Hasselblad was an iconic camera company that faced challenges from digital photography emerging in the 1980s. It created Hasselblad Electronic Imaging (HEIAB) as a subsidiary to explore opportunities in digital imaging. HEIAB had success with products like the Dixel photo digitizer and grew profits significantly for Hasselblad in the late 1980s. However, Nikon introduced a superior product in 1992 that ended HEIAB's flagship product and marked the beginning of the end for the subsidiary. Still, HEIAB was an accomplishment that enhanced Hasselblad's knowledge of digital imaging during a transition period.
Christian Sandström holds a PhD from Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden and writes about disruptive innovation and technological change. The document discusses Nokia's decline from controlling 40% of the global cellphone market in 2007 to collapsing and now fighting to reinvent itself. Several figures are presented to illustrate Nokia's dramatic decline over this period. Contact information is provided to find out more about Nokia and disruptive innovation from Sandström's website.
Disruptive innovation, smartphones and the decline of NokiaChris Sandström
Apple’s IPhone was first revealed in January 2007. Out of curiosity I pondered through Nokia’s quarterly presentation slides in the years 2007-2010 in order to get a better idea about how they related to the ongoing shift from feature phones to smartphones. While such a brief and shallow review will not give the full picture of Nokia’s response, it might still reveal something.
This document discusses some limitations of using the technology S-curve to understand technological change and disruption. Specifically, it notes that the S-curve does not take into account market factors or how customer needs and values can change over time. As an example, it shows how compact cameras were displaced by mobile phone cameras not due to reaching scientific limits, but because increased portability became more important to customers than further improvements in image quality. This phenomenon of "technology overshooting" occurs when a technology is replaced before peak performance due to shifting customer priorities.
This document introduces the concept of a "Sailing Ship effect", where an established technology facing disruption from a new technology undergoes accelerated improvements just before being displaced. The concept is illustrated using an S-curve to show how a new technology improves rapidly after an initial breakthrough, eventually surpassing the established technology. Examples are given of analog CCTV facing threats from digital IP video, and the automotive industry facing saturated markets. The Sailing Ship effect represents a last attempt by incumbent firms to improve the established technology in response to the disruption threat, even though the new technology ultimately wins out.
Hasselblad was an iconic camera company that faced challenges from digital photography emerging in the 1980s. It created Hasselblad Electronic Imaging (HEIAB) as a subsidiary to explore opportunities in digital imaging. HEIAB had success with products like the Dixel photo digitizer and grew profits significantly for Hasselblad in the late 1980s. However, Nikon introduced a superior product in 1992 that ended HEIAB's flagship product and marked the beginning of the end for the subsidiary. Still, HEIAB was an accomplishment that enhanced Hasselblad's knowledge of digital imaging during a transition period.
Christian Sandström holds a PhD from Chalmers University of Technology in Sweden and writes about disruptive innovation and technological change. The document discusses Nokia's decline from controlling 40% of the global cellphone market in 2007 to collapsing and now fighting to reinvent itself. Several figures are presented to illustrate Nokia's dramatic decline over this period. Contact information is provided to find out more about Nokia and disruptive innovation from Sandström's website.
Disruptive innovation, smartphones and the decline of NokiaChris Sandström
Apple’s IPhone was first revealed in January 2007. Out of curiosity I pondered through Nokia’s quarterly presentation slides in the years 2007-2010 in order to get a better idea about how they related to the ongoing shift from feature phones to smartphones. While such a brief and shallow review will not give the full picture of Nokia’s response, it might still reveal something.
This document discusses some limitations of using the technology S-curve to understand technological change and disruption. Specifically, it notes that the S-curve does not take into account market factors or how customer needs and values can change over time. As an example, it shows how compact cameras were displaced by mobile phone cameras not due to reaching scientific limits, but because increased portability became more important to customers than further improvements in image quality. This phenomenon of "technology overshooting" occurs when a technology is replaced before peak performance due to shifting customer priorities.
This document introduces the concept of a "Sailing Ship effect", where an established technology facing disruption from a new technology undergoes accelerated improvements just before being displaced. The concept is illustrated using an S-curve to show how a new technology improves rapidly after an initial breakthrough, eventually surpassing the established technology. Examples are given of analog CCTV facing threats from digital IP video, and the automotive industry facing saturated markets. The Sailing Ship effect represents a last attempt by incumbent firms to improve the established technology in response to the disruption threat, even though the new technology ultimately wins out.
