Lightning talks - Cyber Security Congres 2016
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Vijf presentaties krijgen ieder vijf minuten de tijd om u te inspireren en te verrassen over informatiebeveiliging en privacy. Dit kan zijn in de vorm van een pitch met een goed idee, een inspirerend betoog, een nieuwe technologie of een best practice.
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Lightning talks - Cyber Security Congres 2016
- 10. • Is"a"tool"to"inform"people"in"crisis"situations • Is"able"to"send"push"notifications"to"users • Helps"to"reduce"crowds"in"a"crisis"situation • Is"divided"in"two"application,"send"and"receive • Can"be"installed"on"Android"and"iOS ICE%App…..
- 17. Flexible%design ! The"application"is"designed"to"be"easily"adjusted ! It"can"be"used"as"is"with"little"effort ! Or"combined"with"existing"applications
- 20. De'mens als schakel • Phishing$en spear@phishing • Trojanized software$installers$(malware) • Ddos door$misbruik van$IoT • BYOD$vs$Shadow@it • Focus$van$aanvallers op$de$thuisomgeving
- 21. Security'testing • Crisisoefeningen • Ethical$hacking • Resultaten direct$toepasbaar • Aanspreekbaarheid • Lastig controleerbaar • Lastig gevolgen beperken • Lastig gewenste scenario$te bereiken • Lastig aanspreekbaarheid prettig te laten ervaren
- 22. Security'awareness'training • Bewustzijn (dreigingen,$belang,$eigen rol) • Kennis (voorkomen,$beperken,$afhandelen) • Gedrag • “Het$duurde te lang” • “Het$sprak niet aan” • “Kennis blijft niet goed hangen” • “Het$doel ging langs ze heen”
- 23. Security'awareness'games • Leuk • Interactief • Extra$motivatie • Controlen • Beheersen • “Het$spel was$niet echt leuk” • “Het$was$wel leuk,$maar$ik heb er niet echt iets van$geleerd” • “Dit zal in$het$echt nooit zo$gebeuren” • “Dit zal mij nooit gebeuren”
- 24. Escape'Rooms • Leuk • Teambuilding • Educatieve inzet • Extra$motivatie • Barrieres • Realisme • Controleren • Beheersen
- 25. Mogelijkheden • Cyber$security$vanuit de$aanvaller bekijken • Deelnemers elkaar laten hacken • Meekijken door$(niet@)deelnemers • Competitie • Herspeelbaarheid • Beloningen • Kosten • Ruimte • Benodigdheden • Beschikbaarheid
- 27. DDoS Attacks on the Root DNS Presented by Ricardo de Oliveira Schmidt November 18th, 2016 Amsterdam, Netherlands Presentation copyright © 2016 by Ricardo de Oliveira Schmidt CYBER SECURITY CONGRESS
- 28. Reference: Anycast Vs. DDoS: Evaluating the November 2015 Root DNS Event Giovane C. M. Moura, Ricardo de O. Schmidt, John Heidemann, Wouter B. de Vries, Moritz Müller, Lan Wei and Cristian Hesselman ACM Internet Measurements Conference (IMC), Santa Monica-USA, 2016 (Technical Report ISI-TR-2016-709, USC/Information Sciences Institute)
- 29. Distributed Denial of Service
- 30. Distributed Denial of Service ? ? ? ?
- 31. Big and getting bigger 2012: 100 Gb/s 2016: 100 Gb/s is common, >1 Tb/s is possible Easy and getting easier 2012: many botnets with 1000+ nodes 2016: DDoS-as-a-service (Booters) offer few Gb/s @ US$ 5 Frequent and getting frequent-er 2002: the October 30 DNS Root event 2016: 3 recent big attacks (2015-11-30, 2015-12-01, 2016-06-25) Distributed Denial of Service
- 32. Big and getting bigger 2012: 100 Gb/s 2016: 100 Gb/s is common, >1 Tb/s is possible Easy and getting easier 2012: many botnets with 1000+ nodes 2016: DDoS-as-a-service (Booters) Frequent and getting frequent-er 2002: the October 30 DNS Root event 2016: 3 recent big attacks (2015-11-30, 2015-12-01, 2016-06-25) Distributed Denial of Service vDOS
- 33. Big and getting bigger 2012: 100 Gb/s 2016: 100 Gb/s is common, >1 Tb/s is possible Easy and getting easier 2012: many botnets with 1000+ nodes 2016: DDoS-as-a-service (Booters) Frequent and getting frequent-er 2002: the October 30 DNS Root event 2016: 3 recent big attacks (2015-11-30, 2015-12-01, 2016-06-25) Distributed Denial of Service vDOS
- 34. Distributed Denial of Service Image copyrights © thehackernews.com
- 35. Distributed Denial of Service Image copyrights © thehackernews.com "Someone Just Tried to Take Down Internet's Backbone with 5 Million Queries/Sec" Swati Khandelwal, thehackernews.com "Root DNS servers DDoS'ed: was it a show off?" Yuri Ilyin, Kaspersky "Someone Is Learning How to Take Down the Internet" Bruce Schneier, Schneier on Security
- 36. DDoS attack on the Root DNS Peak of 35+ Gb/s 5 million queries/sec Impact was moderate Thanks to the robustness of the whole system The Nov. 30 Event
- 37. What was the impact? Most letters suffered a bit (E, F, I, J, K) a lot (B, C, G, H) Did not see attack traffic D, L, M Problems on reachability! ... but also on performance The Nov. 30 Event 0 2000 9000 numberofVPswithsuccessfulqueries B C 0 5000 E F 1000 9000 G H 0 4500 7000 I J 0 6000 9000 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 hours after 2015-11-30t00:00 UTC K 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 A D L M
- 38. Collateral damage! D-Root was not targeted... ... but felt the attack The Nov. 30 Event 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 540 580 620 660 numberofVPs hours after 2015-11-30t00:00 UTC D-FRA D-SYD D-AKL D-DUB D-BUR
- 39. The Root DNS handled the situation quite well... ... at no time the service was completely unreachable Resilience of the Root DNS is not an accident... ... consequence of fault tolerant design and good engineering! True diversity is key to avoid collateral damage The Lessons Learned
- 40. And, What Now? Learn from the Root DNS experiences Have in mind the possible very large DDoS attacks when... ... designing Internet systems ... improving countermeasures and mitigation strategies It does not matter if... ... someone was showing off ... someone was testing/scanning the infrastructure ... someone is learning how to take down the Internet It was a big wake up call, this is critical infrastructure! Things are escalating pretty fast and apparently we are not fully aware of what we are dealing with.
- 41. Acknowledgements: Arjen Zonneveld, Jelte Jansen, Duane Wessels, Ray Bellis, Romeo Zwart, Colin Petrie, Matt Weinberg and Piet Barber SIDN Labs, NLnet Labs and SURFnet Self-managing Anycast Networks for the DNS (SAND) project | http://www.sand-project.nl/ NWO DNS Anycast Security (DAS) project | http://www.das-project.nl/ r.schmidt@utwente.nl http://www.ricardoschmidt.com
- 42. SECTOR'ONDERWIJS'EN'ONDERZOEK CYBERDREIGINGSBEELD,2016 Bart'Bosma,'SURFnet bart.bosma@surfnet.nl
- 47. CYBERDREIGINGSBEELD,2016 Trends: • Phishing' • Ransomware' • DDoS • Kwetsbaarheden in'software • Responsible'Disclosure • Ketenbeveiliging 0 20 40 60 80 1 4 7 1013161922252831343740