1) Complex systems are inherently hazardous due to their nature, but are heavily defended against failure through technical, human, and organizational measures. However, catastrophes still occur when small, initially harmless failures combine in unanticipated ways to overcome defenses.
2) Attribution of accidents to a single root cause is incorrect, as failures require multiple contributing factors to jointly cause an accident. Hindsight bias also affects post-accident analysis of human performance.
3) Practitioners operate systems to produce their intended function while also working to prevent failures, but their role balancing these demands is often misunderstood after an accident occurs.
Human Error & Risk Factor Affecting Reliability & SafetyDushyant Kalchuri
Many system reliability predictive methods are based solely on equipment failures, neglecting the human component of man–machine systems (MMS). These methods do not consider the identification of the root causes of human errors.
Accelerating technological development leads to an increased importance of safety aspects for organizations as well as for their environment. Therefore, especially in the case of high hazard organizations an expanded view of safety – system safety including human factors is needed. These organizations need appropriate structures as well as rules for the treatment of safety relevant actions or tasks. The system safety approach is reflected in the recent developmental stage in safety research, which started with a focus on technology and its extension to human errors, socio-technical systems and recently to the inter-organizational perspective. Accident causation theories as well as approaches to organizational learning are the theoretical background. Nevertheless, the majority of measurements (methods) and interventions remain in the former stages, i.e. technical or human error orientation. This problem will be discussed by the means of examples. The contribution will end with an outlook to possible future ways of integrating the new developments in safety research.
This document discusses categorizing and standardizing levels of risk from human error in order to develop safety management policies. It aims to assess, classify and set standards for human error risk and criticality levels based on error rates, error consequences and criticality indexes. The methodology is demonstrated using data from underground coal mines in India. Human errors are analyzed and categorized into risk levels using clustering techniques. Standards are then set to guide risk and safety management policies based on the risk-criticality analysis. The goal is to identify target areas and interventions to reduce risks from human errors.
A new conceptual framework to improve the application of occupational health...Diandra Rosari
This document presents a new conceptual framework for improving the application of occupational health and safety management systems (OHS MS) in organizations. The framework focuses on three key areas: 1) the people in the organization, 2) the physical workplace, and 3) management systems. By examining potential hazards that can arise within, between, and outside each of these three areas, a unique "hazard profile" can be determined for an organization. This hazard profile provides the foundation for a tailored OHS MS that effectively addresses the specific risks faced by that organization. The framework is intended to simplify OHS MS implementation and make the benefits more clear, especially for smaller businesses.
The document discusses threat profiles in OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation), which is a security risk evaluation method. It describes how to document threats to an organization's critical assets by creating threat profiles. Specifically, it discusses building asset-based threat profiles in Phase 1 to identify threats, actors, outcomes, etc. for each critical asset. Generic threat categories and properties are defined, and the process of tailoring the generic threat profile and creating a specific threat profile for a critical asset is explained through an example.
The ICAO SHELL model is a conceptual framework that views human factors through the interaction of liveware (humans), software, hardware, and environment. It represents these components as building blocks and focuses on the interfaces between them, particularly liveware-liveware (interactions between people), liveware-software, liveware-hardware, and liveware-environment. The goal is to understand and minimize stress or breakdown in the system by properly accounting for these interactive dimensions.
The document discusses contingency and emergency plans from the perspective of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations (IFATCA). It covers several key points:
1. IFATCA is the worldwide federation of air traffic controllers with members from over 13 countries, and its goals include promoting aviation safety.
2. The document discusses the importance of common contingency and emergency plans as well as coordination at the industry level. It also discusses guidelines for air traffic controller training in handling unusual and emergency situations.
3. Human factors like situational awareness, stress management, and decision making are important considerations for emergency planning. Maintaining situational awareness is a key human factors issue for the human-technology interface.
Is increasing entropy of information systems a fatalityRené MANDEL
The Information System Complexity is a natural trend.
Data Governance is a solution. Un other way is to act on reference composents (MDM, Data Wells), giving them capability of "perfect" integration.
