1. Going Beyond Whether or Not White Phosphorus Is a Weapon:
Legitimate Tools of the Military from Laws to Leadership
Lisa M. Beck
December 2, 2014

2. Note: Part of this paper includes references to an operation initially known as “Operation Phantom Fury,”
but whose name was changed to “Operation al-Fajr.” “Al-Fajr” which means “dawn” in Arabic refers to
what many commonly call the battle of Fallujah that took place during the last few months of 2004. It may
or may not have been referred to as simply Operation Dawn, but it should be noted that other conflicts have
been given the same name (e.g., the 1967 planned Egyptian offensive against Israel, the 1983 Iranian
offensive in the Iran-Iraq War, or the 2012 Turkish Armed Forces operation against the Kurdistan
Workers Party). Nor does it refer to Operation New Dawn (Afghanistan) or Operation New Dawn
(referring to U.S. and coalition participation in the Iraq War after August 2010). Throughout this paper,
the second battle of Fallujah will be referred to as Operation al-Fajr. Though I was unable to find
documentation of any official change of name with a record of when the change took place, I have found a
couple of resources that indicate the change took place not long before this second battle at
Fallujah began.1
Introduction
Italy’s national public broadcasting company (RAI — Radiotelevisione italiana S.p.A.), alleged in a
documentary titled, “Fallujah, The Hidden Massacre” that the U.S. used white phosphorus as a weapon.2
But
did the U.S. really use it as a weapon? Or perhaps, like any other weapon, is it possible that the use of it may
have been inappropriate? If white phosphorus was used as a weapon, was the U.S. justified in using it as
such? U.S. military leaders have already addressed this issue and contended that the use of white phosphorus
during military combat operations in Iraq was authorized, just, and in compliance with laws of armed conflict.
In fact, during a U.S. Department of Defense press briefing in November of 2005, the then-Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine General Peter Pace, said this in response to a question about U.S. use of white
phosphorus in urban areas:
White phosphorus is a legitimate tool of the military. It is used for two primary purposes. One is to mark a
location for strike by an aircraft, for example. [It is also] used as a screening agent so that you can move your
forces without being seen by the enemy. It is not a chemical weapon, … and it is well within the law of war to
use those weapons as they are being used for marking and for screening.3
But General Pace did more than just explain how the U.S. military uses white phosphorus . His real command
message was one that addressed both respect for law and order as well as following procedures, two things
that can seem so easy, but without certain basic elements can become much harder to achieve . His message
1
Al-Anbar Awakening, vol. I (American Perspectives): U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, Ed. Chief Warrant Officer 4 Timothy S. McWilliams and
Lietenant Colonel Kurtis P. Wheeler (Quantico: Marine Corps University Press, 2009), p. 8. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from
http://books.google.com/books?id=KtkK__Xd_n0C&pg=PA8&lpg=PA8&dq=%22ayad+allawi%22%22al+fajr%22&source=bl&ots=cALXQJOuLb&sig=4-psEwMwPel-
gxkW65gaB20XuD8&hl=en&sa=X&ei=8WR7VI2oH5e0oQSm9oLoCA&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=%22ayad%20allawi%22%22al%20fajr%22&f=false. A second
source of this information comes from: Matt M. Matthews, Introduction to Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations. Global War on
Terrorism Occasional Paper 20. (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), p. 1.
2
Sigfrido Ranucci and Maurizio Torrealta, Fallujah, The Hidden Massacre, RAI (Italy’s state television network). Broadcast Date: November 8, 2005. Documentary.
Retrieved November 29, 2014 from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h9fvR9l7ITE.
3
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace (November 29, 2005). News Briefing [Television Transcript].
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense. Transcribed by Federal News Service. Retrieved November 22, 2014 from
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1492.

3. rose to the surface after he was asked whether or not a weapon like white phosphorus should be used in an
urban area such as Fallujah, where fierce battles were fought between the U.S. military and Iraqi insurgents in
2004. He answered the question by stating:
No armed force in the world goes to greater effort than your armed force to protect civilians and to be very
precise in the way we apply our power…. I would rather have the proper instrument applied at the proper time
as precisely as possible to get the job done in a way that kills as many of the bad guys as possible and does as
little collateral damage as possible.4
I could not agree with him more, but before I examine any issues regarding the use of white phosphorus, it
would be good to begin with some background about both Operations Vigilant Resolve and al -Fajr.
