting
policiescontainrateadjustmentlimitations,andwewouldliketocons
iderwaysitmightberevised—”
TheCommissioner,interrupting:“Ms.Monteiro,yourcompanyhada
mpleopportunitytovoiceany
objectionithadduringthehearingsmydepartmentheldonthoseregula
tionsbeforetheywereissued.I
ranthosehearings,Ms.Monteiro.Ilistenedtoeverywordoftestimony

56. ,andIwrotethefinalversionof
thestrict-
liabilityprovisionspersonally.AreyousayingImadeamistake?”
“No,but—”
“AreyousayingI’munfair?”
“Certainlynot,sir,butIthinkthisprovisionhashadconsequencesnon
eofusforesaw,and—”
“Listen,Monteiro,IpromisedthepublicwhenIcampaignedforthispo
sitionthatIwouldputanend
tokillerhairdryersand$10,000bombsdisguisedascars.Andthesereg
ulationshavedonethat.
“Yourcompanymadea$50millionprofitonitsstrict-
liabilitypolicieslastyear.Whatkindoffooldo
youthinkyoucanplaymefor,cominginheretalkingabout‘unfair’reg
ulationsand‘unforeseen
consequences’?Idon’twanttohearanotherwordofthat.Goodday,Ms
.Monteiro.”
Nowwhat?DoestheinsurancecompanylawyerpresstheCommission
eronthispoint,makinghim
angryandprobablynotgettinganywhere?Hercompanydoesalotofbu
sinessinthisstate.Agood

57. relationshipwiththeCommissionerisimportant.Shouldsheletthema
tterrest,then,eventhoughsheis
convincedthatthisregulationreallyisunfair,thatitslong-
termeffectsarelikelytobeagainstthepublic
interest,andthatnoteventheexpertsforesawthisproblematthetimeof
theoriginalhearings?
Whatisgoingoninthesecases?
Negotiatorsarepeoplefirst
Abasicfactaboutnegotiation,easytoforgetincorporateandinternati
onaltransactions,isthatyouare
dealingnotwithabstractrepresentativesofthe“otherside,”butwithh
umanbeings.Theyhaveemotions,
deeplyheldvalues,anddifferentbackgroundsandviewpoints;andthe
yareunpredictable.Theyareprone
tocognitivebiases,partisanperceptions,bli ndspots,andleapsofillog
ic.Soarewe.
Thishumanaspectofnegotiationcanbeeitherhelpfulordisastrous.Th
eprocessofworkingoutan
agreementmayproduceapsychologicalcommitmenttoamutuallysat
isfactoryoutcome.Aworking

58. relationshipwheretrust,understanding,respect,andfriendshipareb
uiltupovertimecanmakeeachnew
negotiationsmootherandmoreefficient.Andpeople’sdesiretofeelg
oodaboutthemselves,andtheir
concernforwhatotherswillthinkofthem,canoftenmakethemmorese
nsitivetoanothernegotiator’s
interests.
Ontheotherhand,peoplegetangry,depressed,fearful,hostile,frustra
ted,andoffended.Theyhave
egosthatareeasilythreatened.Theyseetheworldfromtheirownperso
nalvantagepoint,andthey
frequentlyconfusetheirperceptionswithreality.Routinely,theyfailt
ointerpretwhatyousayintheway
youintendanddonotmeanw hatyouunderstandthemtosay.Misunder
standingcanreinforceprejudice
andleadtoreactionsthatproducecounterreactionsinaviciouscircle;r
ationalexplorationofpossible
solutionsbecomesimpossibleandanegotiationfails.Thepurposeoft
hegamebecomesscoringpoints,
confirmingnegativeimpressions,andapportioningblameattheexpe
nseofthesubstantiveinterestsof
bothparties.
Failingtodealwithotherssensitivelyashumanbeingspronetohumanr

59. eactionscanbedisastrousfor
anegotiation.Whateverelseyouaredoingatanypointduringanegotia
tion,frompreparationtofollow-
up,itisworthaskingyourself,“AmIpayingenoughattentiontothepeo
pleproblem?”
Everynegotiatorhastwokindsofinterests:inthesubstanceandinther
elationship
Everynegotiatorwantstoreachanagreementthatsatisfieshissubstan
tiveinterests.Thatiswhyone
negotiates.Beyondthat,anegotiatoralsohasaninterestinhisrelation
shipwiththeotherside.An
antiquesdealerwantsbothtomakeaprofitonthesaleandtoturnthecust
omerintoaregularone.Ata
minimum,anegotiatorwantstomaintainaworkingrelationshipgood
enoughtoproduceanacceptable
agreement(andeffectiveimplementation)ifoneispossiblegiveneac
hside’sinterests.Usually,moreis
atstake.Mostnegotiationstakeplaceinthecontextofanongoingrelati
onshipwhereitisimportantto
carryoneachnegotiationinawaythatwillhelpratherthanhinderfutur
erelationsandfuturenegotiations.
Infact,withmanylong-
termclients,businesspartners,familymembers,fellowprofessionals
,government

60. officials,orforeignnations,theongoingrelationshipisfarmoreimpor
tantthantheoutcomeofany
particularnegotiation.
Therelationshiptendstobecomeentangledwiththeproblem.Amajor
consequenceofthe“people
problem”innegotiationisthattheparties’relationshiptendstobecom
eentangledwiththeirdiscussions
ofsubstance.Onboththegivingandreceivingend,wearelikelytotreat
peopleandproblemasone.
Withinthefamily,astatementsuchas“Thekitchenisamess”or“Ourba
nkaccountislow”maybe
intendedsimplytoidentifyaproblem,butitislikelytobeheardasapers
onalattack.Angerovera
situationmayleadyoutoexpressangertowardsomehumanbeingasso
ciatedwithitinyourmind.Egos
tendtobecomeinvolvedinsubstantivepositions.
Anotherreasonthatsubstantiveissuesbecomeentangledwithpsycho
logicalonesisthatpeopledraw
fromcommentsonsubstanceunfoundedinferences,whichtheythentr
eatasfactsaboutthatperson’s
intentionsandattitudestowardthem.Unlesswearecareful,thisproce

