International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) is an open access online peer reviewed international journal that publishes research and review articles in the fields of Computer Science, Neural Networks, Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, Information Technology, Mechanical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Plastic Engineering, Food Technology, Textile Engineering, Nano Technology & science, Power Electronics, Electronics & Communication Engineering, Computational mathematics, Image processing, Civil Engineering, Structural Engineering, Environmental Engineering, VLSI Testing & Low Power VLSI Design etc.
Running head STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC COMPETITIVEN.docxtoltonkendal
Running head: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC COMPETITIVENESS
6
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC COMPETITIVENESS
Strategic Management and Strategic Cmpetitiveness
KaToya Jones
Dr. Wanda Tillman
Business Administration Capstone
January 14, 2018
Introduction
Strategic competitiveness is gained when an organization successfully establishes as well as implements a value-creating approach. In this perspective, strategy refers to a cohesive and coordinated combination of commitments and also to mention actions developed to exploit primary competencies in order to gain a competitive advantage (Hitt, Ireland, & Artz, 1999). This occurs when a firm implements a strategy unique from that of competitors giving them leverage. As a result, the firm is able to ensure above average returns and satisfy investor’s expectations from other investments with a common likelihood of risk. This paper will focus on Twitter, Inc to examine how globalization and advancement in technology have impacted the company. Further, applying the industrial organization model and resource-based model I will explore how the company could earn more profits, analyze how both the vision and the statement of the company impact its overall triumph and lastly investigate how Twitter’s stakeholders impact on the its overall success.
How globalization and technology changed Twitter Inc.
The modern world is transforming into a time of technological invention. Existence of new innovations on top of the available technological resources is such a remarkable achievement. As it improves, it as well spreads to other parts of the world. In this case the global spread of innovations it avails vast connections which consequently creates new markets across the world. Focusing on social media, it is one of those tools that can easily be exploited by those who are connected. Basically, as access is gained on a larger scale, it avails multiple market opportunities to those outsourcing ideas. In today’s world, the use of social media has revolutionized out society. Basing this on real life events various social media platforms have contributed to activism. This, however, has been criticized by many but the point is that social media is revolutionizing the world. Therefore, there’s no doubt that the present as well as the future transformation will still use social media. This is because social media platforms capture considerable large audience within a short period of time. In this case, the widespread of social media platforms such as Twitter; the company growth cannot be stopped.
Globalization and technology have contributed to the consistent growth of the company. For instance, according to Complete the micro-blogging sites recorded 23 million unique users with an increased growth (Java et al, 2007, August). This does not include the large number of people that do not visit Twitter.com but instead use third party service to update. Focusing on the trend the company hopes to h ...
International Journal of Engineering Research and Applications (IJERA) is an open access online peer reviewed international journal that publishes research and review articles in the fields of Computer Science, Neural Networks, Electrical Engineering, Software Engineering, Information Technology, Mechanical Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Plastic Engineering, Food Technology, Textile Engineering, Nano Technology & science, Power Electronics, Electronics & Communication Engineering, Computational mathematics, Image processing, Civil Engineering, Structural Engineering, Environmental Engineering, VLSI Testing & Low Power VLSI Design etc.
Running head STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC COMPETITIVEN.docxtoltonkendal
Running head: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC COMPETITIVENESS
6
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT AND STRATEGIC COMPETITIVENESS
Strategic Management and Strategic Cmpetitiveness
KaToya Jones
Dr. Wanda Tillman
Business Administration Capstone
January 14, 2018
Introduction
Strategic competitiveness is gained when an organization successfully establishes as well as implements a value-creating approach. In this perspective, strategy refers to a cohesive and coordinated combination of commitments and also to mention actions developed to exploit primary competencies in order to gain a competitive advantage (Hitt, Ireland, & Artz, 1999). This occurs when a firm implements a strategy unique from that of competitors giving them leverage. As a result, the firm is able to ensure above average returns and satisfy investor’s expectations from other investments with a common likelihood of risk. This paper will focus on Twitter, Inc to examine how globalization and advancement in technology have impacted the company. Further, applying the industrial organization model and resource-based model I will explore how the company could earn more profits, analyze how both the vision and the statement of the company impact its overall triumph and lastly investigate how Twitter’s stakeholders impact on the its overall success.
How globalization and technology changed Twitter Inc.
