1. University of Oregon Investment Group
January 29th
, 2016
Healthcare
Covering Analyst: Jeremy Garbellano
jgarbell@uoregon.edu
Investment Thesis
▪ Macrogenics’ positioning as a developmental oncology firm in the most
competitive area of the biotech industry with the lowest probability-to-
market for early stage drug candidates bodes poorly in light of their having
9 of 10 pipeline drugs filling this role
▪ Pending approval, Macrogenics’ lead pipeline candidate, margetuximab, is
unlikely to emerge as a favored breast cancer treatment following expected
biosimilar releases in the near-term future
▪ Macrogenics will continue to tap equity markets to fund planned expansions
in manufacturing capacity and late stage clinical development programs,
leading to material shareholder dilution over the next 3-5 years
▪ A lack of FDA approvals yields Macrogenics’ three research platforms
speculative at best in demonstrating clinical safety and efficacy
▪ Given inherent binary risks, uncertainty in forecasting clinical approvals,
and overvaluations on both a relative and intrinsic basis, Macrogenics is
fundamentally opposed to the Tall Firs portfolio’s value investing strategy
Macrogenics, Inc.
Ticker: MGNX
Current Price: $20.54
Recommendation: Sell
Price Target: $17.13
One-Year Stock Chart
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Volume Adjusted Close 50-Day Avg 200-Day Avg
Key Statistics
52 Week Price Range $19.67 - $39.90
% 52-Week High 57.14%
52-Week Return (31.23%)
Estimated Beta 1.69
Market Capitalization $792.61M
Price/Earnings Multiples (LTM)
Macrogenics P/E (73.07x)
Biotech Industry P/E 26.68x
Healthcare Sector P/E 22.64x
Russel 2000 P/E 107.00x
MCSI World P/E 16.15x
Trading Statistics
Diluted Shares Outstanding 35,760.98M
Average Volume (3-Month) 272.69K
Institutional Ownership 64.60%
Insider Ownership 21.45%
Short Interest 9.54%
2. UOIG 2
University of Oregon Investment Group January 29th
, 2016
Business Overview
Overview
Headquartered in Rockville, MD and employing a staff of 317, Macrogenics is a
biopharmaceutical firm engaged in the discovery and development of novel
antibody-based treatments for cancer, autoimmune and infectious diseases. Their
core expertise lies in the burgeoning field of immuno-oncology, which seeks to
target cancerous and other pathogenic cells by activating the immune system.
Macrogenics focuses on both novel, first-in-class biologics, as well as “bio-
betters” – treatments designed to improve upon currently marketed drugs – with
both targeted primarily at the US market.
As a developmental firm, Macrogenics has neither currently nor historically had
any FDA-approved products on the market. Since their founding in 2000, the
company has been devoted to raising capital, building drug discovery platforms,
and advancing potential treatments through research and development (R&D).
In 2008, Macrogenics acquired the privately-held Raven Biotechnologies in a
stock-for-stock transaction to bolster their research platform through stem cell-
based technologies. Macrogenics went public in October 2013, raising $92M.
Revenue Streams
At present, Macrogenics generates over 90% of their revenue from out-licensed
R&D partnerships with larger, more mature firms, as well as the sale of options
and licenses for the right to market their developmental drugs upon FDA approval
in exchange for upfront and milestone payments (Figure 1). As of 2015,
Macrogenics had 10 drugs undergoing preclinical and clinical testing; a majority
target towards various forms of cancer (Figure 2).
Macrogenics’ lead clinical candidate, margetuximab, entered phase III testing in
Q3 2015. Pending approval, it is scheduled to launch by 2020 for the treatment of
advanced breast and gastric cancers showing overexpression of human epidermal
growth factor 2 (HER2), a protein associated with tumor activity in cells with
genetically tested overexpression.
Industry Overview
Overview
Biotechnology firms engage in the research, development, manufacturing and
commercialization of therapeutic molecules engineered from living organisms.
While traditional pharmaceuticals are chemical-based and relatively easy to
synthesize, biotech drugs require far greater expertise to manufacture, as minute
impurities can have disastrous health consequences.
The biotech industry is generally divided by large, profitable companies with
drugs on the market as well as clinical testing, and early-stage firms engaged in
drug discovery and clinical testing. According to Ernst & Young, there were
approximately 1,800 firms in the industry as of 2013, of which 400 were publicly-
traded. Though a majority of these firms have fewer than 50 employees, just four
account for more than 50% of total industry market share (Figure 3).
Developmental-stage biotech firms raise funds through the issuance of equity and
the negotiation of partnerships with larger, more mature firms in exchange for the
outsourcing of R&D and sale of product rights and licensing agreements. (Given
a lack of tangible assets and consistent cash flows, debt is not typically issued
until after a firm is granted regulatory approval to market one or more drugs.) IPO
Figure 1: Macrogenics Revenue by Source
Source: Macrogenics 10-K
Figure 2: Macrogenics Developmental Pipeline
Source: Macrogenics Investor Relations
Figure 3: Biotech Firms by Market Share (2014)
Source: IBISWorld
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2011 2012 2013 2014
Partnerships and Collaborations Government Grants
Drug Name Indication Phase
Margetuximab Breast Cancer II and III
Margetuximab Gastric Cancer I/II Combined
Enoblituzumab Solid Tumors I
MGD006 Acute Myeloid Leukemia I
MGD007 Colorectal Cancer I
MGD009 Solid Tumors I
MGD010 Autoimmune Disorders I
MGD011 B-Cell Malignancies I
MGD012 Solid Tumors/Heme Preclinical
MGD013 Solid Tumors/Heme Preclinical
MGD014 HIV Preclinical
AbbVie Amgen Genentech Gilead All Others
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University of Oregon Investment Group January 29th
, 2016
activity tends to rise in line with industrywide price-to-earnings. Follow-on equity
issuance is generally also required, diluting existing shareholders.
While equity markets are a viable funding source during periods of rising
valuations and declining interest rates, funding windows are highly cyclical and
subject to volatile investor risk preferences. Because almost all of a firm’s
expected future cash flows hinge on the approval of one or more pipeline
candidates, early-stage biotech firms can have option-like payouts, and clinical
failures lead to sudden, dramatic share price declines.
Given this, partnership arrangements represent not only a source of non-dilutive
financing, but can oftentimes also signal a vote of confidence in the management
and scientific potential of an early stage firm. As such, a demonstrated ability to
raise capital on preferential terms is one criterion for prospective investors to
evaluate biotech firms’ executives.
