1.
1
CANNABIS SOCIAL CLUBS: NORMALISATION, NEOLIBERALISM, POLITICAL
OPPORTUNITIES AND PROHIBITION
David Pere Martínez Oró (PhD)
Drug Policy Unit, Autonomous University of Barcelona
Abstract
In
Spain,
the
cannabis
movement
has
been
demanding
a
review
of
prohibitionist
policies
for
over
thirty
years.
The
movement
has
taken
advantage
of
gaps
in
the
legal
framework
to
set
out
a
formula
for
cannabis
clubs,
in
order
to
supply
cannabis
collectively.
Clubs,
among
other
requirements,
may
not
make
a
profit.
This
text
analyses
the
influence
of
socio-­‐
cultural
normalisation
of
cannabis,
the
current
social
context
(economic
crisis)
and
hegemonic
discourse
(neoliberalism,
consumerism,
etc.)
as
being
responsible
for
the
opening
of
hundreds
of
clubs
since
2011,
especially
in
Barcelona.
This
has
led
to
the
emergence
of
club
management
models
which
do
not
conform
to
jurisprudence.
This
situation,
along
with
the
undeniable
reality
of
cannabis
use,
has
offered
the
cannabis
movement
a
political
opportunity
to
regulate
clubs,
an
opportunity
in
which
synergies
have
emerged
in
Catalonia,
Navarre
and
the
Basque
country.
Finally,
it
reflects
on
how
prohibition
has
hampered
the
activities
of
clubs
despite
social
and
legal
advances
that
have
occurred
in
recent
years.
Key
words:
drugs
policies,
cannabis
social
clubs,
political
opportunities,
regulation
and
neoliberalism.
INTRODUCTION
Drug
prohibition
policies
maintained
by
the
international
control
conventions
of
the
United
Nations1,
show
glaring
evidence
of
failure
due
to
the
impossibility
of
achieving
the
intended
goals
(Arana,
2013:
130).
In
particular:
reducing
the
plantations
of
coca,
opium
and
cannabis,
eliminating
international
drug
trafficking,
and
precluding
the
consumption
of
controlled
substances.
All
this
means
that
it
is
a
pipe
dream
to
believe
it
is
possible
to
achieve
the
Declaration
of
the
United
Nations
Office
on
Drugs
and
Crime
(UNODC),
when
in
1998
it
declared
"a
drug-­‐free
world:
we
can
do
it!"
(Wodak,
2014:
191).
Global
prohibitionist
policy
has
also
caused
immense
damage
to
vulnerable
populations,
and
has
continuously
broken
the
International
Bill
of
Human
Rights
(Mena
and
Hobbs,
2010:
66-­‐
67).
In
view
of
the
meagre
results,
the
economic
costs
are
unsustainable.
Rolles,
Murkin,
Powell,
Kushlick
and
Slater
(2012:
16)
estimate
the
cost
of
the
application
of
the
law
in
the
fight
against
drugs
at
least
$100
billion
a
year.
The
market
for
controlled
drugs
generates
1
Single
Convention
on
Narcotic
Drugs,
New
York,
1961,
which
was
supplemented
by
the
Convention
on
Psychotropic
Substances
of
Vienna,
1971,
and
the
United
Nations
Convention
against
Illicit
Traffic
in
Narcotic
Drugs
and
Psychotropic
Substances
of
1988,
also
in
Vienna.

2.
2
$330
billion
a
year.
This
turnover
allows
criminal
organisations,
especially
in
Latin
American
countries
to
"undermine
government
institutions
and
the
state
through
corruption
and
intimidation,
blurs
the
boundaries
between
legal
and
illegal
economies
and
threatens
the
economic
stability
of
nations
and
entire
regions"
(Rolles
et
al.,
2012:
22).
Given
the
blatant
disaster
that
is
prohibition,
activists,
academics,
professionals
and
a
minority
of
politicians
have
spoken
out
about
the
need
to
find
pragmatic
and
sensible
alternatives
to
the
classification
of
drugs
in
the
international
control
system
(Hallam,
Bewley-­‐Taylor
and
Jelsma,
2014;
Monaghan,
2014).
Over
the
last
few
years,
more
and
more
countries
have
joined
the
debate
about
new
drugs
policies,
especially
in
relation
to
cannabis
(Rolles
and
Murkin,
2014;
Room
et
al,
2013,
Rosmarin
and
Eastwood,
2012;
Blickman
and
Jelsma,
2009;
Jelsma,
2009).
The
result
should
be
a
revision
of
the
United
Nations
drug
conventions
and
the
creation
of
a
new
legal
framework
that
defeats
drug
trafficking,
money
laundering
and
the
criminalisation
of
users
(Bewley-­‐Taylor,
2012).
As
Bewley-­‐Taylor,
Blickman
and
Jelsma
(2014:
7)
state,
the
2016
UNGASS
on
drugs
represents
an
excellent
opportunity
to
modify
the
control
treaties
and
also
the
current
status
of
cannabis.
The
winds
of
change
in
cannabis
policy,
following
Montañés'
metaphor
(2014),
have
begun
to
break
the
ice
at
various
points
on
the
prohibitionist
plane.
Uruguay
is
the
standard
bearer
of
the
new
policies
on
cannabis.
On
10
December
the
Uruguayan
Senate
approved
the
19.172
law
allowing
access
to
cannabis
under
certain
conditions.
This
model
is
social-­‐
democratic
because
it
is
the
State,
through
the
Institute
of
Regulation
and
Control
of
Cannabis
(IRCCA),
which
oversees
the
process
of
controlling
plantations
supplying
cannabis
for
personal
use,
the
operation
of
cannabis
clubs2
and
the
production
and
processing
for
sale
in
pharmacies3.
In
the
United
States
it
has
been
possible
to
buy
cannabis
legally
in
Colorado
since
January
2014
and
in
Washington
since
July
2014.
In
Alaska
and
Oregon
on
November
4,
2014
the
sale
of
recreational
cannabis
was
approved
by
referendum
and
in
the
next
few
years
the
system
of
how
cannabis
will
be
legally
accessed
will
be
specified.
As
Montañés
(2014:
79)
points
out
in
relation
to
Colorado
-­‐
but
extending
to
all
the
U.S.
-­‐
the
model
is
based
on
neo-­‐liberal
policies
and
the
free
market,
where
regulation
is
due
to
a
certain
"fundraising
spirit".
The
political-­‐economic
model
to
be
adopted
by
new
drug
policies
and
regulatory
framework
derivatives
represents
a
central
aspect
of
the
discussion.
Other
countries
in
Latin
America
such
as
Mexico,
Chile,
Brazil,
Jamaica
and
Guatemala
are
also
discussing
alternatives
to
prohibition.
Spain
finds
itself
at
the
fringes
of
the
discussion
on
new
drug
policies,
due
in
large
part
to
the
emergence
of
hundreds
of
clubs4.
A
Cannabis
club
is
a
non-­‐profit
whose
members
can
2
From
this
point
on,
the
word
"clubs"
will
refer
exclusively
to
cannabis
clubs.
3
According
to
Montañés
(2014:
65)
"On
2
May
2014,
the
president
of
the
JND,
Diego
Canepa,
held
a
press
conference
to
present
the
regulations
of
the
law.
Pharmacies
will
start
selling
recreational
cannabis
in
November
this
year
at
$1
per
gram"
As
of
1
July
2015
this
had
not
yet
happened
and
there
appears
to
be
no
sign
of
imminent
implementation.
4
It
is
impossible
to
find
out
the
exact
number
of
clubs
but
it
is
estimated
that
there
are
between
500
and
600,
of
which
350
are
located
in
Catalonia
and
75
in
the
Basque
Country
(Blickman,
2014).
Although
the
first
club
was
founded
in
2001
it
was
not
until
2011
when
the
number
of
clubs
began
to
increase
exponentially.