The modern world is transforming into a time of technological invention. Existence of new innovations on top of the available technological resources is such a remarkable achievement. As it improves, it as well spreads to other parts of the world. In this case the global spread of innovations it avails vast connections which consequently creates new markets across the world. Focusing on social media, it is one of those tools that can easily be exploited by those who are connected. Basically, as access is gained on a larger scale, it avails multiple market opportunities to those outsourcing ideas. In today’s world, the use of social media has revolutionized out society. Basing this on real life events various social media platforms have contributed to activism. This, however, has been criticized by many but the point is that social media is revolutionizing the world. Therefore, there’s no doubt that the present as well as the future transformation will still use social media. This is because social media platforms capture considerable large audience within a short period of time. In this case, the widespread of social media platforms such as Twitter; the company growth cannot be stopped.
Globalization and technology have contributed to the consistent growth of the company. For instance, according to Complete the micro-blogging sites recorded 23 million unique users with an increased growth (Java et al, 2007, August). This does not include the large number of people that do not visit Twitter.com but instead use third party service to update. Focusing on the trend the company hopes to h ...
Discuss in detail the stakeholder approach with 300-350 wordswitbuffydtesurina
Discuss in detail the stakeholder approach with 300-350 words
with min 2 APA format citations
and 2 responses to the classmates post around 150-200 words each
Classmate Dharmagiri Post -1
Stakeholder Approach
It used to be believed that the organization's essential objective is or should boost the interests of the investors. In any case, more issues are progressively raised concerning stakeholder control. Accordingly, the Stakeholder approach these days is by all accounts an elective method for corporate government these days. This implies chiefs of the organization ought to consider more on different Stakeholder bunches rather than simply focused on financiers interests. It would encourage chiefs to take progressively significant consultation on their choices as the investor is never again the main factor they have to offer the idea to, and this can stay away from transient benefit boost conduct to a huge degree.
The Interest of the Company
As a matter of first importance, it is basic to think about whether the enthusiasm of the organization is that of the stakeholders. Despite discussion has proceeded on the enthusiasm of the organization, because of the partition of corporate character, it is clear that these two ideas would not be vague.
Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder hypothesis was first raised by R. Edward Freeman as an absolute opposite to the hypothesis that chiefs of the organization is just responsible to the investors. Stakeholders incorporate representatives, suppliers of acknowledge, (for example, banks and money related foundations), providers, clients, nearby set-ups, natural gatherings and the government and their interests out to be assessed by the executives of the organization. As indicated by Freeman, every Stakeholder has an option to be treated as finishes to only a method or an instrument. At the end of the day, every one of the Stakeholders interests ought to be considered by executives of organization, regardless of whether in certain conditions where it may conflict with the transient ideal estimation of the investors.
The Superiority of Stakeholder Approach
Besides, it would accommodate the connection between the non-investor gatherings and the organization. Take the general population representatives for instance, seeing them as an organization instead of a methods would eventually make a progressively agreeable and beneficial connection between the workers and the organization, it is fundamental for organizations to have qualified and well-persuaded workers to endure and to succeed particularly in the escalated focused world these days.
Thirdly, the advancement of an organization must incorporate the nearby networks and condition. Accepting them as Stakeholders would maintain a strategic distance from acquiring a transient benefit to their detriment, which thusly will be hindering to the long haul enthusiasm of the organization. In addition, outside guidelines like natural insurance principles mirro ...
Capital Budgeting M4A1 Peer DiscussionPeer 1Budgeting with R.docxwendolynhalbert
Capital Budgeting M4A1 Peer Discussion
Peer 1
Budgeting with Real Options
Christopher Copenhaver posted Apr 5, 2018 7:28 PM
Memorandum
From: Chris Copenhaver
To: XYZ, Manager
Subject: Budget with Real Options
When you are trying to recognize the profitability of most projects, the success of that project is unknown. There are different approaches that a company can take and many recommendations that a company can utilize. The well-known recommendation is using the NPV method. With the NPV method a company can calculate the project using the cash outflow and inflow for the duration of the project along with the cost of capital. During this, the company can see whether there is going to be a positive NPV, which the company should accept, or a negative NPV and the company should reject. There are other methods that a company can use besides the NPV method. They can use the IRR method, profitability index, and the payback period can also be filtered in to ensure they are making the proper decisions.
A company can also use the real option approach. With this, there are other factors that can be instilled in the findings. Say there are delays in the project, these can be factored into the projects calculations. Sometimes being able to show the delays can result in people considering this to be a better method. However, this method is a very complex and should only be utilized if the project is large enough, this way results may be shown. Companies tend to go with a project that shows a greater probability success rate than that of an assumed one.
