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NIS REPORT: MEXICAN DRUG WAR
Craig L. Gertsch
Professor Busby
NIS Final Report
December 4, 2015
2
NIS Report: Mexican Drug War
In December of 2012, a high-ranking Mexican government
official, the Interior Minister Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong,
issued a scathing rebuke of the previous administration's
policies as a new administration was taking power and promising
to turn the tide against the cartels; he cited a study that
showed seven out of every 10 Mexicans do not feel safe.
Under the previous administration’s strategy, "financial
resources dedicated to security have more than doubled but
unfortunately Mexican crime has increased," Osorio Chong said.
"The rate of increase in homicides places us among the highest
in the world," he said. "In recent years, because of the
violence linked to organized crime, thousands of people have
died and thousands of people have disappeared” (Fabian, ABC News
article).
However, over two years after the Interior Minister
emotionally issued this statement, it was reported (by both US
and Mexican officials, including military and intelligence
personnel) that “the Islamic State terror group is operating a
camp in the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua, just eight
miles from the U.S. border; and coyotes (smugglers) working for
the notorious Juarez Cartel are smuggling Islamic State
3
terrorists across the U.S. border through the porous border
between Acala and Fort Hancock, Texas” (Chasmar, Washington
Times).
Report Layout
In an increasingly complex and violent atmosphere, Mexico
faces both old and new issues that could tear the country apart.
How can the international community assist Mexico in mitigating
the violence, corruption, and destabilization that are inflicted
upon Mexican society by transnational criminal cartels? This
report looks at the Mexican Drug War within an international
systems framework, specifically utilizing the concepts of
international organizations, non-state actors, and sovereignty
to examine the conflict. Finally, based upon these
aforementioned concepts, policy implications - mediation,
sanctions, and anti-money laundering regulations - are
discussed, and concluding thoughts are offered about Mexico’s
possible trajectories in the 21st century.
Background
The Mexican Drug War is a violent, ongoing conflict between
the government of Mexico and transnational criminal cartel
4
organizations; some officials have noted that Mexico, amid the
endless narcotics violence, poverty, and corruption, has a good
chance of becoming a failed state (Grayson, Narco-Violence and a
Failed State?). In December of 2006, the military and the
administration (who had officials implemented in corruption) of
former President Felipe Calderon officially intervened to squash
cartel-related violence throughout Mexico; the brutal fighting
continues to this day under the administration of President
Enrique Pena Nieto (Malkin, NYT article). It is estimated that
the Mexican cartels make upwards of $65 billion on US illegal
drug sales (not including other illegal activities such as
trafficking humans, selling weaponry, forced labor,
prostitution, kidnapping, ransom, robbery, extortion) each year
(Latin American Herald Tribune article).
Not yet satisfied with current profits or influence,
Mexican cartels are constantly expanding to new countries and
new regions around the world, including North America, Latin
America, Africa, Europe, and now Asia (Harris, CNBC article).
Since the 2006 military intervention, approximately 120,000+
people (including police, women, children, US and Mexican
federal agents) have been killed, with 30,000 persons missing,
and 1.7 million people displaced due to ongoing hostilities
5
between the Mexican government and the cartels (Tuckman,
Guardian article).
Concepts - International Orgs, Nonstate Actors, & Sovereignty
The issue of how the international community can assist
Mexico in resolving the negative effects of the transnational
criminal cartels operating within Mexico’s borders can be
applied to various concepts, including international
organizations, non-state actors, sovereignty, governance,
security, and hegemony. In this report, the concepts that will
be focused on are international organizations, non-state actors,
and sovereignty.
International organizations, such as the Organization of
American States in conjunction with the World Bank and the
United Nations, could play an important part in the overall
process and possible resolution to the violence,
destabilization, and corruption that cartels inflict upon
Mexican society. It should be noted that formal international
organizations are often key participants in crucial situations
within the global arena (Abbott, pg. 27).
