This document is a court order granting the plaintiff's application to remand a case back to state court from federal court. The plaintiff had filed a complaint against the defendant in state court for claims related to the use of the plaintiff's likeness in a video game. The defendant removed the case to federal court, arguing the claims were preempted by federal copyright law. The court analyzed the relevant legal standards for removal and copyright preemption. Applying a two-part test, the court determined the plaintiff's claims were not preempted as they involved misappropriation of the plaintiff's name and likeness beyond what was agreed to, rather than contesting the defendant's copyright. The court therefore granted the application to remand the case back to
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Copy of Order issued by U.S. District Court suspending AB 219, a new statute which made deliveries of ready-mix concrete subject to California Prevailing Wage Law.
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision in Harper v Muskingum Watershed Conse...Marcellus Drilling News
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The decision by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. EQT had leased land from Alex Cooper, et al with an initial five-year term. The lease provided for a five-year extension. It also required EQT to drill at least one well on/under the property during the first five-year lease. EQT failed to drill a well in the first term but instead elected to extend the lease for an additional five years. The federal judge found that EQT has the right to extend the lease even if they didn't drill a well during the first term.
Sycamore Vista Homeowner's Association Responds666isMONEY, Lc
it's not actually the HOA's attorney responding but two (yes, two) lawyers from Russo's office. I have yet to write about who Steve Russo is but will say this now: They have no web page! rss-law.com How do they stay in business?
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Loughman v EQT - Decision Rejecting Landowner Request to Sever Production Lea...Marcellus Drilling News
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Evidence for my ePortfolio - An excerpt from my 72-page manual called An Introduction to Small Business - An English Language and Civics, Business Education Workbook for English Language Learners.
http://eportfolio4mwalkerwade.wordpress.com
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In the Northern Forests case, the surface rights owner (Northern Forests) claimed they should also own the subsurface rights due to a legal principal called adverse possession. In reviewing the case, a PA trial court found the original case from 1989 awarding Northern Forests the mineral rights, was in error and the rights revert back to the original rights owners. PA Superior Court agreed and upheld the decision.
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Sycamore Vista Homeowner's Association Responds666isMONEY, Lc
it's not actually the HOA's attorney responding but two (yes, two) lawyers from Russo's office. I have yet to write about who Steve Russo is but will say this now: They have no web page! rss-law.com How do they stay in business?
The official motion filed with the New York State Court of Appeals, NY's highest court, to hear the case of Norse Energy v Town of Dryden over the town's vote to ban all fracking and drilling throughout the township.
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Newtown Loses By Default Judgment- NECA -vs- Kaaihue, a five year litigation and court battle. When NECA board of directors, and community are jealous for driving right by a property that could have been purchased, but was inherited by Angela Kaaihue, who has turned the property she inherited into a Hawaiian Gold Mine.
Hawaii Appellant Court Supreme Court judge castegnetti, judge jeffrey crabtree, judge karen t. nakasone, judge katherine g. leonard, judge keith hiraoka, judge lisa m. ginoza, judge sonja mccullen, judge clyde j. wadsworth, judge karen holma, judge gary W.B. chang
Loughman v EQT - Decision Rejecting Landowner Request to Sever Production Lea...Marcellus Drilling News
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Google Adsense visé par une nouvelle action de groupe - New lawsuit accuses Google of AdSense fraud Source : http://www.cnet.com/news/new-lawsuit-accuses-google-of-adsense-fraud/
Cell Phones/Devices - The Government has provided a proposed Order that directs the manufacturer to provide “reasonable technical assistance” in unlocking the device although omits process allows challenge. Cell Phone Seizure, Search Warrant.
Evidence for my ePortfolio - An excerpt from my 72-page manual called An Introduction to Small Business - An English Language and Civics, Business Education Workbook for English Language Learners.
http://eportfolio4mwalkerwade.wordpress.com
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Esta monografia descreve o processo de desenvolvimento de
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metodologia Extreme Programming (XP) que foi devidamente adaptada ao
processo.