Human Error & Risk Factor Affecting Reliability & SafetyDushyant Kalchuri
Many system reliability predictive methods are based solely on equipment failures, neglecting the human component of man–machine systems (MMS). These methods do not consider the identification of the root causes of human errors.
Accelerating technological development leads to an increased importance of safety aspects for organizations as well as for their environment. Therefore, especially in the case of high hazard organizations an expanded view of safety – system safety including human factors is needed. These organizations need appropriate structures as well as rules for the treatment of safety relevant actions or tasks. The system safety approach is reflected in the recent developmental stage in safety research, which started with a focus on technology and its extension to human errors, socio-technical systems and recently to the inter-organizational perspective. Accident causation theories as well as approaches to organizational learning are the theoretical background. Nevertheless, the majority of measurements (methods) and interventions remain in the former stages, i.e. technical or human error orientation. This problem will be discussed by the means of examples. The contribution will end with an outlook to possible future ways of integrating the new developments in safety research.
This document discusses categorizing and standardizing levels of risk from human error in order to develop safety management policies. It aims to assess, classify and set standards for human error risk and criticality levels based on error rates, error consequences and criticality indexes. The methodology is demonstrated using data from underground coal mines in India. Human errors are analyzed and categorized into risk levels using clustering techniques. Standards are then set to guide risk and safety management policies based on the risk-criticality analysis. The goal is to identify target areas and interventions to reduce risks from human errors.
A new conceptual framework to improve the application of occupational health...Diandra Rosari
This document presents a new conceptual framework for improving the application of occupational health and safety management systems (OHS MS) in organizations. The framework focuses on three key areas: 1) the people in the organization, 2) the physical workplace, and 3) management systems. By examining potential hazards that can arise within, between, and outside each of these three areas, a unique "hazard profile" can be determined for an organization. This hazard profile provides the foundation for a tailored OHS MS that effectively addresses the specific risks faced by that organization. The framework is intended to simplify OHS MS implementation and make the benefits more clear, especially for smaller businesses.
The document discusses threat profiles in OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation), which is a security risk evaluation method. It describes how to document threats to an organization's critical assets by creating threat profiles. Specifically, it discusses building asset-based threat profiles in Phase 1 to identify threats, actors, outcomes, etc. for each critical asset. Generic threat categories and properties are defined, and the process of tailoring the generic threat profile and creating a specific threat profile for a critical asset is explained through an example.
The ICAO SHELL model is a conceptual framework that views human factors through the interaction of liveware (humans), software, hardware, and environment. It represents these components as building blocks and focuses on the interfaces between them, particularly liveware-liveware (interactions between people), liveware-software, liveware-hardware, and liveware-environment. The goal is to understand and minimize stress or breakdown in the system by properly accounting for these interactive dimensions.
The document discusses contingency and emergency plans from the perspective of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers' Associations (IFATCA). It covers several key points:
1. IFATCA is the worldwide federation of air traffic controllers with members from over 13 countries, and its goals include promoting aviation safety.
2. The document discusses the importance of common contingency and emergency plans as well as coordination at the industry level. It also discusses guidelines for air traffic controller training in handling unusual and emergency situations.
3. Human factors like situational awareness, stress management, and decision making are important considerations for emergency planning. Maintaining situational awareness is a key human factors issue for the human-technology interface.
Is increasing entropy of information systems a fatalityRené MANDEL
The Information System Complexity is a natural trend.
Data Governance is a solution. Un other way is to act on reference composents (MDM, Data Wells), giving them capability of "perfect" integration.
The document discusses how automation has impacted flight crews' group processes. It defines the key components of a flight crew's group process, including communication, decision-making, team formation/management, and situation awareness/workload management. It then analyzes how automation has both positively and negatively affected these group processes. Specifically, it notes that while automation has reduced workload, it has also introduced new types of errors related to overreliance on automated systems and reduced vigilance. Automation can impact hierarchical decision-making and reduce individual pilots' active control of the aircraft. Overall, the document examines how automation has changed the cognitive demands on pilots from an emphasis on probabilistic judgment to a focus on system consistency and monitoring.
