The document discusses India's competition law and the roles and powers of the Competition Commission of India in regulating anti-competitive practices such as cartels and abuse of dominance. It outlines the definitions, assessment factors, investigation powers, and orders that the CCI can issue against cartelization and abuse of dominance positions in order to promote competition in India.
The document summarizes South Africa's merger review process. It outlines that the Competition Act and Companies Act govern mergers, and foreign companies require Reserve Bank approval. It describes the types of combinations that fall under review, and that the Competition Commission and Tribunal oversee the process. Mergers must be formally notified if they meet threshold turnover/asset values. The review process examines likely competitive effects and potential offsets. Mergers can be approved with remedies, and there is no time limit for enforcing remedies.
This document provides an overview of competition law and policy in India. It discusses the early stages of India's economic development which involved extensive public sector control and regulations. Economic reforms since 1991 have gradually reduced regulations and opened the economy to market forces. This led to the establishment of the Competition Commission of India in 2003 to administer the Competition Act of 2002. The Act prohibits anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, and regulates combinations or mergers above certain thresholds. It aims to prevent anti-competitive practices and promote competition for the benefit of consumers. The Commission has powers to investigate violations, impose penalties, and provide remedies.
The document provides an overview of competition policy and law in India. It discusses the evolution of competition law from the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP Act) of 1969 to the enactment of the Competition Act of 2002. Key highlights include:
- The MRTP Act was replaced as it had become obsolete with economic reforms since 1991 that focused on reducing regulations.
- The Competition Act of 2002 established the Competition Commission of India in 2003 to prevent anti-competitive practices, promote fair competition, protect consumer interests and ensure freedom of trade.
- The Act prohibits anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position and regulates combinations. It provides the Commission powers to investigate cartels and impose penalties
The document provides information on how the Competition Act of 2002 impacts trade associations in India. It discusses how trade associations can violate the act through anticompetitive agreements or facilitating prohibited information exchanges between competitors. The Competition Commission of India has found some trade associations guilty of cartel-like behavior in the past, such as the film producers association engaging in boycotts and price fixing. Trade associations need to avoid facilitating discussions around prices, markets, bids, and exchanges of sensitive competitive information to stay compliant with the act.
This document provides an overview of competition policy and law in India. It discusses the early stages of India's planned economic development and transition to economic reforms since 1991. This led to the enactment of the Competition Act of 2002 and establishment of the Competition Commission of India in 2003 to prevent anti-competitive practices. The CCI regulates combinations (mergers and acquisitions) by requiring compulsory notification above certain thresholds. Combinations are assessed based on their impact on competition and orders passed for approval or modification. Relevant provisions and procedures related to combination regulation aim to balance effective competition with business certainty.
Public procurement & Disposal - comparison between the Guyanese and T&T lawsNigel Campbell
Presentation made at Conference on Public Corruption & the Oil Curse organised by the Caribbean Institute of Forensic Accounting (CIFA), the Guyana Oil & Gas Association and the the African Business Roundtable at the Pegasus Hotel in Georgetown.
The document provides an overview of the Competition Act of 2002 in India. It discusses key aspects of the Act including its objectives to prevent anti-competitive practices and abuse of dominance. It outlines the prohibitions on anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position. It also covers the regulation of combinations or mergers and acquisitions as well as the thresholds for notification. The document proposes some amendments to the Act including increasing pre-merger consultation and notification timelines.
The document summarizes South Africa's merger review process. It outlines that the Competition Act and Companies Act govern mergers, and foreign companies require Reserve Bank approval. It describes the types of combinations that fall under review, and that the Competition Commission and Tribunal oversee the process. Mergers must be formally notified if they meet threshold turnover/asset values. The review process examines likely competitive effects and potential offsets. Mergers can be approved with remedies, and there is no time limit for enforcing remedies.
This document provides an overview of competition law and policy in India. It discusses the early stages of India's economic development which involved extensive public sector control and regulations. Economic reforms since 1991 have gradually reduced regulations and opened the economy to market forces. This led to the establishment of the Competition Commission of India in 2003 to administer the Competition Act of 2002. The Act prohibits anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, and regulates combinations or mergers above certain thresholds. It aims to prevent anti-competitive practices and promote competition for the benefit of consumers. The Commission has powers to investigate violations, impose penalties, and provide remedies.
The document provides an overview of competition policy and law in India. It discusses the evolution of competition law from the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP Act) of 1969 to the enactment of the Competition Act of 2002. Key highlights include:
- The MRTP Act was replaced as it had become obsolete with economic reforms since 1991 that focused on reducing regulations.
- The Competition Act of 2002 established the Competition Commission of India in 2003 to prevent anti-competitive practices, promote fair competition, protect consumer interests and ensure freedom of trade.
- The Act prohibits anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position and regulates combinations. It provides the Commission powers to investigate cartels and impose penalties
The document provides information on how the Competition Act of 2002 impacts trade associations in India. It discusses how trade associations can violate the act through anticompetitive agreements or facilitating prohibited information exchanges between competitors. The Competition Commission of India has found some trade associations guilty of cartel-like behavior in the past, such as the film producers association engaging in boycotts and price fixing. Trade associations need to avoid facilitating discussions around prices, markets, bids, and exchanges of sensitive competitive information to stay compliant with the act.
This document provides an overview of competition policy and law in India. It discusses the early stages of India's planned economic development and transition to economic reforms since 1991. This led to the enactment of the Competition Act of 2002 and establishment of the Competition Commission of India in 2003 to prevent anti-competitive practices. The CCI regulates combinations (mergers and acquisitions) by requiring compulsory notification above certain thresholds. Combinations are assessed based on their impact on competition and orders passed for approval or modification. Relevant provisions and procedures related to combination regulation aim to balance effective competition with business certainty.