61. ssisalmostautomatic;weare
seldomawarethatotherexplanationsmaybeequallyvalid.Thusinthe
unionexample,Joneswassure
thatCampbell,theforeman,haditinforhim,whileCampbellthoughtit
obviousthathewas
complimentingJonesanddoinghimafavorbygivinghimresponsiblea
ssignments.
Positionalbargainingputsrelationshipandsubstanceinconflict.Fra
minganegotiationasacontest
ofwilloverpositionsaggravatestheentanglingprocess.Iseeyourposi
tionasastatementofhowyou
wouldlikethenegotiationtoend;frommypointofviewitdemonstrate
showlittleyoucareaboutour
relationship.IfItakeafirmpositionthatyouconsiderunreasonable,y
ouassumethatIalsothinkofitas
anextremeposition;itiseasytoconcludethatIdonotvalueourrelation
ship—oryou—veryhighly.
Positionalbargainingdealswithanegotiator’sinterestsbothinsubsta
nceandinagoodrelationship
bytradingoneoffagainsttheother.Ifwhatcountsinthelongrunforyou
rcompanyisitsrelationshipwith
theinsurancecommissioner,thenyouwillprobablyletthismatterdro
p.Yetgivinginonasubstantive

62. pointmaybuynofriendship;itmaydonothingmorethanconvincetheo
thersidethatyoucanbetakenfor
aride.Or,ifyoucaremoreaboutafavorablesolutionthanbeingrespect
edorlikedbytheotherside,you
cantrytoextractconcessionsbyholdingtherelationshiphostage.“Ify
ouwon’tgoalongwithmeonthis
point,thensomuchforyou.Thiswillbethelasttimewemeet.”Whileyo
umayextractaconcessionthis
way,thisstrategyoftenresultsinlousysubstanceandadamagedrelati
onship.
Disentangletherelationshipfromthesubstance;dealdirectlywiththe
peopleproblem
Dealingwithasubstantiveproblemandmaintainingagoodworkingre
lationshipneednotbeconflicting
goalsifthepartiesarecommittedandpsychologicallypreparedtotreat
eachseparatelyonitsown
legitimatemerits.Basetherelationshiponmutuallyunderstoodperce
ptions,cleartwo-way
communication,expressingemotionswithoutblame,andaforward-
looking,purposiveoutlook.Dealwith
peopleproblemsbychanginghowyoutreatpeople;don’ttrytosolveth
emwithsubstantiveconcessions.
Todealwithpsychologicalproblems,usepsychologicaltechniques.

63. Whereperceptionsdiffer,look
forwaystotestassumptionsandtoeducate.Ifemotionsrunhigh,youca
nfindwaysforeachperson
involvedtoletoffsteamandfeelheard.Wheremisunderstandingexist
s,youcanworktoimprove
communication.
Tofindyourwaythroughthejungleofpeopleproblems,itisusefultoth
inkintermsofthreebasic
categories:perception,emotion,andcommunication.Thevariouspe
opleproblemsallfallintooneof
thesethreebaskets.
Innegotiatingitiseasytoforgetthatyoumustdealnotonlywiththeirpe
opleproblems,butalsowith
yourown.Yourangerandfrustrationmayobstructanagreementbenef
icialtoyou.Yourperceptionsare
likelytobeone-
sided,andyoumaynotbelisteningorcommunicatingadequately.The
techniquesthat
followapplyequallywelltoyourpeopleproblemsastothoseoftheothe
rside.
Perception
Understandingtheotherside’sthinkingisnotsimplyausefulactivityt

64. hatwillhelpyousolveyour
problem.Theirthinkingistheproblem.Whetheryouarema kingadeal
orsettlingadispute,differences
aredefinedbythedifferencebetweenyourthinkingandtheirs.Whent
wopeoplequarrel,theyusually
quarreloveranobject—bothmayclaimawatch—oroveranevent—
eachmaycontendthattheotherwas
atfaultincausinganautomobileaccident.Thesamegoesfornations.M
oroccoandAlgeriaquarrelover
asectionoftheWesternSahara;IndiaandPakistanquarrelovereachot
her’sdevelopmentofnuclear
bombs.Insuchcircumstancespeopletendtoassumethatwhattheynee
dtoknowmoreaboutistheobject
ortheevent.Theystudythewatchortheymeasuretheskidmarksatthes
ceneoftheaccident.Theystudy
theWesternSaharaorthedetailedhistoryofnuclearweaponsdevelop
mentinIndiaandPakistan.
Ultimately,however,conflictliesnotinobjectivereality,butinpeopl
e’sheads.Truthissimplyone
moreargument—perhapsagoodone,perhapsnot—
fordealingwiththedifference.Thedifferenceitself

65. existsbecauseitexistsintheirthinking.Fears,evenifill -
founded,arerealfearsandneedtobedealt
with.Hopes,evenifunrealistic,maycauseawar.Facts,evenifestablis
hed,maydonothingtosolvethe
problem.Bothpartiesmayagreethatonelostthewatchandtheotherfo
undit,butstilldisagreeoverwho
shouldgetit.Itmayfinallybeestablishedthattheautoaccidentwascau
sedbytheblowoutofatirethat
hadbeendriven31,402miles,butthepartiesmaydisputewhoshouldp
ayforthedamage.Thedetailed
historyandgeographyoftheWesternSahara,nomatterhowcarefullys
tudiedanddocumented,isnotthe
stuffwithwhichoneputstorestthatkindofterritorialdispute.Nostudy
ofwhodevelopedwhatnuclear
deviceswhenwillputtoresttheconflictbetweenIndiaandPakistan.
Asusefulaslookingforobjectiverealitycanbe,itisultimatelythereali
tyaseachsideseesitthat
constitutestheprobleminanegotiationandopensthewaytoasolution.
Putyourselfintheirshoes.Howyouseetheworlddependsonwhereyou
sit.Peopletendtosee
whattheywanttosee.Outofamassofdetailedinformation,theytendto
pickoutandfocusonthosefacts
thatconfirmtheirpriorperceptionsandtodisregardormisinterpretth

66. osethatcalltheirperceptionsinto
question.Eachsideinanegotiationmayseeonlythemeritsofitscase,a
ndonlythefaultsoftheother
side’s.
Theabilitytoseethesituationastheothersideseesit,asdifficultasitma
ybe,isoneofthemost
importantskillsanegotiatorcanpossess.Itisnotenoughtoknowthatth
eyseethingsdifferently.Ifyou
wanttoinfluencethem,youalsoneedtounderstandempatheticallythe
poweroftheirpointofviewandto
feeltheemotionalforcewithwhichthe ybelieveinit.Itisnotenoughtos
tudythemlikebeetlesundera
microscope;youneedtoknowwhatitfeelsliketobeabeetle.Toaccom
plishthistaskyoushouldbe
preparedtowithholdjudgmentforawhileasyou“tryon”theirviews.T
heymaywellbelievethattheir
viewsare“right”asstronglyasyoubelieveyoursare.Youmayseeonth
etableaglasshalffullofcool
water.Yourspousemayseeadirty,half-
emptyglassabouttocausearingonthemahoganyfinish.
Tenant’sperceptions Landlady’sperceptions
Therentisalreadytoohigh.