Federal Judge Rules Against Small Haulers in Waste Management DisputeThis Is Reno
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Similar to Fall 2010 open memo assignment no doubt v. activision right of publicity california order remanding to state court pdf (20)
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportAlan Dix
Paper presented at SYNERGY workshop at AVI 2024, Genoa, Italy. 3rd June 2024
https://alandix.com/academic/papers/synergy2024-epistemic/
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Fall 2010 open memo assignment no doubt v. activision right of publicity california order remanding to state court pdf
1. Case 2:09-cv-08872-SVW-VBK Document 17 Filed 01/14/10 Page 1 of 16 Page ID #:153
1
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
10
NO DOUBT, a California ) CV 09-8872 SVW (VBKx)
11 Partnership, )
)
12 Plaintiff, ) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S EX
) PARTE APPLICATION TO REMAND [8]
13 v. ) AND REMANDING CASE TO LOS
) ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
14 ACTIVISION PUBLISHING, INC., a )
Delaware Corporation ) [JS-6]
15 )
Defendant. )
16 )
17
18
19 I. Introduction
20 Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant in state court.
21 Defendant removed the case to federal court, arguing that Plaintiff’s
22 Complaint is preempted by the Copyright Act. Plaintiff filed an ex
23 parte application to remand the case to state court. For the following
24 reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s application and remands the case
25 to state court.
26 II. Facts
27 The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s complaint, which
28 for present purposes must be taken as true. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812
2. Case 2:09-cv-08872-SVW-VBK Document 17 Filed 01/14/10 Page 2 of 16 Page ID #:154
1 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d
2 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009).
3 Plaintiff No Doubt is a music group. Defendant Activision
4 Publishing, Inc. is a video game manufacturer. On May 21, 2009,
5 Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a contract whereby Plaintiff
6 licensed Defendant a specific, limited and restricted use of
7 Plaintiff’s name, likeness, and musical works in Defendant’s new video
8 game, Band Hero. Under the agreement, Plaintiff permitted Defendant to
9 create animated character representations, or “avatars,” of Plaintiff’s
10 likeness for the limited purpose of allowing the characters to perform
11 three of Plaintiff’s own musical works. Plaintiff asserts that the
12 Agreement contained express limitations on Defendant’s uses of
13 Plaintiff’s likeness, and that any other use of Plaintiff’s likeness
14 would be subject to Plaintiff’s approval.
15 According to the Complaint, Defendant created in Band Hero the
16 ability to have lifelike embodiments of Plaintiff and its individual
17 band members sing, dance and perform over sixty songs that were neither
18 contracted for nor approved of, and have never been performed, by
19 Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts Defendant hired actors to impersonate
20 Plaintiff and enable the No Doubt avatar characters to perform these
21 sixty plus unapproved songs.
22 The video game includes a Character Manipulation Feature that
23 allows game-players to manipulate each character’s likeness to engage
24 in unapproved acts with other characters included in the game. This
25 feature allows users to cause members of No Doubt to perform vocally as
26 soloists without their band members, including having male members sing
27 with female voices. Plaintiff argues that the Agreement only allowed
28
2
3. Case 2:09-cv-08872-SVW-VBK Document 17 Filed 01/14/10 Page 3 of 16 Page ID #:155
1 the use of Plaintiff’s name and likeness as a collective group, and not
2 as solo artists. Plaintiff further asserts that it never agreed to
3 allow the use of its name and likeness for the Character Manipulation
4 Feature of Band Hero.
5 On November 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging six
6 causes of action in state court: (1) fraudulent inducement; (2)
7 violation of California Civil Code § 3344 and common law right of
8 publicity; (3) breach of contract; (4) unfair business practices; (5)
9 injunctive relief; and (6) rescission.
10 Defendant filed a timely notice of removal under 28 U.S.C. §
11 1441(b) asserting that one or more of Plaintiff’s claim arise under
12 federal law. Plaintiff then filed an ex parte Application to Remand on
13 the ground that its claims do not arise under federal law. Plaintiff’s
14 application to remand is the subject of the present order.