Public procurement & Disposal - comparison between the Guyanese and T&T lawsNigel Campbell
Presentation made at Conference on Public Corruption & the Oil Curse organised by the Caribbean Institute of Forensic Accounting (CIFA), the Guyana Oil & Gas Association and the the African Business Roundtable at the Pegasus Hotel in Georgetown.
The document provides an overview of the Competition Act of 2002 in India. It discusses key aspects of the Act including its objectives to prevent anti-competitive practices and abuse of dominance. It outlines the prohibitions on anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position. It also covers the regulation of combinations or mergers and acquisitions as well as the thresholds for notification. The document proposes some amendments to the Act including increasing pre-merger consultation and notification timelines.
The document discusses the importance of competition and the need for competition laws when global trade is taking place on a single platform. It notes that India enacted the Competition Act 2002 to establish a new competition regime and foster competition in markets after economic reforms in 1991 made the previous MRTP Act inadequate. The Act aims to eliminate anti-competitive practices and promote competition for the benefit of consumers.
The document discusses key aspects of the Competition Act 2002 in India. It outlines provisions related to anti-competitive agreements (Section 3), abuse of dominant position (Section 4), and combinations (Section 5 and 6). It defines concepts like cartels, bid rigging, tie-in agreements, exclusive supply/distribution agreements, and refusal to deal. It provides examples of abuses of dominant position like predatory pricing. The purpose of the Act is to prevent anti-competitive practices and promote fair competition for benefit of consumers.
Competition Act 2002, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, Anti Competitive Agreement, Abuse of Dominant Position, Combination, Competition Commission of India
This document summarizes key aspects of competition law in India related to the regulation of combinations or mergers and acquisitions. It outlines the thresholds and criteria for mandatory pre-notification of combinations, as well as the review process and factors considered in assessing potential anti-competitive effects. It also compares India's regulations with international best practices and jurisdictions. Penalties for non-compliance with the regulatory framework are also summarized.
As a part of the advocacy efforts of the Competition Commission of India(CCI),a presentation to explain the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002, in so far as they relate to the abuse of dominant position in a conference in collaboration with Kerala High Court in Kochi.
National Webinar at the Centre for Corporate and Competition Law at Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad on the topic ”Abuse of Dominance in Competition Law” on 27th August, 2021 by Shri Dhanendra Kumar, 1st Chairperson, Competition Commission of India (CCI).
This document summarizes the key aspects of the Competition Act of 2002 in India. It begins with an introduction explaining the objectives and background of shifting from the MRTP Act to the Competition Act. It then defines important terms and outlines the key parts of the Act, including prohibitions on anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, regulation of combinations, the role and powers of the Competition Commission of India, and penalties for violations. In summary, the Competition Act aims to promote fair competition in India and prevent anti-competitive business practices that could harm consumers or the broader economy.
PPT in Company competition in India.
6th semester B.com program,
Shaheed Bhagat singh College (University of Delhi)
It is totally in Indian ACT" company's.
Here are my analyses of the situations described in the question:
(i) Yes, this amounts to an anti-competitive agreement as it restricts the territory of sale for the distributor, limiting competition.
(ii) Yes, this amounts to resale price maintenance, which is considered an anti-competitive vertical agreement under the Competition Act.
(iii) Yes, this agreement restricts the dealer from dealing in competing products, limiting competition.
(iv) No, this agreement relating to ensuring quality of exports would not be considered anti-competitive as it falls under the exception for agreements increasing efficiency.
(v) Yes, this agreement restricting the purchaser from acquiring goods from others would amount to an anti
The document discusses the interface between sector regulators and the Competition Commission of India (CCI). It notes that while sector regulators focus on technical standards and access in specific industries, the CCI promotes overall competition across sectors. There is potential for disagreements without clear jurisdiction delineation or coordination. However, coordination allows each to play distinct roles, with sector regulators considering competition and CCI overcoming market failures. The document outlines coordination mechanisms like information sharing and referrals between the CCI and sector regulators under various laws. It emphasizes promoting competition, efficiency, and consumer interests in all sectors.
The document provides an overview of India's regulation of combinations (mergers and acquisitions) from early stages of planned economic development to the present status under the Competition Act, 2002. It traces the transition from extensive government controls to economic liberalization since 1991. The Competition Commission of India was established in 2003 to prevent anti-competitive practices, promote fair competition, protect consumer interests and ensure freedom of trade. Notifiable combinations above certain asset/turnover thresholds require suspension approval from CCI which assesses the combination based on factors like impact on competition and consumer welfare.
Unfair competition laws in the UAE are based on international conventions like the Paris Convention and TRIPS agreement. The UAE commercial transactions law prohibits misleading the public, false allegations that create confusion between competitors, and other fraudulent acts. Violations can result in civil and criminal penalties like fines and imprisonment. Authorities responsible for enforcing unfair competition laws include consumer protection departments, economic departments, and trademark offices. Respecting these laws is important for companies to avoid reputational damage, costly lawsuits, investigations, and other severe consequences.
Unfair competition laws in the UAE are aimed at promoting fair competition between businesses. The laws are based on international conventions like the Paris Convention and TRIPS agreement. Acts like false allegations against competitors, misleading the public, and practices that create confusion in the market are considered unfair competition. The UAE Cabinet eliminated food monopolies in 2005 in line with WTO rules. National laws like the Commercial Transactions Law and Consumer Protection Law establish rules against unfair practices and allow for civil and criminal penalties through relevant authorities like courts and consumer protection departments. Companies are advised to respect competition law to avoid severe consequences like reputation damage, lawsuits, investigations, and financial penalties.
