Education and democracy are highly correlated across countries. The author presents evidence that higher levels of education predict transitions from dictatorship to democracy over time. While some studies found no relationship when accounting for fixed country effects, more recent studies using different econometric techniques still find that education causes democracy. The author proposes a model where education increases civic participation, which favors democracy relative to dictatorship since democracy relies on broad civic engagement more than top-down incentives alone. As education increases participation, it makes democratic revolutions more likely to succeed against dictatorships and reduces the chances of anti-democratic coups.

1. Why Does Democracy Need Education?
Author(s): Edward L. Glaeser, Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto and Andrei Shleifer
Source: Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Jun., 2007), pp. 77-99
Published by: Springer
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2. JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99
DOI 10.1007/s10887-007-9015-1
Whydoesdemocracyneededucation?
Edward L. Glaeser • Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto•
AndreiShleifer
Publishedonline:31May2007
© SpringerScience+BusinessMedia,LLC 2007
Abstract Acrosscountries,educationanddemocracyarehighlycorrelated.Wemotivate
empiricallyandthenmodela causal mechanismexplainingthiscorrelation,in ourmodel,
schoolingteachespeopleto interactwithothersand raisesthebenefitsofcivicparticipa-
tion,includingvotingand organizing.In thebattlebetweendemocracyand dictatorship,
democracyhasa widepotentialbase ofsupportbutoffersweakincentivestoitsdefenders.
Dictatorshipprovidesstrongerincentivestoa narrowerbase.As educationraisesthebenefits
of civic engagement,it raisesparticipationin supportof a broad-basedregime(democ-
racy)relativetothatinsupportofa narrow-basedregime(dictatorship).Thisincreasesthe
likelihoodof successfuldemocraticrevolutionsagainstdictatorships,and reducesthatof
successfulanti-democraticcoups.
Keywords Democracy• Education• Politicalparticipation
1 Introduction
Thehypothesisthathighereducationleadstomoredemocraticpolitics(Lipset,1959,1960)
has receiveda good deal ofempiricalsupport(Barro,1999; Glaeser,LaPorta,Lopez-de-
Silanes,andShleifer,2004; PapaioannouandSiourounis,2005). However,thetheoretical
reasonsforthisrelationshipremainunexplored.Indeed,accordingto(Barro,1999,p.SI 82),
"giventhestrengthoftheAristotle/Lipsethypothesisas anempiricalregularity,itis surpris-
ingthatconvincingtheoreticalmodelsofthisrelationshipdo notexist."In thispaper,we
firstmotivateandthenproposeonemodelofa causalimpactofeducationondemocracy.
Ourstartingpointis theconnectionbetweeneducationandpoliticalparticipation.This
connectionhas been emphasizedby Almondand Verba (1989,1sted. 1963), who see
E. L. Glaeser• A. Shleifer
HarvardUniversityandNBER,Cambridge,MA,USA
G. A.M. Ponzetto•A. Shleifer(El)
DepartmentofEconomics,HarvardUniversity,M9LittauerCenter,Cambridge,MA02138,USA
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3. 78 JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99
educationas a crucialdeterminantof"civicculture"and participationindemocraticpol-
itics."The uneducatedmanorthemanwithlimitededucationis a differentpoliticalactor
fromthemanwhohasachieveda higherlevelofeducation(p. 315)." AlmondandVerba's
workhas influencedbothpoliticalscience(e.g., Brady,Verba,andSchlozman,1995) and
sociology(e.g., Kamens,1988),andourworkcan be seenas an elaborationoftheirideas
usingtheoreticalandempiricaltoolsofeconomics.
A dramaticplacetosee theeffectofeducationonpoliticalparticipationis studentactiv-
ism.StudentsriotedagainstauthorityatOxford,Bologna,andParisevenintheMiddleAges.
MartinLutherfoundthemostimmediateintensesupportfromthestudentsinWittenbergand
otherGermanuniversities.Studentsplayedkeyrolesinliberalmovementsandrevolutions
inEuropeinthemiddleofthe19thcentury."Iftherevolutionhada core,itwastheyoung
educatedelite"(Rander-Pehrson,1999,p.145). Studentdemonstrationsplayeda roleinthe
overthrowofPeroninArgentinain 1955,theHungarianRevolutionin 1956,thedownfall
ofPerezJimenezinVenezuelain 1958,theresignationoftheKishigovernmentinJapanin
1960,theresistancetoDiem inVietnamin 1963,theanti-SukarnomovementinIndonesia
andthetopplingoftheRheegovernmentinKoreain 1966,thePragueSpringin 1968,and
thedownfallofAyubKhaninPakistanin 1969.The Tianenmenstudentuprisingof 1989
failedto depose theCommunistParty,perhapsbecause thestudentsgotlittlesupportin
generallyuneducatedChinaandwerecrushedbythetroops.Mostrecently,peacefuldemon-
strationsinwhichstudentsplayeda keyparthelpedsavedemocracyinUkraineagainstthe
aggrandizementbytheex-Presidentwhostoletheelection.
Itwouldbe incorrecttoconcludefromtheseexamplesthatstudentshavea preferencefor
democraticgovernment- perhapsbecausetheyvaluefreedom,information,orelections-
ratherthanforpoliticalparticipation.Thehep-hepanti-semiticriotsinBavariain1819 started
whenduringanacademicceremonyanagedprofessorwhohadrecentlycomeoutinfavorof
civicrightsforJewshadtorunforhislifeas angrystudentsassaultedhim.Mussolinienjoyed
substantialsupportfromstudentsintheyoungfascistmovement.Hitlerlikewisereliedonthe
Nazi students,whoeventuallyseizedcontroloftheuniversities.In LatinAmerica,students
offeredstrongsupporttotheChe Guevaraledcommunistguerillamovement,nofriendsof
democracy.The evidencethatstudentsorganizetoparticipateincollectiveaction- demo-
craticoranti-democratic- is muchmorecompellingthantheevidenceoftheirpreference
fordemocracy.Ourgoal,then,is toexploremoredeeplytheconsequencesofwhatwetake
tobe theprimitiveconnectionbetweeneducationandparticipation.
In Sect.2 we brieflyreviewtheevidenceoneducationanddemocracy.Althoughecono-
metriccontroversiesaboutthisevidencestilllinger,theweightofrecentresearchsuggests
thattheLipsethypothesisis valid,andthattheoriestoexplainitareindeedcalledfor.
In Sect.3, we motivateourbasicassumptionthateducationleadstohigherparticipation
ina wholerangeofsocialactivities,includingpolitics.Thismightbe so forseveralreasons.
Inoneview,schoolingincorporatesindoctrinationaboutthevirtuesofpoliticalparticipation.
A secondviewsees humancapitalas actuallysocialcapital:schoolslargelyteachstudents
to interactwithone another.By improvinginterpersonalskills,educationfacilitatescivic
involvement.Usingmicro-evidencefromboththeUS andothercountries,wedocumentthe
robustcorrelationbetweenmanyformsofcivicactivity,includingpoliticalparticipation,and
education.Thisevidenceis mostnaturallyconsistentwiththesecondview.