Battle of Fallujah I (aka Operation Vigilant Resolve)
Background
The official reason for executing Operation Vigilant Resolve was summed up in this statement by B rigadier
General Kimmitt: "These are the first of a series of actions taken to attack anticoalition and anti-Iraqi forces,
to re-establish security in Fallujah and begin the process of civil military assistance projects in Fallujah.”5
But others have more vividly, albeit bluntly, described its purpose as a mission to “clean out a viper’s nest”6
following the deaths of four U.S. contractors7
who were burned, beheaded, and proudly hung from a bridge as
a crowd of Fallujans celebrated below. Even so, U.S. military leaders closer to the troop level than Kimmitt
were careful to avoid such language. In a report by a correspondent who accompanied a unit of Marines
chosen to participate in Operation Vigilant Resolve, Major Pete Farnum, operations officer for 1st Battalion,
5th Marines gave this explanation for the need to implement Operation Vigilant Resolve: “ … the problem of
Fallujah has festered to the point where dealing with it represents a pivot opportunity to improve the
atmosphere in the entire [area of responsibility].” 8
He was firm in the assertion that the operation was not
“retribution for the butchery of March 31”9
and quoted the admittedly unpolitically correct then-Commanding
General of 1st Marine Division, Major General James Mattis. It isn’t necessary for me to quote Mattis in this
paper, but what many do not know is that he was known for inculcating good will toward non -combatants …
maybe not the enemy, but for everyone else, war should not strip a warrior of a benevolent spirit
toward mankind.
4
Ibid.
5
Jane Arraf, Jim Clancy, Barbara Starr, Kevin Flower, Kianne Sadeq, “Marines, Iraqis join forces to shut down Fallujah,” April 6, 2004. Cable News Network. Retrieved
November 29, 2014 from http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/05/iraq.main/index.html.
6
“This is no time for the US to falter in Iraq,” The Telegraph, May 1, 2004. Features Comment. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/3605461/This-is-no-time-for-the-US-to-falter-in-Iraq.html.
7
Contractors from Blackwater USA: A 38-year-old former U.S. Navy SEAL (Scott Helvenston), a 32-year-old former U.S. Army Ranger (Jerry Zovko), a 38-year-old
former member of a special operations aviation regiment (Michael Teague), and a 48-year-old civilian (Wesley Batalona) [Sources: Multiple to include: Jaymes Song,
“Tragedy in Iraq shakes community on Big Isle,” April 4, 2004. The Honolulu Star Bulletin. Retrieved November 29, 2014 from
http://archives.starbulletin.com/2004/04/04/news/story3.html). Operation Vigilant Resolve may have also been a response, in part, to the deaths of five American
soldiers in Habbaniyah, just days prior to the contractor deaths.
8
Robert D. Kaplan, “Five Days in Fallujah,” The Atlantic, July 1, 2004. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/07/five-days-in-fallujah/303450/.
9
Ibid.

4. Key Events Prior to and During Operation Vigilant Resolve10
March 31 – May 1, 2004
The period between Battle of Fallujah I and Battle of Fallujah II
Six months passed between the battles. Insurgents dug tunnels, prepared defenses, and stocked weapons and
ammunition. Some of the weapons in their possession were obtained by a handover from the Fallujah
Brigade, a militia unit the U.S. initially supported but which proved to be incapable of combating the
numerous insurgent groups in the region. Some of these groups may have been funded by Saudi Arabia and
Europe according to intelligence gathered during the prosecution of the second battle in Fallujah.11
Battle of Fallujah II (aka Operation al-Fajr)
Background
With the authority of the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Interim Government, a joint operation of coalition forces was
launched to rid Fallujah of insurgents which had been allowed to operate freely and gain strength since
Operation Vigilant Resolve ended in May of 2004 and even more so when the Fallujah Brigade disbanded
in September.