6
While international organizations indeed have their
limitations, there are several positive factors that these
organizations have that could help Mexico more effectively
manage the cartels: assist with coordinating activities among
several players (i.e. Mexico, US, other Latin American nations),
provide a forum for the expression of international norms,
incentivize multiple and antagonistic players to participate
(i.e. possibility of sanctions, mediation, modify
laws/regulations) together who might not regularly cooperate for
collective action (i.e. government, military, cartels,
paramilitary groups), provide a forum of neutrality and
legitimacy, allow for the pooling of resources and expertise
that can lower transaction costs, create systems to gather and
analyze/monitor data outcomes along with the corresponding
ability to enforce rules or targeted sanctions for non-
compliance (although international organizations are severely
limited at times with the authority and ability to truly enforce
consequences on non-compliant actors), provide stable funding to
assist with complex issues, increase capacity to solve complex
and vexing issues in a fair manner, leverage decision-making
powers to foster multilateral agreements, and increase capacity
for centralized coordination to solve complex and vexing issues
like cartel violence and corruption in a transparent manner
(Abbott, pgs. 27-64).
7
Even with numerous limitations, “the fact that
international organizations have not been abandoned by states is
a testimony to both their actual value and their perhaps greater
potential” (Abbott, pg. 59). Therefore, international
organizations like the Organizations of American States and the
United Nations clearly have a vital role they could play to help
the country of Mexico truly begin to manage the negative impact
that the cartels have on national and regional communities.
Non-state actors, such as the transnational criminal
cartels, are unfortunately playing an increasingly large
criminal role among not only Mexico’s communities, but also
among communities throughout the region of Latin America and
beyond (Harris, CNBC article). With more open borders and modern
globalization, bad actors such as terrorists, cartels, and human
traffickers have manipulated today’s low barriers to travel,
communication, and trade (Karns, pg. 240).
Although modern nation-states like Mexico are sovereign and
have strong national interests, non-state actors such as the
cartels are increasingly hollowing out states and competing for
the exclusive use of power (i.e. Mexican military vs. cartel
networks) and violence (Cooper, pgs. 16-54). The rapid growth of
non-state actors like the cartels and their extensive influence
8
across all aspects of Mexican society seems to impact/lower the
overall strength of Mexico’s sovereignty and
political/governance structures.
Even though “state and non-state actors may have
differentiated responsibilities, ultimately authority rests with
states, and this is the essence of sovereignty; states remain
central to global governance, no matter how much political
authority is decentralized and power diffused among nonstate
actors” (Karns, pg. 277). And thus Mexico, and the entire
region, is caught in the middle of a violent conflict over
drugs, trafficking humans, money, power, and weapons that is
happening between the government of Mexico (i.e. military,
police) and powerful non-state actors (i.e. cartels, criminal
networks, and corrupt government officials).
Policy Implications
Based on the aforementioned conceptual tools of
international organizations, non-state actors, and sovereignty,
there are several implications for policy amidst the context of
resolving the violence and corruption that the cartels commit
against Mexican society and regional countries. There are
various policy implications, such as mediation, sanctions, and
9
anti-money laundering regulations that are applicable to this
context of establishing peace and security in Mexico.
An important tool for peaceful conflict settlement,
mediation is “a mode of negotiation in which a third party (i.e.
regional or international organization) helps the parties (i.e.
government, non-state actors) find a solution which they cannot
find by themselves; for mediation to have a chance, a conflict
must be at what is called a ‘ripeness’ stage, when parties see
the costs of continuing the conflict as greater than the
benefits of doing so and hence are more willing to consider
(within the context of sovereignty) some form of settlement”
(Karns, pg. 296). Sometimes mediation is successful, and other
times it is not - it just depends on the specific situation
(Karns, pgs. 296-297).
In this particular case, mediation should occur between the
Mexican government and the cartels to see if both sides could
come to a common understanding and reach a mutual agreement.
Depending on the “ripeness” of the situation, mediation may be
successful. However, since the conflicts in Mexico between the
government and the cartels are increasingly brutal and violent,
it is not clear that attempts to mediate and reach a peace
agreement in the current situation are feasible.
10
Sanctions are an increasingly efficient, feasible, and
cost-effective policy tool that is utilized to get other actors
to behave in a particular way. In certain cases, sanctions work;
other times, they are ineffective (Karns, pgs. 310-317).
Sanctions (including the carrot-and-stick model, along with
financial/travel targeted sanctions) are an important
enforcement instrument that serves several purposes: “to coerce
a change of behavior, to constrain access to critical goods and
funds and thereby raise costs and force changes in a target’s
behavior, or to signal and stigmatize targets in support of
international norms” (Karns, pg. 309). While targeted sanctions
have many benefits, there are also drawbacks, including
operational, political, and monitoring difficulties, and
unintended consequences like incentivizing corruption and other
evasive behaviors (Karns, pgs. 316-317).