In most cases when a company plays out the scenarios, they are sure that the project they chose will be 100% worth the option of going ahead with and completing the project however, there are sometimes uncertainties and the value beforehand is 0%. A way to look at this is:
Value of real option = the value of knowing the certainty - the value of the results not known. When this happens, the value with the real options has an increase. When and if this option is not used, the advantage of utilizing this option is not calculated in and it ends up underestimating the NPV. It is beneficial to a company to understand and to determine the usefulness of the value of real option and let it aid them in making their best decision.
References
Van Putten, Alexander B. (Dec, 2004). Making Real Options Really Work. Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2004/12/making-real-options-really-work
Mun, Jonathan. (2006). Real Options Analysis versus Traditional DCF Valuation in Layman’s Terms. Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2f51/e0e143a4a2c166e0c8b84ff41938d831ab2e.pdf
Peer 2
M4A1
Loranda Williams posted Apr 7, 2018 8:05 PM
MEMO
To: LND Enterprise
From: Loranda Williams
Date: 7 April 2018
RE: Real Option Budgeting
The real option is not the unique financial instrument, but it allows a company to have genuine selections as well as opportunities f ...
Bargaining and negotiation in artificial intelligence.it is about the software agents in ai.what are the approaches in software agents and types of bargaining and negotiation.it is based on the 2017 anna university syllabus.it is related to software agents in unit-4.it shortly explain how agents communicate and get resources from other agents.it also contains the need of negotiation
Within a corporation, information technology (IT) departments may frequently handle sensitive
information about customers and are in a particularly unique position to collectively decide upon information
governance policies and practices. Individual its deny that there can be a group agency in a robust sense that can
warrant ascriptions of moral agency. We argue that McKenna’s individualist thesis does not take into account
collectives that have the control and knowledge conditions that warrant ascriptions of moral agency, such as
those of well-formed IT departments. Collectives, including corporations and IT departments, can be responsive
to morally relevant reasons, such as utile maximization and can be moral agents.
MULTI-AGENT PARADIGM FOR LEADERSHIP SELECTION: A REVIEWEditor IJMTER
A Multi-agent System (MAS) is comprised of multiple interacting intelligent agents. Agents
in the MAS could all be of same type (homogeneous) or different (heterogeneous). MAS are used to
solve problems which are either difficult for an individual agent to solve or when the problem is
inherently comprised of multiple actors interacting together. However, the nature of MAS design
coordination among agents in MAS is always a core issue. Coordination and cooperation allows the
agents to manage their inter dependencies and the type and nature of interactions. Coordination and
cooperation differ in degree of inter-agent knowledge and beliefs. Agent coordination is usually
achieved in the backdrop of a communication system between agents. This paper is a based on the
review of various work on selection of multi-agent for various task domain.
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 5DianaGray10
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Speaker:
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GraphSummit Singapore | The Future of Agility: Supercharging Digital Transfor...Neo4j
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Discuss in detail the stakeholder approach with 300-350 wordswitbuffydtesurina
Discuss in detail the stakeholder approach with 300-350 words
with min 2 APA format citations
and 2 responses to the classmates post around 150-200 words each
Classmate Dharmagiri Post -1
Stakeholder Approach
It used to be believed that the organization's essential objective is or should boost the interests of the investors. In any case, more issues are progressively raised concerning stakeholder control. Accordingly, the Stakeholder approach these days is by all accounts an elective method for corporate government these days. This implies chiefs of the organization ought to consider more on different Stakeholder bunches rather than simply focused on financiers interests. It would encourage chiefs to take progressively significant consultation on their choices as the investor is never again the main factor they have to offer the idea to, and this can stay away from transient benefit boost conduct to a huge degree.
The Interest of the Company
As a matter of first importance, it is basic to think about whether the enthusiasm of the organization is that of the stakeholders. Despite discussion has proceeded on the enthusiasm of the organization, because of the partition of corporate character, it is clear that these two ideas would not be vague.
Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder hypothesis was first raised by R. Edward Freeman as an absolute opposite to the hypothesis that chiefs of the organization is just responsible to the investors. Stakeholders incorporate representatives, suppliers of acknowledge, (for example, banks and money related foundations), providers, clients, nearby set-ups, natural gatherings and the government and their interests out to be assessed by the executives of the organization. As indicated by Freeman, every Stakeholder has an option to be treated as finishes to only a method or an instrument. At the end of the day, every one of the Stakeholders interests ought to be considered by executives of organization, regardless of whether in certain conditions where it may conflict with the transient ideal estimation of the investors.
