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Thinking Like They Do:
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations
Gianluca Stringhini
University College London
Cybercrime is a growing problem
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 2
Cybercrime is a growing problem
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 3
Cybercrime is a growing problem
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 4
Source: Levchenko et al. 2011
Spammer
Anatomy of a spam operation
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 5
Harvester
Botmaster
How can we effectively disrupt
spamming botnets?
We need to get a better understanding of these
cybercriminal operations
Over the last years we have been studying spamming
botnets by
• Observing the actors involved
• Getting an inside look into a real botnet
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 6
Fingerprinting a spam operation
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 7
The actors in the underground market are
linked by long-lasting trust relations
More details in “The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer: On the Relations
Between the Different Actors in the Spam Landscape” from AsiaCCS 2014
Spammers buy bots in different
countries – Lethic
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 8
Spammers buy bots in different
countries - Cutwail
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 9
An inside look into a
real spamming botnet
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 10
The Cutwail takedown
In 2010 we participated in an attempted takedown –
we tried to disrupt the botnet by seizing the C&C
servers
We obtained access to 24 C&C servers
• 30% of the botnet
• Each server rent by a different spammer
• Detailed statistics on the spammers’ campaigns
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 11
Some Statistics
The logs of the C&C servers contained information about
• 9 spammers who rented one or more C&Cs
• More than 2M bot IP addresses
• More than 500B spam emails sent
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 12
The performance of spam operations varies a
lot: the most successful spammer sent 7B emails
per day, the least successful only 5.5M
More details in “The Underground Economy of Spam: A Botmaster’s Perspective
of Coordinating Large-Scale Spam Campaigns” from LEET 2011
Botnets need to be efficient
engineering systems
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 13
Additional constraints:
• Infected computers are usually on bad Internet connections
• Adversarial actions can severely disrupt the botnet (victims cleaning up infected
computers, law enforcement seizing control servers)
If we identify the elements
that make a botnet work
well, we can develop better
mitigation techniques
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 14
Spammers split an email list among
many bots – we can use this to find
additional bots!
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 15
More details in “BotMagnifier: Detecting Spambots on the Internet” from USENIX 2011
What makes a spam operation
successful?
Good “housekeeping”
• Clean up email lists for non-existing addresses
• Limit bots to 5,000 at most
Bots have bad Internet connections
Instruct bots to retry sending emails multiple times
Interesting fact: the geographic location of bots does not
influence the performance of the botnet!
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 16
More details in “The Tricks of the Trade: What Makes Spam Campaigns
Successful?” from IWCC 2014
Possible mitigations
Tamper with spammers cleaning up email lists
[Stringhini et al., USENIX 2012]
Exhausting the C&C’s bandwidth by connecting fake bots
[Work in progress]
Use network errors for spam detection
[Kakavelakis et al., LISA 2011]
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 17
Conclusions
Cybercrime is a worldwide phenomenon, and we need
effective countermeasures to fight it
Botnets can be modeled as a distributed systems, and
mitigations can be designed to make such distributed
system perform poorly
Other types of cybercriminal operations require different
techniques
• Identity theft
• Ransomware
• Financial fraud
An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 18
Questions?
g.stringhini@ucl.ac.uk
@gianluca_string

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Thinking Like They Do: An Inside Look At Cybercriminal Operations

  • 1. Thinking Like They Do: An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations Gianluca Stringhini University College London
  • 2. Cybercrime is a growing problem An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 2
  • 3. Cybercrime is a growing problem An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 3
  • 4. Cybercrime is a growing problem An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 4 Source: Levchenko et al. 2011
  • 5. Spammer Anatomy of a spam operation An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 5 Harvester Botmaster
  • 6. How can we effectively disrupt spamming botnets? We need to get a better understanding of these cybercriminal operations Over the last years we have been studying spamming botnets by • Observing the actors involved • Getting an inside look into a real botnet An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 6
  • 7. Fingerprinting a spam operation An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 7 The actors in the underground market are linked by long-lasting trust relations More details in “The Harvester, the Botmaster, and the Spammer: On the Relations Between the Different Actors in the Spam Landscape” from AsiaCCS 2014
  • 8. Spammers buy bots in different countries – Lethic An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 8
  • 9. Spammers buy bots in different countries - Cutwail An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 9
  • 10. An inside look into a real spamming botnet An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 10
  • 11. The Cutwail takedown In 2010 we participated in an attempted takedown – we tried to disrupt the botnet by seizing the C&C servers We obtained access to 24 C&C servers • 30% of the botnet • Each server rent by a different spammer • Detailed statistics on the spammers’ campaigns An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 11
  • 12. Some Statistics The logs of the C&C servers contained information about • 9 spammers who rented one or more C&Cs • More than 2M bot IP addresses • More than 500B spam emails sent An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 12 The performance of spam operations varies a lot: the most successful spammer sent 7B emails per day, the least successful only 5.5M More details in “The Underground Economy of Spam: A Botmaster’s Perspective of Coordinating Large-Scale Spam Campaigns” from LEET 2011
  • 13. Botnets need to be efficient engineering systems An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 13 Additional constraints: • Infected computers are usually on bad Internet connections • Adversarial actions can severely disrupt the botnet (victims cleaning up infected computers, law enforcement seizing control servers)
  • 14. If we identify the elements that make a botnet work well, we can develop better mitigation techniques An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 14
  • 15. Spammers split an email list among many bots – we can use this to find additional bots! An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 15 More details in “BotMagnifier: Detecting Spambots on the Internet” from USENIX 2011
  • 16. What makes a spam operation successful? Good “housekeeping” • Clean up email lists for non-existing addresses • Limit bots to 5,000 at most Bots have bad Internet connections Instruct bots to retry sending emails multiple times Interesting fact: the geographic location of bots does not influence the performance of the botnet! An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 16 More details in “The Tricks of the Trade: What Makes Spam Campaigns Successful?” from IWCC 2014
  • 17. Possible mitigations Tamper with spammers cleaning up email lists [Stringhini et al., USENIX 2012] Exhausting the C&C’s bandwidth by connecting fake bots [Work in progress] Use network errors for spam detection [Kakavelakis et al., LISA 2011] An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 17
  • 18. Conclusions Cybercrime is a worldwide phenomenon, and we need effective countermeasures to fight it Botnets can be modeled as a distributed systems, and mitigations can be designed to make such distributed system perform poorly Other types of cybercriminal operations require different techniques • Identity theft • Ransomware • Financial fraud An Inside Look at Cybercriminal Operations 18