This document discusses Symbian OS platform security and analyzes whether its security model contributed to Symbian's decline. It provides details on Symbian's security architecture, the introduction of platform security features over time, malware trends, developer difficulties with security, and the costs of signing applications. While Symbian's security was technically robust, developer difficulties with complexity, compatibility issues, and signing costs may have contributed to Symbian's loss of market share to other platforms.

1. Franklin Heath Ltd
Smartphone Platform Security
What can we learn from Symbian?
Craig Heath
Independent Security Consultant
15 Jan 2015

2. © Franklin Heath Ltd c b CC BY 3.0
Discussion Points
 Was Symbian OS platform security a success?
 Did developer difficulties with platform security contribute to
Symbian’s downfall?
 Could those difficulties have been prevented?
 Did Symbian’s platform security have anything better than
today’s successful platforms?
15 Jan 2015 2

3. © Franklin Heath Ltd c b CC BY 3.0
Symbian OS Versions
15 Jan 2015 3
Without Platform Security
Year Ver. UI Layer Typical Phone
2001 6.0 Series 80 Nokia 9210
2002
6.1
S60 1st Edition+FP1 Nokia 7650
MOAP(S) Fujitsu F2051
7.0 UIQ 2.0 (& 2.1) Sony Ericsson P800
2003 7.0S S60 2nd Edition+FP1 Nokia 6600
2004 8.0a S60 2nd Edition FP2 Nokia 6630
2005 8.1a S60 2nd Edition FP3 Nokia N90
2007 8.1b MOAP(S) Fujitsu F905i
With Platform Security
Year Ver. UI Layer Typical Phone
2006 9.1
S60 3rd Edition Nokia 3250
UIQ 3.0 Sony Ericsson P990
2007 9.2
S60 3rd Edition FP1 Nokia N95
UIQ 3.1 & 3.2 Motorola Z8
2008
9.3 S60 3rd Edition FP2 Samsung i8510
9.4 S60 5th Edition
Nokia 5800
2009 Nokia N97
2010
^2 MOAP(S) Fujitsu F-07B
^3 S60 Nokia N8
2011 Anna S60 Nokia E6

4. © Franklin Heath Ltd c b CC BY 3.0
Symbian Platform Security Architecture
15 Jan 2015 4
 Run-time controls on system and applications
 Based on long-established security principles
 e.g. “Trusted Computing Base”, “Least Privilege”
 Designed for mobile device use cases
 low-level, highly efficient implementation
 “Capabilities” determine process privileges
 checked by APIs which offer security-relevant services
 “Data Caging” protects stored data
 protected directories for system and for applications
 Secure identifiers (“SIDs”) for applications
 verified at install-time

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Symbian OS New Malware Strains and
Variants Per Month
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0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
New
Variant
First phones introduced
with platform security

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Developer Difficulties
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 Compatibility break
 Used as an excuse for fixing accumulated technical debt
 Additional complexity
 SIDs, data caging, etc.
 “How do I know what capabilities I need?”
 Difficulty of debugging
 “Why can’t you just turn the security off?”
 Cost of approval and signing
 ...even though it was steadily reduced over time
 Delays caused by approval and signing process
 Rejections were common

7. © Franklin Heath Ltd c b CC BY 3.0
Aside: Symbian OS C++
 Same language and environment for apps as the OS (and/or UI)
 In principle allows third party developers to produce powerful apps
 ... but harder to work with in-progress documentation and finicky tools
 Non-standard C++ “idioms”
 Descriptors, active objects, cleanup stack
 ANSI exception handling came too late
 Technically good (vastly more power efficient)
 ... but steep learning curve
 Alternatives were either too little (CDC Java, MIDP Java)
 ... or too late (PIPS, Qt)
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8. © Franklin Heath Ltd c b CC BY 3.0
Symbian Signed Capability Groups
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User
Extended
(System)
Extended
(Restricted)
Manufacturer
LocalServices
Location
NetworkServices
ReadUserData
UserEnvironment
WriteUserData
PowerMgmt
ProtServ
ReadDeviceData
SurroundingsDD
SwEvent
TrustedUI
WriteDeviceData
CommDD
DiskAdmin
NetworkControl
MultimediaDD
AllFiles
DRM
TCB

9. © Franklin Heath Ltd c b CC BY 3.0
Symbian Signed Capability Groups
15 Jan 2015 9
Group
Additional
Capabilities
Permitted
Unverified Verified with Publisher ID
Unsigned
or
Self-signed
Developer
Certificate
per IMEI(s)
Developer
Certificate
per IMEI(s)
Express
Signed
Certified
Signed
User 6
install-time
user prompt
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Extended
(System)
7
Extended
(Restricted)
4
Manufacturer 3
OEM
approval
OEM
approval

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Symbian Signed Costs
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 2004, initially a branding / co-marketing programme
 All outsourced costs passed to publisher (could be over $1000 per app)
 Most developers were their own publisher
 2006, required for “non-user-grantable” platform security capabilities
 Standardised testing, lowest price €195
 Still required $395 publisher ID annually
 2007, reduced costs but increased complexity
 Publisher IDs reduced to $200
 “Express Signed” $20
 subset of “extended” capabilities, self-testing with random auditing afterwards
 2010, streamlined test criteria
 Express Signed €10, Certified Signed €150
 2010, Nokia pays for and performs signing for Ovi Store submissions

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What Could We Have Done Differently?
 Needed more clout and/or money
 Google were able to ignore operator demands
 Apple were able to phase out DRM
 Apple were able to subsidise approval process
 CA-issued publisher IDs were probably a mistake
 Self-signed works for Google Android
 Didn’t help us track down malicious actors
 Robustness was pretty good
 User experience was pretty good
15 Jan 2015 11

12. © Franklin Heath Ltd c b CC BY 3.0
Discussion Points
 Was Symbian OS platform security a success?
 Did developer difficulties with platform security contribute to
Symbian’s downfall?
 Could those difficulties have been prevented?
 Did Symbian’s platform security have anything better than
today’s successful platforms?
15 Jan 2015 12