SOF’s Unquenchable Need for Communication Assets

1. OPERATION PACIFIC GUARDIAN:
TRAINING A JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE FOR UNKNOWN CONDITIONS
By Major Mark D. “Nix” Natale, US Army
SOF’s Unquenchable Need for Communication Assets
The most recent developments in technology (such as Bluetooth, voice recognition, AI, machine
learning, smart phones, and personal SATNAV) are ubiquitous in most societies. It is no stretch of the
imagination to think everyone can benefit from the explosion in technological advances, including those
who wish to do the United States harm. Rogue nations, terrorist groups, and Near-Peer threats have
been capitalizing on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology for years. It is common to find highly
capable commercial technology (including computers, servers, tablets, cellphones, and wireless
networks) in the homes of known terrorists.
The on-site team that conducted the operation that killed Osama Bin Laden discovered a treasure trove
of digital intelligence. Most was in the form of commercially available technology, such as media hard
drives, computers, and video cameras. It is well known that Bin Laden used this equipment to
coordinate, command, and control his assets on the battlefield, however his distribution methods relied
on the low-tech method of couriers. This mix of high-tech systems and low-tech utilization means that
the enemy can employ this technology in new and imaginative ways.
The answer for combating this type of threat must
be to equip US forces with systems that
outperform, outthink, and are hardened against
outside interference. Within US Army Special
Operations Command (USASOC) there is a single
SOF Signal Battalion, the 112th
. The Battalion has
subordinate units, called SIGDETs (Signal
Detachments) across the globe, ready to provide
communications assets to combatant commanders
and TSOCs (Theater Special Operations
Commands).
The 112th Special Operations Signal Detachment
assigned to Camp Smith, Hawaii, is charged with
using cutting-edge technology to provide the
Commander of Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC) secure data and voice services. The SOF
community has a seemingly unquenchable thirst for the communication platforms that the 112th
can
provide. Unlike conventional military units, SOF units routinely operate in areas with little-to-no
infrastructure and limited access to the resources prevalent in garrison bases and civilian locations.
SOF teams have few members, compared to conventional units, and compensate for this disparity by
using imbedded force multipliers. In the cyberspace realm, field commanders require small, portable,
and reliable communication systems to wage asymmetric warfare and maintain positive

2. communications with different entities to coordinate command and control information on the
battlefield.
In today’s battlespace, it is common for junior commissioned and noncommissioned officers to
communicate directly with officials in the Department of State and Department of Defense (DOD) about
ongoing operations. Forward-deployed SOF teams can maintain positive communications with, and relay
messages directly to national level decision makers. Never in the course of military history could Soldiers
at the tactical level have direct contact with strategic-level officials. This tactical data sharing and
analysis provided by the Soldier on the ground help shape US foreign policy. The capability that enables
the strategic officials to reach down to the tactical level is solely available because of the hard work of
SOF communicators.
Once strategic leaders see the value in real-time unmanned aerial vehicle feeds, Top Secret video
teleconferences, and situation reports from the tactical operator on the ground, the expectation placed
upon SOF communicators is that those capabilities will always be available for their benefit. The reality is
that it takes a long time to become experts in deploying, installing, and maintaining electronic
equipment. Compared to conventional units operating similar equipment, the standard setup and
troubleshooting periods are reduced in the SOF community. Many times, SOF communicators are
expected to set up multiple systems at breakneck speeds to react to developments, only hours old in
order to give field operators the right information needed at the right time to conduct specific missions.
The mission of the SOCPAC Signals Detachment (SIGDET) is to provide the command rapidly deployable,
tactical, robust, and reliable communication platforms in support of joint, allied, interagency, and
partner nation task forces to accomplish counterterrorism objectives and conduct special operations
within the Asia-Pacific area of operations (AOR). SIGDETs accomplish this mission by training, repeating,
and analyzing previous exercises to discover performance patterns. Creating deployment standard
operating procedures (SOPs) and quick-reference checklists enable even the most inexperienced
Soldiers to execute a mission.
Each SIGDET’s mission is different. The SIGDET’s role, within the
command structure, is to support all manner of communication
missions spanning all branches of the military, throughout the
AOR. The SOCPAC SIGDET directly supports 1/1 Special Forces
Group, Naval Special Warfare Unit-One, the 353rd Air Force
Special Operations Group and several other components of JTF-
510. The SIGDET also contributes communication support to the
Logistical Support Facility in Singapore, onboard the Maritime
Support Vessel in the Philippine Sea, and the Joint Special
Operations Task Force-Philippines. Additionally, SIGDET Soldiers
provide regional communications support for the President of
the United States (POTUS) within the Asia-Pacific AOR, and serve
as radio operators (RTOs) for the Commanding General of
SOCPAC, and other key leaders.
The two most important quick-reaction force roles SIGDETs fulfill are the pacific surveillance and
assessment team (PSAT) and SOCPAC Joint Task Force (JTF)-510. Both task forces have Soldiers on call
24/7, prepared to be in the air and en route to any undisclosed location within 6 hours. The most