As electronic calculators became popular in the 1960s-1970s, the calculator industry experienced rapid growth. By 1972, most mechanical calculator manufacturers had collapsed. Many new firms, especially in Japan, entered the growing market but faced low barriers. The introduction of integrated circuits and later calculators-on-a-chip drastically reduced prices and improved performance while changing the industry structure. Most new entrants failed while a few like Sharp succeeded in the "Great Calculator War" of the early 1970s.
The Swiss watch industry dominated global exports in the 1970s but collapsed as digital watch technology emerged. The industry's decentralized structure made a coordinated response to digitization difficult. As production costs fell and distribution widened, cheap digital watches from Texas Instruments and others bankrupted many Swiss manufacturers. While some high-end Swiss brands survived on branding, the industry's competitive advantage was lost as specialized mechanical watchmaking skills became obsolete.
This thesis explores disruptive innovation through a study of value, networks, and business models. Previous research has shown that disruptive innovations often topple incumbents because the innovations are not initially demanded by established customers. However, more knowledge is needed on how disruptive innovations can prosper within an incumbent's existing market segment. The thesis presents case studies of Hasselblad and Facit to explore how disruptive innovations create new value through activities like removing labor. This suggests disruptive innovation theory needs a broader view of how different performance dimensions create value. Additionally, customers should be seen as a network of actors with varying competencies and incentives, as disruptive innovations may be incompatible with some actors even when existing customers demand the technology.
The document provides 5 examples of disruptive innovation:
1) Transistor radios disrupted analogue radios by being portable despite lower sound quality.
2) Pocket calculators disrupted desktop calculators through portability despite lower computing power.
3) LCD TVs disrupted CRT TVs initially in mobile applications where lighter weight and battery life were more important than picture quality.
4) Minimills disrupted integrated steel mills by producing cheaper, lower quality steel that captured more segments over time.
5) Mobile phones disrupted landlines by being portable despite lower sound quality and higher costs initially.
The document discusses whether the transition from analogue to digital IP cameras is a disruptive technology. It provides background on Clayton Christensen's theory of disruptive innovation, where new technologies initially underperform along dimensions valued by existing customers but have other attributes that create new markets. While IP video initially had lower image quality and price than analogue, it offered scalability and remote access. However, unlike disruptive technologies, IP video has emerged in major existing surveillance segments like retail and cities, not new or low-end markets. Therefore, the transition may not be a classic example of disruptive innovation.
Robert Noyce Quotes On Leadership And InnovationChris Sandström
Robert Noyce, co-inventor of the integrated circuit, viewed his invention as the result of a continuous, logical process rather than a singular breakthrough moment. He saw himself as trying to solve a production problem rather than specifically aiming to create an integrated circuit. Noyce also believed that researchers are best positioned to evaluate long-term research programs, not supervisors, and that managers should focus on enabling researchers' work rather than directing it.
The Swedish camera manufacturer Hasselblad was known for its compatibility with different lenses and accessories, allowing photographers flexibility. However, with the launch of the H3D model in 2006, Hasselblad announced it would no longer be compatible with other digital backs or allow its new lenses to be used with previous H models, going against its tradition of compatibility. This move was likely a result of Hasselblad's weakening after the shift to digital and its merger with Imacon, but may reduce photographer willingness to invest in Hasselblad instead of high-end DSLRs in the long run.
Christian Sandström holds a PhD from Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden and writes about disruptive innovation and technological change. Roxette is one of Sweden's greatest pop bands, having sold over 45 million albums and 25 million singles. Their success can be largely attributed to understanding the importance of digital technology. Before founding Roxette, lead singer Per Gessle had been in the Swedish band Gyllene Tider, which was popular in Sweden from 1979-1981 but then declined. Gessle realized he could exploit the digital revolution by using synthesizers, MIDI, and drum machines to produce music professionally at low cost anywhere, including Sweden. This led to Roxette's album "Look Sharp" becoming a
Kodak struggled with the technological shift from film to digital imaging due to its entrenched bureaucracy and focus on maintaining the status quo. Former executives described Kodak as a film company that saw equipment only as a means to sell more film and avoided anything seen as risky. The bureaucracy grew so large over Kodak's 100+ years of success in film that decision making required many approvals and meetings to avoid confrontation. This risk-averse culture made it difficult for Kodak to innovate and adapt to digital photography, ultimately leading to the company's decline.