The Competition Act 2002 aims to prevent anti-competitive practices, promote competition, protect consumer interests and ensure freedom of trade in India. It prohibits anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position. It regulates combinations (mergers, acquisitions, amalgamations) that cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. Enterprises are prohibited from entering into anti-competitive agreements and abusing dominant positions. Combinations above certain financial thresholds require approval from the Competition Commission of India.
This presentation by the Singaporean Delegation was made during Break-out session 3: Due Process in relation to Evidence Gathering, of the discussion on “Investigative Powers in Practice” held at the 17th meeting of the OECD Global Forum on Competition on 29 November 2018. More documents and presentations on this topic can be found at oe.cd/invpw.
The document summarizes Turkey's economic reforms and competition law and policy. It outlines Turkey's liberalization of markets through privatization, regulation, and strengthening competition law. It describes Turkey's Competition Authority and the Competition Board that oversees enforcement. The Competition Act prohibits cartels, abuse of dominant market positions, and mergers that significantly impede competition. Undertakings found in violation face fines, damages payments, and other sanctions. The reforms aim to promote a sustainable, competitive economy in Turkey.
The document summarizes key aspects of the legal framework for public procurement in the CARICOM region, including two main legal instruments, objectives of transparency and fairness, and procedures to promote participation of CARICOM suppliers. It outlines the scope of the regime, protected national spaces, and requirements for procuring entities and suppliers to plan for the regional public procurement market. Suppliers are given rights to challenge and appeal procurement decisions through an independent review body to ensure fairness.
This document contains the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act Merger Review Regulations, 2020 published in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette. The regulations provide the framework for reviewing mergers according to the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act, 2018. It outlines the jurisdictional scope of mergers, notification requirements and procedures, substantive assessment criteria, available remedies, and other administrative provisions.
Competition Law is in an evolutionary stage in India having completed a little over five years in India. The orders in the initial stage of enforcement have a huge impact on the progress of this law in the country. Here, K K Sharma ex Director General, CCI discusses the 3:2 order of CCI in Jaypee case. In this case by a slender majority of one, the Commission decided not to impose any fine on Jaypee group holding it not to be dominant in the relevant market. The Market definition itself was changed. Earlier DG was asked to investigate according to a particular market definition but when the report of DG was submitted , the majority did not agree and went back to earlier definition in which the group was not dominant. The author who , now, is Chairman, KK Sharma Law Offices discusses in detail this case in this article.
Merger Review process has evolved over a period of time. This is evident from the changing focus on consideration of efficiencies in merger analysis. However, a cross-country comparison shows that as of date consideration of efficiency has become almost an integral part of merger review. The article details this discussion.
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The document discusses the importance of competition and the need for competition laws when global trade is taking place on a single platform. It notes that India enacted the Competition Act 2002 to establish a new competition regime and foster competition in markets after economic reforms in 1991 made the previous MRTP Act inadequate. The Act aims to eliminate anti-competitive practices and promote competition for the benefit of consumers.
The document discusses key aspects of the Competition Act 2002 in India. It outlines provisions related to anti-competitive agreements (Section 3), abuse of dominant position (Section 4), and combinations (Section 5 and 6). It defines concepts like cartels, bid rigging, tie-in agreements, exclusive supply/distribution agreements, and refusal to deal. It provides examples of abuses of dominant position like predatory pricing. The purpose of the Act is to prevent anti-competitive practices and promote fair competition for benefit of consumers.
Competition Act 2002, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, Anti Competitive Agreement, Abuse of Dominant Position, Combination, Competition Commission of India
This document summarizes key aspects of competition law in India related to the regulation of combinations or mergers and acquisitions. It outlines the thresholds and criteria for mandatory pre-notification of combinations, as well as the review process and factors considered in assessing potential anti-competitive effects. It also compares India's regulations with international best practices and jurisdictions. Penalties for non-compliance with the regulatory framework are also summarized.
As a part of the advocacy efforts of the Competition Commission of India(CCI),a presentation to explain the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002, in so far as they relate to the abuse of dominant position in a conference in collaboration with Kerala High Court in Kochi.
National Webinar at the Centre for Corporate and Competition Law at Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad on the topic ”Abuse of Dominance in Competition Law” on 27th August, 2021 by Shri Dhanendra Kumar, 1st Chairperson, Competition Commission of India (CCI).
This document summarizes the key aspects of the Competition Act of 2002 in India. It begins with an introduction explaining the objectives and background of shifting from the MRTP Act to the Competition Act. It then defines important terms and outlines the key parts of the Act, including prohibitions on anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position, regulation of combinations, the role and powers of the Competition Commission of India, and penalties for violations. In summary, the Competition Act aims to promote fair competition in India and prevent anti-competitive business practices that could harm consumers or the broader economy.
PPT in Company competition in India.
6th semester B.com program,
Shaheed Bhagat singh College (University of Delhi)
It is totally in Indian ACT" company's.
Here are my analyses of the situations described in the question:
(i) Yes, this amounts to an anti-competitive agreement as it restricts the territory of sale for the distributor, limiting competition.
(ii) Yes, this amounts to resale price maintenance, which is considered an anti-competitive vertical agreement under the Competition Act.
(iii) Yes, this agreement restricts the dealer from dealing in competing products, limiting competition.
(iv) No, this agreement relating to ensuring quality of exports would not be considered anti-competitive as it falls under the exception for agreements increasing efficiency.
(v) Yes, this agreement restricting the purchaser from acquiring goods from others would amount to an anti
The document discusses the interface between sector regulators and the Competition Commission of India (CCI). It notes that while sector regulators focus on technical standards and access in specific industries, the CCI promotes overall competition across sectors. There is potential for disagreements without clear jurisdiction delineation or coordination. However, coordination allows each to play distinct roles, with sector regulators considering competition and CCI overcoming market failures. The document outlines coordination mechanisms like information sharing and referrals between the CCI and sector regulators under various laws. It emphasizes promoting competition, efficiency, and consumer interests in all sectors.
