This document summarizes the state of the global oil market in early 2016, when oil prices had collapsed to their lowest levels in over a decade. It finds that despite low prices, oil production continues to grow due to ongoing investments. Major producing countries like Canada, Iran, Iraq, and others are still bringing new production capacity online or restoring existing fields. The only possibilities for a substantial price recovery seem to be unexpected geopolitical events disrupting supply or a formal agreement by producers like OPEC to cut output, though such an agreement would be difficult to implement. Overall, supply appears set to continue outpacing demand in 2016, keeping downward pressure on prices.
The Impact of Oil Price on Economic Development of Kurdistan Region of Iraq f...IJAEMSJORNAL
Kurdistan region of Iraq signifies a great case study to investigate the impact of oil price, for the reason that most of its producing reliance on exporting crude oil KRG is one of the main oil exporting regions. Usually, the national revenue relies on crude oil revenue in KRG comprises a great percentage of Kurdistan region of Iraqi government’s budget and also KRG’s economy can be impact by would economic during economic difficulties. Consequently, growing oil crude oil price can influence on economic development in Kurdistan region of Iraq. Therefore, it is important to utilize other resource instead of oil income as a different approach to increase region’s income. The key objective of this article is to investigate the impacts of oil price and oil production value on economic development. Annual growth rate, compound growth rate and correlation coefficient can be utilized to estimate of the data. The findings revealed that an economic development is one of the most significant sources of economic transformation since it reproduces the society's capability to rise productive volume and ideal investment and likewise sustainability obligation comprises an expanded economy on the face of shocks, dynamically implements technology and head accumulation human money, competitively can increase comparative advantages compared to the other. Consequently, it operates within steady, balanced economic strategies and economic growth and there was positively statistically significance between oil price and GDP, oil production value and GDP.
This is the SPRE presentation from four experts on their 2017 oil price outlooks at the October 2016 full-house Society of Petroleum Resources Economists' meeting in Houston. They included Carl Larry (Frost & Sullivan), Raoul LeBlanc (IHS), Afo Ogunnaike (Wood Mackenzie) and Tony Starkey (S&P Global, Platts). The meeting was opened by JC Rovillain (Enhanced Value Recovery) and the panel discussion was moderated by Javan Meinwald (Marketing Upstream). Check out the YouTube video for the compete presentations and the panel discussion. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC1sXSv6-jXlbBCQwtcB3kUA
Oil is the major
source of energy from most of the developed as well as developing countries around the world.
Therefore a change in the supply of oil will significantly affect operations in most parts of the
world. There are a number of factors that affect the demand and supply of oil in the world.
- See more at: http://www.customwritingservice.org/blog/factors-affecting-demand-and-supply-of-oil
GROWTH FACTORS AND CHALLENGES FOR OIL MARKET; GROWTH FACTORS FOR OIL MARKET; Demographic Factors, Oil Demand, Motorization in Asian Countries, Upstream Costs Increase, Principal CHALLENGES FOR OIL MARKET, US Shale Oil Production, US shale oil production potential for well drilling, Other constraints, Deepwater Production, Iraqi production growth prospects, GTL – challenge for the oil market after 2020
GROWTH FACTORS AND CHALLENGES FOR OIL MARKET; Demographic Factors; Oil Demand; Motorization in Asian Countries; Upstream Costs Increase; US Shale Oil Production; Deepwater Production; Iraqi production growth prospects; GTL – challenge for the oil market after 2020
An Investigation of Crude Oil and its Implication for Financial Markets Priesnell Warren ✔
This research paper seeks to unearth the possible repercussions of fluctuations in Crude Oil markets and how they will affect global trade and financial markets. Crude oil or Black Gold is one of the world’s most precious commodities as its change in price affects the entire economy.
The Impact of Oil Price on Economic Development of Kurdistan Region of Iraq f...IJAEMSJORNAL
Kurdistan region of Iraq signifies a great case study to investigate the impact of oil price, for the reason that most of its producing reliance on exporting crude oil KRG is one of the main oil exporting regions. Usually, the national revenue relies on crude oil revenue in KRG comprises a great percentage of Kurdistan region of Iraqi government’s budget and also KRG’s economy can be impact by would economic during economic difficulties. Consequently, growing oil crude oil price can influence on economic development in Kurdistan region of Iraq. Therefore, it is important to utilize other resource instead of oil income as a different approach to increase region’s income. The key objective of this article is to investigate the impacts of oil price and oil production value on economic development. Annual growth rate, compound growth rate and correlation coefficient can be utilized to estimate of the data. The findings revealed that an economic development is one of the most significant sources of economic transformation since it reproduces the society's capability to rise productive volume and ideal investment and likewise sustainability obligation comprises an expanded economy on the face of shocks, dynamically implements technology and head accumulation human money, competitively can increase comparative advantages compared to the other. Consequently, it operates within steady, balanced economic strategies and economic growth and there was positively statistically significance between oil price and GDP, oil production value and GDP.
This is the SPRE presentation from four experts on their 2017 oil price outlooks at the October 2016 full-house Society of Petroleum Resources Economists' meeting in Houston. They included Carl Larry (Frost & Sullivan), Raoul LeBlanc (IHS), Afo Ogunnaike (Wood Mackenzie) and Tony Starkey (S&P Global, Platts). The meeting was opened by JC Rovillain (Enhanced Value Recovery) and the panel discussion was moderated by Javan Meinwald (Marketing Upstream). Check out the YouTube video for the compete presentations and the panel discussion. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC1sXSv6-jXlbBCQwtcB3kUA
Oil is the major
source of energy from most of the developed as well as developing countries around the world.
Therefore a change in the supply of oil will significantly affect operations in most parts of the
world. There are a number of factors that affect the demand and supply of oil in the world.
- See more at: http://www.customwritingservice.org/blog/factors-affecting-demand-and-supply-of-oil
GROWTH FACTORS AND CHALLENGES FOR OIL MARKET; GROWTH FACTORS FOR OIL MARKET; Demographic Factors, Oil Demand, Motorization in Asian Countries, Upstream Costs Increase, Principal CHALLENGES FOR OIL MARKET, US Shale Oil Production, US shale oil production potential for well drilling, Other constraints, Deepwater Production, Iraqi production growth prospects, GTL – challenge for the oil market after 2020
GROWTH FACTORS AND CHALLENGES FOR OIL MARKET; Demographic Factors; Oil Demand; Motorization in Asian Countries; Upstream Costs Increase; US Shale Oil Production; Deepwater Production; Iraqi production growth prospects; GTL – challenge for the oil market after 2020
An Investigation of Crude Oil and its Implication for Financial Markets Priesnell Warren ✔
This research paper seeks to unearth the possible repercussions of fluctuations in Crude Oil markets and how they will affect global trade and financial markets. Crude oil or Black Gold is one of the world’s most precious commodities as its change in price affects the entire economy.
The oil industry, with its history of booms and busts, is in its deepest downturn since the 1990s, if not earlier.
Earnings are down for companies that made record profits in recent years, leading them to decommission more than two-thirds of their rigs and sharply cut investment in exploration and production. Scores of companies have gone bankrupt and an estimated 250,000 oil workers have lost their jobs.
The cause is the plunging price of a barrel of oil, which has fallen more than 70 percent since June 2014.
Prices recovered a few times last year, but a barrel of oil has already sunk this year to its lowest level since 2004. Executives think it will be years before oil returns to $90 or $100 a barrel, a price that was pretty much the norm over the last decade.
Brent crude, the main international benchmark, was trading at around $29.64 ( 21st February 2016) a barrel on Saturday.
United States production has surged in recent years as the shale boom took off. That has helped create a glut of oil as major producers like Saudi Arabia continue to pump at high levels.
MSC301- The Impact of Change in Oil Price Samiya Yesmin
Course: MSC301- Production-Operations Management
Sr. Lecturer: Md. Tamzidul Islam
This is paper on the impact of change in Oil Price, with regards to Supply Chain Management and production.
The chances in countries’ economies after World War II: Petroleum Economics i...AI Publications
Kurdistan region of Iraq represents a good case study to examine the effect of oil price, because most of its earning dependence on exporting crude oil. Kurdistan region of Iraq is one of the major oil exporting countries. Generally, the national income depends on crude oil. Oil revenue in Kurdistan region of Iraq covers 90 percent of Kurdistan region of Iraqi government’s budget and also Kurdistan region of Iraqi economy could be effect by would economic during economic problems. Thus, increasing oil crude oil price can effect on economic growth in Kurdistan region of Iraq. So it is crucial to use other resource instead of oil revenue as a new strategy to gain national revenue. The main objective of this study is to examine the effects of oil price and oil production value on economic growth. Annual growth rate, compound growth rate and correlation coefficient can be used to estimate of the data. The data is annual data which were converting a period of 21 years from 1995-2017. As a result, Economic growth is one of the most important sources of economic transformation because it reflects the community's ability to increase productive capacity and optimal investment and also sustainability requirement includes a diversified economy on the face of shocks, dynamically adopts technology and head accumulation human money, competitively can gain relative advantages compared to the other. Thus, it operates within stable, stable economic policies and economic development and there were positively statistically significance between oil price and GDP, oil production value and GDP.