In this specific case, targeted sanctions can be enacted
against the cartels to induce different, more socially
acceptable behavior. While non-violent, constructive cartel
behavior is the end goal, sanctions must be targeted and
monitored closely enough so that further criminal and evasive
activities are not incentivized.
Another potent policy implication for combating the Mexican
cartels is the necessity to fully understand and disrupt the
11
money laundering networks (about $40 billion per year laundered
from US to Mexico) that cartels utilize to fund all of their
criminal activities by pushing for stricter anti-money
laundering regulations (LaSusa, InSight Crime article). These
are the policy implications that are applicable to the context
of stabilizing the civic, political, and economic sectors of
Mexico.
Conclusion
In an ever increasing violent and chaotic atmosphere,
Mexico faces issues that could tear the country apart. How can
the international community best assist Mexico in mitigating the
violence, destabilization, and corruption that are inflicted
upon Mexican society by transnational criminal cartels? This
report looked at the Mexican Drug War within an international
systems framework, specifically utilizing the concepts of
international organizations, non-state actors, and sovereignty
to examine the conflict.
Based upon these aforementioned concepts, policy
implications - mediation, sanctions, and anti-money laundering
regulations - were discussed. Overall, it is likely that of the
recommendations that were examined, that stricter anti-money
laundering regulations (upheld by international organizations
12
such as the Organization of American States, United Nations, or
World Bank) will have the most impact (and it may be useful for
future research to compare the newer and more embattled Plan
Mexico with the rather successful Plan Colombia (Boot, Weekly
Standard article) to see if Plan Colombia utilized certain
successful strategies (McDowell, World Bank & IMF Report) to
weaken the power of Colombian cartels, and see if those
strategies could stabilize Mexico) on curtailing the economic
structures of the cartels - which will hopefully lessen the
ability for Mexican cartels to operate or profit from any
illegal activity.
Hopefully, through more research to pinpoint successful
strategies that have worked to decrease cartel violence and by
discovering new/innovative public policy solutions, Mexico can
take a step forward (and not a step back into the quagmire of
increased corruption and violence) and prosper in the 21st
century.
13
References
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. “Why States Act through
Formal International Organizations.” in Frederking, Diehl,
27-64.
Boot, Max, and Richard Bennet. 2009 The Colombian Miracle
The weekly standard.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/article/272306
Chasmar, Jessica. 2015. Islamic state operating in mexico just 8
miles from U.S. border: report. The Washington Times2015
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/14/islamic-
state-operating-in-mexico-just-8-miles-fro/.
Cooper, Robert. 2003. The breaking of nations. New York:
Atlantic monthly press,16-54.2003
Drezner, Daniel, 2010. “Weighing the Scales: The Internet’s
Effect on State-Society Relations,” Brown Journal of World
Affairs, 31-44.
Fabian, Jordan. 2012. Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto
Outlines New Drug War Plan. ABC News.2012
Frankel, Todd. 2015. How mexican drug cartels are fueling
america’s deadly heroin epidemic. The Week2015
http://theweek.com/articles/582099/how-mexican-drug-
cartels-are-fueling-americas-deadly-heroin-epidemic
Frederking, Brian and Paul F. Diehl, editors, The Politics of
Global Governance: International Organizations
in an Interdependent World, (Lynne Rienner 5th edition)2015.
Grayson, George W.,2009 Narco-Violence and a Failed
State. http://www.transactionpub.com/title/Mexico-978-1-
41281151-4.html.2009
14
Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation:
A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.”
International Organization 42(3), 492-503.
Harris, Brian. 2015. Mexican drug cartels eye asian markets.
CNBC Financial Times2015
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/24/mexican-drug-cartels-eye-
asia-as-rising-wealth-spurs-cocaine-demand.html
Hernandez, Daniel. 2015. Mexican soldiers kill a kidnapping
victim, then label him a cartel hitman to cover it up. Vice
News. (Online Exclusive)2015
https://news.vice.com/article/mexican-soldiers-kill-a-
kidnapping-victim-then-label-him-a-cartel-hitman-to-cover-
it-up
Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 2002. “The Rise of Complex Terrorism.”
Foreign Policy. 1-16.
Karns, Margaret P., Karen A. Mingst, Kendall W. Stiles.,2015
International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of
Global Governance (Lynne Rienner, 3rd edition.2015
Karns, Margaret P., Karen A. Mingst, Kendall W. Stiles., The
United Nations: Centerpiece of Global Governance, 95-144.
