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Effects of Mexican Drug Trafficking on Mexico & the US
Relationships
Romina Mollo
Senior Thesis
Professor Swedberg
2
The ongoing problems with Mexico and United States are caused by a number of
issues, one particularly, the continuing corruption that has occurred because of the war
on drugs, which has extended from border to border. 1 However, this has not been an
issue that has recently come about; it is an issue that international organizations have
debated for an extremely long time. In the beginning it seemed like a small problem,
which has tremendously grown, as Mexico’s “marijuana, heroin, and methamphine has
grown increased numbers in the north.” 2 Mexico claims that they as well as the United
States have attempted to control the drug epidemic. Nevertheless, many claim that
Mexico has completely failed at doing so, and so this has led them to now have strict
laws imposed by the United States on Mexico. 3 On the other hand, although this
ongoing drug issue originated in one geographical area, the effects it has had there and
across the border are inevitable; drug trafficking, has led to fire arm trafficking, with an
overall increase violence and consequences that have affected more than one nation,
forcing inevitable tensions to rise.
There is no denying the effects the Mexican drug war has had on both Mexico
and nation and its neighboring border, the United States, which has led to a number of
issues, both domestic, and internationally. Mexico’s war on drugs is not a recent
concern, thus, it is a problem that has been of concern for quite some time now.
However, in the mid-2000s the problem scaled out of control in many aspects.4
1 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on Drugs:
No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002) , 134
2 Recio Gabriela, Journal of Latin American Studies, Drugs and Alcohol: US Prohibition and the Origins of
the Drug Trade in Mexico, 1910-1930, (Cambridge University Press, Feb, 2002) 21-22
3 Toro Maria Celia, Journal of Latin American Studies, Mexico's 'War' on Drugs: Causes and
Consequences, (Cambridge University Press, Feb, 2002), 715-16
4 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on Drugs:
No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002) , 134
3
Nonetheless, it has not been until recently that the circulation around this problem has
escalated than it has in the past. Mexico claims they have tried to control the matter;
however, internationally the Mexican government is associated with the violence of the
drug cartels. Since Mexican drug trafficking has grown over the decades, other issues
have as well, which include: political disputes, fire arm trafficking, human trafficking,
overall increase of violence around the country, more in some specific areas than
others, and ultimately consequences that have affected their country and relationships
with other countries.5
Much of the media attention focuses on the violence in Mexico when the real
issue is “the weakness and pressure from the United the States.” 6 Mexico is the
biggest supplier of drugs in the country; the United States has not done enough to help
its neighbor. The United States does not give Mexico enough alternatives to fight or fix
the problem, as a result the Mexican government has “no alternatives than to continue
fighting the drugs with limited institutional and human resources” 7 However, the United
States is to blame as well, as we are presenting an issue as well. He blames the
problems with the two nations do not only go hand in hand with the drug problem but
with the “behavior and perspective of US officials.” Research that United States officials
have taken control in Mexico and it is the major cause between the “bitter” battles
5 Recio Gabriela, Journal of Latin American Studies, Drugs and Alcohol: US Prohibition and the Origins of
the Drug Trade in Mexico, 1910-1930, (Cambridge University Press, Feb, 2002) 21-22
6 Ibid.; 23
7 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on Drugs:
No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002) , 134
4
between the United States and Mexico, which is real reason for the presenting fights
and issues over the past fifteen years.8
Although Mexico has tried to “gain” control over the spread of the cartels, these
organizations continue to spread. However, the question rises. How do these illegal
organizations actually organize? The Mexican government may have tried to combat
the cartels; nevertheless, the cartels continue to operate effectively despite the
government intervening. Many like the famous “La Familia Michoacana” use “a reward
and punishment scheme,” which in the end prevents defection from its members and
elicits cooperation from the community and government.9
Drug trafficking holds the biggest threat because of the corruption ties that lay
within and what they produce. The Mexican government has tried to combat the issue,
going by their constitution, as well as the pressure they have received from the United
States. Therefore, all these factors puts the Mexican government into a “very complex”
situation as they try to fight the drug problem; however, they have very limited
institutional and human resources, thus, with this problem Mexico has really no way to
change their tactics on their war on drugs. 10 Nevertheless, the issue of corruption
within the state has undoubtedly aided on the drug epidemic, as the issue cannot really
be fixed.
8 Toro Maria Cecilia, The Journal of American History, The Internationalization of Police: The DEA in
Mexico, (Organization of American Historians, 1999), 623
9 Kostelnik and Skarbek, Public Choice, The Governance Institutions of A Drug Trafficking
Organization,(Springler, July 2013), 95-103
10 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on
Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002), 134
5
Mexico’s drug problem has affected the country as whole, as illegal drugs have
affected Mexico’s consumption and trafficking. It shocks many when they see or read
this, but although Mexico’s consumption rate has definitely increased over the years, it
still does not compare to those in industrialized countries. Thus, it leaves drug
trafficking as the biggest concern in Mexico, as it leads to corruption. The traffic in
Mexico has a very costly war which has erupted to contain these increased demands on
the drug exchange, as well as the pressure put on by the United States. However, the
costly war that has come about has become very hard and “endangers” the Mexican
transition into democracy. 11
Mexico has been fighting illegal drugs since the 1920’s, starting when Mexico
supported the Hauge International Opium Convention, in which the following years, the
Mexican government then banned the trade of illicit drugs such as; opium, cocaine, and
marijuana. Thus, during these first three decades of the twentieth century a new pattern
began. Mexico became a leading producer of heroin and marijuana, as a major provider
to the United States of these drugs. However, Mexico has been a producer of drugs
since the 1930’s, therefore, it must be noted that this is not a new issue these countries
are dealing with today. In the 1980’s, with the increase knowledge of drugs, the
Mexican drug trafficking issue, became increasingly controversial, now considered a
“social problem.” 12 However, one must take into consideration the development of illicit
drug trade in the US began in the 1920’s with the prohibition of alcohol, a control and
reduction which aided in overall violence, as well as corruption, connecting to modern
11 Ibid.; 135
12 Ibid.; 135-36
6
day society. 13 The ideology of prohibition was a decent concept, which in many
regards was a “fantasy idea,” which no one wanted to abide by. It began with the notion
that alcohol was causing social problems, which included unemployment, poverty,
business failure, slums, insanity, crime, and violence. Thus, a pattern of drug use
emerged, and as one drug is banned the use of stronger drugs increases.
Nevertheless, people began to be involved in the business of drugs, especially drug
smuggling, such as from Mexico. 14
In the 1970’s, the Mexican government did try to take a step towards the right
direction; “Operation Condor” was implemented, which was done by the pressure that
came from the Nixon administration. The operation was actually efficient in many
regards. The United States used the Mexican government’s success on their behalf,
citing it as example of what a country can “achieve” in respect to the drug problems
occurring, and how they can fight it, as long as there is a “political will.” 15 The Nixon
Administration launched Operation Intercept, which was a “massive action,” done in
order to check vehicles and inspect them while crossing the US-Mexican border. This
operation caused an economic disruption and damage on both sides of the border,
which was then renamed, “Operation Condor,” how we all know to to be today. Thus,
13 Miron Jeffery, Violence and the U.S. Prohibitions of Drugs and Alcohol, American Law and Economics
Review, (Oxford University Press, 1999) 76-88
14 Reinarman and Levine, From Prohibition to Regulation: Lessons from Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy,
The Milbank Quarterly, (: Wiley on behalf of Milbank Memorial Fund, 1991), 465-467
15 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on
Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002), 134
7
this was the start on the US-Mexico’s “war on drugs,” which caused the problems we
that arose. 16
However, everything changed in the 1980’s, when the antidrug effort worsened.
Mexico once again became the biggest drug supplier to the United States of heroin and
marijuana, as well as becoming a point of transit for cocaine to South America, and the
friction between both nations once again rose, which has lasted until today. 17 In the
1980’s President Regan decided to assign both more financial and human resource
support to Mexico. Nonetheless, the problem began to be so big; many saw the US’s
response as being inadequate. Thus, since this time many also see the US as a main
supplier and aide of “deaths.”18
During the twenty first century, the Mexican cartels expanded their control of drug
supply chain throughout the regions, causing their supplies to “explode.” Since there are
no historical or written accounts of their actual revenue of business, it is unknown
exactly how much they produce and how much they make for their supplies, but it is
clear an enormous amount of money is made. In 2002, US Attorney General John
Ashcroft, reported that Americans had spent 62.9 billion dollars on drugs in the year
2000, 36.1 billion was spent on cocaine alone; 90 percent of transits went through and
came from Mexico. Later in 2009, the US Drug Intelligence Center estimated that the
16 Zedillo and Wheeler, Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism, A Yale Center for
the Study of Globalization eBook , (Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2012), 36
17 Ibid.; 135-36
18 Bagley Mitchell, The New Hundred Years War? US National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin
America, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, (Center for Latin American Studies at the
University of Miami, 1998), 173-75
8
Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers had generated between an estimated 17 billion
to 38 billion dollars annually on sales to the United States.19
However, another issue Mexico has seen is the geographical dispersion of
violence that has happened throughout the country. There has been an increase of
shooting, and overall harassment by crime organizations. The number of municipalities
with more of 12 organized-crime related deaths increased in 2007. Thus, in that same
year, a total number of 53 municipalities had 12 or more organized crime-related
deaths. Nevertheless, the number continued to increase, with the number reaching 200
in 2010. 20
The issues lie within the Mexican border, where along the streets the problem is
visible. In the last four years, nearly 35,000 people have been killed due to drug related
violence, mostly alongside the US border. 21 The Mexican cartels are also not backing
down and not weakening. In 2010; nearly 15,273 people were killed, known as the
“bloodiest year,” as many are seeking for a change in the country. Washington DC
firmly had supported former Mexican President Felipe Caledon’s policies, which
captured some high profiled drug barons.22
Fast forwarding from the early 2000’s to the mid 2000’s Mexico experienced a
change in presidency, which changed many things for the country. In 2006, Felipe
Calderon was inaugurated as president of the nation, and nearly a week after his
19 Kellner and Piptone, Inside Mexico's Drug War, World Policy Journal, (The MIT Press, 2010), 30
20 Zedillo and Wheeler, Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism, A Yale Center for
the Study of Globalization eBook, (Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2012), 36
21 Miglierini Julian, Mexico: Cracking Down, The World Today, (Royal Institute of International Affairs,
2011) ,26-28
22 Ibid.; 26
9
inauguration as president in December of that year, he sent 7,000 troops as well as
police to the state of Michoacán, in order to destroy marijuana plantations and set out a
search for drug traffickers. This became known as the “first deployment” on the “war on
drugs,” which increased radically within two weeks, a total 30,000 personnel had been
deployed to 32 states, and four years later it became a complete “murderous
catastrophe.” A total of 40,000 people died, over 6,000 of them in the first half of 2011,
which was equivalent to a casualty rate of more than 30 a day. However, the flow of
drugs and weapons continued to increase, and the killings, kidnappings and extortion
had spread even further. 23
24
Corruption accompanied Caledron’s entire presidency, including his race to the
National Palace, in which he won with the help of a large-scale fraud. 25 Many of
23 Hernandez Isabel, Silver and Lead, Los señores del narco (Grijalbo: Mexico, 2010), 558
24 Zedillo and Wheeler, Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism, A Yale Center for
the Study of Globalization eBook , (Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2012), 37
10
Caledon’s ballots were counted twice, while the ballots of his opponent were thrown
away, until the Federal Electoral Institute produced the “right result.” Caledron won the
election by 0.58 per cent, thus, resulting in street protests from the supporters from his
now former opponent Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who to this day continues to call
himself the ‘legitimate president’. From the beginning Caledron lacked many attributions
including legitimacy. Instead of trying to turn the corner from the rumors that dispelled
about him which his opposers had begun dispersing among the people, he deployed
thousands of troops on his “war on drugs.” 26 Corruption seems to be a common link
between all sources, as political corruption rules Mexico and its people, which inevitably
has led to the massive problems found in the country, which has “altered the equation.”