The Saturday Economist Oil Market Update 2015John Ashcroft
What is pushing oil prices lower? What’s the difference between Brent Crude or West Texas Intermediate? Will prices stay low and what are the prospects for oil demand growth? Who are the winners and losers? What is the impact of lower oil prices on the economy? Are lower oil prices good for growth? What does the falling price mean for the consumer? US Oils rigs go up as the oil prices rise, so is the real challenge, Sheiks versus Shale or a Western squeeze on Russian resources?
Check out our oil market update to understand just what is happening in the oil Market
Impact of Oil Prices on the Economic Growth of PakistanMuhammad Sharjeel
We gathered data from different resources and then finalize our presentation. The intention to upload this file is to help those guys who need some guidelines for preparing presentation. :)
The oil industry, with its history of booms and busts, is in its deepest downturn since the 1990s, if not earlier.
Earnings are down for companies that made record profits in recent years, leading them to decommission more than two-thirds of their rigs and sharply cut investment in exploration and production. Scores of companies have gone bankrupt and an estimated 250,000 oil workers have lost their jobs.
The cause is the plunging price of a barrel of oil, which has fallen more than 70 percent since June 2014.
Prices recovered a few times last year, but a barrel of oil has already sunk this year to its lowest level since 2004. Executives think it will be years before oil returns to $90 or $100 a barrel, a price that was pretty much the norm over the last decade.
Brent crude, the main international benchmark, was trading at around $29.64 ( 21st February 2016) a barrel on Saturday.
United States production has surged in recent years as the shale boom took off. That has helped create a glut of oil as major producers like Saudi Arabia continue to pump at high levels.
MSC301- The Impact of Change in Oil Price Samiya Yesmin
Course: MSC301- Production-Operations Management
Sr. Lecturer: Md. Tamzidul Islam
This is paper on the impact of change in Oil Price, with regards to Supply Chain Management and production.
The chances in countries’ economies after World War II: Petroleum Economics i...AI Publications
Kurdistan region of Iraq represents a good case study to examine the effect of oil price, because most of its earning dependence on exporting crude oil. Kurdistan region of Iraq is one of the major oil exporting countries. Generally, the national income depends on crude oil. Oil revenue in Kurdistan region of Iraq covers 90 percent of Kurdistan region of Iraqi government’s budget and also Kurdistan region of Iraqi economy could be effect by would economic during economic problems. Thus, increasing oil crude oil price can effect on economic growth in Kurdistan region of Iraq. So it is crucial to use other resource instead of oil revenue as a new strategy to gain national revenue. The main objective of this study is to examine the effects of oil price and oil production value on economic growth. Annual growth rate, compound growth rate and correlation coefficient can be used to estimate of the data. The data is annual data which were converting a period of 21 years from 1995-2017. As a result, Economic growth is one of the most important sources of economic transformation because it reflects the community's ability to increase productive capacity and optimal investment and also sustainability requirement includes a diversified economy on the face of shocks, dynamically adopts technology and head accumulation human money, competitively can gain relative advantages compared to the other. Thus, it operates within stable, stable economic policies and economic development and there were positively statistically significance between oil price and GDP, oil production value and GDP.
The Saturday Economist Oil Market Update 2015John Ashcroft
What is pushing oil prices lower? What’s the difference between Brent Crude or West Texas Intermediate? Will prices stay low and what are the prospects for oil demand growth? Who are the winners and losers? What is the impact of lower oil prices on the economy? Are lower oil prices good for growth? What does the falling price mean for the consumer? US Oils rigs go up as the oil prices rise, so is the real challenge, Sheiks versus Shale or a Western squeeze on Russian resources?
Check out our oil market update to understand just what is happening in the oil Market
Impact of Oil Prices on the Economic Growth of PakistanMuhammad Sharjeel
We gathered data from different resources and then finalize our presentation. The intention to upload this file is to help those guys who need some guidelines for preparing presentation. :)
This is my thought about investment plan on oil and this is really a good time to buy Oil for a great investment. Any further question, I would really like to share it. Thx
Financial Algorithms presents the energy trading scenario for the year 2016. In this presentation, after examining various fundamental factors in energy sector, FA forecasts the crude oil price, gasoline & natural gas price levels for the year 2016; in case of mean volatility levels and high volatility levels, both. FA also focuses on how to model price levels and volatility surfaces in low volatility and high volatility scenarios under forward & forward-forward models using various energy contracts and spreads i.e. crack spread. Various greek sensitivities including second order & third order greeks, which can be helpful in projecting the price & volatility levels, are also described. At the end, correlation factors, fundamental & technical both, are discussed. These correlation factors are exogenous in price forecasting, and new emerging trends which can affect the energy trading in a long run also been discussed.
Haggi I
Abdullah Haggi
ENGLISH 2O1O
Shannon Branfield
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dependence on violent conrlicd rournat of Peace no*,"@,7s7-776,
This article is relevant to my argument because it offers part of a solution to both the
rentier peace and resource curse theories, particularly for the oil-producing countries. Hence,
the maior argument in this reference is that both resource dependence and resource wealth per
capita should be considered. In essence, these two concepts should be taken into account
because only the availability of the extremely high per capita revenues mainly from oil
enables governments to attain internal stability. Notably, the empirical analysis of this
reference supports this hypothesis effectively. The research findings of this article state that
oil-wealthy nations ostensibly manage to maintain their political stability through an
amalgamation of protection by outsiders, high expenditure on the security apparatus, and
large-scale distribution. In comparison to the oil-poor nations and inconsistency to the rentier
theory, the reference states that oil-wealthy countries' institutions seem not to be particularly
characterized through clientelism and patronage.
Benes, J., Chauvet, M., Kamenikr 0., Kumhof, M., Laxton, D., Mursula, S., &Selody, J.
,ri- , Th. future of oil: Geology versus technolog,v.lnternational Journal of Forecasting,,{31(l)"
L"',_
j:,
207-22{,2015. Print
Haggr 2
Most importantly, this ret'erence is also relevant to my argument since it reconciles
and discusses two diametrically opposed perspectives about rvorld's oil production future and
prices. The article notes that the geological perspective expects that physical constraints shall
dictate the future evolution of prices and oil output. This perspective is supported by the
statistics that pofiray that rvorld oil production has deciined significantly since 2005 despite
the historically high prices. Additionally, spare capacity has also reduced to near historic
lows. On the other hand, the technological perspective of oil expects that higher oil prices
should eventually lead to a decisive eff-ect specitically on oil output through encouraging
technological solutions. Tl"ris perspective is supported by the fact that high prices since 2003
resulted in escalated revisions in production forecasts lbunded on a purel-v geological
perspective.
"-,i'
ir\-
r l;
Bromley, S. The United States and the control of world oil'. Government antl Oppositio{,',
,'''"
tt'
: 40Q1.225-255. 2005. Print.
I :'
This informative relerence is appropriate for my argument because it expounds oa the
drive to correct the world's oil, which is the fundamental driving torce that is trehind the
American foreign policy. Hence, the reference argues that instead of perceiving the American
foreign poliey as being driven by the US oil companies' expansionary forces that seek new-
mar ...
The business cycle, the global financial crisis and the future of oil markets are currently the three most popular topics of discussion. Since the start of the recession, the international media has been quick to bring many new theories and revelations, brilliant in their simplicity, to light. Hope is the mother of invention, and amidst the crisis they cannot be disproved. However, in two or three years time, 99% of this verbal chaff will have been blown away and only serious analytical work will remain.
Authored by: Leonid Grigoriev
Published in 2010
EY Price Point: global oil and gas market outlook (Q4, October 2020)EY
Oil and gas prices have recovered steadily from their lows and are relatively stable, but that stability is supported by the combination of purposeful withholding of production by oil-producing countries and economic stress on upstream independents. Oil prices closed the quarter roughly where they started it, while refining spreads were down slightly. LNG spreads were substantially higher at the end of Q3 than they were at the beginning of the quarter but are still roughly half of what is generally thought of as sustainable.
Going forward, the market will be looking closely at how the economy and demand respond to new developments with respect to a potential COVID-19 vaccine and the US election.