This document provides an overview of the changing field of maintenance over time. It discusses the evolution from the first generation of maintenance prior to WWII, to the second generation in the 1950s-60s focused on preventative maintenance, to the third generation since the mid-1970s with new expectations, research, and techniques. The document then discusses key maintenance concepts including functions and performance standards, objectives, failure modes and effects, consequences, age and deterioration, scheduled restoration tasks, scheduled discard tasks, and safe-life limits.
This looks interesting, I am writing an article abuot error prediction and prevention in medicine. the last part focuses on errors in aviation that I have no idea about that but the first half worth reading.
The document discusses safety-critical systems and their dependability. It defines safety-critical systems as those whose failure could result in catastrophic consequences such as loss of life. Examples include failures that caused loss of spacecraft, power outages, and airplane crashes. Dependability is the ability of a system to deliver services and avoid failures. It consists of threats like faults, errors, and failures; attributes like availability and reliability; and means to achieve attributes like fault prevention and fault tolerance. The document outlines techniques used to develop dependable safety-critical systems, including verification, validation, and engineering practices applied at early stages.
The document discusses computer reliability and the issues that can cause computers to be unreliable. It notes that computers are subject to hardware failures, software bugs, and communication failures. Specific examples provided include the Therac-25 radiation therapy machine that caused overdoses due to system malfunctions, and the Y2K bug caused by storing years with only two digits. The document also discusses the concepts of hardware reliability, software reliability, and data reliability. It emphasizes that computer professionals have a responsibility to provide fault-tolerant systems, while individuals also bear responsibility to properly use computer systems.
DOMAIN-DRIVEN DESIGN AND SOFT SYSTEMS METHODOLOGY AS A FRAMEWORK TO AVOID SOF...Panagiotis Papaioannou
A crisis is considered to be an issue concerning complex systems like societies, organizations or even families. It can be defined as the situation in which the system functions poorly, the causes of the dysfunction are not immediately identified and immediate decisions need to be made.
The type and duration of a crisis may require different kinds of decision making. In a long-term crisis, when system changes may be required, the active participation of the affected people may be more important than the power and dynamics of the leadership. Software crises, in their contemporary form as organizational malfunctions, can still affect the viability of any organization.
In this paper, we highlight the systemic aspects of a crisis, the complexity behind that and the role of systemic methodologies to explore its root causes and to design effective interventions. Our focus is on modelling as a means to simplify the complexity of the regarded phenomena and to build a knowledge consensus among stakeholders. Domain-Driven Design comes from software as an approach to deal with complex projects. It is based on models exploration in a creative collaboration between domain practitioners and solution providers. SSM is an established methodology for dealing with wicked situations. It incorporates the use of models and, along with Domain-Driven Design and other systemic methodologies can be employed to develop a common perception of the situation and a common language between interested parties in a crisis situation.
Integrating disaster recovery metrics into the NIST EO 13636 Cybersecurity Fr...David Sweigert
Metrics to measure response and recovery methods for severe cyber security incidents (that could lead to “black out” events for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources) need traceable integration within incident management systems and should be offered as a solution as part of the Executive Order 13636 Cybersecurity Framework.
This document discusses how organizational factors can contribute to system failures. It provides examples of organizational failures like the Challenger disaster where safety concerns were overruled by other priorities. The document also discusses theories of normal accidents in complex systems and high-reliability organizations that aim to reduce failures through practices like preoccupation with failure and migration of decision-making. Key organizational vulnerabilities that can lead to failures are identified as over-reliance on process, responsibility issues, a weak safety culture, and under-resourcing safety measures.
Configuration Management: a Critical Component to Vulnerability ManagementChris Furton
Managing software vulnerabilities is increasingly important for operating an information technology environment with an acceptable level of security. Configuration Management, an often overlooked Information Technology process, directly impacts an organization’s ability to manage vulnerabilities. This paper explores a Department of Defense organization that currently struggles with vulnerability management. An analysis of current vulnerability and configuration management programs reveals a gap between two. Further examination of the assets, vulnerabilities, and threats as well as a risk assessment results in recommendation of a new configuration management program. This new program leverages configuration management databases to track the assets of the organization ultimately increasing the effectiveness of the vulnerability management program.
