This document summarizes the first use of digitally aided close air support (DACAS) in combat by US Marines in Afghanistan. It describes how the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines tactical air control party (TACP) and aircraft from Marine Attack Squadron 231 had trained extensively with the DACAS system called StrikeLink prior to deployment. They conducted the first DACAS strike in Marine Corps history on 19 February 2010, disproving claims that DACAS was not a viable option for combat. The author provides details of the TACP's training plan in the months leading up to deployment to achieve proficiency with StrikeLink. This included classroom instruction, live-fire exercises, and a major training exercise incorporating DAC

1. www.mca-marines.org/gazette 53Marine Corps Gazette • February 2011
S
ince the introduction of digitally
aided close air support (DACAS)
systems into the Marine Corps
tactical air control party (TACP)
inventory in 2007, Marine joint termi-
nal attack controllers (JTACs) and tac-
tical aircrew have trained, albeit in a
somewhat limited capacity, to the
DACAS standard; however, until re-
cently they have not demonstrated the
capability in combat. Opponents of the
employment of DACAS systems have
argued that modern JTACs would never
see a DACAS combat control in their
lifetime; in essence, viewing the combat
employment of DACAS as a myth.
However, the JTACs from 1st Battalion,
6th Marines (1/6) and aircrew from
Marine Attack Squadron 231 (VMA–
231) played the role of “myth busters”
during combat operations in Marjeh,
Afghanistan, after successfully complet-
ing the first DACAS strike in Marine
Corps history on 19 February 2010.
Both units have proven the opponents’
predictions false and demonstrated the
inherent value of DACAS during dy-
namic combat operations.
In an effort to educate others on the
capabilities that DACAS systems offer
JTACs in combat and the training re-
quired to attain proficiency, I present a
summary of the actions enabling 1/6
JTACs to conduct the Marine Corps’
first DACAS combat controls. Using
lessons learned and observations from
the events, I offer recommendations to
other JTACs concerning the integra-
tion required for TACPs to achieve
proficiency with their DACAS systems.
Additionally, I provide recommenda-
tions to improve the current state of
DACAS systems in order to foster
wider acceptance and employment of
DACAS in combat. Fire support lead-
ers taking into consideration these rec-
ommendations will set the conditions
for flexible, expeditious, and accurate
fires during combat operations.
The Myth
When seeking guidance on preparing
my battalion’s TACP for combat in
Afghanistan, a recent theater veteran
JTAC explained confidently, “You are
going to see a lot of things as a JTAC in
Afghanistan, but you won’t see any dig-
ital CAS usage.” This statement of ad-
vice characterizes the myth-based
mindset of many JTACs concerning
DACAS employment in combat. Pro-
ponents of the myth claim that Strike-
Link,®
the DACAS program of record
for the Marine Corps, does not enable
JTACs to quickly develop and deliver
CAS nine-lines in combat. They argue
that the large physical size, power re-
quirements, varied messaging formats of
compatible aircraft, number of incom-
patible aircraft, and operating software
characterize the system as cumbersome
and difficult to use. The opponents of
DACAS maintain that their assessment
of the limits of the system make it im-
practical for use during combat.
Digitally Aided CAS
in Combat
The myth is now a reality
by Capt Alex J. “Meatloaf” Ramthun
>Capt Ramthun is an AV–8B Harrier pilot serving as the battalion Air Officer, 1/6,
Marjeh, Afghanistan.
MV–22 being directed for landing in southern Marjeh. (Photo courtesy of author.)
IDEAS & ISSUES (AVIATION)
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2. 54 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • February 2011
IDEAS & ISSUES (AVIATION)
The Epiphany
Like other combat-enabling systems
in the Marine Corps, practice and pro-
ficiency on equipment in training sets
the conditions for mastery in combat.