1Running head GLOBAL OIL PRICES2GLOBAL OIL PRICES.docxnovabroom
1
Running head: GLOBAL OIL PRICES
2
GLOBAL OIL PRICES
Global Oil Prices Comment by Writing Center: Check the order and information needed
Full paper title
Student name
Course name & code
Assignment due date
Faculty name
Westcliff University
Akhil Gadiparthi
Simin Hojat
BUS 505 Managerial Economics
5-19-2019 Comment by Writing Center: Like so:
May 19, 2019
Global Oil Prices Comment by Writing Center: Add this like I did for you here before you begin writing your paper
Oil is a commodity that is consumed on a large scalelarge-scale basis all over the world, although not every other country produces its own oil. Most countries across the globe export the oil that they consume locally. The prices of this particular commodity have been deteriorating ha inthroughout the past twelve months by at least by 60% of the previous prices of his commodityprice in the global market place. Evaluating the supply and demand of oil across the globe is therefore very necessary in determining the price action of oil as well as the impact of price elasticity on demand and supply both in the short run and in the long run. Comment by Writing Center: Great place to cite – where did you find this fact?
(Author’s Last Name, year) Comment by Writing Center: Where did you find this fact? Cite
(Author’s Last Name, year)
However, theThe prices of oil are expected to take another direction especially due to the difference between the amount of supplyied and the amount of demanded. As of 2018, oil was estimated to be in demand of not less than 90 million barrels per day. The and demand is expected to increase to by about 100 million barrels by 2019 (Jahar, 2019). The amount of oil which was produced per day in 2018 was average according to _____. The amount of barrels of oil produced in 2019 by all oil manufactures in was estimated to be 80.622 million barrels per day. This means that the amount demanded is less than the amount supplied; hence, this will be a key factor that will pull the prices of oil up. Comment by Writing Center: Instead, specify – are they going up or down? Comment by Writing Center: Cite here too
(Author’s Last Name, year) Comment by Writing Center: Great! Comment by Writing Center: Cite
The argument here is because,Essentially, when demand is higher than the supply, it this renders a market in deficiency; thus, meaning people scramble for what is offered to them in the market. This scramble calls gets the attention of suppliers attention and as since they are assured of their marketability. Due to this,, they suppliers can alter prices to reap more from the increased demand for their commodities. Comment by Writing Center: Can you say this in another way? This is a bit confusing for me.
The price of oil in March 2018 was about $62.73 per barrel (Lund, 2018). A higher figure was recorded in April 2019 which was $66.14 per barrel. The demand for oil in 2018 was, a.
Greetings,
Attached FYI ( NewBase Special 11 November 2015 ) , from Hawk Energy Services Dubai . Daily energy news covering the MENA area and related worldwide energy news. In todays’ issue you will find news about:-
• UAE: BP presents solid bid for AbuDhabi ( ADCO ) concession
• Qatar accounts for 20% of total GCC chemicals export volume, valued at $10.6bn in 2014
• OPEC Challenges Shale Afresh as Iraq Crude Floods Gulf of Mexico
• OPEC Said to Consider New Output Ceiling as Indonesia Rejoins
• U.S. Lowers 2016 Crude Output Forecast as Drillers Idle Rigs
• Oil prices drop on rising stockpiles, Japan recession fears
• Oil prices to stay low till 2020
• LNG construction sector hits its peak and faces steep fall leading to heightened competitive tension amongst contractors
• OMV CEO, Ex-German Chancellor in Call for Better Russia/EU Relations
we would appreciate your actions to send to all interested parties that you may wish. Also note that if you or your organization wish to include your own article or advert in our circulations, please send it to :-
khdmohd@hotmail.com or khdmohd@hawkenergy.net
Best Regards.
Khaled Al Awadi
Energy Consultant & NewBase Chairman - Senior Chief Editor
MS & BS Mechanical Engineering (HON), USA
Emarat member since 1990
ASME meme since 1995
Hawk Energy sin
• US tight oil production and the future oil price
• Dubai:MD and CEO of DEWA receives CEO of First Solar
• UAE's Masdar inks deal to build Mauritania solar projects
• No 'significant' change in Saudi oil policy after king's death
• Algeria:To increase its oil output & renewable energy projects production
• Norway: Det norske commences drilling on the Ivar Aasen field
• Bangladesh:KrisEnergy completes 2D seismic program in SS-11
• India: Energy subsidies prove drain on Indian economy
• Oil producers in US not able to drill at $45 a barrel
• Oil price plunge to boost global M&A activity in 2015, says EY
Research Paper: How much oil remains for the world to produce? Comparing asse...Energy for One World
ABSTRACT
This paper assesses how much oil remains to be produced, and whether this poses a significant constraint to
global development. We describe the different categories of oil and related liquid fuels, and show that public-
domain by-country and global proved (1P) oil reserves data, such as from the EIA or BP Statistical Review, are
very misleading and should not be used. Better data are oil consultancy proved-plus-probable (2P) reserves.
These data are generally backdated, i.e. with later changes in a field's estimated volume being attributed to the
date of field discovery. Even some of these data, we suggest, need reduction by some 300 Gb for probable
overstatement of Middle East OPEC reserves, and likewise by 100 Gb for overstatement of FSU reserves. The
statistic that best assesses ‘how much oil is left to produce’ is a region's estimated ultimately recoverable resource
(URR) for each of its various categories of oil, from which production to-date needs to be subtracted. We use
Hubbert linearization to estimate the global URR for four aggregate classes of oil, and show that these range from
2500 Gb for conventional oil to 5000 Gb for ‘all-liquids’. Subtracting oil produced to-date gives estimates of
global reserves of conventional oil at about half the EIA estimate. We then use our estimated URR values,
combined with the observation that oil production in a region usually reaches one or more maxima when roughly
half its URR has been produced, to forecast the expected dates of global resource-limited production maxima of
these classes of oil. These dates range from 2019 (i.e., already past) for conventional oil to around 2040 for ‘all-
liquids’. These oil production maxima are likely to have significant economic, political and sustainability con-
sequences. Our forecasts differ sharply from those of the EIA, but our resource-limited production maxima
roughly match the mainly demand-driven maxima envisaged in the IEA's 2021 ‘Stated Policies’ scenario. Finally,
in agreement with others, our forecasts indicate that the IPCC's ‘high-CO2’ scenarios appear infeasible by
assuming unrealistically high rates of oil production, but also indicate that considerable oil must be left in the
ground if climate change targets are to be met. As the world seeks to move towards sustainability, these per-
spectives on the future availability of oil are important to take into account.
How Your Ears Respond to Pressure.
6 Methods to Equalize Your Ears.
10 Tips that Make Equalizing Easier.
How to Deal with Other Ear Problems.
Scuba Diving Cyprus
Harvest 4 Energy Ltd situated in Cyprus is the official representative of the Solarus hybrid systems for electricity generation and hot water applications. www.harvest4energy.com
Chatty Kathy - UNC Bootcamp Final Project Presentation - Final Version - 5.23...John Andrews
SlideShare Description for "Chatty Kathy - UNC Bootcamp Final Project Presentation"
Title: Chatty Kathy: Enhancing Physical Activity Among Older Adults
Description:
Discover how Chatty Kathy, an innovative project developed at the UNC Bootcamp, aims to tackle the challenge of low physical activity among older adults. Our AI-driven solution uses peer interaction to boost and sustain exercise levels, significantly improving health outcomes. This presentation covers our problem statement, the rationale behind Chatty Kathy, synthetic data and persona creation, model performance metrics, a visual demonstration of the project, and potential future developments. Join us for an insightful Q&A session to explore the potential of this groundbreaking project.
Project Team: Jay Requarth, Jana Avery, John Andrews, Dr. Dick Davis II, Nee Buntoum, Nam Yeongjin & Mat Nicholas
Opendatabay - Open Data Marketplace.pptxOpendatabay
Opendatabay.com unlocks the power of data for everyone. Open Data Marketplace fosters a collaborative hub for data enthusiasts to explore, share, and contribute to a vast collection of datasets.
First ever open hub for data enthusiasts to collaborate and innovate. A platform to explore, share, and contribute to a vast collection of datasets. Through robust quality control and innovative technologies like blockchain verification, opendatabay ensures the authenticity and reliability of datasets, empowering users to make data-driven decisions with confidence. Leverage cutting-edge AI technologies to enhance the data exploration, analysis, and discovery experience.
From intelligent search and recommendations to automated data productisation and quotation, Opendatabay AI-driven features streamline the data workflow. Finding the data you need shouldn't be a complex. Opendatabay simplifies the data acquisition process with an intuitive interface and robust search tools. Effortlessly explore, discover, and access the data you need, allowing you to focus on extracting valuable insights. Opendatabay breaks new ground with a dedicated, AI-generated, synthetic datasets.