15 In seeking to remand the case, Plaintiff asserts that it does not
16 contest Defendant’s copyright in the licensed use. Rather, Plaintiff
17 argues that its claims cannot be preempted by the Copyright Act because
18 they arise only from the misappropriation of Plaintiff’s name and
19 likeness in violation of the agreement. Plaintiff further asserts that
20 its request for injunctive relief does not cause its claims to be
21 preempted because the request for an injunction does not change the
22 nature of Plaintiff’s claims.
23 Defendant asserts that the Copyright Act preempts Plaintiff’s
24 claim because Band Hero and in-game avatars fall within the subject
25 matter of the Copyright Act and that Plaintiff’s publicity and unfair
26 competition claims also fall within the scope of the Copyright Act.
27 ///
28
3
4. Case 2:09-cv-08872-SVW-VBK Document 17 Filed 01/14/10 Page 4 of 16 Page ID #:156
1 III. Legal Standards
2 A. Removal
3 “[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district
4 courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed
5 by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
6 States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). If the federal courts lack subject
7 matter over the action, the case must be remanded to the state court
8 from which it was removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
9 The Ninth Circuit has expressed a “strong presumption against
10 removal.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992). The
11 removing party bears the burden of establishing that removal was
12 appropriate, and “the removal statute is strictly construed against
13 removal jurisdiction.” Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assoc., 903
14 F.2d 709, 712 (9th Cir. 1990). Federal courts must remand the case “if
15 there is any doubt as to the right of removal.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc.,
16 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy
17 Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)).
18 B. Federal Jurisdiction
19 In the present case, removal is premised on both the general
20 federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides that “[t]he
21 district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
22 arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
23 States,” as well as the statute governing jurisdiction over copyright
24 claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1338, which provides that “[t]he district courts
25 shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any
26 Act of Congress relating to . . . copyrights.” Section 1338 further
27 provides that “[s]uch jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the states in
28
4
5. Case 2:09-cv-08872-SVW-VBK Document 17 Filed 01/14/10 Page 5 of 16 Page ID #:157
1 . . . copyright cases.”
2 “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is
3 governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule, which provides that
4 federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented
5 on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”
6 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). To determine
7 whether removal was appropriate, the court must focus on the
8 plaintiff’s complaint: “[j]urisdiction may not be sustained on a theory
9 that the plaintiff has not advanced.” Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
10 Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986). The well-pleaded complaint
11 rule “makes the plaintiff the master of the claim; he or she may avoid
12 federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.” Id. (citing
13 Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913)). This rule
14 limits the removal of cases where state law “creates the cause of
15 action,” and thus avoids “a number of potentially serious federal-state
16 conflicts.” Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation
17 Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1983).
18 Ordinarily, a defense based on federal preemption of a state law
19 cause of action is a matter that can be addressed in state court.
20 Preemption defenses do not give rise to federal question jurisdiction
21 under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and thus do not provide removal jurisdiction
22 under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. See Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v.
23 Motley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (anticipation of federal defenses is
24 not a sufficient basis for federal question jurisdiction). However, in
25 certain situations, the doctrine of “complete preemption” provides that
26 state-law causes of action are federal causes of action in sum and
27 substance, and accordingly arise under federal law for purposes of 28
28
5
6. Case 2:09-cv-08872-SVW-VBK Document 17 Filed 01/14/10 Page 6 of 16 Page ID #:158
1 U.S.C. § 1331. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58
2 (1987); see also Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)
3 (“[A] state claim may be removed to federal court in only two
4 circumstances - when Congress expressly so provides, . . . or when a
5 federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through
6 complete pre-emption.”).
7 For purposes of the present motion, the Court will assume without
8 deciding that copyright preemption is “complete preemption” permitting
9 removal of preempted state-law claims. Accord Briarpatch Ltd., L.P v.
10 Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544
11 U.S. 949 (2005); Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816
12 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
13 C. Copyright Preemption
14 Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act preempts “all legal and
15 equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
16 within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106” and
17 “in works of authorship that . . . come within the subject matter of
18 copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103.” 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
19 Section 301(b) clarifies that “Nothing in this title annuls or limits
20 any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State
21 with respect to . . . subject matter that does not come within the
22 subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103.” Id.