Thus, over the last two decades, the patterns of corruption have led to political
breakthroughs on efforts to deal with the problem of corruption, has strengthen the rule
of law and reigning in corruption.” 27 Unfortunately his crusade did little to undo the
damage of the drug traffickers, as he continued to make himself look bad, and
continued to increase violence throughout the country. By February 2010, 53,174
people had been arrested; however, only 941 involved actual members, as violence
grew, bodies were left on display through the streets.28
Calerdon was in office for six bloody years, in his so called “war on drugs.”
According to the Mexican Constitution, presidents are limited to one six year term,
therefore, the question rises, why not only create such disastrous policies, as well as
continue them, when he cannot be reelected? Could Caledron be tainted with cartel
25 Ibid,; 558
26 Ibid.; 558
27 Morris Stephen, The New Politics of Corruption, Corruption and the Mexican Political System:
Continuity and Change, (Taylor and Francis Ltd, 1999), 623
28 Hernandez Isabel, Silver and Lead, Los señores del narco (Grijalbo: Mexico, 2010), 558
11
corruption? The question rises if Caledron had chosen a side between the cartels, and
had an alliance with the infamous Capo’s Sinaloa cartel:
“Described as his de facto backing for the Sinaloa cartel may be the product of a
convergence between corruption and mistaken strategy…Government
statements speak of a policy of ‘disarticulating’ the cartels, fragmenting ...” 29
Could he have based his thoughts on those of the PRI, which were that when there was
one cartel, which was manageable and the violence could still be controlled. 30
The American government completely supported Caledron’s strategies.
Nonetheless, they do note the lack of results that never came about during his six years
in office, calling the drug cartels, “an insurgency,” stating that cartels were taking over
the nation. They described the Mexican army as “slow and risk averse” and all federal
agencies, including the nation’s Army, Navy, and Federal Police were all corrupt,
causing an ultimate failure. Thus, this was a huge threat and concern for American
foreign policy if something was not done to stop the epidemic and the nation’s border
continued to be at risk. 31
Washington claims that Mexico had exceeded Colombia’s demand and the
power of their drug lords, and now being the main “principal drug market.” However, the
United States was and still continues to remains an openhanded source of weapons
towards the Mexican drug war. It is reported that an average of 70 percent of weapons
that are seized in Mexico in the last two years can be traced directly back to the United
States. Nevertheless, shockingly most of these weapons have actually been purchased
29 Ibid.; 558
30 Ibid.; 558
31 Miglierini Julian, Mexico: Cracking Down, The World Today, (Royal Institute of International Affairs,
2011) ,27
12
legally in the states north of the Mexican border. However, there is still a denial that the
drug problem is Mexico’s issue alone, and must be handled by the Mexican government
entirely alone. 32
Under both the Bush and Obama administrations a joint operation was held,
beginning in 2007, through the Merida Initiative. Mexico received millions of dollars
from the United States for equipment, training, and joint special operations. However,
the financial aid was not delivered at the rate in which many Mexican hoped it would be
delivered; although, because of the aide of the United States, drug lord Arturo Beltran
Leyva was captured in December of 2009.33 Many call the help received from the US as
“modest,” as the 1.4 billion dollars that were given under the Merida Initiative which
covered three years of help was not clearly enough for all the needs that had to be
covered. The US was involved itself help its Southern neighbor because they could not
afford to have a “narco-state as a neighbor,” according to former drug czar McCaffrey.
The US became involved under the Bush administration and implemented Merida
Initiative, as Washington felt the Mexican government had not done enough on their
part to “confront the dangerous of narco-terrorism.” 34
However, United States’ involvement is a main key, as the issues go back
decades. The Mexican drug issues, as well as the Mexican and American problems
with one another began in the 1980’s. It is a problem of both nations, one’s lack of
controlling what is occurring in their nation as well as what is leaving, and the other’s
lack of investigating what is entering its borders. The United States believes that
32 Hernandez Isabel, Silver and Lead, Los señores del narco (Grijalbo: Mexico, 2010), 338
33 Miglierini Julian, Mexico: Cracking Down, The World Today, (Royal Institute of International Affairs,
2011) ,27
34 Kellner and Piptone, Inside Mexico's Drug War, World Policy Journal, (The MIT Press, 2010), 37
13
Mexico has lacked the ability to control the problem over the decades, which has
ultimately led to the “friction” between the two countries. Each nation’s interaction with
drugs, has led to the fire that fuels this matter, especially Mexico’s security doctrine,
which came about in the late 1980’s. 35 These problems can also be tied to the
conflicts with the United States and the Mexican Revolution 91910-1920), in which the
“potential governmental income” which shows that it came directly from the trafficking of
drugs, thus, they are still to be resolved. 36
In 2007, violence in Mexico was reaching an ultimate high throughout
the entire country. The press named the killings that occurred in Aguascalientes, "Black
Thursday,” the first shootings of police officials, which until then had been a quiet area
compared to the rest of Mexico. After the fire attack occurred a search for the culprits
ensued. States Attorney Xavier Gonzalez Fisher attempted to calm the waters, and
reassured the public and media that the incident was an “isolated accident.” However,
the incident marked even bloodier period of violence, and increase of drugs, crime, and
corruption grew excessively along the Mexico-US border, even in regions that had not
been affected.37
It seems like the tensions between the United States and Mexico could not be
tamed, as the violence caused by the war on drugs continued to spread. In February of
2010, two US Immigration and Costumes Enforcement agents were shot in Mexico City
by two unknown assassins, one was fatally shot, while the other was injured. Both
35 Reuter and Ronfeldt, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Quest for Integrity: The
Mexican-US Drug Issue in the 1980s, (Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami, 1992)
89-90
36 Sandos James, The Americas, Northern Separatism during the Mexican Revolution: An Inquiry into the
Role of Drug Trafficking, 1910-1920, (Academy of American Franciscan, 1984), 191-93
37 Ibid.; 29
14
Mexico and the United States agreed to work together and find those guilty of the crime.
Nevertheless, this was a different circumstance than in 1985, when a US Drug
Enforcement Official was killed and Mexico was accused by the United States of
protecting the killers, a situation, that caused extreme tensions between the two nations,
and the two countries. As a result, “bilateral relationship reached a historic low.”
38
In order to combat this issue, the problem must be shared by the two nations in
order to figure out a solution. Thus, under the Obama Administration Mexico an
“important discursive milestone” was achieved. In recent years some US officials have
begun to admit that it is a “shared responsibility” to control the drug trafficking. The US
is the world’s biggest consumer of illegal drugs, and the American demand on narcotics
38 Miglierini Julian, Mexico: Cracking Down, The World Today, (Royal Institute of International Affairs,
2011) ,28
15
is an important and big part of the problem, not only Mexico producing the drugs, as
well as the United States aiding in aiding with firearm, which increases the overall
violence across the border, since 2006, more than 100,000 have been confiscated from
the cartels, which can be linked to the US. 39 Thus, the US also provides military
weapons that are used by the cartels.
Mexico once an authoritarian ruled nation, “peacefully” returned to its democracy
after seventy years of a dictatorship rule. However, Mexico became a one-party state,
led the Institutional Revolutionary Party also known as the PRI. The establishment of
the PRI gave little way for “control for a few parties,” still leaving Mexico in many ways
as an authoritarian ruled nation. Thus, this left much conflict in the nation, leaving things
in the air and a window open for a rise of violence and revolts, and new threats to
emerge. 40
Nevertheless, it is important to understand who exactly is fighting who, as well as
the cartels, and which older cartels have power, but there are new cartels rising today.
There are two major dominant Mexican cartels, whom have increased violence and
coercion to “unimaginable” levels. The Sinola cartel, also known as the “The
Federation” is country’s largest cartel, it is based on the amounts of drugs they move
and sell. The Sinaloa replaced all others cartel originated in Sinola, Mexico, the region
was once known for the poppy fields and opium gum produced by thousands of
Mexican campesinos, which are Mexican field workers. The Sinola Cartels operate from
Sinola all the way throughout Mexico’s Pacific Coast, as well as the US border,
39 Ibid.;
40 Ibid.;
16
including Tijuana, Cuidad Juarez, and Nuevo Laredo in the east. Each region has its
own sector of the cartel; each with their own chief, controlling each territory, but at the
top of the hierarchy once sat El Chapo Guzman, once worth one billion dollars,
regarded as the most “powerful drug trafficker in the world,” until he was captured in
2014.41
The second cartel is Gulf Cartel, which was founded in the 1970’s, along the
northeastern border state of Tamaulipas, located alongside the Gulf of Mexico. The
Gulf Cartel grew drastically during the early 1990’s and expanded their territories, thus,
as they grew, conflict with El Chapo and Sinola grew as well, as The Gulf Cartel
became known for their “blood image.” Los Zetas, which originally was a small group of
deserters from the Mexican Special Forces hired in 2000 by the Gulf’s former chief
Guilen to serve as their body guards. However, Los Zetas were not content with their
roles as bodyguards, and when Guilen was captured in 2003, Los Zetas began their
own cartel, beginning to build power by drug trade, kidnapping, extortion, and killings. It
is not known who actually runs The Gulf Cartel anymore, but it is known that Los Zetas
play a crucial role. Today, much of the violence in Mexico is attributed to the war
between these powerful cartels, as well as the participation of other smaller
organizations. In 2003, a war exploded in Nuevo Laredo, concerning who would have
control of the city. The violence it produced is still prevalent today, with gun downs
between the cartels occurring and no truce happening along the US-Mexican border. 42
41 Kellner and Piptone, Inside Mexico's Drug War, World Policy Journal, (The MIT Press, 2010),32
42 Ibid.;
17
Today Mexico is run by “criminal-capital insurgency,” a country ran by drug
gangs who run the government, as violence has taken over, as well as an increase in
kidnapping has completely taken over the country. Nevertheless, what were once
regional problems has now turned into a nationwide epidemic. Although most drug
cartels do battle for drug routes into the United States, seeking the American demand,
drug smugglings happens throughout the country, as mountain, rural people are used to
do the job, known as “bronco,” meaning wild, and they became heroes. They leave their
rural homes and move into wealthy neighborhoods, where they can fire guns in the air
at fancy parties. Everyone wants to be a part of these gang groups and much more is at
“stake.” 43
Thus, as kidnapping seemed to become popular in the country, it spread across
the entire nation, as these gangs began to target the children of noticeable
businessmen. Los Zetas preferred this move more than any other gangs, as they
actually “perfected” the style of kidnapping, connecting it more to the style of drug
trafficking. For example, in May 2008, Nicholas Martinez Reyes, who was the son of a
wine distributor in Mexico, was kidnapped. He was at a seafood restaurant in
downtown in Aguascalientes, on a busy day, dinning with friends, when the incident
occurred. Reyes was held captive for 35 days, he was tortured, and his kidnappers cut
one of his fingers off, before his father finally agreed to pay his ransom. 44
In 2008, the biggest spike came when drug-related crimes jumped from 2,826 to
6,837 killings, a 142% increase with respect to the previous year. In 2009, the numbers
43 Ibid.;
44 Kellner and Piptone, Inside Mexico's Drug War, World Policy Journal, (The MIT Press, 2010),33-34
18
increased by more than 40%, reaching 9,614 victims and the following year records
when 15,273 were killed. Lastly, drug-related organized crime was responsible for 47%
of all intended homicides happening throughout Mexico. Homicides generally do occur
mainly alongside the border and US-Mexico crossing points the most profitable part of
drug trafficking business chain.