Clinical Testing
The Federal Drug Administration (FDA) is the primary arbitrator on prescription
drug evaluation and approval in the US, and requires all marketed drugs pass the
following clinical phases prior to commercialization:
▪ Pre-clinical, characterized by in vitro and animal testing to assess a
drug’s potential safety in humans
▪ Phase I, where between 20-100 healthy volunteers receive the drug for
6-12 months to assess safety, metabolism and dosage ranges
▪ Phase II, where dosage and efficacy are evaluated in 100-300 patients
▪ Phase III, where safety and efficacy are evaluated on 300-3000 patients
for up to 4 years to assess clinical value and longer-term effects
▪ Phase IV, where longer term studies are performed following a drug’s
commercialization
R&D expenses increase in a stepwise fashion after each clinical testing phase.
Business Models
Pre-drug launch biotech firms generally take one of three approaches – drug
development, platform development or a hybrid of the two. The developmental
model seeks to research and develop drugs for clinical approval and reap the
potential cash flow from commercialization and market exclusivity. In contrast,
the platform model is based on developing scientific and technological expertise
in the drug discovery process (traditionally the riskiest portion of R&D) to out-
license preclinical candidates to other firms.
For Big Pharma, a better return on investment can often be made by purchasing
candidates from these specialist platform firms rather than developing internally.
Superior scientific and technological platforms are marked by greater efficiency
and decreased durations in transitioning newly-discovered drugs into testing.
Macrogenics employs the hybrid model, with multiple technology platforms
forming the foundation for its developmental drug portfolio.
Competition
Competition by firm is based on chosen therapeutic focus. Generalist strategies
are not typically possible at the developmental stage due to limited funding and
headcount. As a result, most early-stage firms tend to specialize in a targeting a
small number of related diseases.
Immuno-Oncology
Historically, cancer treatments took one of three forms – surgery, chemotherapy
and radiation therapy. While each carry moderate-to-severe side effects, chemo-
Figure 4: Biotech Public Offerings (Left Axis)
vs. Industry ETF Returns (Right Axis)
Source: S&P Capital IQ
Figure 5: 50-Day Rolling Correlation Between
Macrogenics and Industry ETF Daily Returns
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
Figure 6: Industry R&D by Cost Component
Source: Biotechnology Valuation
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University of Oregon Investment Group January 29th
, 2016
and radiotherapy are especially debilitating given their potential to non-
discriminately kill healthy cells alongside cancerous ones. In recent years, a fourth
option emerged – immune-oncology. This treatment category takes a more
targeted approach based on monoclonal antibodies – proteins produced by the
immune system to render external threats harmless – to dampen tumor growth and
prolong survival rates while reducing negative side effects. Immuno-oncology
treatments can be individualized based on tumor type, representing a clinically
superior option for medically-eligible patients.
Despite their promise, clinical phase approval rates for immune-oncology drugs
have steadily declined over the past decade, even as aggregate industry R&D
expenditures nearly doubled1
. Moreover, upon entering phase I, oncology drugs
represent the lowest launch success rates in the industry2
.
Market Potential
A recent report by Leerink placed current total market potential for immuno-
oncology products at $40B. Consequently, the industry’s largest players (e.g.,
Amgen, AstraZeneca, Bristol Myers Squibb, Merck, Novartis, Pfizer and Roche)
have made significant investments in their immune-oncology portfolios. The
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), an industry
group, estimates nearly 800 novel biologics currently undergoing clinical testing
for cancer treatment. According to Fierce Biotech, 4 of the 10 best-selling newly
launched drugs in 2015 were cancer treatments. The explosion in antibody-based
therapies over the past decade has contributed to declining cancer mortality rates
in the US, which decreased nearly 22% since their peak in the 1990s.
Drug Pricing
Given enhanced specificity and safety profiles, immune-oncology drugs are
among the most expensive drugs on the market, and with prices rising
dramatically in the past decade. For example, the retail price for Novartis’
leukemia drug Gleevac stood at $30,000/year after gaining approval in 2001; by
2012, it retailed for $92,000. Such price appreciation has led many firms to
produce “me-too” drugs that improve marginally on existing treatments and
priced at sizable premiums. However, oncologists have begun pushing back,
opting to weigh price more heavily in their recommendations after increasing
numbers of patients have had to discontinue treatment altogether in lieu of
financial constraints.
Biosimilars
Given greater manufacturing complexity and a difficulty in demonstrating clinical
equivalence across different manufacturers, biologic drugs have historically been
immune to generic drug competition and market share erosion following patent
expiration, a common theme among traditional pharmaceuticals. However,
interest among drug makers to produce generic biologics (“biosimilars”) has
heightened markedly following the expiration of a number of best-selling drug
patents. For their part, lawmakers put in place the regulatory framework to define
how the FDA would evaluate and approve such products in the Affordable Care
Act. While biosimilars have been sold in the European Union since 2006, the first
FDA approved biosimilar drug did not enter US markets until March 2015.
Among developmental biotech firms, the threat of biosimilars is expected to grow
in the near-to-midterm. “Biobetters” (i.e., those that improve marginally on
existing treatments) will have to demonstrate either a compelling case for superior
safety and efficacy, or lower price points. Significantly, this includes
Macrogenics’ phase III candidate, margetuximab, which was designed to improve
upon Roche’s top-selling HER2+ breast cancer treatment Herceptin (Figure 10).
Figure 7: Biotech Revenue, Headcount and R&D
Growth, 2010A-2020E
Source: IBISWorld
Figure 8: Disease Category by Sales (2012)
Source: Deutsche Bank
Figure 9: Biosimilar Competition to
Macrogenics’ Breast Cancer Drug Margetuximab
Source: Generics and Biosimilars Initiative
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Revenue Headcount R&D
Oncology Lipid Regulators
Respiratory Anti-Diabetics
Autoimmune All Others
Company Country Clinical Stage
Allergan, Amgen USA Phase III
Biocad Russia Phase III
Biocon, Mylan India Launched 10/13
Celltrion South Korea Launched 1/14
Hanwha Chemical South Korea Phase I
Hospira USA Phase III
Mylan India Phase III
Pfizer USA Phase III
PlantForm Canada Launching 2016
Samsung Bioepis South Korea Phase III
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University of Oregon Investment Group January 29th
, 2016
Macro factors
External factors influencing the biotechnology industry tend to be based in
demographics and government policy. The largest demand driver for immuno-
oncology treatments, for example, is growth in over-65s (Figure 11), the age-
cohort most likely to develop cancer. Furthermore, the Affordable Care Act has
led to a marked decrease in the uninsured, increasing the addressable market for
cancer treatments.
Recently, scrutiny over dramatic price increases of previously affordable generics
has led to political pressure to mitigate the rise of medical costs. One response has
been to whether to restrict government drug formularies based on drug pricing
and value-based efficacy. (Formularies refer to drugs approved for reimbursement
by insurers, government payers and pharmacy benefits managers.) Drug firms
unable to secure formulary approval risk losing physician coverage and hence,
sales to similar drugs eligible for reimbursement.
