Plaintiff Phillip Lee Walters filed a motion to remand a negligence lawsuit back to state court that was removed to federal court by defendants Samuel Patterson and Keen Transport based on diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff argues that removal was improper because the defendants did not establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, as is required for diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff notes that the complaint does not specify a damages amount and contends that the defendants rely only on unsupported assumptions to claim the threshold is met rather than providing evidence, as is required. The plaintiff requests that the case be remanded back to state court due to lack of federal jurisdiction.

1. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
PHILLIP LEE WALTERS, )
)
)
Plaintiffs, ) CASE NO. 5:09-CV-00
)
vs. )
)
SAMUEL PATTERS AND KEEN )
TRANSPORT, INC. )
Defendants. )
PLAINTIFF PHILLIP LEE WALTERS' MOTION TO REMAND
Plaintiff Phillip Lee Walters, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c), moves this Court to remand the above-styled matter
to the State Court of Bibb County, Georgia. The absence of
removal jurisdiction mandates the requested remand. As
specific grounds, Plaintiff states:
Complaint
1. This is a case sounding in negligence. On August 21,
2009 in the State Court of Bibb County, Georgia, Plaintiff
instituted this lawsuit by filing a Complaint. The named
Defendants are those listed in the caption, Samuel Patterson
and Keen Transport, Inc. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
that his vehicle was struck by a truck driven by Defendant
Patterson.

2. 2. Contrary to Defendants' assertions in Paragraph 7 of
the Notice of Removal, Plaintiff has not alleged in any
paragraph of his Complaint that he seeks “sums in excess of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” (Defendants' Notice
of Removal, Paragraph 7).
Notice of Removal
3. Defendants filed their Notice of Removal with this
Court in a timely manner, doing so on September 29, 2009.
4. As the sole source of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction, Defendants referenced only diversity-of-
citizenship jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1322 (Notice of
Removal Paras. 4, 5, and 6), and a claimed amount in controversy
(Notice of Removal, Paras. 7 and 8).
General Legal Principles
5. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 114
S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins.
Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994).
6. Removal statutes must be strictly construed because
Congressional intent in enacting removal legislation was to
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3. restrict removal jurisdiction. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Streets, 313 U.S. 100, 108, 61 S. Ct. 868, 85 L. Ed. 2D 1214
(1921).
7. “A court must strictly construe the requirements of the
removal statute, as removal constitutes an infringement on state
sovereignty.” Newman v. Spectrum Stores, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d
1342, 1344 (M.D. Ala. 2000). “Failure to comply with the
requirements of the removal statute generally constitutes
adequate grounds for remand.” 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1345.
8. “Statutes that limit federal jurisdiction are always
strictly construed against the removing party, and there is no
shame in a plaintiff’s insistence on full and complete
compliance with them by a defendant who wants to flee to federal
court.” Kisor v. Collins, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1281 (N.D. Ala.
2004).
9. The removing party bears the burden of demonstrating
the existence of federal jurisdiction. Wilson v. Republic Iron
& Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 97, 42 S. Ct. 35, 660 L. Ed. 2d 144
(1921); Leonard v. Enterprise Rent a Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972
(11th Cir. 2002).
Specific Jurisdictional-Threshold-Amount Principles
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4. 10. A district court “shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is
between ... citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
There can be no diversity-of-citizenship-based subject-matter
jurisdiction absent satisfaction of the $75,000 threshold amount.
11. In its removal pleading, Defendants made no mention of
the opinion, Lowery v. Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 (11th
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, sum nom, Hanna Steel Corp. v. Lowery,
___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2877 (2008), and its impact on the
issue of a removing party’s satisfying the jurisdictional-
threshold-amount requirement. Defendants have made no mention
of the numerous opinions that have applied Lowery in factual
scenarios similar to that in the present matter and granted
motions to remand due to a failure to satisfy the
jurisdictional-threshold-amount requirement.
12. In Beasley v. Fred’s Inc., Civil Action No. 08-0120-
WS-C, 2008 WL 899249 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2008), in an Alabama
state court, Beasley sued Fred’s after she fell while shopping
in a Fred’s store and injured her back and both knees. Beasley
sought compensatory damages in connection with a surgery on her
left knee and for her pain and suffering and punitive damages.