Karns, Margaret P., Karen A. Mingst, Kendall W. Stiles.,
“Nonstate Actors: NGOs, Networks, and Social Movements,”
239-278.
Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 2015, “Transnational
Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics,
Frederking/Diehl, 85-104.
15
LaSusa, Mike. 2015. An economic approach to fighting mexico’s
drug cartels. InSight Crime2015
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/an-economic-
approach-to-fighting-mexico-drug-cartels
Latin american herald tribune.2015
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=342471&CategoryId
=14091
Malkin, Elisabeth., and Azam Ahmed. 2015. U.S. withholds $5
million in antidrug aid to mexico as human rights rebuke.
The New York Times2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/20/world/americas/us-
withholds-5-million-in-antidrug-aid-to-mexico-over-human-
rights.html?ref=topics&_r=0
Martinez, Cesar.2013. Mexico’s National Security Framework in
the Context of an Interdependent world: a Comparative
Architecture Approach. PhD Dissertation at the LBJ School
of Public Affairs, University of Texas, Austin.2013.
https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/23031
McDowell, John, and Emiko Todoroki.2002 World Bank and IMF
Global Dialogue Series Sponsored by the World Bank
Financial Sector and the World Bank Institute in
partnership with the International Monetary Fund and Latin
America and Caribbean Region of the World Bank, Anti-Money
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism,
Regional Conference: Latin America and Caribbean Region—
Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Mexico. The World
Bank.2002.
http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/assets/images/aml_lac.pdf
Mearsheimer, John J. 1994/95. “The False Promise of
International Institutions.” In Diehl (3rd
edition), 60-91.
Multi-agency raids prove mexican drug cartel presence in
indianapolis, police say. 2015. Fox News Latino2015
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2015/11/18/multi-
agency-raids-prove-mexican-drug-cartel-presence-in-
indianapolis-police/
16
Oye, Kenneth A. 1985. “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy:
Hypotheses and Strategies.” World Politics 38(1), 1-24.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie, 2012. “Do It Yourself Diplomacy,” The
Rotarian, February 2012. 3 pages
Tuckman, Jo. 2015. Thousands displaced by mexico’s drug wars:
government is deaf and blind to our plight. The Guardian
News.2015.http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/03/mexi
co-drug-wars-thousands-displaced-from-homes
Winslow, Don. 2015. America's war on drugs is empowering
mexico's drug cartels. CNN Press (Online Exclusive)2015
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/28/opinions/winslow-drug-war-
folly/

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CraigGertschMexicanCartelPaper

  • 1. NIS REPORT: MEXICAN DRUG WAR Craig L. Gertsch Professor Busby NIS Final Report December 4, 2015
  • 2. 2 NIS Report: Mexican Drug War In December of 2012, a high-ranking Mexican government official, the Interior Minister Miguel Ángel Osorio Chong, issued a scathing rebuke of the previous administration's policies as a new administration was taking power and promising to turn the tide against the cartels; he cited a study that showed seven out of every 10 Mexicans do not feel safe. Under the previous administration’s strategy, "financial resources dedicated to security have more than doubled but unfortunately Mexican crime has increased," Osorio Chong said. "The rate of increase in homicides places us among the highest in the world," he said. "In recent years, because of the violence linked to organized crime, thousands of people have died and thousands of people have disappeared” (Fabian, ABC News article). However, over two years after the Interior Minister emotionally issued this statement, it was reported (by both US and Mexican officials, including military and intelligence personnel) that “the Islamic State terror group is operating a camp in the northern Mexican state of Chihuahua, just eight miles from the U.S. border; and coyotes (smugglers) working for the notorious Juarez Cartel are smuggling Islamic State