Strategic Positioning
Proprietary Technology Platform
Macrogenics’ proprietary technology platforms employ methods in protein
engineering to treat diseases by multiple theoretical mechanisms which seek to
fortify the body’s immune system and response to foreign threats. The firm keeps
an extensive library of 2,000+ purified antibodies aimed at a large number
of cell targets, allowing for the ability to simultaneously address multiple
theorized mechanisms against cancerous and other pathogenic cells. This library
is used in the drug discovery process by offering potential candidates for further
analysis.
Dual Affinity Re-Targeting (DART)
The DART platform seeks to take advantage of the immune system’s natural
mechanisms towards targeting and destroying pathogens. The platform enables
antibody molecules to simultaneously bind to two targets at the cellular level with
the goal of creating “a more significant biological effect than binding [to] either
one of [them] separately.” This contrasts with most current antibody-based
treatments, which bind to a single target (“monoclonal”). Previous attempts by
researchers to create dual affinity antibodies were thwarted by manufacturing
inefficiencies.
Fc Optimization
Macrogenics’ Fc Optimization platform modifies the constant (“FC”) region of
the immune system’s existing antibodies. This modification enhances how
immune cells recognize therapeutic antibodies to better cooperate in destroying
cancerous cells.
Cancer Stem-Like Cells (CSLC)
The CSLC platform is employed in discovering potential cancer cell attributes
that can be targeted using one of the above technologies. It aims to ascertain novel
cell targets not amenable to current antibody-based cancer treatments. This is
accomplished through the theorized notion that cancer stem cells serve as the basis
for tumor regrowth.
Business Growth Strategies
Overview
Macrogenics’ long-term objective is to be involved in all aspects of the drug-
making process, from discovery and development to manufacturing,
commercialization, marketing and sales. Prior to gaining drug approval, this will
Figure 10: US Prescription Expenditure
Components, 2000-2014
Source: CMMS.gov
Figure 11: US Population Over-65, 2000A-2020E
Source: IBISWorld
Figure 12: Macrogenics Pipeline by Platform
Source: Macrogenics Investor Relations
Figure 13: Platform Patent Expirations
Source: Macrogenics Investor Relations
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Drug Name Platform
Enoblituzumab Fc Optimization
Margetuximab Fc Optimization
MGD006 DART
MGD007 DART
MGD009 DART
MGD010 DART
MGD011 DART
MGD012 Fc Optimization
MGD013 DART
MGD014 DART
Platform Patent Expiration
CSLC 2028
DART 2026 - 2031
Fc Optimization 2024
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University of Oregon Investment Group January 29th
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require significant financing through the issuance of equity and the negotiation of
additional partnerships, as the firm’s manufacturing capacity is at present
insufficient to handle the demands that commercial manufacturing at scale
requires. Moreover, the firm is preliminary steps of building a sales team in
anticipation of future drug approvals.
Lead Developmental Pipeline Candidates
Margetuximab – Phase III
Margetixmab is a phase III candidate being evaluated for the treatment of
advanced (metastatic) gastric and breast tumors with genetic overexpression of
human epidermal growth factor 2 (HER2+), a known protein involved in cancer
growth. (Metastatic cancer is defined as the stage where cancerous cells have
progressed to distant regions of the body from their original tumor site. Once this
progression occurs, survival rates drop markedly and patients are considered
terminally ill.) The drug aims to compete with Roche’s currently marketed
Herceptin, both of which are projected to encounter significant biosimilar
competition in the years ahead for HER2+ breast cancer. Margetuximab is being
studied in conjunction with drug-resistant patients who have failed previous round
of treatment (including to Herceptin).
Enoblituzumab – Phase I
Also known as MGA-271, this first-in-class treatment targets the BH-73 receptor,
which is expressed across many different types of solid tumors (but not in normal
tissue). The drug’s exact biological mechanism is currently unknown, and the
research on BH-73 is at times contradictory (i.e., in some cancers, its expression
at the tumor site is associated with better patient outcome rather than worse) and
recent – most published articles covering it began appearing in the last decade.
No other firm is currently targeting solid tumor inhibition from this cell receptor.
Enoblituzumab is currently being evaluated in phase I safety and dose escalation
studies for patients with a broad array of solid tumors, including bladder, lung,
skin and triple-negative breast cancers. The drug is being targeted at a much wider
sample of cancer types than current practices; given its early stage in clinical
development, little evidence exists in demonstrating tumor growth inhibition.
MGD006 – Phase I
This drug is currently being evaluated for phase I safety and dose escalation
testing for patients with acute myeloid leukemia (AML), a blood cancer. MGD006
is indicated for treatment in refractory patients – those who have developed drug
resistance to previous therapies. In preclinical testing, it was found to activate
portions of the immune system for targeted killing of immune cells. MGD006 is
licensed to Servier for rights outside North America, Japan, South Korea and
India. At present, no equivalent treatment exists on the market.
MGD007 – Phase I
MGD007 is being evaluated for advanced colorectal cancer, which represents
approximately 35% of new diagnoses. In vitro evidence demonstrated its ability
to mediate immune system-led killing of cancerous cells. MGD007 is being
evaluated for more convenient dosing regimens than current colorectal cancer
biologics, e.g., Genentech’s top-selling drug Avastin.
MGD009 – Phase I
Like enoblituzumab, MGD009 is thought to possess anti-tumor activity across a
wide range of cancer types, a claim derived from pre-clinical experiments in
animal and test tube studies. As the drug began phase I safety and dose escalation
studies in October 2015, little is known about its purported efficacy in humans.
Figure 14: Margetuximab Revenue Forecast
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
Figure 15: Enoblituzumab Revenue Forecast
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
Figure 16: MGD006 Revenue Forecast
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
Figure 17: MGD007 Revenue Forecast
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
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Management and Corporate Governance
Dr. Scott Koenig, PhD – Co-Founder, President and CEO
Dr. Koenig has served as Macrogenics’ President and CEO for the past 15 years.
Following the completion of a Ph.D. at Cornell and an M.D. at University of
Texas, Dr. Koenig has spent his entire career in the biotechnology industry,
including a lab research role at the National Institute of Health (NIH) from 1984
to 1990 and a stint as MedImmune’s Senior Vice President of Research from 1990
to 2001, where he oversaw the launch three biologics. Dr. Koenig is also
Chairman of the early stage biotech firm Applied Genetic Technologies
Corporation, a position he has filled since 2004.
In 2014, Dr. Koenig was given a total compensation of $3.34M, representing 7%
of 2014 annual revenue. His salary is evaluated according to the passage of drug
candidates through various clinical phases, new partnership arrangements, and
cash balance maintained above a defined minimum.
Corporate Governance
On their 10-K, Macrogenics details corporate bylaw provisions intended to deter
potential activist investors, including a required 75% shareholder approval needed
to amend corporate bylaws, the nomination of company executives by current
Board members, and authorization, without shareholder approval, of a blank
check of preferred stock that would function as a “poison pill" to dilute the stock
ownership of any would-be acquirer.