Leverage these privacy-preserving datasets for training and testing AI models without compromising sensitive information. Opendatabay prioritizes transparency by providing detailed metadata, provenance information, and usage guidelines for each dataset, ensuring users have a comprehensive understanding of the data they're working with. By leveraging a powerful combination of distributed ledger technology and rigorous third-party audits Opendatabay ensures the authenticity and reliability of every dataset. Security is at the core of Opendatabay. Marketplace implements stringent security measures, including encryption, access controls, and regular vulnerability assessments, to safeguard your data and protect your privacy.
Data Centers - Striving Within A Narrow Range - Research Report - MCG - May 2...pchutichetpong
M Capital Group (“MCG”) expects to see demand and the changing evolution of supply, facilitated through institutional investment rotation out of offices and into work from home (“WFH”), while the ever-expanding need for data storage as global internet usage expands, with experts predicting 5.3 billion users by 2023. These market factors will be underpinned by technological changes, such as progressing cloud services and edge sites, allowing the industry to see strong expected annual growth of 13% over the next 4 years.
Whilst competitive headwinds remain, represented through the recent second bankruptcy filing of Sungard, which blames “COVID-19 and other macroeconomic trends including delayed customer spending decisions, insourcing and reductions in IT spending, energy inflation and reduction in demand for certain services”, the industry has seen key adjustments, where MCG believes that engineering cost management and technological innovation will be paramount to success.
MCG reports that the more favorable market conditions expected over the next few years, helped by the winding down of pandemic restrictions and a hybrid working environment will be driving market momentum forward. The continuous injection of capital by alternative investment firms, as well as the growing infrastructural investment from cloud service providers and social media companies, whose revenues are expected to grow over 3.6x larger by value in 2026, will likely help propel center provision and innovation. These factors paint a promising picture for the industry players that offset rising input costs and adapt to new technologies.
According to M Capital Group: “Specifically, the long-term cost-saving opportunities available from the rise of remote managing will likely aid value growth for the industry. Through margin optimization and further availability of capital for reinvestment, strong players will maintain their competitive foothold, while weaker players exit the market to balance supply and demand.”
Explore our comprehensive data analysis project presentation on predicting product ad campaign performance. Learn how data-driven insights can optimize your marketing strategies and enhance campaign effectiveness. Perfect for professionals and students looking to understand the power of data analysis in advertising. for more details visit: https://bostoninstituteofanalytics.org/data-science-and-artificial-intelligence/
As Europe's leading economic powerhouse and the fourth-largest hashtag#economy globally, Germany stands at the forefront of innovation and industrial might. Renowned for its precision engineering and high-tech sectors, Germany's economic structure is heavily supported by a robust service industry, accounting for approximately 68% of its GDP. This economic clout and strategic geopolitical stance position Germany as a focal point in the global cyber threat landscape.
In the face of escalating global tensions, particularly those emanating from geopolitical disputes with nations like hashtag#Russia and hashtag#China, hashtag#Germany has witnessed a significant uptick in targeted cyber operations. Our analysis indicates a marked increase in hashtag#cyberattack sophistication aimed at critical infrastructure and key industrial sectors. These attacks range from ransomware campaigns to hashtag#AdvancedPersistentThreats (hashtag#APTs), threatening national security and business integrity.
🔑 Key findings include:
🔍 Increased frequency and complexity of cyber threats.
🔍 Escalation of state-sponsored and criminally motivated cyber operations.
🔍 Active dark web exchanges of malicious tools and tactics.
Our comprehensive report delves into these challenges, using a blend of open-source and proprietary data collection techniques. By monitoring activity on critical networks and analyzing attack patterns, our team provides a detailed overview of the threats facing German entities.
This report aims to equip stakeholders across public and private sectors with the knowledge to enhance their defensive strategies, reduce exposure to cyber risks, and reinforce Germany's resilience against cyber threats.
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Empowering the Data Analytics Ecosystem: A Laser Focus on Value
The data analytics ecosystem thrives when every component functions at its peak, unlocking the true potential of data. Here's a laser focus on key areas for an empowered ecosystem:
1. Democratize Access, Not Data:
Granular Access Controls: Provide users with self-service tools tailored to their specific needs, preventing data overload and misuse.
Data Catalogs: Implement robust data catalogs for easy discovery and understanding of available data sources.
2. Foster Collaboration with Clear Roles:
Data Mesh Architecture: Break down data silos by creating a distributed data ownership model with clear ownership and responsibilities.
Collaborative Workspaces: Utilize interactive platforms where data scientists, analysts, and domain experts can work seamlessly together.
3. Leverage Advanced Analytics Strategically:
AI-powered Automation: Automate repetitive tasks like data cleaning and feature engineering, freeing up data talent for higher-level analysis.
Right-Tool Selection: Strategically choose the most effective advanced analytics techniques (e.g., AI, ML) based on specific business problems.
4. Prioritize Data Quality with Automation:
Automated Data Validation: Implement automated data quality checks to identify and rectify errors at the source, minimizing downstream issues.
Data Lineage Tracking: Track the flow of data throughout the ecosystem, ensuring transparency and facilitating root cause analysis for errors.
5. Cultivate a Data-Driven Mindset:
Metrics-Driven Performance Management: Align KPIs and performance metrics with data-driven insights to ensure actionable decision making.
Data Storytelling Workshops: Equip stakeholders with the skills to translate complex data findings into compelling narratives that drive action.
Benefits of a Precise Ecosystem:
Sharpened Focus: Precise access and clear roles ensure everyone works with the most relevant data, maximizing efficiency.
Actionable Insights: Strategic analytics and automated quality checks lead to more reliable and actionable data insights.
Continuous Improvement: Data-driven performance management fosters a culture of learning and continuous improvement.
Sustainable Growth: Empowered by data, organizations can make informed decisions to drive sustainable growth and innovation.
By focusing on these precise actions, organizations can create an empowered data analytics ecosystem that delivers real value by driving data-driven decisions and maximizing the return on their data investment.
1. The Global
Oil Market:
No Safe Haven for Prices
February 2016
Geopolitics of Energy Project
Leonardo Maugeri
2.
3. The Global
Oil Market:
No Safe Haven for Prices
February 2016
Geopolitics of Energy Project
Leonardo Maugeri
4. The Geopolitics of Energy Project
Policy Brief
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Harvard Kennedy School
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
617-496-8238
belfer_center@hks.harvard.edu
http://www. belfercenter.org/geopolitics
Statements and views expressed in this discussion paper are solely those of the author and
do not imply endorsement by Harvard University, the Harvard Kennedy School, or the
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
The report is a product of the Center’s Geopolitics of Energy Project, which receives
support from BP.
The author of this report invites liberal use of the information provided in it for educational
purposes, requiring only that the reproduced material clearly cite the source.
Design & Layout by Andrew Facini
Cover photo:
The sun sets behind an oil pump in the desert oil fields of Sakhir, Bahrain.
(Hasan Jamali, AP File)
Copyright 2016, President and Fellows of Harvard College
Printed in the United States of America
5. About the Author
Leonardo Maugeri is a Belfer Center Senior Fellow with the Geopolitics of Energy Project
and the Environment and Natural Resources Program.
One of the world’s foremost experts on oil, gas, and energy, Maugeri has been one of the most
distinguished top managers of Eni, the largest Italian company, which is also ranked number 6
among the largest international oil companies. At Eni, he held the position of Senior Executive
Vice President of Strategies and Development (2000–2010) and eventually became Executive
Chairman of Polimeri Europa, Eni’s petrochemical branch (March 2010–June 2011). In 2008,
Maugeri promoted the strategic alliance between Eni and the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology (MIT), which—among other outcomes—led to the establishment of the Eni-MIT Solar
Frontiers Center in 2010.
Maugeri is recognized worldwide for his books and seminal articles about energy, as well as
for his part-time activity as a lecturer in some of the most prestigious universities and think-
tanks. Since the early 2000s, he was among the few who affirmed that the world’s oil was
neither running out nor approaching its “peak-production.” He was also among the few who
predicted the revolution of shale-gas and tight oil.
About the Geopolitics of Energy Project
The Geopolitics of Energy Project explores the intersection of energy, security, and inter-
national politics. The project, launched in 2011, aims to improve our understanding of how
energy demand and supplyshape international politics—and vice versa. It also endeavors
to inform policymakers and students about major challenges to global energy security and,
where possible, to propose new ways of thinking about and addressing these issues. The
project focuses both on conventional and alternative energies, as both will influence and be
influenced by geopolitical realities.
6.