23 at § 301(b). Congress has explained that “[t]he intention of section
24 301 is to preempt and abolish any rights under the common law or
25 statutes of a State that are equivalent to copyright and that extend to
26 works within the scope of the Federal copyright law.” Laws v. Sony
27 Music Ent., Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting H.R.
28
6
7. Case 2:09-cv-08872-SVW-VBK Document 17 Filed 01/14/10 Page 7 of 16 Page ID #:159
1 Rep. No. 94-1476, at 130 (1976)).
2 The Ninth Circuit applies a two-part test to determine whether a
3 state law claim is preempted by § 301 of the Copyright Act:
4 We must first determine whether the “subject matter” of the state
5 law claim falls within the subject matter of copyright as
6 described in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. Second, assuming that it
7 does, we must determine whether the rights asserted under state
8 law are equivalent to the rights contained in 17 U.S.C. § 106,
9 which articulates the exclusive rights of copyright holders.
10 Id. at 1137-38 (internal footnotes omitted) (citing Downing v.
11 Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1003 (9th Cir. 2001)). Both prongs
12 of this test must be satisfied in order for the state-law claim to be
13 preempted. Downing, 265 F.3d at 1003.
14 A number of cases have examined the relationship between copyright
15 preemption and state-law rights of publicity. A handful of
16 particularly relevant cases provide the guideposts for deciding the
17 present case.
18 The most relevant example is the Ninth Circuit’s most recent case
19 on the subject, Laws v. Sony Music Ent., Inc., 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir.
20 2006). The plaintiff Debra Laws had entered into a recording agreement
21 with Elektra Records. Id. at 1136. Under the recording contract, Laws
22 gave Elektra the exclusive right to copyright the recordings, the
23 exclusive right to lease the recordings, and the right to use Laws’s
24 name and likeness in connection with the recordings. Id. Laws
25 reserved the right to reject Elektra’s uses in connection with “the
26 sale, advertising or promotion of any other product or service.” Id.
27 Pursuant to the agreement, Laws recorded the song “Very Special”
28
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8. Case 2:09-cv-08872-SVW-VBK Document 17 Filed 01/14/10 Page 8 of 16 Page ID #:160
1 and Elektra retained the copyright in the recording. Id. Over twenty
2 years later, Sony (the defendant in Laws’s lawsuit) obtained a license
3 to sample “Very Special” in a Jennifer Lopez song, which ultimately
4 became a hit single. Id. Laws was credited but never compensated for
5 the sample, which she had never authorized. Id. Laws filed a
6 complaint against Sony alleging that Sony’s use of her song violated
7 her rights to her voice, name, and likeness under California’s
8 statutory (Cal. Civ. Code § 3344) and common law rights of publicity.
9 Id.
10 The Ninth Circuit held that Laws’s claims were preempted because
11 they fell within the scope of the federal copyright laws. Id. at 1139.
12 Laws did not dispute that the song was copyrighted or that it was
13 “fixed in a tangible medium of expression.” Id. at 1141. The Court
14 found that Laws’ case was not based on her voice alone, which is “more
15 personal,” but rather on the sampling of her performance in the
16 copyrighted song. Id. The Court noted that it is “clear that federal
17 copyright law preempts a claim alleging misappropriation of one’s voice
18 when the entirety of the allegedly misappropriated vocal performance is
19 contained within a copyrighted medium.” Id. at 1141. The copyrighted
20 song included her voice; there was no right of publicity severable from
21 the vocal performance. Id. at 1143.
22 In a discussion that is particularly relevant to the present
23 action, the Ninth Circuit explained:
24 The essence of Laws’s claim is, simply, that she objects to having
25 a sample of “Very Special” used in the Jennifer Lopez-L.L. Cool J
26 recording. But Laws gave up the right to reproduce her voice - at
27 least insofar as it is incorporated in a recording of “Very
28
8
9. Case 2:09-cv-08872-SVW-VBK Document 17 Filed 01/14/10 Page 9 of 16 Page ID #:161
1 Special” - when she contracted with Elektra in 1981 and
2 acknowledged that Elektra held the “sole and exclusive right to
3 copyright such master recordings,” including the right “to lease,
4 license, convey or otherwise use or dispose of such master
5 recordings.” At that point, Laws could have either retained the
6 copyright, or reserved contractual rights in Elektra’s use of the
7 recording. Indeed, Laws claims that the latter is precisely what
8 she did. But if Elektra licensed “Very Special” to Sony in
9 violation of its contract with Laws, her remedy sounds in contract
10 against Elektra, not in tort against Sony.