Key Events Prior to and During Operation al_Fajr12
September 10 – December 23, 2004
10
Sources: Multiple, to include: U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004-2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, compiled by Nicholas Schlosser (Washington, D.C.: United
States Marine Corps: History Division, 2010), pp. 261-263. Retrieved November 29, 2014 from
http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/U.S.%20Marines%20In%20Iraq,%202004-
2008%20Anthology%20and%20Annotated%20Bibliography%20%20PCN%2010600001900_3.pdf.
11
Christopher M. Blanchard and Alfred B. Prados, “Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues,” CRS Report for Congress, Updated September 14, 2007, p. CRS-8.
12
U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004-2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography, pp. 262-263
Mar 31: Blackwater contractors are murdered and mutilated while delivering food in Fallujah.
Apr 1: The Deputy Director of U.S. military operations in Iraq promises an ‘overwhelming’
response to the Blackwater USA deaths.
Apr 5: Units from I MEF launch Operation Vigilant Resolve.
Apr 9: Marines are ordered to suspend offensive operations against the insurgency.
Apr 9-30: Skirmishes continue.
May 1: I MEF withdraws from Fallujah and hands authority over to the Fallujah Brigade.
Sep 10: The Fallujah Brigade disbands; it is unable to secure the city.
Nov 7: Marines from I MEF conduct operations in preparation for a second attempt to clear
Fallujah of insurgents. Activities include securing key bridges, conducting surgical
air strikes, and seizing insurgent nodes outside the city.
Nov 8: Operation al-Fajr launches.
Nov 13: The initial attack on Fallujah is completed. Search and attack operations begin.
Dec 23: Operation al-Fajr concludes. Fallujah is secured and cleared of insurgents.
Repopulation of the city commences.

5. In the timeline above, you’ll notice that the initial attack on Fallujah during this second battle was completed
in less than a week, hardly the work of an armed force bent on the indiscriminate destruction of a people (or
an area) on the way to its objective.
Law of Armed Conflict’s Four Core Principles and How They Apply to White Phosphorus in Fallujah
The four core principles of the law of armed conflict are distinction, military necessity, unnecessary
suffering, and proportionality. In this paper, I try to address all four of those principles as they apply to
Operations Vigilant Resolve and al-Fajr.
But before I address those principles, it should be known that the first question one should probably ask when
it comes to matters of contention in armed conflict is this: Is the issue at hand an international armed conflict
or a non-international armed conflict? Different sets of laws have been established for each one and without
getting into detail about the history of the establishment of such laws or their relevance today, let’s assume
that this issue is still relevant. In the case of the contention surrounding the Battle of Fallujah, I think we can
agree that the battles there were cases of international armed conflict. The United States had declared war
against Iraq. In today’s age, it is hard to be more international than that. These are not the days of WWI
or WWII.
Operation Vigilant Resolve and the Case for Distinction and Proportionality
In a CNN article, it was reported:
The Marines came under intense fire late Monday, with Iraqi insurgents firing mortars and rocket -
propelled grenades at their positions from a mosque and from an open field. U.S. forces moving against
those positions also came under attack from Iraqis who fired machine guns and threw grenades at them
from a BMW sedan. The Marines killed one and wounded at least two of their attackers, taking the
survivors into custody. An Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunship, armed with a 105 mm cannon, was called
in to push back the attackers 13
This is just one example demonstrating that coalition forces do not act indiscriminately. In fact, when asked
why they took so long to take action after warrants had been issued for Muqtada al -Sadr,14
and his supporters,
Coalition Provisional Authority spokesman Dan Senor said “it was the Iraqi judge’s call.”15
In another article, this one from the L.A. Times, it was reported:
The Marines called in air support to take out some enemy positions …. At daylight, Marines planned to
distribute leaflets and broadcast radio messages asking residents of Fallujah to stay in their homes and
13
Jane Arraf, Jim Clancy, Barbara Starr, Kevin Flower, Kianne Sadeq, “Marines, Iraqis join forces to shut down Fallujah.”
14
Muqtada al-Sadr had repeatedly demanded an immediate withdrawal of all U.S.-led coalition forces and as of at least April 5, 2004, an Iraqi judge had issued a
warrant for his arrest. [Source: “Muqtada al-Sadr.” GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved November 29, 2014 from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/al-
sadr.htm.]
