l

PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT
[TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE NEEDY
FAMILIES]
PRWORA & TANF

Executive summary
Federal TANF regulations emphasized strict new work requirements and time limits
on cash assistance. PRWORA also included provisions that addressed Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) eligibility, child support enforcement, child protection,
childcare, marriage promotion, and abstinence education.
The history of immigration policy in the U.S. reflects conflicting responses of
humanitarianism and protectionism/exclusion. Since the late 1800s, the latter view has
predominated. With the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, Congress
sought protection from the “yellow peril” of immigrating Chinese laborers. This act
was expanded in 1907 to also exclude Japanese and most Asians, preventing their
naturalization and/or reunification with family members.
When PRWORA’s Title IV was being constructed, the perception predominated that
federal government spending on immigrant welfare was increasing and that the nation
had become a “welfare magnet” for the least desirable immigrants – those with less
education, skills and income. Although some challenged this perception, this concept
of the “immigrant problem” prevailed in the creation of the policy (Fix & Passel,
2002). Cascades of relative stability in structure, public welfare began to change in
radical ways in the 1980s. Under encouragement from the Bush and Clinton
administrations, state welfare departments were urged to apply for waivers permitting
them to depart from federal regulations to try out new ways of providing support to
the poor under Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
Discretionary powers given to the states to design their own versions of TANF.
Significant but less drastic changes were made in other welfare programs such as the
Food Stamp Program, Medicaid, and Supplemental Security Income. Within broad
limits the states may design their own versions of TANF. Some states have elected to
continue policies they put in place under AFDC waivers received prior to the passage
of PRWORA.
Among the more promising waiver experiences are those that were put in place
accompanied by randomized experiments intended to evaluate their effects and which
were continued after PRWORA took effect. More than a dozen states have continuing

AFDC waiver experiments. Strong inferences about TANF effects can be made for
states in which the waiver provisions being tested closely match provisions adopted
under TANF. In other continuing waiver experiments, mismatches make convincing
inferences about TANF effects more difficult. Although the best of the waiver
experiments will provide useful information on TANF effects, the findings will be
limited to a handful of states and to comparisons between TANF and AFDC.
Organizational Role of WtW Grantee Agencies in TANF. Even though most of the
eleven grantee organizations are workforce investment boards, they nonetheless have
fairly established organizational roles in TANF, especially the TANF work programs
(and formerly the AFDCJOBS program), as already noted in the previous chapters. In
most of the sites, the WtW grantee agency has some formal responsibility for the
TANF work program.
The four study sites vary in terms of the role of the tribal government in Tribal TANF
policy making, the extent to which the Tribal TANF programs are integrated with or
distinct from other social services, and the funding structures of the Tribal TANF
programs. Of the four study programs, only TCC operates Tribal TANF as part of a
477 program.8 Co-location and coordination of Tribal TANF with other social service
programs depends both on the organizational structure of the tribal bureaucracies and
on the size of the tribe or Tribal TANF program. The Navajo Nation’s Tribal TANF
program is administered by the Navajo Nation Program for Self Reliance, a
department under the Navajo Nation’s Division of Social Services.
One of four low-income children in the U.S. lives in an immigrant family. Among
children with foreign-born parents, 97% have a parent who works and 72% have a
parent who works full-time. These parents are more likely to receive low wages and
less likely to receive employer benefits such as health care. Before the current
recession, even with the changes in sponsorship rules, half of all immigrant families
had incomes below 200% of poverty. Two thirds of post-enactment immigrant
families live with incomes under 200% of poverty (Dinan, 2005a)
Social Problem
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)
of 1996 radically altered the U.S. public welfare system by replacing former federal

