Jefferson_Country Study_North Korea

Ronald Jefferson1
Intelligence Research and Analysis Country Study (North Korea)2
American Military University (Current Student)3
June 28, 20164
For entry in the Bobby R. Inman Award for Student Scholarship/Intelligence and Analysis5
[National Security] Studies6
North Korea Country Study Intelligence and Analysis from a Militarily, Political/Government,7
Societal, Economical, and Vulnerabilities Overview.8
Military Capabilities9
Military Capabilities Overview. The military branches that make up the Armed forces is10
comprised of the Korean People’s Army (KPA).1
As of 2015, total personnel for the armed11
Forces is [estimated] at 1,170,000 soldiers compared to about 680,000 of its regional neighbors12
in the South.2
By the same token, North Korean outnumbers its regional neighbors of the South13
by almost 2:1 ranging in key categories of offensive weapons, tanks, long-range artillery14
systems, and armored personnel carriers.3
The branches of the North Korean Armed forces are15
the Army (approximately 1-million, including 87,000 special operations soldiers), Navy16
(60,000+), and Air-Force (110,000+, including 7,000 Special Forces Soldiers). Also, there are17
paramilitary security soldiers, including border guards and public safety personnel of about18
189,000 that make up the force.4
19
The armed forces are under the direct control of the country’s new leader Kim Jong-un,20
who is also supreme commander of the KPA with several other added chief administrative titles21
and obligations such as: grand marshal, general secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP),22
and chairman of the state National Defense Commission.5
The KWP Military Affairs Committee23
and the National Defense Commission are responsible for a coordinated effort and exercise24
supreme authority over the forces of the KPA. Behind the United States, China, and India, North25
Korea is a highly militarized state with the fourth largest population under military arms. North26
Korea’s active military is augmented by an estimated 7.7-million reserve component, which27
620,000 are assigned to training units; 420,000 are in paramilitary units, and around 6.6- million28
are members of the Workers and Peasants Red Guards, Red Guard Youth, and university29
preparation units. The age that citizens can join the military in the Democratic People’s Republic30
of Korea (DPRK) is 17-years of age, which is the official legal age. Similarly, in South Korea,31

1
Library of Congress. ‘Country Profile: North Korea’
http:// Icweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/North_Korea.pdf, (accessed November 10, 2015). pg 18
2
"Background Note: North Korea. U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Asian and Pacific
affairs” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm. (accessed November 11, 2015)
3
Ibid.
4
Library of Congress, pg. 18
5
Ibid.

2
the requirements for service start at the same age of 17 and usually last for about 10 years and up32
to the age of 30 as in the North.6
33
To support such a large amount of military personnel and equipment, North Korea uses it34
large-scale military budget. In fact, in the year 2003, 27% or United States Dollars (USD) $5-35
billion of the gross national income was used as the defense forces spending,7
which is translated36
to 44.4% of the total budget (8-billion) by the government.8
The large prioritized large-scale37
spending for military resources detracts from resources needed for investment opportunities and38
civilian consumption, which degrades the economy. Thus, meaning the military will be39
resourced first then everything else after military resources are fulfilled.9
40
Additionally, North Korea’s defense budget reported in 2012 at 9-billion USD was41
almost 15-times more than claimed to be reported by the North Korean state capital of42
Pyongyang.10
In fact, “In spite of North Korea's waning economy since the mid-2000s, North43
Korea continues to gradually increase military spending. According to the Korea Institute of44
Defense Analyses (KIDA), official North Korea figures show that the defense budget increased45
to USD11
570-million in 2009, from USD 540-million in 2008, USD510-million in 2007 and46
USD470-million in 2006. By the same token, North Korea officially maintains an annual defense47
budget of about $1.5-billion to support their armed forces, but some estimates of actual48
expenditures of the KPA are more than three times as high at around $5-billion, which would49
translate to about 25% of North Korea’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), estimated to be at $20-50
billion in 2015;12
down from 2014 with a “GDP” estimated at $40-billion.13
In retrospect, in51
2002, North Korea had an estimated GDP of 22.26 billion or 31.3% (5.5-billion). Interestingly,52
and at the same time, in 2002 North Korea had a projected total revenue and spending totaling53
USD $10.1-billion; so about half of those expenditures were allocated to military expenditures54
and their nuclear weapons program;14
North Korea’s regional neighbor in the South defense55
spending reported at 23.5-billion in 2005 with a GDP of 811-billion with North Korea at 1.9-56

6
The World Fact Book. Central Intelligence Agency.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html (accessed November
10, 2015)
7
Library of Congress, pg. 18
8
Ibid.
9
Quoted from The World Fact Book. Central Intelligence Agency.
10
"Analysts Reveal 'real' North Korea 2009 Defense Budget."
http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?id=1065928818 (accessed
November 10, 2015)
11
All figures from this assessment have been analyzed by researchers in comparison to USD
taking into consideration Korean ₩ (Won) Exchange rates during that time.
12
"The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula." International Institute for
Strategic Studies. http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-
koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/the-conventional-military-balance-on-the-
kore/(accessed November 15, 2015)
13
Rankings." Countries of the World: Purchasing Power Parity”
http://www.photius.com/rankings/economy/gdp_purchasing_power_parity_2012_0.html
(accessed November 11, 2015)
14
"Facts on North Korea." CNN World. http://articles.cnn.com/2004-04-
22/world/nkorea.facts_1_weapons-program-north-korea-chemical-stockpiles?_s=PM:WORLD

3
billion, and a GDP of 40-billion is only distant in spending because of a disappointing GDP and57
ailing economy in the North.15
Moreover, from the figures above, North Korea on average58
spends about a three-quarters of its GDP on defense. Regardless of North Korea’s unimpressive59
GDP and defense spending, the point is that North Korea will spend with no boundaries in60
anticipation of war with the US and South Korea putting their defense first for resourcing.61
Ground Warfare Proficiency. According to RAND, the character of a country’s military62
inventory and its war support capabilities is a significant category of military power and63
effectiveness.16
In essence, an abundance of arms and fire power must be supported with combat64
efficiency. In the case of North Korea’s land proficiency supported by its armed forces, they65
possess the inventory and have the combat support and maintain the capabilities to attack the66
South without warning; North Korea dedicate most of it resources to the Demilitarized Zone67
(DMZ)17
* in preparation for war and or a counter attack against the South supported by the68
United States. Note that the DMZ is approximately 25-miles from Seoul well within striking69
distance to conduct an attack or assault on the South.18
In fact, North Korean forces are heavily70
dug-in with over 4,000 hidden fortified facilities and bunkers near the DMZ with an estimated 2071
tunnels dug under the DMZ.19
There are also more than 20+ Special Forces brigades, totaling72
about 88,000 soldiers, which could be deployed by air, sea and land to disrupt the US and South73
Korean combat operations and attack civilian targets near the DMZ or in the event of an invasion74
by the South.20
75
76
77
78
79

15
"North Korea's Capitalist Experiment." Council on Foreign Relations.
http://www.cfr.org/economics/north-koreas-capitalist-experiment/p10858 (accessed November
11, 2015)
16
Ashley J. Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne & Melissa McPherson, Measuring National
Power in the Post Industrial Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), pg. 141
17
* The DMZ is a trademark of ideological conflict between North and South Korea, winds 155
miles across the Korean Peninsula. Stretching from the Han River to the East Coast, it ranges 2
km north and south of the Military Demarcation Line, covering a broad area of 64 million sq. Ft.
Serves as a buffer and border region between North and South Korea, which runs north along the
38th parallel. The DMZ cuts the Korean Peninsula nearly in half. Peace and tension coexist on a
daily basis. Despite its name, it is the most heavily militarized border in the world.
18
19
"The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula." International Institute for
20
Ibid.

4
Pyongyang’s unit structure for war is equivalent to approximately 150 active duty80
brigades or about 50,000 personnel (US Military Brigade Comparison).21
* That includes 2781
infantry divisions or about 270,000 personnel (US Infantry Division Comparison),22
* as well as82
some 15 independent armored brigades, 14 infantry brigades, and 21 artillery brigades.23
North83
Korea’s armored forces is comprised of some 3,500 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), 3,000 armored84
personnel carriers and light tanks, and more than 10,000 heavy-caliber artillery pieces, many of85
which are self-propelled. The MBT forces mainly consist of older T-54/55/59 models but include86
some 800 North Korean produced T-62s which are nothing more than refabricated Chinese and87
Soviet Armor.24
Of the 10,000 or so artillery pieces in the North Korean inventory, a substantial88
number are pre-deployed well within striking range of Seoul (South Capitol); additional re-89
enforcement of artillery can quickly be moved forward to occupy firing positions at a short90
notice to strike or launch an attack on the South.91
Of particular concern to South Korea is the threat of Pyongyang’s 240mm multiple92
rocket launchers (capable of simultaneously firing 16–18 rockets), its 152mm and 170mm towed93
and self-propelled artillery pieces, and its mobile FROG systems. All of which are capable of94
delivering chemical, and biological agents as well as conventional high-explosives.25
In addition,95
the ground forces have about 7,500 mortars, several hundred surface-to-surface missiles, 11,00096
air defense guns, 10,000 surface-to-air missiles, and numerous anti-tank guided weapons.26
97
North Korea’s strategic doctrine for war is modeled after the stringent Soviet doctrine with98
scripted war plans. Moreover, which indicates that North Korea’s top-ranking decision makers99
may lack flexibility or creativity? In essence, if it is not scripted or planned, North Korean high-100
ranking leadership are likely to be at an impasse for decision making stifling flexibility for active101
mobile type operations.102
On paper, North Korea’s armed forces are intimidating, but their true capabilities are103
very limited, given the outmodedness of most North Korean military equipment.27
Around one-104
half of North Korea’s significant weapons were designed in the 1960s; the other half is also105
dated. Also, it is evident that shortages of spare parts, fuel, and reduced maintenance, some106
weaponry may fail thus degrading North Korea’s effectiveness. Furthermore, North Korea is not107
able to conduct large-scale training exercise like the United States and South Korea due to108