15
Jane Arraf, Jim Clancy, Barbara Starr, Kevin Flower, Kianne Sadeq, “Marines, Iraqis join forces to shut down Fallujah.”

6. help identify insurgents and those responsible for last week's killings. Marines said they had no plans to
conduct door-to-door searches; they instead intended to work from a list of addresses where intelligence
suggested suspects might be hiding and weapons might be stored. Members of the new Iraqi Army and
the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps were playing support roles. Maj. Randon McGowan, executive officer of
the Marines' 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment, called the operation "the first of many steps toward bringing
stability to Fallujah."16
Neither of these articles even hints at a military force bent on acting indiscriminately or v iolating
international humanitarian laws.17
In addition to distributing leaflets and broadcasting messages over the radio, evidence of the efforts U.S.
troops employed to only target enemy combatants also included the use of laser-guided bombs and heavy use
of snipers. Both of these approaches indicate U.S. interest in using targeted, focused methods for the
purposes of eliminating the threat and protecting innocent civilians. Beyond even that, psychological
operations teams were employed in efforts to try to draw the enemy out. Does any of this sound like an
armed force who has little regard for the lives of innocent human beings?
As for proportionality, by some accounts, the number of insurgents inside Fallujah was reported to have been
as low as 3,000 to as high as 20,000. To even attempt to root out insurgents in a city of approximately
300,000 with a force of 2,20018
at most is the very epitome of using force with discretion, proportion, and
commitment to abiding by international humanitarian laws.
As far as use of actual weapons is concerned, it is true that 318 bombs and 391 rockets and missiles were
dropped and 93,000 machine gun and cannon rounds were fired19
, but the bombs that were dropped were
precision bombs and the other weapons were used by those who undergo extensive training and pride
themselves on their accurate marksmanship skills. None of this training includes doctrine that guides
shooters on how to aim at or kill innocent civilians. In today’s professional armed forces, it would not
be tolerated.
Furthermore, we have personal accounts from brigadier generals in Iraq’s newly formed army that operations
were conducted with precision. Brigadier General Abdul Qadir Muhammed Jasim, in a Washington Post
article is quoted as saying, “The operation is going very precise (sic) and with a very small number of
16
Tony Perry and Edmund Sanders, “Marines preparing for raid on Fallujah,” Los Angeles Times, April 5, 2004. Reposted by The Baltimore Sun. Retrieved November
29, 2014 from http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2004-04-05/news/0404050273_1_marines-iraq-battalion.
17
For even greater insight into the deliberations that go into some of the hard decisions that were made during the first battle of Fallujah and how an event can
morph from the truth into sensationalized fiction, read “The Massacre That Wasn’t” by Major Alfred B. “Ben” Connable.. Reprinted from a chapter by the same name
in the book, Ideas as Weapons: Influence and Perception in Modern Warfare. You can also find the chapter in U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004-2008: Anthology and
Annotated Bibliography at http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/U.S.%20Marines%20In%20Iraq,%202004-
2008%20Anthology%20and%20Annotated%20Bibliography%20%20PCN%2010600001900_3.pdf.
18
“First Battle of Fallujah.” Wikipedia. Retrieved November 29, 2014 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Battle_of_Fallujah.
19
Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth W. Estes, USMC (Ret.), Into the Fray: U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004-2005 (Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps: History Division,
2011), p. 78. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from
http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/historydivision/Pages/Publications/Publication%20PDFs/Estes%20Into%20the%20Fray%20Boards_Det%20One%20copy.pdf.