3. difficult factor when training Soldiers to execute a “no-notice, no-fail” mission is simulating and
rehearsing standard recall procedures. On several occasions, the SIGDET initiated recall procedures
designed to test the Soldiers in several different scenarios, including humanitarian aid, Joint intelligence
support, and direct-action missions. Daily, the SIGDET must develop uniquely tailored training
procedures and exercises in order to address any possible mission or situation.
Regardless of the mission, the SIGDET customers require some basic level of support, such as SECRET
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network
(NIPRNET), Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), and coalition access. The
detachment provides access to these networks by deploying the SOF Deployable Node, Radio Integrated
System-Light, and tactical local area networks. These network systems create the backbone for the PSAT
and JTF-510 forces. The SIGDET maintains at least one equipment package at every operating location.
Developing and maintaining proficiency for SOF communicators becomes increasingly difficult when
considering not only SOF standard equipment packages, but also platforms fielded for specific, focused
mission sets such as POTUS support and executive communications packages. Those systems are
comprised of different COTS equipment and have a non-military, low profile, and less-invasive footprint
than SIGDET standard systems.
Whether at sea, in the air, or on land, users expect a
fully functioning network at all times; and a Joint
Operations Center (JOC) capable of supporting a
diverse staff 24 hours a day. The SOF community
cannot wait to build infrastructure or approve
projects in order to provide communications to
commanders. Training for the “unknown” is common
within all military units; however, the SOF community
is expected to be flexible in every operation in which
it participates. Therefore, training for the “unknown”
is magnified and different approaches need to be
taken. To account for training distractions and
unknown factors, the SIGDET develops training
scenarios from the successes and failures of previous
exercises and missions. Deploying onboard a naval
vessel in support of a SEAL team or providing support to the Secret Service’s advance team is a rare
opportunity that cannot be figured out the day the mission starts. The SOF after-action review archives
and military decision-making process procedures are the main tools used to foresee mission
requirements and train to them.
What a Special Operation SIGDET Looks Like and is it Sufficient?
The 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion (Airborne) provides robust communicators in size, scope,
and technical diversity. The 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion’s mission is to provide
simultaneous, dedicated, theater-level, signal support to six theaters, their JTF commands and their
subordinate headquarters, and other commands, as required. The signal battalion also provides network
operations for the US Army Special Operations Command and its subordinate units, and provides
USSOCOM an alternate network. The 112th Special Operations Signal Battalion has arranged its internal

4. command structure to meet these diverse mission sets. It contains four companies, three-line level
tactical companies (A, B, and C) and the TSSC (Theater Signal Support Company, also known as D
company).
The TSSC encompasses all the SIGDETS
stationed throughout the globe and is
responsible for ensuring the SIGDET
commanders, attached to theater special
operations commands (SOCPAC), Special
Operation Command, Europe (SOCEUR),
Special Operations Command, Central
(SOCCENT), etc.), Maintaining a working
relationship between the 112th and the local
TSOC commanders is key. This relationship is
critical for evaluating whether the SIGDET is
meeting the needs of the command, or the
“expectation-to-delivery quotient”. The
relationship between the TSOC J6 (Director of
Communications) and the TSSC commander is
critical to ensure all parties understand the
mission and role of the SIGDET and agree on its
priorities.
To understand the needs of SOCPAC, look to its
mission set. SOCPAC’s mission is: to plan,
conduct and support special operations and
related activities in the Asia-Pacific region; enhance regional security and stability through development
and cooperation with allies, partners, DOD and other agencies; and respond to crises in support of
Commander, Pacific Command (PACOM) objectives. SOCPAC’s mission is flexible and requires tactical
communications units rapidly respond to their needs.
The key to SIGDETs projecting their needs and training for unknown requirements is immersing
themselves in all aspects of mission planning with the SOCPAC SOJ6.
SOCPAC’s staff mirrors the standard joint Service command staff structure divided into directorates
SOJ1-SOJ7. These directorates are responsible for planning and executing the intent of the commander
through their specialty. The SOJ6, Communications Directorate, serves as the primary authority for
coordinating and tasking the SIGDETs. The SIGDET is administrative, tactical, and operational control to
the SOCPAC TSOC. Certain actions or processes must go through SOCPAC’s chain of command; however,
there are some instances where the parent unit (112th Signal Battalion) is directly responsible for the
SIGDET.
If the SIGDET receives conflicting or contradictory guidance, the TSSC commander and the SOJ6 director
will work to eliminate ambiguity. One way to approach the relationship between the SOJ6 and the 112th
Special Operations Signal Battalion is by fully supporting SOCPAC in their requests and informing the
112th on the rationale behind those requests. At the end of the day, the SIGDET is tasked to provide