21
* US size standard military brigades can range from 3,000-5,000 personnel; however, with cut
backs and downsizing those numbers have decreased and for simplicity we’ve utilized 3,500
personnel for comparison. These numbers were utilized to give a general idea in comparison to
US military echelons and formations.
22
* US size standard military Divisions can range from 10,000-20,000 personnel; however, with
cut backs and downsizing those numbers have decreased and for simplicity we’ve utilized 10,000
personnel for comparison.
23
The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula." International Institute for
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27

5
shortages of fuel and spare parts, which may limit their proficiency and effectiveness,28
however,109
and as stated above, this does not limit their ability to attack or counter an attack from the South110
or the United States.111
Naval Warfare Proficiency North Korea’s Navy is primarily a coastal Navy with112
antiquated surface and submarine fleets. The structure of the Navy is comprised of113
approximately 88 submarines, 43 missile crafts, one depot ship, 4 survey vessels, and more than114
334 scout crafts among much other artillery29
. South Korea’s Navy weighs in at 43 subs, 6-115
missile destroyers, and 9-frigates. Figure 1-1 below depicts an example of a frigate ship; from116
this armory of the North Korean Navy, the RAND document classifies these defense systems as117
anti-surface and anti-air warfare with surface ships. RAND also states that coastal defense and118
mining represent the most primitive naval war fighting competency in the capabilities-based119
methodology.30
In essence, personnel operating the usual small vessels to protect and defend the120
coastal waters must be competent in these areas.121
Although a 60,000+ Naval force, North Korea is an agile force, but a fundamental coastal122
defense force meaning most of its vessels are small patrol sized ships only capable of traveling123
up to 50 nautical miles from North Korea’s coast; However, capable of policing and patrolling124
North Korea’s territorial waters.31
We know that North Korea is territorial and capable of125
policing their waters because of the controversial sinking of the South Korean destroyer Cheonan126
in 2010, which is being reported as instigated by the North Korean Navy because of possible127
territorial infringement by the South. Arguably, it is believed that the event in 2010 was from128
escalated tension carried over from 2009 in a dispute on the waters because of the South Korean129
Navy firing on a North Korean ship, allegedly for crossing territorial waters.32
See Figure 1-2130
below which depicts the Northern Line Limit established in 1953 and a snap shot of the131
territorial boundary to include the actual firing incident. Originally, the boundary limits were132
established to keep South Koreans out of North Korean waters. However, since then has evolved133
into a limit or boundary used more by the South to deter North Koreans from coming into South134
Korean waters frequented by North Korean fisherman.135

28
Ibid.
29
Library of Congress pg. 19
30
RAND., pg. 43
31
"Military Forces." Defense Intelligence Agency. October 1991.
http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/knfms/knfms_chp5.html (accessed November 16, 2015)
32
Arnold, Terrell E. "Sinking of The Cheonan & The N Korea Problem." July 26, 2010.
http://rense.com/general91/sink.htm (accessed November 16, 2015)

6
136
137
Figure 1-2138
On the Contrary, the North Korean Navy is an independent branch of the KPA and139
command and control is exercised from the North Korean Capital of Pyongyang. Not to140
undermine its small fleet mentioned above, the Navy is capable of conducting inshore defensive141
operations, submarine operations against merchant shipping and guerilla naval combatants,142
offensive and defensive mining operations, and conventional raids. Because of the general143
variation of North Korean ship types, the North Korean Navy has a limited capacity to carry out144
missions such as sea control or denial and antisubmarine operations.33
145
The North Korean Navy’s primary mission is to conduct offensive operations supporting146
military actions against South Korea, explicitly by inserting small-scale amphibious operations147
and Special Operations Forces along the coast.34
The Navy’s secondary mission is patrolling and148
protecting their coastal waters; The Navy has a limited capability to conduct rocket and shore149
attacks against selected coastal targets. However, any North Korean force attempting to engage150
in these operations would be at risk from both air and surface combatants because of poor air151
defense and detection capabilities.35
Continuing to build attack warships, North Korea has tried152
to strengthen its naval capabilities through developing new ground-to-sea missile systems, such153
as extending the striking range of the Silkworm missiles. North Korea also deploys 80-95 km-154

33
Military." Korea's People's Army Navy.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/Navy.htm (accessed November 16, 2015)
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
Figure 1-1 to the right.
A frigate ship is a medium size
square-rigged warship of the 18th
and 19th centuries; A warship
larger than a destroyer and smaller
than a cruiser. The term has been
used for warships of many sizes
and roles across eras; An obsolete
type of sailing warship with a
single continuous gun deck,
typically used for patrolling,
blockading, etc., but not in line of
battle.
Figure 1-2 Depicts the
Northern Line Limit and South
Korean firing on a North
Korean Ship in a 2010 event.

7
range ground-to-ship samlet and silkworm missiles on both east and west coasts. Silkworm155
missiles, deployed in the forward area can launch anti-ship attacks as far as Tokjok-do in the156
Yellow Sea and Sokcho and Yang yang on the east coast (Average is about 50-70 miles for ship157
attacks for the Yellow Sea and East Coast); Coastal defense artillery includes 122-mm, 130-mm,158
and 152-mm systems. The Naval Command has two separate fleets: the East Sea Fleet36
* and159
Yellow Sea Fleet,37
* with sixteen combatant groups. The fleets do not exchange vessels and their160
areas of operations (threat based), and missions determine their organizational structure; mutual161
support is difficult at best.162
Air Warfare Proficiency. A country Air Warfare Proficiency (AWP) can be measured163
and weighed by its supportive bases related to the size. This consists of passive and active164
defensive measures for its aircraft, survivability, command and control to include critical165
logistics such as Petroleum Oil Lubricants (POL) and ammunition.38
On that note, let’s take a166
look at whether North Korea measures up or not? The North Korean air-force has 80 bombers,167
over 541 ground fighters, 324 armed helicopters, totaling over 1,000 aircraft with no air craft168
carriers and a large investment in their air and ground missiles. In addition, North Korea has over169
70 functional airports to support and launch their fleet.39
The weaponry defined here classifies170
these warfare defense systems as basic and elementary for a strategic strike. In essence, their171
capabilities do not match up to the rest of the world’s Air-force fleets because of their inability to172
carry out comprehensive strategic strikes and large-scale offensive type attacks. Regarding173
elementary, North Koreas primary goal is to counter and be prepared for an attack from the174
South and the US. Simply meaning North Korea’s fleet of air warfare is not designed to counter175
large-scale offensive attacks hence the term elementary.176
In comparison, the South has a similar fleet of Air Warfare totaling over 1,000 aircraft,177
over 700 serviceable Helicopters, over 600 ground fighters, and over 100 bombers. Additionally,178
like its neighbor in the North, South Korea has no reported Air-craft carriers with just over 100179
airports to support and launch their fleet, but the North Korean Air-Force continues to struggle.180
With logistics issues, shortage of fuel, the quality of parts to include the age of their aircraft, it181
reduces their AWP and the threat.40
Although it is speculated that North Korea is believed to182
have a larger Air-Force than its neighbors in the South, however, with elementary weapon183
systems, minimal vintage variety of aircraft, to include insufficient pilot training increasingly184
undermines it is aerial capabilities and AWP.41
Moreover, the one thing we have not discussed is185

36
*The East Sea Fleet, with ten squadrons [versus nine in the early 1990s] and around 470
vessels [versus 400 in the early 1990s], is headquartered at T'oejo-dong, with major bases at
Najin and Wonsan and secondary bases at Ch'aho, Ch'angjn, Mayangdo, and Puam-ni near the
DMZ.
37
*The Yellow Sea Fleet, made up of six squadrons [versus five in the early 1990s] and around
300 vessels, is headquartered at Namp'o, with major bases at Pip'a-got and Sagot and smaller
bases at Ch'o-do and Tasa-ri
38
RAND., pg. 139
39
"Global Firepower - 2012 World Military Strength Ranking."
http://www.globalfirepower.com/(accessed November 10, 2015)
40
O'Carroll, Chad. "The Asymmetrical Challenges of North Korea's Air-Force: The Peninsula."
June 05, 2012. http://blog.keia.org/2012/06/the-asymmetrical-challenges-of-north-koreas-air-
force/(accessed November 10, 2015)
41
Ibid.

