This letter from King & Spalding LLP to members of an arbitration tribunal requests interim measures in an ongoing arbitration between Chevron Corporation, Texaco Petroleum Company, and the Republic of Ecuador. It summarizes recent developments in related litigation in Ecuadorian courts, including the issuance of an order finalizing the evidence period and allowing for imminent judgment, as well as newly discovered evidence of plans by opposing parties to immediately attach assets and disrupt Chevron's global operations. The letter argues interim measures are urgently needed to protect the arbitration tribunal's jurisdiction and ability to provide meaningful relief by suspending enforceability of any imminent Ecuadorian court judgment.

1. King & Spalding LLP
1100 Louisiana, Suite 4000
Houston, TX 77002-5213
Tel: (713) 751-3200
Fax: (713) 751-3290
www.kslaw.com
R. Doak Bishop
Partner
Direct Dial: 713/751-3205
Direct Fax: 713/751-3290
dbishop@kslaw.com
January 14, 2011
Mr. V.V. Veeder, QC
Essex Court Chambers
24 Lincoln’s Inn Fields
London WC2A 3EG
United Kingdom
Prof. Vaughan Lowe, QC
Essex Court Chambers
24 Lincoln’s Inn Fields
London WC2A 3EG
United Kingdom
Dr. Horacio Grigera Naón
2708 35th Place NW
Washington DC 20007
USA
Mr. Martin Doe
Permanent Court of Arbitration
Peace Palace
Carnegieplein 2
2517 KJ The Hague
The Netherlands
Re: Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, PCA
Case No. 2009-23
Dear Members of the Tribunal:
Claimants write to renew and modify their request for interim measures, based on (1) the
Lago Agrio Court’s issuance of autos para sentencia on December 17, 2010, which means that a
judgment can be issued at any time; and (2) newly discovered evidence of the Plaintiffs’ plans to
immediately attach assets and attempt to disrupt Chevron’s operations worldwide.
The effects of the Lago Agrio Litigation are on the verge of expanding beyond Ecuador
(as the Plaintiffs’ lawyers describe) to enforcement courts across the globe. If the Plaintiffs act
on their well-documented strategy to attach assets and attempt to disrupt Chevron’s global
operations before interim measures are issued, the Tribunal’s ability to provide any meaningful
relief, and protect Claimants’ rights at the heart of this Arbitration will be severely diminished, if
not eliminated. That is why it is important that interim measures be issued now—to help

2. January 14, 2011
Page 2
Claimants resist enforcement of such a judgment while the litigation remains solely in Ecuador.
Once the Lago Agrio genie escapes the Ecuadorian bottle, the harm to Chevron’s rights and
operations would be much more difficult if not impossible to remedy. At that point the relevant
actors will include enforcement courts scattered and possibly other governmental and non-
governmental actors worldwide, and the Tribunal may have very limited means to prevent the
harm to Claimants’ rights from worsening. The Tribunal has been entrusted to vindicate the
rights agreed upon by Ecuador and the United States in the Treaty; it therefore should act now to
preserve its jurisdiction and ensure its ability to provide meaningful relief at the conclusion of
the Arbitration.
Claimants have previously raised concerns that rapid developments in the Lago Agrio
Litigation may, as a practical matter, impair the Tribunal’s ability to protect Claimants’ rights
through interim measures.1
And it is for that very reason that Claimants have kept the Tribunal
apprised of new evidence and events relating to the Lago Agrio Litigation in letters dated
September 2, October 27, and December 12, 2010, all of which are relevant to this submission.
Claimants will therefore update the Tribunal only on events that have occurred since Claimants’
latest letter—namely the Lago Agrio Court’s issuance and confirmation of autos para sentencia.
I. New Events in the Lago Agrio Litigation Demonstrate that Further Relief Is
Necessary to Protect Claimants’ Rights
Recent events in the Lago Agrio Litigation indicate that a judgment from the Lago Agrio
Court is imminent. First, neither Respondent nor the Lago Agrio Court has responded to the
Tribunal’s Second Order of Interim Measures of December 6, 2010, in which it asked the Lago
Agrio Court to “make known as a professional courtesy to the Tribunal the likely date for the
issue by the Court of its judgment in the Lago Agrio Case.”2
Second, on December 17, 2010, the
Lago Agrio Court issued autos para sentencia,3
which the Court confirmed as final on December
29, 2010.4
The case is now set for decision and a judgment may be issued at any time. In fact,
Judge Zambrano indicated in a press interview the day after he issued the autos that a judgment
could be issued in as few as 12 days.5
And the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs have recently pleaded
before a U.S. court that they have an “urgent need” for discovery from third parties because a
final judgment could be issued “as early as February 2011.”6
1
Transcript of Jurisdictional Hearing, Nov. 20-22, Day 2, at 378:15-25, 379:1-11; Claimants’ Letter to the
Tribunal, Dec. 12, 2010, at 1.
2
Second Order of Interim Measures, Dec. 6, 2010, at 4.
3
Exhibit C-894, Order by the Provincial Court of Sucumbíos, Dec. 17, 2010, at 9:57 a.m.
4
Exhibit C-895, Order by the Provincial Court of Sucumbíos, Dec. 29, 2010, at 2:20 p.m.
5
Exhibit C-896, The Chevron Case Will Have a Judgment in 2011, EXPRESO, Dec. 18, 2010.
6
Exhibit C-897, In re Yaiguaje et al., No. CV-10-80324, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, Application of the Ecuadorian Plaintiffs for an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Expedited
Service and Enforcement of Subpoena for Use in a Foreign Proceeding, Dec. 30, 2010, at 4 (emphasis added).

3. January 14, 2011
Page 3
As the Tribunal has suggested, the central issue for interim measures related to the Lago
Agrio Litigation is urgency. Urgency is defined as the “risk that action prejudicial to the rights
of either party might be taken before the [Tribunal] has given its final decision.”7
The Lago
Agrio Court’s issuance of autos para sentencia urgently threatens Chevron’s contract, Treaty,
and res judicata rights because there is but a single step remaining—the issuance of a
judgment—before the Plaintiffs intend to execute their enforcement scheme.