Motivatedbythisevidence,we presenta modelofregimestabilityinSect.4. Unlikethe
literatureonregimechangethattypicallyfocusesonthepayoffstocitizensunderalternative
politicalregimes(e.g.,BourguignonandVerdier,2000), ourmodeldescribesincentivesto
participateinthepoliticalactivityitself.These includetop-downincentives,suchas pun-
ishmentsmetedoutbypoliticalleaderstotheirpresumedsupporterswhoareshirking.But
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4. JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99 79
thesealso includelateralincentives,providedbyparticipantsinpoliticswhoencourageor
shametheirfriendsand peerstojoin them.Democraciesare moreinclusiveregimesthan
dictatorships,so,inthespiritofOlson,theydeliverweakertop-downincentives.Largepop-
ularmovementscannotreadilycompeltheirmembersto voteordemonstrate.Butourkey
assumptionis thateducationraisesthebenefitsof politicalparticipation:bettereducated
peersarebetteratpersuadingfriendstojoin. As a consequence,althougheducationraises
participationinbothdemocraticanddictatorialregimes,theincreaseis greaterforthemore
inclusive(democratic)regime.Whenpoliticalsuccessis determinedbytherawnumberof
supporters,educationfavorsdemocracyrelativetodictatorship.
In thismodel,thepoliticalsuccessofa democracyhingeson havinga largenumberof
supporterswhosebenefitsofpoliticalparticipationaresufficientlyhighthattheyfightfor
itevenintheabsenceofdirectrewards.Educationsuppliessuchsupportersandstabilizes
democracy.Conversely,incountrieswithlowlevelsofeducation,dictatorshiporoligarchyis
morestablethandemocracy,becauseonlydictatorshipsofferthestrongtop-downincentives
neededtoinducepeopletodefendthem.InthemodelinSect.4,countrieswithhigherlevels
of educationaremorelikelybothto experiencea transitionfromdictatorshipto democ-
racy,andtowithstandanti-democraticchallenges.Moreover,thesizeofthemostsuccessful
challengerregimetoanexistingdictatorshipriseswiththelevelofeducation.
In additiontohavingsomeempiricalsupportforitscoreassumptionanddeliveringthe
broadempiricalpredictionsdocumentedinSect.2,themodelhasseveralnewimplications.
Itpredictsthat,ingeneral,educationcausesthemoreinclusivegroupstodominatepolitics.
In particular,as educationincreases,groupschallengingexistingregimesbecomeprogres-
sivelylarger- smallcoups arereplacedby largerevolutions.Althoughtheyremainto be
formallytested,thesepredictionsareconsistentwitha broadoutlineofEuropeantransition
todemocracy.
2 The empiricalrelationshipbetweeneducationand democracy
Acrosstheworld,thecorrelationbetweeneducationanddemocracyisextremelyhigh.1Fig-
ure1showstherelationshipbetweenthePolityIV indexofdemocracy(JaggersandMarshall,
2003) andtheyearsofschoolinginthecountryin 1960(BarroandLee, 2001). Across91
countries,thecorrelationcoefficientbetweenthesevariablesis 74%.
Ofcourse,thiscorrelationdoesnotestablishcausality.Barro(1997, 1999)conductedthe
initialresearchon thetime-seriesrelationshipbetweeneducationand democracy.In that
spirit,considertheevidenceontransitionsfromdictatorshiptodemocracy.Figure2 shows
therawcorrelationbetweenthechangeintheJaggersandMarshall(2003) democracyscore
andyearsofschoolingin 1960(fromBarroandLee) forcountriesthathadlowdemocracy
ratings(zeroorone)in1960.Thiscorrelationis66%. Ifwetaketheentiresampleofcountries
andregressthechangeindemocracyoninitialdemocracyandinitialyearsofeducation,we
estimate:
ChaneeinDemocracy= 4.13 - .98 • Democracyin1960 + .84 • Schoolingin 1960
(.48) (.09) (.15)
(1)
1 Przeworski,Alvarez,Cheibub,andLimongi(2000),Barro(1999),BoixandStokes(2003),Glaeser,LaPorta,
Lopez-de-Silanes,andShleifer(2004),andPapaioannouandSiourounis(2005)alsoconsidertherelationship
betweenincomeanddemocracy.Theconclusionemergingfromthecontroversiesis thatincomedoescause
transitiontodemocracy,as wellas itsstability.Ourfocus,however,is oneducationnotincome.Nordo we
considertheconsequencesofdemocracy,see,e.g.,PrzeworskiandLimongi(1993) andMulligan,Gil,and
Sala-i-Martin(2004).
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5. 80 JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99
Fig.1 Educationanddemocracyincross-section
Fig.2 Schoolingandthegrowthofdemocracy1960-2000
Thereare65 observationsinthisregressionandtheR2 is 67%. Initialschooling,even
in highlydictatorialregimes,stronglypredictsbecomingmoredemocraticovertime.In
contrast,democracydoes notpredictgrowthinschooling.Weestimate:
ChangeinSchooling= 2.80 - .07 • Democracyin 1960 + .08 • Schoolingin 1960
(.28) (.05) (.09)
(2)
Thereare 68 observationsin thisregressionand the R2 is only3%. The relationship
betweeninitialdemocracyand changesin yearsof schoolingis shownin Fig. 3. The
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6. JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99 81
Fig.3 Democracyandthegrowthofschooling1960-2000
evidencesuggeststhatschoolingleadstodemocracy,butthereisnoevidencethatdemocracy
leadstoschooling.
Thisevidenceis subjectedtomoreformalspecificationsbyGlaeser,LaPorta,Lopez-de-
Silanes,and Shleifer(2004) and Papaioannouand Siourounis(2005). Both studiescon-
firmthateducationis a strongpredictorof transitionto democracy.The second study
in particularfocuseson thethirdwaveof democratization(Huntington,1991) and shows
thateducationis a powerfulpredictorof permanenttransitionsfromdictatorshipto
democracy.
The mostrecentresearchin thisarea consideredthepossibilitythatsome permanent
countrycharacteristics,suchas geographyor culture,are responsibleforproducingboth
educationand democracy,and to thisend estimatedregressionswithfixedeffects.Ace-
moglu,Johnson,Robinson,andYared(2005) suggestthat,withcountryfixedeffects,there
is noremainingrelationshipbetweeneducationanddemocracy.Theirresults,however,de-
pendon a shorttimeseriesandextremepersistencein theeducationdata (Glaeseret al.,
2004). Castello-Climent(2006) and Bobba and Coviello (2006) arguethat,in thissitua-
tion,theappropriatetechniqueis touse theBlundell-Bond(1998) systemGMM estimator
ratherthantheArellano-Bond(1991) first-differenceGMM estimator.Whentheydo so,
theyfindthateducationindeedcausesdemocracyeventakingaccountofpermanentcountry
effects.
The overallfindingsthusseemquitefavorabletoLipset's(1960) hypothesis.Education
is highlycorrelatedwithdemocracyinbothcross-sectionandmostrecentlyestimatedpanel
regressions.Thebesteconometricevidencesuggeststhatthiseffectis causal.
3 Education and civicparticipation
Educationmaypromotedemocracybecause itraisesthebenefits(or reducesthecosts)of
politicalactivity.InSect.4, wetakethisas an assumptionandshowhowitexplainstheevi-
dence.Inthissection,wedescribesometheoriesofwhyeducationraisescivicparticipation
andthenpresentsomeempiricalevidencebearingonthem.
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7. 82 JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99
3.1 Whyshouldeducationandcivicparticipationbe correlated?
Perhapsthesimplesthypothesisexplainingthelinkbetweeneducationandcivicparticipa-
tionis thatindoctrinationaboutpoliticalparticipationis a majorcomponentofeducation.