67. Therenthasnotbeenincreasedforalongtime.
Withothercostsgoingup,Ican’taffordtopaymoreforhousing.
Withothercostsgoingup,Ineedmorerentalincome.
Theapartmentneedspainting.
Hehasgiventhatapartmentheavywearandtear.
Iknowpeoplewhopaylessforacomparableapartment.
Iknowpeoplewhopaymoreforacomparableapartment.
Youngpeoplelikemecan’taffordtopayhighrents.
Youngpeoplelikehimtendtomakenoiseandtobehardonanapartment
.
Therentoughttobelowbecausetheneighborhoodisrundown.
Welandlordsshouldraiserentstoimprovethequalityoftheneighborh
ood.
Iamadesirabletenantwithnodogsorcats.
Hisloudmusicdrivesmecrazy.
Ialwayspaytherentwheneversheasksforit.
HeneverpaystherentuntilIaskforit.

68. Sheiscoldanddistant;sheneverasksmehowthingsare.
Iamaconsideratepersonwhoneverintrudesonatenant’sprivacy.
Considerthecontrastingperceptionsofatenantandala ndladynegotia
tingtherenewalofalease:
Understandingtheirpointofviewisnotthesameasagreeingwithit.Itis
truethatabetter
understandingoftheirthinkingmayleadyoutoreviseyourownviewsa
boutthemeritsofasituation.But
thatisnotacostofunderstandingtheirpointofview,itisabenefit.Itallo
wsyoutoreducetheareaof
conflict,anditalsohelpsyouadvanceyournewlyenlightenedself-
interest.
Don’tdeducetheirintentionsfromyourfears.Peopletendtoassumeth
atwhatevertheyfear,the
othersideintendstodo.ConsiderthisstoryfromtheNewYorkTimes:“
Theymetinabar,wherehe
offeredheraridehome.Hetookherdownunfamiliarstreets.Hesaidit
wasashortcut.Hegotherhome
sofastshecaughttheteno’clocknews.”Whyistheendingsosurprising

69. ?Wemadeanassumptionbased
onourfears.
Itisalltooeasytofallintothehabitofputtingtheworstinterpr etationon
whattheothersidesaysor
does.Asuspiciousinterpretationoftenfollowsnaturallyfromone’se
xistingperceptions.Moreover,it
seemsthe“safe”thingtodo,anditshowsspectatorshowbadtheothersi
dereallyis.Butthecostof
interpretingwhatevertheysayordoinitsmostdismalli ghtisthatfreshi
deasinthedirectionof
agreementarespurned,andsubtlechangesofpositionareignoredorre
jected.
Don’tblamethemforyourproblem.Itistemptingtoholdtheothersider
esponsibleforyour
problem.“Yourcompanyistotallyunreliable.Everytimeyouservice
ourrotarygeneratorhereatthe
factory,youdoalousyjobanditbreaksdownagain.”Blamingisaneasy
modetofallinto,particularly
whenyoufeelthattheothersideisindeedresponsible.Butevenifblami
ngisjustified,itisusually
counterproductive.Underattack,theothersidewillbecomedefensiv
eandwillresistwhatyouhaveto
say.Theywillceasetolisten,ortheywillstrikebackwithanattackofth

70. eirown.Assessingblamefirmly
entanglesthepeoplewiththeproblem.
Whenyoutalkabouttheproblem,distinguishthesymptomsfromthep
ersonwithwhomyouare
talking.“Ourrotarygeneratorthatyouservicehasbrokendownagain.
Thatisthreetimesinthelast
month.Thefirsttimeitwasoutoforderforanentireweek.Thisfactoryn
eedsafunctioninggenerator.I
needyouradviceonhowwecanminimizeourriskofgeneratorbreakdo
wn.Shouldwechangeservice
companies,suethemanufacturer,orwhat?”
Discusseachother’sperceptions.Onewaytodealwithdifferingperce
ptionsistomakethem
explicitanddiscussthemwiththeotherside.Aslongasyoudothisinafr
ank,honestmannerwithout
eithersideblamingtheotherfortheproblemaseachseesit,suchadiscu
ssionmayprovidethe
understandingtheyneedtotakewhatyousayseriously,andviceversa.
Itiscommoninanegotiationtotreatas“unimportant”thoseconcernso
ftheothersideperceivedas
notstandinginthewayofanagreement.Tothecontrary,communicati
ngloudlyandconvincinglythings

71. youarewillingtosaythattheywouldliketohearcanbeoneofthebestin
vestmentsyouasanegotiator
canmake.
Considerthenegotiationoverthetransferoftechnologythataroseatth
emultinationalLawoftheSea
Conference.From1974to1981representativesofsome150nationsga
theredinNewYorkandGenevato
formulaterulestogovernusesoftheoceanfromfishingrightstominin
gmanganeseinthedeepseabed.At
onepoint,representativesofthedevelopingcountriesexpressedkeen
interestinanexchangeof
technology;theircountrieswantedtobeabletoacquirefromthehighly
industrializednationsadvanced
technicalknowledgeandequipmentfordeep-seabedmining.
TheUnitedStatesandotherdevelopedcountriessawnodifficultyinsa
tisfyingthatdesire—and
thereforesawtheissueoftechnologytransferasunimportant.Inonese
nseitwasunimportanttothem,but
itwasagreatmistakeforthemtotreatthesubjectasunimportant.Bydev
otingsubstantialtimetoworking
outthepracticalarrangementsfortransferringtechnology,theymight
havemadetheirofferfarmore
credibleandfarmoreattractivetothedevelopingcountries.Bydismis

72. singtheissueasamatteroflesser
importancetobedealtwithlater,theindustrializedstatesgaveupalow
-costopportunitytoprovidethe
developingcountrieswithanimpressiveachievementandarealincent
ivetoreachagreementonother
issues.
Lookforopportunitiestoactinconsistentlywiththeirperceptions.Per
hapsthebestwaytochange
someone’sperceptionsistosendthemamessagedifferentfromwhatth
eyexpect.ThevisitofEgypt’s
PresidentAnwarSadattoJerusaleminNovember1977providesanout
standingexampleofsuchan
action.Atthetime,IsraelissawSadatandEgyptastheirenemy,theman
andcountrythathadlauncheda
surpriseattackonthemfouryearsbefore.Toalterthatperception,tohe
lppersuadetheIsraelisthathetoo
desiredpeace,Sadatflewtothecapitalofhisenemies,adisputedcapita
lthatnoteventheUnitedStates,
Israel’sbestfriend,hadrecognizedasthecapitalofIsrael.Insteadofac
tingasanenemy,Sadatactedasa
partner.Withoutthisdramaticmove,itishardtoimaginethesigningof