During the Marine Aviation Weapons
and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS–1)
Air Officer Course, many hours of
StrikeLink exposure enabled me to at-
tain a greater appreciation of the capa-
bilities that the system offers JTACs for
developing and delivering fires. I dis-
covered that DACAS presents JTACs
with advantages in the planning, re-
hearsal, and execution phases of CAS
through “automation, speed, and com-
munications accuracy.”1 Automated
maps, digital imagery, and Precision
Strike Suite Special Operations Forces
(PSS-SOF) targeting software enable
the JTAC to acquire low category tar-
get location error coordinates in envi-
ronments requiring acute collateral
damage considerations. Additionally,
StrikeLink’s CAS mission suite enables
JTACs to quickly develop and send
CAS nine-lines digitally to the aircraft,
reducing the “time to kill” chain of
events. StrikeLink’s digital text delivery
method ensures the communications
accuracy of the nine-line without
human input errors or voice-based in-
terferences. Other benefits of Strike-
Link include viewing realtime friendly
position updates through command
and control personal computer (C2PC)
networks and the attacking aircraft’s
position on the display, as well as target
designation for the F/A–18 Hornet
and AV–8B Harrier. This reduces
“[t]he potential for fratricide and expe-
dites the employment of weapons.”2
By experiencing the advantages of
DACAS at MAWTS–1, I found that
JTACs who were proficient with
StrikeLink employed the system as a
single point of “global” situation aware-
ness (SA), including digital layers of
maps, imagery, PSS-SOF targeting, at-
tack geometry displays, realtime
friendly positions, and attacking air-
craft flight path updates. In compari-
son to other modern SA tools, such as
Internet relay chat (mIRC), StrikeLink
represents a more reliable facilitator of
fires by displaying information in an
actionable form. An overreliance on
mIRC as the primary form of fires ap-
proval strangles SA through disconnec-
tions, misinterpreted information, and
the inability to paint a quickly under-
standable picture of complicated situa-
tions. Additionally, it requires repetitive
and time-consuming data entries that
increase the chances of human error
and increase the time to kill. In light of
my extensive predeployment DACAS
training, I reflected on these mIRC
limitations and asked myself why we
continue to insist on outdated techni-
cal solutions for DACAS communica-
tions. The answer served as an
epiphany. The ever-present myth that
DACAS represents a nonviable combat
procedure characterized the primary
roadblock preventing JTACs from em-
ploying StrikeLink in combat.
Setting the Conditions for Success
In order to achieve flexible, expedi-
tious, and accurate air fires for the bat-
talion, we developed a core skills
training plan employing a “crawl-walk-
run” method 5 months prior to deploy-
ment. The “crawl” phase focused on
pre-TACP school training for the bat-
talion’s future joint fires observers
(JFOs) and nonaviator JTACs. This
phase, mentoring future JTACs/JFOs
during the same training events as a
“whole” TACP, included classroom in-
struction, in-house written exams, local
target “talk-on” practice, simulated and
live call for fire training, AV–8B Harrier
simulator CAS events with aircrew, and
supervised control of aircraft during bat-
talion TACP exercises. Once each
prospective JTAC/JFO met the school’s
standard, the “walk” phase began at Ex-
peditionary WarfareTraining Group At-
lantic (EWTGLant) and Pacific. Our
nine JFOs and six JTACs under train-
ing completed all 1000-level core skills
requirements from the Training and
Readiness (T&R) Manual, achieving of-
ficial certification status as JTACs/JFOs
at a 100 percent completion rate. To
further their skills, we continued ag-
gressive fire support training during the
post-TACP school “run” phase, to in-
clude support of two EWTGLant
TACP exercises, sending JTACs to
Hurlburt Air Force Base for AC–130
call for fire training, completing three
JTAC-evaluator certifications, and set-
Realtime digital exchange between the Harrier and the ground is possible. (Photo courtesy of au-
thor.)
StrikeLink’s digital text
delivery method ensures
the communications ac-
curacy of the nine-line
without human input er-
rors. . . .
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3. www.mca-marines.org/gazette 55Marine Corps Gazette • February 2011
ting up “purple” TACP training at
Naval Air Facility El Centro, CA, with
Strike Fighter Squadron 125.3 Our final
training exercise linked all previous
training events and completed all of the
2000-level core skills for the TACP. Ex-
ercise LOWLAND FURY 01–10, con-
ducted at the Piney Island Bombing
Range, the largest battalion-run TACP
exercise in Marine Corps history, fea-
tured 220 sorties of 12 different type-
model-series (T/M/S) aircraft producing
699 total terminal controls employing
15 different types of air and indirect de-
livered ordnance.Training highlights in-
cluded the use of 81mm mortars,
employment of DACAS, urban CAS
training, GBU–38 joint direct attack
munitions, Canadian JTAC integration,
combined arms employment, JFO ex-
tremis CAS employment, B–1B
bomber CAS, aircraft radar expand map
talk-on targeting in poor weather, low-
altitude CAS tactics, unmanned aircraft
system fire support integration, KC–
130 battlefield illumination integration,
and forward air controller (airborne)
(FAC(A)) integration. Exercise LOW-
LAND FURY 01–10 validated our train-
ing program and represented the
culmination event preparing 1/6 TACP
for combat in Afghanistan.4
To augment our robust TACP train-
ing package, we integrated DACAS
into our overall core skills training plan.