entitlement programs with Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF), a block grant
to the states to operate their own programs. Federal TANF regulations emphasized
strict new work requirements and time limits on cash assistance. PRWORA also
included provisions that addressed Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility,
child support enforcement, child protection, childcare, marriage promotion, and
abstinence education.
In addition, Title IV of this act significantly impacted legal immigrant (noncitizen
permanent resident) eligibility for public benefits (Karger & Stoesz, 2006). Although
PRWORA’s general welfare reform provisions also affected immigrant families, Title
IV specifically targeted legal immigrants, restricting their access to public benefits at
every government level. Title IV departed from prior policy by making receipt of
benefits more dependent on citizenship. It also increased support requirements for
immigrant sponsors, expanded the state’s role in determining immigrant eligibility,
and at the same time, reduced the state’s power to extend benefits to illegal
(undocumented) immigrants.
Background of social problem
The history of immigration policy in the U.S. reflects conflicting responses of
humanitarianism and protectionism/exclusion. Since the late 1800s, the latter view has
predominated. With the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, Congress
sought protection from the “yellow peril” of immigrating Chinese laborers. This act
was expanded in 1907 to also exclude Japanese and most Asians, preventing their
naturalization and/or reunification with family members. After 1924, a national
origins quota system favoring Western European immigrants went into effect for 40
years. During this time, immigration actions continued to discriminate by race and
ethnicity (NASW, 2006). Then in 1965, the Immigration and Nationality Act
Amendments ended the national origins quota system prioritizing family relationships
and labor market skills for immigrant admission instead. As a result, immigration
increased, especially from Asia and Latin America. Following the Vietnam War, a
large number of refugees from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia also added to the Asian
population in the U.S. (NASW, 2006).

At the time PRWORA was enacted in 1996, anti-immigration sentiment was
heightened. Two laws passed at this time – the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRAIRA) – increased restrictions on immigrants (Fix & Passel, 2002). IIRAIRA
made it easier to deport legal immigrants and report undocumented immigrants. The
implementation of this act disrupted families, and negatively impacted national and
international communities (Dinan, 2005a; NASW, 2006).
When PRWORA’s Title IV was being constructed, the perception predominated that
federal government spending on immigrant welfare was increasing and that the nation
had become a “welfare magnet” for the least desirable immigrants – those with less
education, skills and income. Although some challenged this perception, this concept
of the “immigrant problem” prevailed in the creation of the policy (Fix & Passel,
2002). Work requirements and marriage promotion central to PRWORA’s welfare
reform were non-issues because most immigrants wereworking hard and lived in two
parent families. Instead, PRWORA’s immigrant provisions sought to remove the
welfare incentive for immigrants with economic need entering the U.S. (Fix & Passel,
2002).
http://www.uwgb.edu/socwork/files/pdf/takahashi.pdf
Policy analysis
After decades of relative stability in structure, public welfare began to change in
radical ways in the 1980s. Under encouragement from the Bush and Clinton
administrations, state welfare departments were urged to apply for waivers permitting
them to depart from federal regulations to try out new ways of providing support to
the poor under Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Most states applied for and
were successful in receiving waivers. When the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act was enacted in August 1996, many of the states’
changes—and additional modifications—were institutionalized. In the widest sense,
the welfare reform receiving so much attention today consists of the cumulative
changes made over the past ten to fifteen years. “Welfare as we knew it” is really
welfare as it was in the late 1980s. By the time PRWORA was enacted, the “old”
welfare in most states had been transformed, in some instances radically so. An
important change in welfare also was underway by the time PRWORA was enacted.
Average monthly enrollment in AFDC began to decline in 1994 and continued to
decline after PRWORA.
Some of the decline can be attributed to economic prosperity and the accompanying
high employment rates, but as the decline approached 50 percent by mid-1999
(compared with 1994), it also became apparent that fewer families were applying for
welfare. It appears that in the early years, the decline went largely unnoticed in either

policy or welfare research quarters. Perhaps PRWORA accelerated the downward
trend in enrollment, but perhaps not. In any event, this longterm trend would become
an important aspect of the social changes accompanying PRWORA and, as will be
discussed later, presents a vexing problem for existing welfare reform research. The
major provisions enacted under PRWORA were:
• The abolition of AFDC as an entitlement program, to be replaced by TANF, a
timee-limited welfare program with federal support to each state limited by historical
funding patterns.
• Strong emphasis on moving TANF recipients off the rolls and into employment.
Discretionary powers given to the states to design their own versions of TANF.
Significant but less drastic changes were made in other welfare programs such as the
Food Stamp Program, Medicaid, and Supplemental Security Income. Within broad
limits the states may design their own versions of TANF. Some states have elected to
continue policies they put in place under AFDC waivers received prior to the passage
of PRWORA.
Other states have adopted shorter time limits than required for TANF. All states have
changed, although the changes in each state differ. We can safely anticipate that more
changes will occur over the coming years as states try new policies, find some
wanting, and move on to implement modifications. Although federal regulations can
be expected to produce some degree of uniformity across states, it is likely that no two
states will develop exactly the same set of provisions in their welfare programs over
the next few years. Furthermore, it also is likely that many states will modify and
change their programs in response to implementation problems or pressures from
interested constituencies.
It is also possible that federal TANF program requirements might change: For
example, if time limits were found to produce extreme hardships for some families,
Congress might very well modify those provisions or allow the states to do so. In
addition, some states may establish state-financed programs designed to mitigate
perceived hardships for some groups of poor families. Indeed, some states assumed
the costs of providing food stamps to legal immigrants when the initial provisions of
PRWORA declared food stamp eligibility restricted to citizens.2 The evaluations of
the effects of some of the waivers put in place over the past decade can provide at
least some hints about the effects to be expected from some features of the state
TANF programs.
Among the more promising waiver experiences are those that were put in place
accompanied by randomized experiments intended to evaluate their effects and which
were continued after PRWORA took effect. More than a dozen states have continuing

