This document provides background information on Alfredo Stroessner's dictatorship in Paraguay from 1954 to 1989. It discusses how Stroessner rose through the ranks of the military and benefited from political instability to become president in 1954. It also examines how the US supported Stroessner and provided military and economic aid throughout his rule in order to prevent the spread of communism in Latin America during the Cold War. This US backing, combined with Stroessner's repressive tactics against opposition, allowed his dictatorship to endure for over 35 years as one of the longest in Latin American history.

1. Alfredo Stroessner: The Use of Repression and U.S. Economic Aid in Paraguay 1954-1989
Jay Porter
International Affairs 6341:
Latin American and Hemispheric Studies Cornerstone
December 12, 2016

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Introduction to Stroessner’s Paraguay
The dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner, also known as the Stronato, was made possible
with the sponsorship of the United States. The U.S. supported Stroessner in order to prevent the
spread of communism in Latin America. The difference between Stroessner and other dictators
in the Cold War is that Stroessner came to power before the Cuban Revolution and did not lose
power until 1989. His reign was one of the longest of any twentieth century dictator at thirty-five
years, and the second-longest in Latin America after Fidel Castro of Cuba.
The period from the end of the Chaco War in 1935 to the beginning of the Stronato in
1954 was an era of turbulence and upheaval that created opportunities for dictators to take
control of Paraguay. This nineteen-year period saw eleven men assume the presidency, several
military coups, and even a civil war from March to August of 1947. Eventually, Alfredo
Stroessner would emerge from the chaos and officially become president; unofficially, he would
become a repressive, authoritarian dictator.
Throughout Stroessner’s reign elections occurred every five years, but the opposition
never had a chance. After all, in Paraguayan history successors generally took power through
military coups instead of democratic elections. The elections were a ritual to please the United
States, the United Nations, and anyone else that concerned itself with Paraguay’s internal affairs.
The Colorado Party dominated the political arena in a similar way to how the Institutional
Revolutionary Party dominated Mexican politics throughout the twentieth century. Naturally,
Stroessner used Paraguay’s alliance with the United States to entrench himself and his cronies in
their positions while preventing the opposition from organizing into any real, democratic threat.
The Stronato endured for so long because of repression and U.S. military and economic aid.

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U.S.-Paraguayan Relations had four stages during the Cold War:
1. 1934-47: Germany begins to see Latin America as a market for its goods as well as a
source of raw materials. The United States increases its presence in Paraguay to
counter pro-fascist sympathies in an early cold war against fascism in Latin America.
2. 1947-1953: U.S. aid was given to the Colorado party to prevent the spread of
communism during the era of Paraguayan instability.
3. 1953-1977: The U.S. sends military and economic aid with minimal democratic and
human rights concessions by Paraguay.
4. 1977-1989: Diplomatic relations sour between the US and the Stronato becomes
unresponsive to calls for democratic reform and protecting human rights.
The U.S. and Paraguay had a diplomatic relationship before the 1930s, but there was little need
for communication since they were distant from each other and the Paraguayan government lost
most of its power after being defeated in the War of the Triple Alliance (1865-70). Alfredo
Stroessner rose to a position of absolute power in 1954, which he learned to maintain through
careful strategy.
Stroessner’s Early Life (1912-1954)
Alfredo Stroessner Matiauda was born on November 3, 1912, in Encarnación, Paraguay.
His father, Hugo Wilhelm Stroessner, a German immigrant, moved from Baveria to Paraguay in
search of employment like many other Germans who immigrated to Paraguay during the late 19th
and early 20th centuries. Hugo married an indigenous woman, Heriberta Matiauda, and worked
as a brewer. Eventually, Hugo succumbed to alcoholism, needlessly wasting money on
beverages that the family needed. Heriberta compensated by turning to prostitution as a way to
provide for Alfredo and his sister, also named Heriberta.