In democracies,schoolsteachtheirstudentsthatpoliticalparticipationis good. One "con-
tentstandard"listedbytheStateof California'sDepartmentof Educationadvocatesthat
students"understandtheobligationsofcivic-mindedness,includingvoting,beinginformed
on civicissues,volunteeringandperformingpublicservice,and servinginthemilitaryor
alternativeservice."The originalpublicschoolmovementintheUS emphasizedpreparing
studentsforparticipationin democracy.Thisemphasisis notuniquetoAmerica.Holmes
(1979) synthesizestheaimsofschoolssystemsaroundtheworld.Politicalaimsareoften
citedas aneducationalgoal:"schoolworkisorganizedso as todevelopdemocracyinschool
andconsequentlyin societyas a whole"(Sweden),"theConstitutionstatesthata general
aimofeducationis to producegood citizens,a democraticwayoflivingandhumansoli-
darity"(CostaRica), and"aneducationsystemthatcreatesknowledgeable,democraticand
patrioticcitizensis theaimoftheIndonesiangovernment."Perhapsthekeyimplicationof
theindoctrinationhypothesisis thatthepositiveimpactofschoolingshouldbe particularly
pronouncedinpoliticalratherthanall socialparticipation.
A secondhypothesisholdsthatschoolinglowersthecostsof social interactionsmore
generally.Accordingto thisview,a primaryaim of educationis socialization- teaching
peoplehowtointeractsuccessfullyandproductivelywithothers."Educationis oneofthe
mostimportantpredictors- usually,infact,themostimportantpredictor- ofmanyforms
ofsocialengagement- fromvotingtochairinga local committeetohostinga dinnerparty
totrustingothers"(HelliwellandPutnam,2007).
Whatare someof thepossiblemicroeconomicmechanismsbehindthisphenomenon?
Social activitieshingeoninterpersonalexchangeofinformation.Thedirectbenefitofinter-
actionarisesfromcoordination(GradsteinandJustman,2002). Coordinationrequiresmem-
bersofa grouptoexplainandtobe able tounderstandwhatis tobe done,howitwillbe
accomplished,andwhatthemotivationsforactingare.Social connectionalsoprovidesindi-
rectbenefitsinthat,bycommunicatingwithothers,groupmembersacquirenewinformation
thatis usefulfortheirprivatepurposes.On theotherhand,miscommunicationis costlyto
bothgroupsandindividuals.Misunderstandingsleadtocoordinationfailuresthatmayprove
fataltoa group'smission.Attheindividuallevel,misunderstandingslead tohurtfeelings
andarguments,nottomentionpoordecisions.
Educationraisesthebenefitfromsocialparticipationbecauseitfacilitatesseamlessinfor-
mationexchange.Educatedpeoplearebetterabletoexpresswhattheyknow,toinform,and
topersuade.Theyarealsobetterabletoacquirenewinformation,tounderstand,andtolearn.
Schoolingalso teachesrulesofbehaviorthatmakea discussionbetweeneducatedpeople
bothmoreinformativeandlesslikelytodegenerateintoa quarrel(BowlesandGintis,1976).
These proceduralbenefitscapturethefundamentalvalueofeducationas socialization.At
everylevelfromprimaryschooltouniversity,educationis theacquisitionofskillshelpful
foroperatingwithbothknowledgeandpeople,tobe abletolearnandtoteach.
Educationtextbookslistsocializationas a pillarofcurriculumdesign.DriscollandNagel
(2005) describeseveralcurricularapproachestoprimaryeducation.Manyoftheselistsocial
outcomesamongthegoals: "thechildrenwilldevelopcooperativerelationships,reflecting
bothsocial skillsand understandingtheperspectivesof others"(theKamii and DeVries
approach);"socializationofchildren.Self-regulationofbehavioris necessarytoparticipa-
tionin formsof societyand in relationshipwithothers"(theBank Streetapproach);and
"conditionsthatpromoteorstrengthenrelationshipsbetweenchildren,andbetweenchildren
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8. JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99 83
andadults"(theWaldorfapproach).GordonandBrowne(2004) writethat"a majorrolefor
theearlychildhoodteacheristoseethatchildrenhaveenjoyablesocialcontactsandtohelp
motivatechildrentowarda desiretobe withothers,"because"enhancingsocialintelligence
buildsa setofskillsthatmaybe amongthemostessentialforlifesuccessofmanykinds."
Whydo schoolsspendso muchefforton socializingchildren?An altruisticviewmight
suggestthattheabilityto workwellin social settingsis amongthemostimportantskills
neededtofunctioninsociety.A morecynicalviewseessocializedchildrenas easierfortheir
teacherstomanage.Whateverthereason,schoolsinallpoliticalandreligiousregimesdevote
considerableresourcestoteachingsocialcooperation.2
The socializationhypothesispredictsthateducationshouldimpactall formsof social
involvement.Itsabilitytopredictpoliticalengagementshouldbe no strongerthanthatfor
otherformsofsocial participation.Thistheoryalso predictsno differenceintheimpactof
educationon socialactivitiesindemocraciesornon-democracies.
Thesetwohypothesesbothassumethateducationcausescivicparticipation.Itis atleast
possiblethatthelinkbetweenschoolingandeducationrepresentsselection,nottreatment,
andthatexogenouscharacteristicsthatmakepeopletolerantofeducationalso enablethem
tositthroughmeetingsorwaitinlinetovote.Ifthisweretrue,thenexogenousincreasesin
schoolingwouldhavenoimpactonoveralllevelsofcivicparticipation.Furthermore,ifinnate
characteristicsvarymorewithinthanacrossareas,thisviewpredictsa low(ornon-existent)
relationshipbetweeneducationandcivicparticipationattheaggregatelevel.
3.2 Empiricalevidenceoneducationandcivicparticipation
UsingtheWorldValuesSurvey(WVS), we beginwithcross-countryevidenceon educa-
tionandmembershipin social groups.We excludecountrieswiththePolityIV autocracy
scoreabove4 fromtheanalysisbecausethesecountriesforcepartyandotherparticipation.
(Forexample,25% oftheChineserespondentsreportmembershipintheCommunistparty).
Figure4 presentstheresultsfortheavailable34 countries.Itshowsa sharplypositiveand
statisticallysignificant(t = 3.31) relationshipbetweeneducationandparticipationinsocial
groups.Thisevidenceisbroadlyconsistentwithourtheoreticalperspective,butunfortunately
doesnotallowus todistinguishthevarioushypotheses.
Wecando thatbetterwithindividual-levelevidencefromtheUS. Therearetwoprimary
individual-levelsourcesforinformationonsocialactivities:theGeneralSocial Survey(GSS)
andtheDDE NeedhamLifestylesSurvey.UsingtheGSS, DiPasquale andGlaeser(1999)
documenta strongpositiverelationshipbetweeneducationanda varietyofsocialoutcomes.
Collegegraduatesare 27% morelikelythanhigh-schooldropoutsto saythattheyvotein
localelectionsand29% morelikelytosaythattheyhelpsolvelocalproblems.
Collegegraduatesarealsomorelikelytojoinorganizations.GlaeserandSacerdote(2001)
showthistobetruefor15outof16 formsofgroupmembership:theexceptionistrade-union
membership.UsingtheWVS,theyalsofinda significantpositiverelationshipbetweenyears
ofeducationandgroupmembershipinalmosteverycountry.Educationalso positivelypre-
dictschurchattendancein theGSS. FiftypercentofAmericancollegegraduatessaythat
theyattendchurchmorethanseveraltimesperyear;36% ofhigh-schoolgraduatessaythey
attendthatoften.
2
Bysocialcooperationwedonotmeanobediencetoauthority.Obediencetoauthorityisofcoursesomething
differentthatschoolsalsoteach,althoughevidentlynotas successfully,astheevidenceofstudent- andmore
generallyeducatedpeople's- activismagainstauthorityillustrates.