A. A Judgment Is Imminent, and a Decision by the First-Instance
Appeals Court Rendering the Judgment Enforceable Could Follow in
Short Order
On December 17, 2010, Judge Zambrano issued autos para sentencia, announcing that
“the evidence period is declared concluded and the record is requested [from the clerk’s office]
so that judgment can be issued.”8
Chevron timely filed a motion to revoke this request on the
grounds that a number of matters remained pending before the Court, including recent testimony
from the Plaintiffs’ new experts that their new US$ 113 billion damage assessment has no basis
in fact.9
But Judge Zambrano ignored these matters and on December 29, 2010, confirmed his
December 17, 2010 order as final.10
7
CLA-6, Case Concerning the Convention Concerning the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russia), Order, Oct. 15, 2008, ¶ 129. See also CLA-28, Case Concerning the Passage Through the
Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), ICJ, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order, July 29, 1991,
ICJ Reports, 1991, ¶ 23 (a measure is urgent when “action prejudicial to the rights of either party is likely to be
taken before [a] final decision is given”); CLA-25, Quiborax S.A. et al. v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2,
Decision on Provisional Measures, Feb. 26, 2010, ¶ 150 (“The Arbitral Tribunal agrees with Claimants that the
criterion of urgency is satisfied when ‘a question cannot await the outcome of the award on the merits’.”)
(citation omitted).
8
Exhibit C-894, Order by the Provincial Court of Sucumbíos, Dec. 17, 2010, at 9:57 a.m.
9
In response to the Court’s August 2, 2010 order, the Plaintiffs submitted seven new expert reports on September
16, 2010, assessing damages against Chevron of up to US$ 113.5 billion—twice Ecuador’s gross domestic
product, and four times the US$ 27 billion previously recommended in Cabrera’s second report. In depositions
over the last few weeks, these experts have recanted their damage assessments, admitting at times that their
reports: (1) lacked factual support and scientific grounds, (2) failed to assess Petroecuador’s liabilities, (3)
reached no concrete conclusions regarding the inadequacy of TexPet’s remediation, (4) and borrowed heavily
from flawed evidence in the fraudulent Cabrera reports. Exhibit C-898, In re Application of Chevron Corp.,
No. 2:10-mc-0091, U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont, Transcript of Videotaped Deposition of
Douglas C. Allen, Dec. 12, 2010, at 90:2-10, 171:18-172:3 (admitting that he took evidence and figures from
the Cabrera reports “at face value” and made no attempt to verify Cabrera’s underlying data); Exhibit C-899,
Chevron Corp. v. Barnthouse, No. 1:10-mc-53, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Ohio, Deposition
of Lawrence W. Barnthouse, Dec. 10, 2010, at 110:6-14, 169:23-171:3, 52:2-10, 185:23-186:14, 187:11-16,
188:11-15 (establishing that Mr. Barnthouse did not read Spanish and failed to request English translations of
documents he was supposed to review, that his report “couldn’t be completely independent” because most of his
sources “were only available from the Cabrera Report,” and that his report failed to account for TexPet’s
remediation and Petroecuador’s share of liability); Exhibit C-900, Chevron Corp. v. Picone, No. 8:10-cv-
02990-AW, U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Videotaped Deposition of Carlos Emilio Picone,
Dec. 16, 2010, at 20:5-24:12, 48:2-13, 127:6-129:11, 222:20-234, 236:7-10, 273:22-274:18, 151:7-10
(demonstrating that Mr. Picone had no qualifications as a health expert and no court had ever accepted him as a
qualified expert in any field, admitting that he did not conduct his own work or draft his own conclusions, and
stating that he was “not aware of any good data for the position that exposure to crude oil is linked to a range of
diseases”); Exhibit C-901, Chevron Corp. v. Shefftz, No. 1:10-mc-10352, U.S. District Court for the District of

4. January 14, 2011
Page 4
The Lago Agrio Court’s impatience with important submissions, its rush to clear pending
matters on the case docket (no matter the substance or consequences), its repeated refusal to
consider blatant evidence of fraud by the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs,11
and its premature issuance of
autos para sentencia demonstrate a rush to judgment that began shortly after this Tribunal issued
its first Interim Measures Order last May, and that accelerated to the penultimate step in the
Litigation after this Tribunal issued a second Interim Measures Order last month. The Lago
Agrio Court’s recent actions (and reactions to developments in this Arbitration) thus demonstrate
urgency for the Tribunal to issue a critically important third Interim Measures Order focused on
the suspension of a Lago Agrio judgment’s enforceability pending the adjudication of Claimants’
claims in this Arbitration.
When the Lago Agrio Court hands down its judgment, Chevron may have a very short
window of time before its first-instance appeal is decided and the judgment becomes enforceable
under Ecuadorian law. Once Chevron is notified of the first-instance judgment, it must file an
appeal within three working days.12
The record is then sent to the appellate court—which in this
case is merely the Lago Agrio Court sitting en banc.13
Within the limited appellate procedure,14
Massachusetts, Deposition of Jonathan Shefftz, Dec. 16, 2010, at 270:19-271:4, 63:3-9, 16-18, 104:20-106:2
(admitting that Mr. Shefftz was “not familiar with Ecuadorian law in any capacity,” that he simply used Mr.
Cabrera’s figures in his report without “know[ing] one way or the other whether they’re correct or not,” and that
his report did not allocate the economic costs between TexPet and Petroecuador, indeed because he did not
know Petroecuador’s role in the Consortium).
10
Exhibit C-895, Order by the Provincial Court of Sucumbíos, Dec. 29, 2010, at 2:20 p.m.