Middle management at Kodak resisted the shift to digital photography, filtering information and impeding the CEO's efforts to change the culture. They feared losing their positions in the company if it changed strategies and embraced new digital technologies. This resistance from middle management is identified as a major reason for Kodak's decline as it failed to transition quickly enough to digital.
This document discusses the decline of Eastman Kodak due to digital photography. It describes exploring the abandoned Kodak building in Sweden and notes that Kodak employed around 140,000 people in the late 1980s but only around 25,000 today. It also mentions that Kodak's stock price declined from around $85 per share in 1999 to $2-3 per share currently, as digital technology disrupted Kodak's film-based business model.
Kodak used to have a site outside Stockholm, Sweden that has since been vandalized and left in disrepair. The abandoned main building and surrounding area show signs of broken windows and graffiti, documenting the demise of the once prominent company. An artist added graffiti summarizing Kodak's fate on a small building next to the main site.
As electronic calculators became popular in the 1960s-1970s, the calculator industry experienced rapid growth. By 1972, most mechanical calculator manufacturers had collapsed. Many new firms, especially in Japan, entered the growing market but faced low barriers. The introduction of integrated circuits and later calculators-on-a-chip drastically reduced prices and improved performance while changing the industry structure. Most new entrants failed while a few like Sharp succeeded in the "Great Calculator War" of the early 1970s.
The Swiss watch industry dominated global exports in the 1970s but collapsed as digital watch technology emerged. The industry's decentralized structure made a coordinated response to digitization difficult. As production costs fell and distribution widened, cheap digital watches from Texas Instruments and others bankrupted many Swiss manufacturers. While some high-end Swiss brands survived on branding, the industry's competitive advantage was lost as specialized mechanical watchmaking skills became obsolete.
This thesis explores disruptive innovation through a study of value, networks, and business models. Previous research has shown that disruptive innovations often topple incumbents because the innovations are not initially demanded by established customers. However, more knowledge is needed on how disruptive innovations can prosper within an incumbent's existing market segment. The thesis presents case studies of Hasselblad and Facit to explore how disruptive innovations create new value through activities like removing labor. This suggests disruptive innovation theory needs a broader view of how different performance dimensions create value. Additionally, customers should be seen as a network of actors with varying competencies and incentives, as disruptive innovations may be incompatible with some actors even when existing customers demand the technology.
The document provides 5 examples of disruptive innovation:
1) Transistor radios disrupted analogue radios by being portable despite lower sound quality.
2) Pocket calculators disrupted desktop calculators through portability despite lower computing power.
3) LCD TVs disrupted CRT TVs initially in mobile applications where lighter weight and battery life were more important than picture quality.
4) Minimills disrupted integrated steel mills by producing cheaper, lower quality steel that captured more segments over time.
5) Mobile phones disrupted landlines by being portable despite lower sound quality and higher costs initially.
The document discusses whether the transition from analogue to digital IP cameras is a disruptive technology. It provides background on Clayton Christensen's theory of disruptive innovation, where new technologies initially underperform along dimensions valued by existing customers but have other attributes that create new markets. While IP video initially had lower image quality and price than analogue, it offered scalability and remote access. However, unlike disruptive technologies, IP video has emerged in major existing surveillance segments like retail and cities, not new or low-end markets. Therefore, the transition may not be a classic example of disruptive innovation.
Robert Noyce Quotes On Leadership And InnovationChris Sandström
Robert Noyce, co-inventor of the integrated circuit, viewed his invention as the result of a continuous, logical process rather than a singular breakthrough moment. He saw himself as trying to solve a production problem rather than specifically aiming to create an integrated circuit. Noyce also believed that researchers are best positioned to evaluate long-term research programs, not supervisors, and that managers should focus on enabling researchers' work rather than directing it.