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9. 84 JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99
Fig.4 Groupmembershipandeducationbycountry
UsingevidencefromtheDDB NeedhamLifestylesSurvey,werevisitsomeofthoseresults
inTable 1. TheDDB NeedhamSurveyis administeredovertheyears1975-1999 andcovers
(formanyquestions)a largersamplethantheGSS. Wecontrolforbasicdemographicssuch
as age,raceandgender.Allofourvariablesarecategoricalandtakediscretevaluescapturing
thefrequencyoftheactivity.We normalizeeach ofthesevariablestohavea meanofzero
anda standarddeviationofone.Wealsocontrolforincome.Because (as intheGSS) income
ismissingformanyobservations,weincludetheseobservationsbutcodethemas havingthe
meanvalueofincomeinthesample,andadda dummywhichtakesona valueofonewhen
incomeis missing.We also includea dummyforeachsurveyyeartocapturetimetrendsin
social activities.We measureeducationwithtwoseparatedummyvariables.The firsttakes
on a valueofone ifthepersonis a high-schoolgraduateand zerootherwise.The second
variabletakeson a valueofone ifthepersonis a collegegraduateandzerootherwise.Our
resultsdo notchangeifwe usecontinuousmeasuresofeducation.
In each regression,botheducationvariablespositivelyaffectparticipationandbothare
almostalways statisticallysignificant.Regression(1) showstheimpactof educationon
attendingchurch.Theeffectofbeinga collegegraduaterelativetoa high-schooldropoutis
morethan30 percentagepoints.Regression(2) showsthelargeandpositiveimpactofedu-
cationon attendinga class ora seminar.Regression(3) showsa strongassociationbetween
schoolingandself-reportedworkingon a communityproject.In regression(4), we lookat
writinga lettertoa newspaper,a particularlyclearformofcivicengagement.Again,thecor-
relationwitheducationis positive,andtheeffectofcollegeeducationis particularlystrong.
Since themeanofthisvariableis muchlowerthanthatofmanyothers,we shouldnotbe
surprisedthatthecoefficientsonschoolingaresmaller.Regression(5) showsresultsoncon-
tactinga publicofficial.Again,theimpactofeducationis strong.Regression(6) looksat
registeringtovote,animportantmeasureofpoliticalparticipationina democracy.Register-
ingtovote(andvoting)is particularlystronglyassociatedwithyearsofeducation.Finally,
regression(7) showsthatgivingsomeonethefinger- an anti-socialformofbehavior- is
negativelyassociatedwithyearsofschooling.Theseregressionsshowa pervasivepattern,in
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10. JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99 85
whichyearsofschoolingareassociatednotonlywithpoliticalparticipationina democracy,
butalso withmanyotherformsofsocialengagement.
Because ourmodeladdressespoliticalbattlesthatareoftenviolentoutsidetheUS, we
nowturntotheevidenceonmoreviolentformsofgroupactivity.Educationandtrainingare
closelylinkedtomilitarydisciplineandgroupcoherenceunderfire(Hanson,2001). Follow-
ingKeegan(1976) andmanyothers,Hansonarguesboththathistoricallymilitarysuccessis
primarilytheresultoftroopsnotfleeingunderfireandthatmilitarydisciplineis itselfthe
resultofcultureandeducation.CostaandKahn(2003) showthatilliteracystronglypredicts
desertionamongUnionsoldiersintheAmericanCivilWar.
Ferguson(1999) looks at theratioofprisonersof warto totalcasualtiesacrosscoun-
triesduringtheFirstWorldWar.Thisvariableis describedbysomemilitaryhistoriansas a
measureofsoldiers'willingnesstosurrender,as opposedtofight,underfire.Acrossmajor
combatantcountries,theratioof prisonersto totalcasualtieswas thelowestfortheUK,
theUS, and Germany(1.4%, 6.7% and 9%, respectively).These arguablywerethebest
educatedcombatants.The ratioofprisonerstototalcasualtieswas thehighestamongRus-
sians,Austro-HungariansandItalians(51.8%,31.8%,and25.8%)- theleasteducatedofthe
majorcombatants.Morestandardformsofmilitaryhistorycorroboratethattheseprisoner
ratescapturegeneralfailuresofmorale.
Finally,tworecentstudiesaddresstheviewthatthecorrelationbetweeneducationand
participationis selection.Milligan,Moretti,and Oreopoulous(2004) findthatexogenous
increasesin educationdue to compulsoryschoolinglaws raisevoterturnout.Dee (2004)
findsthatincreasesineducationaccountedforbyavailabilityofjuniorandcommunitycol-
legeshavea largeeffectonsubsequentparticipationinvoting.Theseresultssuggestthatthe
effectofeducationon politicalparticipationis causal,ratherthanjusttheconsequenceof
selection.
Can theevidencehelpus distinguishbetweentheotherhypotheses?The factthateduca-
tionincreasesallformsofparticipation,manyofwhicharedeeplyapolitical,goesagainstthe
politicalindoctrinationhypothesis.Thathypothesisis alsounderminedbythepeacefulanti-
communistrevolutionsthroughoutEasternEuropeandtheformerSovietUnion,dominated
byeducatedpeoplewithyearsofpro-communistindoctrinationundertheirbelts.Giventhe
separationbetweenchurchand stateintheUS andUK, andgiventheoftenanti-religious
sentimentoftheFrencheducationalestablishment,thepositivecorrelationbetweenyears
ofeducationandchurchattendanceis hardtounderstandas reflectingpoliticalindoctrina-
tion.
Thetheorythatbestexplainsallofthefactsisthesecondhypothesis:educationis social-
ization.Thistheorypredictstheuniversalrelationshipbetweeneducationandparticipation
acrossactivitiesandacrosscountries.Ofcourse,thisdoes notmeanthatothermechanisms
do notalso operate,butwe areinclinedtoaccepttheviewthatacquiringsocialcapitalis a
crucialpartofacquiringhumancapital.
4 A modelofeducationand democracy
In thissection,we modela channelthroughwhicheducationencouragesdemocracy,both
byincreasingitsstabilityandbyincreasingtheprobabilityoftransitiontodemocracy.The
criticalassumption,followingtheevidenceinSect.3,is thateducationraisesthebenefitsof
politicalparticipation.Thecoreinsightofthemodelisthatdemocracyrequiressupportfrom
a broadbaseofcitizenswhofaceonlyweakincentivestofightforit,whiledictatorshipsoffer
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11. 86 JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99
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12. JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99 87
strongincentivesto a narrowbase of supporters.Educationraisesthebenefitsofpolitical
participationanddrawsrelativelymorepeopletosupportdemocracy.
4.1 Modelsetup
Thecountryis populatedbymeasureoneofhomogeneouscitizens,eachwitha humancap-
itallevelofh > 0.3 A regimeis definedas a setC/ ofinsiders,withg; 6 [0, 1] beingthe
measureoftheset,orthesize oftheregime.Weinterpreta largergj as a moredemocratic
regime.Wecall a regimewithg; = 1 a perfectdemocracy.
Inperiodzero,thereis an exogenousstatusquo regimeGo ofsize go.In periodone,an
alternativeregimeG ofsize gis proposed.Membershipineachregimeis exogenous.In
periodtwo,each individualchooseswhethertodefendtheexistingregime,tofightforthe
newregime,ortostaypoliticallyuninvolved.Individualsmaynotsupportbothregimes.In
thismodel,whileeachindividualtakesas givenhismembershipina particularregime(orin
neither),hestillchooseswhethertoparticipateinpolitics.
We letSi e [0,gj] denotetheendogenouslydeterminedmassofinsiderswhochooseto
supportregimeGj. The challengerunseatstheincumbentifandonlyifsqso 5 fi^i, where
Sj is a randomshocktotheeffectivenessofeachfaction'ssupporters.The ratiop = eo/s
hasa continuousprobabilitydistributionZ(p) onR+.