45
Since violence has taken over most of Mexico, groups of Mexicans have tried to
stand up to the violence through “peaceful tactics.” In 2009, a 17 year old Mormon, Erik
La Baron was kidnapped by a group of armed kidnappers, in Galena in the state of
Chihuahua. The kidnappers demanded a one million dollar kidnap ransom. At the time
it was actually the eleventh Mormon kidnapping in eight months. The community had
only about 1,000 members, was well off, and therefore turned into a target.46
45 Matthew Hall, Emily Greenman and George Farkas Legal Status and Wage Disparities for Mexican
Immigrants, Social Forces, (Oxford University Press, 2010), 5
46 Ibid.;
19
Violence has spread inevitably throughout the country because violence is an
“inherent feature of the trade an illicit drugs.” However, the violence associated with
Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations (DTO) s become increasingly ruthless. The
violent tactics include, mass killings, torture such as the dismemberment of body parts,
as well as the extreme use of car bombs. Analysts show that since 2006, 60,000
homicides can be linked to organized crime, which in 2012 had reached an ultimate
plateau by the end of the presidency of Caledron (2006-2012). During those six years,
DTOs formed new criminal law organizations. Many DTOs and criminal gangs
operating in Mexico have “diversified” into other illegal activities such as extortion,
kidnapping, and oil theft and now pose a multi-faceted organized criminal challenge to
governance in Mexico.47
Mexico’s brutal violent drug trafficking-related violence has included more
than1,300 beheadings, public hanging of corpses, killing of innocent bystanders, car
bombs, torture, and assassination of numerous journalists and government officials. In
March 2012, head of the U.S. Northern Command, General Charles Jacoby, testified to
the Senate Armed Services Committee that Mexico had at that time succeeded in
capturing or killing 22 out of 37 of the Mexican government’s most wanted drug
traffickers48. Jacoby noted their removal had not had “any appreciable positive effect” in
reducing the violence, which continued to climb in 2011. At the end of President
Caldeon’s term in late 2012, several observers maintained that between 47,000 to
47 Beittel June, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Analyst in
Latin American Affairs, (Congressional Research Service, 2013), 3
48 Ibid.; 3
20
65,000 organized crime-related killings had occurred during his tenure depending on the
source cited, roughly 10,000 such murders a year.49
Studies have been conducted in the United States, as some Americans try to get
to the bottom of some issues in Mexico. Studies conducted at the Trans Border
Institute (TBI) at the University of San Diego have also began to report total intentional
homicides. These studies were drawn from Mexican government agencies, and
concluded that between 120,000 to 125,000 people were killed, all killed in a homicides
during Caledron’s presidency. However, at the end the end of President Calderón’s
term in late 2012, several observers maintained that between 47,000 to 65,000
organized crime-related killings had occurred during his tenure roughly 10,000 murders
happened a year, and throughout Caledron’s presidency, between 120,000 to 125,000
people were killed, al homicides. 50
Homicides that are related to drug-trafficking operations in Mexico have
increased by exploring the devices through which this type of violence tends to
increase. Thus, studies have shown that drug-related violence can be understood as
the result of both, “homicides caused by traffickers whom are battling to take control of a
competitive market” as well as “casualties and arrests generated by law enforcement
operations against traffickers.” Nevertheless, violence interactions have caused Mexico
to be locked into a “self-reinforcing violent equilibrium.” 51
The wave of drug-related violence, which hit Mexico from December 2006 to
June 2010, which caused 41,648 killings have been officially linked to drug trafficking
49 Ibid.; 2
50 Ibid.; 2-3
51 Ibid;, 5
21
organizations. It was ultimately a dramatic increase from all previous years, from 2001–
2006 when only 8,901 killings were linked to organized crime. In 2010, drug-related
homicides reached high numbers when it hit the figures of 15,273 victims, making
organized crime officially responsible for 45 % of all intended homicides in the country.
Thus, this resulted in Mexican cities, such as Ciudad Juárez, which is a trans-shipment
point for the introduction of cocaine into the US, to increase homicide rates from 216
victims per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010. Studies show that these rates can be
compared to death tolls of those in war zones. 52
The drug-related violence in Mexico grew rapidly compared to other countries
due to “a self-reinforcing violent equilibrium caused by competition and enforcement.”
53 There are two variables that have helped aide this problem: an emergence of battle
over region, what gangs refer to as “competition,” as well as law enforcement when the
illegal drug industry changed from being “oligopolistic,” such as when a drug
organization goes from controlling only a single region to becoming competitive. Thus,
drug organizations refer to the term “competition” as two or more drug organizations
distributing and being present in one single region. Drug trafficking groups do not like
sharing regions, as it does have an effect, which includes, corruption, reduces the share
of the local market that it can supply throughout, and makes production inputs
uncommon. Competition also reduces the ability of the original criminal organization to
sell protection and rights within the region. Nonetheless, violence increases when a
52 Ibid., 3-4
53 Ibid;, 10
22
new organization tries to overcome the region of another, or when an organization
divides into two which causes internal confrontation.54
Nonetheless, with almost 41,648 drug-related homicides in the country in
4 and 1/2 years Mexico has become even more dangerous than it once was. Cities
located close to the United States border have experienced an increase in violence that
transformed them into war zones not only Cuidad Juarez, but in Michoacán,
Guanajuato, and Guerrero as well. Since the country is indeed a huge supplier of drugs
to the United States had once filled a “non-violent role” now are all drug-related crimes.
Thus, drug related crimes resulted when illegal markets became more “competitive,”
resulting in a change in Mexico’s drug-trafficking industry, which lacked a central
enforcement agency to deal with these changes, which led to violence “erupted.”55
Nonetheless, extortion has also taken over along with homicide. In the beginning
extortion was once used by criminals to target to form illegal businesses, such as
prostitution rings and casinos, industries. However, soon the extortion of business then
extended into the legal world. Some businessmen north of Mexico are part of the
association called “The Zeta Killers,” which refer the gang group the Zetas. The Zetas
Killers have assassinated hundreds of Zetas members. Zeta’s members’ body parts
have been found and have been regularly appeared around Mexico, such as Boca del
Rio, Benito Juarez, and Celaya. There are signs and messages along the streets that
54 Ibid.; 144
55 Ibid.; 153
23
read: “We are the new group of The Zeta Killers and we are against kidnapping and
extortion, and we will fight against them in all the states for a cleaner Mexico.” 56
During Caledon ‘s six years of presidency, all the brutal crimes carried out by not
only the drug gangs but by the DTOs also included attacks on drug rehabilitation
centers, they attacked parties of young people, firebombed a casino in Monterrey, killed
52 patrons and employees, and began targeting Mexican journalists and media
workers. After the Caledron administration, the government had dramatic successes in
capturing and arresting drug leaders. Thus, with 37 most wanted cartel leaders that
Mexico’s government identified in 2009, 25 were either captured or killed during the
course of President Calderon’s term in office. Nonetheless, there was an increasingly
close collaboration between Mexico and the United States 2007 and 2012 Mexico.
Mexico later which then later extradited the issue to their neighbor the United States a
reported 587 suspects wanted on charges in the United States, most of them for drug
trafficking and related crimes. 57
The Mexican drug trafficking has had other effects, which has affected the US
Mexican relationships. In the recent years, research has shown that Mexican cities have
been “depopulating.” Most of the migration has been coming prominently from the US-
Mexican border, since acquiring residency is easier. Usually border cities tend to lose
an average of 35,255 inhabitants, while non-border counties tended to gain an average
of 1,297.86 inhabitants. In the last few years an estimated 8,103.63 people left
56 Ibid.; 6
57 Beittel June, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Analyst in
Latin American Affairs, (Congressional Research Service, 2013), 16
24
unexpectedly out of Mexico and moved into the United States due to what was
happening in Mexico.58
Migration, once see as seen as something positive wave during the industrial
revolution began to change with the increase Mexican immigration into the United
States, which has resulted in problems between the two countries. The issues that lay
between these parties include immigration, narcotics, and smuggling and
NAFTA/Tratado de Libre Comercio related trade issues explain the contemporary
political and media focus on the border; the problems between the two countries
“dominate” and stand on both sides. 59
Since most migration has come from border cities, such as Juarez, which lost
150.36 thousand inhabitants–about 11% of its population, other neighboring cities, with
considerably high violence levels like cities, such as Tijuana, Reynosa, and Matamoros
have lost between 6%, 9% and 4% of their population during the same period. Other
cities, such as Praxedis de Guerrero, Mier and Guadalupe have faced expected
unexpected outflows of more than 25% of their whole population. However, it is not
exactly known where all these people have migrated and relocated. Middle and upper
class Mexicans, whom live on the border is quite strong and rooted in historically
important but informal agreements. Thus, many bordering cities have divided
themselves and facilitated transportation between border-city inhabitants. Thus, there
were bordering cities have given “day border passes,” which is a form of a one-day visa
58 Ibid;.
59 Bersin Alan, Stanford Law Review, El Tercer País: Reinventing the U. S./Mexico Border, (Standford
Law Review, 1996), 1413
25
to Mexican border inhabitants that allow them to cross into the US without a formal visa
or passport. 60
The United States has not been the only place where Mexicans have relocated;
they have also gone to other cities within the country, such as Acapulco, Chimalhuacan
and Tlajomulco. Tlajomulco grew about 30% more than population predictions had
accounted for, Juarez and Bahia de Banderas also grew in more than 18%. Results
show Mexico’s migration flows are being driven by security concerns rather those than
by traditional economic variables. 61
The research project that was conducted to analysis that effects of drug-
trafficking especially on migration was called CONAPO, which by Mexico’s National
Population Council. CONAPO conducts research every year, they predicted county-
level population figures considering demographic changes and expected immigration
outflows. CONAPO has also shown how important migration outflows to the US are as
predictors of population figures. Nonetheless, they use a very “sophisticated” method in
order to predict the total number of Mexicans that will change their residency to the U.S.
Thus, these predictions also take into account the economic conditions of both the
United States and Mexico; they look into surveys, polls, previous census figures, and
panel studies.62
However, looking at traditional economic explanations of migration flows, in
which the expected signs and are significant in all outflows specifications. It also
showed there was an increase of one point in employment rates or in the number of
60 Ibid.; 8
61 Ibid.; 9
62 Ibid.; 9
26
college degrees per 100,000 inhabitants reduces migration outflows in 0.01 and 0.11
per 100,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, neither employment nor education is
significantly correlated with migration inflows. Usually when deciding where to relocate
Mexicans do not go to cities with higher levels of education or lower unemployment.
Finally, CONAPO had at times faced some problems when measuring population flows
in some places more than others. 63
Some call the cause of migration as a “phenomenon,” as violence does indeed
create unexpected migration flows and refugees. In Mexico it was more of political or
social concerns that drove most migration decisions, rather than economic reasons.