AFDC waiver experiments. Strong inferences about TANF effects can be made for
states in which the waiver provisions being tested closely match provisions adopted
under TANF. In other continuing waiver experiments, mismatches make convincing
inferences about TANF effects more difficult. Although the best of the waiver
experiments will provide useful information on TANF effects, the findings will be
limited to a handful of states and to comparisons between TANF and AFDC.
In any event, a need will remain for more information on TANF in all its various
manifestations throughout the country. At the point of enactment, both the nature and
the consequences of the changes enacted under PRWORA were largely unknown (and
remain so). Perhaps the changes would lead to improvements, but perhaps not; the
changes might very well produce some unanticipated effects. New research efforts
were needed to find out what shape welfare reform would take in each of the states,
the effects of the new welfare systems on public and private agencies and, most of all,
the effects on poor households and the children within them.
PRWORA is primarily the evaluation of the additional changes embodied in that
legislation and in the welfare plans designed by the states. It is not the evaluation of
welfare reform represented by all the changes that began taking place before 1996.
The decline in welfare rolls beginning in 1994 illustrates that the pre-PRWORA
welfare changes may have had effects that precede those of PRWORA. In addition,
the research projects are concerned mainly with the TANF provisions of the
PRWORA legislation. Accordingly, the studies reviewed here are mainly concerned
with TANF changes imposed on top of an already changed welfare system. (Peter H.
Rossi)
TANF Eligibility Requirements
In order to be determined eligible to receive TANF benefits, the following criteria
must be met by the members of the assistance unit (family):
Age: A child must be less than 18 years of age (19 years if s/he is a full-time student).
Application for other benefits: A TANF applicant/recipient must apply for and accept
other benefits (Unemployment Compensation, Workman’s Compensation,
Supplemental Security Insurance (SSI), Child Support, etc) for which s/he may be
eligible.

Citizenship: A recipient must be a citizen of the U.S. or a lawful resident alien.
Deprivation: A child must be deprived due to:
1.Continued absence from the home of at least one parent
2.Physical or mental incapacity of at least one parent
3.Death of a parent
In a two parent family in which both parents are able-bodied, deprivation is
established if one parent has a “recent connection to the workforce.”
Enumeration: All assistance unit members must have or apply for a Social Security
number.
School Attendance: All children ages 6 through 17 who have not graduated from
high school or who have not received a certificate of high school equivalency must
attend school and have satisfactory attendance.
Immunization: All preschool children must be immunized.
Income: An assistance unit’s countable, net income must be below certain established
limits that are adjusted for the number of persons in the AU. A family must meet the
financial criteria to receive TANF. For example, a family of three (mother and two
children) must have a gross income below $784 a month and countable assets of less
than $1,000.
Lifetime Limits: Receipt of cash assistance is limited to 48 months in a lifetime. The
limit may be extended if it is determined that an extension is justified due to certain
hardships, including domestic violence and physical or mental incapacity.