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Stroessner worked his way to high ranking positions. At age 16, Stroessner enlisted in a
military academy and once the Chaco War began in 1932 he was sent to fight in the Battle of
Boquerón, which was a couple of years before he graduated.1 Stroessner was promoted to second
lieutenant and became an artillery officer who distinguished himself in several other battles
against the Bolivians. The war ended in 1935 and he kept going higher in rank to become a
major in 1940.2 During the 1940s, the soldier learned a few things about politics and power
plays.
In the Civil War of 1947, Stroessner fought for then-president Higinio Moríñigo and the
Colorado Party against a coalition of Febreristas, Liberals, and communists under the command
of Colonel Rafael Franco. The military became increasingly powerful and Stroessner managed to
position himself to land on the winning sides of the various revolts and coup d’états such as
serving under Moríñigo in the Paraguayan Civil War of 1947 and avoiding the power struggles
from within the Colorado Party. Nevertheless, Stroessner sided with the party majority to
overthrow Moríñigo in 1948.3 After the coup, Stroessner became commander-in-chief in 1951,
the perfect place from which to seize power. He led the coup against the democratically-elected
Federico Chávez in 1954 to become president. 4 Stroessner proved himself to be an adept
1 Paul Lewis, Paraguay Under Stroessner (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press,
1980): 64-65.
2 Ibid., 65.
3 Ibid., 70.
4 Roberto Paredes, Stroessnery el Stronismo, (Asunción, Paraguay: n.p., 2011): ch. 1, accessed November
15, 2016,
http://www.portalguarani.com/619_roberto_paredes/16168_stroessner_y_el_stronismo__por_roberto_paredes.html.
There is no compelling evidence that the United States supported the 1954 coup as they did in removing Jacobo
Árbenz from power in Guatemala and Salvador Allende in Chile. See Frank O. Mora and Jerry W. Cooney. United
Statesand the Americas: Paraguay and the United States: Distant Allies (Athens,US: University of Georgia Press,
2007), 125, accessed November 15, 2016, ProQuest ebrary.

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politician who kept the army, the Colorado Party, and the U.S. on his side.5 The following table
compares Stroessner’s time in office with his predecessors.
President Presidency Length
Eusebio Ayala 1932-6
Rafael Franco 1936-7
Félix Pavia 1937-9
José Estigarribia 1939-40
Higinio Moríñigo 1940-8
Juan Manuel Frutos June 1948 - August 1948
Juan González 1948-9
Raimundo Rolón January 1949 - February 1949
Felipe Molas February 1949 - September 1949
Federico Chávez 1949-54
Tómas Romero May 1954 - August 1954
Alfredo Stroessner 1954-89
Table 1 The Paraguayan Presidency was a revolving door with many presidents entering office through militarycoups and
leaving in the same manner.
The upheaval and rapid succession of presidents of the 1930s and 1940s allowed for
Stroessner’s rise to power. No one could have predicted that Stroessner would hold on to power
for thirty-five years. In fact, many spectators believed he would be replaced as president within a
year or two like his predecessors.6 It was akin to natural selection as the weaker presidents and
generals were weeded out until the Paraguayan presidency found someone that could not only
gain power, but also maintain it. He kept his friends close and his enemies closer. Stroessner
outlawed all opposition parties and eliminated or subdued rivals before they could usurp him.
Maintaining Power: Cold War politics in U.S.-Paraguayan Relations
5 Lewis, 72.
6 Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, eds., Paraguay: A Country Study, 2nd ed., (Washington,
D.C.: Library of Congress,1990), 41-2.

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Harry S. Truman began to give the Colorado Party economic assistance during the
Paraguayan Civil War of 1947 in order to prevent the formation of a communist regime.7 Before
the 1940s, the U.S. and Paraguay had very little interest in each other. Higinio Moríñigo’s trip to
Washington, DC, to visit Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1943 was the first meeting in history
between Paraguayan and American heads-of-state.8 Roosevelt wanted Moríñigo to join the Allies
against Germany and Italy. Nevertheless, Paraguay maintained neutrality through most of World
War Two in order to find himself on the winning side of a conflict it had no real interest in
pursuing. Axis sympathizers and pro-Axis businesses were ignored despite U.S. pressure.9
Paraguay declared war on the Axis powers in February 1945 after victory was certain.
One of the reasons Stroessner succeeded in consolidating his power is that the political
culture of Paraguay from before the Stronato favored authoritarianism. “The decidedly fascist
cast to the military regimes headed by Major Rafael Franco, Marshall Felix Estigarribia and
General Higinio Moríñigo throughout the I930s and 1940s reinforced the traditional xenophobia
permeating Paraguayan political culture, enshrining authoritarian values.”10 Not only did
previous regimes possess authoritarian tendencies, but Paraguay’s major leaders from the
nineteenth century were authoritarian dictators such as José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia, Carlos
Antonio López, and Francisco Solano López. Paraguay’s authoritarian tradition favored a
7 The opposition consisted of Communists, Febreristas, and Liberals who united in a failed attempt to
overthrow the repressive Moríñigo.
8 Mora and Cooney, 113. The first Latin American Nazi Party was established in Paraguay in 1931. See
page 95 of the same book.
9 Ibid., 114.
10 Paul C. Sondrol, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators: A Comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo
Stroessner,” Journal of Latin American Studies 23, no. 3 (October 1991), 613, accessed November 3, 2016,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/157386.