3.
3
acquire
cannabis
without
entering
the
black
market
and
whose
operation
is
possible
due
to
the
jurisprudence
of
the
Spanish
legal
system
(Carmena,
2012).
Despite
the
overtones,
such
clubs
can
be
deemed
to
be
conforming
to
the
jurisprudence
if
they
meet
the
following
requirements:
1)
It
is
a
legally
constituted
association
of
adult
consumers
of
cannabis.
2)
Only
members
can
access
the
association's
premises,
which
must
comply
with
health
and
safety
standards.
3)
The
supply
circuit
is
closed,
i.e.
only
members
are
supplied
from
the
association's
plantations,
ensuring
planning
for
demand
and
avoiding
excess.
4)
No
profit
is
generated.
5)
No
advertising
strategies
are
executed
to
recruit
members.
The
existence
of
clubs
is
a
result
of
the
cannabis
movement's
long
struggle
to
defend
personal
liberties
(Marín,
2008:
222-­‐223).
The
advance
has
been
possible
by
repeated
assaults
on
the
Spanish
wall
of
prohibition,
with
the
objective
-­‐
amongst
others
-­‐
of
acquiring
cannabis
without
breaking
the
law.
As
(Barriuso,
2012a)
points
out,
the
CSC
model
is
based
"on
the
gradual
development
of
principles
derived
in
piecemeal
fashion
from
the
Supreme
Court's
doctrine
on
so-­‐called
"shared
consumption"
[…].
CSCs
have
been
formed
based
on
filling
the
gaps
left
by
legislation,
gaps
whose
dimensions
are
not
yet
clear.
The
path
has
been
tortuous
and
full
of
vicissitudes
due
to
the
criminalising
logic
of
prohibition,
but
the
overlap
between
the
cannabis
movement,
political
opportunities
and
normalisation
have
enabled
the
current
system
of
clubs
to
develop
in
the
country.
It
has
also
fuelled
political
debate
on
how
it
should
be
regulated,
which
has
been
crystallised
in
regional
regulations
and
bylaws
THE CANNABIS MOVEMENT VS THE WALL OF PROHBITION: THE EMERGENCE OF
CANNABIS CLUBS
The
roots
of
the
cannabis
movement
can
be
found
in
the
youth
counterculture
of
the
sixties
and
seventies
(Romaní,
2004:
88-­‐94).
But
it
was
not
until
the
death
of
the
dictator
Franco
that
the
first
voices
openly
favourable
to
the
legalisation
of
cannabis
were
heard
(González
Duro,
1979,
Usó,
1996:
299).
The
public
faces
of
this
debate
were
certain
left-­‐wing
politicians
and
publications
such
as
the
legendary
magazine
Ajoblanco
(Usó,
1996:
298-­‐
299).
Since
then
the
anti-­‐prohibition
movement
has
seen
fluctuations
in
its
activity
and
social
visibility.
During
the
eighties
it
was
rarely
taken
into
consideration
and
almost
silenced
as
a
result
of
the
fight
against
"the
Drug
Problem"
(Usó,
2013:
67-­‐69).
The
dominance
of
the
morality
brigade
prevented
a
sensible
discussion
from
being
maintained
because
it
believed
that
the
only
valid
strategy
to
address
the
"terrible
problem"
was
a
heavy-­‐handed
one
(Gonzalez,
Funes,
Gonzalez,
Mayor
and
Romaní,
1989:
45).
Despite
little
public
visibility
and
no
political
discussion
on
alternatives
to
prohibition,
throughout
the
nineties
more
and
more
professionals
and
academics
-­‐
for
the
most
part
dedicated
to
harm-­‐
reduction
-­‐
began
to
criticise
prohibition
and
demand
a
much-­‐needed
debate
on
drug
policy
(Romaní,
2005).
The
first
milestone
of
the
cannabis
movement
was
reached
in
1993
with
the
collective
plantation
of
the
Ramon
Santos
Association
for
Cannabis
Studies
(ARSEC).
According
to
(Barriuso,
2011:
3)
ARSEC
asked
the
anti-­‐drug
prosecutor
if
it
was
a
crime
to
grow
cannabis
collectively
to
supply
themselves,
to
which
the
answer
came
back
that
in
principle
it
was
not
an
offense
to
cultivate
cannabis
for
personal
consumption
among
adult
consumers.
However,
the
plantation
was
confiscated
and
the
growers
eventually
convicted,
following
an
appeal
to
the
Supreme
Court.
The
sentence
concluded
that
"the
cultivation
of
cannabis
was
dangerous
per
se
and
must
be
punished
"(Barriuso,
2011:
3).
The
plantation

4.
4
opened
up
the
so-­‐called
"Catalan
Breach"
(Borrallo,
1997)
because
it
represented
the
first
solid
blow
against
the
wall
of
prohibition,
even
though
a
priori
the
sentence
implied
that
collective
cannabis
plantations
were
not
possible
(Barriuso,
2011:
3)
.
The
breach
was
widened
by
the
Bilbao
Kalamudia
Association,
which
created
collective
plantations
in
1997,
1999
and
2000.
These
were
reported
to
the
authorities
but
they
were
harvested
without
hindrance
(Barriuso,
2011:
3).
Another
crack
can
be
seen
in
the
form
of
the
Muñoz
and
Soto
Report
(2001),
which
analysed
the
legal
feasibility
of
establishments
whose
activity
would
be
the
supply
of
cannabis
for
therapeutic
purposes.
In
practice
this
report
represents
a
"legal
framework
document"
for
clubs
as
it
lists
the
characteristics
that
must
be
met
to
self-­‐supply
without
breaking
the
law
and
is
complemented
by
the
Díez
Ripollés
and
Muñoz
obiter
dictum
(2012).
Under
the
conviction
that
it
was
lawful
to
form
members
associations
to
self-­‐supply
cannabis
and
represented
individual
freedom,
in
2001
the
country's
first
cannabis
club,
the
"Cannabis
Tasters
Club
Barcelona",
was
established.
The
club
split
with
previous
research
associations
in
explicitly
specifying
in
its
articles
of
association
the
intention
of
producing
and
consuming
cannabis.
The
first
cannabis
clubs
conformed
strictly
with
the
jurisprudence
in
carrying
out
their
activities
without
breaking
the
law,
but
there
was
no
guarantee
of
legal
impunity.
This
left
space
for
prohibitionists
to
thwart
any
activity
related
to
controlled
substances
(Barriuso,
2012b:
174).
During
the
first
decade
of
the
21st
century
clubs
sprung
up
all
around
Spain,
especially
in
the
Basque
Country
and
Catalonia
(Blickman,
2014).
The
vast
majority
of
these
clubs
joined
the
FAC
(Federation
of
Cannabis
Associations)5,
whose
members
have
a
long
history
of
anti-­‐prohibition
activism,
argue
for
a
cooperative
model
where
members
play
an
active
role
in
decision-­‐making
and
comply
with
the
premise
of
the
closed
circuit
(Barriuso,
2012a).
Despite
clubs'
lack
of
relevancy
among
the
general
public,
security
forces
and
prosecutors
were
determined
to
crack
down
on
them,
as
proven
by
the
various
seizures
and
arrests
(Usó,
2009;
2005).
In
2005
police
seized
marijuana
belonging
to
the
Pannah
Association
but
it
was
returned
in
2007
because
a
judge
found
that
no
crime
had
been
committed.
This
incident
reinforced
the
legitimacy
of
claims
by
the
cannabis
movement.
Barriuso
(2011:
4)
notes
that
this
fact
"can
be
considered
the
starting
signal
for
a
boom
of
new
associations
that
seek
to
set
up
their
own
production
of
cannabis."
A
socio-­‐historical
analysis
of
events
in
recent
years
in
the
"cannabis
world"
shows
the
influence
of
various
phenomena
that
are
key
to
understanding
the
current
situation,
which
is
characterised
by
the
increasing
number
of
clubs
and
discussion
on
the
regulatory
framework.
The
elements
are:
• The
process
of
normalisation
of
controlled
substances,
especially
cannabis.
5
The
FAC
website
states
that
"
The
Spanish
Federation
of
Cannabis
Associations
is
a
group
of
cannabis
user
associations
from
around
the
country
who
share
ideas
about
regulation
which
should
serve
society.
Thus,
all
associations
in
the
federation,
including
growers,
researchers
and
users,
aim
to
provide
safe
access
to
cannabis
for
all
users,
respecting
their
rights
as
users
and
putting
distance
between
themselves
and
the
dangers
of
the
black
market".
The
bold
highlighting
is
mine.