Since there has been an increase on drug-related violence within Mexico, it has
changed the migration dynamics in the country. The average number of Mexican
migration that has occurred because of the drug violence is an estimated 230,000, who
have moved out of the violent cities, 115,000 of them to relocate at the US. However,
many do claim that the number may be underestimated as it does not account for
Mexicans who leave on a temporary basis, checking in at US hotels for short periods of
time, “to rest from the constant violence.” 64
The most shocking case would have to be the case of drug-violence migration
that has come about out of Juarez, Chihuahua, and its US-city counterpart, El Paso,
Texas. This migration epidemic has had impacts on the Mexican outflow, as they have
felt with such strength in El Paso that some have even claimed that “a sort of ’Little
63 Ibid.; 9-10
64 Ibid.; 15-6
27
Juarez, comparing Miami to “Little Havana.” Thus, all this migration has significantly
changed housing, schooling, business associations, and many other public entities. 65
Contraband has influenced Mexican culture as result as well, including gender
discrimination, as well “corridos,” which are Mexican ballads that record events and
subjects, including state-controlled records. These ballads have turned into
narcocorridos, a new sub-genre. These ballads do at times maintain“shady” and violent
relationships with the narcoculture and journalists. However, A “corrido actually does
offers a counter of “official history.” Many believe there has been a loss of journalistic
integrity, which has then led to a corrido being a representation of “pura vida,” meaning
pure life. 66 The group sang about gunfights with police officials- corruption, retribution,
and violence, and machismo. The group is seen as a modern story-teller of what is
happened and is happening. Many do believe that indeed corridos are a link between
the Mexican people, their culture, history, and what is occurring in their soil. In a video
that explain what a corrido is, a dark screen is shown, where the voices of two
anonymous men is heard, they state:
“I like corridos because they are the real deeds of our people.”
“Yes I like them too because they are the pure truth.” 67
Mexico also faces another issue known as, “Narco-propaganda,” which also
began to take major effect during President’s Caledron’s bloody six years. Narco-
propaganda is known as “a distinctive form of communication and discourse,” used
65 Ibid; 16
66 Ramírez-Pimienta Juan Carlos and Villalobos Jose Pablo, Memory and Nation in Contemporary
Mexico, "Corridos" and "la Pura Verdad": Myths and Realities of the Mexican Ballad, (The Johns Hopkins
University Press on behalf of The South Central Modern Language Association, 2004), 130-131
67 Sierra Ramiro, Los Corridos Prohibidos, Los Tigees Del Norte, © 1989, by Fanovisa
28
within the Mexican cartel culture. 68 Mexican cartels use this ideology as a crucial
format of controlling Mexico. It can be said that is very similar to the tactics used by
Middle Eastern terrorists groups. Narco- propaganda is geared and usually used as
cyber-communication. Narco-propaganda is not a political ideology; however some
cartels such as La Familia Michoacana, the Gulf Cartel, the Beltrán Leyva Cartel, and
the Zetas have documented manuals and go as far as military training members.
Today, narco-propaganda has become “the main face of public opposition to the
government today.” 69
Mexican organized groups threaten the national government. However, they do
originate from the roots of the Mexican government and find their way to corrupt the
state. Unfortunately, the government is not the victim of these groups it’s the Mexican
people. These groups have dispersed themselves throughout all local towns of the
country, with authorities not doing anything to stop them. These authorities have sat
back and watched these organized groups participate in abusing human rights,
completed drug deals, extortion, kidnapping, robbery, and murder. Thus, as the powers
of these cartels grow, they gain more and more power to control and overpower the
state officials. In cities such as, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Michoacán, Chihuahua,
Durango, Sinaloa, and Guerrero, cartels act as the main political party. Some cartels
have so much power they are able to control the production and distribution illicit drugs
across the Mexican/US border, control the traffic of undocumented immigrants,
prostitutes, counterfeit DVDs and music CDs and other illegal “pirated” materials, and
68 Campell Howard, Narco-Propaganda in the Mexican “Drug War,” An Anthropological Perspective,
(Jourmal Citation Report, 2013)
69 Ibid.;
29
even Pemex gasoline, as well as extortion, carjacking, and kidnapping. Lastly, in
Coahuila, the Zetas run and operate large grocery stores made available to the public.70
In areas such as Cuidad Juarez, completely ran by cartels and “devastated” by
organized crime, the local newspaper publishes editorials to the head of cartels fighting
to control the city. Thus, as these cartels have gained such a political and economic
power, they are seen as the city’s political force, and with that the organized groups also
holding free range to broadcast their ideologies to recruit new members, it makes things
easier for them. Narco-propaganda has full consequences as it captivates “multiple
audiences that include rival cartels, opponents and allies within law enforcement, the
military and the government, potentially disloyal cartel members, the general public, and
even the U.S. government.” 71
A decade after the “war on drugs” was declared the consumption has even
grown into a bigger problem. Today it is even greater problem than when it originally
originated. The Mexican government has stated they made a federal attempt to arrest
some of the major cartel groups in the last few years. There were law enforcement
actions on more than 2,600 members of the major drug cartel since December of 2006.
Analysis showed that the major number of arrests came from the Gulf-Zeta cartel, with
44 percent of defendants coming from them.
70 Ibid,;
71 Ibid.;
30
72
The drug world is not only a man’s world, as women drug smugglers have
increased dramatically in the recent years, with such an increase in numbers their
relationships with men have changed, as well as their positions in society. Most of the
women’s’ involvement in drug smuggling were caused by both economic and cultural
factors. However, there are different levels of female drug smugglers, which usually
depend on the woman’s social position and her place within the drug organization she is
a part of. Women drug smugglers who hold high-levels usually are attracted to the
power of drug trafficking and sometimes are able to “achieve an independence from
male dominance.” Middle level women involved in drug trafficking usually have less
freedom from men; however, they can sometimes “manipulate” some gender
72 Burrnet and Penolza, Mexico Seems To Favor Sinaloa Cartel In Drug War, Mexico’s Drug Cartel
Territory, (NPR, 2010),
31
stereotypes to their own advantage in the drug smuggling world. Lastly, there are low
level mules; these mules usually perform the traditional roles of drug smugglers. 73
However, they receive less economic benefits as well as power; there are some
cases where there they do receive some forms of male independence. Nevertheless,
drug smuggling involving women causes female victimization, especially regarding low
and middle levels of classes of women, causing huge problems in cities in Cuidad
Juarez. Today woman play “key roles” in drug trafficking, women provide housing, they
are both buyers and sellers of houses, and have changed the “models of drug
trafficking.” Finally, these women have also been affected and victimized by these
crimes.74
In both the United States and Mexico the word “terrorists” have been used. Are
members of drug cartels terrorists? It is said that international trade in illicit drug does
indeed help to fuel terrorism. Terrorists groups have increasingly involved themselves
illegal drug trade and use drug revenues to expand their own activities. Thus, as drug
money increases, it allows these crime organized groups to be able to purchase
weapons, and equipment; it allows them to be able to recruit more members. It allows
terrorists groups, to “thrive” in politically disabled countries because of drug trade. 75
These “terrorist” cannot be fought with the corruption that ties corruption and
government however. According to a media outlet, some high officers, the Salinas
73 Campbell Howard, Female Drug Smugglers on the U-S.-Mexico Border: Gender, Crime, and
Empowerment Howard Campbell, Anthropological Quarterly, (The George Washington University Institute
for Ethnographic Research, 2008), 233-35
74 Ibid.;
75 Piazza James, The illicit drug trade, counternarcotics strategies and terrorism, Public Choice, (Springer,
2011) 296-97
32
administrations gave also been involved with drug traffickers, which it also included the
Salinas chief of staff Jose Cordoba, as well as his brother, Raul Salinas de Gotari.
Some American newspapers also suggested that some members of the Zedillo cabinet,
such secretary of defense, General Enrique Cervantes, as well as the private secretary
of the president, Liebano Saenz have been linked to drug traffickers as well. The
governors of the states of Sonora, and Moneros have also been linked to drug
trafficking in the past; as well presidential candidates have been involved with these
organized crime organizations. Nonetheless, no legal actions have been taken against
these men, it is said that “Mexican drug traffickers pose a hug threat to the Mexican’s
state’s ability to govern.” Although not all necessarily true, cartels do take power in a
majority of state regulated office, they govern the state.76
However, another pre-existing notion of the cartels influence on government
officials includes their ability to escape high security prisons. Before Joauqin “El Chapo”
Guzman had been captured in 2014, he had been previously captured in 2014. The
level of corruption that took place during his corruption was acknowledged by Mexico’s
Secretary of Public of Security Jorge Tello Peon. Drug money in political campaigns has
also been extremely popular. However, there is no clear evidence, which links these
two, there is no deny the influence political campaigns have had by them.77
The Mexican government claims they have been using human resources, as well
as economic resources to change this situation. They have been using the Federal
Judicial Police for years now, which have resulted in very disappointing results.
76 Chabat Jorge, Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, (Cross-National Drug Policy, 2002) 138-39
77 Ibid,; 139
33
Corruption has also been extremely tied with national police, as they have also been
called “inefficient.” Lastly, the Mexican federal armies are the only federal officials who
have been collaborating to stop this ongoing issue with drug traffickers. The Mexican
federal armies have been getting work done, which is exactly why they were sent in the
“eradication” of illicit drugs. They have collaborated in the arrest of many drug
traffickers, although many people have mixed feelings on the army, and what they have
done over the past few years, they could possibly be a representation of a “change” in
Mexico and their counter efforts on their war on drugs. 78
Although many believe that Mexico has not been putting enough to fight
this issue, including the United States, this is not case. The Mexican government has
actually been dedicating large amount of money to this cause. In 1991, they dedicated
the first large amount of sum, an estimated 100 million US dollars. By 1994, Mexico had
spent 500 million US dollars on this cause. However, by 1997, the Mexican peso had
been devaluated, and by 1997, it was said that the budget for their war on drugs was at
an estimated one million dollars. Nevertheless, by the end of 1998, the antidrug money
represented one-third of the total budget of Mexico and the budget of the attorney
general’s office. 79
However, despite all these effects from Mexico and some aide from the United
States the country is still suffering largely from both corruption and influences from drug
cartels. Many believe they are too weak to capture other powerful drug lords, and even
corrupt officers. Nevertheless, the inability to be able to stop many drug traffickers from
78 Ibid.; 139-140
79 Ibid; 141
34
escaping prison and also brining many through trial, only to declare them “innocent.”
These cases show how hard it really has been over the past few decades for Mexico to
not only improve, but as well as maintain their performance of law enforcements
institutions throughout Mexico. However, it is important to note, the Mexican’s
government on fighting drugs, as well as the corruption abilities these crime organized
members do have over everyone in the country, the fear in Mexico is great, and there is
no true support coming from anywhere, not the Mexican government, nor the US
government, nor the international government. 80
In reality, drugs do not actually represent a true threat in terms of
consumption in domestic use in Mexico. What truly affects the Mexican people is the
corruption and violence that are tires with the drug world. However, the real issue is
Mexico’s inability to protect their own citizen, as well as the United States aide in this
problem, as high consumer of Mexican drugs. In retrospective what really needs to
happen is a better collaboration between the two nations, in order to strengthen their
alliance, and rid of the problem once and for all. If this problem can be dealt with in the
correct way, drugs can may become a “health as well as a public security problem that
does not challenge Mexico’s governance.” 81
Mexico’s war on drugs has not been nor will it ever be Mexico’s war on drugs. It
must be noted from the beginning where it all began, the rise of American demand
coming in from the United States in the early 1920’s. This demand has never stopped
growing. It is easy to say the problem has only escalated with time. Each decade as
80 Ibid.; 145
81 Ibid.; 146
35
the demand from the United States grows, the corruption in Mexico grows, as well as
the overall violence grows, which directly affects Mexico and its people. The effects the
Mexican cartel has had on both Mexican and US relationships have been great,
tensions have risen, the two nations cannot seem to meet eye to key on topic and that
is because it is evident that both know this is an American problem as well. Although
the United States has aided finances to Mexico, that is the least they can do help them
combat the problem they have help to form. Mexico’s war on drugs is also the United
States war on drugs, and war will not end until the US stop waging Mexico, stops
demanding drugs, and both nations can come to terms and deal with this issue on both
sides of the border.