  • 3. 3 terrorists across the U.S. border through the porous border between Acala and Fort Hancock, Texas” (Chasmar, Washington Times). Report Layout In an increasingly complex and violent atmosphere, Mexico faces both old and new issues that could tear the country apart. How can the international community assist Mexico in mitigating the violence, corruption, and destabilization that are inflicted upon Mexican society by transnational criminal cartels? This report looks at the Mexican Drug War within an international systems framework, specifically utilizing the concepts of international organizations, non-state actors, and sovereignty to examine the conflict. Finally, based upon these aforementioned concepts, policy implications - mediation, sanctions, and anti-money laundering regulations - are discussed, and concluding thoughts are offered about Mexico’s possible trajectories in the 21st century. Background The Mexican Drug War is a violent, ongoing conflict between the government of Mexico and transnational criminal cartel
  • 4. 4 organizations; some officials have noted that Mexico, amid the endless narcotics violence, poverty, and corruption, has a good chance of becoming a failed state (Grayson, Narco-Violence and a Failed State?). In December of 2006, the military and the administration (who had officials implemented in corruption) of former President Felipe Calderon officially intervened to squash cartel-related violence throughout Mexico; the brutal fighting continues to this day under the administration of President Enrique Pena Nieto (Malkin, NYT article). It is estimated that the Mexican cartels make upwards of $65 billion on US illegal drug sales (not including other illegal activities such as trafficking humans, selling weaponry, forced labor, prostitution, kidnapping, ransom, robbery, extortion) each year (Latin American Herald Tribune article). Not yet satisfied with current profits or influence, Mexican cartels are constantly expanding to new countries and new regions around the world, including North America, Latin America, Africa, Europe, and now Asia (Harris, CNBC article). Since the 2006 military intervention, approximately 120,000+ people (including police, women, children, US and Mexican federal agents) have been killed, with 30,000 persons missing, and 1.7 million people displaced due to ongoing hostilities
  • 5. 5 between the Mexican government and the cartels (Tuckman, Guardian article). Concepts - International Orgs, Nonstate Actors, & Sovereignty The issue of how the international community can assist Mexico in resolving the negative effects of the transnational criminal cartels operating within Mexico’s borders can be applied to various concepts, including international organizations, non-state actors, sovereignty, governance, security, and hegemony. In this report, the concepts that will be focused on are international organizations, non-state actors, and sovereignty. International organizations, such as the Organization of American States in conjunction with the World Bank and the United Nations, could play an important part in the overall process and possible resolution to the violence, destabilization, and corruption that cartels inflict upon Mexican society. It should be noted that formal international organizations are often key participants in crucial situations within the global arena (Abbott, pg. 27).
  • 6. 6 While international organizations indeed have their limitations, there are several positive factors that these organizations have that could help Mexico more effectively manage the cartels: assist with coordinating activities among several players (i.e. Mexico, US, other Latin American nations), provide a forum for the expression of international norms, incentivize multiple and antagonistic players to participate (i.e. possibility of sanctions, mediation, modify laws/regulations) together who might not regularly cooperate for collective action (i.e. government, military, cartels, paramilitary groups), provide a forum of neutrality and legitimacy, allow for the pooling of resources and expertise that can lower transaction costs, create systems to gather and analyze/monitor data outcomes along with the corresponding ability to enforce rules or targeted sanctions for non- compliance (although international organizations are severely limited at times with the authority and ability to truly enforce consequences on non-compliant actors), provide stable funding to assist with complex issues, increase capacity to solve complex and vexing issues in a fair manner, leverage decision-making powers to foster multilateral agreements, and increase capacity for centralized coordination to solve complex and vexing issues like cartel violence and corruption in a transparent manner (Abbott, pgs. 27-64).