11
The Lago Agrio Court has refused to strike from the record fraudulent evidence such as the Calmbacher and
Cabrera reports, and this fraud continues to taint the trial because the Plaintiffs’ new expert reports base their
conclusions on the biased information in the Cabrera reports. Recently, Steven Donziger admitted under oath
that the Plaintiffs had selected and secretly met with Cabrera before the Court appointed him, and that
Plaintiffs’ representatives drafted the Cabrera reports, in addition to generating the data underlying those
reports. Exhibit C-902, In re Application of Chevron Corp., No. 10-MC-00002, U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York, Deposition of Steven Donziger, Dec. 29, 2010, at 2136:19-2137:3, 2147:7-11,
2191:4-10, 2253:5-11, 2266:17-25, 2300:4-7 (stating that Donziger knew that the Court would appoint Cabrera
as global expert at least by March 3, 3007 (more than two weeks before the appointment took place), admitting
that the Plaintiffs tasked their consultants with drafting the global expert report “in a form that it could be
submitted directly to the Ecuadorian court by Mr. Cabrera,” admitting that Donziger had “publicly den[ied] that
plaintiffs had worked privately with Cabrera” despite knowing otherwise, and admitting that he knew that
Cabrera was ordered to “act independent of the parties”). The Lago Agrio Court has also refused to nullify the
rulings of Judge Núñez, despite his involvement in a bribery scheme and his documented prejudgment of the
case.
12
Exhibit C-260, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure, Arts. 324, 838, & 845.
13
Id., Art. 333.
14
In verbal summary proceedings such as the Lago Agrio Litigation, the law does not provide for the production
of new evidence or the submission of further pleadings during the appellate procedure. Id., Art. 838. Article
838 expressly provides that “[t]he higher court shall issue its decision based on the record,” thus preventing the
parties from adding new evidence. Id.

5. January 14, 2011
Page 5
the first-level appellate court may expedite its decision-making and issue a decision quickly.15
As a practical matter, there may be insufficient time between issuance of a first-instance
judgment and issuance of an appellate confirmation of that judgment for this Tribunal to consider
and issue interim measures to protect its jurisdiction and to prevent further and potentially
irremediable harm to Chevron’s rights.
If the appellate court does confirm in whole or in part the adverse first-instance judgment,
Chevron may file an extraordinary appeal—“cassation”—before the National Court of Justice
(formerly the Supreme Court of Justice).16
Cassation is limited to legal issues and cannot be
brought on the basis of matters of fact on which either the trial court or the appellate court may
have erred.17
Plaintiffs’ representative Steven Donziger already has documented several
meetings between the Plaintiffs and Supreme Court judges.18
The Ecuadorian Law on Cassation Appeal provides that filing for cassation does not
suspend a judgment’s enforceability unless the appellant expressly requests its suspension and
posts a bond.19
The bond must be “sufficient ... for the estimated damages that a delay in
enforcing the judgment ... may inflict on the other party.”20
If the appellate court establishes the
bond based on a simple calculation of the interest that a multi-billion-dollar judgment may
accrue during the cassation period, the resulting amount could be astronomic. Chevron would be
forced to deposit the bond within three days, and failure to post bond would render the judgment
immediately enforceable under Ecuadorian law.21
In short order, Chevron could be subjected to
enforcement of a non-final judgment. And even in the improbable event that the highly
politicized National Court of Justice ultimately reversed the adverse judgment, as a practical
matter, Chevron is unlikely to be able to obtain restitution of its bond and any assets that may
have been attached by then, or obtain full compensation for the damages caused by enforcement
of an illegitimate judgment.
15
In fact, Plaintiffs’ counsel has recognized that “Chevron’s anticipated appeal of an adverse ruling would not
substantially delay enforcement” because the first-level appeal “is not a lengthy process.” Exhibit C-903,
“Invictus, Path Forward: Securing and Enforcing Judgment and Reaching Settlement” by Patton Boggs,
undated [DONZ00032520-51], at 7-8.
16
The appeal in cassation is governed by Ecuadorian Law on Cassation Appeal, as codified and published in the
Offical Gazette (Supplement) No. 299, Mar. 24, 2004.
17
Exhibit C-316, Ecuadorian Law on Cassation Appeal, Art. 3.
18
Claimants have provided the Tribunal with evidence of at least five separate meetings or private
communications between the Plaintiffs and various Supreme Court judges. Exhibit C-790, Email from S.
Donziger to J. Kohn, Subject: new Cristobal email/important, regarding Cristobal Bonifaz, attaching note to A.
Ponce (Steven Donziger Deposition, Exhibit 21), June 1-5, 2006 [DONZ00028557]; Exhibit C-716, Diary of
Steven Donziger, Feb. 7, 2007, at 23 of 111 [DONZ00027156]; Exhibit C-743, Email exchange between S.
Donziger and P. Fajardo, et al., Oct. 10, 2007 [DONZ00025204]; Exhibit C-360, Crude Outtakes, Jan. 17,
2007, at CRS161-01-02-CLIP 01; id., Mar. 5, 2007, CRS208-02-CLIP 04; id., Mar. 5, 2007, CRS208-02-CLIP
01; id., Mar. 5, 2007, CRS208-04-CLIP 04, CRS208-06-CLIP 02.
19
Exhibit C-316, Ecuadorian Law on Cassation Appeal, Art. 10.
20
Id., Art. 11.
21
Id.

6. January 14, 2011
Page 6
B. The Plaintiffs Are Preparing a Strategy to Enforce a First-Instance
Judgment Immediate upon its Issuance
Even though a first-instance judgment is not enforceable under Ecuadorian law, the
Plaintiffs have made no secret of their intent to try to seize assets and thereby harm Chevron
immediately after the Lago Agrio Court renders its impending judgment.22
Over the past several
weeks, and as a result of U.S. discovery proceedings, Chevron has obtained evidence in the form
of documents and sworn deposition testimony from Steven Donziger, in the personal presence of
a court-appointed special master charged with overseeing this testimony. This evidence not only
confirms the Plaintiffs’ plans to enforce the judgment worldwide as soon as possible, but also
that the Plaintiffs are considering seizing assets even before the Lago Agrio court reaches its
judgment, making the instant application even more urgent. This proceeding could quickly but
needlessly be overcome by the chaos planned by the Plaintiffs.