73. anEgyptian-Israelipeacetreatyin
1979.
Givethemastakeintheoutcomebymakingsuretheyparticipateinthep
rocess.Iftheyarenot
involvedintheprocess,theyareunlikelytoapprovetheproduct.Itis th
atsimple.Ifyougotothestate
insurancecommissionerpreparedforbattleafteralonginvestigation,
itisnotsurprisingthatheisgoing
tofeelthreatenedandresistyourconclusions.Ifyoufailtoaskanemplo
yeewhetherhewantsan
assignmentwithresponsibility,don’tbesurprisedtofindo utthathere
sentsit.Ifyouwanttheotherside
toacceptadisagreeableconclusion,itiscrucialthatyouinvolvethemi
ntheprocessofreachingthat
conclusion.
Thisispreciselywhatpeopletendnottodo.Whenyouhaveadifficultis
suetohandle,yourinstinctis
toleavethehardpartuntillast.“Let’sbesurewehavethewholethingwo
rkedoutbeforeweapproach
theCommissioner.”TheCommissioner,however,ismuchmorelikel
ytoagreetoarevisionofthe
regulationsifhefeelsthathehashadapartindraftingit.Thiswaytherev
isionbecomesjustonemore

74. smallstepinthelongdraftingprocessthatproducedhisoriginalregula
tionratherthansomeone’sattempt
tobutcherhiscompletedproduct.
Duringthenearlyfifty-
yearstruggleagainstapartheid(legalizedracialsegregation)inSouth
Africa
thatendedonlywiththemultipartyelectionsof1994,whitemoderates
atonepointweretryingtoabolish
thediscriminatorypasslaws.How?Bymeetinginanall-
whiteparliamentarycommitteetodiscuss
proposals.Yethowevermeritoriousthoseproposalsmightprove,the
ywouldbeinsufficient,not
necessarilybecauseoftheirsubstance,butbecausetheywouldbethep
roductofaprocessinwhichno
blackswereincluded.Blackswouldhear,“Wesuperiorwhitesaregoin
gtofigureouthowtosolveyour
problems.”Itwouldbethe“whiteman’sburden”alloveragain,which
wastheproblemtostartwith.
Evenifthetermsofanagreementseemfavorable,theothersidemayrej
ectthemsimplyoutofa
suspicionbornoftheirexclusionfromthedraftingprocess.Agreemen
tbecomesmucheasierifboth
partiesfeelownershipoftheideas.Thewholeprocessofnegotiationbe

75. comesstrongeraseachsideputs
theirimprimaturbitbybitonadevelopingsolution.Eachcriticismofth
etermsandconsequentchange,
eachcompromise,isapersonalmarkthatthenegotiatorleavesonapro
posal.Aproposalevolvesthat
bearsenoughofthesuggestionsofbothsidesforeachtofeelitistheirs.
Togivetheothersideafeelingofparticipation,gettheminvolvedearly
.Asktheiradvice.Giving
creditgenerouslyforideaswhereverpossiblewillgivethemapersonal
stakeindefendingthoseideasto
others.Itmaybehardtoresistthetemptationtotakecreditforyourself,
butforbearancepaysoff
handsomely.Apartfromthesubstantivemerits,thefeelingofparticip
ationintheprocessisperhapsthe
singlemostimportantfactorindeterminingwhetheranegotiatoracce
ptsaproposal.Inasense,the
processistheproduct.
Face-
saving:Makeyourproposalsconsistentwiththeirvalues.IntheEnglis
hlanguage,“face-
saving”carriesaderogatoryflavor.Peoplesay,“Wearedoingthatjust
toletthemsaveface,”implying
thatalittlepretensehasbeencreatedtoallowsomeonetogoalongwith

76. outfeelingbadly.Thetone
impliesridicule.
Thisisagravemisunderstandingoftheroleandimportanceofface-
saving.Face-savingreflects
people’sneedtoreconcilethestandtakeni nanegotiationoranagreem
entwiththeirexistingprinciples
andwiththeirpastwordsanddeeds.
Thejudicialprocessconcernsitselfwiththesamesubject.Whenajudg
ewritesanopiniononacourt
ruling,sheissavingface,notonlyforherselfandforthejudicialsystem
,butfortheparties.Insteadof
justtellingoneparty,“Youwin,”andtellingtheother,“Youlose,”shee
xplainshowherdecisionis
consistentwithprinciple,law,andprecedent.Shewantstoappearnota
sarbitrary,butasbehavingina
properfashion.Anegotiatorisnodifferent.
Ofteninanegotiationpeoplewillconti nuetoholdoutnotbecausethepr
oposalonthetableis
inherentlyunacceptable,butsimplybecausetheywanttoavoidthefee

77. lingortheappearanceofbacking
downtotheotherside.Ifthesubstancecanbephrasedorconceptualize
ddifferentlysothatitseemsafair
outcome,theywillthenacceptit.Termsnegotiatedbetweenamajorcit
yanditsHispaniccommunityon
accesstomunicipaljobswereunacceptabletothemayor —
untiltheagreementwaswithdrawnandthe
mayorwasallowedtoannouncethesametermsashisowndecision,car
ryingoutacampaignpromise.
Face-
savinginvolvesreconcilinganagreementwithprincipleandwiththes
elf-imageofthe
negotiators.Itsimportanceshouldnotbeunderestimated.
Emotion
Inanegotiation,particularlyinabitterdispute,feelingsmaybemorei
mportantthantalk.Thepartiesmay
bemorereadyforbattlethanforcooperativelyworkingoutasolutionto
acommonproblem.Peopleoften
cometoanegotiationrealizingthatthestakesarehighandfeelingthrea
tened.Emotionsononesidewill
generateemotionsontheother.Fearmaybreedanger,andanger,fear.
Emotionsmayquicklybringa
negotiationtoanimpasseoranend.