We paralleled our crawl-walk-run
TACP training tempo beginning with
StrikeLink classroom training events
from Stauder representatives at II MEF
fires, in-house StrikeLink battle drills,
and culminated with full StrikeLink in-
tegration into Exercise LOWLAND
FURY 01–10.5 Our StrikeLink-inte-
grated TACP achieved a high level of
DACAS proficiency, completing 49
DACAS controls with 3 different
T/M/S aircraft during multiple training
events. Once our battalion arrived in
theater, our TACP made liaison with
VMA–231 to build a common digital
CAS picture. Partnering with the
squadron’s weapons and tactics instruc-
tor and operations representatives, we
developed DACAS standing operating
procedures (SOPs) and agreed to con-
duct DACAS checks during non-
kinetic missions. The SOPs and
DACAS practice enabled both JTACs
and aircrew to develop a strong digital
relationship, increasing both units’
overall DACAS proficiency. Our unit-
initiated predeployment TACP training
and theater unit partnering set the con-
ditions for success as the battalion’s fire
supporters in Operation MOSTARAK in
Marjeh, Afghanistan.
The Digital Strike
On the afternoon of 19 February
2010, Company A, 1/6, received accu-
rate and effective sniper and medium
machinegun fire from a bunker com-
pound. The company commander de-
clared a troops-in-contact situation and
requested air fires on the bunker to en-
able his Marines to maneuver out of
the kill zone. Two AV–8B Harriers
from VMA–231, fragged to support a
preplanned joint tactical air request for
another unit, launched after hot refu-
eling at Camp Dwyer airfield to pro-
vide support. With no JTACs on scene
to take control, an onsite JFO took the
initiative to quickly and accurately tar-
get the bunker. The JFO used his Vec-
tor–21B/defense advanced global
positioning system receiver targeting
device to attain a grid for the target.
After cross checking the grid with
buildings mapped on a grid reference
graphic, he sent the target’s informa-
tion to a JTAC for CAS nine-line de-
velopment and delivery. In order to
refine the target location and speed the
process of ordnance delivery, the JTAC
employed a digitally aided approach
using StrikeLink. To improve the tar-
get location, the JTAC used Strike-
Link’s PSS-SOF integration to attain
Category I target location error and
then incorporate the grid into a digital
nine-line. The JTAC selected an initial
point from the battalion-squadron pre-
coordinated list of control points in
StrikeLink. He manually entered in the
closest friendly position and used the
digitally displayed final attack headings
to determine the best approach to sup-
port both target acquisition and
friendly force deconfliction. The JTAC
also added rules of engagement (ROE),
type of ordnance, weapons timing sep-
aration, and bomb fuze setting using
free text remarks. The time to develop
the digital nine-line, from JFO target-
ing to remarks, required less than 5
minutes.
JTAC 1stLt “Chaps” Chappell diverts fixed-wing airstrikes in southern Marjeh. (Photo courtesy of au-
thor.)
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4. 56 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • February 2011
IDEAS & ISSUES (AVIATION)
Upon the aircrew’s initial verbal
check-in, the JTAC briefed the CAS
game plan: Type II control, bomb on
target, and GBU–51 employment.
After submitting a digital on-station re-
port, the aircrew established uninter-
rupted digital communications with
the JTAC. Following this procedure,
the JTAC digitally delivered the CAS
nine-line to the aircrew and attained
required verbal read backs upon digital
acceptance of the mission. Finally, the
JTAC provided verbal amplifying re-
marks and quickly conducted target
correlation for both aircraft. The time
period between the on station report
submission and target correlation
spanned less than 4 minutes.
After delivery of the nine-line, the
flight held overhead the target for 14
minutes waiting for ROE adjudication.