This document provides an overview of key topics from Chapter 11 on security and dependability, including:
- The principal dependability properties of availability, reliability, safety, and security.
- Dependability covers attributes like maintainability, repairability, survivability, and error tolerance.
- Dependability is important because system failures can have widespread effects and undependable systems may be rejected.
- Dependability is achieved through techniques like fault avoidance, detection and removal, and building in fault tolerance.
This document discusses the history and evolution of human factors analysis and just culture in aviation incident investigation. It provides details on:
- The shift from solely focusing on human-machine interfaces to recognizing broader organizational and cultural causes of human error.
- Advances in understanding why errors occur rather than just classifying them, driven partly by reduced hardware errors with technological changes.
- Types of errors (active vs. latent) and Reason's Swiss cheese model of defenses with holes that must align for accidents to occur.
- Challenges investigating errors but importance of reports, including near misses, for understanding underlying causes even if reconstructed versus objective.
- Just culture aims to balance accountability with open reporting by focusing
This document discusses the risks to industrial control systems (ICS) from aging and obsolete hardware and software. As ICS age over decades, maintenance becomes more difficult as replacement parts and skills are lost. Additionally, connecting ICS to business networks improves monitoring but introduces cybersecurity risks as outdated systems lack patches. The author analyzes how obsolescence impacts hardware, software, documentation and human competency. Best practices are proposed like lifecycle management, inventory plans and disaster recovery to mitigate supply chain risks and obtain secure replacements for aging ICS components.
A survey of online failure prediction methodsunyil96
The document surveys online failure prediction methods. It defines key terms like faults, errors, failures and symptoms. A taxonomy of online failure prediction approaches is developed to structure the wide spectrum of methods. Almost 50 online failure prediction techniques are surveyed and their quality is evaluated using established metrics.
Complex Systems Failure: Designing Reliability Teams - 2012 STS Roundtable Pr...Sociotechnical Roundtable
1) The document proposes designing Reliability Teams to manage failures in complex technical systems like nuclear power plants.
2) Reliability Teams would be multi-disciplinary groups that learn during normal operations to develop "mindfulness" about potential failures. They would assume authority during major failures to contain and recover from them.
3) Key aspects of the proposed Reliability Team design include accepting uncertainty, viewing all variations as learning opportunities, and checking administrative authority at the door to promote collaborative learning. The goal is for Reliability Teams to become the most experienced groups to handle major failures.
Dr Dev Kambhampati | Security Tenets for Life Critical Embedded SystemsDr Dev Kambhampati
This document outlines security tenets for life critical embedded systems. It discusses the need for clearly defined security best practices as more devices take on life critical roles. The document proposes seven areas of security tenets: general security, communications security, boot-time security, run-time security, securely managing systems, backend system security, and monitoring for advanced threats. It emphasizes the importance of implementing all tenets to mitigate threats to human life, equipment, or the environment. Threat models must consider all system aspects and assumptions to address protection against known threats.
This document analyzes intuitive and sophisticated aviation systems, and proposes that a resilience system combining both approaches is best. It notes intuitive systems are easy to learn but unstable, while sophisticated systems are stable but complex. A resilience system allows organizations to tailor the approach based on factors like employee experience levels and workload. Large established groups could rely more on sophisticated systems, while new airlines may prefer intuitive systems, but all benefit from a balanced resilience model.
Here are the key differences between a hazard, vulnerability, and risk:
Hazard - A hazard is a situation or event that has the potential to cause harm, such as flooding,
earthquakes, fires, etc. Hazards are events that are potentially dangerous. For example, a hurricane is
a hazard because it can cause damage through high winds and flooding.
Vulnerability - A vulnerability is a weakness or flaw that can be exploited by a threat or hazard. It is
a condition within a system or entity that can be exploited. For example, living in a floodplain makes
a community vulnerable to flooding from a hurricane. Older buildings may be more vulnerable to
damage from high winds.
Risk -
This document summarizes key points from a paper on how complex systems fail. It discusses that complex systems are inherently hazardous due to multiple potential failure points, but have many defensive layers that generally prevent failures. It notes that catastrophes occur when small, disconnected failures combine in unexpected ways. Complex systems also constantly operate with some degraded functionality and latent failures, requiring operators to adapt over time to changing conditions in order to maintain safety.