7. casualties. In every place we finish an operation, our forces start to distribute aid, food, clothes , blankets and
even money…. We are very sure that we are moving in the right way and will do the tasks we are asked to do
very precisely."20
Operation al-Fajr and the Case for Military Necessity
If coalition forces did not have a case for military necessity before the first battle of Fallujah, they had it by
the second. Despite that, it is important to note that even though coalition forces were six times the size they
were during the first battle of Fallujah – Operation Vigilant Resolve – discretion remained among the troops
even though they faced a “heavily armed and well-entrenched fanatical enemy.”21
What is more, this was no
ragtag innocent bunch of infidels of no consequence or threat. From a New York Times article during this
time period, the following was reported: “Senior Pentagon and military officials predict no easy success in
their effort, acknowledging that the insurgency is resilient, well-armed, lavishly financed and organized in
cells without the typical hierarchy of leaders and subordinates.”22
Even Donald Rumsfeld himself had this to
say about the insurgents, “… these folks are determined…. These are killers. They chop people's
heads off.”23
Disposition, Discretion and Distinction
The Oxford Dictionary gives us a definition for all three of these words. Disposition is defined as “A
person’s inherent qualities of mind and character,” discretion is defined as, “The freedom to decide what
should be done in a particular situation,” and distinction as “A difference or contrast between similar things
or people.”24
Unless things have drastically changed in the United States Marine Corps, and other branches of service I
would presume, I know that discretion, as in it being the better part of valor, is learned before the principle of
“distinction” in the rule of law. But even before a Marine or a soldier or some other service member learns or
reads of discretion, he or she has formed a disposition and it is this disposition that determines, largely,
whether or not that individual is likely to practice discretion. Men and women don’t join a branch of service
to learn about matters of right and wrong. I would argue that they have already formed such opinions and
that many join the armed services, in part, because they already have a code of ethics and they are motivated
20
Jackie Spinner, Karl Vick, and Omar Fekeiki, “U.S. Forces Battle Into Heart of Fallujah,” Washington Post, November 10, 2014. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A35979-2004Nov9.html.
21
Commander, U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command. “I Marine Expeditionary Force Summary of Action.” Adapted from its “Presidential Unit Citation” award
recommendation for extraordinary heroism and exceptional performance, from August 2, 2004 to February 1, 2005 and reprinted in U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004-2008:
Anthology and Annotated Bibliography (Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps: History Division, 2010), p. 83.
22
Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, “Fallujah Data Said to Pressure Guerillas,” New York Times, December 3, 2004. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T21048639355&format=GNBFI&sort=R
ELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T21048639359&cisb=22_T21048639358&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=6742&docNo=3.
23
Corky Siemaszko, “U.S. Firestorm Rips Fortress Fallujah,” News Wire Services, November 9, 2004. Retrieved November 30, 2004 from
http://www.lexisnexis.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T21048639355&format=GNBFI&sort=R
ELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T21048639359&cisb=22_T21048639358&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=151550&docNo=5.
24
“Disposition.” “Discretion.” “Distinction.” Oxford Dictionaries. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/disposition?searchDictCode=all,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/discretion?searchDictCode=all, and
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/distinction?searchDictCode=all.

8. by doing “what is right.” So, when I read the following in Robert Kaplan’s article on his experiences with
Marines during Operation Vigilant Resolve25
"Today is Palm Sunday," he began. "The day of Jesus' triumphal entry into Jerusalem, where he broke
the bounds of Hell. Tonight commences your triumphal entry into Fallujah, a place in the bounds of Hell.
This is a spiritual battle, and you Marines are the tools of mercy." As Hall invoked the Holy Spirit, the
Marines all dropped to one knee and bowed their heads, removing their bush or field caps as they did so.
and Kaplan’s reflection on it:
I had become accustomed to such sermons. For young men living in austere conditions, going out daily
to risk their lives, morale is based not on polite subtleties but on a stark belief in their own
righteousness, and in the iniquity of the enemy. The spirit of the U.S. military is fiercely evangelical,
even as it is fiercely ecumenical. Although both kosher and halal MREs are provided, and soldiers and
Marines of all races, religions, and regions of the country are welcomed into the ranks, the fact is that
not all races, religions, and regional types join up in equal numbers. So it is that the martial
evangelicalism of the South and the Bible Belt gives the military its true religious soul, along with its
compassion for innocent civilians—a phenomenon I had seen in Afghanistan, the Philippines, and other
places, and would see again in Fallujah.
I felt as if I knew exactly what he was talking about. Kaplan’s observations support this characterization
when he writes about the compassionate reaction of Marines to the death of civilians accidentally shot.
Despite a few bad apples that engage in activities that aren’t worth repeating the vast majority of those who
serve in the armed services have good intentions and have a reverence for humanity and the laws designed to
protect it.