5. communication support to the SOCPAC commander. Objectives that interfere with providing
communications support are not priorities in developing the training plan.
The SOJ6 sets the ground rules for SIGDET training that supports its mission and the SIGDET joint
mission-essential tasks list. The SOJ6 plans and manages the installation, operation, and maintenance of
reliable, interoperable, and secure joint command and control, communications, and computer systems
to support the SOCPAC commander, and ensure successful mission accomplishment.
The SOJ6 directorate is staffed similarly to a battalion headquarters’ company. For example, positions
within the battalion headquarters element are SOJ61 (Communications Administration), SOJ63
(Communications Operations), SOJ65 (Communications Plans). This hierarchy allows the SIGDET to
interact with the joint staff and parent unit.
Two points of contention arise within the SIGDET. They are the unit reporting chain and rating scheme
for the SIGDET commander. Some feel a fellow commander should rate the SIGDET commander; others
feel the SOJ6 director should be the rater. Other proposals include the SOCPAC deputy commander or
the TSSC commander rating the SIGDET commander. Currently the SIGDET commander’s rater is the
SOCPAC SOJ6 director and is senior rated by the Chief of Staff.
The interesting part of this relationship is the joint aspect of the SIGDET’s command structure. The
SIGDET is a non-joint coded Army unit assigned to a sub-unified command of PACOM, under an Air Force
Commanding General, located on a Marine Corps base. For the SIGDET to be successful under these
unique conditions in command structure, supported organizations, and mission sets, the SIGDET must
train as if it were a joint unit. Additionally, the SIGDET’s mission statement must be flexible enough to
encompass any unforeseen requirement and rigid enough to match each mission with its capabilities.
Currently, there is a heavy focus on recurring training
exercises and the task organization of the
detachment. The SIGDET was organized by military
occupational specialty (MOS) and skill-set. For
example, all radio related MOSs were in the same
section, trained and rated by noncommissioned
officers (NCOs) of the same rank, all competing for
the same radio team leader slot. In addition, all
Soldiers of the same section were occupying several
of the long-term rotational deployment slots.
Therefore, 80–90% of the radio section deployed
simultaneously, effectively decimating the
capabilities of an entire section and degrading the
SIGDET’s communications capability.
To combat this, the 32-person detachment has been reorganized into two teams, and each has a
designated team leader charged with the daily training and operations of their subordinates. The teams
would go on a 60-day, red cycle/green cycle deployment scheme. The red cycle denoted the on call
team, prepared to deploy in support of mission tasking. The green cycle denoted training, refitting
equipment, conducting inventories, and supporting Soldier's leave. This reorganization improved cross
training within the detachment, MOS diversity, and enabled the sustainable reconstitution of the entire

6. detachment. This allows confidently deploying a team comprised of all MOSs, with a team lead who has
Asia-Pacific deployment experience.
Since the reorganization, the SIGDET has seen a marked increase in overall performance. This includes
deployment and equipment activation speed, team cohesion, and focusing on a common goal.
Furthermore, improvements in individuals’ technical skills and experience enable them to compensate
for weaknesses or gaps within the team. During past exercises, each section would set up its own
equipment and focus on the success of that section. Now, the team leaders are forcing cross training
and ensuring all members of the team will not stop until the entire team is operational.
When considering the SOF community and its challenges, leaders should never put the artificial
limitations of a rigid task organization on commanders’ shoulders, especially if the justification is “this is
how it’s been done before”. The organizations’ leaders run the risk of fighting last year’s battle and not
focusing on the future, and could lose sight of the flexibility needed to conduct unconventional mission
sets and the ability to execute unforeseen requirements in unknown conditions. SIGDETs succeed in the
unknown because they do routine tasks routinely well; this is what sets the SOF community apart from
others.
How Real-World Missions Drive Training
Form following function, or vice versa, is an appropriate analogy when looking at training models. Does
the real-world mission drive training objectives, or do assumptions on what SIGDETs should train dictate
capabilities to conduct the mission? In an ideal scenario, leaders would know the variables and be able
to train the forces to execute well-defined missions. However, that is not the case for SIGDETs. Leaders
must balance creating training objectives from historical experiences and forecasting mission sets from
assumptions of future needs. An
approach, encompassing both is
preferred.
The SIGDET could continue to train
solely based on requirements of past
missions, but this would leave it
unprepared for the unique
requirements of today and, possibly,
incapable of adapting to future
unknowns. Exercise PACIFIC
GUARDIANIAN provides a venue for
the SIGDET to continually test its
personnel’s technical expertise and
evaluate the unit’s SOPs and planning
capabilities. PACIFIC GUARDIANIAN
helps improve the force’s capabilities
by introducing scenarios not
commonly seen by conventional units.
Repeating the exercise every month