The Superiority of Stakeholder Approach
Besides, it would accommodate the connection between the non-investor gatherings and the organization. Take the general population representatives for instance, seeing them as an organization instead of a methods would eventually make a progressively agreeable and beneficial connection between the workers and the organization, it is fundamental for organizations to have qualified and well-persuaded workers to endure and to succeed particularly in the escalated focused world these days.
Thirdly, the advancement of an organization must incorporate the nearby networks and condition. Accepting them as Stakeholders would maintain a strategic distance from acquiring a transient benefit to their detriment, which thusly will be hindering to the long haul enthusiasm of the organization. In addition, outside guidelines like natural insurance principles mirro ...
Capital Budgeting M4A1 Peer DiscussionPeer 1Budgeting with R.docxwendolynhalbert
Capital Budgeting M4A1 Peer Discussion
Peer 1
Budgeting with Real Options
Christopher Copenhaver posted Apr 5, 2018 7:28 PM
Memorandum
From: Chris Copenhaver
To: XYZ, Manager
Subject: Budget with Real Options
When you are trying to recognize the profitability of most projects, the success of that project is unknown. There are different approaches that a company can take and many recommendations that a company can utilize. The well-known recommendation is using the NPV method. With the NPV method a company can calculate the project using the cash outflow and inflow for the duration of the project along with the cost of capital. During this, the company can see whether there is going to be a positive NPV, which the company should accept, or a negative NPV and the company should reject. There are other methods that a company can use besides the NPV method. They can use the IRR method, profitability index, and the payback period can also be filtered in to ensure they are making the proper decisions.
A company can also use the real option approach. With this, there are other factors that can be instilled in the findings. Say there are delays in the project, these can be factored into the projects calculations. Sometimes being able to show the delays can result in people considering this to be a better method. However, this method is a very complex and should only be utilized if the project is large enough, this way results may be shown. Companies tend to go with a project that shows a greater probability success rate than that of an assumed one.
In most cases when a company plays out the scenarios, they are sure that the project they chose will be 100% worth the option of going ahead with and completing the project however, there are sometimes uncertainties and the value beforehand is 0%. A way to look at this is:
Value of real option = the value of knowing the certainty - the value of the results not known. When this happens, the value with the real options has an increase. When and if this option is not used, the advantage of utilizing this option is not calculated in and it ends up underestimating the NPV. It is beneficial to a company to understand and to determine the usefulness of the value of real option and let it aid them in making their best decision.
References
Van Putten, Alexander B. (Dec, 2004). Making Real Options Really Work. Retrieved from https://hbr.org/2004/12/making-real-options-really-work
Mun, Jonathan. (2006). Real Options Analysis versus Traditional DCF Valuation in Layman’s Terms. Retrieved from https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2f51/e0e143a4a2c166e0c8b84ff41938d831ab2e.pdf
Peer 2
M4A1
Loranda Williams posted Apr 7, 2018 8:05 PM
MEMO
To: LND Enterprise
From: Loranda Williams
Date: 7 April 2018
RE: Real Option Budgeting
The real option is not the unique financial instrument, but it allows a company to have genuine selections as well as opportunities f ...
Bargaining and negotiation in artificial intelligence.it is about the software agents in ai.what are the approaches in software agents and types of bargaining and negotiation.it is based on the 2017 anna university syllabus.it is related to software agents in unit-4.it shortly explain how agents communicate and get resources from other agents.it also contains the need of negotiation
Within a corporation, information technology (IT) departments may frequently handle sensitive
information about customers and are in a particularly unique position to collectively decide upon information
governance policies and practices. Individual its deny that there can be a group agency in a robust sense that can
warrant ascriptions of moral agency. We argue that McKenna’s individualist thesis does not take into account
collectives that have the control and knowledge conditions that warrant ascriptions of moral agency, such as
those of well-formed IT departments. Collectives, including corporations and IT departments, can be responsive
to morally relevant reasons, such as utile maximization and can be moral agents.
MULTI-AGENT PARADIGM FOR LEADERSHIP SELECTION: A REVIEWEditor IJMTER
A Multi-agent System (MAS) is comprised of multiple interacting intelligent agents. Agents
in the MAS could all be of same type (homogeneous) or different (heterogeneous). MAS are used to
solve problems which are either difficult for an individual agent to solve or when the problem is
inherently comprised of multiple actors interacting together. However, the nature of MAS design
coordination among agents in MAS is always a core issue. Coordination and cooperation allows the
agents to manage their inter dependencies and the type and nature of interactions. Coordination and
cooperation differ in degree of inter-agent knowledge and beliefs. Agent coordination is usually
achieved in the backdrop of a communication system between agents. This paper is a based on the
review of various work on selection of multi-agent for various task domain.