Even more importantly, Kaplan also casts some light on Marine Corps leadership and how they react to
judgment that infringes upon the rules of engagement designed to protect innocent civilians. One Marine
Corps captain quoted in the article asks a Marine, “"Did he have a weapon? No! So where in the ROEs [Rules
of Engagement] does it say you can shoot at him?" A person’s disposition leads to discretion, which leads to
making better decisions when it comes to distinction. When mistakes are made, leaders should be capable,
qualified, and willing to make a correction especially when humanitarian laws are at stake.
What Can Counts Tell You About the Principle of Distinction?
If one were to make the case that U.S. troops and its coalition partners deliberately act indiscriminately,
wouldn’t it also then be true that the number of civilian casualties would go up proportionally? In this case,
the number of friendly troops who fought in the second battle of Fallujah – Operation al-Fajr -- increased by
600 percent; the number of civilian deaths increased by just 30 percent. If attacks by U.S. troops were
indiscriminately conducted, the death toll for civilians should be much, much higher, but they weren’t.
25
Robert D. Kaplan, “Five Days in Fallujah.”

9. Furthermore, let’s take a look at the ratio of civilian deaths to enemy combatant deaths. In the first battle of
Fallujah – Operation Vigilant Resolve – civilian casualties/losses were almost three times higher than for
enemy casualties/losses. During the second battle, civilian casualties/losses were just half of the enemy
casualties/losses. Again, none of this appears to be evidence that the U.S. acted indiscriminately during
either of these battles and especially not during Operation al-Fajr.
Attempts to Warn Civilians
U.S. forces attempted to warn the citizens of Fallujah that attacks were imminent. Though I have not seen
any leaflets that were specifically created for Operations Vigilant Resolve or al-Fajr, I have seen numerous
leaflets that were dropped over Iraq between 2002 and 2003. In some of these leaflets, it is clear that
coalition forces are aware of the rules of law and even make use of the phrase “non -combatant” declaring that
coalition forces “do not wish to harm or injure” them.26
In fact, of the more than 60 leaflets and posters I saw
that were created for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the larger operation under which Operations Vigilant Resolve
and al-Fajr were a part of, at least 14 different versions of them were specifically addressed toward the people
of Iraq and measures they could take to try to distinguish themselves from the enemy. To illustrate attempts
by coalition forces to ensure the safety of the civilian population, some content from one of the leaflets
is below:
•Park your vehicles in squares no larger than battalion size.
•Stow artillery and air defense artillery [systems] in travel configuration.
•Display white flags on vehicles.
•No [visible] man portable air defense systems.
•Personnel must gather into groups, a minimum of one kilometer away from their vehicles.
•Officers may retain their sidearm, others must disarm.
•Do not approach Coalition forces.
•Wait for further instructions.
I am unaware of any reports that have attempted to objectively measure the effects of these types of efforts on
the civilian populace, but I have read several reports that indicate many of Fallujah’s citizens had fled the city
before the second battle of Fallujah began. If this was an intended consequence of these activities, then I
26
“Operation Iraqi Freedom Leaflets.” IZD-036. Retrieved November 29, 2014 from http://www.psywarrior.com/IraqNFL030.html.
Coalition
Forces
Enemy
Forces
Coalition
Forces
Enemy
Forces
Civilians
Killed
Battle of Fallujah, I 2,200 3,600 271
184-228 572-616
Battle of Fallujah, II 13,350 3,700-4,000 720 1,200-1,500 800
1
Killed only.
Combatants Casualties/Losses

10. would say they were effective. Who knows how many innocent civilian lives were saved because they heeded
the warnings and fled the city to safer havens? Perhaps we will never know, but for the record, it is clear that
U.S. troops and coalition partners do everything they can think of to protect the lives of non-combatants.
White Phosphorus and Unnecessary Suffering
Though I have seen at least one claim that during Operation al-Fajr, articles of the Geneva conventions were
disregarded,27
I am unaware of any voice of authority claiming that conventions were violated during that
operation. It is true that the Washington Post reported that some artillery guns fired white phosphorus rounds
but that does not mean they were used intentionally as a weapon. White phosphorus has many uses other than
use as a weapon and to my knowledge neither has it been U.S. Department of Defense policy or common
practice to use it as such.