Management Guidance and Analysis
Given the lack of marketed products and the difficulty in predicting clinical
approval rates, management guidance from developmental biotech firms is
generally minimal at best. Macrogenics is no exception, with guidance offered
only on expected cash burn rates and updates from various clinical trials.
As of Q3 2015, Macrogenics stated having sufficient funds to conduct operations
through 2018. (Two years of cash is considered the industry minimum to remain
operational in light of any single pipeline drug failing to gain approval.) On their
most recent 10-K, the firm also stated that net losses are expected to increase
through the “foreseeable future,” driven by increased capital needed to build their
manufacturing capacity to commercial proportions, a planned buildout of their
salesforce before their first anticipated drug launch in 2019-2020, and the greater
R&D expenses generated in phase III testing versus earlier clinical stage testing.
Differential Disclosure
Differential disclosure is the practice of companies making claims on financial
reports that appear contradictory and/or misleading when viewed across time.
Macrogenics’ management has, at times, demonstrated an aptitude for making
over-exuberant statements on the estimated market potential of their drug
candidates in SEC filings.
In their prospectus from October 2013, Macrogenics stated the market potential
for their lead breast cancer drug margetuximab as “treating approximately 25%
of all breast cancer patients whose tumors overexpress HER2… This population
of 25% of breast cancer patients represents 60.5% of the 42% of all patients who
are HER2+.” Obfuscating language aside, this “42% of all patients” represents a
considerable bump above other sources on the matter. The NIH National Cancer
Institute, for example, put the figure at 25-30%, while WebMD, the Mayo Clinic
and the Susan B. Komen For the Cure Foundation estimated that just 20% of all
Figure 18: Macrogenics’ Forecasted Cash (Right
Axis) and Shares Outstanding (Left Axis)
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
Figure 19: Macrogenics’ Estimated Market
Potential for Margetuximab
Source: Macrogenics Form S-1 Prospectus (2013)
Figure 20: Margetuximab Potential Revenue at
30% vs. 42% HER2+ Market Potential
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
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University of Oregon Investment Group January 29th
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breast cancer patients overexpress HER2+. Not to be explained away by
measurement error, scientists in the academic journal Breast Cancer Research
concluded that current testing is “highly sensitive, accurately quantifies HER2
protein expression and correlates well with routine HER2 testing” before putting
their estimate of HER2+ expression at 15-20% of total breast cancer patients.
Holding forecasted market penetration rates fixed, the difference in patient
estimates from Macrogenics and the upper end of NIH’s range would represent a
difference of $4.5B in cumulative sales for their phase III drug, margetuximab
(Figure 20). Macrogenics’ statements and associated charts (Figure 19) were
redacted from subsequent filings describing margetuximab’s potential.
Portfolio Strategy
Original Investment Strategy
Macrogenics was originally pitched to Tall Firs and (now-defunct) Svigals’
portfolios under the promise of “significant diversification benefits coupled with
huge upside potential.” Since initiating a Tall Firs position for 195 shares of the
firm in January 2014, Macrogenics’ stock is now down 69% (from a cost basis of
$37.41). By comparison, shares of IBB, an industry ETF, are up 18% over the
same period.
As of January 22nd
, 2015, Tall Firs is overweight healthcare and within 190 basis
points of its small cap allocation benchmark (Figure 21-22).
Portfolio Eligibility
Tall Firs, which manages a portion of the University’s endowment, seeks to invest
in “fundamentally undervalued companies.” In Security Analysis, the original text
on value investing, Benjamin Graham defined investments as operations “in
which, upon thorough analysis, promise safety of principal and a satisfactory
return,” a measure Macrogenics has failed on both counts.
Furthermore, Macrogenics fails to meet eligibility requirements for the Group’s
other portfolios. The Alumni Fund, which seeks to buy companies with low
valuation multiples and high returns on capital, describes the exact opposite
situation Macrogenics is presently in. The DADCO fund, for its part, seeks to
hold only the Group’s “highest conviction” picks, an unlikely label for a firm
whose underlying business presents considerable difficulty even by leading
industry specialists in predicting whether early-stage clinical drug trial results will
ultimately translate to FDA approval.
Recent News
“Servier Severs $450M Oncology Deal with Macrogenics”
Fierce Biotech, October 28, 2015
Following an early glimpse at the clinical data, French pharmaceutical firm
Servier opted not to exercise an option for the international rights to
enoblituzumab, Macrogenics’ phase I candidate with purported anti-tumor
activity across a range of different cancers. The option, if exercised, would have
entitled Macrogenics to clinical, regulatory and sales milestone payments of
$430M in additional to the $20M received upfront when the agreement was signed
in 2011. For their part, Servier was slated to gain commercial rights in all markets
except North America, Japan, South Korea and India, pending successful approval
by the FDA and its foreign equivalents. Servier continues to stand by Macrogenics
for commercial rights to MGD006 and 007 in the same international regions.
When pressed for details on the event, Macrogenics’ CEO Scott Koenig claimed
ignorance to Servier’s exact reasoning, but mentioned the French firm’s recent
Figure 21: Tall Firs’ Current Sector Allocations
Source: UOIG
Figure 22: Tall Firs’ Current Market Cap
Allocations
Source: UOIG
Figure 23: Current DADCO Holdings
Source: UOIG
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SolarCity VASCO Data Security
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University of Oregon Investment Group January 29th
, 2016
management overhaul as possible factor. In a later statement, Servier
announced plans to lay 10% of its French workforce while re-orienting core
focuses, “partly by increasing its emphasis on oncology.” Wasting little time in
putting fresh capital from the severed enoblitzumab deal to use, Servier
announced the following collaborations in the weeks after:
▪ The early exercising of an option with Pfizer for the co-development
and worldwide (ex. US) rights to a novel phase I CAR-T
immunotherapy treatment (a class in which Macrogenics’ phase I
candidate MGD011 is positioned to compete against)
▪ A $130M deal to co-develop and market TAS-102 - Taiho
Pharmaceutical’s colorectal cancer drug - in Europe
▪ A new partnership with Spectrum Pharmaceuticals to develop four
hemato-oncology drugs in exchange for exclusive rights to the
Canadian market
▪ The expansion of an existing collaboration with Novartis to include
additional anticancer drug candidates in a co-development and
commercialization agreement
In passing, Macrogenics CEO Scott Koenig mentioned openness to new
partnerships for enoblituzumab.
“Macrogenics Teams Up with Merck for Cancer Drug”
Washington Business Journal, October 26, 2015
Macrogenics announced plans to evaluate a combination treatment for
margetuximab and pembrolizumab (Merck’s recently approved drug currently
approved for advanced skin and lung cancer patients) against HER2+ gastric
cancer in a combined phase I/II trial. The two-part open label trial will evaluate
the safety of the combination in phase Ib testing while analyzing anti-tumor
activity in phase II testing. While financial terms were not disclosed, an option
for collaboration through phase III testing was made. Macrogenics expects
patient enrollment for the current trial to continue through 2016.