The Plaintiffs have been planning an aggressive strategy to enforce a Lago Agrio
judgment against Chevron since at least 2008. They have requested proposals from several U.S.
law firms to serve as co-counsel in enforcement actions in the U.S. and abroad. In response, one
of the firms submitted a 59-page proposal detailing a “fast-moving, aggressive” strategy to
enforce the Lago Agrio judgment, including “pre-judgment attachments of Chevron’s assets[.]”23
The proposal covered various jurisdictions such as Middle Eastern countries and the United
States, and advocated a parallel public relations campaign.24
Other law firms submitted requests
for proposals advocating similarly-aggressive enforcement and public-relations strategies.25
22
In their Interim Measures pleadings and oral arguments, Claimants listed the numerous instances in which
Plaintiffs have made public statements regarding their intent to pursue an aggressive strategy to seize Chevron’s
assets as soon as possible. The Tribunal itself has recognized the dangers behind this strategy. See Transcript
of Hearing on Jurisdiction, Nov. 23, 2010, at 393:12-18 (stating that it is “quite clear … from the address by
Mr. Donziger, that he has well in mind “[saisie conservatoire],” injunctions and the arrest of vessels. Now, the
l[a]tter can be done very easily in this jurisdiction and no doubt in others without advanced notice without the
judgment being final. Now, that’s the concern …”).
23
Exhibit C-867, Response to Request for Proposal Presented to Serve as Co-Counsel for Aguinda v.
Chevron/Texaco, Feb. 2010, at 13 [DONZ00019742]. This is consistent with the statements by Mr. Donziger at
Duke Law School during a speech to the students there on November 15, 2010, or which the Tribunal already is
aware. Exhibit C-681, Transcript of Address by Steven Donziger at Duke University School of Law: The
Clash of Indigenous Rights, the Environment, and Corporate Investor Rights: The Landmark Aguinda Legal
Case in Ecuador, Nov. 15, 2010.
24
Exhibit C-867, Response to Request for Proposal Presented to Serve as Co-Counsel for Aguinda v.
Chevron/Texaco, Feb. 2010 [DONZ00019742].
25
See Exhibit C-868, Response to Chevron’s Information Request by Constantine Cannon LLP, Feb. 5, 2010 at 2
[DONZ00009512] (proposing “an aggressive multi-faceted legal/public relations/lobbying effort to put Chevron
on the defensive” and “hit[] them [Chevron] out of the box with a collateral estoppel motion for judgment”);
Exhibit C-869, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco – Response to Request for Information, by Bartlit Beck Herman
Palenchar & Scott LLP [DONZ00009546] (setting out a work plan for litigation to enforce a judgment against
Chevron).

7. January 14, 2011
Page 7
The Plaintiffs’ strategy also included seeking an interim order from the Lago Agrio Court
seizing Chevron’s assets in the amount set forth in the second Cabrera report (US$ 27 billion).26
And they have even used their political connections in Ecuador to prepare a strategy to enforce
the Lago Agrio judgment and otherwise disrupt the business of Chevron’s subsidiaries in
Venezuela.27
Plaintiffs’ representatives similarly have confirmed to potential investors in the lawsuit
that the judgment’s enforcement possibilities are many. In a strategy memo for potential
financial backers entitled “Invictus – Path forward: Securing and Enforcing Judgment and
Reaching Settlement,” Patton Boggs (a U.S. law firm purporting to represent the Plaintiffs in
U.S. proceedings) suggested a multi-pronged “aggressive approach” to enforce the anticipated
Lago Agrio judgment in several jurisdictions in the United States and internationally.28
With
respect to enforcement in the United States, it set forth a strategy “to proceed against Chevron on
a pre-judgment basis, largely as a means of attaining a favorable settlement at an early stage” and
to “compound the pressure already placed on Chevron vis à vis an international enforcement
campaign.”29
Patton Boggs viewed this strategy as playing a “critical role in our decision to
enforce the judgment,” before examining various state laws on the issue of pre-judgment
attachment.30
It outlined the framework for an “international enforcement plan” and designated
as “of particular interest” various nations, including the Philippines, Singapore, Australia,
Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, Canada, Kuwait, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia,
Russia, and the United Kingdom.31
Tellingly, the firm touted its “political connections and
strategic alliances” with numerous foreign governments, stating that its influence with the
executive branches of such “foreign governments means that barriers to judgment recognition in
a given country may not necessarily preclude enforcement there.”32
Patton Boggs recommended
“selecting jurisdictions that offer the path of least resistance to enforcement” and “to proceed
initially in a jurisdiction that promises the most favorable law and practical circumstances,”
26
Exhibit C-866, E-mail exchange between P. Fajardo and S. Donziger, Mar. 2, 2009 [DONZ00029003].
27
Exhibit C-716, Diary of Steven Donziger, Oct. 27, 2006, at 11 of 109 [DONZ00027256] (stating that he “[m]et
with Alberto Acosta with LY [Luis Yanza] and PF [Pablo Fajardo] … [Acosta s]aid he would help us with
Venezuela meeting (we now have Acosta, the ambassador, and Vargos Pazzos [Rene Vargas Pazzos, former
Minister of Energy, and Vice President of Petroecuador] on this)”). Mr. Donziger also hoped for a meeting
with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, to pressure him to tell Chevron that “they can’t enter Venezuela to
invest if they don’t fix Ecuador.” Exhibit C-360, Crude Outtakes, Jan. 16, 2007, at CRS-145-02.
28
Exhibit C-903, “Invictus, Path Forward: Securing and Enforcing Judgment and Reaching Settlement” by
Patton Boggs, undated [DONZ00032520-51]. Chevron has presented substantial evidence to a U.S. court in
related discovery proceedings that Patton Boggs does not in fact have authority to represent the Lago Agrio
Plaintiffs. See Exhibit C-904, In re Application of Chevron Corp., U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York, Chevron’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Order to Show Cause, Jan. 7, 2011, at 19-20, 30-
32.