8
North Korea’s biggest arsenal, which is their highly proliferated nuclear weapons program,186
which the South does not have.187
Closing remarks. Figure 1-3 below depicts North Korea’s arsenal of Nuclear weapons188
ranging from 500-6000 miles’ launch capabilities into the atmosphere. Testing and development189
of these nuclear weapons to include advance versions is still to be determined, yet remains a190
world threat. North Korea utilizes their highly proliferated Nuclear weapons program to leverage191
cohesion with the world and the international community. North Korea knows its ground, air,192
and Naval proficiency struggles, but will utilize their nuclear weapons program to make up the193
differences to leverage cohesion and cooperation from the international community; Although194
world rankings in 2011 places North Korea’s total Military strength at a distant 22 behind South195
Korea at 7, Japan at 9, China 3, and the United States at Number 1,42
it can be assessed that those196
figures and rankings are accurate and conclusive based on the size of the North Korean Army197
and their highly proliferated nuclear weapons program. As mentioned earlier, North Korea on198
paper is impressive; however, very likely to fold and not able to sustain prolong battles because199
of their lack of proficiency and training to include its poor logistical support and aging200
equipment. History has dictated that self-proclaimed resourced highly proliferated militarized201
states has resulted in failure with a vested interest in Nuclear weapons as that was proven by the202
fall of the former Soviet Union, which North Korea has desperately idolized for years and still do203
to present day. Although North Korea may not have a stellar strategic military capable of204
carrying out large-scale offensive operations, their highly proliferated Nuclear weapons program205
are not to be undermined and remains a world threat. North Korea will continue to flex their206
military might and boast to the rest of the world by nuclear weapons testing to yield respect and207
avoid an invasion— North Korea’s large-scale defense spending and ultimate goal is to prepare208
for an offensive counter attack against South Korea and an invasion by the US as long as they209
remain in power. Figure 1-3210
211

42
Quoted from "Global Firepower - 2012 World Military Strength Ranking

9
212
Figure 1-3 Above43
213
Note: The figures on North Korea’s Armed forces utilized in this Military Capabilities214
assessment (overview) were taken from various sources for the best analysis and comparison.215
Thus, sources that report on North Korea’s military numbers will likely vary and differ from216
source to source. This is because North Korea is a very secretive and undisclosed society and217
estimations for accuracy is difficult to quantify.218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233

43
Durden, Tyler. "Comparison of North and South Korea's Military Capabilities." ZeroHedge.
November 23, 2010. http://www.zerohedge.com/article/comparison-north-and-south-koreas-
military-capabilities. (accessed November 16, 2015)

10
234
Bibliography235
"Analysts Reveal 'real' North Korea 2009 Defense Budget."236
http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?id=1065928818237
(accessed November 10, 2015)238
Arnold, Terrell E. "Sinking of The Cheonan & The N Korea Problem." July 26, 2010.239
http://rense.com/general91/sink.htm (accessed November 16, 2015)240
Ashley J. Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne & Melissa McPherson, Measuring National241
Power in the Post Industrial Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), pg. 43,139, 141242
"Background Note: North Korea. U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Asian and Pacific affairs”243
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm. (accessed November 11, 2015)244
Durden, Tyler. "Comparison of North and South Korea's Military Capabilities." ZeroHedge.245
November 23, 2010. http://www.zerohedge.com/article/comparison-north-and-south-246
koreas-military-capabilities. (accessed November 16, 2015)247
"Facts on North Korea." CNN World. http://articles.cnn.com/2004-04-248
22/world/nkorea.facts_1_weapons-program-north-korea-chemical-249
stockpiles?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed November 11, 2015)250
"Global Firepower - 2012 World Military Strength Ranking." http://www.globalfirepower.com/251
Library of Congress. ‘Country Profile: North Korea’253
http:// Icweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/North_Korea.pdf, (accessed November 10, 2015).254
pg. 18255
"Military Forces." Defense Intelligence Agency. October 1991.256
http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/knfms/knfms_chp5.html (accessed November 16,257
2015)258
Military." Korea's People's Army Navy.259
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/Navy.htm (accessed November 16,260
2015)261
"North Korea's Capitalist Experiment." Council on Foreign Relations.262
http://www.cfr.org/economics/north-koreas-capitalist-experiment/p10858 (accessed263
November 11, 2015)264
O'Carroll, Chad. "The Asymmetrical Challenges of North Korea's Air-Force: The Peninsula."265
June 05, 2012. http://blog.keia.org/2012/06/the-asymmetrical-challenges-of-north-koreas-266
air-force/ (accessed November 10, 2015)267
Rankings." Countries of the World: Purchasing Power Parity”268
http://www.photius.com/rankings/economy/gdp_purchasing_power_parity_2012_0.html269
"The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula." International Institute for271
Strategic Studies. http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-272

11
dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a-net-asses/the-conventional-military-273
balance-on-the-kore/ (accessed November 11, 2015)274
The World Fact Book." Central Intelligence Agency.275
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html (accessed276
November 10, 2015)277
Political/Government Overview:278
Purpose: To analyze and provide an assessment of North Korea’s political and government279
factors to include relative composition and level of power in the 21st
Century but not limited to…280
a. Government Overview. Following North Korea’s liberation and declared independence from281
South Korea in 1948, North Korea was re-established as the Democratic People’s Republic of282
Korea (DPRK) marking its separation from South Korea.44
On the other-hand, with adopted283
totalitarian rule and communism comparatively to the former Soviet Union, North Korea’s284
government can be assessed as rigid and highly personalized under the rule of man with ultimate285
loyalty to now President Kim Jong-un.45
The governing or ruling party of North Korea is housed286
under the Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland, which are comprised of three287
smaller political parties;46
the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) (majority party), (minor parties);288
Chondoist Chongu Party, and the Korean Social Democratic Party (SDP) together help form the289
North Korean government, nominate candidates for office, direct the country, and hold seats in290
the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA). Comparatively, like the United States system of291
government without the added democracy, North Korea has an Executive, Legislative, and292
Judicial branch. Under President Kim Jong-un, the executive branch backed by the SPA has the293
inherent responsibility of directing the country under its strict assessed dictatorship and294
totalitarian-style rule. The Legislative branch, which consists of a unicameral SPA is responsible295
for strict and controlled oversight of elected members within the SPA often without any296
opposition from elected officials.47
And lastly, the judicial branch that interprets and exercises297
the country’s strict laws is a central court system where members are also elected by the SPA298
and acts as a strict proletarian weapon for the country’s dictatorship.48
Collaboratively, these299
three branches are responsible for governing a state assessed to be about the size of Mississippi300
aggregately consisting of 9 provinces, 18 districts, racially majority Korean with a small Chinese301

44
"Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs." U.S. Department of State.
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm (accessed October 09, 2015).
45
"North Korean Government." Maps of the World. http://www.mapsofworld.com/north-
korea/government/ (accessed October 9, 2015).
46
Ibid.
47
"The World Fact Book." Central Intelligence Agency.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html (accessed October 10,
2015)
48
Ibid.

12
and Japanese community;49
Autonomous religious beliefs in the country are almost non-existent,302
and government-sponsored religious groups are provided to deceive and provide an illusion of303
religious freedom to the outside world.50
The military backed by its government indoctrinate and304
deceive its citizens with strict ideology and state beliefs with little to no transparency to the305
outside world.306
b. Extent of Elite Cohesion. According to the U.S. Department of State and as mentioned above,307
there are three political parties that are allowed to exist by name in North Korea.51
Additionally,308
these parties direct and control the country under a strict highly centralized communist system.309
Those parties are: The “Major party - Korean Workers' Party or KWP controlled by President310
Kim Jong-un; minor parties - Chondoist Chongu Party ran by Ryu Mi Yong (under the KWP311
control), SDP Kim Yong Dae (under KWP control).”52
Of note, the leadership in these positions312
are always subject to change except for those controlled and held by the President and until his313
next successor, but the President does have the power to delegate his authority. However, under314
these recognized controlling parties, the oppressed are its people amongst a society of great315
social and political inequalities where the government is the elite and the people’s sole allocator316
of resources.53
With an assessed comparison to the former Soviet Union regarding their strict317
communist ideology, privileged and elite power is unicameral with the KWP as the center of318
gravity and control; Minority parties do relish distinct privileges and social statues as well;319
however, it is leveraged and strictly monitored by the KWP.54
In essence, it is implied that the320
state’s capacity for self-control is inevitably a function of the coherence demonstrated by its321
political elite.55
In fact according to RAND, the political elite is “an entity that can be defined as322
those individuals or groups who possess varying degrees of either high traditional status,323
economic influence, administrative power, or coercive capacity.”56
The consensus of power lies324
within the three parties with little to no opposition. Those who seek to oppose the elite, which is325

49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Quoted from the U.S. Department of State
52
Direct Quote from the CIA World Fact book
53
Savada, Andrea Matles. North Korea: A Country Study. Washington D.C.: GPO for the library
of Congress, 1993. http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/ (accessed October 11, 2015).
54
Quoted from North Korea Country Study
55
Power in the Post Industrial Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p110.
56
Ibid.