  • 7. 7 Even with numerous limitations, “the fact that international organizations have not been abandoned by states is a testimony to both their actual value and their perhaps greater potential” (Abbott, pg. 59). Therefore, international organizations like the Organizations of American States and the United Nations clearly have a vital role they could play to help the country of Mexico truly begin to manage the negative impact that the cartels have on national and regional communities. Non-state actors, such as the transnational criminal cartels, are unfortunately playing an increasingly large criminal role among not only Mexico’s communities, but also among communities throughout the region of Latin America and beyond (Harris, CNBC article). With more open borders and modern globalization, bad actors such as terrorists, cartels, and human traffickers have manipulated today’s low barriers to travel, communication, and trade (Karns, pg. 240). Although modern nation-states like Mexico are sovereign and have strong national interests, non-state actors such as the cartels are increasingly hollowing out states and competing for the exclusive use of power (i.e. Mexican military vs. cartel networks) and violence (Cooper, pgs. 16-54). The rapid growth of non-state actors like the cartels and their extensive influence
  • 8. 8 across all aspects of Mexican society seems to impact/lower the overall strength of Mexico’s sovereignty and political/governance structures. Even though “state and non-state actors may have differentiated responsibilities, ultimately authority rests with states, and this is the essence of sovereignty; states remain central to global governance, no matter how much political authority is decentralized and power diffused among nonstate actors” (Karns, pg. 277). And thus Mexico, and the entire region, is caught in the middle of a violent conflict over drugs, trafficking humans, money, power, and weapons that is happening between the government of Mexico (i.e. military, police) and powerful non-state actors (i.e. cartels, criminal networks, and corrupt government officials). Policy Implications Based on the aforementioned conceptual tools of international organizations, non-state actors, and sovereignty, there are several implications for policy amidst the context of resolving the violence and corruption that the cartels commit against Mexican society and regional countries. There are various policy implications, such as mediation, sanctions, and
  • 9. 9 anti-money laundering regulations that are applicable to this context of establishing peace and security in Mexico. An important tool for peaceful conflict settlement, mediation is “a mode of negotiation in which a third party (i.e. regional or international organization) helps the parties (i.e. government, non-state actors) find a solution which they cannot find by themselves; for mediation to have a chance, a conflict must be at what is called a ‘ripeness’ stage, when parties see the costs of continuing the conflict as greater than the benefits of doing so and hence are more willing to consider (within the context of sovereignty) some form of settlement” (Karns, pg. 296). Sometimes mediation is successful, and other times it is not - it just depends on the specific situation (Karns, pgs. 296-297). In this particular case, mediation should occur between the Mexican government and the cartels to see if both sides could come to a common understanding and reach a mutual agreement. Depending on the “ripeness” of the situation, mediation may be successful. However, since the conflicts in Mexico between the government and the cartels are increasingly brutal and violent, it is not clear that attempts to mediate and reach a peace agreement in the current situation are feasible.
  • 10. 10 Sanctions are an increasingly efficient, feasible, and cost-effective policy tool that is utilized to get other actors to behave in a particular way. In certain cases, sanctions work; other times, they are ineffective (Karns, pgs. 310-317). Sanctions (including the carrot-and-stick model, along with financial/travel targeted sanctions) are an important enforcement instrument that serves several purposes: “to coerce a change of behavior, to constrain access to critical goods and funds and thereby raise costs and force changes in a target’s behavior, or to signal and stigmatize targets in support of international norms” (Karns, pg. 309). While targeted sanctions have many benefits, there are also drawbacks, including operational, political, and monitoring difficulties, and unintended consequences like incentivizing corruption and other evasive behaviors (Karns, pgs. 316-317). In this specific case, targeted sanctions can be enacted against the cartels to induce different, more socially acceptable behavior. While non-violent, constructive cartel behavior is the end goal, sanctions must be targeted and monitored closely enough so that further criminal and evasive activities are not incentivized. Another potent policy implication for combating the Mexican cartels is the necessity to fully understand and disrupt the
  • 11. 11 money laundering networks (about $40 billion per year laundered from US to Mexico) that cartels utilize to fund all of their criminal activities by pushing for stricter anti-money laundering regulations (LaSusa, InSight Crime article). These are the policy implications that are applicable to the context of stabilizing the civic, political, and economic sectors of Mexico. Conclusion In an ever increasing violent and chaotic atmosphere, Mexico faces issues that could tear the country apart. How can the international community best assist Mexico in mitigating the violence, destabilization, and corruption that are inflicted upon Mexican society by transnational criminal cartels? This report looked at the Mexican Drug War within an international systems framework, specifically utilizing the concepts of international organizations, non-state actors, and sovereignty to examine the conflict. Based upon these aforementioned concepts, policy implications - mediation, sanctions, and anti-money laundering regulations - were discussed. Overall, it is likely that of the recommendations that were examined, that stricter anti-money laundering regulations (upheld by international organizations
  • 12. 12 such as the Organization of American States, United Nations, or World Bank) will have the most impact (and it may be useful for future research to compare the newer and more embattled Plan Mexico with the rather successful Plan Colombia (Boot, Weekly Standard article) to see if Plan Colombia utilized certain successful strategies (McDowell, World Bank & IMF Report) to weaken the power of Colombian cartels, and see if those strategies could stabilize Mexico) on curtailing the economic structures of the cartels - which will hopefully lessen the ability for Mexican cartels to operate or profit from any illegal activity. Hopefully, through more research to pinpoint successful strategies that have worked to decrease cartel violence and by discovering new/innovative public policy solutions, Mexico can take a step forward (and not a step back into the quagmire of increased corruption and violence) and prosper in the 21st century.
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