Each individualis of measurezero and so does notimpacttheprobabilitythateither
regimesucceeds.Individualsthereforedo notbase theirpoliticalparticipationdecisionson
theirimpacton theoutcome.Instead,participationin politicsis based on threedifferent
forces.First,regimesprovideincentivestotheirmembersto participate.These incentives
taketheformof punishinga regime'sinsiderswho do notfightforit (or,equivalently,
rewardingregimeinsiderswhodo comeoutandfight).Second,regimeinsiderswhopartici-
patethemselvesmotivatetheirfellowinsiderstojointhemthroughpersuasion,camaraderie,
orpeerpressure.Wemodelthisas a benefitfromparticipation(equivalently,itcanbe a cost
ofnon-participation,ifyourfriendsshameyouwhenyousitout).Wealso assumethatthere
areindividual-specificcostsofparticipation.Inourmodel,whatis crucialis thenetbenefit
ofparticipatinginpoliticsrelativetonotparticipating,so itdoes notmatterwhethereither
regime-levelorpeer-levelincentivestaketheformofpunishmentsorrewards.
Weformallymodela regime'spowertomotivateinsidersbyassumingthatinsiderswho
failto supporttheirregimesufferan expectedutilityloss describedby thecontinuously
differentiablefunctionp(gj) suchthatforall gi € [0, 1]
p(8i) >0 andp'(gi)<0.
Smallergroupsimposelargerpunishmentson free-riders:"thegreatereffectivenessof
relativelysmallgroups[. . .] is evidentfromobservationand experienceas well as from
theory"(Olson,1965,p.53). Smallergroupsbenefitfrombettermonitoringandpunishment
oftransgressors.As Olson (p. 61) writes,"In general,socialpressureandsocial incentives
operateonlyingroupsofsmallersize."Thisassumptionsetsupthebasic tradeoffbetween
smallerandlargerregimes.Smallregimesprovidestrongincentivestoa smallbase. Larger
(i.e.,moredemocratic)regimesprovideweakerincentivesbuttoa largerpotentialbase of
supporters.
Thethreatofpunishment(orthepromiseofrewards)capturestheglobalincentivespro-
videdbytheleaderstoallinsiders.Wealsoallowregimeinsiderswhoparticipatetomotivate
3 InBourguignonandVerdier(2000)politicalparticipationdependsoneducation,buteducationisdetermined
bytheinitialincomedistributionandparticipationincentivesarenotconsidered.
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13. 88 JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99
theirpeerstodolikewise.Whiletheregime-levelmotivationshouldbethoughtofaslead-
ersthreateningmembers,wethinkofthislocalmotivationas friendsconvincingfriendsto
comeoutandfight.Preciselybecauseoftheirlocalnature,thesebenefitsdependnotonthe
aggregatesizeoftheregime,butontherateofparticipationa€[0,1],whichcapturesthe
shareoffriendswhoturnouttosupporta regimeandprovidemotivation,oridenticallythe
probabilitythateachfriendturnsout.
Wealsoassumethatthesebenefitsofparticipationarea functionofthehumancapi-
talofregimemembers,andspecificallythattheyarerepresentedbya twicecontinuously
differentiablefunctionb(ajh) suchthatb(0) = 0 andforalla€[0,1]andh > 0
baih)>0andZ/'(a,/0< 0.
Higherlevelsofhumancapitalmakepeoplebetteratinducingtheirpeerstoparticipate
politically.4AsdiscussedinSect.3,thisreflectsthetwofoldroleofeducationincreating
socialskills.First,moreeducatedpeoplearebetteratcajoling,encouraging,motivating,or
otherwisepersuadingotherstheyinteractwithtojointhem.Second,moreeducatedpeopleare
betterabletoreapthebenefitsofsocialinteractionthemselves,perhapsbecausetheyunder-
standbetterwhytheyareparticipating.Socializationcoversthetwinpowerstopersuadeand
tounderstand,bothcapturedbyb{.).Itismoreappealingtoparticipateinacollectiveactivity
themoreeducateda personis,andthemoreeducatedtheotherparticipantsare.
Offsettingtheglobalandlocalincentivesisaneffortcostcofpoliticalparticipation,which
isidenticallyandindependentlydistributedacrossallindividualswithcontinuousdistribu-
tionF(c). Thisidiosyncraticcostisrealizedatthestartofperiodtwo,aftermembershipin
thetworegimeshasbeendefined.
4.2 Groupequilibrium
Peerincentivesforparticipationdeterminea socialmultiplier,whichcouldbeunderstoodas
a bandwagoneffect.Themoreactivemembersagroupalreadyhas,themorelikelytopartic-
ipatetheremainingmembersare.Theparticipationratea, isthenendogenouslydetermined
asa functionoftheexogenousparametersgjandh.Ina groupequilibrium,
ai = F(p(gi)+ b(aih)).
Inprinciple,strategiccomplementaritycouldleadmultipleequilibria,someofwhich
wouldtypicallybeParetoranked(CooperandJohn,1988).Althoughcoordinationfailures
mayplayapartintheempiricaldeterminationofturnout,theyarenotcentraltoouranalysis.
Moreover,consideringa scenariowithoutcoordinationfailuresallowsustoestablisha more
robustlinkbetweeneducationandparticipation,beforetakingintoaccounttheroleofhuman
capitalinresolvingcoordinationfailures.
Hence,wemaketwoeconomicallyintuitiveassumptionsonthedistributionofcoststhat
guaranteeuniquenessofthegroupequilibrium:
Assumption1 c hasa connectedsupportC thatincludestherangeofp(g{) + b(cijh).
Assumption2 c has a continuouslydifferentiabledensityf(c) thatis monotone
non-increasing:f'(c) < 0 foreveryc eC.
4 Thereis nolossofgeneralityinhavingh enterlinearly,becausewechoosehowtomeasureh.Wecould
writeb{ath{H)), whereh(.) isanymonotoneincreasingfunctionandH isanothermorenaturalmeasureof
humancapital,suchas yearsofschooling.
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14. JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99 89
Thefirstassumptionmeansthatamongindividualsbelongingtoa grouptherearealways
somechoosingtoparticipateandsomechoosingnottoparticipate,regardlessofgroupsize
andhumancapital.The secondassumptionmeansthatthecostofinducingparticipationis
(weakly)convex:themoresupportersa regimealreadyhas,themoredifficultitbecomesfor
ittoattractadditionalsupporters.5Wecanthenprovethefollowing:
Lemma 1 Thereexistsa uniquegroupequilibriuma(gj,h) € (0, 1) suchthatda/dgi < 0
andda/dh > 0.
The Lemmais intuitive,and illustratesthenaturaleffectof exogenousparameterson
endogenousturnout:smallergroupshavehigherturnoutbecausetop-downincentivesare
morepowerful,whilehigherhumancapitalinduceshigherparticipationatanygroupsize.
4.3 Humancapitalandpoliticalcompetition
Considera contestbetweentwoexogenouslyformedregimesGo and G, withrespective
sizesgoandg. Theformeris theincumbentandthelatteris a challenger.
SomeindividualsmaybelongonlytotheincumbentregimeGo: theirmassis denotedby
go-SomemaybelongonlytothechallengerregimeG,andtheirmassisdenotedbyg.Some
individualsmaybe excludedfrombothregimes,theirmeasureis 1- go- g= 1- go- g.
Finally,somepeoplecouldformallybelongtobothregimes:themassoftheseindividuals
equals y = go - go = g - g-The membershipoverlapbetweenregimescomplicates
themodelandrequiresus tomakeassumptionson howpeoplechoose,butwe needtocon-
siderthispossibilitybecause,withbroadlyencompassingdemocraticregimes,overlapsare
inevitable.