11 Id. at 1144 (emphasis added).
12 In its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit again emphasized the
13 relevance of the potential breach-of-contract claim against the
14 recording company:
15 Elektra copyrighted Laws’s performance of “Very Special” and
16 licensed its use to Sony. If Laws wished to retain control of her
17 performance, she should (and may) have either retained the
18 copyright or contracted with the copyright holder, Elektra, to
19 give her control over its licensing. In any event, her remedy, if
20 any, lies in an action against Elektra, not Sony.
21 Id. at 1145.
22 The precise holding of Laws is better understood in light of Fleet
23 v. CBS, Inc., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1911 (1996), which the Laws court found
24 “quite persuasive.” 448 F.3d at 1142. In Fleet, the plaintiffs were
25 actors; the defendant, CBS, owned the copyright to a film in which they
26 performed. 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1916. Notably, the actors’
27 “performances in the film were recorded with their active participation
28
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10. Case 2:09-cv-08872-SVW-VBK Document 17 Filed 01/14/10 Page 10 of 16 Page ID #:162
1 and consent.” Id. at 1920 n.5. But after a pay dispute, the actors
2 filed a claim for misappropriation of likeness and violation of their
3 rights of publicity. Id. at 1915.
4 The court held that the actors’ claim fell within copyright
5 subject matter. Id. at 1920. The court reasoned that once the
6 performances were put on film with the actors’ consent, they were
7 “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” that fulfilled the
8 requirements of section 102 of the Copyright Act. Id. at 1919. The
9 actors’ performances were part of the copyrighted material, and the
10 actors’ likenesses could not be detached from the copyrighted
11 performances that were contained in the film. The court concluded
12 that the actors’ case “crumbles in the face of one obvious fact: their
13 individual performances in the film . . . were copyrightable.” Id. at
14 1919. As a result, the court held that their claims were preempted: “A
15 claim asserted to prevent nothing more than the reproduction,
16 performance, distribution, or display of a dramatic performance
17 captured on film is subsumed by copyright law and preempted.” Id. at
18 1924.
19 Laws and Fleet stand for the following proposition: federal law
20 preempts state-law right of publicity claims where the claims are based
21 on the claimant’s copyrightable activities that are captured in a
22 copyrighted work. Fleet involved actors who had performed in a film —
23 that is, a “dramatic work” “fixed in a tangible medium of expression”
24 within the meaning of the Copyright Act. Laws involved a singer who
25 had performed in a music recording — that is, a “sound recording”
26 “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” within the meaning of the
27 Copyright Act.
28
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11. Case 2:09-cv-08872-SVW-VBK Document 17 Filed 01/14/10 Page 11 of 16 Page ID #:163
1 In contrast, where the plaintiff’s claims are based on a non-
2 copyrightable personal attribute rather than a copyrightable
3 performance, the Copyright Act does not preempt the claims.
4 The best example of this principle is the Ninth Circuit’s
5 controlling authority of Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994
6 (9th Cir. 2001). In Downing, the clothing retailer Abercrombie & Fitch
7 purchased a photograph of appellant surfers at a 1965 surfing
8 competition from a photographer, who owned the copyright. Id. at 1000.
9 Abercrombie & Fitch then published the photo in their catalogue, with
10 appellants’ names but without appellants’ permission. Id. at 1000.
11 The surfers filed state misappropriation claims. Id. Abercrombie &
12 Fitch argued, as Defendant does now, that the Copyright Act preempted
13 the state law claims. Id. at 1003.