29
Exhibit C-903, “Invictus, Path Forward: Securing and Enforcing Judgment and Reaching Settlement” by
Patton Boggs, undated [DONZ00032520-51] at 14.
30
Id. at 14-15.
31
Id. at 19-20.
32
Id. at 12, 19.

8. January 14, 2011
Page 8
while “understanding the reality that judicial systems in some nations may be more susceptible to
political winds than others.”33
It also recommended a number of “offensive public policy
endeavors” to “set Plaintiffs up for success on the [enforcement] litigation front.”34
A June 2010 memorandum from the Plaintiffs’ lawyers to the investing firm IMF
Australia further explains:
[P]laintiffs might seek enforcement of an Ecuadorian judgment
against Chevron in any of [sic] number of jurisdictions outside the
U.S. where Chevron has substantial assets. Our team has
researched this possibility and there are an array of options in
Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere.
There also are possibilities to initiate actions to attach Chevron’s
assets either pre-judgment or while enforcement is pending. The
primary basis for such actions would be the fact that Chevron has
no assets in Ecuador, is a foreign entity, and has publicly
announced it will never pay an adverse judgment.35
Plaintiffs also have repeatedly made clear that they will not halt enforcement of the Lago
Agrio judgment pending the outcome of this Arbitration. On a number of recent occasions,
when asked by U.S. federal judges whether the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs were willing to suspend the
Lago Agrio Litigation, Plaintiffs’ counsel has categorically refused.36
33
Id. at 12, 18, 19.
34
Id. at 24.
35
Exhibit C-905, Memorandum from Aguinda Litigation Team to IMF Australia regarding Financial Due
Diligence Questions, June 2010 [DONZ00026924], at 2.
36
Exhibit C-4, Rep. of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Co., No. 09 CV 9958 (LBS), Yaiguaje
et al. v. Chevron Corp. and Texaco Petroleum Co., No. 10 CV 316 (LBS), Transcript of Hearing, Mar. 10-11,
2010, at 84 (refusing to suspend the Lago Agrio Litigation pending the outcome of this Arbitration); see also
Exhibit C-906, In re Application of Chevron Corp., In re Application of Pérez and Veiga, No. M19-111, U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, May 19, 2010, at 13:13-14:12 (in which the court stated,
“I don’t hear the Lago Agrio plaintiffs saying that they would ask the Ecuadorian judicial system to stop dead in
its tracks today … What I see here is a race, and at the moment, the petitioners are in imminent jeopardy, and
[the Plaintiffs] have not offered to stop the race. What they want to do is they want to tie the legs of the
competing horse in the race.”); Exhibit C-907, In re Application of Chevron Corp., No. 10-MC-0002,
Transcript of Hearing, Sept. 23, 2010, at 34:23-35:4 (“Q: Are you willing to join with Chevron in applying to
the Ecuadorian courts to stop it and hold it status quo, no further activity until these matters are resolved … Are
you willing to do it or not? A: The answer is no, we’re not willing to[.]”); Exhibit C-908, In re Application of
Chevron Corp., No. 10-MC-0002, Memorandum and Order, Oct. 20, 2010, at 2 n.4 (“Donziger and the Lago
Agrio plaintiffs rejected this Court’s suggestion that proceedings in Ecuador be stayed pending a more extended
determination of these motions.”); Exhibit C-318, Fiona Smith, Fight Over Chevron Toxic Waste Cleanup
Comes to a Head, LOS ANGELES DAILY JOURNAL, Apr. 22, 2010 (in which Amazon Defense Front (“ADF”)
spokesperson Karen Hinton assured that “[i]f there is a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the Amazon Defense
Front will ask the Ecuadorean court to require Chevron to post a bond before it can appeal . . . ‘If the courts
were to agree to allow that to happen, then we would try to start seizing assets in other countries[.]’”).

9. January 14, 2011
Page 9
As this Tribunal is aware, enforcement and recognition statutes vary significantly across
the world, meaning that there is no basis to discount the likelihood of harm to Claimants’ rights
based on the anticipated responses of potentially dozens of foreign courts, any of which the
Plaintiffs may target for enforcement. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have represented to third
parties, and presumably will represent before the foreign enforcement courts, that it is their “right
by law” to “enforce [the judgment] immediately . . . and not wait for the appeals in Ecuador.”37
Regardless of the outcome of these attachment proceedings, Chevron will be forced to appear
and defend against them on short notice, causing it to incur significant risk and expense. Several
jurisdictions offer attachment proceedings whereby the Plaintiffs can seek ex parte injunctions
against assets, even prior to formal recognition of the judgment.38
In the United Kingdom, pre-
recognition attachment of assets, such as a Mareva injunction or “freezing” injunction, is made at
the discretion of the court and without affording the judgment debtor the opportunity to be
heard.39
Similar pre-recognition attachment proceedings are available in Argentina, Belgium,
Canada, Korea, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, among other jurisdictions. Although the
standards for such an attachment are somewhat stricter in most U.S. jurisdictions, certain state
laws likewise permit pre-judgment attachment.
There is a practical need to address the enforceability of the Lago Agrio judgment now,
before Chevron begins to face enforcement proceedings in any number of jurisdictions. At this
time, the Tribunal has the ability to order Ecuador to suspend enforceability of the judgment
under Ecuadorian law pending the outcome of this Arbitration. At a minimum, the Tribunal
could grant the declaratory relief in order to defend against enforcement and asset seizure
proceedings in other jurisdictions, which generally will look to Ecuadorian law to determine the
finality and enforceability of the judgment.40
Once the Lago Agrio judgment is rendered and the
Plaintiffs unleash their aggressive enforcement strategy, this Tribunal’s ability to offer any real
protection in this regard will be severely diminished if not extinguished.