13
almost nonexistent are jailed, tortured, forced into harsh labor detention camps, often exiled and326
isolated from society in concentrated areas in undisclosed locations and some cases even killed.57
327
b. Substantive Rationality-State Ideology. On the other-hand, with the government’s strict328
rationale and control, its people are infinitely oppressed and suffer from the harsh realities of329
forced labor; Moreover, with only favorable considerations by the government for people from330
acceptable skilled backgrounds such as defense industries, farming, heaving mining but not331
limited to.58
In fact according to a human rights report, North Korean economics is centered on332
forced labor where the government will force its people to work at jobs for little to no wages333
with subsidies for pay in some cases being food and allotted rations. Furthermore, resulting in334
the collapse of an already oppressed society whose economy is crippled because the labor is ill-335
defined regarding rationale of democracy. Such unfavorable circumstances can also be attributed336
to waning financial support by neighboring countries such as South Korea and China.59
Also, the337
U.S. along with its allies has imposed strict sanctions on North Korea because of the lack of338
transparency in their operations and nuclear weapon programs;60
This includes limited and339
staggered trade with other countries to include sanctions and limited external influence.340
Unfortunately, the extent of rationale and ideology can be assessed as porous and ill-defined.341
c. National Goals. North Korea’s national goal at one point was to reunite the peninsula meaning342
the North and South, which was the reason for the Korean War in 1950. Following the stalemate343
military attempt and devastation by the war, North Korea has struggled ever since to gain344
political and international recognition as the sole government of the Korean peninsula for which345
they arguably continue to claim.61
North Korea still tries to overshadow South Korea politically346
and economically. In fact, Pyongyang and their political elite believe the political, economic, and347
military assistance and cooperation between the Republic of Korea, South Korea, and the United348
States significantly hinders its National goals, but not just limited to these assessed outside349
influences.62
North Korea’s assessed political ideology regarding their national goals is to limit350
national interest and attempt to build their economy and military with its own resources. The351
political elite of Pyongyang places heavy emphasis and focus national efforts on its military; it352

57
"North Korea: Economic System Built on Forced Labor." Human Rights Watch.
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/13/north-korea-economic-system-built-forced-labor (accessed
October 13, 2015).
58
Quoted from North Korea Country Study
59
Quoted from Human Rights Watch
60
"North Korea's Economy Struggles." Economy Watch.
http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/north_korea/ (accessed October 13, 2015)
61
"North Korea's National Goals." Defense Intelligence Agency.
http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/knfms/knfms_chp1.html (accessed October 13, 2015).
62
Ibid.

14
remains a top priority for resourcing in the event the country has to defend or launch an offensive353
against the US, South Korea, or an outside threat.354
On that note, the North Korean Army is trained to protect against socialism and is the355
focal point for implementing national policy.63
At the same time, because of such a high356
emphasis and top priority for its military, North Korea’s citizens chronically suffer due to a357
shortage of supplies and goods that are prioritized and resourced for their military. There is no358
doubt that economically North Korea’s ideology is cancerous, which is self-reliance and359
resourced with no outside influence. Additionally, with little to no outside influence, it affects360
trade, disrupts the quality of life, inferiorities their citizens and contributes to an already crippled361
economy on the verge of a massive futuristic economic crisis. Currently because of these very362
same politics and beliefs, their economy continues to suffer to this day. Unemployment rates in363
the country are skewed and ill-defined because of the government’s strict policy and control over364
its laborious laws and rope around its people. In fact, most of their numbers are fabricated and365
quite often skewed and inflated to deceive the outside world.366
367
d. National Issues. According to RAND, “when examining a state’s capacity to effectively set368
goals, it is more important to focus on whether the cleavages (policies) in question actually369
impede the ability of state managers to make the requisite decisions associated with acquiring or370
increasing national power.”64
North Korea’s outcry for state and national recognition along with371
its policies and decision makers are definitely questionable and will likely continue to impede372
their ability to requisition and increase national power. Thus, the ability to set goals realistically373
is tunneled to the states beliefs and ideology, which is not transparent to the outside world which374
again will detract from requisitioning and increasing national power.375
376
e. Robustness of Governing Institutions. North Korea is very unsupportive of its people and only377
caters to the elite and people of acceptable social classes. By the same token, there is an378
economic divide between the elite and its people whereas the flow of goods is distributed to the379
elite first then what is left are strictly rationed to its people and cities outside the elite Capital of380
Pyongyang.65
North Korea’s strategic intended perception to the rest of the world is that it is a381
self-reliant and collectively free of external influences;66
when it is nothing more than a smoke382
screen for a communist state that oppresses its citizens, leverage and divides power among the383
elite, and in a sense at war with its own people. Societal cohesion for status quo with countries384
such as China, Japan, and even South Korea does exist, but North Korea is at war with its people385
and struggles with the perceived tarnished image of its national and regional identity.67
Sadly,386
military cohesion does exist and remains a top priority for resourcing for fear of an invasion by387

63
Ibid.
64
RAND measuring National Power, pg. 112
65
Ibid.
66
Juetten, Stephan A., David S. Yost and Edward A. Olsen. "North Korea's Juche Ideology."
U.S. Navy Post Graduate School (2008): 2-3.
67
Ibid.

15
South Korea and the United States. 68
Furthermore; North Korea is also assessed to be one of the388
most militarized countries in the world, which devotes most of its human and economic389
resources to its military and not its citizens.69
However, North Koreans are taught and390
brainwashed at very young ages that it has two distinct enemies of hatred and must be prepared391
to defend against at all times: The Japanese because of its colonization of Korea from 1910 to392
1945, and the United States because of the Korean War.70
393
394
Closing remarks: Ironically, after careful analysis and research, it can arguably be concluded that395
North Korea’s enemy is not Japan, the United States and or South Korea; it is their very own ill-396
defined ideology and the country’s President backed by selfish politics, tradition, blasphemous397
beliefs, and History with its people at the tip of the spear. Furthermore, there is no real398
opposition within this ailed gray society to assess except for their own government and external399
influences, which are perceived by the elite as cancer, and has detrimental psychological effects400
on its already oppressed citizens, and its national perceived tarnished ideology; The North401
Koreans utilizes its Army to propagate its national policies and social movement. It indoctrinates402
its citizens with coercive state ideology and government illusion programs with complete403
alienation from the rest of the world. Their politics and ideology can be summed up to this404
conclusive statement. Oppress and control its people, leverage and flex power among the elite,405
build a strong military to propagate its policies and defend its nation with no external influences,406
self-resource, and deceive the rest of the world. Unfortunately, without external influences and407
more transparency to its operations, waning support from neighboring countries such as South408
Korea and imposed sanctions by the United States and its allies will potentially elude to409
complete socio-economic failure.410
411
Bibliography412
Power in the Post Industrial Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000): 110-112414
"Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs." U.S. Department of State.415
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm (accessed October 09, 2015).416
"How North Korean Children are taught to Hate." Mail Online News.417
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2163817/How-North-Korean-children-taught-418
hate-American-b----kindergarten.html (accessed October 13, 2015).419
Juetten, Stephan A., David S. Yost and Edward A. Olsen. "North Korea's Juche Ideology." U.S.420
Navy Post Graduate School (2008): 2-3.421

68
Ibid.
69
Quoted from Defense Intelligence Agency
70
"How North Korean Children are taught to Hate." Mail Online News.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2163817/How-North-Korean-children-taught-hate-
American-b----kindergarten.html (accessed October 13, 2015).

16
"North Korea: Economic System Built on Forced Labor." Human Rights Watch.422
http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/13/north-korea-economic-system-built-forced-labor423
(accessed October 13, 2015).424
"North Korea's Economy Struggles." Economy Watch.425
http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/north_korea/ (accessed October 13,426
2015)427
"North Korean Government." Maps of the World. http://www.mapsofworld.com/north-428
korea/government/ (accessed October 9, 2015).429
"North Korea's National Goals." Defense Intelligence Agency.430
http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/knfms/knfms_chp1.html (accessed October 13, 2015).431
Savada, Andrea Matles. North Korea: A Country Study. Washington D.C.: GPO for the library432
of Congress, 1993. http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/ (accessed October 11, 2015).433
"The World Fact Book." Central Intelligence Agency.434
October 10, 2015)436
Societal Assessment437
Societal Overview. North Korea is a country that struggles with class oppression and privileged438
resources are rationed and strictly controlled amongst the government and the elite. The elite can439
be assessed as living like privileged communist kings of the former Soviet Union with its people440
at its mercy and the oppressed.71
Additionally, North Korea is declared to be armed and a very441
militarized state;72
Ranked 49th
in the world with an estimated population size of about442
24,589,122 and about half the size of South Korea (Population size 48,860,500, North Korea’s443
population suffers from hunger, starvation, and malnutrition by its irrational government where444
food is poorly rationed and controlled.73
With an assessed birth rate of 14.51 births per 1,000, a445
death rate of 9.12 per 1,000, and an average life expectancy of about 70- years(total446
population),74
their numbers in comparison have a lower life expectancy than its neighbors in447
South Korean at 79-years of age.448

71
"North Korean Society." Mongabay Country Studies.
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/north-korea/SOCIETY.html (accessed
October 20, 2015).
72
Jacobs, Andrew. "Countries and territories North Korea." New York Times.
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/northkorea/index.html
(accessed October 21, 2015).
73
The World Fact Book." Central Intelligence Agency.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html (accessed October 19,
2015).
74
Numbers for comparison for North and South Korea of life expectancy were taken based on
total population size, accounted for both sexes, and average age of life span in both countries.