7. Table of Contents
1. Introduction.....................................................................................................1
2. Cost decreases & investments are still pushing up oil supply............2
3. A brief look into the key producing countries/areas .........................4
3.a Canada.................................................................................................................................................. 4
3.b Iran........................................................................................................................................................ 5
3.c Iraq........................................................................................................................................................ 6
3.d North Sea............................................................................................................................................. 7
3.e Russia.................................................................................................................................................... 7
3.f Saudi Arabia......................................................................................................................................... 8
3.g United States......................................................................................................................................10
4. Could oil demand help producers? ..........................................................12
5. Hoping for geopolitical turmoil or a production-cut agreement?.15
Conclusions..........................................................................................................17
8.
9. 1Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
1. Introduction
In 2012, evidence suggested that a collapse in oil prices by 2015 was quite
possible and that the duration of such a collapse would depend essentially on
how quickly the massive worldwide investment in new production capacity
could be stopped.1
For multiple reasons, halting ongoing investments in the oil
industry is particularly difficult.2
After a decade (2005-2014), the investment
super-cycle of 2010-2014 started bringing online new production capacity and
slowed the rate of decline of mature oil fields. Almost all big oil producers reg-
istered significant output growth, with the United States and Iraq leading the
way, whereas demand growth was insufficient to absorb the increase of pro-
duction. From July 2014 on, oil prices reflected this imbalance as they started
to decline constantly after staying higher than USD 100 per barrel for several
years. Finally, in November 2014, they collapsed when Saudi Arabia essentially
imposed a policy of no production cutbacks on the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC).
In 2015, prices fell by more than 50 percent, and the collapse continued in
early 2016. In the third week of January 2016, oil prices fell below USD 27 per
barrel, the lowest level in 13 years.
Despite the decline in price, actual production of oil seemed to defy the laws
of gravity and economics as it continued to grow. Once again, the main reason
for this apparent contradiction is that while many companies and countries
announced cuts to their spending budgets, very few actually halted invest-
ments already under way in the upstream sector. Many are just beginning
to register production from recently completed investments, while others
are completing their investments, after having spent the bulk of their capital
budgets. The result: production capacity and the supply of oil will continue to
grow.
Oil producers hope that in 2016, the demand for “black gold” will rise enough
to clear at least some of the excess that has been created. This seems unlikely.
Consumption will almost certainly increase, but not realistically to the levels
necessary to eliminate excess production, which has reached almost three
million barrels per day (mbd)—mostly swelling stockpiles worldwide. Overall,
10. 2 The Global Oil Market: No Safe Haven for Prices
global production capacity—which includes both voluntary and non-voluntary spare
capacity—is now greater than actual consumption by more than seven million mbd.
In this framework, the only possibility for oil prices to recover substantially seems to be
an effective agreement among oil producers to cut production. Such a hypothesis gained
momentum by the end of January, and contributed to a mini-rally of oil prices. However, a
formal agreement to cut production and—above all—the execution of such an agreement
by the countries that sign up to it, is far more difficult than it may appear.
This brief offers an initial analysis of the forces at work in the world of oil, to be followed
by a more extensive analysis later in 2016.
2. Cost decreases & investments
are still pushing up oil supply
According to my preliminary estimates, at the end of 2015, world oil production stood at
about 98.5 mbd (including crude oil and other liquids, according to international statisti-
cal conventions), while consumption had slightly exceeded 95 mbd. The difference—more
than 3 mbd—went to stockpiles. Global production capacity, however, is still higher than
actual production.
Worldwide, there is at least 2.5 mbd of voluntary, unused production capacity (or “spare
capacity”), mostly concentrated in Saudi Arabia (including the Saudi 50 percent share of
the Neutral Zone). In addition, there are almost two mbd of involuntary spare capacity,
distributed among several countries that are unable to produce to their potential due to
political crises or technical challenges. Meanwhile, the average price for Brent crude oil
has plummeted from more than USD 99 per barrel in 2014 to USD 53.60 in 2015, touch-
ing lows of less than USD 37 per barrel in December 2015 (See Fig. 1) and falling even
further in January 2016 at around USD 27 per barrel.
Two factors cause this apparent contradiction between collapsing oil prices and
ever-growing production. First, past heavy investment is creating significant ripple effects,
and will continue to do so throughout 2016, and perhaps for most of 2017. True, both the
industry and the producing countries have announced major cost cuts to both capital and
operating expenditures (or CAPEX and OPEX) in the upstream sector, and the latter
11. 3Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
probably totals more than USD 150 billion according to estimates in 2015 (See Fig. 1). But
by looking carefully into the announced cuts, one notes that they mainly involve explora-
tion and development projects that were not yet approved, or other sectors of the industry
itself (natural gas, petrochemicals, downstream oil, etc.).
Fig. 1: Upstream expenditures and Brent price, 2003-2015
On the other hand, except for American shale oil companies (See Section 3.g), no one
is cutting capital expenditures committed to projects that are close to completion and
that have already spent a significant portion of the original budget. The residual share of
these investments, which is approximately USD 250 billion (and may be lower, because
costs are decreasing), has momentum that is unstoppable, because oil companies need to
respect three conditions: 1) recover the money that has been spent as quickly as possible,
2) respect the contract conditions imposed by the producing countries, and 3) replace
reserves, particularly oil. The latter has become an obsession, especially for the interna-
tional oil companies (IOCs), who have been largely unsuccessful in replacing oil reserves
in the last decade.
As for the big producing countries that directly control their national oil companies
(NOCs), it is worth noting that so far all Persian Gulf NOCs have confirmed their pre-
vious investment plans and production targets out to 2020 (with the exception of Iraq,
12. 4 The Global Oil Market: No Safe Haven for Prices
which has revised downward its original, unrealistic production targets—see Section 3.c).
This policy reflects a continued effort to show the world that they can weather the storm,
replace their reserves, and preserve or improve their market share globally.
Second, while it is true that prices have fallen, the costs of exploration and production are
falling too. Expenses are lower, and therefore the break-even point of many development
projects tends to fall rapidly, making it less painful to live with low prices.
3. A brief look into the key
producing countries/areas
Worldwide crude oil production is growing across the board, starting with the world’s
leading producers. What follows is a brief review of what is happening and what might
happen in the major oil-producing areas of the world. They are listed in alphabetical order,
independent of geopolitical factors, for which there is a section below.
3.a Canada
During 2015, Canada passed the symbolic milestone of production of 4 mbd. Much of
this production was linked to rapid development of oil sands, which reached 2.3 mbd
during 2015, up almost four-fold from Canada’s 600,000 barrels per day (bd) output in
2000. Some oil sands projects have the highest marginal costs in the world, a fact that has
caused many to doubt Canada’s ability to maintain its current pace of development. How-
ever, Canadian resilience can be explained by at least two factors that have medium-term
impact.
First, many investments to develop new projects have already been completed. In the
near future, it will likely be necessary to only make incremental investments in those
projects, which will involve smaller capital outlays. Second, the costs of investing in oil
sands are decreasing rapidly. From 2000 through 2014, a concentration of investments in
the oil sector led to cost inflation of between 70 percent and 130 percent (depending on
the source of the analysis). The completion of many investments and the freezing of new
projects will collapse costs, yielding a lower break-even point for many Canadian oil sands
production projects. According to the industry information company, IHS, operating
costs decreased by 20 percent in 2015, but this estimate appears conservative.3
13. 5Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
Much of the infrastructure needed to process and transport new production has also been
completed. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that in the coming years, Canadian
production of crude oil will continue to grow, albeit at reduced rates, fueled by projects
already completed.
3.b Iran
While the world discussed the timing and scope of production development in Iran, the
country silently started down a growth path in 2015 by exploiting its existing production
capacity.
There are actually two stages in Iran’s oil production growth. The first is already under
way, and does not require either significant participation by international oil companies
or a major investment effort. It will lead to a production capacity of around 4.1-4.2 mbd
in 2016, which is what Iran had in 2011, before the latest round of international sanctions.
The key factor is Iran’s pre-existing production capacity. Although doubted by many, the
latter seems to be the main reason behind a rapid production growth of Iran in 2015 and
early 2016.
At the beginning of 2015, Iran was producing about 2.5 mbd of crude oil, plus about
400,000 bd of other liquids. By the end of 2015, Iran was producing 3 mbd of crude oil, in
addition to about 500,000 bd of other liquids, for a total oil production of 3.5 mbd.
To achieve a production capacity above 4 mbd, Iran must restore the full capacity of its
existing oilfields and find new international outlets for its oil. This is possible within the
first half of 2016. Prudently, Iran has based its new government budget on an oil price of
USD 35 per barrel (although much of its exports are already selling well below that price),4
showing its determination to seize the moment and fight for global market share, even if
this implies hardships for future government spending capability.