78. Firstrecognizeandunderstandemotions,theirsandyours.Lookatyou
rselfduringthenegotiation.
Areyoufeelingnervous?Isyourstomachupset?Areyouangryattheot
herside?Listentothemandgeta
senseofwhattheiremotionsare.Youmayfinditusefultowritedownw
hatyoufeel—perhapsfearful,
worried,angry—andthenhowyoumightliketofeel—
confident,relaxed.Dothesameforthem.
Indealingwithnegotiatorswhorepresenttheirorganizations,itiseasy
totreatthemasmere
mouthpieceswithoutemotions.Itisimportanttorememberthattheyto
o,likeyou,havepersonalfeelings,
fears,hopes,anddreams.Theircareersmaybeatstake.Theremaybeis
suesonwhichtheyare
particularlysensitiveandothersonwhichtheyareparticularlyproud.
Noraretheproblemsofemotion
limitedtothenegotiators.Constituentshaveemotionstoo.Aconstitue
ntmayhaveanevenmoresimplistic
andadversarialviewofthesituation.
Askyourselfwhatisproducingtheemotions.Whyareyouangry?Why
aretheyangry?Arethey
respondingtopastgrievancesandlookingforrevenge?Areemotionss

79. pillingoverfromoneissueto
another?Arepersonalproblemsathomeinterferingwithbusiness?Int
heMiddleEastnegotiation,
IsraelisandPalestiniansalikefeelathreattotheirexistenceaspeoples
andhavedevelopedpowerful
emotionsthatnowpermeateeventhemostconcretepracticalissue,lik
edistributionofwaterintheWest
Bank,sothatitbecomesalmostimpossibletodiscussandresolve.Beca
useinthelargerpictureboth
peoplesfeelthattheirownsurvivalisatstake,theyseeeveryotherissue
intermsofsurvival.
Payattentionto“coreconcerns.”Manyemotionsinnegotiationaredri
venbyacoresetoffive
interests:autonomy,thedesiretomakeyourownchoicesandcontroly
ourownfate;appreciation,the
desiretoberecognizedandvalued;affiliation,thedesiretobelongasa
nacceptedmemberofsomepeer
group;role,thedesiretohaveameaningfulpurpose;andstatus,thedesi
retofeelfairlyseenand
acknowledged.Tramplingontheseintereststendstogeneratestrongn
egativeemotions.Attendingtothem

80. canbuildrapportandapositiveclimateforproblem-
solvingnegotiation.[1]
Considertheroleofidentity.Anothersurefiredriverofstrongnegativ
eemotionisaperceivedthreat
toidentity—one’sself-imageorself-
respect.Ashumanbeings,weapplyourgeneraltendencytoward
either-orthinkingtoourself-
perception:“Iamakindperson.”“I’magoodmanager.”Thissetsusupt
o
feelthreatenedbypeoplepointingoutourinevitablefailingsandincon
sistencies.Nooneisperfector
entirelyconsistentaboutanything,butunconsciouslythatcanbepainf
ulanduncomfortabletoaccept.Asa
result,whenconfronted,wemaygetscaredorangryasaninternaldebat
eragesaboutwhetherwe“are”
or“aren’t”competent,lovable,fair,orwhatevermatterstous.
Ifyoufindacounterpart’sbehavioroddlyoutofcharacterorfeelasifyo
uhaveunexpectedlystepped
onalandmineinyourconversation,thinkaboutwhethertheymightbee
xperiencingathreattotheir
identityfromsomethingyouhavesaidormightsay.Similarly,ifyoufi
ndyourselffeelingoff-balanceand
emotional,askyourselfifyoursenseofidentityfeelsthreatened.[*]

81. Makeemotionsexplicitandacknowledgethemaslegitimate.Talkwit
hthepeopleontheother
sideabouttheiremotions.Talkaboutyourown.Itdoesnothurttosay,“
Youknow,thepeopleonourside
feelwehavebeenmistreatedandareveryupset.We’reafraidanagreem
entwillnotbekeptevenifone
isreached.Rationalornot,thatisourconcern.Personally,Ithinkwema
ybewronginfearingthis,but
that’safeelingothershave.Dothepeopleonyoursidefeelthesameway
?”Makingyourfeelingsor
theirsanexplicitfocusofdiscussionwillnotonlyunderscoretheserio
usnessoftheproblem,itwillalso
makethenegotiationslessreactiveandmore“pro-
active.”Freedfromtheburdenofunexpressed
emotions,peoplewillbecomemorelikelytoworkontheproblem.
Allowtheothersidetoletoffsteam.Often,oneeffectivewaytodealwit
hpeople’sanger,
frustration,andothernegativeemotionsistohelpthemreleasethosefe
elings.Peopleobtain
psychologicalreleasethroughthesimpleprocessofrecountingtheirg
rievancestoanattentiveaudience.
Ifyoucomehomewantingtotellyourhusbandabouteverythingthatwe
ntwrongattheoffice,youwill

82. becomeevenmorefrustratedifhesays,“Don’tbother tellingme;I’ms
ureyouhadahardday.Let’sskip
it.”Thesameistruefornegotiators.Lettingoffsteammaymakeiteasie
rtotalkrationallylater.
Moreover,ifanegotiatormakesanangryspeechandtherebyshowshis
constituencythatheisnotbeing
“soft,”theymaygivehimafreerhandinthenegotiation.Hecanthenrel
yonareputationfortoughnessto
protecthimfromcriticismlaterifheeventuallyentersintoanagreeme
nt.
Hence,insteadofinterruptingpolemicalspeechesorwalkingoutonth
eotherparty,youmaydecideto
controlyourself,sitthere,andallowthemtopourouttheirgrievancesa
tyou.Whenconstituentsare
listening,suchoccasionsmayreleasetheirfrustrationaswellasthene
gotiator’s.Perhapsthebest
strategytoadoptwhiletheothersideletsoffsteamistolistenquietlywi
thoutrespondingtotheirattacks,
andoccasionallytoaskthespeakertocontinueuntilhehasspokenhisla
stword.Inthisway,youoffer
littlesupporttotheinflammatorysubstance,givethespeakereveryen
couragementtospeakhimselfout,
andleavelittleornoresiduetofester.