Catalysts
Upside
▪ Novel, presently unanticipated disease indications for Macrogenics’
existing portfolio of pipeline candidates could broaden their estimated
market potential, leading investors to bid up shares
▪ Better-than-expected clinical efficacy results could result in preferences
among clinical oncology specialists shifting in Macrogenics’ favor as
anticipation builds prior to future drug launches
▪ Robust evidence in support of the safety and efficacy of one or more of
Macrogenics’ current pipeline candidates could lead to more attractive
future partnership opportunities
▪ Additional equity investments and/or partnership arrangements could
allow Macrogenics to make further investments in their clinical pipeline,
increasing the likelihood of a successful approval
Downside
▪ Failure of one or more clinical trials could result in a sudden decline in
Macrogenics’ share price and intrinsic valuation
▪ Termination of existing partnerships might reduce future opportunities
as Macrogenics’ perceived desirability as a collaborator wanes
▪ Unforeseen safety issues in Macrogenics’ clinical pipeline could lead to
loss of credibility among prescribing physicians
▪ Amidst concerns over price inflation in the specialty drugs space, the
failure to obtain formulary inclusion and/or unfavorable reimbursement
Figure 24: Returns: Biotech ETF vs. Macrogenics
Source: Yahoo! Finance
Figure 25: Merck Annual Revenue
Source: Yahoo! Finance
Figure 26: Returns: Biotech ETF vs. Merck
Source: Yahoo! Finance
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
120%
130%
140%
150%
1/2015 4/2015 7/2015 10/2015 1/2016
MGNX IBB
$39B
$40B
$41B
$42B
$43B
$44B
$45B
$46B
$47B
$48B
2012A 2013A 2014A
70%
80%
90%
100%
110%
120%
130%
1/2015 4/2015 7/2015 10/2015 1/2016
MRK IBB
10. UOIG 10
University of Oregon Investment Group January 29th
, 2016
rates from public and private payers could lead to physicians and patients
opting for competing drugs over Macrogenics’ current candidates,
especially as lower-priced biosimilars hit the market
▪ Legal disputes concerning the firm’s portfolio of intellectual property, of
which Macrogenics has noted might be an issue for certain components
of their Fc Optimization platform, could lead to lengthy patent litigation
▪ Declines in overall industry valuations and/or investor risk preferences
could lead to shareholder dilution if Macrogenics’ stock declines
materially before the planned issuance of additional equity
▪ With an average daily volume of <300K shares traded, any of the above
downside catalysts could have an amplified effect on Macrogenics’ stock
as lower liquidity levels inhibit the price discovery process
Comparable Analysis
Overview
Because developmental biotech firms are valued on their estimated potential to
generate outsized cash flows far into the future, relative valuation techniques are
not generally awarded much importance when making investment decisions.
Furthermore, as a majority of firms in the selection universe will not reach
sustainable levels of profitability until after their first drug launch, both last twelve
month (LTM) and one-year forward income statement estimates tend to be
negative from the operating line down, rendering them useless for valuation
purposes. To mitigate against these shortcomings, analyst estimates for sales,
operating and net income were taken for the period of 2020, when a majority of
selected comparable companies are expected to have at least one marketed drug.
Screening Criteria
The following criteria were taken into consideration when selecting comparable
US-based biotechnology companies:
▪ Market capitalization below $1.5B to control for company maturation
▪ Gross margins of 100%, to account for a lack of marketed drugs
▪ Return on equity, return on assets and return on invested capital below
0% to account for firms’ current cash burn rates and lack of profitability
▪ A primary focus on cancer and oncology drug development
▪ The use of a hybrid platform/developmental pipeline business model
▪ At least one significant partnership agreement (to fulfill going concern
requirements in the years preceding drug launches)
The last criteria was given particular consideration, as 2 of the 5 companies used
as comparables in Macrogenics’ original report are now trading for less than $1.
Multiple and Company Weightings
Because sales represent both the most important driver behind industry growth as
well as the “cleanest” estimate, EV/Revenue was given a 50% weighting for
valuation multiples, with the remainder divided evenly on EV/EBIT and P/E.
Weightings for individual companies were assigned according to a weighting
model based on the number of drugs in each clinical phase, along with employee
headcount and enterprise value to control for business size, maturity and cash
relative to market cap. Beta coefficients were also used as a proxy for the changing
investor sentiment in each firm relative to the market. Implied prices were
discounted to present value based on Macrogenics’ WACC.
Celldex – 24.6%
With a clinical portfolio biased towards phase I candidates and the closest beta to
Macrogenics’, Celldex was weighted 24.65%. The firm’s two lead drug
candidates, CDX-011 and CDX-110, are being evaluated in the treatment of breast
cancer and glioblastoma (a form of brain cancer), respectively. The firm holds a
Figure 27: Macrogenics Pipeline by Phase
(Includes Drugs in Multiple Phases)
Source: Macrogenics Investor Relations
Figure 28: Proceeds from Stock Issuance (Right
Axis) vs. Shares Outstanding (Left Axis)
Source: Macrogenics 10-K
Figure 29: Comparable Company Pipelines
Source: SEC Filings
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Phase III
Phase II
Phase I
Preclinical
$0M
$50M
$100M
$150M
$200M
$250M
0M
5M
10M
15M
20M
25M
30M
35M
40M
Q1-2014 Q2-2014 Q3-2014 Q4-2014 Q1-2015 Q2-2015 Q3-2015
Cumulative Proceeds from Issuance Shares Outstanding
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
Macrogenics Celldex ImmunoGen Merrimack OncoMed Xencor
Phase I Phase II Phase III
11. UOIG 11
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, 2016
number of partnerships, including licensing agreements with Amgen and Seattle
Genetics.
ImmunoGen – 27.2%
ImmunoGen’s enterprise value, headcount and clinical pipeline were the closest
among comparables to Macrogenics’ among comparable companies, suggesting
the most similar stage of business development. Kadcyla, a currently marketed
antibody-based HER2+ breast cancer treatment similar to Macrogenics’
margetuximab, was developed using their technology platform and out-licensed
to Roche. ImmunoGen’s entire pipeline is devoted to oncology candidates, and
they hold partnerships with Novartis, Bayer, Eli Lilly and Amgen. For these
reasons, the firm was given a 27.21% weighting.
Merrimack – 15.6 %
With a pipeline tilted towards phase II candidates and an unusual amount of debt
on their balance sheet given their stage of development, Merrimack was given the
lowest weighting. The firm holds partnerships with Baxter and Sanofi, and has a
portfolio devoted purely to oncology drugs, including a mid-stage candidate for
advanced HER2+ breast cancer.