In practice,each memberofbothregimeswillshowallegiancetoone regimeonly,and
willnotconsidersupportingtheotherevenifhe formallybelongstoitas well.We assume
forsimplicitythateach individualformallybelongingtobothregimeswillaffiliateexante
withonlyone ofthem(withequal probability).As a consequence,he derivesno benefits
frominteractionwiththemembersoftheotherregime,norcan he be punishedbyitslead-
ers.Nonetheless,theleadershavetokeepwastingmonitoringresourcesonthesedefectors,
perhapsbecause theyneedto monitor(a randomsampleof) all memberseventhoughex
posttheydiscoverthattheycannotpunish(orreward)someofthem.Withthisassumption,
a regimeofnominalsize gi withmeasuregj ofexclusivemembershas an actualbasinof
support
y . y gi+ h
gi=gi-^=gi
+
^
=
2
*
Allindividualsbelongingtoneitherregime(a massof1- go- g) abstainfrompolitical
participation,sincetheywouldreapno benefitsandonlyincurcosts.Those witheffective
membershipin a regime(a massofgj) willconsidertwooptions:abstaining,whichhas a
costp(gj orparticipatinginsupportofG,,whichhasa costc - b(ajh). Theirparticipation
rate,therefore,is endogenouslydeterminedas theuniquegroupequilibriumoftheregime.
5 Forthemostdirectillustration,considerthesimplestincentiveschemewherew is paidto participants.
Sinceonlythoseagentswitha costc < wwillchoosetoparticipate,thisdeterminesa turnoutF(w). Henceto
achievea participationratea incentiveswouldhavetobesetatw(a) - F~l(a). Thenecessarycompensation
is monotoneincreasinginthetargetparticipationrate:w' (a) = , V v > 0. Moreover,itis (weakly)
f(F-l(a))*
convexifandonlyifthedensityofthecostdistributionis(weakly)decreasing:w" (a) = - * - -4- > 0
f(F Ha))
ifandonlyif/'(c)<0.
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15. 90 JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99
It
0.8 ■
^^
g.= 0.15 S^
0.6 /
0.4 ■
I
~~~ ~~ "~ - - __
0.2 . /
0.4 / 0.6 1
_; , ,- a - , . _ )
0.2 0.8
Fig.5 Theprobabilitythata go = 30% oligarchyisreplacedbya smallerg= 15% oligarchyorbyperfect
democracy(g= 100%)as a functionofhumancapital
TheprobabilitythatthechallengerGreplacestheincumbentGo equals
n _ z /gia(g,h)
goa(go*h))'
Wecanprovethefollowing:
Proposition1 Considera contestbetweentwogivenregimesGo and G. Theprobability
thatthemoredemocraticregime(G ifandonlyifg> go)succeedsismonotoneincreasing
inthelevelofhumancapitalh.
Proposition1 is illustratedin Fig. 5. The mechanismunderpinningthispropositionis
intuitive.Participationinsupportofa regimedependsontwodifferentkindsofincentives:
thoseprovidedbytheleadership,andthoseprovidedbyotherparticipants.Humancapital
makesthelattermoreeffective,andthereforeitis particularlyimportantinelicitingsupport
forgroupsthatareprimarilydrivenbypeerpersuasionratherthanbytop-downmonitoring.
Sincetheeffectivenessofthelatterisdecreasingingroupsize,whiletheformerisunaffected,
humancapitalis a moreimportantdeterminantofsupportformoredemocraticregimes.
4.3.1 Thesizeand compositionofmost-threateningchallengerregimes
We haveshownthat,amongtworivalregimesofgivensizes,an increaseinhumancapital
makesitmorelikelythatthemoreinclusiveoneprevails.In particular,democracyis more
likelytobeinstitutedandpreserved.Wenextaska complementaryquestion:fora givenlevel
ofhumancapital,whatis thesize andcompositionofa regimethatposesthegreatestthreat
toa particularincumbent?Thisanalysisoffersanotherperspectiveonregimestability.
FollowingLemma 1,increasingthesize ofa grouphastwoopposingeffectsonitssup-
port:broadeningthebaseanddecreasingtheincentivesforthatbasetoparticipate.Ashuman
capitalincreases,incentivesareless andlessdependentongroupsize,so thatwe canprove
thefollowing:
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16. JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99 91
gi*
1 I
0.8 . /
0.6 y^
0.4
"
j
- '^*~
0.2 .
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Fig.6 Thesizeofthemostdangerouschallengertoa go = 30%oligarchyas a functionofhumancapital
Proposition2 Consideran incumbentoligarchicregimeGo ofsize go e (0, 1]. Thesize
g* e (0, 1] ofthechallengerregimemostlikelyto overthrowGo is monotone(weakly)
increasinginthelevelofhumancapitalh.
Proposition2 is illustratedinFigs.6 and7. As humancapitalincreases,thegreatestthreat
to an incumbentregimebecomesan evermoredemocraticregime.Therecan be a finite
levelofhumancapitalh(go) abovewhichthemostdangerouschallengerbecomesa perfect
democracy,g* = 1.
Butwhatisthecompositionofthemostthreateningregime?Fora fixedincumbentregime
Go,thesupportofa challengerGi dependsontwofactors:thesizeofitsmembershipgand
theextentoftheoverlapofthemembershipofthecompetingregimes.Recallingthaty isthe
measureofoverlap,theprobabilitythatthechallengerGreplacestheincumbentGo equals
ff_7/(gi-$)fl(g».*A
Fora challenger,recruitingmembersfromtheincumbentregimeratherthanamongthose
excludedfromithastwoopposingeffects:itstealssupportfromtheincumbent,butitalso
introducesa wedgebetweenthesize ofthechallengingregimeanditsownactualbasinof
support.Theresolutionofthistrade-offcomesfroma comparisonofthesizesofthecompet-
ingregimes.Thesmallerregimeismoreaffectedbythea priorilossofhalfoftheagentswith
dualmembership.Hence,a challengerregimethatismoredemocraticthantheincumbentis
morelikelytosucceedwhenitincludesall membersoftheincumbentitself.Conversely,a
lessdemocraticchallengerismorelikelytosucceedwhenitincludesas fewmembersofthe
incumbentregimeas possible(givenitssize). Formally,wecanprovethefollowing:
Corollary1 Consideran incumbentoligarchicregimeGo- The compositionofthemost
dangerouschallengercan be characterizedasfollows:
(1) ifthemostdangerouschallengeris less democraticthantheincumbent(g* < go),it
isminimallyoverlapping:thesizeofthegroupofcitizensbelongingtobothregimesis
y = max{0,gJe-(l
-
go)};
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17. 92 JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99
Fig.7 Thesizeofthemostdangerouschallengertoa perfectdemocracy(go = 100%) asa functionofhuman
capital
(2) ifthemostdangerouschallengeris moredemocraticthantheincumbent(g* > go),it
isstrictlymoreinclusive:Go C G*.
AccordingtoProposition2, atlowlevelsofeducation,statusquo dictatorshipsaremost
effectivelychallengedbysmallcoups.Indeed,somehistoricalandstatisticalevidencesug-
geststhatchallengerstodictatorshipsinsuchcountriesareoftenbandsofdisgruntledoppo-
nents(CampanteandDo, 2005;Finer,1988;Huntington,1957).Athigherlevelsofeducation,
thesizesofoptimaluprisingsagainstbothdictatorshipanddemocracyrise.InEuropeduring
theage ofRevolutions,increasinglylargegroupsfoughttooverthrowtheexistingregime.
Similarly,revoltsagainstdemocracy,suchas theFascisttakeoverin Italyin the1920sor
theNazi movementin Germany,becameincreasinglybroad-basedin societieswithmore
education.