83. Don’treacttoemotionaloutbursts.Releasingemotionscanproverisk
yifitleadstoanemotional
reaction.Ifnotcontrolled,itcanresultinaviolentquarrel.Oneunusual
andeffectivetechniquetocontain
theimpactofemotionswasusedinthe1950sbytheHumanRelationsC
ommittee,alabor-management
groupsetupinthesteelindustrytohandleemergingconflictsbeforeth
eybecameseriousproblems.The
membersofthecommitteeadoptedtherulethatonlyonepersoncouldg
etangryatatime.Thismadeit
legitimateforothersnottorespondstormilytoanangryoutburst.Itals
omadelettingoffemotionalsteam
easierbymakinganoutburstitselfmorelegitimate:“That’sOK.It’shi
sturn.”Therulehasthefurther
advantageofhelpingpeoplecontroltheiremotions.Breakingtherulei
mpliesthatyouhavelostself-
control,soyoulosesomeface.
Usesymbolicgestures.Anyloverknowsthattoendaquarrelthesimple
gestureofbringingared
rosegoesalongway.Actsthatwouldproduce aconstructiveemotional
impactononesideofteninvolve

84. littleornocosttotheother.Anoteofsympathy,astatementofregret,av
isittoacemetery,deliveringa
smallpresentforagrandchild,shakinghandsorembracing,eatingtog
ether—allmaybepriceless
opportunitiestoimproveahostileemotionalsituationatsmallcost.On
manyoccasionsanapologycan
defuseemotionseffectively,evenwhenyoudonotacknowledgeperso
nalresponsibilityfortheactionor
admitanintentiontoharm.Anapologymaybeoneoftheleastcostlyand
mostrewardinginvestmentsyou
canmake.
Communication
Withoutcommunicationthereisnonegotiation.Negotiationisaproce
ssofcommunicatingbackandforth
forthepurposeofreachingajointdecision.Communicationisneveran
easything,evenbetweenpeople
whohaveanenormousbackgroundofsharedvaluesandexperience.C
oupleswhohavelivedwitheach
otherforthirtyyearsstillhavemisunderstandingseveryday.Itisnotsu
rprising,then,tofindpoor
communicationbetweenpeoplewhodonotknoweachotherwellandw
homayfeelhostileand
suspiciousofoneanother.Whateveryousay,youshouldexpectthatth
eothersidewillalmostalways

85. hearsomethingdifferent.
Therearethreebigproblemsincommunication.First,negotiatorsmay
notbetalkingtoeachother,or
atleastnotinsuchawayastobeunderstood.Frequentlyeachsidehasgi
venupontheotherandisno
longerattemptinganyseriouscommunicationwithit.Insteadtheytal
kmerelytoimpressthirdpartiesor
theirownconstituency.Ratherthantryingtodancewiththeirnegotiati
ngpartnertowardamutually
agreeableoutcome,theytrytotriphimup.Ratherthantryingtotalkthei
rpartnerintoamoreconstructive
step,theytrytotalkthespectatorsintotakingsides.E ffectivecommun
icationbetweenthepartiesisall
butimpossibleifeachplaystothegallery.
Evenifyouaretalkingdirectlyandclearlytothem,theymaynotbehear
ingyou.Thisconstitutesthe
secondproblemincommunication.Notehowoftenpeopledon’tseemt
opayenoughattentiontowhatyou
say.Probablyequallyoften,youwouldbeunabletorepeatwhattheyha
dsaid.Inanegotiation,youmay
besobusythinkingaboutwhatyouaregoingtosaynext,howyouaregoi
ngtorespondtothatlastpointor
howyouaregoingtoframeyournextargument,thatyouforgettolistent

86. owhattheothersideissayi ng
now.Oryoumaybelisteningmoreattentivelytoyourconstituencytha
ntotheotherside.Your
constituents,afterall,aretheonestowhomyouwillhavetoaccountfort
heresultsofthenegotiation.
Theyaretheonesyouaretryingtosatisfy.Itisnotsurprisingthatyoush
ouldwanttopaycloseattention
tothem.Butifyouarenothearingwhattheothersideissaying,thereisn
ocommunication.
Thethirdcommunicationproblemismisunderstanding.Whatonesay
s,theothermaymisinterpret.
Evenwhennegotiatorsareinthesameroom,communicationfromonet
otheothercanseemlikesending
smokesignalsinahighwind.Wherethepartiesspeakdifferentlanguag
esthechanceformisinterpretation
iscompounded.Forexample,inPersian,theword“compromise”appa
rentlylacksthepositivemeaningit
hasinEnglishof“amidwaysolutionbothsidescanlivewith,”buthason
lyanegativemeaningasin“our
integritywascompromised.”Similarly,theword“mediator”inPersia
nsuggests“meddler,”someone
whoisbarginginuninvited.Inearly1980U.N.SecretaryGeneralKurt
WaldheimflewtoIrantoseekthe
releaseofAmericandiplomatsbeingheldhostagebyIranianstudentss

87. oonaftertheIslamicrevolution.
HiseffortswereseriouslysetbackwhenIraniannationalradioandtele
visionbroadcastinPersiana
remarkhereportedlymadeonhisarrivalinTehran:“Ihavecomeasame
diatortoworkouta
compromise.”Withinanhourofthebroadcast,hiscarwasbeingstoned
byangryIranians.
Whatcanbedoneaboutthesethreeproblemsofcommunication?
Listenactivelyandacknowledgewhatisbeingsaid.Theneedforlisten
ingisobvious,yetitis
difficulttolistenwell,especiallyunderthestressofanongoingnegoti
ation.Listeningenablesyouto
understandtheirperceptions,feeltheiremotions,andhearwhattheyar
etryingtosay.Activelistening
improvesnotonlywhatyouhearbutalsowhattheysay.Ifyoupayattent
ionandinterruptoccasionallyto
say,“DidIunderstandcorrectlythatyouaresayingthat...?”theothersi
dewillrealizethattheyarenot
justkillingtime,notjustgoingthrougharoutine.Theywillalsofeelthe
satisfactionofbeingheardand

88. understood.Ithasbeensaidthatthecheapestconcessionyoucanmaket
otheothersideistoletthem
knowtheyhavebeenheard.
Standardtechniquesofgoodlisteningaretopaycloseattentiontowhat
issaid,toasktheotherparty
tospelloutcarefullyandclearlyexactlywhattheymean,andtorequest
thatideasberepeatedifthereis
anyambiguityoruncertainty.Makeityourtaskwhilelisteningnottop
hrasearesponse,buttounderstand
themastheyseethemselves.Takeintheirperceptions,theirneeds,and
theirconstraints.
Manyconsideritagoodtacticnottogivetheotherside’scasetoomucha
ttention,andnottoadmitany
legitimacyintheirpointofview.Agoodnegotiatordoesjusttherevers
e.Unlessyouacknowledgewhat
theyaresayinganddemonstratethatyouunderstandthem,theymaybe
lieveyouhavenotheardthem.
Whenyouthentrytoexplainadifferentpointofview,theywillsuppose
thatyoustillhavenotgrasped
whattheymean.Theywillsaytothemselves,“Itoldhimmyview,butno
whe’ssayingsomething
different,sohemustnothaveunderstoodit.”Theninsteadoflisteningt
oyourpoint,theywillbe