17
Furthermore, releasable demographics and vital statistics are strictly controlled by the449
government and skewed for deception leading the world to believe they have legitimate figures.75
450
Regarding control, the government monitors household size and treats its families like cells or a451
basic unit of society but not as an economic entity.76
For example, working citizens of families452
who participate in cooperative factory or offices can earn work points for the family as a whole453
awarded and rationed by the government. By the same token, unlike its perceived regional threat454
and neighbors in South Korea where elders and fathers are categorized as head of household and455
controls economic way of life, North Korean authorities de-liberate its family households by456
controlling their economic way of life.77
Although North Korea claims to be a socialist society457
where equality should be promised and balanced amongst its people, evidence indicates sure458
signs of social and political inequality in an ailing society whose line of equality is so close yet459
so far away unlike its more privileged and liberated neighbors in South Korea; government460
officials and entrusted authorities are added to be corrupt, which in some cases accept bribes to461
selfishly better personal and their own Family way of life.78
462
Depicted below in Figure-179
is a map to show the very thin line of separation between463
North Korea and South Korea (Seoul) also known as the 38th
parallel and Demilitarized Zone; It464
is very sad, but this line separates two homogenous societies meaning predominately Korean,465
one with added liberties, recognized, and more acceptable societal norms and the other with466
deceptive societal norms with complete control and oppression of its people…467

75
Quoted from Mongaby Country Study
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid.
78
Oh, Kongdan. "Political Classification and Social Structure in North Korea." Brookings.edu
research testimonies.
http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2003/06/05northkorea-oh (accessed
October 21, 2015).
79
Quoted from Countries and territories North Korea NY Times

18
468
a. National Cohesion. Completely isolated under Japanese rule and colonization until 1945, the469
North Korean peninsula is densely one of the most homogenous regions in the world; it is an470
almost total ethnically Korean population with a very small Chinese and Japanese community471
where the dominant language in the North is Chosŏn muntcha and han’gŭl pronounced (Hangul)472
in the South;80
Known practiced religions in North Korea are Buddhist Confucianism,473
Christianity, and syncretic Chondogyo. Unfortunately, autonomous practices with open474
worshipping are almost nonexistent. Moreover, under the fierce rule and communist style of475
dictatorship, religious practices are being replaced with government-sponsored groups and476
programs for the deception of religious freedom.81
Although there is no assessed divide and477
tension amongst ethnicities in the Korean population, there is a clear line of separation between478
the government’s power and control over its people where ethnic cohesion amongst the479
government and its people can be defined as gray.82
480
Furthermore, because North Korea is such a highly concentrated militarized country,481
which it utilizes to boost state and National identity, its people suffer due to devoted prioritized482
resources to their military and defense.83
North Korea’s obsession and devotion to a more483
militarized communist state or ruling can be analyzed and attributed to three things: the fear of484
re-oppression/occupation and war with the Japanese, an invasion or war with South Korea, and485
or the United States... North Korea’s ideology and state beliefs can be assessed and arguably486
very relevant to the RAND studies. Why? According to RAND, as Kugler and Domke have487
argued, “The most capable [states] extract and allocate a larger portion of available resources for488

80
Quoted from the CIA world Fact book
81
Ibid.
82
Savada, Andrea Matles. North Korea: A Country Study. Washington D.C.: GPO for the library
of Congress, 1993. http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/ (accessed October 18, 2015).
83
Ibid.
38th
Parallel/DMZ
Figure-1

19
war purposes. Accordingly, analyzing the flow of revenues from the societal to the [state]489
resource pool provides an effective measurement of the political component of490
Power . . . [particularly because the evidence suggests that] . . . the [usual] winners of war are491
those who have the resources and the political capacity to mobilize and maintain a war effort.”84
492
493
As mentioned above, regarding gray defined cohesion between the people and its494
government, during a more recent interview by the New York Times of North Koreans about the495
government and assessed conditions, they simply stated that” their lives have gotten harder and496
no better under the new youthful leader of North Korea. They embarked on the government in497
shame as it watched its more privileged children prance around in its new clothing when they498
(the citizens) are suffering from starvation… Moreover, ranting about the loss of life of less499
fortunate neighbors because of malnutrition and starvation...”85
More interviewees clearly stated500
and realized that the false implications of a more impoverished South Korea are nothing more501
than deception and propaganda for which the government uses to mislead its ailing own502
impoverished people.86
The government does this by utilizing its controlled media sources to503
disseminate propaganda, issue products such as DVDs and videos to undermine South Korea as504
being less fortunate and more impoverished. Deception can be assessed as the North Koreans505
government way of controlling its people and eluding the rest of the world with its non-506
transparent operations and suffering economy; North Koreas economical pitfalls can be507
attributed to its obsession with military hardware and its costly nuclear weapons program for508
which it neglects its people and prioritizes over its ailing society…87
509
From the RAND studies and a few assessed factors from above, it can be concluded that510
North Korea flexes and measures its political component of power to the National community by511
means of a strong military utilizing societal resources to win and deter war at the expense of its512
people; North Korea also utilizes its military power to build and maintain National cohesion and513
state identity by its well renowned and infamous Nuclear weapons program. Moreover, for514
which it utilizes to taunt and leverage power from the National community.88
Let’s suggest what515
this might mean? Although a self-proclaimed resourced entity with limited external influence,516
there is much-needed cohesion amongst economic and political boosters from countries like the517

84
Power in the Post Industrial Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p1119.
85
Direct Quote from Countries and territories North Korea NY Times
86
Quoted from Countries and territories North Korea NY Times
87
"S. Korea, US, Japan agree to close cooperation on NK nuclear issues." The Korea Times.
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/10/120_122472.html (accessed October 20,
2015).
88
Ibid.

20
United States, Japan, South Korea, and China which are all leveraged and in a sense controlled518
by the North Koreans which it uses to flex its power for National cohesion.519
In Lehman’s term, the North Koreans strategically gets what it wants from the520
International and National community because it is perceived as an imminent world threat521
regarding their very active Nuclear weapons program.89
Will they ever launch a nuclear attack522
causing a major international crisis? Maybe; however, they will probably continue to utilize the523
program as a deterrence for war along with its well-resourced military to leverage state524
recognition, puppeteer, and taunt the international community to influence cohesion and525
cooperation…Sounds like the old communist Stalinist Soviet regime strategic implications and526
look what happened to them…? In essence, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program will likely527
never end, but History has dictated that this type of Regime’s days just might be numbered…528
b. Enterprise. Like any society, education starts with the youth for continued succession to help529
shape and build that society’s next generation. Children in North Korea spend four years in530
elementary school and six years in secondary or middle school before they have to make a531
decision whether or not they want to pursue a college degree.90
Education in North Korea is free,532
compulsory, and universal for 11 years, from ages four to 15, in state-run schools. The national533
literacy rate for citizens 15 years of age and older is 99 percent.91
Although education in North534
Korea is free, they are ranked at a distant 47th 92
in the world for enrollments; Unfortunately well535
behind its more liberated neighbors of South Korea ranked at Number 8, the U.S. being number536
1 ahead of China at Number 2.93
Graduation from college or Universities is about 10%, and those537
are usually from wealthy or elite families.94
Of the reported enrollments and comparison to other538
countries, only about 10% of the students go to college, which is a distant far of about a 70%539
college enrollment rate in the U.S. or more than 80% in South Korea, which has the highest540
college enrollment rate in the world and graduation rate of about 50% or more.95
In comparison541

89
Ibid.
90
"Even in North Korea, getting into college is tough: A glimpse into the country’s higher
education." Business and Education.
http://businessandeducation.wordpress.com/2011/11/15/even-in-north-korea-getting-into-
college-is-tough-a-glimpse-into-the-countrys-higher-education/ (accessed October 21, 2015).
91
"Country Profile: North Korea." Library of Congress-Federal Research Division.
lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/North_Korea.pdf (accessed October 21, 2015), p. 7
92
Korean Education System," Facts about Korea and Korean, 2009, accessed June 24, 2016,
http://gokorean.com/Education.html.
93
"Nation Master." Education enrolment by level > Tertiary level (most recent) by country:
North Korea. http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/edu_edu_enr_by_lev_ter_lev-education-
enrolment-by-level-tertiary (accessed October 21, 2015).
94
Quoted from Business and Education World Press
95
Ibid.

21
to its close neighbors in South Korea, the quality of education in North Korea is assessed as542
equivalent for those who are more fortunate and can attend the state-run programs.96
However,543
the low enrollment rates can be attributed to its millions of oppressed citizens, which at the same544
time lack education because of the countries highly proliferated social, but separate545
equalities.97
As for the elite and more fortunate, North Korea has very competitive Science and546
Math programs, which students have to compete for regarding acceptance. Through rigorous547
selection to include challenging curriculums, exams, and even scouting by Colleges and548
Universities in distinct regions, North Korea’s Science and Math programs are just as549
competitive and equivalent to renowned world Science and Math leaders Japan and South550
Korea.98
551
Infamously, North Korea is ranked as the lowest country in the world regarding media552
freedom.99
In fact, according to a more recent Huffington post report; there is no public internet553
access anywhere to be found in the country.100
However, this doesn’t mean that there is no access554
but all media Domestic and international is monitored via the Agitations and Propaganda555
Department in the Koreans Worker Party (Elite). Most national broadcasting is via the Korean556
Central Broadcasting Station in Pyongyang. Radio service was provided by approximately 17557
AM, 14 FM, and 14 shortwave government-controlled stations in 2014.101
Nearly all households558
have access to broadcasts from radios or public loudspeakers and its assessed that there is about559
55 television sets per 1,000, or about 22% of the total population has television access. Nearly all560
households have access to broadcasts from radios or public loudspeakers. With that, Domestic561
media censorship is strictly enforced, and there is no external media or broadcast allowed;562
however, elite and more privileged party members have good access to external media, which563
they are able to censor and control.102
Newspapers, radio, and mass media are major vehicles for564
information dissemination and political propaganda in the country.103
However, with the control,565

96
Quoted from Library of Congress-Federal Research Division. p. 7
97
Quoted from Mongaby Country Study
98
"National Academy of Science." North Korea Economy Watch.
http://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/dprk-organizations/state-offices/national-academy-of-
science/ (accessed October 21, 2015).
99
"North Korea's Access to Media." BBC News Asia. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
18030692 (accessed October 20, 2015).
100
Bangs, Richard. "Visiting North Korea, The Hermit Kingdom." Huffington Post.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-bangs/north-korea-and-the-hassl_b_1948471.html
101
Quoted from Library of Congress-Federal Research Division. p. 13
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.