7. helps forge the standard and expectations for the SOF communicators and Soldiers of the SIGDET,
regardless of the operational environment.
SIGDETS provide core services (i.e., SIPRNET, NIPRNET, JWICS, video teleconference, and radio
communication systems) for every mission as part of the standard SOCPAC deployment package. The
location, size, and duration of the package varies based on the mission. The PACIFIC GUARDIAN exercise
provides an opportunity to practice the nuances of setting up a deployed JOC in support of joint users.
The high standard of tactical communications in the SOF community is not only having operational
equipment, but also creating a professional, world-class environment that anticipates the needs of the
commander. The challenge for the SIGDET commander becomes how to train the detachment so
Soldiers can go from being capable to superior. These nuances and details differentiating a SIGDET from
a conventional force communications team will make or break a SOF unit.
A minor detail, such as an assigning an incorrect phone number, can tarnish the reputation of a SIGDET.
The expected performance of a SIGDET is above that expected of conventional communications units.
The SOF communications community continually operates at a collective level of excellence that some
struggle to accomplish. One lesson from high expectations of others is that every opportunity must be a
training event, because there may never be time to conduct an uninterrupted training event. Real-world
missions have a way of interrupting training. The key is to use real-world missions to train SOF
communicators continuously. The best way to
train for a mission is to be involved in past
missions. That is not possible for every Soldier
every time, so a bit of personnel management is
needed when analyzing a mission. As with a
split operations team construct, leaders need to
rely on the noncommissioned officer in charge
(NCOIC) to train and prepare the junior team
members to execute the mission. The NCOIC
can work to group experience and leadership
with novice communicators to ensure the
SIGDET is executing the mission and cross
training replacements. The success and
reputation of the unit is the responsibility of
every Soldier in the unit, even when they
deploy alone.
Junior enlisted Soldiers will face unique mission sets, personnel, and organizations. The commander or
NCOIC must prepare them to handle every contingency from a Secret Service Agent assigned to POTUS
who expects a certain level of “associated support” beyond just the average communications platform
operation to providing laminated call sheets and user instructions or keeping the work area clean and
orderly.
Another tool to facilitate the success of SIGDET, is provide training opportunities with sister Services,
joint agencies, and partner nation SOF and conventional force communicators. By being co-located with
different organizations during a training event (such as Joint Communications Support Element at Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii or the Australian Air Regiment in Guam) gives the SIGDET a wealth of operational

8. experience that cannot be replicated. The relationships developed among communicators of different
nations provide invaluable experiences applicable to future US and combined-forces missions. One great
example occurred during the SOCPAC exercises with Australian SOF communicators from the elite
Special Air Service Regiment who trained alongside SIGDET Soldiers.
The Future of the SIGDET in the SOF Community
The SIGDETs will be used more heavily, be more active, and be in greater demand by SOF commanders
than ever before. This unquenchable demand for superior communications support will not diminish
since the SIGDETs have shown their worth to TSOC commanders. Across the communication community,
SIGDETs are making positive impacts for the TSOC commanders, and earning a reputation unmatched
across the military.
The future holds the possibility of SIGDETs executing a wider array of mission sets including,
counterterrorism missions, nation-state antijamming requirements, and joint communication exercises
without an increase in personnel or equipment. Currently, the SIGDET manning complement of 32
persons is adequate to successfully operate the equipment in support of mission sets. However, with
the unique mission and small team and individual deployment schedules, SIGDETs are perfectly suited as
the communications force multiplier for the SOCPAC command. The amount of support and large
footprint SIGDETs are capable of supporting, with limited numbers, is a testament to the operational
experience contained within the groups.
The SIGDET may be a recent invention in the SOF community, but its existence addresses a requirement
as old as military warfare itself: how to get the commander’s voice to the Soldiers on the ground.
Regardless of the future organization of the SIGDETs, or changes in their missions, the units will always
stand ready to deploy rapidly, in a moment’s notice, to provide a voice for the commander and the
communicators assigned to the unit validate the “SOF Truths”, proving that Humans are more important
than Hardware.
The Author, Major Mark Natale, is a Signal officer assigned to the British Army Headquarters in Andover,
United Kingdom. He was the former commander of the 112th
Special Operations Signal Detachment
(Airborne) and the Senior Signal officer at 1st
Special Forces Group, (Airborne). He is also a graduate of
the Command and General Staff College and Kansas University, with a masters in Global, Interagency
studies. MAJ Natale is married, with three children and currently resides in Winchester, England.