The Swedish camera manufacturer Hasselblad was known for its compatibility with different lenses and accessories, allowing photographers flexibility. However, with the launch of the H3D model in 2006, Hasselblad announced it would no longer be compatible with other digital backs or allow its new lenses to be used with previous H models, going against its tradition of compatibility. This move was likely a result of Hasselblad's weakening after the shift to digital and its merger with Imacon, but may reduce photographer willingness to invest in Hasselblad instead of high-end DSLRs in the long run.
Christian Sandström holds a PhD from Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden and writes about disruptive innovation and technological change. Roxette is one of Sweden's greatest pop bands, having sold over 45 million albums and 25 million singles. Their success can be largely attributed to understanding the importance of digital technology. Before founding Roxette, lead singer Per Gessle had been in the Swedish band Gyllene Tider, which was popular in Sweden from 1979-1981 but then declined. Gessle realized he could exploit the digital revolution by using synthesizers, MIDI, and drum machines to produce music professionally at low cost anywhere, including Sweden. This led to Roxette's album "Look Sharp" becoming a
Kodak struggled with the technological shift from film to digital imaging due to its entrenched bureaucracy and focus on maintaining the status quo. Former executives described Kodak as a film company that saw equipment only as a means to sell more film and avoided anything seen as risky. The bureaucracy grew so large over Kodak's 100+ years of success in film that decision making required many approvals and meetings to avoid confrontation. This risk-averse culture made it difficult for Kodak to innovate and adapt to digital photography, ultimately leading to the company's decline.
Middle management at Kodak resisted the shift to digital photography, filtering information and impeding the CEO's efforts to change the culture. They feared losing their positions in the company if it changed strategies and embraced new digital technologies. This resistance from middle management is identified as a major reason for Kodak's decline as it failed to transition quickly enough to digital.
This document discusses the decline of Eastman Kodak due to digital photography. It describes exploring the abandoned Kodak building in Sweden and notes that Kodak employed around 140,000 people in the late 1980s but only around 25,000 today. It also mentions that Kodak's stock price declined from around $85 per share in 1999 to $2-3 per share currently, as digital technology disrupted Kodak's film-based business model.
Kodak used to have a site outside Stockholm, Sweden that has since been vandalized and left in disrepair. The abandoned main building and surrounding area show signs of broken windows and graffiti, documenting the demise of the once prominent company. An artist added graffiti summarizing Kodak's fate on a small building next to the main site.
9. Den enögda
spegelreflex-
kameran
lanserades 1962
och blev en
omedelbar succé.
Modellen 1000F
hade en unik
kombination av
bildkvalité,
bärbarhet och
kompatibilitet.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24. I Göteborg byggde Victor
Hasselblad sitt företag och
expanderade verksamheten
under efterkrigstiden.
40. Detta har hänt.
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Antalet sålda digitala och filmbaserade
kameror i USA över tiden.
59. “Även om jag inte trodde på
Mavica-konceptet var jag
övertygad om att den foto-
kemiska filmen i framtiden skulle
hotas av elektronisk fotografi
och att den i slutändan skulle
ersätta den analoga tekniken.”
//VD Jerry Öster, 1991
60. Givet produkternas dåliga
prestanda vid den här tiden
beslutade Öster att Hasselblad inte
skulle utveckla digitala kameror
just då, utan istället lära sig mer
om tekniken genom att utveckla
andra applikationer.
63. En prototyp lanserades lagom till OS i Los
Angeles 1984. Produkten blev en omedelbar
succé eftersom fotografer nu inte behövde
använda mörkrum utan kunde skicka hem
sina bilder på ett snabbare och enklare sätt.
85. De första digitala bakstyckena var
dyra och hade en måttlig prestanda.
Leafs första produkt hade 4
Megapixel och Kodak lanserade
senare ett bakstycke med 6 Mpixel.
86. Affärsnyttan var emellertid
stor. Många filmer skulle
digitaliseras förr eller
senare och med ett
bakstycke kunde ett steg i
bildproduktionen
elimineras.
91. ”The quality of high-end
digital studio cameras is
good enough to replace
film for most catalog and
magazine needs.”
MacWEEK 94-05-13
92. 6 million pixel resolution is
good enough for most
applications. The
perception of colour is
more important than the
perception of sharpness.