The document provides an overview of India's regulation of combinations (mergers and acquisitions) from early stages of planned economic development to the present status under the Competition Act, 2002. It traces the transition from extensive government controls to economic liberalization since 1991. The Competition Commission of India was established in 2003 to prevent anti-competitive practices, promote fair competition, protect consumer interests and ensure freedom of trade. Notifiable combinations above certain asset/turnover thresholds require suspension approval from CCI which assesses the combination based on factors like impact on competition and consumer welfare.
Unfair competition laws in the UAE are based on international conventions like the Paris Convention and TRIPS agreement. The UAE commercial transactions law prohibits misleading the public, false allegations that create confusion between competitors, and other fraudulent acts. Violations can result in civil and criminal penalties like fines and imprisonment. Authorities responsible for enforcing unfair competition laws include consumer protection departments, economic departments, and trademark offices. Respecting these laws is important for companies to avoid reputational damage, costly lawsuits, investigations, and other severe consequences.
Unfair competition laws in the UAE are aimed at promoting fair competition between businesses. The laws are based on international conventions like the Paris Convention and TRIPS agreement. Acts like false allegations against competitors, misleading the public, and practices that create confusion in the market are considered unfair competition. The UAE Cabinet eliminated food monopolies in 2005 in line with WTO rules. National laws like the Commercial Transactions Law and Consumer Protection Law establish rules against unfair practices and allow for civil and criminal penalties through relevant authorities like courts and consumer protection departments. Companies are advised to respect competition law to avoid severe consequences like reputation damage, lawsuits, investigations, and financial penalties.
The Competition Act 2002 aims to prevent anti-competitive practices, promote competition, protect consumer interests and ensure freedom of trade in India. It prohibits anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominant position. It regulates combinations (mergers, acquisitions, amalgamations) that cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in the relevant market. Enterprises are prohibited from entering into anti-competitive agreements and abusing dominant positions. Combinations above certain financial thresholds require approval from the Competition Commission of India.
This presentation by the Singaporean Delegation was made during Break-out session 3: Due Process in relation to Evidence Gathering, of the discussion on “Investigative Powers in Practice” held at the 17th meeting of the OECD Global Forum on Competition on 29 November 2018. More documents and presentations on this topic can be found at oe.cd/invpw.
The document summarizes Turkey's economic reforms and competition law and policy. It outlines Turkey's liberalization of markets through privatization, regulation, and strengthening competition law. It describes Turkey's Competition Authority and the Competition Board that oversees enforcement. The Competition Act prohibits cartels, abuse of dominant market positions, and mergers that significantly impede competition. Undertakings found in violation face fines, damages payments, and other sanctions. The reforms aim to promote a sustainable, competitive economy in Turkey.
The document summarizes key aspects of the legal framework for public procurement in the CARICOM region, including two main legal instruments, objectives of transparency and fairness, and procedures to promote participation of CARICOM suppliers. It outlines the scope of the regime, protected national spaces, and requirements for procuring entities and suppliers to plan for the regional public procurement market. Suppliers are given rights to challenge and appeal procurement decisions through an independent review body to ensure fairness.
This document contains the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act Merger Review Regulations, 2020 published in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette. The regulations provide the framework for reviewing mergers according to the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act, 2018. It outlines the jurisdictional scope of mergers, notification requirements and procedures, substantive assessment criteria, available remedies, and other administrative provisions.
Similar to K k sharma korean business delegation march 24, 2011 (20)
Competition Law is in an evolutionary stage in India having completed a little over five years in India. The orders in the initial stage of enforcement have a huge impact on the progress of this law in the country. Here, K K Sharma ex Director General, CCI discusses the 3:2 order of CCI in Jaypee case. In this case by a slender majority of one, the Commission decided not to impose any fine on Jaypee group holding it not to be dominant in the relevant market. The Market definition itself was changed. Earlier DG was asked to investigate according to a particular market definition but when the report of DG was submitted , the majority did not agree and went back to earlier definition in which the group was not dominant. The author who , now, is Chairman, KK Sharma Law Offices discusses in detail this case in this article.
Merger Review process has evolved over a period of time. This is evident from the changing focus on consideration of efficiencies in merger analysis. However, a cross-country comparison shows that as of date consideration of efficiency has become almost an integral part of merger review. The article details this discussion.
While benefiting from the available best practices as compiled and recommended by the international competition network(ICN),India has ensured that the merger control regime adopted by India takes into account the ground economic realities of the country. Inter alia, the detailed factors of determination contain factors for consideration by the CCI which give CCI is enough flexibility to factor in the social realities by ensuring a fair merger review.The presentation analyses this and compares India's merger regime with the merger regime of some comparable countries.
The document provides a historical overview of India's economic policy and regulations regarding competition from the early 1950s to the present. It traces the transition from a command economy with extensive public sector control and regulations to a more liberalized market-oriented economy since 1991. Key reforms have included reducing licensing requirements, opening sectors to private competition, and abolishing price controls. This led to the enactment of the Competition Act of 2002 and establishment of the Competition Commission of India in 2003 to regulate combinations, dominant positions, and anticompetitive agreements. The CCI notifies and reviews mergers and acquisitions based on thresholds and assesses the impact on competition in the relevant market.
This document summarizes India's new merger control regime established in 2011. Some key points:
- The Competition Commission of India was established to regulate combinations (mergers and acquisitions) that meet certain asset or turnover thresholds.