C. New Evidence Reinforces that Ecuador Shares Responsibility for the
Plaintiffs’ Plan to Expedite Enforcement of the Judgment
Ecuador argues that the Government cannot be the proper target of Claimants’ interim
measures request because the Plaintiffs are the ones publicly threatening enforcement, but the
fact remains that Ecuador and Petroecuador are the real beneficiaries of the Lago Agrio
37
Exhibit C-865, Email from S. Donziger to S. Alpern and others, Sept. 19, 2007 [DONZ00006935].
38
See Transcript of Hearing on Jurisdiction, Nov. 23, 2010, at 391:15-394:15.
39
See CLA-285, David H. Zicherman, The Use of Pre-Judgment Attachments and Temporary Injunctions in
International Commercial Arbitration Proceedings: A Comparative Analysis of the British and American
Approaches, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 667, 668 et seq. (tracing the history and application of Mareva injunctions in
the United Kingdom in relation to international proceedings).
40
A number of national laws on recognition and enforcement on foreign judgments require the judgment to be
final and conclusive under the law of its country of origin, including, inter alia, Argentina, Bermuda,
Cambodia, Canada, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
For example, the U.S. Uniform Money-Judgments Recognition Act provides that “a judgment is final when it is
not subject to additional proceedings in the rendering court other than execution.” Exhibit C-909, U.S.
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, § 3.

10. January 14, 2011
Page 10
judgment, and they have assisted the Plaintiffs continuously and funded the Amazon Defense
Front,41
the organization that the Plaintiffs designated in their Complaint as the sole beneficiary
of the Lago Agrio judgment.42
Steven Donziger recently testified in a deposition that the named
Plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio complaint will not receive any funds from the Lago Agrio
judgment.43
And newly discovered documents produced by Donziger further show that the
Plaintiffs’ representatives sent a letter to the Ecuadorian Ambassador to the United States,
offering to share the settlement funds with the Government, in case the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs
obtained a settlement from Chevron.44
This is consistent with the public declarations of
Ecuadorian officials that 90% of any judgment would go to the Government.45
There is therefore
no legitimate “third party” in interest in the Lago Agrio Litigation.46
While the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs ostensibly seek remediation, their current damages claim
of US$ 113 billion is approximately 1,000 times larger than the amount estimated by
Petroecuador as sufficient to remediate the Consortium area.47
Not even a significant fraction of
that amount would ever realistically be used for remediation.48
At the same time that the Plaintiffs and the Lago Agrio Court are rushing toward
enforcement of a final judgment, Ecuador is attempting to slow the progress of this Arbitration.
Ecuador’s December 31, 2010 letter to the Tribunal seeks to lengthen these proceedings in two
41
Petroecuador paid the ADF nearly US$ 100,000 for an environmental report filed by the Plaintiffs in 2003.
Exhibit C-184, Study on the Socio-Environmental Conflicts at the Sacha and Shushufindi Fields (1994-2002),
FLACSO Project, Report by Guillaume Fontaine, Nov. 2003, at 28 n.29 (noting that Petroecuador paid US$
98,500 to have the report made).
42
Exhibit C-71, Lawsuit for Alleged Damages Filed before the President of the Superior Court of “Nueva Loja,”
in Lago Agrio, Province of Sucumbíos, May 7, 2003, at 11:30 a.m.
43
Exhibit C-910, In re Application of Chevron Corp., No. 10-MC-00002, U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, Deposition of Steven Donziger, Jan. 8, 2011, Vol. 9, at 2695:10-2701:25.
44
Exhibit C-871, E-mail exchange between S. Donziger and E. Bloom, Oct. 31, 2006 (discussing a letter from
Cristóbal Bonifaz, one of the Plaintiffs’ lead representatives, to the Ecuadorian Ambassador to the U.S.
inquiring about the Government’s interest in the proceeds of a settlement with Chevron.) [DONZ00023834].
45
Exhibit C-5, Press Conference with Dr. Washington Pesántez Muñoz, Prosecutor General of Ecuador, Sept. 4,
2009.
46
The only parties-in-interest on the Plaintiffs’ side are the Plaintiffs’ lawyers, Ecuador’s State treasury, and the
ADF—a shell organization supported and funded in part by the Government itself. See id.; Claimants’ Letter to
the Tribunal, Dec. 12, 2010, at 5-6 (summarizing recent evidence of the Government’s funding of the ADF and
Lago Agrio Plaintiffs); Exhibit C-184, Study on the Socio-Environmental Conflicts at the Sacha and
Shushufindi Fields (1994-2002), FLACSO Project, Report by Guillaume Fontaine, Nov. 2003, at 28 n.29.
47
See Claimants’ Memorial on the Merits, Sept. 6, 2010, ¶ 151.
48
In fact, the Plaintiffs’ lawyers have suggested that any funds received should be kept out of the reach of
Ecuadorian law. They suggested fund recovery strategy is to “arrang[e] for receipt of any funds recovered
against the judgment through payment agents in the United States and thereafter dividing those funds outside
the Republic of Ecuador. This would have the practical effect of keeping the funds outside the immediate reach
of Ecuadorian law upon recovery and would permit adjudication of fee-splitting to take place in a carefully
considered forum.” Exhibit C-903, “Invictus, Path Forward: Securing and Enforcing Judgment and Reaching
Settlement” by Patton Boggs, undated [DONZ00032520-51], at 27-8.

11. January 14, 2011
Page 11
ways: (1) by resisting Claimants’ efforts to set a merits schedule; and (2) by proposing an
interim procedure to determine the “scope and legal effect of the 1995 Settlement Agreement.”
Neither of Ecuador’s positions has any merit, but rather they demonstrate Ecuador’s close
coordination and cooperation with the Plaintiffs and suggest that Ecuador is attempting to stall
the progress of this Arbitration in order to foreclose Claimants’ ability to resist enforcement of
the Lago Agrio judgment.
Ecuador cannot claim that it is a stranger to the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs’ actions and has no
power to halt or suspend the enforcement of the judgment—a judgment emanating from its own
courts, as a result of its own wrongful interference and influence, and from which it will benefit.