5.
5
• Defragmentation
of
the
model
proposed
by
the
FAC
for
cannabis
clubs,
due
to
the
influence
of
hegemonic
discourses
(entrepreneurship,
neoliberalism,
the
consumer
society,
etc.),
which
has
led
to
clubs
becoming
a
niche
business.
• Political
opportunities
for
the
cannabis
movement
arising
from
the
undeniable
reality
of
the
clubs.
• Prohibition,
which
despite
the
changes
in
recent
years
poses
a
threat
to
the
functioning
of
the
clubs
and
limits
personal
freedom
of
consumers.
THE NORMALISATION PROCESS AS A CATALYST FOR CLUBS
Normalisation
is
a
macro-­‐social
phenomenon
which
has
enabled
the
emergence
of
clubs
because,
among
the
consequences,
it
implies
accepting
cannabis
and
cannabis
clubs
as
part
of
social
reality
(Arana,
2005:
131-­‐135).
Taking
place
in
Western
Europe
over
the
last
twenty
years
(Parker,
2005),
normalisation
is
the
socio-­‐historical
process
by
which
certain
controlled
substances,
including
cannabis,
move
from
a
marginalised
position
into
mainstream
society
(Martinez
Oró,
2014a:
95-­‐98;
Parker,
Aldridge
and
Measham,
1998:
122-­‐125).
The
core
elements
of
normalisation
are:
decreasing
the
alarm
caused
by
the
"the
Drugs
Problem",
the
spread
of
consumption
with
a
consequent
increase
in
the
number
of
consumers,
changes
in
the
way
drugs
are
obtained,
and
above
all,
greater
social
tolerance
and
less
stigmatisation
of
consumers
(Martinez
Oró
2014a:
99-­‐122).
All
these
elements
have
caused
cultural
integration
of
cannabis,
i.e.,
society
has
adapted
to
the
reality
of
cannabis
use,
allowing
coexistence
to
become
less
problematic
(Martinez
Oró,
et
al.,
2010;
Aldridge,
Measham
and
Williams,
2011).
A
clear
example
of
how
much
social
normalisation
has
been
achieved
can
be
observed
in
the
fact
that
it
now
is
the
cannabis
movement
pressing
public
administrations
to
discuss
the
"issue
of
clubs"
and
not
citizens
worried
about
preventing
the
"virus"
of
drugs
(Martinez
Oró
and
Pallares,
2013:
32-­‐33).
According
to
Vibeke,
Christensen
and
Vibeke
(2014)
for
most
consumers,
cannabis
is
a
practial
way
to
achieve
desired
pleasurable
states
of
mind.
To
others,
consumption
is
an
action
of
self-­‐care,
a
way
to
forget
the
suffocating
reality
of
their
daily
lives
(Martinez
Oró,
2014b).
The
stigma
attached
to
consumption
has
also
been
diluted
and
fewer
people
now
stigmatise
a
person
simply
because
of
cannabis
use
(Aldridge,
2008:
199;
Hathaway,
Comeau
and
Erickson,
2011:
465).
Normalisation
is
accentuated
when
people
of
all
ages
consume,
regardless
of
socioeconomic
level,
gender
(Zalakain,
2012:
60-­‐66)
or
belief
system
-­‐
unless
it
interferes
with
their
daily
duties
(Romaní,
2015).
Its
presence
is
so
ubiquitous
that
Bilckman
(2014:
2)
speaks
of
a
de
facto
decriminalisation
of
cannabis.
In
recent
years,
social
alarm
caused
by
public
safety
concerns
about
"the
Drugs
Problem"
(robberies,
thefts,
dumping
of
syringes...)
has
decreased
to
such
an
extent
that
it
has
reached
the
point
where,
in
May
2014,
only
0.1%
of
Spaniards
felt
that
it
represented
a
social
problem
(CIS,
2014).
This
decrease
in
social
alarm
has
led
to
the
question
of
drugs
being
dropped
from
the
political
agenda
(Comas,
2002:
90-­‐92).
The
interweaving
of
lesser
hysteria
with
greater
social
tolerance
has
meant
that
in
response
to
the
emergence
of
clubs,
part
of
the
population
tolerates
them
and
the
vast
majority
are
indifferent
to
their
presence
as
long
as
they
are
not
affected
by
their
existence.
In
this
regard,
a
study
by
GESOP
notes
that
77.6%
of
Catalans
believe
cannabis
clubs
should
be
regulated;
it
also
shows
that
43.4%

6.
6
are
in
favour
of
legalising
marijuana.6
In
relation
to
the
legalisation
of
cannabis,
according
to
the
August
2014
Euro
barometer,
47%
of
young
Spaniards
(15-­‐24
years)
felt
that
cannabis
should
be
legalised.
And
according
to
Rodríguez
S,
Megías
V.,
Megías
Q.,
Rodríguez
F.
and
Rubio
(2014:
76)
46.2%
of
Spaniards
are
of
the
view
that
"regulated
sale
to
adults
in
pharmacies
or
other
authorised
sites
should
be
allowed"
while
5.9
per
cent
think
"unrestricted
sale
to
adults
should
be
allowed".
In
total,
52.2%
of
Spaniards
envisage
some
kind
of
regulated
access
to
cannabis.
These
data
show
the
high
level
of
social
acceptance
and
leaves
social
justification
for
prohibition
in
abeyance.
In
Spain
it
is
estimated
that
in
2013
2,093,000
people
consumed
cannabis
at
least
once
a
month
and
some
602,000
did
so
every
day.
These
data
are
far
higher
than
in
1999,
when
the
monthly
figure
was
1,238,000
and
the
daily
figure
220,0007.
The
spread
of
consumption
without
an
increase
in
problematic
use
is
a
clear
sign
of
the
normalisation
of
cannabis
(Martinez
Oró,
2014a:
195-­‐196).
To
clarify,
while
the
number
of
requests
for
treatment
of
cannabis-­‐related
problems
has
increased
in
recent
years,
from
4,772
in
2002
to
12,873
in
2011,
The
proportion
of
daily
users
asking
for
treatment
has
remained
stable:
in
2002
the
percentage
was
2.16%
and
in
2011
it
was
2.3%.8.
Given
this
volume
of
consumers
it
is
logical
that
clubs
flourished
in
Spain
(especially
in
those
areas
where
normalisation
is
more
pronounced,
as
in
the
Basque
Country
and
Catalonia.
The
vast
majority
of
consumers
wish
to
obtain
cannabis
of
high
quality,
safely
(Arana
and
Montañés,
2011:
172-­‐173).
Given
the
dangers
inherent
in
the
black
market,
some,
therefore,
saw
in
a
club
an
excellent
supply
channel
(Barriuso,
2012b:
178-­‐179).
The
spread
of
consumption
led
to
changes
in
the
typical
consumer
profile
and,
consequently,
to
sale
of
cannabis
to
people
outside
marginal
sectors
of
society.
At
present,
the
perceived
availability
of
cannabis
in
Spain
is
almost
universal,
with
two
out
of
every
three
Spaniards
(67%)
considering
it
easy
or
very
easy
to
buy
cannabis
in
less
than
24
hours
(OED,
2014).
The
clubs
allow
members
to
acquire
cannabis
in
a
pleasant
environment,
so
less
consumers
feed
drug
trafficking
networks,
who
are
seeing
their
profits
dwindle
as
a
result
(Decorte,
2015).
Acquiring
substances
in
socially
accepted
contexts,
such
as
clubs,
distances
consumers
from
deviant
practices
and
sub-­‐cultural
norms
(Parker,
Williams
and
Aldridge,
2002:
90
-­‐
92;
Parker,
2005:
206-­‐206).
6
77%
of
Catalans
Believe
It
Is
Better
to
Regulate
than
Veto
Associations.
El
Periódico,
14
July
2014.
7
According
to
the
2013
Report
of
the
Spanish
Drug
Observatory
(OED,
2013),
in
2013
6.6%
of
the
Spanish
population
between
the
ages
of
15
and
64
had
used
cannabis
at
some
time
in
the
month
preceding
the
study
compared
with
4.5%
in
1999.
Daily
consumption
stood
at
1.9%
in
2013
and
0.9%
in
1999.
The
Spanish
population
between
the
ages
of
15
and
64
according
to
the
INE
(National
Statistics
Office)
was
31,718,825
as
of
1
January
2013
and
27,517,892
as
of
1
January
1999.
Drawing
on
these
data
the
figures
have
been
calculated
for
monthly
and
daily
consumption.
8
From
this
percentage
one
should
subtract
the
-­‐
unknown
-­‐
number
of
consumers
who
are
protected
by
paragraph
2
of
Article
25
of
the
Protection
of
Public
Safety
Act
1992
(Ley
1/1992),
which
provides
for
the
suspension
of
pecuniary
sanctions
if
they
undergo
treatment
for
addiction.
But
one
must
also
add
those
consumers
who
request
treatment
in
private
centres
and
do
not
appear
in
the
official
statistics,
as
well
as
those
with
problematic
use
who
refrain
from
seeking
help.
Given
these
elements
we
believe
that
in
no
event
would
the
percentage
of
problematic
use
exceed
5%.