Paternity: The AU must cooperate in the establishment of paternity. The paternity of a
child must be established at application and whenever a child is added to an active
case.
Work Requirement: All adult recipients have a work requirement, and are required
to participate in work activities and training for at least 30 hours weekly. These work
activities help recipients gain the experience needed to find a job and become
self-sufficient.
Cooperation with Office of Child Support Services is a requirement for receiving
TANF benefits.
Note: A family receiving TANF for ten months might not receive increased cash
assistance for the birth of additional children. (division of family and children
services)
Immigrant participation and eligibility
In the 23 expresses that give minimal measure of backing for migrants, nourishment
shakiness inside settler family units expanded somewhere around 1994 and 1998. In
1993-1994, 11.3 percent of families headed by outsiders were sustenance uncertain
(implying that the family unit had individuals who were ravenous or needed to either
skip or cut back on suppers in view of absence of salary), contrasted with 16.3 percent
in 1997-1998. In these same expresses, the rate of sustenance shaky family units
headed by local conceived people fell. (Fremstad 2002).
By 1997, noncitizen families with livelihoods beneath 200 percent of neediness had
welfare use rates that were altogether lower than subjects' rates?14.5 percent versus
17.9 percent. (Fix and Passel 1999)
Somewhere around 1995 and 2000, the quantity of noncitizen youngsters and
noncitizen guardians getting Medicaid fell by seven to eight rate focuses. In the
meantime, the rate of low-pay, noncitizen youngsters and guardians who need
medical coverage, including work based protection, expanded by six to seven rate
focuses. (Fremstad 2002).

Somewhere around 1994 and 1999, low-salary LPR families with kids getting TANF
diminished by 53 percent, and evacuee families accepting TANF diminished by 78
percent. (Fix and Passel 2002).
While the quantity of naturalized native families expanded by 480,000 somewhere
around 1994 and 1999, the number taking an interest in TANF dropped by 300,000.
There were just 16,000 new enlistments. In the meantime, the remote conceived
populace developed from 24.5 million in 1995 to 28.4 million in 2000. (Fix and
Passel 2002).
Administrative structure of services management most of the study grantees are
workforce investment boards (WIBs), which are responsible for programs authorized
under the Workforce Investment Act (which replaced the Job Training Partnership
Act-JTPA). This does not necessarily mean, though, that the WtW programs or
grantees are separate from the TANF system. Most of the grantee agencies in the
study sites—those that are WIBs as well as those that are not—also have some
substantial role in the TANF work program, generally either administering the entire
TANF work program or as a major service delivery contractor to the TANF agency.
Organizational Role of WtW Grantee Agencies in TANF. Even though most of the
eleven grantee organizations are workforce investment boards, they nonetheless have
fairly established organizational roles in TANF, especially the TANF work programs
(and formerly the AFDCJOBS program), as already noted in the previous chapters. In
most of the sites, the WtW grantee agency has some formal responsibility for the
TANF work program. ( Alan Hershey)
Organizational Structure and Tribal TANF Management
The organizational and management structures for Tribal TANF programs vary
considerably among the four study sites. While two of the Tribal TANF programs are
administered directly by individual tribes (Navajo Nation and the Oneida Tribe of
Wisconsin), the other two are administered by nonprofit organizations whose
members are tribes that may or may not themselves participate in the Tribal TANF
program.
The four study sites vary in terms of the role of the tribal government in Tribal TANF
policy making, the extent to which the Tribal TANF programs are integrated with or
distinct from other social services, and the funding structures of the Tribal TANF