With authorization for the strike, the
aircrew provided verbal “pushing,”
“initial point inbound,” and “in” calls.
The JTAC acknowledged all calls with
verbal and digital (appearing in the air-
craft’s heads-up display) “continue”
commands. With weapons release cri-
teria achieved, the JTAC provided both
verbal and digital “cleared hot”
weapons release authorizations. The
flight lead released and guided his ord-
nance to a direct hit on the target.
With calm winds holding battlefield
debris overhead the target, making it
difficult to assess the need for a second
bomb, the wingman received verbal
and digital “abort” instructions. After
a 3-minute delay, the on-scene com-
mander requested the second bomb on
the bunker. Prior to the wingman’s at-
tack, control was transferred from one
JTAC to another; the new JTAC pro-
vided verbal and digital cleared hot au-
thorizations. The wingman’s weapon
scored a direct hit, destroying the tar-
get; the JTAC followed the strike with
verbally and digitally delivered bomb
hit assessment (BHA) information to
the aircrew. The AV–8B Harriers con-
tinued to provide overwatch and addi-
tional BHA, exchanging multiple
digital text messages with the JTAC
prior to ending the mission.
The outcome of this strike repre-
sented a successful mission achieving the
ground commander’s intent through the
employment of DACAS tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures (TTP).The suc-
cess of the strike directly resulted from
aggressive predeployment TACP and
aircrew training, JFO integration, profi-
ciency with equipment, and strong re-
lationships between supporting units.
Additionally, the battalion built upon
the DACAS achievement by operating
the only DACAS network in theater.
This network has produced an addi-
tional seven DACAS nine-line briefs
supporting Marines during Operation
MOSTARAK.
1/6 JFO Cpl “Hathcock” Gibbons-Neff directs a rotary-wing nine-line attack against a sniper in central Marjeh. (Photo courtesy of author.)
The wingman’s weapon
scored a direct hit, de-
stroying the target. . . .
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5. www.mca-marines.org/gazette 57Marine Corps Gazette • February 2011
Recommendations to Fires Supporters
Start early and combine training.
Based on current operational tempo,
most units have 5 months prior to de-
ployment to prepare a TACP for com-
bat. In order to maximize the short
training window and increase the value
of specific events, develop a compre-
hensive plan early that combines the
training effort for both JFOs and
JTACs and integrates FAC(A)s. By tak-
ing initiative to develop a plan, JTACs
increase the chances of reserving valu-
able training ranges (urban CAS com-
plexes, ranges permitting joint direct
attack munitions and Types II and III
control, etc.) and securing large
amounts of air support (both green and
purple). By integrating JFOs and
FAC(A)s into the training events, the
TACP has more opportunities to de-
velop and perfect battle drills; this re-
sults in the creation of strong
relationships and high SA for all fires
supporters. With training venues, sup-
porting aircraft, and JFO/JTAC/
FAC(A) integration, TACPs maximize
their ability to complete core skills
training requirements and attain fire
support proficiency.
Integrate DACAS into TACP train-
ing events and predeployment exer-
cises. Understand that the goal of
DACAS does not represent a 100 per-
cent pure digital exchange between air-
crew and the TACP; rather, the
objective is a verbal/digital mix in-
tended to achieve quick and accurate
fires through clear communications. By
training with StrikeLink during TACP
events, fires supporters become familiar
and proficient with the equipment.
Seek cooperation with local digitally
capable squadrons in order to organize
specific training events tailored to a
TACP’s training phase. For the crawl
phase, facilitate the conduct of DACAS
checks between JTACs and aircrew
using static aircraft on a squadron’s
flightline. This has minimum impact
on a squadron’s flight operations, en-
ables all parties to test digital systems
and develop digital SOPs/TTP in a be-
nign environment, and facilitates the
personal relationships among con-
trollers and CAS aircrew. For the run
phase, fully integrate DACAS into
large TACP exercises, battalion train-
ing events, and Enhanced MOJAVE
VIPER (EMV).6 These training meth-
ods enable the TACP to attain digital
employment proficiency and test the
digital fires approval processes at the
battalion level. By integrating DACAS
into TACP training, JTACs set the
conditions for flexible, expeditious,
and accurate operations in combat.