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HISTORY BASED COALITION FORMATION IN HEDONIC CONTEXT USING TRUST
1. International Journal of Artificial Intelligence & Applications (IJAIA), Vol. 4, No. 4, July 2013
DOI : 10.5121/ijaia.2013.4401 1
HISTORY BASED COALITION FORMATION IN
HEDONIC CONTEXT USING TRUST
Ahmadreza Ghaffarizadeh and Vicki H. Allan
Department of Computer Science, Utah State University, Logan, UT 84341, USA
ghaffarizadeh@aggiemail.usu.edu, vicki.allan@usu.edu
ABSTRACT
In this paper we address the problem of coalition formation in hedonic context. Our modelling tries to be as
realistic as possible. In previous models, once an agent joins a coalition it would not be able to leave the
coalition and join the new one; in this research we made it possible to leave a coalition but put some
restrictions to control the behavior of agents. Leaving or staying of an agent in a coalition will affect on the
trust of the other agents included in this coalition. Agents will use the trust values in computing the
expected utility of coalitions. Three different risk behaviors are introduced for agents that want to initiate a
coalition. Using these risk behaviors, some simulations are made and results are analyzed.
KEYWORDS
Coalition Formation, Trust, Risk Behaviors, Hedonic Context
1. INTRODUCTION
A multiagent system (MAS) is a system composed of various interacting agents. Based on the
type of agents, system can be a simple group or a complicated system doing sophisticated
operations. Agents in a MAS can have different types of objectives they are trying to reach. There
is not any external decision-maker or centralized processing unit in a MAS; agents work
autonomously and communicate with each other to do their tasks [1]. Due to lack of resources or
expertise, agents may not be able to reach their goals by themselves, so they are willing to form
coalition in order to reach their goals jointly. In most applications of multiagents, agents are
considered as cooperative, this means that they form coalition to reach common goals. This
research explores the context of hedonic games; in this context agents are self-interested and their
coalition satisfaction depends on the composition of the coalition they join. Agents only care
about their own profit and try to maximize it; so it is not reasonable for these agents to follow
actions which maximize the global profit not their own profit. Therefore agents in hedonic games
define a preference order over the set of all coalitions they can join and use this preference order
to form a satisfactory coalition. Many important problems in multi-agent systems including
marriage problem, roommate selection, admission proposals in universities, etc. can be
categorized in the context of hedonic games.
The main usage of hedonic games is in the game theory models in Economics; different models
have been studied in this domain and some research has been conducted to employ the hedonic
games concept in Economics models [2,3,4]. These models concentrate on the analysis of agents’
behavior; these research studies do not consider a multiagent framework and usually analyze self-
interested agents theoretically. Hedonic games are also frequently studied in the context of
Artificial Intelligence; these researches basically deals with finding the core solution in Hedonic
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2
games, analyzing stability of core and examining its optimality [5,6,7,8]. Some works have been
published about coalition formation under uncertainty [7,9,10,11], however these works are not in
the context of Hedonic games and can’t be adopted.
An interesting research study has been published by Genin and Aknine [12]; this research mainly
deals with autonomous agents that are self-interested, a protocol is defined for coalition formation
process and some strategies are suggested for proposal acceptance and proposal selection
mechanisms. The current research is an extension of this study and tries to consider more
realistic cases by introducing new behaviors, parameters and mechanisms.
2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
2.1. Preliminaries
Definition 1: Agent a is an autonomous entity who can sense the environment and make a
sequence of actions upon to these sensations in order to reach a predefined objective.
Definition 2: A multiagent system M is a group of n agents M={a1, a2, …, an}that are joined to do
a/some task(s). These agents may or may not share common resources.
Definition 3: Coalition c is a nonempty subset of M. Let C denotes the set of all coalitions, then Ci
denotes all coalitions which agent i belongs to; { }i iC c M a c= ⊂ ∈ .
Definition 4: A Hedonic game G is a preference order if defined over sets of agents; ( ), iM f ;
this preference order is transitive and asymmetric.
Definition 5: A solution for a Hedonic game is a partition from set of all agents M, {c1, c2,…, ck}
where 1
k
jj
c M=
=∑ and , i ji j c c∀ ≠ ∩ = ∅ .