programs. Of the four study programs, only TCC operates Tribal TANF as part of a
477 program.8 Co-location and coordination of Tribal TANF with other social service
programs depends both on the organizational structure of the tribal bureaucracies and
on the size of the tribe or Tribal TANF program. The Navajo Nation’s Tribal TANF
program is administered by the Navajo Nation Program for Self Reliance, a
department under the Navajo Nation’s Division of Social Services. The Navajo
Nation’s large size and bureaucratic structure creates challenges for coordinating
Tribal TANF with other programs, both on an administrative level and for individual
clients, who must go to separate offices to obtain Tribal TANF, nutrition assistance,
health insurance, and child support enforcement (CSE) services. The SPIPA Tribal
TANF program also is administered separately from these other supports and services,
which are administered by the state.
However, the SPIPA Tribal TANF program staff have taken the initiative to
coordinate access to these other services at the Tribal TANF offices, through the use
of designated liaisons with the other programs, some of whom visit the Tribal TANF
offices in person to facilitate access. In the Oneida Tribal TANF program, the same
caseworkers administer Tribal TANF, nutrition assistance, and health insurance,
providing seamless access for clients. A single Oneida office building houses the
Oneida Tribal TANF program and all other major support services, further facilitating
coordination and access for administrators and clients alike.
Similar to Oneida, TCC’s Tribal TANF program provides combined case
management of Tribal TANF and other programs, and co location of most major
support services in its Fairbanks office. In the Alaska villages, a single worker
provides villagers with information and access to all support services. As shown in
table 5, the annual Tribal TANF grants for the study sites range from $835,924 for the
Oneida Tribe of Wisconsin to over $31 million for the Navajo Nation. The Oneida
Tribe of Wisconsin is the only site that does not receive state maintenance-of-effort
(MOE) funds. While the amount of federal funds should remain consistent over time,
funding from the state can change from year to year, depending on the availability of
state funds and the tribes’ agreements with the states. SPIPA Tribal TANF, for
example, receives a relatively large share of its total funds from Washington State,
although it received less in 2011 than in 2010, and Tribal TANF officials report that
they are concerned about the possibility of further reductions in state funding in the
future. (Heather, haley)
“Children of recent immigrants and children of undocumented immigrants are
particularly likely to be low income. And these are also the groups most likely to be
affected by federal restrictions on immigrant access to benefits” (Dinan, 2005a, p. 4).
Low-income immigrant families with high rates of food insecurity are less likely to
receive TANF or food stamps. Their children are twice as likely to be uninsured if
parents are noncitizens, yet are less likely to receive Medicaid. Low-income children

living with undocumented parents are even less likely to be insured (Dinan, 2005a).
Most of these children will remain in the U.S. for their lifetimes, but hardship puts
them at risk. Soon, these children will make up one quarter of the U.S. labor force
(Fix & Passel, 2002).
The issue of whether the federal government should provide welfare benefits for non
citizens was disputed among those who believed that legal immigrants should be
treated like other Americans and those who believed that non citizens did not have the
same rights to benefits as citizens. Those who supported benefits for immigrants
expressed concern that these families were being left outside of the welfare safety net
that provided protection for the elderly, disabled and poor. In this view, because non
citizens worked, paid taxes and were eligible for a wartime draft, they should qualify
for this protection. The children of non citizens born in the U.S. were viewed as
especially deserving of social welfare (Fix & Haskins, 2002).
Those who would deny benefits argued that citizen taxpayers should not be required
to support needy non citizens. In this view, non citizens who could not support
themselves should not be in the U.S. Removing the welfare incentive to immigration
would deter those more likely to need public assistance from entering or staying in the
U.S. To relieve the immigrant burden on the public benefits system, the too lenient
rules controlling public assistance eligibility and sponsorship conditions needed to be
changed. It was this view that predominated in the Title IV’s definition of the
“immigrant problem” (Fix & Haskins, 2002).
One of four low-income children in the U.S. lives in an immigrant family. Among
children with foreign-born parents, 97% have a parent who works and 72% have a
parent who works full-time. These parents are more likely to receive low wages and
less likely to receive employer benefits such as health care. Before the current
recession, even with the changes in sponsorship rules, half of all immigrant families
had incomes below 200% of poverty. Two thirds of post-enactment immigrant
families live with incomes under 200% of poverty (Dinan, 2005a)
Short-term goals of Title IV included decreasing the number of legal immigrants
receiving welfare to realize cost savings. In 1997, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) estimated that 40% of PRWORA’s $54 billion expected savings would come
from immigrant restrictions, even though immigrants were only 15% of all welfare
recipients in the U.S. (Fix & Passel, 2002). Long-term goals included shifting
responsibility for immigrant support from the federal government to their sponsors
thus controlling immigrant flow by discouraging the poorest immigrants, those most
likely to seek benefits, from entering the U.S. The intended outcomes were to save
money by ensuring that immigrants relied on private rather than public resources
(Library of Congress, 1996)