The Corollaryfurthertellsus that,as humancapitalincreases,notonlythesize butthe
natureofthemostdangerouschallengerchanges.Whenh is low,anincumbentdictatorship
ismostlikelytobereplacedbyanothersmalldictatorshipthatcomprisesa completelydiffer-
entsetofagents:thethreatcomesnotfroma subsetofthecurrentelitetryingto exclude
otherinsiders,butfromcurrentoutsiderstryingtooustthem.Whenhishigh,themosteffec-
tivechallengeris insteada (relatively)democraticregimethatdoes notattempttoremove
anyofthecurrentinsiders,butsimplytoadd morememberstotheregime.In thelimit,as
humancapitalrises,thegreatestthreattodictatorshipcomesfroma fulldemocracy,which
bydefinitionincludesthewholepopulation.
Anintermediatecase ispresentwhentheincumbentregimeislarge,go € (1/2,1].Inthis
case,themaximumprobabilityofsuccessmaycomefroma challengerthatincludesall the
currentoutsidersbutalso a subgroupofcurrentinsiders.Needlesstosay,thiscase istheonly
possibleone whentheincumbentregimeis a perfectdemocracy:thenanychallengercan
includeonlymembersofthecurrentregime.Forsufficientlyhighlevelsofhumancapital,the
highestprobabilityofsuccessisassociatedwithdemocraticturnover.Inotherwords,boththe
challengerandtheincumbentareperfectdemocracies,andcitizensfreelychoosetoaffiliate
witheithergroup.Our particularspecification,then,deliverstheoutcomeofcompetition
amongregimesperfectlycommittedtodemocracyathighenoughlevelsofhumancapital.
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gi*
0.2 0.4 0.6 7 o78 r
0.8 /
0.6 /
0.4 /
0.2 __^--*^^
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18. JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99 93
4.3.2 Implications
Themodelprovidesoneexplanationfortheempiricallinkbetweeneducationanddemocracy,
butalso a furthersetoftestableimplications.Italso suggeststhat,at low levelsofeduca-
tion,thegreatestthreattonarrowregimescomesfromothernarrowregimes,suchas small
uprisingsandcoups.Incontrast,athigherlevelsofeducation,thegreatestthreattonarrow
regimescomesfrombroaderregimes,anddemocraticgovernmentsfalltootherdemocratic
governments.Someanecdotalevidenceseemsconsistentwiththeseimplications.
Before1600,Europeanmonarchieswererelativelysecureagainstbroad-baseduprising.
Sporadicpeasantrevoltsweregenerallycrushed,andtherealthreatto a monarchusually
camefroma close relativeofferingan alternativemonarchy.StartingwiththeDutchrevo-
lutionagainstSpainandtheEnglishrevolution,monarchswereincreasinglythreatenedby
morebroadlybasedoppositiongroups.Notably,thesetwonationshadunusuallyhighlevels
ofeducation.Inthelate18thand 19thcenturies,France,Germany,andItalyallexperienced
popularuprisingsas well,withlargerolesplayedbythemoreeducatedcitizens.By 1920,
monarchieshadalmostvanishedinEurope,as theincumbencyadvantagesofmonarchswere
wipedoutintheaftermathofWorldWarI. Butittookanother25yearsinWesternEurope
andanother70yearsinEasternEuropefordemocracytobecomeentrenched.
Wecanalsolookathistoryfromtheperspectiveofpoliticalstability.Englandwasunstable
until1689,withoftenviolentroyalsuccessions(De LongandShleifer,1993).FourFrench
regimesweretoppledbypopularrevoltsbetween1789and 1871,as thelevelsofeducation
weregrowing.SimilarinstabilitywasseeninGermanyandelsewhereintheeducatedEurope.
Oncethetransitionstodemocracyoccurred,welleducateddemocracieswerethemselvesini-
tiallyunstable.Atleastatfirstglance,one sees similarpatternsofinstabilityofdemocracy
inLatinAmerica,theformerSovietUnion,andotherpartsoftheworld.
Educationalso seems linkedto theabilityof democraciesto defendthemselvesfrom
dictatorialcoups.Popularuprisingsduringthelesseducatedperiods(England1640,France
1789,Russia1917,andGermany1920)werealmostinvariablyfollowedbydictatorialtake-
overs.Theeducatedsupportersofdemocracytriedbutfailedtoresistthedictators.Asnations
becamemoreeducated,theyalsobecamemoresuccessfulatdefendingdemocracy.InFrance
inthe1870sand1880s,theThirdRepublicfacedrisksfromboththemonarchistsanda pop-
ulargeneralsuchas Boulanger.However,unlikethecoupsof1797and1851,whenthetwo
Napoleonscrushedtheirless organizedopponents,in thislaterperioda coalitionofedu-
cateddemocratsprotectedtherepublic.Sucha defenseofdemocracywasevenmorestriking
in 1990,wheneducatedRussiansengagedina remarkablecampaignto stopan attempted
putsch.
Inlesseducatedtimesandplaces,coupsaregenerallysmallaffairsincludingonlysmall
cadresofnoblesorarmyofficers(CampanteandDo, 2005). As educationgrows,effective
uprisings(liketheAmericanRevolution)becamelarger.Eventually,largeswathsofsociety
areincludedinattemptstooverthrowa regime.EventheNazi takeoverinGermany,which
eventuallyledtoa dictatorship,succeededonlyaftertheNazis hadbuilta broadcoalition,
includingstudentsandothereducatedGermans.Theirearlierattemptata narrowcoupproved
anembarrassingfailure.
5 Conclusion
Thecorrelationbetweeneducationanddemocracyisclear.Thereasonforthiscorrelationis
not.Inthispaper,we offeroneexplanationforthecorrelation.
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19. 94 JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99
Ourexplanationhingeson theconnectionbetweeneducationandthecostsandbenefits
ofpoliticalengagement.Schools socialize youngpeopleandpoliticalinvolvementis one
formofsocialization;a varietyofevidenceshowsa positiveconnectionbetweeneducation
andcivicengagement.We modeleducationas raisingthebenefitsofpoliticalactionwhen
individualschoosetosupporta moreorless democraticregime.In thismodel,democratic
regimesofferweakincentivesto a wide base of potentialsupporters,whiledictatorships
offerstrongincentivestoa narrowerbase. Educationincreasesthesociety-widesupportfor
democracybecausedemocracyrelieson peoplewithhighparticipationbenefitsforitssup-
port.We showthatbettereducatednationsaremorelikelybothtopreservedemocracyand
toprotectitfromcoups.
Theanalysisraisesthreebroaderquestionsthatareworthmentioninginconclusion.First,
whileourmodelhasfocusedontheeffectsofeducationonparticipation,theanalysisapplies
toall socialgluethatencouragescollectiveaction.Forexample,theanalysismightsuggest
thatethnichomogeneityis good fordemocracy(althoughincross-countryorpanelregres-
sionswitheducationcontrols,ethnicheterogeneitydoes notmatterfordemocracy).This
surelyseemsplausible,and remainsto be explored.Perhapsas interestingly,theanalysis
suggestsa solutionofOlson'sfree-riderprobleminallorganizations,andnotjustinpolitical
regimes,namelyhumancapitalorothersocialglueas a motivationtoparticipate.
Second,ouranalysisrunsintotheold puzzle,namelywhydo somedictatorsinvestin
educationiftheyknowthatdoingso eventuallydoomsthem?Theexamplesoffallendicta-
torsinEastAsia,EasternEurope,andtheformerSovietUnionaretellingremindersofthis
risk.Thereareseveralpossibleanswers.One is thatmanydictatorsfacean externalthreat,
and thereforemustgrowtheireconomiesand theirarmies(includinginvestingin human
capital)tocounterthesethreatsevenifthisraisestheriskofdemocratization.A secondis
thatevenselfishdictatorsunconcernedwithexternalthreatsmightderiveincomefromeco-
nomicgrowth,andthereforepromoteeducationtogetricher.A thirdideaisthatalldictators
facesignificantousterrisks,andthatitis muchbetterforthedictator'slifeforhimto be
replacedbya democracyinan educatedcountrythanbyanotherdictatorinan uneducated
one.A symmetricalpoint,ofcourse,is thatdemocracieshaveanextraincentivetoinvestin
educationinordertosecureandstabilizethemselvesagainstoligarchiccoups.