14 The Ninth Circuit held that the claims were not preempted because
15 the subject matter of the publicity claims was the appellants’ names
16 and likenesses, which is not a work of authorship within Section 102 of
17 the Copyright Act. Id. at 1004. The Court reasoned that while the
18 photograph falls within copyright subject matter, “it is not the
19 publication of the photograph itself, as a creative work of authorship,
20 that is the basis for Appellants’ claims, but rather, it is the use of
21 the Appellants’ likenesses and their names pictured in the published
22 photograph.” Id. at 1003. The subject matter of a right to publicity
23 claim is “the very identity or persona of the plaintiff as a human
24 being.” Id. at 1004 (citing McCarthy, Rights of Publicity and Privacy
25 §11.13[C] at 11-72-73 (1997)). The subject matter of a right to
26 publicity claim is the name or likeness, which “does not become a work
27 of authorship simply because it is embodied in a copyrightable work.”
28
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12. Case 2:09-cv-08872-SVW-VBK Document 17 Filed 01/14/10 Page 12 of 16 Page ID #:164
1 Id. at 1003-4 (citing Nimmer on Copyright §1.01[B][1][c] at 1-23
2 (1999)).
3
4 IV. Discussion
5
6 Applying the Ninth Circuit’s two-part copyright preemption test to
7 Plaintiffs’ claims, it is clear that Plaintiff’s claims are not
8 preempted. As explained by the Ninth Circuit:
9 We must first determine whether the “subject matter” of the state
10 law claim falls within the subject matter of copyright as
11 described in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. Second, assuming that it
12 does, we must determine whether the rights asserted under state
13 law are equivalent to the rights contained in 17 U.S.C. § 106,
14 which articulates the exclusive rights of copyright holders.
15 Laws, 448 F.3d at 1137-38.
16 First, Plaintiffs’ rights do not fall within the subject matter of
17 copyright. In this case, in contrast to Laws and Fleet, the object
18 that is “fixed in a tangible medium of expression” is the physical
19 likeness and persona of the Plaintiffs. Name, likeness, and persona
20 are not copyrightable subject matter, both under the Copyright Act and
21 the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, because a name, likeness, or
22 persona is not a work of “authorship” entitled to copyright protection.
23 See Downing, 265 F.3d at 1003-05; see also Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.,
24 406 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding no preemption where photo model
25 asserted right of publicity claim against photo copyright holder).
26 It is true that Defendant’s videogame is a work of authorship
27 entitled to copyright protection, see Midway Mfg. Co. v. Arctic
28
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13. Case 2:09-cv-08872-SVW-VBK Document 17 Filed 01/14/10 Page 13 of 16 Page ID #:165
1 Intern., Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 1983), and that the
2 musicians’ songs incorporated into Defendant’s videogame are
3 copyrightable. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(2),(7) (listing “musical works”
4 and “sound recordings” as copyrightable works of authorship). Further,
5 live musical recordings that are captured on videotape are also
6 copyrightable. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Eagle Rock Ent., Inc., __ F.
7 Supp. 2d ___, 2009 WL 2923173, at *7-8 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (musician’s
8 publicity and appropriation claims against music video distributor
9 preempted by Copyright Act where case involved live musical performance
10 recorded on videotape); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (listing “motion
11 pictures and other audiovisual works” as copyrightable works of
12 authorship). Thus, if Plaintiff were suing on the basis of Defendant’s
13 misuse of Plaintiff’s songs or videotaped musical performance, its
14 claims would be preempted by the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Laws, 448
15 F.3d at 1138-43. The same result would occur if Plaintiff were
16 claiming a right in the entire videogame as infringing a similar work
17 of Plaintiff’s own authorship. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co., Inc. v.
18 Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 445-46 (4th Cir. 1986).
19 However, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant misused
20 Plaintiff’s copyrighted songs or copyrightable musical performances.
21 Plaintiff alleges that the contents of Defendant’s videogame infringes
22 Plaintiff’s rights under the parties’ contract and under state
23 publicity laws. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s
24 videogame contains cartoon likenesses that resemble Plaintiff. See
25 Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 55-57 (2006)
26 (video game character that resembled plaintiff potentially infringed
27 plaintiff’s likeness and identity); see also Wendt v. Host Intern.,
28
13
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1 Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 810-12 (9th Cir. 1997) (robot look-alike
2 misappropriated plaintiff’s identity); White v. Samsung Electronics
3 America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397-99 (9th Cir. 1992) (same); Newcombe
4 v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692-94 (9th Cir. 1998) (cartoon
5 likeness of baseball player potentially infringed rights of publicity);
6 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959,
7 967-68 (10th Cir. 1996) (same).