The Swiss Cheese Model document discusses models for analyzing accidents involving individuals and organizations. Individual accidents typically involve a single person as both the agent and victim, while organizational accidents involve multiple causal factors across different levels of an organization. The Swiss Cheese Model depicts accidents as resulting from the alignment of vulnerabilities ("holes") in multiple defensive layers, including human, technical, and organizational factors. It has evolved over time but generally represents defenses as multiple "slices" of cheese, with holes that open and close as causal factors. The model is applied to analyze the 2005 BP Texas City refinery explosion, identifying active failures by operators and latent failures in the organization that allowed defenses to be breached along an accident trajectory.
13421ijmit03Engineering Life Cycle Enables Penetration Testing and Cyber Oper...IJMIT JOURNAL
This document discusses how proper engineering processes and life cycle management are important for cybersecurity operations and penetration testing. Rushing innovation undermines security foundations. Effective engineering adds security even after implementation. Current computer systems fail to manage risks properly by focusing on reactive tasks over preventative planning and maintenance. Proper risk management, personnel training, and system design are needed to avoid systemic failure. Behavioral monitoring and integrity checks can help address issues if given resources. Legacy systems may be outdated but have long usage histories that aid detection. Management must adapt approaches to succeed in securing systems.
ENGINEERING LIFE CYCLE ENABLES PENETRATION TESTING AND CYBER OPERATIONSIJMIT JOURNAL
This document discusses how proper engineering processes and life cycle management are important for cybersecurity operations and penetration testing. Rushing innovation undermines security foundations. Effective engineering adds security even after implementation. Current computer systems fail to manage risks properly and focus too much on reactive responses instead of addressing root causes like lack of planning. Proper system design, monitoring, and maintenance over the full life cycle are needed to build secure and stable systems. Personnel issues around training and risk management priorities also undermine security. Adopting full engineering practices and addressing organizational and human factors are necessary to improve current fragile security postures.
The document discusses how automation has impacted flight crews' group processes. It defines the key components of a flight crew's group process, including communication, decision-making, team formation/management, and situation awareness/workload management. It then analyzes how automation has both positively and negatively affected these group processes. Specifically, it notes that while automation has reduced workload, it has also introduced new types of errors related to overreliance on automated systems and reduced vigilance. Automation can impact hierarchical decision-making and reduce individual pilots' active control of the aircraft. Overall, the document examines how automation has changed the cognitive demands on pilots from an emphasis on probabilistic judgment to a focus on system consistency and monitoring.
This document provides an overview of the changing field of maintenance over time. It discusses the evolution from the first generation of maintenance prior to WWII, to the second generation in the 1950s-60s focused on preventative maintenance, to the third generation since the mid-1970s with new expectations, research, and techniques. The document then discusses key maintenance concepts including functions and performance standards, objectives, failure modes and effects, consequences, age and deterioration, scheduled restoration tasks, scheduled discard tasks, and safe-life limits.
This looks interesting, I am writing an article abuot error prediction and prevention in medicine. the last part focuses on errors in aviation that I have no idea about that but the first half worth reading.
The document discusses safety-critical systems and their dependability. It defines safety-critical systems as those whose failure could result in catastrophic consequences such as loss of life. Examples include failures that caused loss of spacecraft, power outages, and airplane crashes. Dependability is the ability of a system to deliver services and avoid failures. It consists of threats like faults, errors, and failures; attributes like availability and reliability; and means to achieve attributes like fault prevention and fault tolerance. The document outlines techniques used to develop dependable safety-critical systems, including verification, validation, and engineering practices applied at early stages.
The document discusses computer reliability and the issues that can cause computers to be unreliable. It notes that computers are subject to hardware failures, software bugs, and communication failures. Specific examples provided include the Therac-25 radiation therapy machine that caused overdoses due to system malfunctions, and the Y2K bug caused by storing years with only two digits. The document also discusses the concepts of hardware reliability, software reliability, and data reliability. It emphasizes that computer professionals have a responsibility to provide fault-tolerant systems, while individuals also bear responsibility to properly use computer systems.