2.2. Protocol
We do not have any central decision maker and agents in this research decide for themselves via
negotiation with other agents. During time each agent may receive many proposals for forming
coalition; it also sends some proposals to other agents asking about their willingness to form
coalition. We use a simple two-phase protocol: an agreement phase and commitment phase. The
protocol works as follow:
1- An initiator selects one of its possible coalitions according to its preference operator (it
will be discussed in later sections); suppose that this coalition includes k agents (1
initiator and k-1other agents).
2- Initiator sends the proposal of the selected coalition to all k-1 agents.
3- Agents respond to initiator with yes or no about their interest in joining this coalition.
4- If all agents agreed with the proposed coalition, initiator sends a confirmation request to
all agents and wants them to commit to the coalition, otherwise it sends a cancellation
message.
If all agents commit to the coalition, initiator informs all members that coalition is formed
otherwise it sends a cancellation message.
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3. PROPOSAL ACCEPTANCE STRATEGY
3.1. Proposal Acceptance
Agents in this research are rational; since proposal acceptance does not have any cost, and there is
always a probability that the current coalitions get broken; agents accept all proposals they
receive except for the proposals in which they have a utility less than when they are alone. Each
proposal has a limited waiting time, i.e. agents should respond by that time; otherwise the
response will be considered as rejection. Three types of agents are considered in this research:
1- Early responders who responds as soon as possible.
2- Lazy responders who waits to the end of deadline.
3- Random responders who have a random behavior in responding to the proposals.
3.2. Proposal Confirmation
On confirming proposals, whenever an agent feels that a proposal for a coalition is better than
current coalition, it can leave current one and join the proposed coalition. Following are some
considerations in confirming proposals:
1- Each coalition has an obligatory staying time Tc, it means that if an agent enrolled in a
coalition, it needs to be in the coalition for at least Tc unit of time. If it wants to leave
coalition sooner, it should pay the penalty Pc. Earned money from penalty will be shared
between all agents of the coalition equally.
2- Each agent has a level of honesty Hi; since leaving a coalition is unpleasant from
viewpoint of other members, the expected utility of leaving current coalition and joining
the other one should be great enough to tempt agent i to join a new coalition; as an
example if utility of current coalition is 1000; an agent with honesty level of 0.1 will be
tempted by a coalition with utility more than 1100 and an agent with level of 0.4 will be
tempted by a coalition with utility more than 1400. There is another factor that
discourages agents to leave one coalition: Bad Reputation Coefficient (BRC). To decide
on leaving current coalition and joining other coalition, agents act in a greedy way: they
only consider the next timestep. Totally, each agent evaluates the following criterion for
the next step and if it holds, then it leaves the current coalition and joins the new one.
Expected utility of current coalition*(1+Hi) < Expected utility of proposed coalition*(1- BRC)
3- There would be an enrollment fee for each solicited agent, CostEnroll ; the initiator will
receive a part of this fee as a reward for forming the coalition which benefits all.
Since confirmation doesn’t mean that the confirmed proposal by this agent will certainly form a
coalition, the agent may need to confirm some proposals before joining one of them; but there is a
restriction that an agent at each time step can only confirm a limited number of proposals.
3.3. Trust between Agents
Each agent ai has a record for all other agents that shows its trust in them to not leave the
coalition. As an example, trij shows the trust ai has in the agent aj to stay in the next step in the
current coalition; from mathematical point of view, trij is the probability that aj won’t leave the
group in the next time step. All trust values are initialized by 0.5. In each time step all agents
update their trust values for other included agents in the coalition; suppose that agent ai in time
step t wants to update its trust records for agent aj that is in the same coalition as ai is; two cases
may happen:
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1- If aj stayed in the current coalition in step t-1, then ai increases the value trij by the special
trust reward r.
2- If aj has left the current coalition in step t-1, then ai decreases the value trij by the special
betray punishment pu.
The value for pu should be bigger than r to reflect that other agents hate the betrayer agent that
breaks the coalition. In this research r is 0.01 and pu is considered as 0.05.
3.4. Expected Utility Evaluation
Agent i uses the following formula to calculate the expected utility of current coalition Ccur for the
next step as:
( ) ( )
j cur
i cur i cur ij
a C
ExpectedUtility C Utility C tr
∈
= × ∏
To compute the expected value of a proposed coalition C, agent i uses the following formula:
( )( ) ( )i leaving enroll
ExpectedUtility C Utility C Penalty Cost stepCoeff= − + ×
stepCoeff is a coefficient that lets the agent to consider the likelihood of being more than one time
step in the proposed coalition; so the stepCoeff is less than one.