22
neither televisions nor radios can be utilized or tuned to anything accept for approved566
programming by the government.104
Additionally, external devices such as DVDs, USBs, hard-567
drives etc.…all have to be prior approved for use by the government with imposed punishment568
for non-compliance.105
569
Moreover, with an estimated population size over 24-million people, about 10% have570
radios, 22% have television access but mostly in private and suburban areas, all have newspaper571
access, and only 20% of the country’s population have access to the internet in mostly private572
homes and the suburbs for the more privileged.106
One thing that’s become apparent, is that573
North Korean is a very secretive society, so most of the figures are in some cases are dated, or574
even skewed for deceptive means; It is also apparent that North Korea will continue to censor575
and control media and communications maintaining social control in an already alienated576
society.577
However, North Korea will continue to deceive the world with aspirations of becoming a578
more developed nation trying to expand its means technologically. In fact, according to RAND,579
to leverage and measure the extent of which a country is technologically capable but not limited580
to, a few things must be understood and weighed. That is “the capacity to invent, innovate, and581
diffuse innovations, thus remains the motor of technological changes...”107
Technological582
innovations can be assessed based on a countries devotion and expenditures regarding research583
and development.108
Being a deceptive, self-proclaimed resourced labeled secretive society,584
North Korea ironically depends on the U.S. and other foreign countries for food aid (Leveraged585
sanctions by U.S.), China, Japan, and even South Korea which represents about 90% of the586
countries imports.109
With an estimated Gross Domestic product reported in 2013 to be 22.26587
billion, of that 31.3 percent is devoted to military expenditures, weapons research programs, and588
nuclear science, which dollar for dollar is reported to be the most militaristic state in the world110
589
Unfortunately, innovation and technology is not North Korea’s forte; however, a report released590

104
Ibid.
105
Ibid.
106
Ibid.
107
Direct Quote from RAND p 73.
108
Quoted from RAND p 79.
109
Quoted from CIA World Fact book
110
"Facts on North Korea." CNN World. http://articles.cnn.com/2004-04-
22/world/nkorea.facts_1_weapons-program-north-korea-chemical-stockpiles?_s=PM:WORLD

23
in 2006, stated that the North has been focusing on technological development as a means of591
spurring its ailing economy.111
592
North Korea, a much-undisclosed society has only reported a few documented patents to593
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).112
On that note, North Korea has filed two594
cases of international patents through the WIPO. WIPO has confirmed that one of the patents595
filed was a cast iron welding rod structure used for industrial material while the other patent was596
still in the filing process and thus could not be disclosed to the public. In the past five years,597
North Korea submitted three patent filings in 2007, seven in 2008, and four in 2011; however,598
types were not disclosed.113
Ironically, in 2008 it was reported that North Korean Scientist had599
created a high super calorie noodle, which is supposed to have five times more protein and twice600
as much fat as an ordinary Ramen.114
Not much along the lines of technology and innovation;601
however, quite evident that the state is looking for desperate means economically to perhaps602
mitigate hunger and starvation. Ironically, the fail state does not produce enough food to feed603
their own people, who are heavily reliant on foreign food programs where the invention(s) are604
nothing to celebrate. Lastly, by no means does the lack of reported information regarding North605
Koreas technological advances are to undermine their abilities. However, this is in fact due to the606
country’s ideology to remain secretive and questionably “self-reliant,” which is nothing more607
than deception to the rest of the world for what’s really happening underneath the hood and608
behind the scenes.609
610
Bibliography611
Power in the Post Industrial Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p. 73,79,1119.613
Bangs, Richard. "Visiting North Korea, The Hermit Kingdom." Huffington Post.614
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-bangs/north-korea-and-the-615
hassl_b_1948471.html (accessed October 21, 2015).616
"Country Profile: North Korea." Library of Congress-Federal Research Division.617
lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/North_Korea.pdf (accessed October 21, 2015), p. 7, 13618

111
"Policy Forum 06-61A: North Korea Focusing On Technological Development to Revive
Economy." Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability (accessed on October 18, 2015).
112
"Promoting New Technologies and Inventions at the National Exhibition." North Korea
Economy Watch. http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2012/09/27/promoting-new-technologies-and-
inventions-at-the-national-exhibition/ (accessed October 21, 2015).
113
Ibid.
114
Ibid.

24
"Even in North Korea, getting into college is tough: A glimpse into the country’s higher619
education." Business and Education.620
http://businessandeducation.wordpress.com/2011/11/15/even-in-north-korea-getting-621
into-college-is-tough-a-glimpse-into-the-countrys-higher-education/ (accessed October622
21, 2015).623
"Facts on North Korea." CNN World. http://articles.cnn.com/2004-04-624
22/world/nkorea.facts_1_weapons-program-north-korea-chemical-625
stockpiles?_s=PM:WORLD (accessed October 21, 2015).626
Jacobs, Andrew. "Countries and territories North Korea." New York Times.627
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/northkorea/inde628
x.html (accessed October 21, 2012).629
"Korean Education System." Facts about Korea and Korean. 2009. Accessed June 24, 2016.630
http://gokorean.com/Education.html.631
Oh, Kongdan. "Political Classification and Social Structure in North Korea." Brookings.edu632
research testimonies.633
http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2003/06/05northkorea-oh (accessed634
October 21, 2015).635
""Nation Master." Education enrolment by level > Tertiary level (most recent) by country: North636
Korea. http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/edu_edu_enr_by_lev_ter_lev-education-637
enrolment-by-level-tertiary (accessed October 21, 2015).638
"National Academy of Science." North Korea Economy Watch.639
http://www.nkeconwatch.com/category/dprk-organizations/state-offices/national-640
academy-of-science/ (accessed October 21, 2015).641
"North Korea's Access to Media." BBC News Asia. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-642
18030692 (accessed October 20, 2015)643
"North Korean Society." Mongabay Country Studies.644
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/north-korea/SOCIETY.html (accessed645
October 20, 2015).646
"Policy Forum 06-61A: North Korea Focusing On Technological Development to Revive647
Economy." Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability (accessed on October 18, 2015).648
"Promoting New Technologies and Inventions at the National Exhibition." North Korea649
Economy Watch. http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2012/09/27/promoting-new-650
technologies-and-inventions-at-the-national-exhibition/ (accessed October 21, 2015).651
Savada, Andrea Matles. North Korea: A Country Study. Washington D.C.: GPO for the library652
of Congress, 1993. http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/ (accessed October 18, 2015).653
"S. Korea, US, Japan agree to close cooperation on NK nuclear issues." The Korea Times.654
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/10/120_122472.html (accessed655
October 20, 2015).656
The World Fact Book." Central Intelligence Agency.657
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html (accessed October 19,658
2015)659
660

25
Economic Assessment661
Economic Overview. Money regarding a country’s national power can be measured by its Gross662
National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP)115
* and how it stacks up against its663
competitors.116
In comparison to the international community, North Korea ranks at a distant low664
99th
with a “GDP” estimated at $40-billion in 2014 with a GDP growth potential of 4% ranked665
at a low 96 to the rest of the world.117
Nothing to brag about but up from 2007 with GDP666
potential of -0.4% ranked then at 56 to the rest of the world. Unfortunately, well behind in667
comparison to its regional neighbor of South Korea ranked at 13th
in the international668
community with a GDP of $1.5-trillion.118
Regarding the measuring of power, for a general idea669
of North Korea’s “GNP, we will utilize some releasable data in comparison from North Korea,670
which was provided in 1991.119
North Korea’s GNP in 1991 was estimated at 22.9 billion or671
1,038/capita well short and behind its regional neighbor of South Korea estimated at $237.9-672
billion or 5,569/capita or a GNP difference of (+$215-billion ahead of its neighbor).120
*673
Interestingly, from 1989-91 North Korea’s economic factors showed a 5 %(-$1.2billion) decline674
with preliminary indicators that the trend would continue in the future. To prove that point, the675
reported GNP per capita of North Korea was $920 in 1996 a $118 decline from 1991. And with676
the country’s unimpressive GNP comes an external debt that sums up to $12.5 billion owing677
countries like China, Japan, and even the United States.121
On the contrary, South Korea hasn’t678
always been a global and economic front-runner with a previous 60’s era gross domestic product679
equivalent to poorer nations like Africa at ($7.3-billion)122
and over the past four-decades has680
demonstrated incredible growth and global integration with a stunning 66% or an estimated681
$992-billion in growth rate.123
682

115
* Note: Gross National Product is the market value of all products and services produced in
one year by labor and property supplied by the residents of a country. Unlike Gross Domestic
Product, which defines production based on the geographical location of production, GNP
allocates production based on ownership.
116
Power in the Post Industrial Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p 84.
117
(accessed November 5, 2015).
118
"North Korea Economy 2011." Countries of the World.
http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/korea_north/korea_north_economy.html (accessed
November 5, 2015).
119
1, 2015).
120
*" Note: According to the CIA World fact book, North Korea does not publish reliable
National Income Accounts data.
121
1, 2015)
122
South Africa's GDP." Trading Economics: South Africa
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/gdp (accessed November 02, 2015)
123
1, 2015)