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caudillo or an absolute dictator who would seize the reins of government and enforce the law
with a heavy hand.
The Stronato operated under a “state of emergency” that constitutionally allowed martial
law. According to the Paraguayan constitution of 1940, the “state of emergency” could only last
for a period of ninety days, but was constantly renewed until 1988.11 A new constitution was
written in 1967 that gave Stroessner greater authority, but still gave the president “state of
emergency” powers. The authoritarian culture of Paraguay made this possible because it meant
limiting resistance such as denying or restricting the power of opposition parties to form. Martial
law also meant the military had complete control of the government.
During Stroessner’s reign, the Paraguayan people were heavily repressed to help the
regime avoid the hostile takeovers of the past.12 Of course, the cover-story was to label detainees
as being Marxist guerrillas or communist subversives. Thus, the U.S. gave Stroessner and other
dictators a con tool to use every time when confronted about its terrible acts. Not only did the
Stronato abduct its own citizens, but also censored the press to reinforce impressions of
Stroessner’s benevolence and protection. Alan Whicker examined a copy of the Paraguayan
newspaper ABC Color and found that sixteen stories focused on Stroessner while two stories
dealt with sports.13 Like Josef Stalin in Russia, Stroessner was able to control public opinion and
perception by manipulating the media.
11 Hanratty and Meditz, 42.
12 “35 Años del Stronismo Documental Completo (1954-1989),” produced by Adolfo Fernandez Penayo,
TV Pública Paraguaya, February 3, 2015, accessed December 11, 2016, http://www.dparaguay.com/2013/12/35-
anos-del-stronismo-documental.html.
13 Alan Whicker, The Last Dictator: Alan Whicker in Stroessner’s Paraguay,(British Broadcasting
Company, April 7, 1970): 53:20-53:53, accessed December 3, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8uEB-
Vs8m-8.

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The South American dictators worked with the United States in the shadowy Operation
Condor, an intelligence-sharing operation between the different military governments to find and
apprehend subversive elements regardless of which country they were in. With typical military
efficiency, the authoritarian governments would find, apprehend, and torture communists and
other rebels. One source reports that the military would regularly load up their airplanes with
“dissidents,” fly over the Paraguayan countryside, and throw them out of the plane without
parachutes.14 Fear may be understood as a manner of deterring and preventing uprisings and
military coups, but at some point, the meaning becomes lost and the military government begins
to commit atrocities without justification as the darker tendencies of human nature take over.
Constitutional rights to humane treatment and a trial by jury become forgotten.
There was no accountability for the terrible things Stroessner and his men did, some of
which have no justification. Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Stroessner’s
former chauffeur, Elvio Acosta, said in an interview from 2012 that the dictator would abduct
children from poor families in the interior, slit their throats, hoist them upside down over his
bathtub, and bathe in their blood to cure himself of a skin disease.15 Children’s blood, or any
blood for that matter, has never been proven to treat skin disease, which demonstrates
Stroessner’s absolute depravity. This report may seem far-fetched, but other horrifying stories
have become public knowledge. Anibal Miranda reports that a civilian found the bloody bodies
14 Charles Kimball, “The Xenophile Historian: A History of Latin America and the Caribbean, Chapter 6:
Contemporary Latin America, Part 3, 1959 to 2014,” 2016, accessed November 15, 2016,
http://xenohistorian.faithweb.com/latinam/la06c.html#Paraguay1.
15 “Ex Chofer de Stroessner:El Dictador Se Bañaba con Sangre de Niños.” Paraguay.com(February 16,
2012), accessed December 11, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IpuX2yeCeWk.

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of several girls in front of the house of Colonel Leopoldo “Popol” Perrier in barrio Sajonia of
Asunción.16
The Push for Reform
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, told Stroessner in a state visit
in 1962 that the U.S. would continue to give Paraguay economic assistance in the Alliance for
Progress if opposition parties were allowed to form and receive official recognition.17 Stroessner
agreed immediately, but the Kennedy Administration did not press further for fear of losing
Paraguay as a Cold War ally. Stroessner’s policy was to agree immediately with the demands of
the United States to maintain the alliance.
The Cold War could not be won without allies. Therefore, the U.S. decided it would turn
a blind eye to the corruption and tyranny of dictators as long as they were not communists and in
league with the Soviet Union. U.S. foreign policy focused on preventing the spread of
communism. Special sensitivity was given to Latin America where communist subversives had
already overthrown Battista in Cuba. Stroessner and his fellow South American dictators realized
they benefitted from squashing communist insurgencies because it also meant pruning their
territory of and potential threats. The U.S. would also give them economic aid with a few
concessions to keep Washington happy.18
16 Miranda, Anibal, Stroessner, (Asunción,Paraguay: Ediciones Última Hora: UniNorte, 2004): 61-68. The
incident was also reported in an article by Les Whitten of the Washington Post on December 20, 1977.
17 Frank O. Mora, "The Forgotten Relationship: United States-Paraguay Relations, 1937-89," Journal of
Contemporary History 33, no. 3 (1998): 451-73, accessed November 21, 2016.
http://www.jstor.org.proxygw.wrlc.org/stable/261125.
18 Mora, 462.