89. consideringhowtomaketheirargumentinanewwaysothatthistimem
aybeyouwillfathomit.Soshow
thatyouunderstandthem.“LetmeseewhetherIfollowwhatyouaretell
ingme.Fromyourpointofview,
thesituationlookslikethis....”
Asyourepeatwhatyouunderstoodthemtohavesaid,phraseitpositivel
yfromtheirpointofview,
makingthestrengthoftheircaseclear.Youmightsay,“Youhaveastro
ngcase.LetmeseeifIcanexplain
it.Here’sthewayitstrikesme....”Understandingisnotagreeing.Onec
anatthesametimeunderstand
perfectlyanddisagreecompletelywithwhattheothersideissaying.B
utunlessyoucanconvincethem
thatyoudograsphowtheyseeit,youmaybeunabletogetthemtohearw
henyouexplainyourviewpoint
tothem.Onceyouhavemadetheircaseforthem,thencomebackwithth
eproblemsyoufindintheir
proposal.Ifyoucanputtheircasebetter thantheycan,andthenrefuteit,
youmaximizethechanceof
initiatingaconstructivedialogueonthemeritsandminimizethechanc
eoftheirbelievingyouhave
misunderstoodthem.
Speaktobeunderstood.Talktotheotherside.Itiseasytoforgetsometi

90. mesthatanegotiationisnot
adebate.Norisitatrial.Youarenottryingtopersuadesomethirdparty.
Thepersonyouaretryingto
persuadeisseatedatthetablewithyou.Ifanegotiationistobecompare
dwithalegalproceeding,the
situationresemblesthatoftwojudgestryingtoreachagreementonho
wtodecideacase.Tryputting
yourselfinthatrole,treatingyouroppositenumberasafellowjudgewi
thwhomareyouattemptingto
workoutajointopinion.Inthiscontextitisclearlyunpersuasivetobla
metheotherpartyfortheproblem,
toengageinname-
calling,ortoraiseyourvoice.Onthecontrary,itwillhelptorecognizee
xplicitlythat
theyseethesituationdifferentlyandtotrytogoforwardaspeoplewitha
jointproblem.
Toreducethedominatinganddistractingeffectthatthepress,homeau
diences,andthirdpartiesmay
have,itisusefultoestablishprivateandconfidentialmeansofcommun
icatingwiththeotherside.You
canalsoimprovecommunicationbylimitingthesizeofthegroupmeeti
ng.Inthenegotiationsoverthecity
ofTriestein1954,forexample,littleprogresswasmadeinthetalksamo
ngYugoslavia,Britain,andthe

91. UnitedStatesuntilthethreeprincipalnegotiatorsabandonedtheirlarg
edelegationsandstartedmeeting
aloneandinformallyinaprivatehouse.Agoodcasecanbemadeforcha
ngingPresidentWoodrow
Wilson’sappealingslogan“Opencovenantsopenlyarrivedat”to“Op
encovenantsprivatelyarrivedat.”
Nomatterhowmanypeopleareinvolvedinanegotiation,importantde
cisionsaretypicallymadewhen
nomorethantwopeopleareintheroom.
Speakaboutyourself,notaboutthem.Inmanynegotiations,eachsidee
xplainsandcondemnsat
greatlengththemotivationsandintentionsoftheotherside.Itismorep
ersuasive,however,todescribea
problemintermsofitsimpactonyouthanintermsofwhattheydidorwh
y:“Ifeelletdown”insteadof
“Youbrokeyourword.”“Wefeeldiscriminatedagainst”ratherthan“
You’rearacist.”Ifyoumakea
statementaboutthemthattheybelieveisuntrue,theywillignoreyouor
getangry;theywillnotfocuson
yourconcern.Butastatementabouthowyoufeelisdifficulttochalleng
e.Youconveythesame

92. informationwithoutprovokingadefensivereactionthatwillpreventt
hemfromtakingitin.
Speakforapurpose.Sometimestheproblemisnottoolittlecommunic
ation,buttoomuch.When
angerandmisperceptionarehigh,somethoughtsarebestleftunsaid.A
tothertimes,fulldisclosureof
howflexibleyouaremaymakeithardertoreachagreementratherthane
asier.Ifyouletmeknowthatyou
wouldbewillingtosellyourcarfor$15,000,afterIhavesaidthatIwoul
dbewillingtopayasmuchas
$20,000,wemayhavemoretroublestrikingadealthanifyouhadjustke
ptquiet.Themoralis:Before
makingasignificantstatement,knowwhatyouwanttocommunicateo
rfindout,andknowwhatpurpose
thisinformationwillserve.
Preventionworksbest
Thetechniquesjustdescribedfordealingwithproblemsofperception,
emotion,andcommunication
usuallyworkwell.However,thebesttimeforhandlingpeopleproblem
sisbeforetheybecomepeople
problems.Thismeansbuildingapersonalandorganizationalrelation
shipwiththeothersidethatcan
cushionthepeopleoneachsideagainsttheknocksofnegotiation.Itals

93. omeansstructuringthenegotiating
gameinwaysthatdisentanglethesubstantiveproblemfromtherelatio
nshipandprotectpeople’segos
fromgettinginvolvedinsubstantivediscussions.
Buildaworkingrelationship.Knowingtheothersidepersonallyreall
ydoeshelp.Itismucheasierto
attributediabolicalintentionstoanunknownabstractioncalledthe“ot
herside”thantosomeoneyou
knowpersonally.Dealingwithaclassmate,acolleague,afriend,oreve
nafriendofafriendisquite
differentfromdealingwithastranger.Themorequicklyyoucanturnas
trangerintosomeoneyouknow,
theeasieranegotiationislikelytobecome.Youhavelessdifficultyund
erstandingwheretheyarecoming
from.Youhaveafoundationoftrusttobuilduponinadifficultnegotiat
ion.Youhavesmooth,familiar
communicationroutines.Itiseasiertodefusetensionwithajokeorani
nformalaside.
Thetimetodevelopsucharelationshipisbeforethenegotiationbegins
.Gettoknowthemandfindout
abouttheirlikesanddislikes.Findwaystomeettheminformally.Tryar
rivingearlytochatbeforethe
negotiationisscheduledtostart,andlingerafteritends.BenjaminFran

