“… outcomes for major weapon programs are  not  improving over the 6 years we have been issuing this report.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
“ Flagship acqusitions continue to: cost significantly more… 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
“… take  longer to produce … 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
“… and deliver less than was promised.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
 
 
 
 
 
$7B, 20 years, 0 Aircraft $3B, 8 years, 0 Aircraft $11B, 7 years, 0 artillery 20% overrun, 20 years
 
 
An unreasonably long acquisition cycle…  is a  central  problem  from which most other acquisition problems stem. - Packard Commission, 1986
“ A hallmark of an executable program with a sound business case is short development cycle times.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
“ The DoD itself suggests that system development should be limited to about 5 years.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
“ For 32 programs that started since 2001, only 11 even planned their development cycle times to be less than 5 years.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
“ On average, the current portfolio of programs has experienced a 21-month delay in delivering IOC to the warfighter.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
Average Cycle Times   Packard Commission Air Force Navy 0 10 12 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 Program Start to IOC  (Years) Army Source: DSB Briefing, Dan Czelusniak, 12 June 1998 8 6 4 2 1999  Automobile Industry
PEM and SPO Surveys N=208 Superior Performance Low Acquisition Cost Low Operation Costs Shortened Schedule Fourth Third Second First 100 80 60 40 20 0 Fourth Third Second First 100 80 60 40 20 0 Fourth Third Second First 100 80 60 40 20 0 Fourth Third Second First 100 80 60 40 20 0 Axis: Number of Programs Responding
Parkinson’s Law Work  e-x-p-a-n-d-s   to fill the time allotted. Ward’s Corollary Work is  compressible .
 
 
“…  we have too much money… this overfunding is  limiting our ability to innovate …”
“ DoD’s planned investments for new weapon systems now reflect the highest funding levels in two decades.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
“ During this same time period, acquisition outcomes did not improve…” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
“ Total acquisition costs for FY07… increased  26% . … whereas the 2000 portfolio increased by  6% .” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
“ Total acquisition cost for the current portfolio of major programs… has grown by nearly $300B over initial estimates.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
 
 
 
Goodness Complexity Complexity Slope Complication Slope Simplification Slope TIME
Goodness Complexity Complexity Slope
Goodness Complexity Complication Slope
Goodness Complexity Simplification Slope
Goodness Complexity Simplistic Complexity Slope Complex Complication Slope Complicated Simplification Slope Simple TIME
Download the free PDF at Lulu.com
 
Goodness Complexity Simplification Slope
T  I N Y Schedule Process Team Budget
 
“ If you look at the history of innovation, you’ll see one proven recipe for breakthroughs…”
Take a small, intensely focused team and impose an unreasonable timeframe on it. - Alan Naumann, CEO & President Calico Commerce, Inc
fail n  -> succeed m fail n succeed m
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“ Courageous trust in the face of possible exploitation is the most ethically responsible and organizationally successful approach over the long term.”
 
http://www.lulu.com/content/2448437 [email_address]

Fist 2008

  • 1.
  • 2.
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 5.
  • 6.
  • 7.
    “… outcomes formajor weapon programs are not improving over the 6 years we have been issuing this report.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
  • 8.
    “ Flagship acqusitionscontinue to: cost significantly more… 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
  • 9.
    “… take longer to produce … 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
  • 10.
    “… and deliverless than was promised.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
  • 11.
  • 12.
  • 13.
  • 14.
  • 15.
  • 16.
    $7B, 20 years,0 Aircraft $3B, 8 years, 0 Aircraft $11B, 7 years, 0 artillery 20% overrun, 20 years
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19.
    An unreasonably longacquisition cycle… is a central problem from which most other acquisition problems stem. - Packard Commission, 1986
  • 20.
    “ A hallmarkof an executable program with a sound business case is short development cycle times.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
  • 21.
    “ The DoDitself suggests that system development should be limited to about 5 years.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
  • 22.
    “ For 32programs that started since 2001, only 11 even planned their development cycle times to be less than 5 years.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
  • 23.
    “ On average,the current portfolio of programs has experienced a 21-month delay in delivering IOC to the warfighter.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
  • 24.
    Average Cycle Times Packard Commission Air Force Navy 0 10 12 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 Program Start to IOC (Years) Army Source: DSB Briefing, Dan Czelusniak, 12 June 1998 8 6 4 2 1999 Automobile Industry
  • 25.
    PEM and SPOSurveys N=208 Superior Performance Low Acquisition Cost Low Operation Costs Shortened Schedule Fourth Third Second First 100 80 60 40 20 0 Fourth Third Second First 100 80 60 40 20 0 Fourth Third Second First 100 80 60 40 20 0 Fourth Third Second First 100 80 60 40 20 0 Axis: Number of Programs Responding
  • 26.
    Parkinson’s Law Work e-x-p-a-n-d-s to fill the time allotted. Ward’s Corollary Work is compressible .
  • 27.
  • 28.
  • 29.
    “… wehave too much money… this overfunding is limiting our ability to innovate …”
  • 30.
    “ DoD’s plannedinvestments for new weapon systems now reflect the highest funding levels in two decades.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
  • 31.
    “ During thissame time period, acquisition outcomes did not improve…” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
  • 32.
    “ Total acquisitioncosts for FY07… increased 26% . … whereas the 2000 portfolio increased by 6% .” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
  • 33.
    “ Total acquisitioncost for the current portfolio of major programs… has grown by nearly $300B over initial estimates.” 2008 GAO Report Assessment Of Selected Weapon Programs
  • 34.
  • 35.
  • 36.
  • 37.
    Goodness Complexity ComplexitySlope Complication Slope Simplification Slope TIME
  • 38.
  • 39.
  • 40.
  • 41.
    Goodness Complexity SimplisticComplexity Slope Complex Complication Slope Complicated Simplification Slope Simple TIME
  • 42.
    Download the freePDF at Lulu.com
  • 43.
  • 44.
  • 45.
    T IN Y Schedule Process Team Budget
  • 46.
  • 47.
    “ If youlook at the history of innovation, you’ll see one proven recipe for breakthroughs…”
  • 48.
    Take a small,intensely focused team and impose an unreasonable timeframe on it. - Alan Naumann, CEO & President Calico Commerce, Inc
  • 49.
    fail n -> succeed m fail n succeed m
  • 50.
  • 51.
  • 52.
  • 53.
  • 54.
  • 55.
  • 56.
  • 57.
    “ Courageous trustin the face of possible exploitation is the most ethically responsible and organizationally successful approach over the long term.”
  • 58.
  • 59.

Editor's Notes

  • #2 Good afternoon – I’m Maj Dan Ward and I’m here to tell you some stories. As many of you know, the Wright Brothers made their first flight in 1903 – but what I think is particularly interesting is the fact they started work in 1899… just four years earlier? By 1905, two years after the first flight, they had a practical, dependable flying machine (relatively speaking). And they did it without computer models, without successful historical precedents. This is what a pair of talented bicycle repairmen can do in 4 years.