7.
7
THE COMMERCIAL REINTERPRETATION OF THE COOPERATIVE MODEL
The
experience
of
the
pioneer
clubs
within
the
FAC
environment
gave
wings
to
an
amalgam
of
people,
groups
and
entrepreneurs
to
open
a
club.
In
Barcelona
between
2011
and
2014
there
was
a
veritable
cannabis
boom,
defined
by
a
massive
and
almost
indiscriminate
opening
of
clubs.
During
the
boom,
a
minority
opened
their
doors
with
the
intention
of
following
the
operating
rules
proposed
by
the
FAC.
But
the
vast
majority
reinterpreted
this
model
and
chose
to
work
with
less
strict
parameters,
with
the
resulting
increase
in
the
risk
of
breaking
the
law.
The
legal
grey
area
offered
shadows
in
which
to
hide
criminal
practices
under
the
guise
of
a
not-­‐for-­‐profit
association.
For
the
militants
who
had
opened
up
the
cracks
in
prohibition,
the
emergence
of
clubs
with
"lax"
rules
or
indeed
purely
motivated
by
profiting
from
the
sale
of
cannabis,
pose
a
threat
to
their
co-­‐operative
model
(Barriuso,
2012a).
In
social
and
cultural
terms
one
can
observe
how
the
socio-­‐economic
context
of
the
recession,
which
has
brutally
punished
part
of
Spanish
society,
has
set
the
stage
for
the
cannabis
boom.
The
feeling
of
being
trapped
combined
with
hegemonic
discourse
on
the
subject
(Alonso
and
Fernández
Rodríguez,
2013)
helps
explain
the
boom.
Contributing
to
this
feeling
of
being
trapped
are
the
major
stumbling
blocks
faced
by
young
Spaniards:
unemployment9
,
over-­‐qualification,
lack
of
work
and
job
insecurity.
These
elements
create
instability
and
uncertainty,
place
them
in
a
vulnerable
position
(Romaní
and
Casadó,
2014)
and
also
affect
their
emotional
state
(Martínez-­‐Hernáez,
2009).
As
far
as
hegemonic
discourse
is
concerned,
one
can
see
that
it
is
neoliberal
and
consumerist
logic
that
defines
social
reality
(Ramonet,
2009).
Another
issue
deserving
special
attention
is
the
discourse
surrounding
entrepreneurship
in
the
context
of
neoliberal
hegemony,
that
espouses
risk-­‐
taking
in
work
and
business,
where
success
is
celebrated
individually
but
failure
also,
without
the
Welfare
State
providing
any
kind
of
safety
net
(Byung-­‐Chul
Han,
2012:
25-­‐32).
In
a
labour
market
that
offers
no
opportunities,
opening
a
cannabis
club
represents
a
way
of
earning
a
living
through
self-­‐employment.
During
the
boom
all
kinds
of
cannabis
clubs
opened.
Some,
despite
opting
out
of
FAC
model,
have
adhered
to
the
jurisprudence,
and
have
operated
as
a
non-­‐profit
association
trying
to
go
unnoticed
since
avoiding
problems
is
crucial
to
maintaining
operations
and
work.
Other,
more
ambitious,
entrepreneurs
have
stretched
the
boundaries
of
jurisprudence,
undertaking
unlawful
practices
under
the
guise
of
a
non-­‐profit
association.
In
a
society
where
one
can
market
any
product,
"cannabis
entrepreneurs"
have
had
no
qualms
about
making
money
from
cannabis
or
supplying
themselves
on
the
black
market,
to
fulfil
the
capitalist
dream
of
being
rich.
Entrepreneurship,
consumerism,
business,
buying
and
selling,
commercial
transfers,
customers,
brand
and
competition,
among
other
staples
of
hegemonic
discourse,
have
also
been
incorporated
into
the
language
of
some
clubs.
Following
the
cannabis
boom,
the
influence
of
business
logic
has
seen
some
clubs
competing
like
companies.
These
maintain
a
strictly
business
relationship
with
cannabis
users
-­‐
in
other
words,
they
become
mere
customers.
This
can
be
seen
in
the
free
services
offered,
such
as
lending
video-­‐game
9
The
unemployment
rate
in
the
last
quarter
of
2014
stood
at
23.7%
for
the
general
population
and
51.8%
for
young
people,
but
the
all-­‐time
high
was
in
the
first
quarter
of
2013,
with
rates
of
26.94%
and
57%
respectively.

8.
8
consoles,
offering
DJ
sessions,
organising
football
matches,
etc.,
to
improve
member-­‐client
satisfaction,
in
order
to
build
customer
loyalty.
It
was
not
by
chance
that
the
cannabis
boom
took
place
in
Barcelona
but
an
unintended
consequence
of
the
political-­‐economic
model.
The
Barcelona
Brand
has
for
some
time
been
in
vogue
in
political
and
economic
discourse
as
a
way
of
presenting
the
city
as
cosmopolitan,
business
friendly,
touristic
and
socially
and
culturally
attractive.
Sponsors
stress
its
benefits
but
citizens
are
suffering
the
unintended
consequences
of
this
highly
criticised
model
(Delgado,
2007,
VVAA,
2004).
Barcelona
received
1,732,902
tourists
in
1990
and
that
figure
increased
every
year
following
the
1992
Olympics,
reaching
a
record
high
in
2013
of
7,571,766
tourists
(Tourism
Barcelona,
2014).
This
volume
of
tourism
makes
Barcelona
an
ideal
place
to
do
business,
so
it
is
not
surprising
that
cannabis
entrepreneurs
have
chosen
Barcelona.
Some
"commercial
clubs"
have
not
missed
the
opportunity
to
grow
their
businesses,
with
illegal
practices
like
attracting
tourists
online
or
in
the
street.
When
these
methods
of
capturing
clients
came
to
light
and
people
noticed
how
some
niche
media
were
calling
Barcelona
the
world
marijuana
capital10
,
Barcelona
City
Council
took
steps
to
stop
"cannabis
tourism",
for
example
a
moratorium
on
new
club
licences
and
an
increase
in
inspections,
which
led
to
the
closing
down
of
59
clubs11
.
Avoiding
cannabis
tourism
appears
to
be
a
high
priority,
from
the
new
regulations
approved
by
both
Barcelona
City
Council
and
by
the
Generalitat
(autonomous
government)
of
Catalonia.
Commercial
clubs
have
created
an
aura
of
"undesirability"
because
they
transgress
jurisprudence.
There
is
no
doubt
that
these
clubs
do
not
conform
to
the
legal
framework,
but
if
we
consider
classical
sociological
theories
of
Deviance
(Becker,
2009;
Matza,
1981),
we
see
how
they
can
also
act
as
normalising
agents
for
consumers
because
they
enable
safe
supply,
avoid
contact
with
deviant
practices
and
withdraw
smokers
from
public
spaces,
with
the
consequent
effect
of
stopping
potential
complaints
and
reporting
to
the
police
by
local
residents.
This
in
turn
implies
less
policing
and
so
a
reduction
in
cost
and
public
disorder.
THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES OF THE CANNABIS MOVEMENT.
Taking
Toch's
(1971:
5)
classic
definition,
it
is
clear
that
the
cannabis
movement
is
a
social
one
because
it
is
"an
effort
by
a
large
number
of
people
to
solve
collectively
a
problem
they
feel
they
have
in
common."
As
Marín
(2008)
points
out,
the
cannabis
movement,
in
its
fight
for
the
"normalisation"
of
cannabis,
has
undergone
a
long
journey
over
the
past
two
decades
to
reach
this
point.
According
to
Tarrow
(1994)
and
his
interpretation
of
"political
opportunity
theory",
the
probability
of
a
social
movement
achieving
its
goals
is
determined
by
the
how
the
social
system
opens
up
to
their
demands
and
objectives
(Buechler,
2000).
In
recent
years,
demands
by
the
cannabis
movement
have
been
heard
by
certain
governments
and
opened
up
the
debate
on
a
regulatory
framework
for
clubs
(Renovatio,
2013).
This
10
The
Marijuana
Capital.
El
Periódico,
30
May
2014.
11
Barcelona
City
Council
Closes
59
Cannabis
Associations,
35%
of
the
Total.
La
Vanguardia,
21
November
2014.

9.
9
political
opening
up
(unprecedented
in
more
than
thirty
years
of
pressure)
is,
first
of
all,
the
result
of
years
of
struggle
by
the
cannabis
movement,
but
such
opening
up
has
been
accelerated
by
the
cannabis
boom
and
the
malpractice
of
commercial
clubs.
The
current
situation
has
forced
the
movement's
anti-­‐prohibition
campaigning
to
be
put
on
hold
while
regulation
of
the
operations
of
clubs
is
pursued.
In
the
near
future,
we
should
find
out
if
the
initial
demands
are
resurrected,
or
if
the
movement
is
evolving
towards
other
goals
than
anti-­‐prohibition
propositions.
The
political
opening
up
has
occurred
in
three
regions:
the
Basque
Country,
Catalonia
and
Navarre.
In
each
case,
the
political
means
used
is
different,
the
common
element
being
wanting
to
regulate
clubs.
In
the
Basque
Country,
through
a
parliamentary
commission
that
lasted
from
April
2012
to
October
2014,
the
Basque
Government
was
urged
to
regulate
clubs
via
the
future
Law
on
Addictions.
In
Navarra,
the
discussion
of
clubs
arose
through
a
people's
legislative
initiative
that
culminated
on
27
November
2014
with
the
approval
of
the
"Regional
Law
24/2014
of
2
December,
regulating
cannabis
user
collectives
in
Navarra."
The
law
is
seen
as
a
triumph
by
the
cannabis
movement,
led
by
the
political
party
"Cannabis
Representation
of
Navarre",
although
in
light
of
the
text,
the
law
does
not
appear
to
resolve
the
"question
of
cannabis",
i.e.,
the
text
omits
any
explicit
reference
to
cultivation,
transport
or
supply.
Despite
the
approval,
the
Spanish
Interior
Ministry
considers
the
law
illegal
and
a
violation
of
state
powers12.
That
is,
once
again,
prohibition
is
on
the
attack
with
alarmist
arguments
such
as
that
clubs
"entail
an
increase
in
problematic
drug
use,
especially
among
teenagers",
and
discredits
those
who
defend
individual
freedoms
and
pursue
fairer
laws.
In
Catalonia,
following
the
media
impact
of
the
Rasquera
plantation13
,
in
full
cannabis
boom,
the
Generalitat
of
Catalonia
began
legislative
work
through
the
Health
Commission
of
the
Parliament
of
Catalonia
which
ended
in
January
2015
with
the
ratification
of
regulation14
in
the
form
of
a
code
of
practice
to
be
followed
by
clubs
and
councils.
Minimal
regulation
once
again
as
it
does
not
solve
the
"question
of
cannabis",
but
that
was
the
maximum
possible
given
the
powers
available
to
the
Generalitat.
The
Spanish
state
reserved
and
maintains
legislative
competencies
over
controlled
substances
like
cannabis.
Therefore,
despite
this
first
step,
greeted
positively
by
Catalan
cannabis
federations,
the
regulation
does
not
clarify
the
jurisprudential
grey
area
and
clubs
remain
vulnerable.
Furthermore,
the
Catalan
regulation
transfers
the
responsibility
for
regulating
clubs
to
local
councils.
This
may
lead
certain
councils
to
adopt
ordinances
containing
conditions
with
which
it
is
impossible
to
comply,
thus
de
facto
vetoing
their
activity.
12
The
Interior
Ministry
Puts
a
Halt
to
Cannabis
Clubs.
El
Diario,
23
December
2014.
13
Rasquera
village
council
submitted
civic
plans
for
a
cannabis
plantation
in
the
municipality
to
cater
for
a
Barcelona
based
club
with
more
than
10,000
members.
Despite
a
“yes”
vote
in
the
village
plebiscite,
the
public
prosecutor
in
Tarragona
censured
the
action
and
it
was
dismissed
by
the
Provincial
Assembly.
14
RESOLUCION
SLT/32/2015,
15
January,
approving
public
health
standards
to
guide
cannabis
associations
and
their
social
clubs
and
the
conditions
under
which
they
are
permitted
to
operate,
for
the
guidance
of
councils
in
Catalonia.