The second stage of growth, which could build up a production capacity of 5.5 mbd, will
take longer, and is more difficult to achieve, because it requires the development or rede-
velopment of several Iranian oilfields, some of which were discovered after 1998 and never
developed. Consequently, this stage will require large investments, as well as the adoption
of more advanced techniques of reservoir management and advanced recovery meth-
ods, which may limit the decline of mature fields and increase the recovery rate of other
14. 6 The Global Oil Market: No Safe Haven for Prices
deposits. (Today, Iran can extract only 20 percent of the oil “trapped” in its deposits, even
though official sources cite 25 percent. This is less than the 35 percent worldwide average
and much less than the 55 percent achieved in the United States.) For these reasons, the
cooperation of international oil companies is essential, both financially and technically,
because Iran has neither the economic resources nor the technical capabilities to exploit
its potential. Tehran has announced its intention to offer foreign companies a new oil
contract with formulas presumably more attractive than the current ones. But that will
address only part of the problem. Indeed, Tehran will need to simplify the Byzantine
bureaucratic processes that have previously made it extremely difficult for many compa-
nies to operate in the country and to be paid for their work. Without such changes, more
ambitious production targets may be significantly delayed.
3.c Iraq
For some years now, the production growth forecasts for Iraq have been shrouded in pes-
simism (with the exception of those made by the Iraqi government, which appear far too
optimistic).
There is no doubt that the Iraqi potential is enormous, but the financial problems of the
central government, the non-payment of the companies operating in the country, and
the lack of infrastructure crucial for the handling, transport, and export of oil, year after
year, have led most analysts to renew their negative views of the possibility of increas-
ing production capacity in Iraq. However, while falling far short of the unrealistic goals
set by Baghdad years ago, Iraqi production has continued to grow, contradicting analyst
predictions.
At the beginning of 2015, Iraq was producing about 3.4 million barrels per day of crude
oil. At the end of the year, production of the country ranged from 4.5-4.6 mbd. The
lion’s share of the production continues to take place in the south of the country, but the
northern Kurdish-controlled areas also recorded unexpected levels, mainly by restoring
facilities that were once seized by the Islamic State (IS).
Between November and the first few weeks of December 2015, Iraq was exporting about
3.4 million barrels per day from Basra. The country’s own refineries accounted for about
450,000 bd, while crude oil burned directly for power generation amounted to about
180,000 bd. The Kurdish Regional Government controlled approximately 600,000 bd of
15. 7Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
crude oil production— production that is beyond the control of the Iraqi central govern-
ment. A fraction of this (about 80,000 bd) is included in the data of oil consumed by Iraqi
refineries.
It is true that Iraqi production is subject to significant variations in the course of a year,
but the basic trend is that the country has reached a production capacity of five mbd,
while some of its large deposits are still waiting to be developed. During the next two
years, many political, financial, and infrastructure snags may limit further growth in
production.
3.d North Sea
Perhaps the most striking example of oil production resilience has been the North Sea—
particularly its U.K. section. A declining oil production region since the late 1990s, the
U.K. section of the North Sea witnessed a liquid output growth (+10 percent) in 2015 for
the first time in more than 15 years. As a whole, the North Sea (including the Norwegian
section) liquid production grew by almost 150,000 bd.
It is improbable that such a level of growth can be maintained for a long period, although
medium-term factors are likely to support output resilience. In particular, the UK
output—the most critical— “was attributed to producers becoming more efficient and
having invested more than USD 50 billion during the last four years, which resulted in
new fields coming on stream.”5
Norway registered higher spending and more important discoveries than the U.K. This
means that new production buildup (which typically requires three to four years to
achieve its peak) will also continue to partially offset the decline of mature fields over the
next few years. Coupled with the decreasing costs of services and the huge efforts of the
industry to further increase its efficiency, the North Sea might continue to hold some
surprises.
3.e Russia
Since the early 2000s, most analysts have predicted that Russia was doomed to an irre-
versible decline of its overall oil production, mainly due to the accelerated decline of its
mature fields. Year after year, they have repeated this gloomy forecast, but it has never
16. 8 The Global Oil Market: No Safe Haven for Prices
materialized. On the contrary, Russian production has jumped from less than 8 mbd in
2000 to a new post-Soviet record of 10.8 mbd in November 2015. This took place in spite
of a situation that many depicted as desperate. Russia was facing international sanctions
and weaker prices for oil and natural gas, while oil and gas revenue accounted for 52 per-
cent of the government budget.
Even more surprising is that most Russian oil production continues to originate in West
Siberia, notably from the Priobskoye and Samotlor fields, which have been producing
oil for decades. Adopting advanced technology not only forestalled the expected pro-
duction decline, but also in several cases reversed it. In spite of progress made increasing
the recovery rate of currently producing oilfields, Russia’s current recovery rate is still no
higher than 25 percent. This means that mature oilfields could sustain current output for
some years if advanced technology were applied, even without developing new reserves.
Production costs in Russia average USD 15-16 per barrel, a level that is highly competitive
with most areas of the world. Under the current Russian taxation system, the State gets the
lion’s share of revenues when prices are high, but reduces its take when prices tumble. It’s
worth noting that it is going to be extremely hard for Russia to preserve this system, given
Moscow’s serious budgetary woes. However, there are no signs of revisions being planned
for the current year.
So far, Moscow has based its 2016 State budget on a price of USD 50 per barrel for Urals
crude oil (the Russian oil benchmark). This implies a deficit of about USD 32 billion, or
about 15 percent of the entire budget. The government has also set contingency plans that
prepare for a possible price of USD 40.8
In both cases, deficits will require drawing on
the country’s ruble reserves, cutting spending, and selling off State holdings. While these
actions will probably entail some erosion of Vladimir Putin’s popularity, in the short term
they do not seem capable of significantly affecting the oil sector, whose production may
stagnate or decrease slightly (no more than 200,000 bd).
3.f Saudi Arabia
Another big question mark for the oil market concerns Saudi Arabia. How long will the
country with the largest oil production capacity in the world (about 12.3 mbd—including
the Kingdom’s portion of the Neutral Zone, which it shares with Kuwait) be able to sustain
a policy of super-production aimed at ensuring its market share in the world, but that also
helps depress prices?
17. 9Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
During 2015, with Brent crude trading at below USD 50 per barrel, Riyadh was forced to
drain more than USD 10 billion per month from its foreign reserves to maintain spending
levels already planned by the government. Nevertheless, the Saudi logic goes something
like this: “We suffer, but others are suffering and will suffer more than we do, and they will
have to yield. Their production will drop. At that point, the market will go down the road
toward rebalancing.” This is a risky stance, but one without likely alternatives.
In a world in which all of the major oil producers are increasing their production, it would
be unthinkable for Saudi Arabia to even suggest that it restrict production, especially at a
moment in which it is the only country in the world capable of maintaining unused pro-
duction capacity of almost two mbd.
Decreasing production would be a gift to large non-OPEC producers, mainly Russia and
the United States. But it would also be a gift to other OPEC producers—most notably
Iran—who are calling on all the other countries to make production cuts, but for some
legitimate reasons are unwilling to make cuts themselves. In other words, for Riyadh to
cut its production would be to rerun the script of the 1980s, when the Saudi Kingdom
continually cut production while all other countries of the world increased theirs. At that
time, Saudi Arabia became the oil-producing country that paid the highest price for global
overproduction.
Conscious of these constraints, the country seems to have taken a different path. Already
in November, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who has become a key figure in piloting the
new course for Saudi Arabia, announced the government’s intention to reduce the state
budget in 2016 by cutting operating expenses and increasing some taxes.6
In late Decem-
ber, the government announced heavy cuts in subsidies on all petroleum products and
natural gas, providing a budget for 2016 which appears to assume an oil price of USD 26
per barrel and a reduction of expenses of about USD 40 billion (from USD 262 billion in
2015 to USD 220 billion in 2016). This move suggests that Riyadh is keen to maintain its
oil policy in the near future.
In the longer term, however, Saudi Arabia needs a multipronged approach to confront-
ing low oil prices, and has taken some steps in this direction. Prince Mohammed has
announced the government’s intention to make Saudi Arabia less dependent on oil reve-
nues, particularly by developing the non-oil manufacturing sector. In January 2016, Prince
Mohammed floated the idea of partially privatizing Saudi Aramco through an initial
public offering (IPO) of its shares.7
But some skepticism remains.
18. 10 The Global Oil Market: No Safe Haven for Prices
In the last 30 years, Riyadh has announced several times its will to develop sectors other
than oil, and its attempts have yielded limited success. Moreover, a partial privatization of
Aramco will represent a major blow to the country’s system of power and to the internal
equilibrium of the Royal family. In sum, both targets will represent a radical change for
Saudi Arabia. The months ahead will probably offer some more hints about the sustain-
ability of such radical shifts.