Kodak, 1996
93. Frågan var nu hur Hasselblad
skulle hantera dessa
förändringar…
95. I början av 90-talet räknade
ledningen med att skiftet skulle
äga rum någon gång 2003-2005,
vilket skulle visa sig vara en
korrekt bedömning.
96. Jerry Öster lämnade posten
som VD 1993. Innan dess
poängterade han att bolagets
långsiktiga överlevnad kan
komma att bero på hur
mycket som investeras i
digital fotografi.
98. Incentive tog till sig vad Öster
sade och började se sig om
efter en VD som kunde
förbereda Hasselblad för det
digitala skiftet.
99. Valet föll på Staffan Junel,
som hade en bakgrund på
bl.a. Ericsson och dessutom
var en entusiastisk
amatörfotograf.
100. Junel tog nu in den digitala
utvecklingen i moderbolaget.
Divisionen för digital fotografi
börjat med att försöka förstå
tekniken, utan ett uttalat syfte
att utveckla produkter.
101. Elektronikingenjörerna kom dock
snabbt under fund med att
bildsensorerna utvecklades snabbt
och att bolaget nu borde ge sig in i
tekniken på allvar.
104. Dessa kunder tog massor av
bilder som skulle digitaliseras
förr eller senare. Möjligheten
att se bilderna direkt utan
framkallning kunde göra
arbetet enklare, exempelvis vid
produktionen av kataloger.
105. Tanken var att dessa kunder
skulle vilja göra ett visst
avkall på bildprestanda för
kunna ta ett oändligt antal
bilder till en låg kostnad och
dessutom sända, redigera
och replikera bilderna på ett
enklare sätt.
107. Det fanns dock inte särskilt mycket rum
för avancerad F&U på ett litet företag
som Hasselblad.
108. Pengarna kunde antingen gå till
digital eller analog utveckling och
det blev nu alltmer konkurrens om
resurserna inom bolaget.
109. Vid den här tidpunkten hade
Hasselblad i allt väsentligt
vidareutvecklat samma
kamerasystem i 40 år.
110. Bilden till höger
illustrerar att
Hasselblad i allt
väsentligt levde
på Victors
gamla system.
111. Bolaget var i det här skedet
faktiskt i stort behov av ett nytt
analogt system.
112. Relationen mellan de olika
utvecklingsavdelningarna
blev alltmer infekterad
under åren 93-96.
113.
114. Hasselblad var ett bolag som i allt väsentligt
handlade om finmekanik. Elektronik och
digital teknik uppfattades som någonting
mycket udda av många inom företaget.
115.
116. Hursom, bortåt 1996 var en
digital kameraprototyp redo,
detta var precis när Incentive
hade sålt Hasselblad till UBS.
117. Innan dess tog Incentive den
kassa på 200 MSEK som
bolaget byggt upp under 80-
talet för att kunna ägna sig åt
utvecklingsprojekt.
118. UBS köpte Hasselblad med en
del eget kapital och ett lån, som
därefter fördes in i Hasselblad.
119. På bara några år gick
Hasselblad från att vara rikt på
resurser till att vara rejält
underkapitaliserat.
120. UBS hade för avsikt att göra
en så kallad ’leveraged
buyout’, dvs att få en hög
avkastning på eget kapital
genom att jobba med en
hög belåning.
122. Det var nu dags för den
nye ägaren att ta
ställning till den digitala
studiokameran.
123. ”Vårt syfte är att bli mer marknadsorienterade.
Hittills har vi varit ett teknikdrivet företag. Vi
måste utveckla produkter som är intressanta
för marknaden.”
// Göran Diedrichs, chairman (UBS)
Källa: Göteborgs-Posten, 1997-04-10
129. ”Dom som förstod nischen för
den digitala tekniken såg dess
fördelar och att kameran hade
en stor potential. Men
styrelsen relaterade till den
analoga tekniken och
avfärdade digitalkameran.”
130. Här följer några citat
som försöker förklara
varför man beslutar
att lägga ner projektet:
131. Göran Diedrichs säger att Hasselblad
kommer fortsätta utveckla filmbaserad
teknologi.
”Den digitala tekniken är fortfarande i
sin linda. När den har utvecklats
kommer vi såklart att gå in i tekniken
och då måste vi vara finansiellt starka.”