36
Bibliography
Bersin Alan, El Tercer País: Reinventing the U. S./Mexico Border
Stanford Law Review Vol. 48, No. 5 (May, 1996) , pp. 1413-1420
Published by: Stanford Law Review
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Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
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Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. in association with the American
Academy of Political and Social Science Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1049739
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and Empowerment Anthropological Quarterly
Vol. 81, No. 1 (Winter, 2008) , pp. 233-267
Published by: The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic
Research Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30052745
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Social Forces Vol. 89, No. 2 (December 2010) , pp. 491-513
37
Published by: Oxford University Press
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Kellner and Pipitone, Inside Mexico's Drug War
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Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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final senior thesis 2015

  • 1. 1 Effects of Mexican Drug Trafficking on Mexico & the US Relationships Romina Mollo Senior Thesis Professor Swedberg
  • 2. 2 The ongoing problems with Mexico and United States are caused by a number of issues, one particularly, the continuing corruption that has occurred because of the war on drugs, which has extended from border to border. 1 However, this has not been an issue that has recently come about; it is an issue that international organizations have debated for an extremely long time. In the beginning it seemed like a small problem, which has tremendously grown, as Mexico’s “marijuana, heroin, and methamphine has grown increased numbers in the north.” 2 Mexico claims that they as well as the United States have attempted to control the drug epidemic. Nevertheless, many claim that Mexico has completely failed at doing so, and so this has led them to now have strict laws imposed by the United States on Mexico. 3 On the other hand, although this ongoing drug issue originated in one geographical area, the effects it has had there and across the border are inevitable; drug trafficking, has led to fire arm trafficking, with an overall increase violence and consequences that have affected more than one nation, forcing inevitable tensions to rise. There is no denying the effects the Mexican drug war has had on both Mexico and nation and its neighboring border, the United States, which has led to a number of issues, both domestic, and internationally. Mexico’s war on drugs is not a recent concern, thus, it is a problem that has been of concern for quite some time now. However, in the mid-2000s the problem scaled out of control in many aspects.4 1 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002) , 134 2 Recio Gabriela, Journal of Latin American Studies, Drugs and Alcohol: US Prohibition and the Origins of the Drug Trade in Mexico, 1910-1930, (Cambridge University Press, Feb, 2002) 21-22 3 Toro Maria Celia, Journal of Latin American Studies, Mexico's 'War' on Drugs: Causes and Consequences, (Cambridge University Press, Feb, 2002), 715-16 4 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002) , 134
  • 3. 3 Nonetheless, it has not been until recently that the circulation around this problem has escalated than it has in the past. Mexico claims they have tried to control the matter; however, internationally the Mexican government is associated with the violence of the drug cartels. Since Mexican drug trafficking has grown over the decades, other issues have as well, which include: political disputes, fire arm trafficking, human trafficking, overall increase of violence around the country, more in some specific areas than others, and ultimately consequences that have affected their country and relationships with other countries.5 Much of the media attention focuses on the violence in Mexico when the real issue is “the weakness and pressure from the United the States.” 6 Mexico is the biggest supplier of drugs in the country; the United States has not done enough to help its neighbor. The United States does not give Mexico enough alternatives to fight or fix the problem, as a result the Mexican government has “no alternatives than to continue fighting the drugs with limited institutional and human resources” 7 However, the United States is to blame as well, as we are presenting an issue as well. He blames the problems with the two nations do not only go hand in hand with the drug problem but with the “behavior and perspective of US officials.” Research that United States officials have taken control in Mexico and it is the major cause between the “bitter” battles 5 Recio Gabriela, Journal of Latin American Studies, Drugs and Alcohol: US Prohibition and the Origins of the Drug Trade in Mexico, 1910-1930, (Cambridge University Press, Feb, 2002) 21-22 6 Ibid.; 23 7 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002) , 134
  • 4. 4 between the United States and Mexico, which is real reason for the presenting fights and issues over the past fifteen years.8 Although Mexico has tried to “gain” control over the spread of the cartels, these organizations continue to spread. However, the question rises. How do these illegal organizations actually organize? The Mexican government may have tried to combat the cartels; nevertheless, the cartels continue to operate effectively despite the government intervening. Many like the famous “La Familia Michoacana” use “a reward and punishment scheme,” which in the end prevents defection from its members and elicits cooperation from the community and government.9 Drug trafficking holds the biggest threat because of the corruption ties that lay within and what they produce. The Mexican government has tried to combat the issue, going by their constitution, as well as the pressure they have received from the United States. Therefore, all these factors puts the Mexican government into a “very complex” situation as they try to fight the drug problem; however, they have very limited institutional and human resources, thus, with this problem Mexico has really no way to change their tactics on their war on drugs. 10 Nevertheless, the issue of corruption within the state has undoubtedly aided on the drug epidemic, as the issue cannot really be fixed. 8 Toro Maria Cecilia, The Journal of American History, The Internationalization of Police: The DEA in Mexico, (Organization of American Historians, 1999), 623 9 Kostelnik and Skarbek, Public Choice, The Governance Institutions of A Drug Trafficking Organization,(Springler, July 2013), 95-103 10 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002), 134
  • 5. 5 Mexico’s drug problem has affected the country as whole, as illegal drugs have affected Mexico’s consumption and trafficking. It shocks many when they see or read this, but although Mexico’s consumption rate has definitely increased over the years, it still does not compare to those in industrialized countries. Thus, it leaves drug trafficking as the biggest concern in Mexico, as it leads to corruption. The traffic in Mexico has a very costly war which has erupted to contain these increased demands on the drug exchange, as well as the pressure put on by the United States. However, the costly war that has come about has become very hard and “endangers” the Mexican transition into democracy. 11 Mexico has been fighting illegal drugs since the 1920’s, starting when Mexico supported the Hauge International Opium Convention, in which the following years, the Mexican government then banned the trade of illicit drugs such as; opium, cocaine, and marijuana. Thus, during these first three decades of the twentieth century a new pattern began. Mexico became a leading producer of heroin and marijuana, as a major provider to the United States of these drugs. However, Mexico has been a producer of drugs since the 1930’s, therefore, it must be noted that this is not a new issue these countries are dealing with today. In the 1980’s, with the increase knowledge of drugs, the Mexican drug trafficking issue, became increasingly controversial, now considered a “social problem.” 12 However, one must take into consideration the development of illicit drug trade in the US began in the 1920’s with the prohibition of alcohol, a control and reduction which aided in overall violence, as well as corruption, connecting to modern 11 Ibid.; 135 12 Ibid.; 135-36
  • 6. 6 day society. 13 The ideology of prohibition was a decent concept, which in many regards was a “fantasy idea,” which no one wanted to abide by. It began with the notion that alcohol was causing social problems, which included unemployment, poverty, business failure, slums, insanity, crime, and violence. Thus, a pattern of drug use emerged, and as one drug is banned the use of stronger drugs increases. Nevertheless, people began to be involved in the business of drugs, especially drug smuggling, such as from Mexico. 14 In the 1970’s, the Mexican government did try to take a step towards the right direction; “Operation Condor” was implemented, which was done by the pressure that came from the Nixon administration. The operation was actually efficient in many regards. The United States used the Mexican government’s success on their behalf, citing it as example of what a country can “achieve” in respect to the drug problems occurring, and how they can fight it, as long as there is a “political will.” 15 The Nixon Administration launched Operation Intercept, which was a “massive action,” done in order to check vehicles and inspect them while crossing the US-Mexican border. This operation caused an economic disruption and damage on both sides of the border, which was then renamed, “Operation Condor,” how we all know to to be today. Thus, 13 Miron Jeffery, Violence and the U.S. Prohibitions of Drugs and Alcohol, American Law and Economics Review, (Oxford University Press, 1999) 76-88 14 Reinarman and Levine, From Prohibition to Regulation: Lessons from Alcohol Policy for Drug Policy, The Milbank Quarterly, (: Wiley on behalf of Milbank Memorial Fund, 1991), 465-467 15 Chabat Jorge, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, (Sage Publications, Inc, 2002), 134
  • 7. 7 this was the start on the US-Mexico’s “war on drugs,” which caused the problems we that arose. 16 However, everything changed in the 1980’s, when the antidrug effort worsened. Mexico once again became the biggest drug supplier to the United States of heroin and marijuana, as well as becoming a point of transit for cocaine to South America, and the friction between both nations once again rose, which has lasted until today. 17 In the 1980’s President Regan decided to assign both more financial and human resource support to Mexico. Nonetheless, the problem began to be so big; many saw the US’s response as being inadequate. Thus, since this time many also see the US as a main supplier and aide of “deaths.”18 During the twenty first century, the Mexican cartels expanded their control of drug supply chain throughout the regions, causing their supplies to “explode.” Since there are no historical or written accounts of their actual revenue of business, it is unknown exactly how much they produce and how much they make for their supplies, but it is clear an enormous amount of money is made. In 2002, US Attorney General John Ashcroft, reported that Americans had spent 62.9 billion dollars on drugs in the year 2000, 36.1 billion was spent on cocaine alone; 90 percent of transits went through and came from Mexico. Later in 2009, the US Drug Intelligence Center estimated that the 16 Zedillo and Wheeler, Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism, A Yale Center for the Study of Globalization eBook , (Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2012), 36 17 Ibid.; 135-36 18 Bagley Mitchell, The New Hundred Years War? US National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin America, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, (Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami, 1998), 173-75
  • 8. 8 Mexican and Colombian drug traffickers had generated between an estimated 17 billion to 38 billion dollars annually on sales to the United States.19 However, another issue Mexico has seen is the geographical dispersion of violence that has happened throughout the country. There has been an increase of shooting, and overall harassment by crime organizations. The number of municipalities with more of 12 organized-crime related deaths increased in 2007. Thus, in that same year, a total number of 53 municipalities had 12 or more organized crime-related deaths. Nevertheless, the number continued to increase, with the number reaching 200 in 2010. 20 The issues lie within the Mexican border, where along the streets the problem is visible. In the last four years, nearly 35,000 people have been killed due to drug related violence, mostly alongside the US border. 21 The Mexican cartels are also not backing down and not weakening. In 2010; nearly 15,273 people were killed, known as the “bloodiest year,” as many are seeking for a change in the country. Washington DC firmly had supported former Mexican President Felipe Caledon’s policies, which captured some high profiled drug barons.22 Fast forwarding from the early 2000’s to the mid 2000’s Mexico experienced a change in presidency, which changed many things for the country. In 2006, Felipe Calderon was inaugurated as president of the nation, and nearly a week after his 19 Kellner and Piptone, Inside Mexico's Drug War, World Policy Journal, (The MIT Press, 2010), 30 20 Zedillo and Wheeler, Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism, A Yale Center for the Study of Globalization eBook, (Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2012), 36 21 Miglierini Julian, Mexico: Cracking Down, The World Today, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011) ,26-28 22 Ibid.; 26