10.
10
At
the
local
level,
Sarrià
de
Ter
was
the
first
council
in
the
country
to
enact
a
bylaw
on
clubs15
,
published
in
the
Official
Gazette
of
the
Province
of
Girona
on
November
12,
2014.
The
next
day
the
Official
Gazette
of
the
Province
of
Guipúzcoa
published
the
San
Sebastián
Ordinance16
.
Both
emphasise
location,
especially
the
distance
between
clubs
and
various
public
facilities.
In
Catalonia,
council
activity
in
relation
to
clubs
has
been
quiet
but
prolific.
21
councils
have
approved
decrees
suspending
the
granting
of
licences
for
cannabis-­‐
related
activities,
including
Barcelona,
Lleida,
Mataró,
Sabadell,
Gavà
and
Vilafranca
del
Penedès.
Other
councils
have
approved
decrees
relating
to
the
initial
approval
of
bylaws
regulating
cannabis
activity,
including
Girona,
Castelldefels,
Sitges
and
Vilanova
i
la
Geltrú.
Councils
which
have
made
declarations
in
relation
to
clubs
have
chosen
to
publish
a
moratorium:
some
with
the
intention
of
planning
the
definitive
bylaw
and
others
to
limit
the
opening
of
cannabis
clubs.
It
is
clear,
therefore,
how
the
cannabis
boom
has
accelerated
council
activity
to
avoid
conflictive
situations.
This
is
true
of
the
councils
of
La
Jonquera
and
Vilamalla
(municipalities
bordering
with
France)
who
have
suspended
the
granting
of
licences
after
noticing
a
proliferation
of
clubs
with
French
members
who
cross
the
border
to
buy
cannabis
due
to
the
difficulties
of
supplying
themselves
in
their
country
(Massin,
Carrieri
and
Roux,
2013).
SHOULD WE PERSEVERE WITH PROHIBITION?
If
one
examines
current
law,
the
Spanish
wall
of
prohibition
began
to
come
up
with
the
ratification
of
the
Single
Convention
on
Narcotic
Drugs
of
1961
in
1966
and
the
passing
of
the
Law
17/1967
which
prohibited
all
use
of
drugs.
The
wall
was
reinforced
by
successive
laws
like
the
Royal
Decree
2829/1977
which
banned
the
use
of
psychotropic
substances
and
articles
(368,
369,
370
and
371)
of
the
Criminal
Code
(Statutory
Law
1/1988).
It
was
completed
by
successive
reforms
and
the
Protection
of
Public
Safety
Act
1992
(Ley
Orgánica
1/1992)
(Muñoz,
2007:
34-­‐36).
As
a
result
of
these
laws,
as
Muñoz
(2007:
36)
notes,
"our
legal
system
forms
a
purely
prohibitionist
model
characterised
by
repressive
strictness
and
legislative
intransigence
against
any
contact
with
drugs".
And
this
is
the
legal
framework
on
which
the
clubs
have
tried
to
develop
their
activity.
Despite
the
progress
of
the
cannabis
movement
and
the
political
opening
up
of
some
administrations,
prohibition
is
still
in
good
health
in
Spain
and
seems
unwilling
to
capitulate
easily
and
will
prevent
any
change
to
the
current
status
quo
(Arana,
2012).
Prohibition
poses
a
threat
to
clubs
that
can
lead
to
cessation
of
activity
and
criminal
prosecutions
(Renovatio,
2014:
18-­‐19).
In
recent
years,
despite
the
efforts
of
many
clubs
to
be
transparent
and
their
willingness
to
adhere
to
the
jurisprudence,
this
has
not
been
enough
to
put
them
out
of
danger
and
stop
them
being
targeted
by
the
police
(Barriuso,
2012b:
169-­‐172).
As
Brión
and
del
Valle
(2015:
23)
point
out,
the
associations
feel
that
"their
insecurities
about
the
lack
of
regulation
is
like
the
sword
of
Damocles
that
threatens
their
ventures.
"
The
legal
grey
area
allows
security
forces
to
act
if
they
observe,
in
their
judgment,
evidence
of
a
crime.
These
15
“Edict
of
final
approval
of
the
Bylaw
regulating
the
activity
of
Cannabis
Clubs"
16
"Bylaw
regulating
the
location
of
cannabis
social
clubs".

11.
11
operations
occur
both
at
the
headquarters
of
the
association
and
at
the
plantations,
where
cannabis
is
seized
and
managers
detained,
accused
of
various
crimes,
especially
against
public
health.
Transportation
of
cannabis
is
also
a
dangerous
activity
because
at
any
roadblock
members
can
be
subject
to
inspection
and
arrest
(Barriuso,
2012b:
175).
Despite
the
fact
that
clubs
show
documentation
certifying
that
the
cannabis
is
shared
and
complies
with
prevailing
jurisprudence,
in
reality
this
does
not,
in
most
cases,
prevent
the
club
members
being
arrested
and
later
released
on
bail
pending
trial.
Typically
trials
end
in
acquittal
but
are
a
cause
of
hardship
as
preparing
for
a
trial
involves
looking
for
a
lawyer
and
appearing
before
a
judge
to
give
evidence,
a
situation
that
generates
anxiety,
malaise
and
uncertainty.
The
current
framework
of
prohibition
also
leaves
cannabis
clubs
vulnerable
to
outside
interference,
such
as
theft
from
the
association's
plantations
(Brión
and
del
Valle,
2015:
28).
The
grey
area
makes
it
impossible
for
them
even
to
think
about
reporting
the
theft
to
the
police
to
prevent
further
interference.
Clubs
can
also
receive
threats
or
pressure
from
criminal
groups
who
take
advantage
of
the
grey
area.
Regarding
the
prohibitionist
pressure
on
consumers,
despite
the
change
in
culture,
security
forces
have
remained
relentless
(Arana
and
Germán,
2004).
The
number
of
cases
of
reported
drug
use
or
possession
under
Article
25
of
the
Public
Safety
Act
1992,
has
increased
steadily
since
the
law
came
into
force.
The
earliest
statistic
provided
by
the
Interior
Ministry
on
drug-­‐related
police
reports
is
for
1998,
when
81,64417
were
detained
or
fined
for
drugs.
In
2006
the
number
of
administrative
sanctions
increased
to
218,656,
77.32%
of
which
were
for
cannabis,
and
in
2013
they
reached
a
record
high
of
401,289
police
reports,
of
which
87%
were
cannabis
related
(Ministry
of
Interior,
2014:
322).
The
new
Public
Safety
Act18
also
puts
pressure
on
cannabis
consumers
and,
implicitly,
on
clubs.
In
relation
to
possession
and
consumption
in
public,
consumers
are
now
liable
to
more
hefty
fines,
ranging
from
€601
to
€30,000
-­‐
in
other
words
double
the
previous
minimum
fine
of
€301.
Furthermore,
the
new
act
includes
a
point
absent
in
the
previous
one
in
regard
to
plantations.
Paragraph
20
of
article
36
refers
to
"illicit
acts
of
planting
and
cultivation
of
toxic
drugs,
narcotics
or
psychotropic
substances
in
publicly
visible
places,
even
if
it
does
not
constitute
a
criminal
offence
to
do
so".
This
leaves
the
security
forces
free
to
sanction
any
plantation
destined
for
personal
use.
It
remains
to
be
seen
what
the
expression
"publicly
visible"
implies,
but
in
the
worse
case
scenario,
any
visible
plant
would
incur
a
minimum
fine
of
€601.
This
situation
is
a
clear
persecution
of
consumers
as
it
prevents
self-­‐supply
and
puts
them
in
a
vulnerable
position.
To
avoid
problems,
they
are
more
likely
to
purchase
on
the
black
market.
Until
now,
seizure
of
marijuana
plants
has
been
adjudicated
in
court,
with
the
judge
deciding
whether
it
was
destined
for
trafficking,
with
the
resulting
fine
or
prison
sentence,
or
whether
it
was
destined
for
personal
use
or
shared
consumption,
in
the
case
of
clubs,
which
normally
results
in
acquittal.
With
the
previous
Public
Safety
Act,
if
the
police
saw
17
This
statistic
does
not
differentiate
between
drugs
or
between
arrests
or
fines,
so
the
actual
figure
for
cannabis-­‐related
police
reports
is
much
lower.
18
Approved
by
the
Congress
of
Deputies
in
December
2014,
it
entered
into
force
on
1
July
2015.