26
South Korea has become a global front-runner joining the trillion dollar club ranking in683
the top 20 world largest economies with contributors of success being its high tech industrialized684
economy, close government, and business affiliations, and it is direct and import restrictions.124
685
The distant figures separating a lagging regional North Korean economy can be attributed to the686
following economic pitfalls. First, North Korea has one of the least open economies in the world,687
which detracts from foreign investments. Second, its industrial “capital stock” is in a state of688
disarray with poor maintenance, shortfalls in spare parts, and years of underinvestment’s689
domestic and foreign. Third, prioritized large scale spending for military resources detracts from690
resources needed for investment and civilian consumption.125
Additional contributing factors691
regarding the country’s economic stalemates can be attributed to agricultural set-backs, which692
the country lacks support and often neglect by its government. Such set-backs include the693
country’s struggle to grow food with aggregated crop related failures and insufficient694
fertilization, which produces poor soil quality.695
Unfortunately, the overarching results of chronic food shortages are stalemates to boost696
the country’s economy and feed its people.126
Other paling North Korean economic shortfalls can697
be attributed and assessed to the following regional and foreign aid factors: On the first hand,698
South Korea in response to the North Korean’s sinking of the South Korean destroyer Cheonan699
and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island has stifled economic support and initiatives; it is regional700
neighbor of South Korea's has cut off most aid, trade, and bilateral cooperation activities with701
limited industrial interaction.127
On the other hand, according to a congressional review and702
report released in 2008, “Between 1995 and 2008, the United States provided North Korea with703
over $1.3 billion in assistance: just over 50% for food aid and about 40% for energy assistance.704
Since early 2009, the United States has provided virtually no aid to North Korea because of705
initiated sanctions in response to North Korea’s nuclear test launches and highly active nuclear706
weapons program.”128
The point from the above statistics is to show that the United Stated at one707
point was the country’s biggest foreign aid food and energy contributor after the collapse of the708
Soviet Union. However, a more “cautious but optimistic United States” knows from experience709
even after unsuccessful bilateral talks to suspend nuclear-related activities, that broken deals still710
plagues North Korea, which has halted food aid and energy contribution initiatives with the711
country from external supporters.”129
North Korea at one time in 2012 had agreed to stop712
nuclear activity at its main facility in Yongbyon and nuclear tests and long-range missile713
launches, which ironically had agreed to stop in exchange for 240,000 tons of food from the714
United States.130
715
Keep in mind that North Korea has been a deal breaker for years for non-compliance of716
its nuclear program and the lack of transparency of its operations to the international community.717

124
Ibid.
125
Ibid.
126
Ibid.
127
Ibid.
128
Manyin, Mark E., & Nikitin, Mary Beth. "Foreign Assistance to North Korea." Congressional
Research Service: Specialist in Asian Affairs. www.crs.gov (accessed November 4, 2015)
129
Elise, Labott. "U.S. cautiously optimistic after food aid deal with North Korea." By Elise
Labott, CNN. (http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/01/opinion/analysis-north-korea-
promise/index.html (accessed November 4, 2015)
130
Ibid

27
The same non-compliances have plagued the North Korean economy with imposed sanctions. At718
the same time, these sanctions have also stifled initiatives from the international community in719
terms of support and aid, which the country so desperately needs. On the contrary, in spite of720
imposed sanctions on North Korea, the international community still has answered with good721
deeds and there have been reported huge initiatives in the past for support. Reports indicated its722
regional neighbor of South Korea and economic giants such as Japan, China, and the United723
States collaboratively served as the country’s biggest life line and in most cases their means of724
survival.725
In fact, according to the International Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS), the726
aid combined accounted for 80% of the 8.34 million Metric Tons of food aid the World Food727
Program (WFP) stated North Korea received between 1996 and 2004 from the four economic728
giants.131
Stunning support and enough food to feed an entire population and wanted to729
“highlight” and show those statistics to prove a point. It is evident that North Korea cannot730
afford to feed its people with its own money and probably could not survive without aid from the731
international community. So lets’ look at some more underlying contributing factors that are732
exposing the facts of an ailing and dependent economy debunking the smoke screen of self-733
reliance; In 2011, the regional labor force of South Korea reported at 25.1 million, which734
accounts for close to half of the country’s population at over 48-million people.132
735
On the contrary, North Korea’s labor force is reported at 12.2 million about half the size736
of its reported population at over 24.5 million.133
In essence, South Korea employs about 25.1737
million people just about the total population size in North Korea with almost double the people.738
In essence, labor-force comparisons between North and South Korea are at a ratio of 1:1 or one739
in the same each employing about half its population sizes. Moreover, why so very distant740
regarding economy conditions and growth? Sounds all negative so far but North Korea does have741
productivity in its work force. In fact, the industrial sector in the country was most productive at742
43.4% in the year 2011. The other sectors that were equally productive were the service (33.6%)743
and the agricultural (23%) sectors. This is from a workforce of 12.2 million people form the total744
24.5 million in the country.134
However, just not enough to boost the country’s very poor GNP745
and compete with its regional neighbor of South Korea and the international community.746
Unfortunately, the shortfalls and trendy road blocks in the North Korean economy dates747
back to their heavy reliance and emulated economy of the former Soviet Union. With the same748
self-reliance ideology and heavy emphasis on defense spending, it crumbled the Soviet Union749
and their economy. In fact, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, food deficit and the750
withdrawal of food aid in the 1990s forced the country to ask for aid from the United Nations751

131
Manyin, Mark E. "Foreign Assistance to North Korea: Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division." Congressional Research Service: Specialist in Asian Affairs.
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl31785.pdf (accessed November 3, 2015)
132
1, 2015)
133
Ibid
134
1, 2015)

28
causing an economic crisis and desperate need for food.135
The aid the country received went752
well into the next decade with the country in the year 2005 announcing that in the following753
year, they would not receive any aid from the (UN) United Nations. The country was facing754
major economic challenges and as such in the year 2010, the Democratic People’s Republic of755
Korea ( DPRK) resumed to receiving food aid from the Unite Nations Development Program756
(UNDP)136
, however, still in need of foreign aid and help to this day.757
Comparatively, the big lag and gap of economic growth between North Korea and South758
Korea to include the rest of the world is the distinct economic structures. North Korea being759
completely closed centrally planned and claims self-reliance. South Korea and growth countries760
in the international community have a more open economic system, which allows foreign761
investment and welcomes external influences for growth and gains. Arguably, there are three762
things to take away from the information provided thus far in this assessment. One, North Korea763
has very poor “economic and national power”; Two, it cannot afford to feed its people and764
without foreign aid will likely collapse as a nation; Three it leverages cohesion and mitigates765
cooperation from its region and the international community for foreign aid by utilizing its766
perceived “world threat” nuclear weapons program. We can conclude from the data and767
information above that the North Korea’s professed “self-reliance, self-resourced ideology to768
include no external influence is cancerous. Inevitably, it is nothing but a smoke-screen for769
deception. Unfortunately, North Korea will continue to neglect its people at the expense to770
defend its nation utilizing its highly proliferated nuclear weapons program to leverage cohesion771
from the international community and to deceive the world. North Korea’s economic trends are772
putting the country on track for failure just like its former militarized idol of the former Soviet773
Union.774
775
Critical Technologies. According to RAND, technology is defined as the ability of the country to776
create innovative and the most sophisticated new technology as identified in the world today.137
777
Unfortunately, North Korea lags at the ability to create and be innovative when it comes to778
sophisticated technology and remain behind the rest of the world. Moreover, the country779
continues to proliferate to the rest of the world on its abilities to become a more developed nation780
trying to expand its means of technology, however, has yet to measure up. In fact, according to781
RAND, the capacity to invent, innovate, and diffuse innovations is the motor of technological782
change.138
On that note, not sure if North Korea quite measures up when in fact most of the783
innovation and invention of critical technology is currently in the hands of the Iran government784
and Countries like China; Iran along with China augments North Korea’s ballistic missile and785
nuclear weapon’s program and both are perceived as rogue states (North Korea, Iran)139
* and786

135
Library of Congress. ‘Country Profile: North Korea’
Icweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/North_Korea.pdf, (accessed November 1, 2015). pg. 7
136
Foreign & Commonwealth Office. ‘Korea, DPR (North Korea) www.fco.gov.uk, 2011
137
Power in the Post Industrial Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), pg. 53
138
RAND, pg. 73
139
*Rogue states are defined as states that conduct its policy in a dangerously unpredictable way
disregarding international law or diplomacy; also referred to by some international theorist as
disruptors of world peace.