In her complaint, Beasley demanded no specified amount of
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5. damages. While Beasley did not file a motion to remand,
District Judge Steele remanded the matter because he
independently found a failure to satisfy the jurisdictional-
threshold-amount requirement. District Judge Steele stated that
“[t]he amount in controversy [was] not apparent from the face of
the complaint, because there [was] no way to determine from the
complaint whether the plaintiff has been injured so badly as to
make an award of over $75,000 more likely than not.” 2008 WL
899249 at *1. He wrote:
Moreover, “[a] conclusory allegation in
the notice of removal that the
jurisdictional amount is satisfied, without
setting forth the underlying facts
supporting such an assertion, is
insufficient to meet the defendant’s
burden.” Williams [v. Best Buy Co.], 269
F.3d [1316,] 1319-20 [(11th Cir. 2001)].
“[U]nsupported assumptions” are likewise
“inadequate.” Leonard v. Enterprise Rent A
Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir. 2002).
The standard for removal is preponderance of
the evidence and, when the removing
defendant relies only on representations
without presenting evidence, it cannot meet
its burden of supporting removal. Lowery v.
Alabama Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1210-1211
(11th Cir. 2007).
2008 WL 899249 at *2.
13. In Williamson v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. 07-61643-
CIV, 2008 WL 2262044 (S.D. Fla. 30, 2008), Williamson was
injured while shopping at a Home Depot store. Williamson
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6. commenced a lawsuit in a Florida state court, Home Depot removed
the matter and Williamson filed a motion to remand. Home Depot
unsuccessfully argued that it was facially apparent from the
complaint that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000
because Williamson asserted that he sustained serious injuries
to his dominant hand. The district court wrote:
To show that it is facially apparent that
the damages exceed the jurisdictional
minimum, it is insufficient to rely on the
severity of the injuries alleged. Beal v.
La Quinta Inns., Inc., No. 3:06-CV-966-J-33
TEM, 2007 WL 1577826, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May
31, 2007)(finding it insufficient to rely
upon on the severity of the damages claimed
to satisfy burden of proving jurisdiction by
a preponderance of the evidence). ...
2008 WL 2262044 at *2.
Argument
15. Defendants do not mention the Lowery opinion or any
recent germane opinions applying the principles announced in
Lowery.
16. Defendants wrongfully assume that the jurisdictional-
threshold-amount requirement is met because a plaintiff alleges
personal injuries. Since the issuance of the Lowery opinion,
throughout the Eleventh Circuit, assumptions are insufficient to
satisfy the burden imposed on a removing defendant to satisfy
the jurisdictional-threshold-amount requirement.
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7. 17. Defendants truly ask this Court to speculate as to
some satisfaction of the jurisdiction-threshold-amount
requirement because the Plaintiff may ask a jury to award him
some measure of damages.
18. Defendants have chosen to ignore Lowery; this Court
may not. Defendants have made no effort to follow the
principles announced in Lowery and applied in post-Lowery
opinions.
WHEREFORE,Plaintiff moves this Court to enter an order
remanding this matter of the State Court of Bibb County,
Georgia.
DATED this _20th day of October, 2009.
s/ Mark Zamora
GA BAR 784239
MARK ZAMORA, ESQUIRE
POST OFFICE BOX 660216
ATLANTA, GA 30366
T: 404/451-7781
F: 404/506-9223
Email: mzamoralaw@yahoo.com
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 20, 2009 I electronically
filed PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND with the Clerk of Court using
the CM/ECF system which will automatically send email
notification to the following attorneys of record: GRANT SMITH,
ESQ. and KIMBERLY DEWITT, ESQ., Dennis, Corry, Porter and Smith,
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8. LLP, 3535 Piedmont Road, NE, 14 Piedmont Center, Suite 900,
Atlanta, GA 30305.
I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal
Service the document to the following non-CM/ECF participants:
None.
s/ Mark Zamora
GA BAR 784239
MARK ZAMORA, ESQUIRE
POST OFFICE BOX 660216
ATLANTA, GA 30366
T: 404/451-7781
F: 404/506-9223
Email: mzamoralaw@yahoo.com
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