DOMAIN-DRIVEN DESIGN AND SOFT SYSTEMS METHODOLOGY AS A FRAMEWORK TO AVOID SOF...Panagiotis Papaioannou
A crisis is considered to be an issue concerning complex systems like societies, organizations or even families. It can be defined as the situation in which the system functions poorly, the causes of the dysfunction are not immediately identified and immediate decisions need to be made.
The type and duration of a crisis may require different kinds of decision making. In a long-term crisis, when system changes may be required, the active participation of the affected people may be more important than the power and dynamics of the leadership. Software crises, in their contemporary form as organizational malfunctions, can still affect the viability of any organization.
In this paper, we highlight the systemic aspects of a crisis, the complexity behind that and the role of systemic methodologies to explore its root causes and to design effective interventions. Our focus is on modelling as a means to simplify the complexity of the regarded phenomena and to build a knowledge consensus among stakeholders. Domain-Driven Design comes from software as an approach to deal with complex projects. It is based on models exploration in a creative collaboration between domain practitioners and solution providers. SSM is an established methodology for dealing with wicked situations. It incorporates the use of models and, along with Domain-Driven Design and other systemic methodologies can be employed to develop a common perception of the situation and a common language between interested parties in a crisis situation.
Integrating disaster recovery metrics into the NIST EO 13636 Cybersecurity Fr...David Sweigert
Metrics to measure response and recovery methods for severe cyber security incidents (that could lead to “black out” events for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources) need traceable integration within incident management systems and should be offered as a solution as part of the Executive Order 13636 Cybersecurity Framework.
This document discusses how organizational factors can contribute to system failures. It provides examples of organizational failures like the Challenger disaster where safety concerns were overruled by other priorities. The document also discusses theories of normal accidents in complex systems and high-reliability organizations that aim to reduce failures through practices like preoccupation with failure and migration of decision-making. Key organizational vulnerabilities that can lead to failures are identified as over-reliance on process, responsibility issues, a weak safety culture, and under-resourcing safety measures.
Configuration Management: a Critical Component to Vulnerability ManagementChris Furton
Managing software vulnerabilities is increasingly important for operating an information technology environment with an acceptable level of security. Configuration Management, an often overlooked Information Technology process, directly impacts an organization’s ability to manage vulnerabilities. This paper explores a Department of Defense organization that currently struggles with vulnerability management. An analysis of current vulnerability and configuration management programs reveals a gap between two. Further examination of the assets, vulnerabilities, and threats as well as a risk assessment results in recommendation of a new configuration management program. This new program leverages configuration management databases to track the assets of the organization ultimately increasing the effectiveness of the vulnerability management program.
This document provides an overview of key topics from Chapter 11 on security and dependability, including:
- The principal dependability properties of availability, reliability, safety, and security.
- Dependability covers attributes like maintainability, repairability, survivability, and error tolerance.
- Dependability is important because system failures can have widespread effects and undependable systems may be rejected.
- Dependability is achieved through techniques like fault avoidance, detection and removal, and building in fault tolerance.
This document discusses the history and evolution of human factors analysis and just culture in aviation incident investigation. It provides details on:
- The shift from solely focusing on human-machine interfaces to recognizing broader organizational and cultural causes of human error.
- Advances in understanding why errors occur rather than just classifying them, driven partly by reduced hardware errors with technological changes.
- Types of errors (active vs. latent) and Reason's Swiss cheese model of defenses with holes that must align for accidents to occur.
- Challenges investigating errors but importance of reports, including near misses, for understanding underlying causes even if reconstructed versus objective.
- Just culture aims to balance accountability with open reporting by focusing
This document discusses the risks to industrial control systems (ICS) from aging and obsolete hardware and software. As ICS age over decades, maintenance becomes more difficult as replacement parts and skills are lost. Additionally, connecting ICS to business networks improves monitoring but introduces cybersecurity risks as outdated systems lack patches. The author analyzes how obsolescence impacts hardware, software, documentation and human competency. Best practices are proposed like lifecycle management, inventory plans and disaster recovery to mitigate supply chain risks and obtain secure replacements for aging ICS components.