Commanders need to emphasize the
importance of battalion training with
all digital systems of record. Proper
training, understanding, and familiar-
ization of digital systems, such as
StrikeLink and advanced field artillery
tactical data system, prior to deploy-
ment will facilitate doctrinal set up and
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6. 58 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • February 2011
IDEAS & ISSUES (AVIATION)
employment of equipment in theater.
The speed, accuracy, and ease of rout-
ing digital messages throughout the
fires chain and approval process are just
a few reasons to be proficient with
these systems. The fires community, to
include the TACP, fire support team,
fires support coordination center, force
fires coordination center, and aviation
and artillery units, should all be profi-
cient with digital operations.
Recommendations for the Future
Expand DACAS capabilities to ro-
tary-wing assets, expand digital capabil-
ities (in the same messaging standard/
format) to all aviation platforms and C2
nodes, and expand digital messages be-
yond just CAS. The digital exchange of
information, such as airdrop briefing,
medevac nine-line, imagery exchange,
nonkinetic fires request, etc., will bring
digital advantages to the entire MAGTF.
Additionally, develop future DACAS
systems that maximize the expeditionary
nature of the Marine Corps. Next-gen-
eration DACAS devices should feature
a reduction in electrical power require-
ments and physical mass/size of the sys-
tem. This will enable fire supporters to
maximize DACAS employment in aus-
tere environments.
Modify the DACAS template to
mirror current CAS delivery TTP. As
the development and delivery of nine-
lines has changed since the introduc-
tion of StrikeLinksystems, the DACAS
template in StrikeLink has not changed
at the same rate. In order to speed the
exchange of information, further build
aircrew SA, and maximize employment
of multiple weapons, integrate software
features enabling JTACs to pass a com-
plete CAS game plan prior to or along
with a nine-line and send multiple tar-
gets in a single nine-line. Additionally,
cosmetic changes to the template that
include options for defaulting lines one
through three to “from the overhead,”
free text for line five, “talk on” for line
seven, and “overhead” for line nine.
These modifications represent neces-
sary improvements that will enable
JTACs to more clearly communicate
their intent to aircraft.
Mandate digital fires training in
T&R manuals and at predeployment
venues, such as EMV. Digital opera-
tions will continue to be personality
driven until the Marine Corps requires
and assesses this capability. Limiting
the employment of these programs of
record will further delay the realization
of the increased capabilities and effi-
ciencies available to the warfighter. The
training, education, and employment
requirement will facilitate a paradigm
shift away from voice and mIRC and
toward employment of our digital fires
equipment.
Conclusion
DACAS represents an underutilized
combat-enhancing capability. With the
termination of the combat DACAS
myth, a wider opportunity exists for
other fires supporters to achieve opera-
tional digital success. In order to prop-
erly set the conditions for successful
digital fires in combat, fires supporters
must employ initiative to develop com-
bined JFO/JTAC/FAC(A) training
plans incorporating DACAS using a
crawl-walk-run method. We must train
to digital operations in our fires school-
houses and during predeployment
training exercises, such as EMV, and
units must work together in theater to
develop relationships facilitating
DACAS proficiency.
When reflecting on the original pre-
deployment statement of JTAC advice
for Afghanistan, I have found the re-
marks to be significantly ironic. Dur-
ing the first 10 days of combat in
Marjeh our TACP conducted 44 ter-
minal attack controls with a 100 per-
cent weapons-to-target effectiveness
rating, including DACAS terminal at-
tack controls. Our efforts to be aggres-
sive with CAS training and execution
have paid off with success in combat,
presenting opportunities for others to
exceed our precedent as DACAS capa-
bilities expand in the future.
Notes
1. Joint Publication 3–09.3, Close Air Support,
JointStaff,Washington,DC,8July2009,p.V–93.
2. Ibid.
3. Funded through U.S. Joint Forces Command
J–7 (Operational Plans and Joint Force Devel-
opment), 1/6 unfortunately had to cancel this
excellent TACP training event 1 week prior to
execution in order to depart for Afghanistan.
4. The scope of the 1/6 TACP training program
produced an average of 17 terminal attack con-
trols (representing Types I and II) per JFO and
109 terminal attack controls (representing Types
I, II, and III) per JTAC. This represents the
largest number of controls achieved by a mod-
ern predeployment battalion TACP unit in the
Marine Corps.
5. To ensure onsite training support, Stauder
Technologies provided fleet support representa-
tives during all Exercise LOWLAND FURY 01–10
events.