12.
12
one
or
two
plants,
they
would
have
been
unlikely
to
act
because
they
knew
that
the
judge
would
apply
the
Supreme
Court's
jurisprudence
which
allowed
cultivation
for
personal
use
and
acquit
the
accused.
Prohibition
is
not
sustained
exclusively
by
the
law.
Public
anti-­‐drug
opinion
also
plays
a
major
part.
Public
opinion
against
drugs
is
based
on
discourses
by
'experts',
especially
doctors,
extolling
the
dangers
of
controlled
substances.
It
is
also
influenced
by
socio-­‐
historical
elements
recorded
in
the
collective
memory.
Hence,
despite
normalisation,
the
image
of
compulsive
consumption
of
heroin
still
survives
among
the
population.
And
in
these
"anti-­‐drugs"
discourses
in
general,
the
media
have
played
a
key
role
(Gayo,
2013:
146-­‐148).
One
of
the
most
immediate
consequences
of
the
cannabis
boom
was
the
painting
of
a
negative
picture
of
clubs,
caused
by
media
reports
of
bad
practices
such
as
attracting
tourists
via
the
Internet19and
selling
to
minors20.
Such
reporting
also
induced
fear
among
citizens
by
claiming
that
Barcelona
had
become
the
new
Amsterdam21
and
so
was
attracting
cannabis
tourism22.
In
this
respect,
news
reports
are
one-­‐sided.
They
do
not
mention
the
complaints
of
the
movement,
which
was
trying
to
guarantee
the
survival
of
the
closed
supply
circuit
-­‐
which
had
already,
in
part,
been
recognised
by
the
jurisprudence.
The
media
have
repeatedly
used
their
sources
to
run
stories
on
the
arrests
of
club
bosses
and
the
charges
brought
against
them
of
crimes
against
public
health
and
even
criminal
conspiracy23
,
theft
of
electrical
supply24
and
money
laundering25
.
They
have
also
used
alarmist
and
tendentious
discourse,
as
in
the
case
of
the
reports
on
the
arrest
of
"the
ringleaders"
of
cannabis
associations26
that
used
exactly
the
same
discourse
as
that
of
reports
on
the
arrests
of
members
of
ETA.
The
amalgam
of
news
of
this
kind
leads,
among
a
large
swathe
of
the
population,
to
an
image
being
portrayed
of
clubs
as
criminal
and
delinquent
organisations.
They
are
considered
responsible
for
facilitating
consumption,
of
trivialising
the
risks
of
cannabis
and
of
normalising
inherently
dangerous
practices.
That
is,
prohibitionist
arguments
are
used
to
justify
the
persecution
and
closure
of
clubs
in
the
name
of
public
health
and
social
cohesion,
because
contrary
to
pro-­‐cannabis
arguments,
they
claim
that
clubs
enhance
drug
19
"Cannabis
Clubs"
Advertise
on
the
Internet
to
Sell
the
Drug.
El
País,
22
May
2014.
20
Leaders
of
a
Cannabis
Club
in
Barcelona
Arrested
for
Selling
to
Minors.
La
Vanguardia,
5
May
2014.
21
Sunny
Amsterdam.
El
País,
7
December
2013.
22
The
Cannabis
Club
Boom
Attracts
Reefer
Tourism
to
Barcelona.
La
Vanguardia,
20
January
2014.
23
Owners of Four Cannabis Associations Arrested for Supplying Drugs to 200 People. ABC, 26 July 2014.
24
Police Detain Two Bosses from a Cannabis Association in Maresme County. La Vanguardia, 1 December
2014.
25
Bosses of the Biggest Marijuana Club Arrested for Money Laundering. El Periódico, 12 July 2014.
26
Ringleaders
of
the
Cannabis
Associations
Arrested
for
Money
Laundering.
El
País,
11
July
2014.

13.
13
trafficking
and
offer
no
improvement
to
"the
Drugs
Problem"
and
do
not
benefit
society
in
any
way.
CONCLUSION
In
Spain
the
cannabis
movement
has
been
fighting
for
fairer
drugs
policies
for
more
than
thirty
years.
This
fight
led
to
cracks
in
the
wall
of
prohibition
which
enabled
the
creation
of
cannabis
clubs.
The
combination
of
a
lack
of
clear
regulation
and
normalisation
of
cannabis,
along
with
certain
hegemonic
discourses
(consumerism
and
entrepreneurship)
has
led
to
a
boom
in
cannabis
clubs.
Recognition
of
the
reality
of
consumption,
a
result
of
the
process
of
normalisation,
made
it
possible
for
clubs
to
operate.
Normalisation
led
to
a
proliferation
in
the
profiles
of
consumers,
regardless
of
age,
sex
or
socioeconomic
status.
Acquiring
cannabis
from
clubs
has
enabled
these
consumers
to
distance
themselves
from
the
black
market
and
purchase
from
a
safe
and
quality-­‐assured
supplier.
The
cannabis
boom
began
in
Barcelona
in
2011.
The
majority
of
the
new
clubs
disassociated
themselves
from
the
co-­‐operative
FAC
model
and
began
to
operate
without
adhering
to
the
jurisprudence.
During
the
recession,
some
young
people
saw
clubs
as
an
opportunity
to
make
a
living.
Others,
influenced
by
contemporary
neoliberal
thinking,
saw
them
an
investment
opportunity.
Commercial
clubs
are
a
product
of
consumerist
and
capitalist
thinking
which
has
found
a
good
business
niche
in
the
newly
transformed
cannabis
capital,
Barcelona.
This
type
of
club
is
a
threat
to
co-­‐operative
clubs
because
they
undermine
decades
of
work,
but
bad
practices
have
also
created
a
political
opportunity
to
demand
clear
regulations.
Given
this
situation,
the
cannabis
movement
has
pressured
the
authorities
to
accelerate
the
regulation
of
clubs,
establishing
itself
as
a
valid
interlocutor
in
the
political
debate.
The
presence
of
the
"issue
of
clubs"
on
the
political
agenda
has
produced
results
in
three
regional
parliaments:
the
Basque
Country,
the
Autonomous
Community
of
Navarre
and
Catalonia
and
in
some
municipalities
in
these
territories.
However,
the
regulations
obtained
so
far
are
insufficient
as
they
fail
to
resolve
the
issues
of
cultivation,
transport
and
access
to
cannabis,
and
could
be
considered
a
"patch"
for
the
prohibition
model.
At
some
point
we
should
evaluate
the
results
of
their
implementation
and
whether
they
have
led
to
an
improvement
for
clubs
and
have
fulfilled
the
objective
of
eliminating
bad
practice,
or
on
the
contrary,
they
have
caused
the
bureaucratisation
of
activity
and
control
by
the
authorities
which
also
fails
to
prevent
bad
practice.
These
first
regional
regulations
are
seen
as
an
extremely
symbolic
first
step
towards
continued
discussion
about
drugs
policies.
An
obstacle
to
the
opening
up
of
some
local
administrations
is
the
belligerence
towards
and
rejection
of
regional
and
local
regulations27
by
Central
Government,
which
seems
unwilling
to
make
any
changes
to
the
wall
of
prohibition28.
Spanish
prohibition
has
been
and
is
an
element
of
harassment
which
prevents
the
smooth
operation
of
clubs.
Fines,
seizures,
arrests
and
prosecutions
have
formed
part
of
clubs'
existence
in
recent
years.
Prohibition
27
State
Counsel
Studies
Impugning
Cannabis
Clubs.
El
Diario,
11
December
2014.
28
Legalising
Marijuana
"is
not
a
path
that
Spain
is
willing
to
follow."
El
Diario,
11
February
2015.