- Reviews must be completed within 210 days (180 days for simpler cases), similar to other major jurisdictions like the EU.
- Factors for assessing potential anti-competitive effects are listed. Thresholds were increased by 50% and include both domestic and international transactions.
- The CCI can approve deals, approve with modifications, or not approve. Silence within the review period means approval.
The document provides an overview of the procedures for investigating combinations (mergers and acquisitions) by the Competition Commission of India (CCI). It discusses key aspects of the regulatory framework including relevant sections of the Competition Act that establish thresholds and notification requirements for combinations. It also describes CCI's process for reviewing combinations, considering various factors to determine if the combination causes an appreciable adverse effect on competition. The document highlights challenges in enforcing competition laws for combinations and compares CCI's role to predicting outcomes like an astrologer.
The document summarizes key principles from the International Competition Network (ICN) regarding merger notification regimes. It discusses 9 recommended practices from the ICN, including having clear notification thresholds, reasonable review periods, procedural fairness, transparency, and protecting confidential information. For each practice, it provides India's position based on its new merger notification law, noting areas of alignment like review periods being similar to other jurisdictions, as well as aspects where guidelines will be further developed over time, like procedures for substantive assessment. The document aims to show how India's new regime follows ICN best practices to have an efficient and effective merger review process.
This document summarizes the key regulations of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) regarding combinations. It discusses Regulations 5-7, 12, 18-22, 24, 26-27, 36, 39, 41, 46, 54-55 which cover notification procedures and timelines for combinations, flexibility in filing notices, fees, additional time provisions, acceptance of belated or revised notices, deemed approvals, expert assistance, opportunities to be heard, modifications to orders, independent trustees to oversee compliance, and confidentiality of information. The regulations aim to facilitate business transactions with no significant competition issues, provide flexibility, and follow international best practices of organizations like the International Competition Network.
This document discusses competition regulation and the relationship between sector regulators and competition authorities in various jurisdictions. It notes that most countries establish both sector regulators to oversee specific industries as well as general competition authorities. However, overlaps and conflicts can sometimes arise between the two. The document explores various approaches that countries take to managing the relationship and resolving potential conflicts between these two types of regulatory bodies, including through statutory provisions for consultation, concurrence on decisions, and mechanisms for resolving disputes. It provides examples from jurisdictions like the EU, UK, Australia and others to illustrate different models for structuring the high-level relationship between sector regulators and competition authorities.
This document discusses competition and regulation in India. It begins by outlining the rationale for competition and the benefits it provides like efficiency and lower prices. However, perfect competition is difficult to achieve in reality. Some sectors require regulation due to natural monopolies or to ensure standards and access. Both competition laws and sector regulations aim to promote consumer welfare, but they can sometimes overlap or conflict in their approaches. The document examines regulatory frameworks in other countries and how they coordinate competition authorities and sector regulators. It argues that in India, laws could better delineate jurisdictions and provide for consultation between authorities to minimize conflicts and maximize benefits of competition.
A exposition on the provisions relating to the anti-competitive agreements and cartels during a seminar on competition law and policy in Kolkatta in 2009 as a part of the advocacy functions of the Competition Commission of India(CCI).
A detailed presentation on the provisions of the Competition Act, 2002 ,in so far as it relates to the anti-competitive agreements and cartels during a seminar on competition policy and law in Kerala. This was a part of advocacy function of the Competition Commission of India (CCI).
The document summarizes the development and implementation of merger control regulations in India by the Competition Commission of India (CCI). It discusses how there was initial opposition to bringing merger control provisions into force, but that the CCI was finally able to notify final merger regulations in May 2011. It describes some initial amendments made by the CCI in 2012 and 2013 to refine the merger review process based on experience. It also notes that after over two years of implementation, it is an appropriate time to review the CCI's performance in regulating combinations and mergers under Indian competition law.
A detailed perspective of the background, the present functioning and the future possibilities of the merger control regime in India as it unfolds with the passage of time by the architect of merger control in India.
This document summarizes a recent ruling by the German Federal Supreme Court that clarified two issues regarding private antitrust enforcement in Germany. The ruling confirmed that indirect purchasers have standing to bring damages claims. It also allowed defendants to use a "pass-on defense" to argue that the claimant passed on some or all of the damages to subsequent purchasers in the supply chain. However, the document notes that the ruling raised new questions about burden of proof standards regarding the pass-on defense that will need to be addressed in future cases.
this article contains a view of merger control in India by way of analysing the clearances given by the competition agency of India and the time taken in different stages. It looks at all the competition review done by CC I and finds out the average clearance time. This is a two-part article. Part one deals with the performance and the outcome in terms of the quickness of clearance. Second part deals with the lessons learnt after the experience of merger review in India for the first time.
This article deals with an in-depth analysis of the doctrine of extraterritoriality contained in the competition law of India which gives CC I jurisdiction require into anti-competitive agreements ,abuses of dominant position and combinations if such agreement or dominant position or combinations have or are likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition in the relevant market in India.
The Competition Act 2002 provides for prohibition of abuse of dominant position. However, the provisions of unfair trade practices earlier covered by the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969,are not covered under the competition law. The apparent effect of the two being quite similar, there is a considerable possibility that a situation very close to unfair trade practices may be held to be an abuse of dominant position. The difference being very close, the article looks at the penalty handed out to DLF Ltd for abuse of dominant position from this perspective.
(1) There is a need for healthy cooperation between the Competition Commission of India (CCI) and other sector regulators to ensure the quality of economic regulation and avoid conflicts.
(2) While sector regulators have expertise in their industries, CCI has expertise in competition issues. Consultation between the two can help address regulatory issues from both competition and industry perspectives.