OncoMed – 15.7 %
Like Macrogenics, OncoMed has targeted the use of cancer stem cells to discover
and develop novel treatments. The firm has strategic alliances with Bayer,
Celgene and GlaskoSmithKline. While their pipeline is slanted towards phase I,
ImmunoGen’s lower beta and lack of phase III candidates yielded a 15.65%
weighting.
Xencor – 16.9%
Xencor develops antibody-based treatments to target cancer and autoimmune
diseases. Their lead candidate, XmAb5574, is in phase II trials for the treatment
of B-cell cancers. Xencor has licensing agreements with Novo Nordisk and
Amgen. However, their lower beta and lack of phase III candidates resulted in a
16.93% weighting.
Intrinsic Valuation
Probability-Adjusted Discounted Cash Flow Overview
Given the inherent uncertainties involved in forecasting cash flows for early-stage
biotechnology firms, a probability-adjusted DCF was implemented. The model
seeks to overcome the binary nature of clinical trial progression and FDA
approval by accounting for the likelihood a developmental drug will reach the
commercial stage given its current phase in clinical testing. As this uncertainty
affects both firms’ decisions on which drugs to progress through trials as well as
anticipated future sales, R&D expenses are probability-adjusted in addition to
sales. Phase success probabilities were taken from a 2014 Nature Biotechnology
article featuring the most comprehensive industry study to date.
Revenue Model
Market Potential
Forecasting future revenues for drugs in current development requires the use of
a bottom-up market potential estimation. First, current year incidence rates (i.e.,
new diagnoses) for a drug’s disease target are used to assess the maximum market
size. Data for these rates was accessed from the National Cancer Institute, a
government-backed component of the National Institute of Health. Following
this, forecasts must be made for each disease in question. Estimates for disease
Figure 30: Quantitative Metric Weightings
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
Figure 31: Relative Valuation
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
Figure 32: Comparables – Headcount (Left Axis)
vs. Enterprise Value (Right Axis)
Source: Yahoo! Finance
Figure 33: Returns: Macrogenics vs. Biotech ETF
vs. Healthcare ETF vs. Russell 2000
Source: Yahoo! Finance
Criteria Importance Weighting
Beta 20.00%
Phase I 20.00%
Phase II 20.00%
Phase III 25.00%
Headcount 5.00%
Enterprise Value 10.00%
Multiple Implied Price Weighting
EV/Revenue $14.50 50.00%
EV/EBIT $14.72 25.00%
P/E $13.03 25.00%
$0M
$200M
$400M
$600M
$800M
$1000M
$1200M
$1400M
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
MGNX CLDX IMGN MACK OMED XNCR
Headcount Enterprise Value
$25
$75
$125
$175
Jan-14 Apr-14 Jul-14 Oct-14 Jan-15 Apr-15 Jul-15 Oct-15 Jan-16
Macrogenics Biotech ETF Healthcare ETF Russell 2K
12. UOIG 12
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, 2016
rates in 2020, 2025 and 2030 were accessed from the World Health with linear
interpolation between the stated dates.
After forecasting incidence, market potential is narrowed down according to each
drug’s stated patient type. Macrogenics’ oncology candidates are being evaluated
for advanced (metastatic) cancer progression in patients who have already or are
concurrently undergoing surgery, chemotherapy and radiation therapy, including
those who have failed previous biologic-based treatments. Current rates for said
patients were found in various academic sources and held fixed as a percentage
of total patients across the forecast.
Drug Pricing
For drug pricing, sticker prices are non-representative of the actual dollars going
to a manufacturer. Consequently, the wholesale acquisition cost (WAC) – the
price paid by pharmacies to drug makers– has to be gathered or estimated.
Because WACs are generally confidential, estimation is common. Fortunately,
gross sales figures are reported by firms such as IMS Health while net sales are
reported by manufacturers, leading to viable estimates.
The WACs of comparable currently-marketed antibody-based oncology drugs
were compiled from academic sources (when available), or estimated from sticker
prices otherwise. The general estimate for gross-to-net pricing is 83%. In cases
where one of Macrogenics’ pipeline candidates had a direct comparable, the
corresponding WAC was used; otherwise, an average was taken across the data.
Given patent protection and inelastic demand, manufacturers do not generally set
prices according to market equilibrium, but instead estimate the maximum price
a payer will bear while still offering formulary status and reimbursement. Drug
prices – especially for specialty pharmaceuticals - have experienced considerable
inflation in the past decade; Express Scripts’ Specialty Prescription Drug Index
has nearly doubled (!) from 2007 to 2014.
The author feels that this trend has its upper limits on Medicare and Medicaid
budgets, public perceptions of the biopharmaceutical industry and budgetary
pressure from politicians. Consequently, price inflation from current levels was
forecasted to only double over the next 15 year period. Inflation was forecasted
according to this rate for the WACs of all drugs in the revenue model.
Market Penetration
Developmental pipeline drugs must be evaluated not only against presently-
marketed comparables (if they exist), but also the future potential of the current
pipelines of other firms in the industry. Because a drug’s proof of concept in
humans does not have to be established until the end of phase II testing, assigning
any reasonable conviction to such estimates for sales decades away would be an
exercise in deceit. Consequently, rules of thumb were used.
Launch year penetration rates are not generally high for cancer drugs given
patients’ aversion to immediately switching from current treatments unless a truly
innovative product is entering the market. Consequently, launch penetration rates
were kept at 5% for all drug forecasts.
Following launch, drug sales tend to follow a predictable life cycle – with
increasing market penetration until “peak sales”, whereby new competition erodes
excess returns and sales growth declines before dramatically falling off after
patent expiration gives generic competition. While increased difficulties in the
biologic manufacturing process have generally insulated biotech firms from
patent erosion, the emergence of more biosimilars into the US market in upcoming
years is expected to lower this lead against traditional pharmaceuticals, including
Figure 34: Oncology Drug Clinical Probabilities
for Phase Transition and Launch Success
Source: Nature Biotechnology
Figure 35: Bottom-Up Sales Forecasting Process
Source: Analyst’s Illustration
Figure 36: Comparable Antibody-Based Drug
Wholesale Acquisition Costs
Source: Journal of Clinical Oncology
Figure 37: Drug Sales Forecast
Source: Analyst’s Forecast
Phase Transition Launch
I 68.90% 13.20%
II 42.30% 19.16%
III 54.70% 45.29%
BLA 82.80% 82.80%
Newly
Diagnosed
Patients
Eligible
Subgroups
Market
Penetration
Brand Name Generic Name WAC
Avastin bevacizumab $27,805
Erbitux cetuximab $59,526
Herceptin trastuzumab $48,792
Mylotarg gemtuzumab $17,496
Rituxan rituximab $15,670
$0M
$500M
$1000M
$1500M
$2000M
$2500M
2020E 2022E 2024E 2026E 2028E 2030E
Margetuximab Enoblituzumab MGD006 MGD007 MGD009
13. UOIG 13
University of Oregon Investment Group January 29th
, 2016
those expected to compete against margetuximab. In cases where a drug did not
have current existing competition (e.g., MGD006 for acute myeloid leukemia),
peak penetration rates were forecasted to be higher than instances where both
currently marketed drugs and upcoming biosimilars are projected to launch.