  • 9. 9 inauguration as president in December of that year, he sent 7,000 troops as well as police to the state of Michoacán, in order to destroy marijuana plantations and set out a search for drug traffickers. This became known as the “first deployment” on the “war on drugs,” which increased radically within two weeks, a total 30,000 personnel had been deployed to 32 states, and four years later it became a complete “murderous catastrophe.” A total of 40,000 people died, over 6,000 of them in the first half of 2011, which was equivalent to a casualty rate of more than 30 a day. However, the flow of drugs and weapons continued to increase, and the killings, kidnappings and extortion had spread even further. 23 24 Corruption accompanied Caledron’s entire presidency, including his race to the National Palace, in which he won with the help of a large-scale fraud. 25 Many of 23 Hernandez Isabel, Silver and Lead, Los señores del narco (Grijalbo: Mexico, 2010), 558 24 Zedillo and Wheeler, Rethinking the “War on Drugs” Through the US-Mexico Prism, A Yale Center for the Study of Globalization eBook , (Yale Center for the Study of Globalization, 2012), 37
  • 10. 10 Caledon’s ballots were counted twice, while the ballots of his opponent were thrown away, until the Federal Electoral Institute produced the “right result.” Caledron won the election by 0.58 per cent, thus, resulting in street protests from the supporters from his now former opponent Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who to this day continues to call himself the ‘legitimate president’. From the beginning Caledron lacked many attributions including legitimacy. Instead of trying to turn the corner from the rumors that dispelled about him which his opposers had begun dispersing among the people, he deployed thousands of troops on his “war on drugs.” 26 Corruption seems to be a common link between all sources, as political corruption rules Mexico and its people, which inevitably has led to the massive problems found in the country, which has “altered the equation.” Thus, over the last two decades, the patterns of corruption have led to political breakthroughs on efforts to deal with the problem of corruption, has strengthen the rule of law and reigning in corruption.” 27 Unfortunately his crusade did little to undo the damage of the drug traffickers, as he continued to make himself look bad, and continued to increase violence throughout the country. By February 2010, 53,174 people had been arrested; however, only 941 involved actual members, as violence grew, bodies were left on display through the streets.28 Calerdon was in office for six bloody years, in his so called “war on drugs.” According to the Mexican Constitution, presidents are limited to one six year term, therefore, the question rises, why not only create such disastrous policies, as well as continue them, when he cannot be reelected? Could Caledron be tainted with cartel 25 Ibid,; 558 26 Ibid.; 558 27 Morris Stephen, The New Politics of Corruption, Corruption and the Mexican Political System: Continuity and Change, (Taylor and Francis Ltd, 1999), 623 28 Hernandez Isabel, Silver and Lead, Los señores del narco (Grijalbo: Mexico, 2010), 558
  • 11. 11 corruption? The question rises if Caledron had chosen a side between the cartels, and had an alliance with the infamous Capo’s Sinaloa cartel: “Described as his de facto backing for the Sinaloa cartel may be the product of a convergence between corruption and mistaken strategy…Government statements speak of a policy of ‘disarticulating’ the cartels, fragmenting ...” 29 Could he have based his thoughts on those of the PRI, which were that when there was one cartel, which was manageable and the violence could still be controlled. 30 The American government completely supported Caledron’s strategies. Nonetheless, they do note the lack of results that never came about during his six years in office, calling the drug cartels, “an insurgency,” stating that cartels were taking over the nation. They described the Mexican army as “slow and risk averse” and all federal agencies, including the nation’s Army, Navy, and Federal Police were all corrupt, causing an ultimate failure. Thus, this was a huge threat and concern for American foreign policy if something was not done to stop the epidemic and the nation’s border continued to be at risk. 31 Washington claims that Mexico had exceeded Colombia’s demand and the power of their drug lords, and now being the main “principal drug market.” However, the United States was and still continues to remains an openhanded source of weapons towards the Mexican drug war. It is reported that an average of 70 percent of weapons that are seized in Mexico in the last two years can be traced directly back to the United States. Nevertheless, shockingly most of these weapons have actually been purchased 29 Ibid.; 558 30 Ibid.; 558 31 Miglierini Julian, Mexico: Cracking Down, The World Today, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011) ,27
  • 12. 12 legally in the states north of the Mexican border. However, there is still a denial that the drug problem is Mexico’s issue alone, and must be handled by the Mexican government entirely alone. 32 Under both the Bush and Obama administrations a joint operation was held, beginning in 2007, through the Merida Initiative. Mexico received millions of dollars from the United States for equipment, training, and joint special operations. However, the financial aid was not delivered at the rate in which many Mexican hoped it would be delivered; although, because of the aide of the United States, drug lord Arturo Beltran Leyva was captured in December of 2009.33 Many call the help received from the US as “modest,” as the 1.4 billion dollars that were given under the Merida Initiative which covered three years of help was not clearly enough for all the needs that had to be covered. The US was involved itself help its Southern neighbor because they could not afford to have a “narco-state as a neighbor,” according to former drug czar McCaffrey. The US became involved under the Bush administration and implemented Merida Initiative, as Washington felt the Mexican government had not done enough on their part to “confront the dangerous of narco-terrorism.” 34 However, United States’ involvement is a main key, as the issues go back decades. The Mexican drug issues, as well as the Mexican and American problems with one another began in the 1980’s. It is a problem of both nations, one’s lack of controlling what is occurring in their nation as well as what is leaving, and the other’s lack of investigating what is entering its borders. The United States believes that 32 Hernandez Isabel, Silver and Lead, Los señores del narco (Grijalbo: Mexico, 2010), 338 33 Miglierini Julian, Mexico: Cracking Down, The World Today, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011) ,27 34 Kellner and Piptone, Inside Mexico's Drug War, World Policy Journal, (The MIT Press, 2010), 37
  • 13. 13 Mexico has lacked the ability to control the problem over the decades, which has ultimately led to the “friction” between the two countries. Each nation’s interaction with drugs, has led to the fire that fuels this matter, especially Mexico’s security doctrine, which came about in the late 1980’s. 35 These problems can also be tied to the conflicts with the United States and the Mexican Revolution 91910-1920), in which the “potential governmental income” which shows that it came directly from the trafficking of drugs, thus, they are still to be resolved. 36 In 2007, violence in Mexico was reaching an ultimate high throughout the entire country. The press named the killings that occurred in Aguascalientes, "Black Thursday,” the first shootings of police officials, which until then had been a quiet area compared to the rest of Mexico. After the fire attack occurred a search for the culprits ensued. States Attorney Xavier Gonzalez Fisher attempted to calm the waters, and reassured the public and media that the incident was an “isolated accident.” However, the incident marked even bloodier period of violence, and increase of drugs, crime, and corruption grew excessively along the Mexico-US border, even in regions that had not been affected.37 It seems like the tensions between the United States and Mexico could not be tamed, as the violence caused by the war on drugs continued to spread. In February of 2010, two US Immigration and Costumes Enforcement agents were shot in Mexico City by two unknown assassins, one was fatally shot, while the other was injured. Both 35 Reuter and Ronfeldt, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Quest for Integrity: The Mexican-US Drug Issue in the 1980s, (Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami, 1992) 89-90 36 Sandos James, The Americas, Northern Separatism during the Mexican Revolution: An Inquiry into the Role of Drug Trafficking, 1910-1920, (Academy of American Franciscan, 1984), 191-93 37 Ibid.; 29
  • 14. 14 Mexico and the United States agreed to work together and find those guilty of the crime. Nevertheless, this was a different circumstance than in 1985, when a US Drug Enforcement Official was killed and Mexico was accused by the United States of protecting the killers, a situation, that caused extreme tensions between the two nations, and the two countries. As a result, “bilateral relationship reached a historic low.” 38 In order to combat this issue, the problem must be shared by the two nations in order to figure out a solution. Thus, under the Obama Administration Mexico an “important discursive milestone” was achieved. In recent years some US officials have begun to admit that it is a “shared responsibility” to control the drug trafficking. The US is the world’s biggest consumer of illegal drugs, and the American demand on narcotics 38 Miglierini Julian, Mexico: Cracking Down, The World Today, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2011) ,28
  • 15. 15 is an important and big part of the problem, not only Mexico producing the drugs, as well as the United States aiding in aiding with firearm, which increases the overall violence across the border, since 2006, more than 100,000 have been confiscated from the cartels, which can be linked to the US. 39 Thus, the US also provides military weapons that are used by the cartels. Mexico once an authoritarian ruled nation, “peacefully” returned to its democracy after seventy years of a dictatorship rule. However, Mexico became a one-party state, led the Institutional Revolutionary Party also known as the PRI. The establishment of the PRI gave little way for “control for a few parties,” still leaving Mexico in many ways as an authoritarian ruled nation. Thus, this left much conflict in the nation, leaving things in the air and a window open for a rise of violence and revolts, and new threats to emerge. 40 Nevertheless, it is important to understand who exactly is fighting who, as well as the cartels, and which older cartels have power, but there are new cartels rising today. There are two major dominant Mexican cartels, whom have increased violence and coercion to “unimaginable” levels. The Sinola cartel, also known as the “The Federation” is country’s largest cartel, it is based on the amounts of drugs they move and sell. The Sinaloa replaced all others cartel originated in Sinola, Mexico, the region was once known for the poppy fields and opium gum produced by thousands of Mexican campesinos, which are Mexican field workers. The Sinola Cartels operate from Sinola all the way throughout Mexico’s Pacific Coast, as well as the US border, 39 Ibid.; 40 Ibid.;
  • 16. 16 including Tijuana, Cuidad Juarez, and Nuevo Laredo in the east. Each region has its own sector of the cartel; each with their own chief, controlling each territory, but at the top of the hierarchy once sat El Chapo Guzman, once worth one billion dollars, regarded as the most “powerful drug trafficker in the world,” until he was captured in 2014.41 The second cartel is Gulf Cartel, which was founded in the 1970’s, along the northeastern border state of Tamaulipas, located alongside the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf Cartel grew drastically during the early 1990’s and expanded their territories, thus, as they grew, conflict with El Chapo and Sinola grew as well, as The Gulf Cartel became known for their “blood image.” Los Zetas, which originally was a small group of deserters from the Mexican Special Forces hired in 2000 by the Gulf’s former chief Guilen to serve as their body guards. However, Los Zetas were not content with their roles as bodyguards, and when Guilen was captured in 2003, Los Zetas began their own cartel, beginning to build power by drug trade, kidnapping, extortion, and killings. It is not known who actually runs The Gulf Cartel anymore, but it is known that Los Zetas play a crucial role. Today, much of the violence in Mexico is attributed to the war between these powerful cartels, as well as the participation of other smaller organizations. In 2003, a war exploded in Nuevo Laredo, concerning who would have control of the city. The violence it produced is still prevalent today, with gun downs between the cartels occurring and no truce happening along the US-Mexican border. 42 41 Kellner and Piptone, Inside Mexico's Drug War, World Policy Journal, (The MIT Press, 2010),32 42 Ibid.;
  • 17. 17 Today Mexico is run by “criminal-capital insurgency,” a country ran by drug gangs who run the government, as violence has taken over, as well as an increase in kidnapping has completely taken over the country. Nevertheless, what were once regional problems has now turned into a nationwide epidemic. Although most drug cartels do battle for drug routes into the United States, seeking the American demand, drug smugglings happens throughout the country, as mountain, rural people are used to do the job, known as “bronco,” meaning wild, and they became heroes. They leave their rural homes and move into wealthy neighborhoods, where they can fire guns in the air at fancy parties. Everyone wants to be a part of these gang groups and much more is at “stake.” 43 Thus, as kidnapping seemed to become popular in the country, it spread across the entire nation, as these gangs began to target the children of noticeable businessmen. Los Zetas preferred this move more than any other gangs, as they actually “perfected” the style of kidnapping, connecting it more to the style of drug trafficking. For example, in May 2008, Nicholas Martinez Reyes, who was the son of a wine distributor in Mexico, was kidnapped. He was at a seafood restaurant in downtown in Aguascalientes, on a busy day, dinning with friends, when the incident occurred. Reyes was held captive for 35 days, he was tortured, and his kidnappers cut one of his fingers off, before his father finally agreed to pay his ransom. 44 In 2008, the biggest spike came when drug-related crimes jumped from 2,826 to 6,837 killings, a 142% increase with respect to the previous year. In 2009, the numbers 43 Ibid.; 44 Kellner and Piptone, Inside Mexico's Drug War, World Policy Journal, (The MIT Press, 2010),33-34