(3) The author argues that CCI seeking to provide input into sector regulators' merger and acquisition guidelines, such as those for telecom, is reasonable given CCI's mandate to evaluate combinations under the Competition Act. Regular consultation and coordination between regulators is beneficial.
This document provides an overview of competition law in India and the roles of inquiry and investigation by the Competition Commission of India. It discusses:
1) The meaning and purpose of inquiries and investigations in assessing potential violations of competition law. Inquiries are used to determine if there is a prima facie case for investigation.
2) How inquiries can be triggered by information from various sources and examples of sectors that may warrant inquiry.
3) The importance of inquiries and investigations for a new agency like the Competition Commission of India, and the need to establish standardized procedures to avoid cases being lost on technical grounds.
4) The process and tactics of investigations once an inquiry has found a prima facie case,
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This presentation is a curated compilation of PowerPoint diagrams and templates designed to illustrate 20 different digital transformation frameworks and models. These frameworks are based on recent industry trends and best practices, ensuring that the content remains relevant and up-to-date.
Key highlights include Microsoft's Digital Transformation Framework, which focuses on driving innovation and efficiency, and McKinsey's Ten Guiding Principles, which provide strategic insights for successful digital transformation. Additionally, Forrester's framework emphasizes enhancing customer experiences and modernizing IT infrastructure, while IDC's MaturityScape helps assess and develop organizational digital maturity. MIT's framework explores cutting-edge strategies for achieving digital success.
These materials are perfect for enhancing your business or classroom presentations, offering visual aids to supplement your insights. Please note that while comprehensive, these slides are intended as supplementary resources and may not be complete for standalone instructional purposes.
Frameworks/Models included:
Microsoft’s Digital Transformation Framework
McKinsey’s Ten Guiding Principles of Digital Transformation
Forrester’s Digital Transformation Framework
IDC’s Digital Transformation MaturityScape
MIT’s Digital Transformation Framework
Gartner’s Digital Transformation Framework
Accenture’s Digital Strategy & Enterprise Frameworks
Deloitte’s Digital Industrial Transformation Framework
Capgemini’s Digital Transformation Framework
PwC’s Digital Transformation Framework
Cisco’s Digital Transformation Framework
Cognizant’s Digital Transformation Framework
DXC Technology’s Digital Transformation Framework
The BCG Strategy Palette
McKinsey’s Digital Transformation Framework
Digital Transformation Compass
Four Levels of Digital Maturity
Design Thinking Framework
Business Model Canvas
Customer Journey Map
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2. WTO : “Law is broadly comparable to those of other
jurisdictions with effective laws in this area and, for the most
part, embodies a modern economics - based approach” (Trade
Policy Review of India 2007)
OECD : “close to state-of-the-art” (Economic Survey India
Report 2007)
2
3. An international conference on “India’s New Merger
Notification Regime (INMNR)” held on 15/16, March, 2008 in
New Delhi, by IBA & others
Delegates from ICN, EU, FTC, ACCC, IBA, ABA & leading legal
firms across the world attended
Benefitting from the experience of mature, functioning
jurisdictions
3
4. Duties of CCI
Prevent practices having adverse effect
on competition
Promote and sustain competition in
market
Protect the interests of consumers
Ensure freedom of trade carried on by
other participants in markets, in India
5. Horizontal agreements ‘presumed’ anti-competitive
(Price fixing, Quantity/supply limiting, Market
sharing, Bid rigging/collusive bid) ( S 3(3))
Vertical agreements – if causing AAEC (S 3 (4))
Exempted from these provisions:
Efficiency enhancing JVs exempted from
presumptive rule (S 3(3) proviso)
Agreement imposing reasonable conditions for
protecting IPRs (S 3(5)(i))
Agreements for exports (S 3(5)(ii))
5
7. “ Cartel includes an association of producers, sellers,
distributors, traders or service providers who, by agreement
amongst themselves, limit, control or attempt to control the
production, distribution, sale or price of, trade in goods or
provision of services” (S 2 (c))
Cartels are in the nature of prohibited horizontal agreements
and presumed to have AAEC
7
8. For inducing any member of a Cartel to make full, true and vital
disclosure, the Commission has been empowered to levy lesser
penalty
The party making disclosure will, however, be subject to other
directions of the Commission as per provisions of the Act
Clarity, certainty and fairness are critical to make leniency
programme effective and, for this, Commission can take suitable
measures including formulation of Regulations etc.
(S 46)
Regulations Notified
8
9. Principles: certainty, confidentiality, transparency, “first
through the door”
Eligibility: full, true & vital disclosure; continuing cooperation
Marker system– first applicant entitled to full leniency;
subsequent applicants to lesser leniency on graded
scale(50/30) (R 4)
Identity of applicant to be kept confidential (R 6)
9
10. CCI has powers of a civil court for gathering evidence
After prima facie determination CCI shall direct DG to
investigate (S 26(1))
DG is empowered to investigate into contraventions of the Act
when so directed by the commission and has the powers of a
civil court for gathering evidence {Section 41(1) & (2)}
10
11. Powers of a civil court for gathering evidence
Summoning and enforcing attendance of any person
and examining him on oath;
Requiring the discovery and production of documents;
Receiving evidence on affidavits;
Issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses
or documents;
Requisitioning any public record or document or copy
of such record or document from any office.
11
12. DG has powers as are vested in the ‘Inspector’ in terms of
Section 240 & 240 A of the Companies Act, 1956.