A survey of online failure prediction methodsunyil96
The document surveys online failure prediction methods. It defines key terms like faults, errors, failures and symptoms. A taxonomy of online failure prediction approaches is developed to structure the wide spectrum of methods. Almost 50 online failure prediction techniques are surveyed and their quality is evaluated using established metrics.
Complex Systems Failure: Designing Reliability Teams - 2012 STS Roundtable Pr...Sociotechnical Roundtable
1) The document proposes designing Reliability Teams to manage failures in complex technical systems like nuclear power plants.
2) Reliability Teams would be multi-disciplinary groups that learn during normal operations to develop "mindfulness" about potential failures. They would assume authority during major failures to contain and recover from them.
3) Key aspects of the proposed Reliability Team design include accepting uncertainty, viewing all variations as learning opportunities, and checking administrative authority at the door to promote collaborative learning. The goal is for Reliability Teams to become the most experienced groups to handle major failures.
Dr Dev Kambhampati | Security Tenets for Life Critical Embedded SystemsDr Dev Kambhampati
This document outlines security tenets for life critical embedded systems. It discusses the need for clearly defined security best practices as more devices take on life critical roles. The document proposes seven areas of security tenets: general security, communications security, boot-time security, run-time security, securely managing systems, backend system security, and monitoring for advanced threats. It emphasizes the importance of implementing all tenets to mitigate threats to human life, equipment, or the environment. Threat models must consider all system aspects and assumptions to address protection against known threats.
This document analyzes intuitive and sophisticated aviation systems, and proposes that a resilience system combining both approaches is best. It notes intuitive systems are easy to learn but unstable, while sophisticated systems are stable but complex. A resilience system allows organizations to tailor the approach based on factors like employee experience levels and workload. Large established groups could rely more on sophisticated systems, while new airlines may prefer intuitive systems, but all benefit from a balanced resilience model.
Here are the key differences between a hazard, vulnerability, and risk:
Hazard - A hazard is a situation or event that has the potential to cause harm, such as flooding,
earthquakes, fires, etc. Hazards are events that are potentially dangerous. For example, a hurricane is
a hazard because it can cause damage through high winds and flooding.
Vulnerability - A vulnerability is a weakness or flaw that can be exploited by a threat or hazard. It is
a condition within a system or entity that can be exploited. For example, living in a floodplain makes
a community vulnerable to flooding from a hurricane. Older buildings may be more vulnerable to
damage from high winds.
Risk -
This document summarizes key points from a paper on how complex systems fail. It discusses that complex systems are inherently hazardous due to multiple potential failure points, but have many defensive layers that generally prevent failures. It notes that catastrophes occur when small, disconnected failures combine in unexpected ways. Complex systems also constantly operate with some degraded functionality and latent failures, requiring operators to adapt over time to changing conditions in order to maintain safety.
The Swiss Cheese Model document discusses models for analyzing accidents involving individuals and organizations. Individual accidents typically involve a single person as both the agent and victim, while organizational accidents involve multiple causal factors across different levels of an organization. The Swiss Cheese Model depicts accidents as resulting from the alignment of vulnerabilities ("holes") in multiple defensive layers, including human, technical, and organizational factors. It has evolved over time but generally represents defenses as multiple "slices" of cheese, with holes that open and close as causal factors. The model is applied to analyze the 2005 BP Texas City refinery explosion, identifying active failures by operators and latent failures in the organization that allowed defenses to be breached along an accident trajectory.
13421ijmit03Engineering Life Cycle Enables Penetration Testing and Cyber Oper...IJMIT JOURNAL
This document discusses how proper engineering processes and life cycle management are important for cybersecurity operations and penetration testing. Rushing innovation undermines security foundations. Effective engineering adds security even after implementation. Current computer systems fail to manage risks properly by focusing on reactive tasks over preventative planning and maintenance. Proper risk management, personnel training, and system design are needed to avoid systemic failure. Behavioral monitoring and integrity checks can help address issues if given resources. Legacy systems may be outdated but have long usage histories that aid detection. Management must adapt approaches to succeed in securing systems.