  • 18. 18 increased by more than 40%, reaching 9,614 victims and the following year records when 15,273 were killed. Lastly, drug-related organized crime was responsible for 47% of all intended homicides happening throughout Mexico. Homicides generally do occur mainly alongside the border and US-Mexico crossing points the most profitable part of drug trafficking business chain. 45 Since violence has taken over most of Mexico, groups of Mexicans have tried to stand up to the violence through “peaceful tactics.” In 2009, a 17 year old Mormon, Erik La Baron was kidnapped by a group of armed kidnappers, in Galena in the state of Chihuahua. The kidnappers demanded a one million dollar kidnap ransom. At the time it was actually the eleventh Mormon kidnapping in eight months. The community had only about 1,000 members, was well off, and therefore turned into a target.46 45 Matthew Hall, Emily Greenman and George Farkas Legal Status and Wage Disparities for Mexican Immigrants, Social Forces, (Oxford University Press, 2010), 5 46 Ibid.;
  • 19. 19 Violence has spread inevitably throughout the country because violence is an “inherent feature of the trade an illicit drugs.” However, the violence associated with Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations (DTO) s become increasingly ruthless. The violent tactics include, mass killings, torture such as the dismemberment of body parts, as well as the extreme use of car bombs. Analysts show that since 2006, 60,000 homicides can be linked to organized crime, which in 2012 had reached an ultimate plateau by the end of the presidency of Caledron (2006-2012). During those six years, DTOs formed new criminal law organizations. Many DTOs and criminal gangs operating in Mexico have “diversified” into other illegal activities such as extortion, kidnapping, and oil theft and now pose a multi-faceted organized criminal challenge to governance in Mexico.47 Mexico’s brutal violent drug trafficking-related violence has included more than1,300 beheadings, public hanging of corpses, killing of innocent bystanders, car bombs, torture, and assassination of numerous journalists and government officials. In March 2012, head of the U.S. Northern Command, General Charles Jacoby, testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that Mexico had at that time succeeded in capturing or killing 22 out of 37 of the Mexican government’s most wanted drug traffickers48. Jacoby noted their removal had not had “any appreciable positive effect” in reducing the violence, which continued to climb in 2011. At the end of President Caldeon’s term in late 2012, several observers maintained that between 47,000 to 47 Beittel June, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, (Congressional Research Service, 2013), 3 48 Ibid.; 3
  • 20. 20 65,000 organized crime-related killings had occurred during his tenure depending on the source cited, roughly 10,000 such murders a year.49 Studies have been conducted in the United States, as some Americans try to get to the bottom of some issues in Mexico. Studies conducted at the Trans Border Institute (TBI) at the University of San Diego have also began to report total intentional homicides. These studies were drawn from Mexican government agencies, and concluded that between 120,000 to 125,000 people were killed, all killed in a homicides during Caledron’s presidency. However, at the end the end of President Calderón’s term in late 2012, several observers maintained that between 47,000 to 65,000 organized crime-related killings had occurred during his tenure roughly 10,000 murders happened a year, and throughout Caledron’s presidency, between 120,000 to 125,000 people were killed, al homicides. 50 Homicides that are related to drug-trafficking operations in Mexico have increased by exploring the devices through which this type of violence tends to increase. Thus, studies have shown that drug-related violence can be understood as the result of both, “homicides caused by traffickers whom are battling to take control of a competitive market” as well as “casualties and arrests generated by law enforcement operations against traffickers.” Nevertheless, violence interactions have caused Mexico to be locked into a “self-reinforcing violent equilibrium.” 51 The wave of drug-related violence, which hit Mexico from December 2006 to June 2010, which caused 41,648 killings have been officially linked to drug trafficking 49 Ibid.; 2 50 Ibid.; 2-3 51 Ibid;, 5
  • 21. 21 organizations. It was ultimately a dramatic increase from all previous years, from 2001– 2006 when only 8,901 killings were linked to organized crime. In 2010, drug-related homicides reached high numbers when it hit the figures of 15,273 victims, making organized crime officially responsible for 45 % of all intended homicides in the country. Thus, this resulted in Mexican cities, such as Ciudad Juárez, which is a trans-shipment point for the introduction of cocaine into the US, to increase homicide rates from 216 victims per 100,000 inhabitants in 2010. Studies show that these rates can be compared to death tolls of those in war zones. 52 The drug-related violence in Mexico grew rapidly compared to other countries due to “a self-reinforcing violent equilibrium caused by competition and enforcement.” 53 There are two variables that have helped aide this problem: an emergence of battle over region, what gangs refer to as “competition,” as well as law enforcement when the illegal drug industry changed from being “oligopolistic,” such as when a drug organization goes from controlling only a single region to becoming competitive. Thus, drug organizations refer to the term “competition” as two or more drug organizations distributing and being present in one single region. Drug trafficking groups do not like sharing regions, as it does have an effect, which includes, corruption, reduces the share of the local market that it can supply throughout, and makes production inputs uncommon. Competition also reduces the ability of the original criminal organization to sell protection and rights within the region. Nonetheless, violence increases when a 52 Ibid., 3-4 53 Ibid;, 10
  • 22. 22 new organization tries to overcome the region of another, or when an organization divides into two which causes internal confrontation.54 Nonetheless, with almost 41,648 drug-related homicides in the country in 4 and 1/2 years Mexico has become even more dangerous than it once was. Cities located close to the United States border have experienced an increase in violence that transformed them into war zones not only Cuidad Juarez, but in Michoacán, Guanajuato, and Guerrero as well. Since the country is indeed a huge supplier of drugs to the United States had once filled a “non-violent role” now are all drug-related crimes. Thus, drug related crimes resulted when illegal markets became more “competitive,” resulting in a change in Mexico’s drug-trafficking industry, which lacked a central enforcement agency to deal with these changes, which led to violence “erupted.”55 Nonetheless, extortion has also taken over along with homicide. In the beginning extortion was once used by criminals to target to form illegal businesses, such as prostitution rings and casinos, industries. However, soon the extortion of business then extended into the legal world. Some businessmen north of Mexico are part of the association called “The Zeta Killers,” which refer the gang group the Zetas. The Zetas Killers have assassinated hundreds of Zetas members. Zeta’s members’ body parts have been found and have been regularly appeared around Mexico, such as Boca del Rio, Benito Juarez, and Celaya. There are signs and messages along the streets that 54 Ibid.; 144 55 Ibid.; 153
  • 23. 23 read: “We are the new group of The Zeta Killers and we are against kidnapping and extortion, and we will fight against them in all the states for a cleaner Mexico.” 56 During Caledon ‘s six years of presidency, all the brutal crimes carried out by not only the drug gangs but by the DTOs also included attacks on drug rehabilitation centers, they attacked parties of young people, firebombed a casino in Monterrey, killed 52 patrons and employees, and began targeting Mexican journalists and media workers. After the Caledron administration, the government had dramatic successes in capturing and arresting drug leaders. Thus, with 37 most wanted cartel leaders that Mexico’s government identified in 2009, 25 were either captured or killed during the course of President Calderon’s term in office. Nonetheless, there was an increasingly close collaboration between Mexico and the United States 2007 and 2012 Mexico. Mexico later which then later extradited the issue to their neighbor the United States a reported 587 suspects wanted on charges in the United States, most of them for drug trafficking and related crimes. 57 The Mexican drug trafficking has had other effects, which has affected the US Mexican relationships. In the recent years, research has shown that Mexican cities have been “depopulating.” Most of the migration has been coming prominently from the US- Mexican border, since acquiring residency is easier. Usually border cities tend to lose an average of 35,255 inhabitants, while non-border counties tended to gain an average of 1,297.86 inhabitants. In the last few years an estimated 8,103.63 people left 56 Ibid.; 6 57 Beittel June, Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence, Analyst in Latin American Affairs, (Congressional Research Service, 2013), 16
  • 24. 24 unexpectedly out of Mexico and moved into the United States due to what was happening in Mexico.58 Migration, once see as seen as something positive wave during the industrial revolution began to change with the increase Mexican immigration into the United States, which has resulted in problems between the two countries. The issues that lay between these parties include immigration, narcotics, and smuggling and NAFTA/Tratado de Libre Comercio related trade issues explain the contemporary political and media focus on the border; the problems between the two countries “dominate” and stand on both sides. 59 Since most migration has come from border cities, such as Juarez, which lost 150.36 thousand inhabitants–about 11% of its population, other neighboring cities, with considerably high violence levels like cities, such as Tijuana, Reynosa, and Matamoros have lost between 6%, 9% and 4% of their population during the same period. Other cities, such as Praxedis de Guerrero, Mier and Guadalupe have faced expected unexpected outflows of more than 25% of their whole population. However, it is not exactly known where all these people have migrated and relocated. Middle and upper class Mexicans, whom live on the border is quite strong and rooted in historically important but informal agreements. Thus, many bordering cities have divided themselves and facilitated transportation between border-city inhabitants. Thus, there were bordering cities have given “day border passes,” which is a form of a one-day visa 58 Ibid;. 59 Bersin Alan, Stanford Law Review, El Tercer País: Reinventing the U. S./Mexico Border, (Standford Law Review, 1996), 1413
  • 25. 25 to Mexican border inhabitants that allow them to cross into the US without a formal visa or passport. 60 The United States has not been the only place where Mexicans have relocated; they have also gone to other cities within the country, such as Acapulco, Chimalhuacan and Tlajomulco. Tlajomulco grew about 30% more than population predictions had accounted for, Juarez and Bahia de Banderas also grew in more than 18%. Results show Mexico’s migration flows are being driven by security concerns rather those than by traditional economic variables. 61 The research project that was conducted to analysis that effects of drug- trafficking especially on migration was called CONAPO, which by Mexico’s National Population Council. CONAPO conducts research every year, they predicted county- level population figures considering demographic changes and expected immigration outflows. CONAPO has also shown how important migration outflows to the US are as predictors of population figures. Nonetheless, they use a very “sophisticated” method in order to predict the total number of Mexicans that will change their residency to the U.S. Thus, these predictions also take into account the economic conditions of both the United States and Mexico; they look into surveys, polls, previous census figures, and panel studies.62 However, looking at traditional economic explanations of migration flows, in which the expected signs and are significant in all outflows specifications. It also showed there was an increase of one point in employment rates or in the number of 60 Ibid.; 8 61 Ibid.; 9 62 Ibid.; 9
  • 26. 26 college degrees per 100,000 inhabitants reduces migration outflows in 0.01 and 0.11 per 100,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, neither employment nor education is significantly correlated with migration inflows. Usually when deciding where to relocate Mexicans do not go to cities with higher levels of education or lower unemployment. Finally, CONAPO had at times faced some problems when measuring population flows in some places more than others. 63 Some call the cause of migration as a “phenomenon,” as violence does indeed create unexpected migration flows and refugees. In Mexico it was more of political or social concerns that drove most migration decisions, rather than economic reasons. Since there has been an increase on drug-related violence within Mexico, it has changed the migration dynamics in the country. The average number of Mexican migration that has occurred because of the drug violence is an estimated 230,000, who have moved out of the violent cities, 115,000 of them to relocate at the US. However, many do claim that the number may be underestimated as it does not account for Mexicans who leave on a temporary basis, checking in at US hotels for short periods of time, “to rest from the constant violence.” 64 The most shocking case would have to be the case of drug-violence migration that has come about out of Juarez, Chihuahua, and its US-city counterpart, El Paso, Texas. This migration epidemic has had impacts on the Mexican outflow, as they have felt with such strength in El Paso that some have even claimed that “a sort of ’Little 63 Ibid.; 9-10 64 Ibid.; 15-6