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Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress helped promote “democratic social development” in
Latin America. Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and Venezuela were portrayed as examples of
success.19 When it came to Paraguay, they just shrugged. Too many reforms could disrupt the
status quo and cause revolution or anarchy. Dictatorships were tolerated because reform was
risky, which in turn left a sour legacy between Latin America and the United States because the
U.S. helped cultivate dictatorships in Guatemala in 1954, and eventually, Argentina and Chile.
Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Panama, Haiti also experienced dictatorships throughout the latter-half
of the twentieth century. Stroessner and the other Latin American dictators played the United
States well by making them believe that the communists were at the gates, but in reality, they
were only entrenching their own power.
Stroessner received economic aid from the U.S. to help stimulate the Paraguayan
economy. The Johnson Administration kept sending money to Paraguay as Nixon did after him.
The Stronato received $41 million in U.S. public assistance, $5.5 million in military aid, and $32
million in loans from private sources.20 Like most dictatorships, the economic aid often did not
find its way to its intended investment target and instead landed the pockets of military and
government personnel. 21
Economic aid from the United States had the added effect of being used in propaganda to
promote the dictatorship’s image among the Paraguayan people. The Central Bank had a neon
sign that said “Peace, Jobs, and Well-being with Stroessner.”22 Naturally, the Stronato wanted to
19 Mora and Cooney, 166-7.
20 Ibid., 168.
21 Mora, 461.
22 Lewis, 151.

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project the impression that everything was great and much better off than before the 1954 coup.
Indeed, trade and development were pitiful in the early 1950s and late 1940s with the victors of
the 1947 civil war continuing to fight amongst themselves rather joining together to form a
stable, united government.
Corruption, while unethical, helped Stroessner keep his position. It was a way of
maintaining power by appeasing the highest-ranking members of his regime; and therefore,
preventing future coups. Much of the United States’ economic aid was eaten up by high-ranking
members of the government and the military. Alan Whicker reported in 1970, “As is common in
Paraguayan life, scandal lies behind these smiles. The former Director of Agriculture directed
much of the American aid given for wheat growing to the area of his own estancia. Ignoring the
fact that it was the one place in Paraguay where the soil lacked calcium and where only wheat
queens might flourish, but all seems forgiven.”23 The U.S. must have known that a lot of the
money given to the Stronato was not used for its intended purposes because Washington
wondered throughout the 1960s how much reform they could request without alienating
Paraguay as an ally against communism. The answer was usually “not much;” but after Jimmy
Carter became president in 1977, the alliance took 180 degree as U.S. foreign policy obtained a
new focus on human rights.
U.S. Assistance during the Carter and Reagan Administrations
Beginning in 1976, the U.S. government began to decrease the amount of economic aid.
U.S. military assistance declined from “$8.8 million in 1976 to $467,000 in 1979. The decrease
23 Alan Whicker, The Last Dictator: Alan Whicker in Stroessner’s Paraguay,(British Broadcasting
Company, April 7, 1970): 29:49-30:10, accessed December 3, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8uEB-
Vs8m-8.

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demonstrated that the U.S. would no longer turn a blind eye on the repression and human rights
abuses of the Stronato. The U.S. used its soft power to pressure the Stronato into ending its
authoritarian tradition in the mid-1980s, which was one of the reasons for the dictatorship’s
demise. Paraguay became diplomatically isolated. U.S. Ambassadors Arthur Davis (1982-5) and
Clyde Taylor (1985-8) pressured the Stronato to reform by respecting human rights and cracking
down on drug traffickers who moved contraband across Paraguayan territory.24
Diplomatic ties grew weak in the 1980s, and Stroessner started to run into the problems
of old age and succession. Most dictatorial regimes and monarchies runs into similar questions
about who should take over. He wanted his oldest son, Gustavo, to succeed him. However, old
age and politics eventually caught up Stroessner. His son-in-law, General Andrés Rodríguez,
rebelled in 1988 and forced Stroessner into exile. Death came for the dictator in a hospital in
Brasilia in 2006.
Conclusion
Alfredo Stroessner left a legacy of terror. His regime committed gruesome atrocities such
as throwing prisoners from airplanes, and sexually assaulting young girls. The U.S. achieved an
alliance with Stroessner that ultimately cemented his power and delayed reform. Conversely, it
was pressure to reform from U.S. diplomats that weakened the Stronato and allowed Andrés
Rodríguez to overthrow Stroessner. A new constitution was written in 1992 and the government
has transitioned to peaceful democratic transitions with the Colorado party still maintaining its
hold over the country with the exception of the 2008 election of Fernando Lugo of the Patriotic
Alliance for Change. Paraguay’s fate was largely decided by the United States throughout the
24 Mora and Cooney, 471-2.

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Cold War; and thankfully, it changed its mind and used its soft power to evoke a change for the
better.

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