For declines in penetration rates through the terminal year, 60-80% of peak sales
penetration was used as a general range. It is important to note that this relates
more to the limitations of the DCF in biotech valuation rather than underlying
fundamentals. Modeling in a decline through terminal year has the effect of
making terminal free cash flow growth negative, violating the “going concern”
assumption of the model. Consequently, intermediate growth rates were used to
project FCF growth back within range of the Group-mandated 3%.
Revenue from Collaborative Research
Macrogenics currently generates sales by out-licensing their technology
platforms, performing pre-clinical R&D for larger firms, and licensing sales rights
for pipeline candidates to outside firms. These services incur upfront payments
followed by maintenance and milestone payments pending fulfillment of agreed-
upon clinical, regulatory, and commercial milestones. Financial terms for these
arrangements were accessed from Macrogenics’ most recent 10-Q and
probability-adjusted according to clinical phase.
Macrogenics holds options with certain firms to exercise for the arrangement of
profit-sharing and co-marketing agreements following successful completion of a
milestone (typically, entrance into phase III testing). Given the lack of available
contractual terms and the marked lack of specific disease indications to forecast
market potential, these options were not projected in the model.
Preclinical Drugs
Drugs currently in preclinical testing are not generally projected by biotech
analysts. Not only are their disease indications and proof of concepts uncertain,
but miniscule probability-to-market metrics and heavy discount rates from
expected cash flows far in the future render such revenue streams nearly
immaterial from a valuation perspective. However, because the advancement of
preclinical-to-clinical products represents a cost of doing business for
Macrogenics, preclinical R&D expenses were projected and probability-adjusted
appropriately. (This includes expenses for MGD012, MGD013 and MGD014.)
Cost of Goods Sold (COGS)
Given a lack of commercial products, developmental biotech firms do not have
COGS expenses until their initial drug launches. As such, COGS was projected
to be in line with a 10 year historic industry average based on FactSet data.
General and Administrative (G&A)
Macrogenics’ current G&A expense consists of salaries and benefits for support-
related employees. However, the firm is in the preparatory stages of building a
salesforce in anticipation of future drug launches. Consequently, in recent
quarters, G&A expenses have been above trailing annual averages seen in 2011-
2013. Caution was taken against overestimating expenses going forward, as
oncology drugs require fewer sales representatives than industry averages given
their work focuses on specialist rather than general practitioners.
Research and Development (R&D)
R&D expenses are generated from the discovery, manufacturing, and
advancement of pipeline candidates through the preclinical and clinical testing
process. Forecasts were based on the number of drugs Macrogenics has in each
major clinical testing phase, estimated transition dates following completion of
Figure 38: Revenue from Collaborative Research
Source: Macrogenics 10-K
Figure 39: Preclinical Drug Phase Transition Date
Estimates
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
Figure 40: Clinical Pipeline Launch Date
Estimates
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
$0M
$20M
$40M
$60M
$80M
2011A 2012A 2013A 2014A
Boehringer Eli Lilly Government Agencies
Gilead Green Cross Janssen
Pfizer Servier Takeda
Drug Phase Start Date End Date
MGD012 Preclinical 10/1/2015 9/30/2018
MGD012 I 10/1/2018 7/31/2020
II 8/1/2020 1/30/2023
MGD012 III 1/31/2023 1/30/2027
MGD013 Preclinical 10/1/2015 9/30/2018
MGD013 I 10/1/2018 7/31/2020
II 8/1/2020 1/30/2023
MGD013 III 1/31/2023 1/30/2027
MGD014 Preclinical 10/1/2015 9/30/2018
MGD014 I 10/1/2018 7/31/2020
II 8/1/2020 1/30/2023
MGD014 III 1/31/2023 1/30/2027
Drug and Phase Indication Expected Launch
Enoblituzumab - I Solid Tumors (+ipi) 7/2024
Enoblituzumab - I Solid Tumors (mono) 10/2022
Enoblituzumab - I Solid Tumors (+pembro) 5/2025
Margetuximab - III Breast (3+) 6/2020
Margetuximab - II Breast (1-2+) 4/2023
Margetuximab - I/II Gastric 11/2022
MGD006 - I AML 10/2024
MGD007 - I Colorectal 1/2025
MGD009 - I Solid Tumors 1/2025
MGD010 - I Autoimmune Disorders 5/2024
MGD011 - I B-Cell Malignancies 10/2024
14. UOIG 14
University of Oregon Investment Group January 29th
, 2016
current clinical phases, and average cost per phase. Because little transparency
exists on cost components of Macrogenics’ R&D expense, data for average drug
trial costs and durations was taken from Karl Keegan’s Biotechnology Valuation
to aid in forecasting the above. Expenses were probability-adjusted based on
phase success rates. For current trials, additional adjustments were made for each
drugs’ projected total phase expense versus costs already incurred.
To account for future drug development outside their existing pipeline, additional
expenses were projected on the “Other Preclinical Drugs” line. This, in part, falls
in line with management’s desire to mature to a large-scale, fully integrated firm
with a deep pipeline. As such expenses are fundamental to long-term business
sustainability, and because pre-clinicals do not require rigorous approval prior to
testing, these costs were not probability-adjusted. Finally, headcount-related
expenses were projected according to current salaries for biotech research analysts
found on Payscale and Glassdoor, and then adjusted according to an expected
long-term salary inflation rate.
Capital Expenditures and Depreciation
Macrogenics’ management has stated plans to increase manufacturing capacity to
produce drugs at the increased throughput required in phase III and commercial
environments. Moreover, while their current manufacturing is adequate to handle
margetuximab’s transition into phase III, management has stated that this will not
be sufficient for additional late-stage candidates. Consequently, capital
expenditures were projected to experience significant growth in anticipation of
the firm’s first drug launch by 2020.
Because Macrogenics’ plants are under operating lease agreements, projections
for increased manufacturing needs were accounted for on the “Leaseholds
Improvement” line. Gross leasehold improvements were then projected to decline
to 0% growth by the terminal year.
Depreciation was forecasted based on useful life assumptions from Macrogenics’
most recent10-K.
Working Capital
Working capital items were projected using their associated drivers listen on
Macrogenics’ 10-K and slated to evolve from current levels to those seen in more
mature biopharmaceutical firms. To define mature levels, a composite was
computed from the largest firms in the industry – Gilead, Amgen, Celgene, and
Biogen. Following their expected first drug launch, inventory was added to
current assets. For AR, days sales outstanding was projected to peak in the interim
period between first and additional drug launches (2020-2022) as the firm remains
relatively new among drug wholesalers before declining following the expectation
of increased bargaining power on payment terms.