  • 27. 27 Juarez, comparing Miami to “Little Havana.” Thus, all this migration has significantly changed housing, schooling, business associations, and many other public entities. 65 Contraband has influenced Mexican culture as result as well, including gender discrimination, as well “corridos,” which are Mexican ballads that record events and subjects, including state-controlled records. These ballads have turned into narcocorridos, a new sub-genre. These ballads do at times maintain“shady” and violent relationships with the narcoculture and journalists. However, A “corrido actually does offers a counter of “official history.” Many believe there has been a loss of journalistic integrity, which has then led to a corrido being a representation of “pura vida,” meaning pure life. 66 The group sang about gunfights with police officials- corruption, retribution, and violence, and machismo. The group is seen as a modern story-teller of what is happened and is happening. Many do believe that indeed corridos are a link between the Mexican people, their culture, history, and what is occurring in their soil. In a video that explain what a corrido is, a dark screen is shown, where the voices of two anonymous men is heard, they state: “I like corridos because they are the real deeds of our people.” “Yes I like them too because they are the pure truth.” 67 Mexico also faces another issue known as, “Narco-propaganda,” which also began to take major effect during President’s Caledron’s bloody six years. Narco- propaganda is known as “a distinctive form of communication and discourse,” used 65 Ibid; 16 66 Ramírez-Pimienta Juan Carlos and Villalobos Jose Pablo, Memory and Nation in Contemporary Mexico, "Corridos" and "la Pura Verdad": Myths and Realities of the Mexican Ballad, (The Johns Hopkins University Press on behalf of The South Central Modern Language Association, 2004), 130-131 67 Sierra Ramiro, Los Corridos Prohibidos, Los Tigees Del Norte, © 1989, by Fanovisa
  • 28. 28 within the Mexican cartel culture. 68 Mexican cartels use this ideology as a crucial format of controlling Mexico. It can be said that is very similar to the tactics used by Middle Eastern terrorists groups. Narco- propaganda is geared and usually used as cyber-communication. Narco-propaganda is not a political ideology; however some cartels such as La Familia Michoacana, the Gulf Cartel, the Beltrán Leyva Cartel, and the Zetas have documented manuals and go as far as military training members. Today, narco-propaganda has become “the main face of public opposition to the government today.” 69 Mexican organized groups threaten the national government. However, they do originate from the roots of the Mexican government and find their way to corrupt the state. Unfortunately, the government is not the victim of these groups it’s the Mexican people. These groups have dispersed themselves throughout all local towns of the country, with authorities not doing anything to stop them. These authorities have sat back and watched these organized groups participate in abusing human rights, completed drug deals, extortion, kidnapping, robbery, and murder. Thus, as the powers of these cartels grow, they gain more and more power to control and overpower the state officials. In cities such as, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Michoacán, Chihuahua, Durango, Sinaloa, and Guerrero, cartels act as the main political party. Some cartels have so much power they are able to control the production and distribution illicit drugs across the Mexican/US border, control the traffic of undocumented immigrants, prostitutes, counterfeit DVDs and music CDs and other illegal “pirated” materials, and 68 Campell Howard, Narco-Propaganda in the Mexican “Drug War,” An Anthropological Perspective, (Jourmal Citation Report, 2013) 69 Ibid.;
  • 29. 29 even Pemex gasoline, as well as extortion, carjacking, and kidnapping. Lastly, in Coahuila, the Zetas run and operate large grocery stores made available to the public.70 In areas such as Cuidad Juarez, completely ran by cartels and “devastated” by organized crime, the local newspaper publishes editorials to the head of cartels fighting to control the city. Thus, as these cartels have gained such a political and economic power, they are seen as the city’s political force, and with that the organized groups also holding free range to broadcast their ideologies to recruit new members, it makes things easier for them. Narco-propaganda has full consequences as it captivates “multiple audiences that include rival cartels, opponents and allies within law enforcement, the military and the government, potentially disloyal cartel members, the general public, and even the U.S. government.” 71 A decade after the “war on drugs” was declared the consumption has even grown into a bigger problem. Today it is even greater problem than when it originally originated. The Mexican government has stated they made a federal attempt to arrest some of the major cartel groups in the last few years. There were law enforcement actions on more than 2,600 members of the major drug cartel since December of 2006. Analysis showed that the major number of arrests came from the Gulf-Zeta cartel, with 44 percent of defendants coming from them. 70 Ibid,; 71 Ibid.;
  • 30. 30 72 The drug world is not only a man’s world, as women drug smugglers have increased dramatically in the recent years, with such an increase in numbers their relationships with men have changed, as well as their positions in society. Most of the women’s’ involvement in drug smuggling were caused by both economic and cultural factors. However, there are different levels of female drug smugglers, which usually depend on the woman’s social position and her place within the drug organization she is a part of. Women drug smugglers who hold high-levels usually are attracted to the power of drug trafficking and sometimes are able to “achieve an independence from male dominance.” Middle level women involved in drug trafficking usually have less freedom from men; however, they can sometimes “manipulate” some gender 72 Burrnet and Penolza, Mexico Seems To Favor Sinaloa Cartel In Drug War, Mexico’s Drug Cartel Territory, (NPR, 2010),
  • 31. 31 stereotypes to their own advantage in the drug smuggling world. Lastly, there are low level mules; these mules usually perform the traditional roles of drug smugglers. 73 However, they receive less economic benefits as well as power; there are some cases where there they do receive some forms of male independence. Nevertheless, drug smuggling involving women causes female victimization, especially regarding low and middle levels of classes of women, causing huge problems in cities in Cuidad Juarez. Today woman play “key roles” in drug trafficking, women provide housing, they are both buyers and sellers of houses, and have changed the “models of drug trafficking.” Finally, these women have also been affected and victimized by these crimes.74 In both the United States and Mexico the word “terrorists” have been used. Are members of drug cartels terrorists? It is said that international trade in illicit drug does indeed help to fuel terrorism. Terrorists groups have increasingly involved themselves illegal drug trade and use drug revenues to expand their own activities. Thus, as drug money increases, it allows these crime organized groups to be able to purchase weapons, and equipment; it allows them to be able to recruit more members. It allows terrorists groups, to “thrive” in politically disabled countries because of drug trade. 75 These “terrorist” cannot be fought with the corruption that ties corruption and government however. According to a media outlet, some high officers, the Salinas 73 Campbell Howard, Female Drug Smugglers on the U-S.-Mexico Border: Gender, Crime, and Empowerment Howard Campbell, Anthropological Quarterly, (The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research, 2008), 233-35 74 Ibid.; 75 Piazza James, The illicit drug trade, counternarcotics strategies and terrorism, Public Choice, (Springer, 2011) 296-97
  • 32. 32 administrations gave also been involved with drug traffickers, which it also included the Salinas chief of staff Jose Cordoba, as well as his brother, Raul Salinas de Gotari. Some American newspapers also suggested that some members of the Zedillo cabinet, such secretary of defense, General Enrique Cervantes, as well as the private secretary of the president, Liebano Saenz have been linked to drug traffickers as well. The governors of the states of Sonora, and Moneros have also been linked to drug trafficking in the past; as well presidential candidates have been involved with these organized crime organizations. Nonetheless, no legal actions have been taken against these men, it is said that “Mexican drug traffickers pose a hug threat to the Mexican’s state’s ability to govern.” Although not all necessarily true, cartels do take power in a majority of state regulated office, they govern the state.76 However, another pre-existing notion of the cartels influence on government officials includes their ability to escape high security prisons. Before Joauqin “El Chapo” Guzman had been captured in 2014, he had been previously captured in 2014. The level of corruption that took place during his corruption was acknowledged by Mexico’s Secretary of Public of Security Jorge Tello Peon. Drug money in political campaigns has also been extremely popular. However, there is no clear evidence, which links these two, there is no deny the influence political campaigns have had by them.77 The Mexican government claims they have been using human resources, as well as economic resources to change this situation. They have been using the Federal Judicial Police for years now, which have resulted in very disappointing results. 76 Chabat Jorge, Mexico's War on Drugs: No Margin for Maneuver, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (Cross-National Drug Policy, 2002) 138-39 77 Ibid,; 139
  • 33. 33 Corruption has also been extremely tied with national police, as they have also been called “inefficient.” Lastly, the Mexican federal armies are the only federal officials who have been collaborating to stop this ongoing issue with drug traffickers. The Mexican federal armies have been getting work done, which is exactly why they were sent in the “eradication” of illicit drugs. They have collaborated in the arrest of many drug traffickers, although many people have mixed feelings on the army, and what they have done over the past few years, they could possibly be a representation of a “change” in Mexico and their counter efforts on their war on drugs. 78 Although many believe that Mexico has not been putting enough to fight this issue, including the United States, this is not case. The Mexican government has actually been dedicating large amount of money to this cause. In 1991, they dedicated the first large amount of sum, an estimated 100 million US dollars. By 1994, Mexico had spent 500 million US dollars on this cause. However, by 1997, the Mexican peso had been devaluated, and by 1997, it was said that the budget for their war on drugs was at an estimated one million dollars. Nevertheless, by the end of 1998, the antidrug money represented one-third of the total budget of Mexico and the budget of the attorney general’s office. 79 However, despite all these effects from Mexico and some aide from the United States the country is still suffering largely from both corruption and influences from drug cartels. Many believe they are too weak to capture other powerful drug lords, and even corrupt officers. Nevertheless, the inability to be able to stop many drug traffickers from 78 Ibid.; 139-140 79 Ibid; 141
  • 34. 34 escaping prison and also brining many through trial, only to declare them “innocent.” These cases show how hard it really has been over the past few decades for Mexico to not only improve, but as well as maintain their performance of law enforcements institutions throughout Mexico. However, it is important to note, the Mexican’s government on fighting drugs, as well as the corruption abilities these crime organized members do have over everyone in the country, the fear in Mexico is great, and there is no true support coming from anywhere, not the Mexican government, nor the US government, nor the international government. 80 In reality, drugs do not actually represent a true threat in terms of consumption in domestic use in Mexico. What truly affects the Mexican people is the corruption and violence that are tires with the drug world. However, the real issue is Mexico’s inability to protect their own citizen, as well as the United States aide in this problem, as high consumer of Mexican drugs. In retrospective what really needs to happen is a better collaboration between the two nations, in order to strengthen their alliance, and rid of the problem once and for all. If this problem can be dealt with in the correct way, drugs can may become a “health as well as a public security problem that does not challenge Mexico’s governance.” 81 Mexico’s war on drugs has not been nor will it ever be Mexico’s war on drugs. It must be noted from the beginning where it all began, the rise of American demand coming in from the United States in the early 1920’s. This demand has never stopped growing. It is easy to say the problem has only escalated with time. Each decade as 80 Ibid.; 145 81 Ibid.; 146
  • 35. 35 the demand from the United States grows, the corruption in Mexico grows, as well as the overall violence grows, which directly affects Mexico and its people. The effects the Mexican cartel has had on both Mexican and US relationships have been great, tensions have risen, the two nations cannot seem to meet eye to key on topic and that is because it is evident that both know this is an American problem as well. Although the United States has aided finances to Mexico, that is the least they can do help them combat the problem they have help to form. Mexico’s war on drugs is also the United States war on drugs, and war will not end until the US stop waging Mexico, stops demanding drugs, and both nations can come to terms and deal with this issue on both sides of the border.
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