In their submissions, Claimants have documented extensively the collusion between Ecuador and
the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs to influence the Lago Agrio Litigation.49
The recently-obtained
Aguinda Plaintiffs’ agreement not to sue Ecuador—a 1996 “Waiver of Rights”—further
confirms Ecuador’s longstanding partnership with the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.50
Claimants have
therefore established a prima facie case for interim measures. The Tribunal’s May 14 and
December 6, 2010 Orders on Interim Measures confirm it.
49
Claimants’ Interim Measures Request for Interim Measures, Apr. 1, 2010, ¶¶ 35-71; Claimants’ Reply in
Support of Interim Measures, May 7, 2010 ¶¶ 12-19; Claimants’ Memorial on the Merits, ¶¶ 246-298;
Claimants’ Rejoinder Memorial on Jurisdiction, Nov. 6, 2010, ¶¶ 24-28; Claimants’ Letter to the Tribunal, Sept.
2, 2010; Claimants’ Letter to the Tribunal, Oct. 27, 2010, Claimants’ Letter to the Tribunal, Dec. 12, 2010.
50
Despite Ecuador’s challenge to the existence of this document (Transcript of Hearing on Interim Measures, May
10-11, 2010, Day 2, at 71-72), Claimants recently have obtained a copy of the Plaintiffs’ agreement not to sue
Ecuador—a “Waiver of Rights” signed on November 20, 1996 by Mr. Bonifaz and Mr. Kohn on behalf of the
Aguinda Plaintiffs. On November 12, 1996, shortly before the Waiver of Rights was signed, Judge Rakoff
dismissed the Aguinda case partly on the grounds that the Aguinda Plaintiffs failed to join Ecuador and
Petroecuador, finding that they were indispensable parties to the litigation. Therefore, the Aguinda Plaintiffs
needed Ecuador’s and Petroecuador’s intervention in the proceeding for the case to continue. Presumably
because the Government feared that its appearance would cause Judge Rakoff to apportion some of the damages
to it (given Petroecuador’s 62.5% interest in the Consortium), the Aguinda Plaintiffs’ waiver of any right to
recover from Ecuador seemed a condition sine qua non for the much-need Government’s intervention. The
Plaintiffs waived (1) any claim for damages against Ecuador/Petroecuador, if the court attributed to Ecuador
any part of the damages; and (2) any right to recover from Ecuador, in the US, or in Ecuador, any damages that
the court might order. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs committed: (1) not to accept any ruling from the Aguinda
Court ordering contribution from Ecuador; and (2) to cooperate and assist counsel for Ecuador at all times
during the Aguinda Litigation. The Waiver of Rights specified that the Government would appear as a non-
party to “express that it is in favor of allowing” performance of those measures, and that it would request that
“any compensation sought . . . be paid exclusively by Texaco.” Exhibit C-911, Waiver of Rights Granted
Before Notaries Public of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, Respectively, Nov. 20, 1996 at 2. Just two days
before the Plaintiffs signed their “Waiver of Rights,” Ecuador’s then-Attorney General conferred a special
Power of Attorney to a U.S. lawyer to intervene in the Aguinda Litigation and file a brief in which the
Government would assert that it would “collaborate with the US Court to allow execution in its territory of the
environmental cleaning-up measures that, in accordance with the Plaintiffs’ sought relief, the Court would order
the defendant to carry out.” Ecuador’s brief would argue the position that Texaco was the only entity against
whom damages should be awarded, and that the Government or Petroecuador (and any affiliates or government
agencies) should not be responsible for payment of any damages. The Power of Attorney also specified that
the purpose of the Government’s intervention was to eliminate Judge Rakoff’s concern that Ecuador’s lack of
appearance in the case prevented him from deciding the dispute. Exhibit C-912, Special Power of Attorney
from Attorney General of Ecuador Leonidas Plaza Verduga toward Henry Dahl, Nov. 18, 1996, at 2.

12. January 14, 2011
Page 12
II. The Tribunal Has the Authority to Issue the Requested Relief Against the
Government
As a general matter, it is accepted that interim measures, adopted by an arbitral tribunal
against a State party to a BIT or other arbitration, may validly impact upon the position of a
private third party.51
Indeed, even if the interim measures would have a direct impact on the
rights of a third party (e.g., an order sequestering assets due to a third-party creditor), that does
not preclude their adoption. A fortiori, interim measures are not precluded when their third-party
effect is unclear and concerns a claim as yet undecided.
In the present case, interim measures are requested against the Republic of Ecuador—not
against the nominal Plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio Litigation. Claimants have requested that the
Tribunal tailor the interim measures as narrowly as possible while still providing effective relief.
This is not a request to suspend a national court proceeding (although such requests have been
allowed in earlier cases).52
Rather, the requested measures would merely require the State to
take steps concerning the notification and enforcement of an eventual Lago Agrio judgment.
Even if the nominal Plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio Litigation were bona fide private parties acting
independently of the State (which is not the case), the requested measures would have no effect
on their right to pursue their claim in Ecuadorian court. But the Plaintiffs are not acting
independently of the State, and the outrageous and fraudulent conduct of their representatives
51
See, e.g., CLA-51, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985 as amended 2006),
Art 17H(3): “The court of the State where recognition or enforcement is sought may, if it considers it proper,
order the requesting party to provide appropriate security if the arbitral tribunal has not already made a
determination with respect to security or where such a decision is necessary to protect the rights of third
parties.”