6. EMV provides an outstanding forum to con-
duct this type of digital integration training
should demonstrating digital fires proficiency
become a requirement of Marine Corps battal-
ions.
>Author’s Note: The author would like to
extend a special “thank you” to the TACP
radio operator, JFO, JTACs, and aircrew
making the first DACAS strike in Marine
Corps history possible:
TACP radio operator: Sgt Amos
“Camel” Stowbridge.
JFO: Sgt William “Bumble” Bee.
JTACs: Capt Alex “Meatloaf” Ram-
thun and SSgt Lawrence “Ole Red” Rus-
sell.
Pilots: Majs Shawn “Junk” Hermley
and Toby “Bucky” Buchan.
This article would not have been possi-
ble without the professional criticism,
input, advice, and feedback from Majs
Brian Newbold and Thomas Campbell III,
and LtCols Peter Blake, Andrew Tate,
Christopher DeLong, and Mikel Huber.
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7. www.mca-marines.org/gazette 59Marine Corps Gazette • February 2011
s a tailorable, scalable secu-
rity cooperation MAGTF
(SCMAGTF), the Black Sea
Rotational Force (BSRF)
proved ideally suited to meet U.S. Eu-
ropean Command’s (USEuCom’s) the-
ater security cooperation (TSC)
objectives in a strategically significant
area of the world. Well nested in the
strategic guidelines set forth in the re-
cent Quadrennial Defense Review,
Naval Operations Concept, and Ma-
rine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025,
the BSRF task organized general-pur-
pose forces to meet the combatant com-
mand’s engagement and military
development requirements. From May
through July 2010, the BSRF con-
ducted targeted security cooperation ac-
tivities with 11 partner nations (PNs)
in the Black Sea, Balkan, and Caucasus
regions in order to enhance partner mil-
itary capabilities, expand access to the
regions, and build U.S. Marine Corps
operational experience and relation-
ships in an area of operations (AO)
rarely frequented by Marines. As
Marines we have always done more
with less, and this was exemplified by
the BSRF completing 40 percent of
Marine Forces Europe’s (MarForEur’s)
TSC requirements effectively, effi-
ciently, and with less than 120 Marines
in a 3-month period.
Orientation
The importance of our allies and
PNs in the Black Sea, Caucasus, and
Balkan regions cannot be overstated.
This area of the world, with its geo-
graphic proximity to the Bosporus
and Dardanelles Straits, as well as the
Aegean and Black Seas, is of strategic
significance to the West. This geogra-
phy not only holds strategic impor-
tance for energy security in the future,
but it is a historic conduit between the
East and the West that must be denied
to terrorists and traffickers of weapons
of mass destruction. It is imperative
that we bolster military partnerships
with nations that have proven them-
selves to be amongst our strongest al-
lies since 11 September 2001. When
the United States was seeking allies
and PNs to build a coalition during
the buildup to Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, our traditional allies were
quickly joined by new ones, such as
Romania, Bulgaria, and other former
Warsaw Pact nations. It was an op-
portunity for them to not only prove
their operational capabilities, but also
to stand side by side with the United
States, Britain, and Australia in the
initial phases of the global war on ter-
rorism. U.S. and Romanian relations
grew even closer in December 2005
when President Traian Băsescu and
The Black Sea
Rotational Force
Providing training and gaining access
by LtCol Thomas J. Gordon & Capt Marshall Hand
>LtCol Gordon is the former Commanding Officer, 1st Tank Battalion/BSRF. He is
currently a National Security Fellow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Se-
curity Studies Program.
>>Capt Hand is the former assistant operations officer and Non-Lethal Weapons
Instructor, BSRF. He is currently a Platoon Commander, Marine Corps Security
Force Battalion, Kings Bay.
“The SCMAGTF will have capabilities, mobility, and
sustainability commensurate with its requirements to
provide training to less developed military forces. The
SCMAGTF will be tasked with building partner nation
security capacity and supporting partner nation secu-
rity efforts in specific regional areas. The SCMAGTF
will provide the combatant commander with a flexi-
ble expeditionary force employment option that fur-
ther augments the traditional capabilities provided by
the Marine Corps.”
—Gen James T. Conway,
Concepts and Programs 2010
A
IDEAS & ISSUES (EUROPE)
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