These powers, inter-alia, include seizure of documents with
the approval of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi,
when there is reasonable ground to believe that books,
papers or documents may be destroyed, mutilated, altered,
falsified or secreted. (S 41(3))
12
13. CCI empowered to pass following orders against anti-
competitive agreements (including cartels) :
Temporary restraint orders– during the pendency of
inquiry (S 33)
Cease and desist order - directing parties to
discontinue and not to repeat such agreements (S 27)
13
14. ◦ Modification of agreement - directing parties to modify
the agreements to the extent and in the manner as may be
specified in the order (S27 (d) )
◦ Heavy penalty – imposing on each member of cartel, a
monetary penalty of up to three times of its profit for each
year of the continuance of such agreement or 10% of its
turnover for each year of the continuance of such
agreement, whichever is higher (S 27 (b))
14
15. The availability of explicit definition of ‘Cartel’ in the Act
Adequate powers of investigation
Leniency programme for members of a cartel to defect
Power to impose deterrent penalty linked with profits
or turnover on each member of the cartel during
the continuance of cartel
Efforts to build strong competition culture including
encouragement to public to submit information
by ensuring confidentiality
15
16. Not dominance but its abuse is prohibited (S 4(1))
Dominance defined in Act, based on several listed factors (
S 4(2)/19(4))
Relevant market (product, geographic) to be determined as
defined in Act ( S 19(5)/(6)/(7))
Abuses listed in Act (exclusive list) (S
4(2)/factors19(3))
16
17. Position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise in the
relevant market which enables it to:
Operate independently of competitive forces
prevailing in relevant market; or
Affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant
market in its favour
Ability to prevent effective competition and
Ability to behave independently of two sets of market
actors, namely:
Competitors
Consumers
17
18. Factors (S 19(4))
1) Market share of enterprise
2) Size and resources of enterprise
3) Size and importance of competitors
4) Commercial advantage of enterprise over competitors
5) Vertical integration
6) Dependence of consumers
7) Dominant position as a result of a statue
8) Entry barriers
9) Countervailing buying power
10) Market structure and size of market
11) Social obligations and costs
12) Contribution to economic development
13) Any other factor
18
19. Relevant Geographic Market (S 19(6))
1) Regulatory trade barriers
2) Local specification requirements
3) National procurement policies
4) Adequate distribution facilities
5) Transport costs
6) Language
7) Consumer preferences
8) Need for secure or regular supplies or rapid after-sales
services
19
20. Relevant Product Market (S 19(7))
1) Physical characteristics or end-use of goods
2) Price of goods or service
3) Consumer preference
4) Exclusion of in-house production
5) Existence of specialized producers
6) Classification of industrial products
20
21. Imposing unfair or discriminatory price or condition in
purchase or sale, including predatory pricing
Limits or restricts production of goods or provision of services
or market therefor
Limiting scientific development to the prejudice of consumers
Denial of market access in any manner
Conclusion of contract subject to supplementary obligations
Use of position in one relevant market to enter into or protect
other relevant market
21
22. Cease and desist order
Specifying future terms and conditions
Imposition of penalties
Structural remedies include ‘division of enterprise’
Such other order as may be deemed appropriate by
Commission
22
23. Combination defined, includes mergers & amalgamation,
acquisition of shares, assets above thresholds and domestic
nexus (S 5)
Combination must be above thresholds defined in terms of
total assets or turnover plus domestic nexus (S 5)
Exemption introduced by notifications
Mandatory pre-notification (S 6 (2))
Suspensive regime (S 6 (2A))
Assessment of anti-competitive effect based on listed factors
(S 20(4))
23
24. Assets Turn over
Total (In India) Total (In India)
Only in No Rs. 15000 m Rs. 45000 m
India Group
Group Rs. 60000 m Rs. 180000 m
In and No US $ 750 m (Rs. 7500 m) US $ 1500 m(Rs. 22500 m)
outside Group
India Group US $ 3000 m (Rs.7500 m) US$ 9000 m (Rs. 22500 m)
24
25. Country Stage One Stage Two
EU 25-35 W days 90-125 W days (35+125=160 W days or 224 days in the
least)
France 5-8 weeks Additional 4 months. Further extended by 4 more weeks
(thus 5 ½ Months in total)
Spain 1 month 7 months
Singapore 30 W days 120 W days (30+120=150 W days)
China 30 W days 90-150 W days
Mexico 40 C days 145 (in complex cases)
Japan 30 C days 120 C days (more if information is late)
USA 30/15 C days -----
Germany 1 month 3 months (1+3= 4 months)
India 30 c days (draft 210 C days (150 w days)
regulations)
Indian time caps not very different from major jurisdictions 25
26. 1. Actual and potential level of competition through
imports
2. Extent of barriers to entry into the market
3. Level of concentration in the market (HHI, CR)
4. Degree or countervailing power in the market
5. Likelihood of post combination price/profit increase
6. Extent of effective competition in the market - post
combination
7. Extent to which substitute are/likely to be available
8. Market share in the relevant market-individually
and combined
26
27. 9. Removal of vigorous and effective competitor from
the market
10. Nature and extent of vertical integration in the
market
11. Possibility of failing business
12. Nature and extent of innovation
13. Contribution to economic development
14. Whether the benefit of combination outweigh
adverse effect of combination
(S 20(4))
27
28. Competition Commission of India can:
Approve
Approve with modifications
Not approve
If no order by CCI within 210 days, the combination is deemed
to have been approved
CCI Regulations to specify time limits
Less than 10-15 per cent of notified combinations seen to
have adverse effect on competition (international experience)
Very few (less than one in hundred) blocked
Approval with Structural and/or Behavioural remedies
28
29. Central or State Government can refer policy or law relating to
competition or any other matter for Commission’s opinion –
not binding (S 49(1)/(2)) – 60 days
Commission required to take measures for “competition
advocacy, awareness and training” (S 49(3))
- with industry, trade associations etc. to strengthen competition
culture and improve compliance
Commission may give opinion suo-motu to Government,
regulators, other authorities (S 49(3)/ GR 60)
- Competition principles interface with policies relating to:
disinvestment, concessions, industrial policy, international
agreements, entry/exist policies etc.