29
imminent world threats. In fact, the United Nations has named both countries as violators of the787
UN sanctions deal in regard to their highly proliferated nuclear weapons program. However,788
unlike Iran, North Korea has been under talks in the past to denuclearize and tame their nuclear789
weapons program for cooperation and to leverage sanctions imposed by the international790
community; future production with partnered Iran and China at this time remains questionable791
yet treacherous because of North Korea’s infamous broken promises with the world and792
international community.140
In essence, North Korea has infamous history of not following793
through on their promises to succumb to Nuclear weapons inspections and adhering to794
international laws concerning their Nuclear weapons program.795
On the contrary, collaboratively, China, North Korea, Iran, and Russia work hand in hand796
exchanging critical technologies to boost their weapons programs. This is nothing new; notably,797
in the past North Korea once relied on the former Soviet Union to provide critical technology of798
weapons, which then it would reverse engineer and claim as their own.141
In exchange, it was799
reported from1948-1984 that Beijing had contributed 900-milion in subsidized food and energy800
and Moscow 2.2-billion to the North Koreans for their perceived brilliancy for critical801
technologies. Moreover, when in fact the North Korean’s where deceptively using the former802
Soviet Union’s technology experimenting with it and recreating North Korean prototypes and803
selling it back to the Chinese and former Soviet union for subsidies.142
Sounds like deception,804
and the lagging of critical technologies have become quite evident as the fidelity of “self-reliant”805
remains questionable. Furthermore, as the country continues to share and exchange information806
with countries like Iran, Russia, and China their past has caught up with them as the gateway and807
benefits of the former Soviet Union is no longer present. No wonder North Korea cannot808
successfully launch a missile into the atmosphere without complete failure; It is only because the809
once militarized and highly powerful Soviet Union is no longer around to help facilitate the810
critical technology needed that North Korean once utilized, reverse engineered, and claimed as811
their own. The country is desperately looking for ways not only to boost its technological812
advances, but in exchange with Countries like Iran, China, and Russia to help facilitate its813
questionable nuclear weapons program.814
Physical Resources. The GDP composition in the agricultural sector is currently at 23%815
with the common types of crops grown being rice, corn, soybeans, potatoes and pulses. They816
keep animals such as pigs for pork, cattle for milk and meat and chicken for eggs and meat. The817
commodities they export are minerals, textiles as well as agricultural and fishery products to818
their partners such as China 46.5%, South Korea 40.8% and Bangladesh 1.4%. Apart from819
exporting, they also import goods such as petroleum, coal for cooking, textiles, grains and820
machinery and equipment from China 64.5%, South Korea 24.6% and Russia 2.4%. The821
country’s industries produce minerals such as coal, iron ore, limestone, magnetite, graphite,822
copper, zinc, and lead among other precious metals (gold)143
.823

140
Harvey McDaniel ‘North Korean Ballistic Missile technology in Iran’s hands?’ (The
examiner, May 21st 2016)
141
Feffer, John. North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis. New York: Seven
Stories, 2003. pg. 40
142
Ibid
143
North Korean Ballistic Missile technology, The Examiner

30
As of 2013, North Korea produced as much as 20.45 billion kWh in electricity, with their824
consumption being 17.12 billion, exporting none and importing none in that year. Fossil fuel825
make up for 47.4% of the installed electricity in the country while fuel from 52.6% is from the826
hydroelectric plants in the country. The country does not produce any crude oil and thus does not827
export the same, other than import it. As of 2013, the import in crude oil was 8432 bbl/day. From828
these figures, the country produces 9133bbl/day refined petroleum products, consuming 15070829
bbl/day and importing 7967 bbl/day petroleum products. From all this consumption of energy830
from the petroleum products, the amount of carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere is 63.69831
million Mt144
. Sounds like a lot of emissions to include productivity and exchange with the832
international community. Unfortunately, with a poor GNP and GDP, these figures amount to833
nothing but just figures and don’t” measure up” because their economy is failing by the numbers834
and cannot afford to feed its people without the help of foreign aid and the international835
community.836
837
838
839
Bibliography840
Power in the Post Industrial Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p. 53,73,84842
Elise, Labott. "U.S. cautiously optimistic after food aid deal with North Korea." By Elise Labott,843
CNN. (http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/01/opinion/analysis-north-korea-promise/index.html844
(accessed November 4, 2015).845
Feffer, John. North Korea, South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis. New York: Seven846
Stories, 2003. pg. 40847
Foreign & Commonwealth Office. ‘Korea, DPR (North Korea) www.fco.gov.uk, 2011 (accessed848
November 1, 2015).849
Harvey McDaniel ‘North Korean Ballistic Missile technology in Iran’s hands?’ (The examiner,850
May 21, 2016)851
Manyin, Mark E., & Nikitin, Mary Beth. "Foreign Assistance to North Korea." Congressional852
Research Service: Specialist in Asian Affairs. www.crs.gov (accessed November 4,853
2015).854
North Korea Economy 2011." Countries of the World.855
http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/korea_north/korea_north_economy.html (accessed856
November 5, 2015).857
Library of Congress. ‘Country Profile: North Korea’858
Icweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/North_Korea.pdf, (accessed November 1, 2015). pg. 7859

144
Ibid.

31
Rankings." Countries of the World: Purchasing Power Parity”860
http://www.photius.com/rankings/economy/gdp_purchasing_power_parity_2012_0.html861
(accessed November 5, 2015).862
South Africa's GDP." Trading Economics: South Africa.863
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/south-africa/gdp (accessed November 02, 2015).864
“The World Fact Book." Central Intelligence Agency.865
November 1, 2015).867
Vulnerabilities Assessment868
Outlook. North Korea also known as The Democratic People's Republic of Korea869
(DPRK) is an isolated case in the annals of modern economic growth, and not a pleasant one:870
today, North Korea has the unpleasant distinction from the rest of the world with a literacy rate871
of 99% for their population and the only urbanized society in history to suffer from hunger872
during armistice. North Korea has a powerless Gross Domestic Product (GDP) estimated at $40-873
billion in 2011 with a GDP growth potential of 4% ranked in comparison at 96 to the rest of the874
world.145
These ailing economic and hunger problems continues to plague the state to this day.875
Pyongyang has continued to rely upon "emergency" international humanitarian aid for over a876
decade and a half.146
The DPRK continue to lodge desperate and urgent appeals to the United877
Nations (UN) World Food Program (WFP) for food aid to feed their people.147
The suffering878
North Korean economy remains in desperate need of help from the international community879
debunking the countries declared self-reliance. Moreover, long term suffering of its economy can880
also be attributed to its own government policies and practices which the purported “self-881
reliance, self-resourced principles to include no external influence has proven to be ineffective.882
Inevitably, this is a fact because North Korea is the first and only industrialized economy to lose883
their ability to feed themselves. 148
However, plagued with more debilitated issues internally and884
externally further contributing to the countries problems.885
886
887
888
889

145
(accessed November 18, 2015).
146
Eberstadt, Nicholas. "American Enterprise Institute." What Is Wrong with the North Korean
Economy. July 01, 2011. http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-
policy/regional/asia/what-is-wrong-with-the-north-korean-economy/(accessed November 18,
2015)
147
Ibid
148
Ibid

32
Internal Constraints. North Korea’s citizens struggle internally with oppression amongst890
a society of in-equalities. For example, the North Korean government divides its people into891
three distinct social orders based on loyalty to the authorities and their former dear leader Kim892
Jong-Il.149
First, are the core (adamant) believers of the regime where most of the wealthy is893
more fortunate and resourced; second, is the wavering social class which are categorized as(go-894
with-the flow) weak followers of the regime. However, still discriminated against because of895
doubtful loyalty; third is the worst being hostile of the three social classes who are adamantly896
opposed to the regime, their former dear leader, and their communist type system of897
government.150
By the same token, hostile and wavering social classes can be categorized as all898
members of minority faiths and descendants of perceived enemies of the state (non-believers).899
Consequently, hostile and wavering castes are discriminated against and denied employment,900
subject to starvation, and in some cases imprisoned, and even beaten.151
Regarding internal901
constraints, I think this is a critical area of concern of coerced social stratification and class902
oppression where the government imposes their radical beliefs by discriminating against their903
own citizens based on social status. In fact, in the 1990’s over 3.5-million died of starvation904
because North Korea would intentionally block international food donations to punish its905
wavering and hostile classes. Unfortunately, with primary resourcing dedicated to its military906
and the elite; malnutrition to this date is widespread in the state except for the ruling class and907
the countries elite, where in comparison the average North Korean 7-year old girl is 7-inches908
shorter than the average South Korean girl.152
909
North Korea has an estimated population size of about 24,589,122 and about half the910
size of South Korea (Population size 48,860,500); North Korea’s population still continue to911
suffer from hunger, starvation, and malnutrition where food is strictly rationed and controlled.912
Furthermore, with an assessed birth rate of 14.51 births per 1,000, a death rate of 9.12 per 1,000,913
and average life expectancy of about 70- years (total population), their numbers in comparison914
have a lower life expectancy than its neighbors in South Korean at 79-years of age.153
The state915
remains the sole allocator of resource. Economically and overall compared to their regional916
neighbors of South Korea and the international community, North Korea’s GDP is limited with917
inadequate national power154
and Purchasing Parity Power (PPP)155
weighing in at 40-billion in918
2011 compared to its neighbors in the South at 1.5-trillion during the same year.156
The North919
Korean economy just does not measure up at a distant 96th
compared to their regional neighbors920

149
Head, Tom. "Human Rights in North Korea." About.com Civil Liberties.
http://civilliberty.about.com/od/internationalhumanrights/p/northkorea101.htm (accessed
November 19,2015)
150
"Human Rights in North Korea." About.com Civil Liberties
151
Ibid
152
Ibid
153
19, 2015)
154
Power in the Post Industrial Age (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p 84
155
Ibid
156
"North Korea Economy 2011." Countries of the World
http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/korea_north/korea_north_economy.html (accessed
November 18, 2015)

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