14.
14
sees
clubs
as
perverse
spaces,
when
in
truth
the
task
they
are
performing
is
to
weaken
drug
trafficking,
keep
consumers
normalised
and
ensure
their
safety.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aldridge,
J.
(2008).
Decline
but
no
fall?
New
millennium
trends
in
young
people’s
use
of
illegal
and
illicit
drugs
in
Britain.
Health
Education.
108
(3),
189-­‐206.
Alonso,
L.
E.
y
Fernández
Rodríguez,
C.
(2013).
Los
discursos
del
presente.
Un
análisis
de
los
imaginarios
sociales
contemporáneos.
Madrid:
Siglo
XXI.
Aldridge,
J.,
Measham
F.
y
Williams,
L.
(2011).
Illegal
Leisure
revisited.
Changing
patterns
of
alcohol
and
drug
use
in
adolescents
and
young
adults.
Londres:
Routledge,
Arana,
X.
(2005).
Cannabis:
Normalización
y
legislación.
Eguzkilore,
19,
121-­‐138.
Arana,
X.
(2012).
Drogas,
legislaciones
y
alternativas.
De
los
discursos
de
las
sentencias
sobre
el
tráfico
ilícito
de
drogas
a
la
necesidad
de
políticas
diferentes.
Gakoa:
Donostia.
Arana,
X.
(2013).
Marco
jurídico
de
la
reducción
de
daños
en
el
campo
las
drogas.
En
David
Pere
Martínez
Oró
y
Joan
Pallarés
(eds.).
De
riesgos
y
placeres.
Manual
para
entender
las
drogas
(129-­‐142).
Lleida:
Millenio.
Arana,
X.
y
Germán,
I.
(2004).
Delimitación
del
“status”
jurídico
del
ciudadano
“consumidor
de
drogas”.
Propuesta
de
Carta
de
Derechos
de
los
Usuarios
del
Drogas.
Vitoria-­‐Gasteiz:
Servicio
Central
de
Publicaciones
del
Gobierno
Vasco.
Arana,
X.
y
Montañés,
V.
(2011)
Cannabis
cultivation
in
Spain-­‐
The
case
of
cannabis
social
clubs.
En
T.
Decorte,
G.
Potter
y
M.
Bouchard
(Eds.)
World
wide
weed:
Global
trends
in
cannabis
cultivation
and
its
control
(163-­‐167).
London:
Ashgate.
Borrallo,
F.
(1997).
La
brecha
catalana.
Modelo
propuesto
por
la
Asociación
Ramón
Santos
de
Estudios
sobre
el
Cannabis
(ARSEC).
Cáñamo:
La
revista
de
la
cultura
del
cannabis.
1,
50-­‐51.
Barriuso,
(2007).
Más
allá
de
las
excusas:
hacia
una
regulación
legal
no
prohibicionista
para
el
cannabis.
En
Hablemos
del
Cannabis
(107-­‐131).
Bilbao:
Universidad
de
Deusto.
Barriuso,
M.
(2011).
Los
clubes
sociales
de
cannabis
en
España.
Una
alternativa
normalizadora
en
marcha.
Serie
reforma
legislativa
en
materia
de
drogas,
9.
TNI,
Barriuso,
M.
(2012a).
Los
clubes
de
Cannabis
en
la
encrucijada.
Entre
la
autogestión
y
la
mercantilización.
TNI.
Online.
Barriuso,
M.
(2012b).
Ni
prohibición
ni
mercantilización:
Buscando
el
equilibrio
en
la
regulación
legal
del
cannabis.
En
Cannabis,
usos,
seguridad
jurídica
y
políticas
(189-­‐
181).
Vitoria-­‐Gasteiz:
Ararteko.

15.
15
Becker,
H.
(2009).
Outsiders.
Hacia
una
sociología
de
la
desviación.
Buenos
Aires:
Siglo
XXI
editores.
Original
1963.
Bewley-­‐Taylor,
D.
(2012).
Hacia
una
revisión
de
las
convenciones
de
drogas
de
la
ONU.
La
lógica
y
los
dilemas
de
los
grupos
afines.
Serie
reforma
legislativa
en
materia
de
drogas,
19.
TNI.
Bewley-­‐
Taylor,
D.,
Blickman,
T.
y
Jelsma,
M.
(2014).
Auge
y
caída
de
la
prohibición
del
cannabis.
Barcelona:
La
cañamería
global.
Blickman,
T.
(2014).
Cannabis
policy
reform
in
Europe.
Bottom
up
rather
than
top
down.
Series
on
Legislative
Reform
of
Drug
Policies
,
28.
Blickman,
T.
y
Jelsma
M.
(2009).
La
reforma
de
las
políticas
de
drogas.
Experiencias
alternativas
en
Europa
y
Estados
Unidos.
Nueva
Sociedad,
222,
(81-­‐103).
Brión,
A.
y
del
Valle,
J.
(2015).
Sostenibilidad
estructural
de
los
CSC
en
la
CAPV.
Bilbao:
EUSFAC.
Buechler,
S.
M.
(2000).
Social
movements
in
advanced
capitalism.
The
political
economy
and
cultural
construction
of
social
activism.
Oxford:
Oxford
University
press.
Byung-­‐
Chul
Han
(2012).
La
sociedad
del
cansancio.
Barcelona:
Herder.
Original
de
2010.
Carmena,
M.
(2012).
La
jurisprudencia
sobre
la
ilicitud
del
tráfico
del
hachís.
En
Cannabis,
usos,
seguridad
jurídica
y
políticas
(89-­‐98).
Vitoria-­‐Gasteiz:
Ararteko.
CIS
(2014).
Barómetro
de
la
percepción
de
los
principales
problemas
de
España.
Madrid:
Centro
de
Investigaciones
Sociológicas
(CIS).
Comas,
D.
(2002).
La
percepción
social
de
los
problemas.
Fundación
de
Ayuda
contra
la
Drogadicción
(ed.),
Sociedad
y
drogas:
una
perspectiva
de
15
años
(77-­‐94).
FAD:
Madrid.
Comisión
de
Políticas
de
Drogas
y
Sostenibilidad
(2013).
El
presente
continuo
de
los
clubes
de
cannabis
en
Cataluña.
TNI.
Online.
Decorte,
T
(2015).
Cannabis
social
clubs
in
Belgium:
Organizational
strengths
and
weaknesses,
and
threats
to
the
model.
International
Journal
of
drug
policy,
26
(2),
122-­‐130.
Delgado,
M.
(2007).
La
ciudad
mentirosa:
fraude
y
miseria
del
"modelo
Barcelona".
Madrid:
Los
Libros
de
la
Catarata.
Díez
Ripollés,
J.L.
y
Muñoz
Sánchez,
J.
(2012).
Licitud
de
la
autoorganizacion
del
consumo
de
drogas.
Jueces
para
la
Democracia,
75,
48-­‐64.
Eurobarómetro
(2014).
Young
people
and
Drugs.
Eurobarometer
401.
Bruselas:
Comisión
Europea.

16.
16
Gayo,
A.
(2013).
El
papel
de
los
medios
de
comunicación:
más
fuentes,
más
rigor,
más
debate…
menos
riesgos».
En
David
Pere
Martínez
Oró
y
Joan
Pallarés
(eds.).
De
riesgos
y
placeres.
Manual
para
entender
las
drogas
(143-­‐156)
Lleida:
Milenio.
González
Duro,
E.
(1979).
Consumo
de
drogas
en
España.
Madrid:
Villalar.
González,
C.,
Funes,
J.,
González,
S.,
Mayol,
I.
y
Oriol
Romaní
(1989).
Repensar
las
drogas.
Hipótesis
de
la
influencia
de
una
política
liberalizadora
respecto
a
las
drogas,
sobre
los
costes
sociales,
las
pautas
de
consumo
y
los
sistemas
de
recuperación.
Barcelona:
Grup
IGIA.
Hallam,
C.,
Bewley-­‐
Taylor,
D.
y
Jelsmam
M.
(2014).
La
clasificación
en
el
sistema
internacional
de
control
de
drogas.
Serie
Reforma
legislativa
en
materia
de
drogas,
25.
TNI.
Hathaway,
A.
D.,
Comeau,
N.
y
Erickson
P.
G.
(2011).
Cannabis
normalization
and
stigma:
Contemporary
practices
of
moral
regulation.
Criminology
and
Criminal,
Justice,
11
(5),
451-­‐469.
Jelsma,
M.
(2009).
Innovaciones
legislativas
en
políticas
de
drogas.
Secretariado
de
la
iniciativa
latinoamericana
sobre
drogas
y
democracia.
Lipovestky,
G.
(2008).
La
felicidad
paradójica.
Barcelona:
Anagrama.
Original
2007.
Marín,
I.
(2008).
La
cultura
“cannábica”
en
España
(1991-­‐2007).
Análisis
socioantropológico
de
un
nuevo
tipo
de
movimiento
social
(Tesis
doctoral).
Granada:
Editorial
de
la
Universidad
de
Granada.
Martínez
Hernáez,
A.
(2009).
Cuerpos
fantasmales
en
la
urbe
global.
Fractal.
Revista
de
psicología,
21
(2),
223-­‐236.
Martínez
Oró,
D.
P.
(2014a).
Sense
passar-­‐se
de
la
ratlla.
La
normalització
dels
consums
de
drogues.
Barcelona:
Bellaterra.
Martínez
Oró,
D.
P.
(2014b).
El
malestar
emocional
entre
los
jóvenes
españoles.
La
liquidez
de
las
instituciones
sociales
como
fuente
de
malestar
emocional.
En
Oriol
Romaní
y
Lina
Casadó
(eds),
Jóvenes,
desigualdades
y
salud:
vulnerabilidad
y
políticas
públicas.
Tarragona:
Publicacions
de
la
URV,
Colección
Antropología
Médica
n.º
13,
Martínez
Oró,
D.
P.,
Pallarés,
J.,
Espluga,
J.,
Barruti,
M.
y
Canales,
G.
(2010),
Observatori
de
nous
consums
de
drogues
en
l’àmbit
juvenil.
Informe
2009.
Barcelona:
Fundación
Igenus
Martínez
Oró,
D.
P.
y
Pallarés,
J.
(2013).
Riesgos,
daños
y
placeres.
En
David
Pere
Martínez
Oró
y
Joan
Pallarés
(eds.).
De
riesgos
y
placeres.
Manual
para
entender
las
drogas
(23-­‐
36).
Lleida:
Milenio.
Massin,
S.,
Carrieri,
M.
P.
y
Roux,
P.
(2013).
De
jure
decriminalisation
of
cannabis
use
matters:
some
recent
trends
from
France.
International
Journal
of
Drug
Policy,
24
(634-­‐635).