Third,ouranalysisdeals withthesize ofthemostproductivecoalitionsinpolitics,but
Lemma1 appliestoorganizationsandgroupsmorebroadly.The resultssuggest,then,that
higherhumancapitalsocietiescan moreefficientlymaintainlargerorganizationsinwhich
bothtop-downandpeer-providedincentivesplaya role.Whetherthispredictionistrueabout
firmsandotherinstitutionsandgroupsremainsa questionforfurtherresearch.
AcknowledgementsGlaeserthankstheTaubmanCenterforStateandLocalGovernment.Ponzettothanks
theMarcoFannoandtheMarioGasbarriFoundations.WearegratefultoTimothyBesley,FilipeCampante,
RubenEnikolopov,OdedGalor,NicolaGennaioli,ElhananHelpman,EliasPapaiouannou,RichardPosner,
JoshuaSchwartzstein,SidneyVerba,andtwoanonymousrefereesforcomments,andtoJoshuaGottliebfor
outstandingresearchassistance.
Appendix:Proofs
A. 1 ProofofLemma1
Forease ofnotation,weomitthesubscripti denotinggroup-specificparametersintheanal-
ysisofgroupequilibrium.A groupequilibriumis a rootoftheauxiliaryfunction
Q(a;g,h) = F(p(g) + b(ah))-a
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20. JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99 95
whichistwicecontinuouslydifferentiablewithrespecttoa, becausesoareb andF. Omitting
argumentsforthesakeofbrevity,thefirstderivativeis
Qa = hfb'- 1
andthesecondis
Qaa=h2[f'{bf + fb"]<0
whosesignfollowsfromAssumption2.
Assumption1impliesfurthermorethat
Q(0g,h) = F(p(g))>0
Q(Ug,h) = F(p(g) + b(h))-l<0
andthereforebycontinuitythereexistsatleastoneroota e (0, 1).
Moreover,Q (0; g,h) > 0 impliesthatatthefirstrootQa (a;g,h) < 0. Concavitythen
impliesQa(a; g,h) < OVa> a, whichimpliesthattheroota is unique.Thecondition
Q(a;g,h)=0^Qa(a;g,h) < 0
canalsobe interpretedas showingthestabilityofthegroupequilibrium.
By theimplicit-functiontheorem,equilibriumparticipationis a differentiablefunction
a (g, h) suchthatQ (a (g, h) ; g, h) = 0. Since
Qg= fp'<o
Qh= afbf> 0
itsgradientis
da
_ Qg _ fp'
H Qa -hfb'
da
_ Qh = afbf
dh
_
Qa
=
1- hfb'
>
recallingthatQa < 0 inequilibrium.
A. 2 ProofofProposition1
Theimplicit-functiontheoremalsoallowsustocomputehigher-orderderivatives,andamong
these
d2d
= QQgh
~ QhQa QSa
-
QgQa Qha + QgQhQaa
SgSh Q
where
Qgh= af'p'b' > 0
Qga= hf'p'b' > 0
Qha= fb'+ ahf'(bf+ahfb"
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21. 96 JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99
Therefore,
a2loga _ J/ j?a_ _ Sa_Sa
Sgdh ~a2dgdh
_ _
dgdh)
=
2753ia (Ql Qsh
- QhQaQga~ QgQaQha+ QgQhQaa) + QgQhQa]
*^a
=
JTp-{"Qo (QoQgh
-
QhQga)+ Qg[a {QhQaa- QaQha)+ QhQa]}
=^rW(°"hfbf)alf>pty+a2hfpftr{bf+fb"^
^p'(fb'+hf2b") o
(l-A/*03
Letfl,-=a(gi,h):ihe probabilityofvictoryforregimeGoverregimeGois
(gCt
1- I = Z (exp{log|i - loggo+ logai - logflo})
^0^0/
sothat
^L = - (h5l Jogii-iogJb+iogfli-logoo/81°g*l _ 81°gfl0
3A
=
VloflO/ V M
_
dh )
andthus
dn rt
-77-> 0rt4> gi > go
A.3 ProofofProposition2 andCorollary1
Recallthattheprobabilityofsuccessofa challengeris
(*o-£)«<«>,*)/
sothatthechallengerthatismostlikelytosucceedisthemaximizerof
M (g,y;go,h) = logo(g,h)+ logg
-
-j
- log^0
-
-r)
subjectto
gi €[0,1] andy €[max{0,gi - (1 - go)},min{g0,g}]
Tobeginwith,since
theoptimalvalueofy isindefiniteifg= goanditliesina cornerifg^ go.
Hencetheoptimalregimesizeis
8*(80,h) = arg max {loga (guh) + X(gi,go)}
£l€[0,l]
whereX(gi,go)isdefinedbythejointlyoptimalchoiceofoverlapy.
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22. JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99 97
TherearetwodifferentcasesbasedonthesizeoftheincumbentGo:smallgo€(0, j or
largego€(j, l]. Thefirstwillonlyhavetwopotentialcornersolutionsforoptimaloverlap:
y = 0 andy = go;thelatterwillalsohavethepossibilityofy = g- (1 - go) > 0.
1. Ifgo€(0,j] theoptimaloverlapis
gi e [0,go)
[0,go] g= go
go g€(go,1]
andtherefore
w« o flog^i - loggo gi €[0,g0]
^'^-llog^-fj-logf
w« o
g!€[gO,l]
a continuousfunctionthatismonotoneincreasingingandpiecewiseconcaveingfor
gi €[0,go]andge [go,1],butwitha convexkinkatg= go
2. Ifgo€(5, l] theoptimaloverlapis
0 gi e [0,1- g0]
v(o-yKgx)~
£i-0 -So) Si€[l-go,go)v(o-yKgx)~
[2go-l,go] gi=go
go 8€(go,1]
andtherefore
- loggo g€[0,1- g0]
Iloggi
log£rz|Q±i_log£Qz|i±i gl€[l-go,go]
log(gi-f)-logf Si€[go,l]
a continuousfunctionthatismonotoneincreasingingandpiecewiseconcaveingfor
g€[0,go]andg€ [go,1],butwitha convexkinkatg= goanda concavekinkat
g= 1- go-
Givenanygo€(0, l],g*(go,h) e (0,1]iswell-definedasthemaximandofacontinuous
functionona compact.ConsidertwolevelsofhumancapitalHl < h^. Supposethat
g*L= g*(go,hL) > g*(go,hH) ssg^
Thisimpliesbydefinitionthat
( log*(gl hL)+ k(gl go) > loga (g*H,hL)+ X(g*H,go)
1log*(g^, hH)+X(g*H,go) > oga(gl hH)+ X(gl go)
andthereforerearranging
logo(gl, hi)-oga (g*HihL)>X (g*H,go)-X (gl go)>oga (g*L>hH)-oga (g*H,hH)
andfinally
loga (g*H,hH)
- loga (g*HihL) > logfl(gl hH)
~ oga(gl hL)
ButintheproofofProposition1weestablishedthat
a^iog.
dgdh
whichprovesbycontradictionthat
hL <hH=>g$ (go,hL) < g*(go,hH)
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23. 98 JEconGrowth(2007) 12:77-99
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