4. PROPOSAL SELECTION STRATEGY
We consider a cost CostCom for each proposal the initiator sends. The initiator should consider this
cost to avoid sending bad proposals, i.e. the proposals that has a little chance of acceptance by all
agents. Initiator needs a measure to calculate the likelihood of formation of a candidate coalition;
so it calculates degree of interest of solicited agents based on the similarity with previous
proposals.
Similar to work done by Genin and Aknine[12] and based on the Bayesian reinforcement learning
model proposed by Chalkiadakis and Boutiller[11], the normalized distance between two
coalitions is used in this research to estimate their similarity. Suppose that all agents store all sent
and received proposals. Therefore if agent i finds a coalition that is similar to previously formed
coalition, it can hope that this candidate coalition will be formed too. The normalized distance
between two coalitions c1 and c2 is defined as:
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2
1
, d c c c c c c
n
= ∪ ∩
For each agent aj in candidate coalition c, initiator calculates ( )rcv
jd c , ( )acc
jd c and ( )ref
jd c as the
distance between c and all the proposals received from aj, all the accepted proposals sent to aj and
all the refused proposals sent to aj accordingly. Using these three values, initiator computes the
following degree of interest for aj:
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )min ,rcv acc ref
j j j jc d c d c d cδ = −
( )j cδ less than zero shows that aj may be interested in c and when ( )j cδ is greater than zero it
shows that aj is not. Since a coalition will be formed if and only if all agents are interested, so for
analyzing the likelihood of formation of a coalition, the degree of most unwilling agent should be
5. International Journal of Artificial Intelligence & Applications (IJAIA), Vol. 4, No. 4, July 2013
5
considered. If we map the willingness value to the range [0, 1], we can use this value as the
probability of formation of a coalition (Pformation).
At each step, agents can send a limited number of proposals. If agents were banned to leave a
formed coalition, initiator could decide on its preference order and evaluate proposals one by one;
but in this research, agents can leave coalitions. So it is possible that an agent, who is not
interested in a proposal in time step t, accepts it at time step t+k. Also when the number of agents
is too large, it is not possible to have a preference order due to cost of memory and computation.
Based on these facts, agents in this project do not have a preference order; instead they have a
preference operator based on their risk attitude:
1- Risk seeking: agents in this category weigh the utility of coalition more than the
possibility of formation. They risk proposing the coalitions with high utility that may
have low possibility of formation. They use following measure to choose between the
proposal they can send:
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 1formationPreference C Utility C P Cα
α= × >
2- Risk-averse: these agents prefer to choose the proposal that has the higher chance to be
accepted. Following equation is the measure which agents in this category use to
discriminate different proposals:
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 1formationPreference C Utility C P C β
β= × <
3- Risk-neutral: these agents consider expected value and chance of acceptance in the same
weight; using this measure they decide which proposal to send:
( ) ( ) ( )formationPreference C Utility C P C= ×
At each time step, an initiator creates a set that contains a) a fixed number of random coalitions b)
some randomly selected proposals from the previously sent proposals and c) some randomly
selected proposals from previously received proposals. Using this set, initiator selects the best
proposals it can send using its preference operator. Agents do not send the selected proposal if its
expected utility is less than a threshold; this threshold is set to 2*CostCom in our work.
5. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We conducted 4 different simulations and repeated each simulation 20 times. There are 20 agents
in each simulation running for 100 time steps. Bad Reputation Coefficient is set to 0.15 and
Honesty level for each agent is taken from the range [0, 0.35]. Expiration time for accepting and
confirmation is set to 3 steps. To calculate the utility of coalitions, each agent considers the direct
interaction with other agents and pairwise interaction of each two other agents in the coalition;
each agent has a table of estimation of interaction for each two agents (including itself). It finds
all permutation of size 2 of agents and look up for the value in the estimation table, then sums all
these value to compute the utility of a given coalition. Each entry in the table is randomly chosen
from the range [-100, 100].
For the first simulation, all agents are risk seeking; for the second simulation agents are risk
averse and in the third simulation all the agents are risk neutral. We have considered the equal
number of each type of agents in the fourth simulation. Gained utility for agents with similar
honesty levels are averaged for simulations and are depicted in Figure 1. Note that honesty levels
are divided to 0.05 ranges and each agent is mapped to the closest level in averaging. Results
show that risk-seeking and risk-neutral agents have similar utility behavior over the changes in
honesty factor and have the highest utility with the honesty factor [0.15, 0.20].