In addition, early CBO reports questioned the relevance of status differences between
citizen and immigrant; most legal immigrants were eligible to become citizens and
simply did not have the financial incentive to do so. If these legal immigrants became
naturalized citizens, this would undermine expected savings (Agrawal, 2008).
Although some questioned the quality of the knowledge on which Title IV was based,
critical reports were mostly ignored and/or manipulated in the “ideologically driven”
debate over restricting benefits (Agrawal, 2008, p. 666).
An implicit goal of the immigrant provisions was to keep “less desirable’ immigrants
out of the U.S. These immigrants, primarily people of color whose numbers had been
increasing in the years before the passage of Title IV, were viewed as an economic
liability in the protectionist climate of the 1990s. A value premise underlying this
perspective was that poor, unskilled, and uneducated immigrants brought nothing
worthwhile with them and instead, drained the nation’s resources when they went on
welfare. Dan Stein of the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), a
well-known anti-immigration lobbying group, shared his perception of this population
as “illiterate in any language, fifth grade education. Joining a community of a lot of
relatives who live in poverty as well as unlikely to ever rise above the poverty level”
(Brookings Institution, 2002, Stein dialogue).
Republicans initially introduced PRWORA and its Title IV immigrant provisions.
Although President Clinton expressed dismay at the restrictions, he signed the bill and
at least half of the Congressional Democrats voted for the final bill. Public sentiment
was supportive of the restrictive provisions at the time and recent immigrant laws
proposed in states such as Arizona, Colorado, Georgia show that such sentiment still
exists (Broder, 2007)
Impact of welfare forms and immigrants families:
In the 23 expresses that give minimal measure of backing for migrants, nourishment
shakiness inside settler family units expanded somewhere around 1994 and 1998. In
1993-1994, 11.3 percent of families headed by outsiders were sustenance uncertain
(implying that the family unit had individuals who were ravenous or needed to either
skip or cut back on suppers in view of absence of salary), contrasted with 16.3 percent
in 1997-1998. In these same expresses, the rate of sustenance shaky family units
headed by local conceived people fell. (Fremstad 2002).
By 1997, noncitizen families with livelihoods beneath 200 percent of neediness had
welfare use rates that were altogether lower than subjects' rates?14.5 percent versus
17.9 percent. (Fix and Passel 1999)

Somewhere around 1995 and 2000, the quantity of noncitizen youngsters and
noncitizen guardians getting Medicaid fell by seven to eight rate focuses. In the
meantime, the rate of low-pay, noncitizen youngsters and guardians who need
medical coverage, including work based protection, expanded by six to seven rate
focuses. (Fremstad 2002).
Somewhere around 1994 and 1999, low-salary LPR families with kids getting TANF
diminished by 53 percent, and evacuee families accepting TANF diminished by 78
percent. (Fix and Passel 2002).
While the quantity of naturalized native families expanded by 480,000 somewhere
around 1994 and 1999, the number taking an interest in TANF dropped by 300,000.
There were just 16,000 new enlistments. In the meantime, the remote conceived
populace developed from 24.5 million in 1995 to 28.4 million in 2000. (Fix and
Passel 2002).
discussion n Recommendations
PRWORA’s Title IV does not adequately address the social problem of welfare and
immigration, in part because policy framers constructed a social problem and solution
that did not reflect reality. They ignored the CBO’s technical data, the demographics
and the lived experiences of the target population. They did not consider the
underlying causes of immigrant poverty such as economic forces on migration and
labor policies. Framers also did not recognize that punitive immigrant policy would
adversely impact citizens with whom immigrants shared families, neighborhoods and
communities.
DRA’s documentation requirements that prohibited states from providing Medicaid
without verification of citizenship adversely impacted the elderly poor who had to pay
for expensive passports. It also affected the mentally ill who could not say where they
were born and victims of disasters such as Katrina who had lost documentation.
African Americans, who were not allowed in hospitals for their births, as well as poor
whites and Native Americans from rural areas, who were not born in hospitals, lacked
the required birth certificates. The DRA requirements increased state administrative
costs and deprived many eligible citizens of Medicaid coverage (Broder, 2007)
Placing responsibility for immigrant support on the states has created administrative
and financial burdens, and unfair disparities. Change is needed at the federal level.