17.
17
Matza,
D.
(1981).
El
proceso
de
desviación.
Madrid:
Taurus.
Original1964.
Mena,
F.
y
Hobbs,
D.
(2010)
Narcophobia:
drugs
prohibition
and
the
generation
of
human
rights
abuses.
Trends
Organ
Crim,
13,
(60–74).
Ministerio
del
Interior
(2014).
Anuario
estadístico
del
Ministerio
del
Interior.
Madrid:
Ministerio
del
Interior
Monaghan,
M.
(2014).
Drug
Policy
Governance
in
the
UK:
Lessons
from
changes
to
and
debates
concerning
the
classification
of
cannabis
under
the
1971
Misuse
id
Drug
Act.
Journal
of
Drug
Policy,
25,
(1025-­‐1030).
Montañés,
V.
(2014).
Rompiendo
el
hielo.
La
regulación
del
cannabis
en
Países
Bajos,
Colorado
y
Uruguay.
Renovatio:
San
Sebastián.
Muñoz,
J.
(2007).
Política
criminal
de
drogas.
Reflexiones
en
torno
a
la
normalización
del
cannabis.
En
Hablemos
del
cannabis
(31-­‐44).
Bilbao:
Universidad
de
Deusto.
Muñoz,
J.
y
Soto,
S.
(2001).
El
uso
terapéutico
de
cannabis
y
la
creación
de
establecimientos
para
su
adquisición
y
consumo.
Revista
de
Derecho
Penal
y
Criminología,
7,
49–94.
Parker,
H.
(2005).
Normalization
as
a
barometer:
recreational
drug
use
and
the
consumption
of
leisure
by
younger
Britons.
Addiction
research
and
theory,
13
(3),
205-­‐215.
Parker,
H.,
Aldridge,
J.
y
Measham,
F.
(1998).
Illegal
Leisure.
The
Normalisation
of
Adolescent
Recreational
Drug
Use.
Routledge:
Londres.
Parker,
H.,
Williams
L.
y
Aldridge
J.
(2002).
The
normalisation
of
“sensible”
recreational
drug
use:
Further
evidence
from
the
north
west
England
longitudinal
study.
Sociology,
36
(4),
941-­‐964.
Observatorio
Español
de
Drogas
(OED).
(2014).
Informe
del
Observatorio
Español
de
Drogas.Informe
2013.
Madrid:
Delegación
del
Gobierno
para
el
Plan
Nacional
sobre
Drogas.
Ramonet,
I.
(2009).
La
catástrofe
perfecta.
Crisis
del
siglo
y
refundación
del
porvenir.
Barcelona:
Icària.
Renovatio,
Fundación
(2014).
DAFO.
Cannabis
&
Activismo.
San
Sebastián:
Fundación
Renovatio.
Online.
Renovatio
(2013).
Propuesta
de
regulación
del
cannabis
en
la
CAPV.
San
Sebastián:
Fundación
Renovatio.
Online.
Rodríguez
S.,
E.,
Megías
V.
E.,
Megías
Q.,
I.,
Rodríguez
F.
y
Rubio,
A.
(2014).
La
percepción
social
de
los
problemas
de
drogas
en
España,
2014.
Madrid:
FAD.

18.
18
Rolles,
S.,
Murkin,
G.,
Powell,
M.,
Kushlick,
D.
y
Slater,
J.
(2012).
The
alternative
World
drug
report.
Counting
the
cost
of
the
war
on
drugs.
London:
Transform
Drug
Policy
Foundation.
Rolles,
S.
y
Murkin
G.
(2014).
How
to
regulate
cannabis.
A
practical
guide.
London:
Transform
Drug
Policy
Foundation.
Romaní,
O.
(2004).
Las
drogas.
Sueños
y
Razones.
Barcelona:
Ariel.
Original
1999.
Romaní,
O.
(2005).
La
cultura
del
cannabis
treinta
años
después…
unas
reflexiones
personales.
Revista
Española
de
Drogodependencias,
30
(3/4),
263-­‐282,
Monográfico
20
años
del
Plan
Nacional
Sobre
Drogas.
Romaní,
O.
(2013).
Reducción
de
daños
y
control
social.
¿De
qué
estamos
hablando?».
En
David
Pere
Martínez
Oró
y
Joan
Pallarés
(eds.),
De
riesgos
y
placeres.
Manual
para
entender
las
drogas
(103-­‐116).
Lleida:
Milenio.
Romaní,
O.
(2015).
Normalización
de
los
usos
de
drogas
y
salud:
de
la
prevención
y
reducción
de
riesgos,
al
“buen
vivir”.
En
V
Simposio
Internacional
sobre
Reducción
de
Daños:
“Políticas
de
drogas:
Retos
desde
el
prisma
de
los
Derechos
Humanos.
UPV:
Donostia.
(En
prensa).
Romaní,
O.
y
Casadó,
L
(eds),
Jóvenes,
desigualdades
y
salud:
vulnerabilidad
y
políticas
públicas.
Tarragona:
Publicacions
de
la
URV,
Colección
Antropología
Médica
n.º
13,
Room,
R.,
Fischer,
B.,
Hall,
W.,
Lenton,
S.,
Reuter,
P.,
Rossi,
D.
y
Corda,
R.
A
.
(2013).
Políticas
sobre
el
cannabis.
México:
Fondo
de
Cultura
Económica.
Rosmarin,
A.
Y
Eastwood,
N.
(2012).
Una
revolución
silenciosa:
Políticas
en
práctica
para
la
descriminalización
de
las
drogas
en
todo
el
mundo.
London:
Release.
Usó,
J.
C.
(1996).
Drogas
y
cultura
de
masas.
España
1855-­‐1995.
Madrid:
Taurus.
Usó,
J.
C.
(2005).
Historia
y
evolución
del
consumo
de
cannabis
en
España.
En
Colectivo
interzona.
Cannabis.
Madrid:
Amargord
Usó,
J.
C.
(2009).
La
represión
del
cannabis
en
España.
Breve
historia
de
un
expolio
continuado.
Cáñamo:
La
revista
de
la
cultura
del
cannabis,
144,
50-­‐57.
Usó,
J.
C.
(2013).
Políticas
de
drogas
en
España.
En
David
Pere
Martínez
Oró
y
Joan
Pallarés
(eds.)
De
riesgos
y
placeres.
Manual
para
entender
las
drogas
(55-­‐70).
Lleida:
Milenio.
Tarrow,
S.
(1994).
Power
in
movement:
social
movements,
collective
action
and
politics.
Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
Press.
Toch,
H.
(1971).
The
social
psychology
of
social
movements.
Londres:
Methuen.
Original
1965.
Turisme
Barcelona
(2014).
Estadístiques
de
turisme
a
Barcelona,
2013.
Barcelona:
Turisme
Barcelona.

19.
19
Vibeke,
F.,
Christensen,A-­‐S.,
y
Vibeke,
H.
(2014).
Cannabis
use
during
a
life
course-­‐
integrating
cannabis
use
into
a
everyday
life.
Drugs
and
alcohol
today,
13
(1),
44-­‐50.
VVAA
(2004).
Barcelona,
marca
registrada:
un
model
per
desarma.
Barcelona:
Virus.
Wodak,
A
(2014).
The
abject
failure
of
drug
prohibition.
Australian
&
New
Zealand
Journal
of
Criminology
August
47(190-­‐201).
Zalakain,
J.
(2012).
Un
acercamiento
sociológico
al
uso
del
cannabis
en
Euskadi:
Consumo
y
percepciones
sociales.
En
Cannabis,
usos,
seguridad
jurídica
y
políticas.
(55-­‐73).
Vitoria-­‐Gasteiz:
Ararteko.