Deferred revenue arises from partnership agreements and represent upfront
payments for licenses that are deemed not to have stand-alone value until further
R&D has been conducted. Because current deferred revenue flows to the income
statement in later periods, this was modeled in, with the new current balance
becoming the change in long-term deferred revenue from the previous period.
Adjustments to deferred revenue had a negligible impact on valuation.
Tax Rate
As of 2014, Macrogenics had $288.6M in federal and state net operating loss
(NOL) carryforwards, and R&D tax credits. Expirations for these carryforwards
are slated to take place from 2020 through 2035. Under the model, Macrogenics
Figure 41: Research and Development Expense
Forecast
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
Figure 42: Capital Expenditures and Depreciation
Forecast
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
Figure 43: Gross PP&E Forecast
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
(300%)
(200%)
(100%)
0%
100%
200%
300%
400%
500%
600%
$0M
$20M
$40M
$60M
$80M
$100M
$120M
$140M
$160M
$180M
2015E 2017E 2019E 2021E 2023E 2025E 2027E 2029E
Research and Development % Revenue
$0M
$5M
$10M
$15M
$20M
$25M
$30M
$35M
2015E 2017E 2019E 2021E 2023E 2025E 2027E 2029E
Depreciation Capital Expenditures
$0M
$50M
$100M
$150M
$200M
2015E 2017E 2019E 2021E 2023E 2025E 2027E 2029E
Computer Equipment Furniture and Office Equipment
Laboratory Equipment Leasehold Improvements
Software
15. UOIG 15
University of Oregon Investment Group January 29th
, 2016
will have exhausted current NOLs by 2025. After that, the tax rate was forecasted
to increase to the US corporate marginal rate of 35% in line with Group standards.
Beta
Because shares of Macrogenics have been trading for less than 3 years, beta was
calculated starting from the firm’s IPO date in October 2013. A terminal beta
consisting of industry and comparable companies’ Hamada and Vasicek betas was
also used to account for lowered capital costs following a forecasted maturation.
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)
A small cap premium of 100 basis points was added to Macrogenics’ WACC to
account for operational risks. Even taking this into account, the final WACC of
14% in context to what is used among early stage biotech analysts when
evaluating potential capital returns. According to Avance, a biotechnology
valuation firm, WACCs between 15-20% are the industry norm for clinical stage
firms. With that said, return on invested capital into perpetuity stood just below
Macrogenics’ cost of capital in the model, suggesting a reasonable figure.
Shareholder’s Equity Model
To mitigate against negative cash balances in the years preceding drug approval
and estimate dates of future stock issuance, an equity schedule was implemented.
Current year prices for equity issuance were computed by taking Macrogenics’
volume-weighted average price (VWAP) since IPO. From there, the firm’s
implied price-to-earnings multiple was projected to converge to current industry
levels by the terminal year (an admittedly generous supposition). Assuming no
additional non-dilutive financing, Macrogenics is estimated to issue at least 5M
equity shares through 2019 to fund their pipeline and scale existing operations.
Recommendation
Macrogenics has no place in the portfolio of a long-term value-oriented
investment fund. The firm has failed on each of its four original investment thesis
points, and is overvalued on both relative and intrinsic measures. For these
reasons, the author recommends a SELL in the Tall Firs portfolio.
Final Valuation Price Weighting
Discounted Cash Flow $17.45 90.00%
Forward Comparables $14.28 10.00%
Implied Price $17.13
Current Price $20.54
Overvalued (16.59%)
Figure 44: Beta Estimates
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
Figure 45: Proceeds from Equity Issuance (Right
Axis) vs. Total Shares Offered (Left Axis)
Source: Macrogenics 10-K
Figure 46: DCF Assumptions
Source: Analyst’s Calculations
Period Beta SE Weighting
1 Year Daily 1.54 0.21 0.00%
Since IPO Daily 1.69 0.18 100.00%
Since IPO Weekly 1.78 0.39 0.00%
Macrogenics Beta 1.69
$0M
$30M
$60M
$90M
$120M
$150M
$180M
0M
1M
2M
3M
4M
5M
6M
7M
10/2013 2/2014 7/2015
Total Shares Offered Proceeds from Issuance
TaxRate 35.00% Terminal Growth Rate 3.00%
Risk Free Rate 2.13% Terminal Value 153,067
Beta 1.69 PVof Terminal Value 20,651
Market Risk Premium 6.45% Sumof PVFCF 599,537
% Equity 100.00% FirmValue 620,188
% Debt - Total Debt -
CAPM/WACC 14.04% Minority Interests -
Terminal Risk Free Rate 2.95% Market Capitalization 620,188
Terminal Beta 1.36 Fully Diluted Shares 35,539
Terminal % Equity 100.00% Implied Price $17.45
Terminal % Debt - Current Price $20.54
Terminal CAPM/WACC 12.74% Overvalued (15.04%)
DiscountedFree Cash FlowAssumptions
26. UOIG 26
January 29th
, 2016University of Oregon Investment Group
Appendix 9 –Partnership Revenue Model (Continued)
EstimatedTime andMilestone Payment By Trial
Drug Name Indication Phase Phase Start Date Phase End Date Milestone Payment Partner
MGD006 AML I 7/1/2015 4/30/2017 49,400 Servier
II 5/1/2017 10/30/2019 49,400 Partner
III 10/31/2019 10/30/2023 49,400 Servier
BLA 10/31/2023 10/30/2024 210,000 Servier
MGD007 Colorectal I 10/1/2015 7/31/2017 49,400 Servier
II 8/1/2017 1/30/2020 49,400 Servier
III 1/31/2020 1/30/2024 49,400 Servier
BLA 1/31/2024 1/30/2025 210,000 Servier
MGD010 Autoimmune Disorders I 1/1/2015 10/31/2016 31,000 Takeda
II 11/1/2016 5/2/2019 31,000 Takeda
III 5/3/2019 5/2/2023 31,000 Takeda
BLA 5/3/2023 5/2/2024 375,500 Takeda
MGD011 B-Cell Malignancies I 7/1/2015 4/30/2017 62,700 Janssen
II 5/1/2017 10/30/2019 135,000 Janssen
III 10/31/2019 10/30/2023 135,000 Janssen
BLA 10/31/2023 10/30/2024 150,000 Janssen
Undisclosed DART NA 0 1/1/2014 12/31/2016 41,300 Boehringer
I 1/1/2017 11/1/2018 29,667 Boehringer
II 11/2/2018 5/2/2021 29,667 Boehringer
III 5/3/2021 5/2/2025 29,667 Boehringer
BLA 5/3/2025 5/3/2026 83,000 Boehringer