Källa: Göteborgs-Posten, 1997-04-10
132. ”Den kostnadskrävande utvecklingen
av en ny digitalkamera har sålts...
...den optimala digitala kameran får
utvecklas av någon annan. Därmed
sparas 15-18 miljoner kronor... ...som
kan investeras i utveckling av
konventionella kameror samt att
anpassa dem till digital teknik”.
//DI, januari 1998.
133. Elektronikingenjörerna var av en
annan uppfattning:
“If the chemical waste from film
processing could be turned into beer
– film would have a bright future!”
(1997, hittat i interna dokument)
134. 1998 hade all digital
kompetens med undantag för
två personer fått sparken.
Företag var nu rejält
underkapitaliserat och en
teknikrevolution stod för
dörren…
135. Vid den här tiden blev det klart
för UBS att ett nytt
kamerasystem måste utvecklas.
136. Projektet tog sin början 1998 och
Hasselblad inledde samarbetet
med Fuji 1999. Syftet var att
utveckla en hybrid – ett nytta
kamerasystem som är
kompatibelt med såväl digitala
bakstycken som filmmagasin.
137. Projektet var gigantiskt,
komplext och helt
nödvändigt för bolagets
långsiktiga överlevnad.
Deadlines kunde inte hållas
och arbetet drog ut på
tiden…
138. Samtidigt började systemkamerorna
från Canon och Nikon att ta
marknadsandelar från Hasselblad.
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
139. På bara några år tappade
Hasselblad hela
segmentet för
bröllopsfotografi.
140.
141. I många länder var
Hasselblad-kameran en lika
självklar del av bröllopet
som ringen och buketten.
Allt detta ändrades dock i
och med skiftet till digital
fotografi.
144. Fyra år försenat.
Ett fantastiskt, men inte
digitalt system.
100 000 SEK dyrare än
Canon’s konkurrerande
produkt.
145. Det krävdes ett digitalt
bakstycke för att göra
systemet helt digitalt, vilket
innebar att Hasselblad inte
kunde leverera ett digitalt
system på egen hand.
146. ”När H1:an väl kom var det en
fantastisk kamera men det
spelade ingen roll eftersom alla
hade gått in i det digitala”
152. Först år 2005 kunde bolaget till
slut leverera ett fullständigt
digitalt kamerasystem och
överlevde därmed skiftet till
digital fotografi.
153.
154. ”När jag började på Hasselblad
tyckte min fru att vi kunde köpa en
digital kamera, jag sade ’vänta,
Hasselblads är snart klar, då köper
vi den’. Åtta år senare lämnade jag
Hasselblad, det första jag gjorde
var att gå och köpa en Canon”
155. Hasselblad har därefter gått
med vinst i några år, men jag
betvivlar att man ännu
betalat tillbaka de pengar
Shriro tvingades skjuta till.
156. Historien illustrerar ett antal
viktiga lärdomar kring
teknikskiften och
affärsutveckling i företag.
157. 1. Konkurrensen om resurser
under mitten av 90-talet var
destruktiv på många sätt.
Kanske borde man istället ha
separerat utvecklingsarbetet
i högre grad?
158. 2. HEIABs framgångar under
80-talet illustrerar vikten av att
finna en nischmarknad för att
utveckla en ny teknologi. Här
kunde tekniken utvecklas och
ny kunskap genereras under en
längre tid.
159. 3. Precis som alla andra bolag i
mellanformatssegmentet misslyckades
Hasselblad med att utveckla egna
digitala bakstycken. Den främsta
anledningen är förmodligen att
Hasselblads kompetensbas låg inom
mekaniken snarare än elektroniken.
160. 4. Ägarskiften tenderar att
skapa en strategisk
inkonsistens som försvårar
övergången från en teknologi
till en annan.
161. Det finns mycket annat
att säga om den här
historien, men det får
sägas en annan gång.
162. Källor
Interna dokument
Årsredovisningar
Omkring 100 timmar av intervjuer
Stort Tack!
171. SVT och SR har flyttat in där
efter några år av
ombyggnation.
172.
173.
174. Christian Sandström
doktorerar på Chalmers.
Han skriver och föreläser
om teknikskiften och hur
de förändrar samhällen
och företag.
www.christiansandstrom.org
christian.sandstrom@chalmers.se