Second set of results show the average distribution of initiator, solicited and alone agents per step
in each simulation. Note that axes are scaled to show the distribution clearly. Figure 2 shows the
6. International Journal of Artificial Intelligence & Applications (IJAIA), Vol. 4, No. 4, July 2013
6
distribution of alone agents, it can be seen that in the simulation with risk-seeking agents the
number of alone agents are less than two other simulations. Figure 3 depicts distribution of
solicited agents that have similar distributions in all three simulations. Distribution of initiator
agents are depicted in Figure 4; since each coalition has only one initiator, Figure 4 shows the
number of formed coalitions as well. As results show, number of formed coalitions in simulation
with risk-neutral agents is less than two other simulations. The average duration of coalitions for
risk-seeking agents is 8 steps, for risk-averse agents is 12 and for risk neutral agents is 17 steps.
6. CONCLUSION
Humans are self-interested and always (with some exceptions and restrictions) follow their
preferences in their interaction with others. That is why context of “hedonic games,” that includes
self-interested agents, has been received a significant attention. In this paper we addressed the
problem of coalition formation in the context of hedonic games. We modelled a realistic case
where agents at each time step can decide to stay in a coalition or leave. As in reality, when an
agent leaves a group, other agents lose their trust in the left agent. Agents have an honesty factor;
the more this honesty factor, the more reliable our agents are. Agents use trust values to estimate
the possibility of continuing with the coalition they currently are in. We analyzed the gained
utility of agents regards to their risk behavior in proposing coalitions to
Figure 1: Utility versus Honesty factor regards to agent types in 4 different simulations.
Figure 2. Distribution of alone agents in 100 time steps for agents with different risk attitudes.
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
5500
6000
6500
7000
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Utility
Honesty Factor
All Risk Seeking
All Risk Averse
All Risk Neutral
Mixture
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 20 40 60 80 100
Distributionofaloneagents
Step
Risk Seeking
Risk Averse
Risk Neutral
7. International Journal of Artificial Intelligence & Applications (IJAIA), Vol. 4, No. 4, July 2013
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Figure 3. Distribution of solicited agents in 100 time steps for agents with different risk attitudes.
Figure 4. Distribution of initiator agents in 100 time steps for agents with different risk attitudes.
other agents. Results show that different levels of honesty can lead to different utility values for
distinct risk attitudes.
7. FUTURE WORK
Some ideas for future work are as follows: one may think about considering the level of
friendship between agents; an agent may accept a proposal from a friend while it doesn’t accept a
similar proposal with a higher utility from a stranger. As in real world, some people like to be
manager, some agents may enjoy of being initiator; it would be interesting to consider a factor to
show the willingness of agents about being an initiator or being solicited. Implementing this
behavior can be done by introducing a value α in the range [ ]0,1 showing the willingness of each
agent to be an initiator. An agent with α=0 never propose coalitions to others and an agent with
α=1 never accept any proposals from others; other values will affect the decision of being an
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0 20 40 60 80 100
Distributionofsolicitedagents
Step
Risk Seeking
Risk Averse
Risk Neutral
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0 20 40 60 80 100
Distributionofinitiatoragents
Step
Risk Seeking
Risk Averse
Risk Neutral
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initiator or not. As another future work, one may employ history to estimate duration of candidate
coalitions to use in the coalition utility evaluation.
REFERENCES
[1] K. Ahmadi and V. H. Allan, “Efficient Self Adapting Agent Organizations,” in Proceedings of the 5th
International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence, ICAART 2013, Barcelona, Spain.
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[3] S. Banerjee, H. Konishi, and T. Sonmez, “Core in a simple coalition formation game,” Social Choice
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[5] S. Sung and D. Dimitrov, “On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games,”
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[10] K. Westwood and V. H. Allan, “Heuristics for dealing with a shrinking pie in agent coalition
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Authors
Ahmadreza Ghaffarizadeh is a research assistant and PhD candidate in Computer Science
department at Utah State University. His research interests include computational biology,
artificial intelligence and evolutionary algorithms.
Vicki H Allan completed her PhD in Computer Science at Colorado State University in
1986. She completed a master’s degree in computer science and a master’s degree in
mathematics from Utah State University. She is currently an associate professor in the
Computer Science department at Utah State University where she teaches courses in
multiagent systems, programming languages, data structures, and algorithms. Her research
is supported by NSF grants 0812039 and 0829563.