Benefits should be restored to all legal immigrants in order to eliminate barriers for
full participation in society. Advocacy organizations support comprehensive
immigration reform that includes providing pathways for legal status and citizenship
for all residents, ensuring fair and equal treatment for those fleeing oppression,
promoting family reunification and equitable labor policies (Center for Community
Change, 2007; NASW, 2006). Punitive, xenophobic policy such as PRWORA’s Title
IV exacerbates distrust and fear, doing little to protect the health and welfare of those
who are most vulnerable. Comprehensive, compassionate policy is needed to provide
the resources that will support and maximize the assets and strengths that all
immigrant families bring.
The advantages to expanded instructive accomplishment for welfare beneficiaries
can't be thought little of for the long haul strength and development of the economy
and in addition for person beneficiaries and their families. However very regularly,
strategy creators consider extending instruction open doors for low-wage people as
too immoderate and politically disagreeable. In today's economy with the developing
requirement for a more gifted workforce, national policymakers must wipe out the
limitation to postsecondary instruction as a passable work movement and advance
access to advanced education for welfare beneficiaries. School authorities must do
their part, too, furthermore, welcome welfare beneficiaries to grounds by giving
bolster benefits that guarantee access, maintenance, and graduation for all that try to
proceed with their training. ( Brenda Dann-Messier)

References
1) Agrawal, S. (2008). Immigrant exclusion from welfare: An analysis of the 1996
welfare reform legislative process. Politics and Policy
2) Borjas, G. (2002). Welfare reform and immigrant participation in welfare
programs. International Migration Review, 36(4), 1093-1123.
3) Dinan, K. (2005a). Children in low income immigrant families policy brief:
Federal policies restrict immigrant children’s access to key public benefits. New
York, NY: National Center for Children in Poverty.Retrieved data August 14,
2016 From http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_638.pdf
4) Fix, M. & Passel, J. (2002). The scope and impact of welfare reform’s immigrant
provisions. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.Retrieved data August 14, 2016
From http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410412_discussion02-03.pdf
5) Fix, M. & Haskins, R. (2002). Welfare benefits for non-citizens. Washington, DC:
The Brookings Institution. Retrieved August14, 2016 from
https://www.brookings.edu/research/welfare-benefits-for-non-citizens/
6) National Association of Social Workers (NASW). (2006). Immigration policy
toolkit. Washington DC: National Association of Social Workers.Retrieved data
August 14, 2016 From
http://www.socialworkers.org/diversity/ImmigrationToolkit.pdf
7) Library of Congress. Thomas. Authenticated U.S. Government Information.
(1996). H.R. 3734. Retrieved data August 14, 2016 From
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/z?c104:H.R.3734.ENR:
8) Brookings Institution. (February 2002). Should legal immigrants receive public
benefits? Washington DC: Brookings Office of Communications. Retrieved data

August 14, 2016 From
https://www.brookings.edu/events/should-legal-immigrants-receive-public-benefi
ts/
9) Broder, T. (2007). State and local policies on immigrant access to services:
Promoting integration or isolation? Los Angeles, CA: National Immigration Law
Center. Retrieved data August 15, 2016 From
http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/sf_benefits
10) Messier.B “Levers for Change: Educational Opportunity Centers and Welfare
Reform”oppurtunity outlook, The Journal of the Council for Opportunity in
Education April 2001, Retrieved data August 15, 2016From
http://www.pellinstitute.org/downloads/trio_clearinghouse-Dann-Messier_April_
2001.pdf
11) Retrieved data August 14, 2016 From Alan Hershey,urban institute sub co
ordinator,“Program Structure and Service Delivery in Eleven Welfare-to-Work
Grant Programs” January 2001,Retrieved data August 15, 2016 From
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/410036-Progra
m-Structure-and-Service-Delivery-in-Eleven-Welfare-to-Work-Grant-Programs.P
DF
12) Heather,Healy,and Chris Narducci,”A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY OF TRIBAL
TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF)
PROGRAMS”September 2013,Retrieved data August 15, 2016 From
www.acf.hfiles/opre/tribal_tanf_final_report_for_submission.pdfhs.gov/sites/defa
ult/
13) Amanda Levinson,”Immigrants and Welfare Use”, AUGUST 1, 2002
MIGIRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, Retrieved data August 15, 2016 From
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrants-and-welfare-use
14) Division of family and cheldren services,” TANF eligibility requirements”
Retrieved data August 15, 2016 From
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://dfcs.dhs.georgia.g
ov/tanf-eligibility-requirements
Peter H. Rossi”Reaserch on PRWORA, what can be learned, Retrieved data August
15, 2016 From

http://www.welfareacademy.org/pubs/welfare/fourevals/rossi2.pdf

l

More Related Content

What's hot

Viewers also liked

Similar to l

l