94. klin’sfavoritetechniquewasto
askanadversaryifhecouldborrowacertainbook.Thiswouldflatterth
epersonandgivehimthe
comfortablefeelingofknowingthatFranklinowedhimafavor.
Facetheproblem,notthepeople.Ifnegotiatorsviewthemselvesasadv
ersariesinapersonalface-
to-
faceconfrontation,itisdifficulttodisentangletheirrelationshipfrom
thesubstantiveproblem.Inthat
context,anythingonenegotiatorsaysabouttheproblemseemstobedir
ectedpersonallyattheotherandis
receivedthatway.Eachsidetendstobecomedefensiveandreactivean
dtoignoretheotherside’s
legitimateinterestsaltogether.
Amoreeffectivewayforthepartiestothinkofthemselvesisaspartners
inahardheaded,side-by-
sidesearchforafairagreementadvantageoustoeach.
Liketwoshipwreckedsailorsinalifeboatatseaquarrelingoverlimite
drationsandsupplies,
negotiatorsmaybeginbyseeingeachotherasadversaries.Eachmayvi

95. ewtheotherasahindrance.To
survive,however,thosetwosailorswillwanttodisentangletheobjecti
veproblemsfromthepeople.
Theywillwanttoidentifytheneedsofeach,whetherforshade,medicin
e,water,orfood.Theywillwant
togofurtherandtreatthemeetingofthoseneedsasasharedproblem,al
ongwithothersharedproblems
likekeepingwatch,catchingrainwater,andgettingthelifeboattoshor
e.Seeingthemselvesasengagedin
side-by-
sideeffortstosolveamutualproblem,thesailorswillbecomebetterabl
etoreconciletheir
conflictinginterestsaswellastoadvancetheirsharedinterests.Simila
rlywithtwonegotiators.However
difficultpersonalrelationsmaybebetweenus,youandIbecomebetter
abletoreachanamicable
reconciliationofourvariousinterestswhenweacceptthattaskasashar
edproblemandfaceitjointly.
Tohelptheothersidechangefromaface-to-faceorientationtoside-
by-side,youmightraisetheissue
withthemexplicitly.“Look,we’rebothlawyers[diplomats,business
men,family,etc.].Unlesswetryto
satisfyyourinterests,wearehardlylikelytoreachanagreementthatsa
tisfiesmine,andviceversa.Let’s

96. looktogetherattheproblemofhowtosatisfyourcollectiveinterests.”
Alternatively,youcouldstart
treatingthenegotiationasaside-by-
sideprocessandbyyouractionsmakeitdesirableforthemtojoinin.
lthelpstositliterallyonthesamesideofatableandtohaveinfrontofyou
thecontract,themap,the
blankpadofpaper,orwhateverelsedepictstheproblem.Ifyouhaveest
ablishedabasisformutualtrust,
somuchthebetter.Buthoweverprecariousyourrelationshipmaybe,tr
ytostructurethenegotiationasa
side-by-sideactivityinwhichthetwoofyou—
withyourdifferentinterestsandperceptions,andyour
emotionalinvolvement—jointlyfaceacommontask.
Separatingthepeoplefromtheproblemisnotsomethingyoucandoonc
eandforgetabout;youhaveto
keepworkingatit.Thebasicapproachistodealwiththepeopleashuma
nbeingsandwiththeproblem
onitsmerits.Howtodothelatteristhesubjectofthenextthreechapters.
3FocusonInterests,NotPositions

97. ConsiderMaryParkerFollett’sstoryoftwomenquarrelinginalibrary
.Onewantsthewindowopen
andtheotherwantsitclosed.Theybickerbackandforthabouthowmuc
htoleaveitopen:acrack,
halfway,three-quartersoftheway.Nosolutionsatisfiesthemboth.
Enterthelibrarian.Sheasksonewhyhewantsthewindowopen:“Toget
somefreshair.”Sheasksthe
otherwhyhewantsitclosed:“Toavoidthedraft.”Afterthinkingaminu
te,sheopenswideawindowin
thenextroom,bringinginfreshairwithoutadraft.
Forawisesolutionreconcileinterests,notpositions
Thisstoryistypicalofmanynegotiations.Sincetheparties’problema
ppearstobeaconflictofpositions,
andsincetheirgoalistoagreeonaposition,theynaturallytendtothinka
ndtalkaboutpositions—andin
theprocessoftenreachanimpasse.
Thelibrariancouldnothaveinventedthesolutionshedidifshehadfocu
sedonlyonthetwomen’s
statedpositionsofwantingthewindowopenorclosed.Insteadshelook
edtotheirunderlyinginterestsof
freshairandnodraft.Thisdifferencebetweenpositionsandinterestsis
crucial.

98. Interestsdefinetheproblem.Thebasicprobleminanegotiationliesno
tinconflictingpositions,but
intheconflictbetweeneachside’sneeds,desires,concerns,andfears.
Thepartiesmaysay:
“Iamtryingtogethimtostopthatrealestatedevelopmentnextdoor.”
Or“Wedisagree.Hewants$300,000forthehouse.Iwon’tpayapenny
morethan$250,000.”
Butonamorebasicleveltheproblemis:
“Heneedsthecash;Iwantpeaceandquiet.”
Or“Heneedsatleast$300,000topayoffthemortgageandput20percen
tdownonhisnewhouse.I
toldmyfamilythatIwouldn’tpaymorethan$250,000forahouse.”
Suchdesiresandconcernsareinterests.Interestsmotivatepeople;the
yarethesilentmoversbehind
thehubbubofpositions.Yourpositionissomethingyouhavedecidedu
pon.Yourinterestsarewhat
causedyoutosodecide.
TheEgyptian-
IsraelipeacetreatyblockedoutattheCampDavidsummitin1978dem
onstratesthe

99. usefulnessoflookingbehindpositions.IsraelhadoccupiedtheEgypti
anSinaiPeninsulasincetheSix
DayWarof1967.WhenEgyptandIsraelsatdowntogetherin1978tone
gotiateapeace,theirpositions
wereincompatible.IsraelinsistedonkeepingsomeoftheSinai.Egypt,
ontheotherhand,insistedthat
everyinchoftheSinaibereturnedtoEgyptiansovereignty.Timeanda
gain,peopledrewmapsshowing
possibleboundarylinesthatwoulddividetheSinaibetweenEgyptand
Israel.Compromisinginthisway
waswhollyunacceptabletoEgypt.Togobac ktothesituationasitwasi
n1967wasequallyunacceptable
toIsrael.
Lookingtotheirinterestsinsteadoftheirpositionsmadeitpossibletod
evelopasolution.Israel’s
interestlayinsecurity;theydidnotwantEgyptiantankspoisedontheir
borderreadytorollacrossatany
time.Egypt’sinterestlayinsovereignty;theSinaihadbeenpartofEgy
ptsincethetimeofthePharaohs.
AftercenturiesofdominationbyGreeks,Romans,Turks,French,and
British,Egypthadonlyrecently
regainedfullsovereigntyandwasnotabouttocedeterritorytoanother