8 Even more specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Plaintiff consented
9 to Defendant’s use of Plaintiff’s name, image, and likeness in the
10 videogame, but only within the well-defined parameters laid out in the
11 parties’ contract. Defendant’s videogame then included Plaintiff’s
12 name, image, and likeness in a manner that was outside the scope of
13 Plaintiff’s contractual consent.
14 This case is exactly what the Laws court had in mind when it
15 suggested that Debra Laws might have a valid cause of action against
16 Elektra Records (with whom she had entered into a recording contract),
17 but not against Sony Records (which had obtained from Elektra licenses
18 to use Laws’s songs). The court clearly counseled that artists and
19 entertainers should proceed exactly as Plaintiff has proceeded in this
20 case:
21 If Laws wished to retain control of her performance, she should
22 (and may) have either retained the copyright or contracted with
23 the copyright holder, Elektra, to give her control over its
24 licensing.
25 Laws, 448 F.3d at 1145. The court added:
26 But if Elektra licensed “Very Special” to Sony in violation of its
27
28
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15. Case 2:09-cv-08872-SVW-VBK Document 17 Filed 01/14/10 Page 15 of 16 Page ID #:167
1 contract with Laws, her remedy sounds in contract against Elektra,
2 not in tort against Sony.
3 Id. at 1144. Laws’s right-of-publicity claims against the copyright
4 licensee were preempted by the Copyright Act; but Laws’s claims against
5 the party with whom she contracted would not be preempted.
6 Here, Plaintiff contracted with the videogame’s copyright holder
7 (that is, Defendant) so that the copyright holder would only engage in
8 certain activities. Plaintiff carefully controlled the rights it was
9 allowing Defendant to incorporate into the videogame. Subsequently,
10 Defendant engaged in certain other activities that were not
11 contractually permissible. Thus Plaintiff has a valid breach of
12 contract cause of action. Further, Defendant’s alleged breach of
13 contract involved Defendant’s impermissible use of Plaintiff name,
14 image, and likeness. Thus Plaintiff also has a valid tort cause of
15 action for violation of Plaintiff’s right of publicity. Accord Facenda
16 v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1031-32 (3d Cir. 2008)
17 (sportscaster’s breach of contract and right of publicity claims not
18 preempted by copyright where sportcaster’s contract allowed defendant
19 to use sportscaster’s voice recordings in context of sports broadcasts,
20 not in context of television advertisements for videogame).
21 In short, the rights asserted by Plaintiff are not copyrightable,
22 see Downing, 265 F.3d 1003-04, and Plaintiff did not agree to
23 Defendant’s incorporation of Plaintiff’s name, likeness, or image into
24 Defendant’s copyrighted work in the manner that Defendant did so, cf.
25 Fleet, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 1919. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s tort and
26 contract claims are not preempted by the Copyright Act.
27 ///
28
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1 V. Conclusion
2
3 Plaintiff’s claims are not preempted by the Copyright Act. To the
4 extent that the Court’s legal conclusion is even debatable, the Court
5 emphasizes the federal courts’ “strong presumption against removal.”
6 Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992), which counsels
7 that federal courts should remand cases “if there is any doubt as to
8 the right of removal.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th
9 Cir. 1992) (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062,
10 1064 (9th Cir. 1979)). Because Defendant’s removal involved a
11 relatively novel issue and was not plainly frivolous, Plaintiff’s
12 request for costs and fees is denied. See Lussier v. Dollar Tree
13 Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2008).
14 For the reasons stated above, the Court lacks subject matter
15 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338. The Court ORDERS that the
16 action be REMANDED to state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
17
18 IT IS SO ORDERED.
19
20
21 DATED: January 14, 2010
22 STEPHEN V. WILSON
23 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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