3.g United States
Most experts thought that U.S. shale oil production would evaporate with oil prices lower
than USD 75 per barrel. Yet, even with an average WTI price of USD 47.7 per barrel in
2015, in April the U.S. crude oil production reached 9.7 mbd, according to the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA), marking the highest monthly volume since the same
month of 1971.9
Production did eventually decline, settling at around 9.3 mbd on a monthly basis by the
end of 2015. That drop was modest, considering not only that prices have collapsed below
USD 40 per barrel but also that U.S. shale companies have so far been the only ones in the
world to significantly cut investments in ongoing projects.
At its core, this resilience is the result of a continuous advancement in both knowledge of
shale formations and the technology used to develop them. Those factors have allowed
shale costs to decrease by more than 30 percent between 2011 and 2014. In 2015, both
CAPEX and OPEX fell substantially—probably by 30 percent more —as a result of the
financial crisis in the sector. As an example of this dramatic decline, in mid-2014, the
average daily rate for a horizontal drilling rig was about USD 26,000-28,000, but now it is
usually less than USD 13,000.
Better knowledge and technology have also dramatically increased per-well productivity
and efficiency. As a rule of thumb, in the same area of a shale formation, a well drilled
today produces four to five times what it did five years ago. What’s more, the time needed
to drill and complete a new well has been drastically reduced, while the growing adoption
of multi-well pad drilling (MWPD, drilling multiple wells from a single surface station) is
reducing time and cost even more.
Together, these factors mean that even with fewer active drilling rigs, shale oil production
19. 11Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
shows a much smaller decline than expected. This is in spite of the collapse of the U.S. oil
“rig count” in 2015. According to oilfield services provider Baker Hughes, there were only
536 rigs drilling for oil in the U.S. during the week ended on December 31, 2015, down
nearly 950 compared with the same week a year ago. (The largest decline, however, took
place during the first four months of 2015, when the number of oil-drilling rigs fell below
700; after that, the progression of decline was much slower). Despite this decline, produc-
tion did not suffer dramatically.
At the same time, shale producers are testing closer proximity between wells or, in oil
jargon, “down-spacing.” This will facilitate more intense exploitation of the shale areas and
further reduce costs. Another option currently being tested is “re-fracking” (fracking old
wells again), which may increase production from existing shale wells at a much lower
cost.
In 2016, the best American shale oil producers can weather the low-price storm by aggres-
sively concentrating their operations on their most productive shale formations (their
core areas) and by postponing growth into more expensive and less productive areas. The
consequence of this concentration is often ignored, because most analysts tend to focus on
misleading average and marginal cost figures without checking them against actual pro-
ductivity. For example, four counties of the Bakken formation delivered almost 90 percent
of the formation output in December 2015, or almost 1.1 mbd. The break-even point for
those four areas was less than USD 40 per barrel. Similarly, six core areas—counties of the
Eagle Ford Shale—accounted for 85 percent of the whole output of the formation, with a
break-even point below USD 36 per barrel.
Some highly indebted shale companies with negative cash flow will be squeezed finan-
cially by continued low prices, so 2016 will bring a new wave of bankruptcies (there were
more than 40 in the shale sector in 2015). Yet this will not necessarily have a big impact on
U.S. shale oil production, either because the insolvent companies are not currently making
a significant contribution to overall shale production, or because their worthwhile assets
will simply change hands to companies with a stronger balance sheet.
Because of these dynamic factors, US shale oil production will continue to show more
resilience than expected. It will decline further, perhaps by 400,000-500,000 bd, but not
enough to precipitate a drawing down of the excess oil supply.
In addition to the countries listed above, other major oil producers are resisting the storm.
20. 12 The Global Oil Market: No Safe Haven for Prices
Despite civil instabilities that are critical for several reasons, Nigeria has increased its
production by more than 300,000 bd, while Venezuela, Brazil, and Mexico have recorded
modest declines. Countries that have suffered the most are Angola and China, with pro-
duction losses of 200,000 bd and 100,000 bd, respectively.
However, for many of the countries that recorded losses, 2016 could bring positive sur-
prises because of the awaited start of new production or advanced recovery methods
applied to mature fields.
4. Could oil demand help
producers?
Under current conditions, the prospect of a strong rebound in prices rests on the hope of
a substantial recovery in demand in 2016 and beyond. Because too many uncertainties
weigh on the growth rate of the future demand for oil, a meaningful recovery is far from
certain.
First of all, considering the size of the excess supply and oil production capacity, it seems
that many tend to underestimate the size of the increase in demand needed to rebalance
the world market. To achieve a substantial balance, demand should grow by more than 2.5
mbd in 2016 and by more than two mbd in 2017. Compare this with an average annual
growth of less than 900,000 mbd in the first half of this decade, and an estimate of 1.7 mbd
demand growth in 2015 as a result of low prices (unfortunately, data on global demand are
always more uncertain than data on production, due to the statistical pitfalls and lack of
transparency). Anything is possible, but what could spark and sustain such a recovery?
In the industrialized countries, the consumption of oil has been dropping since the mid-
1990s. Since 2006, even the United States has joined this trend, not only because of high
crude oil prices, but also because of efficiency, environmental policies, and a gradual
change in consumer habits, especially among the young. Although U.S. oil demand recov-
ered significantly in 2015 as a result of low prices, it was still more than two mbd less than
at its peak in 2005-2006. What’s more, part of that consisted of growing exports, which
registered historical records across the year, outpacing 4.5 mbd—mostly made up of
refined products.
21. 13Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
Global demand was also impacted by the uncertain performance of both advanced and
developing economies. China, the mainstay of world consumption for years, is going
through a phase of economic uncertainty. Throughout 2015, analyses and controversial
data supported conflicting stories of the actual performance of Chinese demand for oil.
Some claim the country is already in crisis, while others claim its oil consumption is rising
more than expected. The dramatic fall of the Shanghai stock exchange at the beginning
of 2016 has cast doubt on the possibility that the country can contribute to an increase of
global oil demand.
The discrepancy between demand and consumption by the Asian giant can be explained
largely by the issue of stockpiles. Throughout 2015, Chinese agencies disseminated infor-
mation that appears accurate, at least with regard to the strategic storage (while the data
concerning commercial storage remains somewhat vague), which increased considerably,
reaching almost 190 million barrels. This was an increase of approximately 100 million
barrels from the year before. During the first half of 2015, at least 500,000 bd of Chinese
crude oil demand growth was attributable to storage. By the middle of 2015, Chinese
strategic storage facilities were already saturated, according to the National Bureau of Sta-
tistics of China.10
Between 2016 and 2017, another 140 million barrels of new storage capacity is planned.
This will allow China to achieve a strategic storage capacity of 330 million barrels. Its long-
term objective is to reach a capacity of 435 million barrels.11
This should provide support
to the country’s oil demand, which could be partially offset by the shutdown of many inef-
ficient refineries (due to new environmental legislation) and by the possible slowdown of
the Chinese economy’s rate of growth. In any case, even if Chinese oil demand continues
to grow at a pace equal to the last few years, this will not affect the excess supply.
Many analyses of demand also look at India, which, along with China, has accounted for
about two- thirds of the net growth in global demand for oil over the last five years. Before
exploring India’s potential, we should bear some numbers in mind. In October of 2015
(the most recent data available), India imported 3.68 mbd and produced 745,000 bd of
crude oil. It exported about one mbd of oil products, thus returning what it had imported
as crude back into the international market in the form of products.12
Indian net con-
sumption touched 3.6 mbd.
The Modi government embraces the ambitious goal of replacing China as the manufac-
turing center of the world. This goal is pegged to target oil consumption growth rates of
22. 14 The Global Oil Market: No Safe Haven for Prices
at least 15 percent per year, meaning an increase of approximately 500,000 bd in 2016 and
750,000 in 2017. A portion of this increase would return to the international market in
the form of products.
This is a credible scenario, but in the short- to medium-term, it would not be not sufficient
to eat significantly into the excess supply worldwide, since many developing countries that
previously made significant contributions to the growth of global demand are currently
experiencing serious economic problems. Some are cutting the massive subsidies that
were once used to support the consumption of oil products, thereby dampening the effect
that lower prices for “black gold” could have had on consumption. Due to the uncertainty
concerning data on global demand, it’s still difficult to assess how much these factors
may affect the rate of consumption in 2016, but it would be unwise not to take them into
account and just looking at the theoretical effect of prices on demand.
Another problem “crowding out” oil demand could come from the strengthening of the
U.S. dollar (the currency of oil exchange) vis-á-vis the currencies of many oil-consuming
countries, following the decision by the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank to begin gradually rais-
ing interest rates, starting in December 2015.