My own experience as a United States Marine never indicated any uses of it that would contradict this.
Though it is true I was never an infantry or artillery Marine, even those Marines who serve more of a support
role are required to fire a rifle, sometimes at night, and in the absence of a good, working pair of night vision
goggles, if the night can be lit up with an effective incendiary, like white phosphorus, it certainly helps a
Marine aim in on the target. All things considered, I would think the world at large would be quite in favor
of warriors who, through the use of an incendiary, can shoot with more precision. In addition, the
Washington Post report I saw on this did not indicate who, specifically, had fired the white phosphorus
rounds.28
Though it may be true that the U.S. Department of Defense does not use it as a weapon, I cannot be
certain that other nations -- coalition forces or local national forces – follow that same policy.
Nevertheless, despite the one Washington Post report I read, more reporting surfaced that blurs the line of its
use as simply an incendiary or a weapon. A BBC article on this topic referenced an article three soldiers had
written about their activities in Fallujah. The BBC included this excerpt from that article:
[White Phosphorus (WP)] proved to be an effective and versatile munition. We used it for screening
missions at two breeches and, later in the fight, as a potent psychological weapon against the insurgents
in trench lines and spider holes where we could not get effects on them with HE [High Explosive]. We
fired "shake and bake" missions at the insurgents, using WP to flush them out and HE to take
them out."29
Though the phrase “shake and bake” does little to instill in one’s mind that unnecessary suffering is always at
the forefront of a warrior’s mind, this does not mean that the intentions of these young men weren’t still of a
noble character. If this method of rooting out the insurgents ultimately helped prevent the unnecessary
27
Jonathon Holmes, “The legacy of Fallujah,” The Guardian, April 3, 2007. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/apr/04/iraq.iraq. Holmes actually claims that 70 Geneva conventions were breached during the “siege warfare”
Fallujah was subjected to during Operation al-Fajr.
28
Jackie Spinner, Karl Vick, and Omar Fekeiki, “U.S. Forces Battle Into Heart of Fallujah.”
29
Paul Reynolds, “White Phosphorus: weapon on the edge,” British Broadcasting Corporation, November 16, 2005. Retrieved November 30, 2014 from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4442988.stm.

11. suffering of innocent civilians, wouldn’t it be their duty to pursue this method of extracting them from their
hiding places? The key phrase in this discussion is “rooting out the insurgents,” which is what the soldiers
were attempting to do. Nowhere do they indicate that they were using this method against civilians. And,
according to the author of the book The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War,
“Without a showing that it was used directly against civilians, its use in Fallujah was lawful.”30
Even beyond that, would it be better to do nothing at all and allow insurgents to continue holding the citizens
of Fallujah hostage? I think General John Sattler, USMC (Ret.), and former I Marine Expeditionary Force
Commander would agree. In an American Forces Press Service article he is quoted as saying, “Ou r focus was
on breaking the backbone of the insurgents and restoring the rule of law in Fallujah. We want to give
Fallujah back to Fallujah's people."31
Conclusion
I began this paper with some comments by General Pace in response to a question about U.S. use of white
phosphorus in urban areas. I stepped away from the topic for a bit to give some background on the military
operations in which its use has been questioned recently and then discussed some other principles of the laws
of armed conflict and how U.S. and coalition forces used every method thinkable to ensure such laws were
upheld. I did that to make the point that conduct in war isn’t so much about a classification of a thing or even
an application of a rule. It is a philosophy and a commitment that must be endemic throughout the
organization in order for these laws to stand any chance of succeeding. Humans are not robots and situations
are not static or just like you see them in a textbook. Sound philosophy, leadership, and an ethos that
respects and protects is really what will serve humanity best.
30
LtCol Gary D. Solis, USMC (Ret.), The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. First published
2010.), p. 599. Print.
31
John Valceanu, “Coalition Fights to Destroy Remaining Fallujah Insurgents,” American Forces Press Service, November 14, 2004. Retrieved December 1, 2014 from
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=24835.

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