Provision for mutual consultation between Commission and
regulators ( S 21/21A)-60 days
29
30. Competitive neutrality [S 2(h)/expln (l)]
Effects doctrine (S 32)
International co-operation (S 18)
Exclusive jurisdiction in competition matters (S 53B/ 53T /61)
Confidentiality (S 57/GR 38)
30
31. Failure to comply with orders/ directions u/s 27, 28, 31,
32, 33, 42A and 43A – fine upto Rs. one lakh per day [S
42 & 43 (S 36 (2)/(4)) / 41(2)]
Non furnishing of information on combinations – upto
1% of turnover/ assets whichever is higher (S 43A)
Making false statement/ omission to furnish material
information on combinations – not less than Rs. 50 lakh
extendable to Rs. one crore (S 44)
False statement/ omitting information – fine upto Rs.
one crore
Lesser penalty (S46)
31
32. Trade off between cost of non-compliance and cost of
compliance is obvious in competition law violations
Hefty penalties/imprisonments(in some jurisdictions)
Cost of non compliance is too huge in comparison to
cost of compliance
32
33. Self compliance = f (effectiveness of detection)
Effectiveness of detection-high
◦ Self compliance-high and vice versa
Self compliance will also depend on CCI
Savings to society
◦ Cost of enforcement & Cost on enterprises in terms of
fines/imprisonment etc.
33
34. Individuals whose employment is dependent on
corporate/business unit profitability
Profile can be extremely varied
May be
◦ Highest level
◦ Middle level
◦ Lower level
34
35. Year Cartel Position(s) of
employees involved
2009 LCD SCREENS*# President of
Subsidiary;
Executive Vice
President of Sales
and Marketing; Vice
President of Sales
Planning
2008 AIR CARGO# Director of Sales and
Marketing;
Commercial General
Manager
2007 PASSENGER FUEL Head of Sales;
SURCHARGE Commercial
(BA/VIRGIN) Director; Head of
Communications 35
36. Year Cartel Position(s) of
employees involved
2002 AUCTION HOUSES Chairmen
2007 LIFTS & National Sales
ESCALATORS Managers
2001 VITAMINS*# President of
Divisions; Division
Managers; Marketing
Directors
2001 GRAPHITE President ;
ELECTRODES*# Chairman; Senior
Vice President;
General Managers;
Local Sales Managers
36
37. Year Cartel Position(s) of
employees involved
2000 LYSINE (AMINO Executive Vice
ACIDS)*# President; Group
Vice President
*Some involvement of subsidiary companies
# Atleast one employee imprisoned in the United States
37
38. Objective
◦ Prevention of competition law violations
◦ Not to enable enterprises committing violation to escape
punishment
Detect violation as soon as possible
Early warning systems (EWS)
38
39. Clearly established compliance standards
Assigning overall responsibility to oversee compliance
to high-level executives within the company
Exercising due care not to delegate responsibility to
employees who have a propensity to engage in illegal
conduct
39
40. Taking reasonable steps to communicate standards and
procedures effectively to all employees
Taking reasonable steps to achieve compliance with
standards
40
41. Consistent enforcement of standards through
appropriate disciplinary mechanism and
Taking reasonable steps when an offense occurs to
respond and to prevent future violations
41
42. Activities of trade associations
Sales transactions between the enterprise and the
competitor- especially towards the close of the year
Data on market share
Calls to senior executives from callers giving strange
sounding names or refusing to identify
42
43. Sudden unexplained price increases
Copies of announcement of competitors prices in the
files of your enterprise
43
44. Difference between survival and possible extinction of
an enterprise
Massive fines
Possible jail terms in many jurisdictions
Reputation
44
45. Those doing sales and marketing;
Anyone having direct contact with competitors
Those engaged in setting up and operation of
distribution arrangements
45
46. Keep record of all agreements for competition audit
High commercial value agreements should be
evaluated from competition angle by senior executives
Time bound review of these agreements-may be
annual or once in two years/five years
46
47. Liaison of marketing department with legal
department
Regular competition review of all agreements – may be
in one, two or five years
If resources don’t permit in house audit, can be given
to outsiders
Regular screening of e -mails
47
48. How well are officers and employees aware of the
chief executive’s determination and commitment as
regards compliance?
Do officers and employees have a clear understanding
of what kind of conduct violates competition law?
48
49. Do officers and employees properly recognize the ‘dos
and don’ts’ of preventing violations of law?
Is compliance accountability accurately perceived at all
levels of management?
To what extent do the enterprise’s business practices
conform to the provisions of competition law and
other related regulations?
49
50. How high is the enterprise’ level of conformity’
compared to other enterprises engaging in the same
business activities?
How many violations took place and how serious were
they?
What kind of corrective action was taken against those
violations, and how effective have they been?
50
51. How often is internal monitoring carried out and has
the monitoring proved effective in preventing and
detecting violations of law?
To whom and to what extent is compliance education
provided, and how effective are education
programmes?
51
52. Past, current or future prices
What constitutes ‘fair profit level’
Pricing policy and actual costs of individual enterprises
Possible increase or decrease in prices
Standardization or stabilization of prices
52
53. Bidding prices for projects
Collusive tendering (bid rigging)
Standardization of credit and trade terms
Control of production
Division or allocation of markets
Select customers to deal or not to deal because of the
above reasons
53
54. Delegation of authority to enforcement complaint
programme
Independent professional with expertise in compliance
Focal point for compliance
54
55. Up to date compliance procedure
Regular updating
Compliance check list
Regular monitoring
55