ENGINEERING LIFE CYCLE ENABLES PENETRATION TESTING AND CYBER OPERATIONSIJMIT JOURNAL
This document discusses how proper engineering processes and life cycle management are important for cybersecurity operations and penetration testing. Rushing innovation undermines security foundations. Effective engineering adds security even after implementation. Current computer systems fail to manage risks properly and focus too much on reactive responses instead of addressing root causes like lack of planning. Proper system design, monitoring, and maintenance over the full life cycle are needed to build secure and stable systems. Personnel issues around training and risk management priorities also undermine security. Adopting full engineering practices and addressing organizational and human factors are necessary to improve current fragile security postures.
Human factors relates to CRM by studying the human-machine interface to reduce error and maximize safety and productivity. Some key points:
- Human error has been found to contribute to over 70% of commercial airplane accidents.
- The objectives of aviation human factors include identifying technical efforts to address significant human issues, understanding the human aspects to recognize mental/physical issues, and maintaining awareness of flight physiology.
- The SHELL model examines the interactions between software, hardware, environment, and liveware (humans) and how mismatches can lead to errors. It is used to analyze human factors in complex systems like aviation.
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a systematic approach to identify potential causes of failures using a fault tree diagram with a top-down graphical representation. The main purpose is to help identify causes of system failures before they occur. It involves identifying a top undesired event and breaking it down into intermediate events and lowest level basic causes using logic gates. FTA provides benefits like prioritizing issues, evaluating reliability, and designing tests and maintenance procedures. It should be performed to increase reliability, identify weaknesses, and calculate failure probabilities.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic quality analysis tool developed in 1960 by the aerospace industry to improve system reliability and safety. FMEA works from the bottom up to analyze each component's potential failure modes and their effects on the overall system. The 9 step FMEA process identifies risks and ways to eliminate or reduce the highest risks. FMEA is now used across many industries to improve quality, safety, and reduce costs by preventing defects.
This document provides an overview of sequential accident modeling approaches. It discusses domino, fault tree, and events and causal factors charting models. These sequential models describe accidents as a linear sequence of events. While useful for identifying direct causes, they do not account for latent factors or variability in sociotechnical systems. The document also reviews academic literature on accident modeling and comparisons of investigation methods.
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a deductive failure analysis technique used in safety and reliability engineering. It involves defining an undesired event, understanding how the system works, constructing a fault tree diagram using logic gates to represent how lower-level failures can combine to cause the top event, evaluating the tree to understand risks and identify areas for improvement, and controlling identified hazards. FTA was originally developed in 1962 for missile systems and is now widely used in industries like aerospace, nuclear power, and process engineering.
Safety, Risk, Hazard and Engineer’s Role Towards SafetyAli Sufyan
1. Safety engineering aims to identify hazards and ensure systems can operate safely without risk of injury, death, or environmental damage.
2. Engineers must consider safety in various fields such as aerospace, automotive, chemical, nuclear and ensure proper safety measures are implemented to prevent accidents from failures, errors or external threats.
3. Safety is critical in systems where failure could be catastrophic, like aircraft control systems, and engineers are responsible for thorough hazard analysis and mitigation of risks.
This document discusses safety standards for critical systems and proposes a new concept called Assured Reliability and Resilience Level (ARRL). It notes that while safety standards aim to reduce risk, their requirements differ across domains. The document argues that Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) alone are not sufficient and that Quality of Service is a more holistic criterion. It also notes standards provide little guidance on composing systems from components. The ARRL concept aims to address these issues and complement SIL by considering factors like component trustworthiness and fault behavior. The document suggests ARRL could help foster cross-domain safety engineering.
This document presents a 7-stage framework for analyzing and improving near-miss management programs in the chemical process industry. Near-misses are unplanned incidents that do not result in injury or damage but have the potential to. The framework involves identifying near-misses, reporting them, analyzing causes, determining and disseminating solutions, and ensuring resolutions. Effective near-miss programs encourage employee involvement and can improve safety by addressing accident precursors before harm occurs.