There are also longer-term unknowns. What will be the impact of new energy efficiency
efforts and environmental legislation around the world, especially given the strong impact
these factors have had in industrialized countries? And what will be the effects of policies
to limit greenhouse gases that come as a result of the COP21 meeting in Paris in Decem-
ber 2015? In any scenario, one can see it will have negative implications for crude oil
consumption.
In spite of these doubts, most economists insist that demand is price sensitive and that
sooner or later it will rebound. While this may be true, let us not forget lessons from the
past. Historically, after any price boom and bust, demand recovered, but the new growth
rate was much lower. For example, between the 1940s and the 1970s, world oil demand
almost doubled every decade — implying a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of
more than seven percent per year. After the collapse of oil prices in 1986, demand never
fully recovered. Both in the 1990s and in the 2000s its CAGR was about 1.4 percent. The
main driver of this phenomenon is the fact that during periods of high oil prices, consum-
ing countries tend to adopt legislation on energy efficiency and support a shift to alternative
fuels that cap the future growth of oil demand. Our age is no exception to this rule, with
even more emphasis on environmental impacts and greenhouse emissions than before.
23. 15Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
5. Hoping for geopolitical
turmoil or a production-cut
agreement?
There are just two remaining factors that might change the bleak outlook for oil producers
that this brief has outlined: one is geopolitics, and the other is a major production cut by
the producers themselves.
The impact of geopolitics on the oil market faced a new test at the beginning of 2016, after
the execution of the Shiite leader Nimr al-Nimr by Saudi authorities. It is certainly not the
only one. To date, neither the Libyan crisis (which is reducing the country’s production to
less than 400,000 bd, keeping about 1.2 mbd of its potential off the market), nor the fear
caused by the Islamic State, nor fears about the difficult internal situation in Venezuela,
have significantly affected the underlying psychology of the market.
This can be explained by an unwritten law, relevant at each stage of a collapse of oil prices:
geopolitical crises tend to have a reduced effect—or no effect at all—when world oil pro-
duction capacity far exceeds demand, especially when there is sufficient spare capacity to
compensate for any disruption in crude supplies from the countries in crisis.
Initial reactions to a sudden worsening of the confrontation between Riyadh and Tehran
seem to affirm this law; oil prices went up for just one day at the beginning of 2016, but
they soon dropped again as China’s stock exchange problems propagated across the world,
casting new shadows on the possibility for oil demand to significantly recover.
Given the interests at stake in the Saudi-Iranian confrontation, few believe that the latter
will put the oil sector of the two countries—vital for both—at risk. Furthermore, in the
event that a psychological effect should push prices up substantially, Saudi Arabia could
always play its ace: it could put some of its spare capacity on the market, thereby keeping
pressure on Iran while simultaneously stabilizing the market. Geopolitical turmoil in the
Middle East—and particularly in the Persian Gulf Region—could have a major impact on
prices. But so long as this remains a theoretical option, fundamentals will prevail.
In this framework, the possibility of a coordinated production cut by OPEC and non-
OPEC producers gained momentum at the end of January, particularly after Russia’s
24. 16 The Global Oil Market: No Safe Haven for Prices
energy minister declared that his country could enter a negotiation with OPEC to explore
that option. In spite of the optimism that surrounds this option at the time of the writing
of this brief, there are several factors that suggest a more skeptical stance.
First of all, who in OPEC could make significant cuts in production? Saudi Arabia is
already working harder than anyone else not to flood the world with petroleum, holding
back production of almost two mbd. The second and third OPEC producers—respectively
Iraq and Iran—are re-emerging now as great protagonists of the oil market after decades
of hardships and lack of oil development. Iran in particular—with some legitimacy—
could call itself out of a production cut by observing that due to its past sacrifice, other
OPEC producers have more room to sell their output.
Libya is producing almost 1.2 mbd less than its pre-crisis level because of the state of civil
war existing in the country. Venezuela has suffered for years from poor political man-
agement of its own petroleum industry, and it’s already far from producing the levels it
achieved in the past. The United Arab Emirates are in an arm-wrestling contest with the
foreign companies to renegotiate the terms for developing or redeveloping the country’s
deposits, which has frustrated UAE objectives for production growth. Nigeria and Angola
cut their own production in the context of an agreement, but it would not be substantial.
The other members of OPEC do not have sufficient maneuvering margin to make signifi-
cant cuts.
Beyond OPEC, the only country that could actually make important production cuts is
Russia. Moscow could be interested in temporarily joining OPEC in such a move, because
its revenues are being devastated by the oil (and natural gas) price collapse. Unlike OPEC
countries, however, the Russian government has no direct control of the country’s oil pro-
duction, which will make it harder for Moscow to ensure a production cut.
Further, Moscow is distrustful of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, and believes
that the current oil price collapse is the result of a secret agreement between Riyadh and
Washington. What’s more, Russia and Saudi Arabia are clashing on the methods to reduce
the Islamic State influence in some Arab countries, starting with Libya. By the same token,
the mistrust between Iran and Saudi Arabia has reached new highs after the execution of
Nimr al-Nimr, and both countries are still fighting for global market share.
Finally, even if a formal agreement within OPEC is achieved, it remains to be seen if that
will be actually implemented. The history of OPEC is dotted with formal production-cut
25. 17Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs | Harvard Kennedy School
agreements that went wrong just because several OPEC producers cheated on their quotas
and sold oil “under the table.”
Conclusions
The coming months will bring some clarity to all aspects of the global oil market summa-
rized in this paper.
Volatility will remain a key feature of the market. In particular, as we approach the spring
seasons— e.g., the beginning of higher consumption for transportation—refinery runs
will grow across the world, sending the signal that more robust demand recovery is occur-
ring. Also, the signals of lower production from the United States and other producers,
such as Venezuela, might convince the market that the worst is behind them.
In turn, this sort of complacency may act as a brake for more decisive actions by oil pro-
ducers, who may convince themselves that the market is finally working and there is no
need to search for a difficult agreement for cutting production.
But unless demand growth actually explodes—which seems unlikely—the fundamentals
remain the same: in spite of some erosion of production here and there, global oil output,
production capacity, and inventories will remain too high versus the level of consumption
growth. This implies that the downward pressure on oil prices will remain the dominant
force in 2016, with the first real inflection point for the market, which could probably
materialize only in 2017.
This outcome might be accelerated only if prices should reach new lows (USD 25 per
barrel or less) for a significant period of time (at least one month), so as to dissipate in big
producers’ mindset the perception that the market is finally working the right way, and
really convince them that a production-cut agreement—as difficult as it is—will be the
only way to avoid additional suffering.
26. 18 The Global Oil Market: No Safe Haven for Prices
Notes
1. Maugeri, Leonardo.“Oil: The Next Revolution.”Discussion Paper 2012-10. Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2012. http://
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22144/oil.html
2. Ibid.
3. “Expansion Projects Drive Near-Term Oil Sands Growth.”Oil Daily (OD), December 18,
2015. http://www.energyintel.com/Pages/Eig_Article.aspx?DocId=909872
4. “Iran Budgets for $35 Oil, Recent Sales Priced Lower.”Oil Daily (OD), December 29,
2015. http://www.energyintel.com/Pages/Eig_Article.aspx?DocId=910931
5. “UK North Sea production rose in 2015 despite oil prices.”Oil & Gas Journal, January 5,
2016. http://www.ogj.com/articles/2016/01/uk-north-sea-production-rose-in-2015-
despite-oil-prices.html
6. The Economist, January 6th, 2016. http://www.economist.com/saudi_interview
7. Ibid.
8. “Low Oil Price Raises Budget Issues for Russia.”Petroleum Intelligence Weekly (PIW),
January 11, 2016. http://www.energyintel.com/pages/articlesummary/911135/
low-oil-price-raises-budget-issues-for-russia
9. “US Crude Oil Production Plunges in May.”In: Oil Daily (OD), August 3, 2015. http://
www.energyintel.com/Pages/Eig_Article.aspx?DocId=894744
10. “China Says Secret SPR Tanks Are Full.”Oil Daily (OD), December 17, 2015. http://www.
energyintel.com/Pages/Eig_Article.aspx?DocId=909523
11. “Transparency Deepens China’s SPR Mystery.”Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
(PIW), December 1, 2014. http://www.energyintel.com/pages/eig_article.
aspx?mail=PA_TEXT_4_1296&DocId=868570
12. Data released by the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell and the Indian Ministry of
Petroleum.
27.
28.
29.
30. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Harvard Kennedy School
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
Fax: (617) 495-8963
Email: belfer_center@hks.harvard.edu
Website: http://belfercenter.org
Copyright 2016 President and Fellows of Harvard College