52
See, e.g., CLA-15, City Oriente Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador and Petroecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/21,
Decision on Provisional Measures, Nov. 19, 2007 (ordering Ecuador to refrain from pursuing judicial
proceedings, including ongoing criminal proceedings and collection actions against City Oriente); CLA-16,
Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Provisional Measures,
May 8, 2009, ¶ 79 (“Perenco”) (enjoining Ecuador from “instituting or further pursuing any action . . . to collect
from Perenco any payments [they] claim are owed . . . pursuant to Law 42,”; CLA-18, In re Electricity Co. of
Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v. Bulgaria), PCIJ, Interim Measures Decision, Dec. 5, 1939, Series A/B, No. 79
(“In re Electricity”), at 199 (ordering a suspension of pending local court proceedings “to prevent … the
performance of acts likely to prejudice … the respective rights which may result from the impending
judgment”); CLA-19, Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4,
Procedural Order No. 4, Jan. 11, 1999, 14 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 251, 255 (1999) (granting interim measures to
suspend judicial bankruptcy proceedings brought before Slovakian courts, insofar as the proceedings interfered
in the dispute submitted to arbitration); CLA-20, Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, Procedural Order No. 5, Mar. 1, 2000; see also CLA-21, Tokios Tokelés v.
Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Order No. 1, July 1, 2003, 11 ICSID Rep. 311, at 312 (deciding that both
parties should refrain from, suspend and discontinue, any domestic proceeding, judicial or otherwise,
concerning Tokios Tokelés or its investment in Ukraine); CLA-22, Zhinvali Development Ltd. v. Republic of
Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/1, Award, Jan. 24, 2003, 10 ICSID Rep. 6, ¶ 45 (ordering a Georgian court
to “stay and suspend its proceedings insofar as any issues pending before the Tribunal were concerned”); CLA-
287, ATA Constr., Indus., & Trading Co. v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2, Award, May 18, 2010, ¶ 133
(ordering that “the ongoing Jordanian court proceedings … be immediately and unconditionally terminated,
with no possibility to engage further judicial proceedings in Jordan or elsewhere on the substance of the
dispute.”).

13. January 14, 2011
Page 13
provide the Tribunal with a strong and sound basis to preclude enforcement of the impending,
fraudulently procured Lago Agrio judgment. Indeed, as noted above, Donziger recently testified
that the named Lago Agrio Plaintiffs will not receive any funds from a Lago Agrio judgment. As
a result, this Tribunal’s granting of interim measures could never affect the nominal Lago Agrio
Plaintiffs, because they would not receive any funds under any circumstances.
Because Ecuador has partnered with the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs in a joint scheme to
manufacture a fraudulent judgment against Chevron through corruption and intimidation of the
Lago Agrio Court, interim measures requiring Ecuador to suspend enforcement of that judgment
pending adjudication of Claimants’ claims in this Arbitration are appropriate.
As to the contingency that the measures which Claimants request to preserve their BIT
rights against the State would have an effect on the nominal Plaintiffs enforcing a national court
judgment, this is irrelevant. Either the judgment should not have been rendered, in which case
the nominal Plaintiffs have no legitimate rights, or their enforcement of a nonetheless fraudulent
judgment is temporarily postponed. Such a temporary postponement of enforceability is
manifestly equitable given the potential costs and reputational damage to Claimants resulting
from immediate worldwide enforcement proceedings, and the important issues presented in this
case. No one seriously suggests that Claimants would have any effective recourse against
Respondent, still less the nominal Plaintiffs in the Lago Agrio Litigation, if Claimants eventually
prevail in this Arbitration. In these circumstances, Respondent is seeking to rely on its own
internal law as an excuse to avoid compliance with its prima facie obligations under the BIT.
The above considerations hold, a fortiori, when the third party is acting in complicity
with the State to pursue a strategy of litigation in breach of the State’s international obligations.
As detailed above, and in Claimants’ previous letters and submissions, Claimants have adduced
evidence showing the complicity between the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs, Ecuador, and Petroecuador
in the proceedings against Chevron.53
An interim order certainly can address any act or omission of the State; and it also can
address conduct of third parties for which the State would be responsible. Highly relevant in this
context is the acknowledgment and adoption of the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs’ conduct by the
Ecuadorian State. Article 11 of the ILC Articles provides as follows:
Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding
articles shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State under
international law if and to the extent that the State acknowledges
and adopts the conduct in question as its own.54
53
Indeed there are indications that the Lago Agrio Litigation is being at least partly financed by Petroecuador.
See Claimants’ Letter to the Tribunal, Dec. 12, 2010, at 5-6 (summarizing evidence of the Government’s and
Petroecuador’s involvement in the funding of the Lago Agrio Litigation).
54
CLA-288, James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction,
Text and Commentaries, Art. 11 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).

14. January 14, 2011
Page 14
Claimants have set out several instances of explicit support on the part of President Correa, his
family and close advisors for, and espousal of, the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs’ claims and litigation
strategy.55
These include Ecuador’s misuse of its sovereign right to prosecute criminal conduct
in order to further the Lago Agrio Plaintiffs’ interests, its expected financial benefit from the
outcome of the Lago Agrio Litigation, and its agreement with the Aguinda Plaintiffs that they
would not sue Ecuador and Petroecuador.56
By this and other conduct, Ecuador acknowledges
and adopts the Plaintiffs’ conduct in the Lago Agrio Litigation as its own.
III. Request for Relief
The UNCITRAL Secretariat, in considering proposals for uniform provisions on interim
measures of protection, said that the aim of interim measures may be broadly described under
two headings:
First, they are intended to preserve the position of the parties
pending resolution of their dispute, a function often referred to as
“preserving the status quo.” A second aim is to ensure that the
final award or judgement can be enforced by preserving, in the
jurisdiction in which enforcement will be sought, assets or property
which can be applied to satisfy the award or judgement.57
The practical purpose of Claimants’ request regarding the Lago Agrio Litigation is two-fold: (1)
to obtain a measure of protection from disruptive enforcement proceedings in foreign
jurisdictions during the pendency of this Arbitration; and (2) to suspend enforcement of the Lago
Agrio judgment using valid mechanisms under Ecuadorian law. Given the Plaintiffs’ aggressive
stance towards enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment in various jurisdictions, and that a
number of jurisdictions permit ex parte, pre-recognition attachment proceedings, the first goal of
the requested relief is designed for the limited purpose of helping Chevron to defend those
proceedings efficiently and effectively. The second goal is designed to work within the letter of
Ecuadorian law to ensure that a fraudulent judgment, made in violation of Ecuador’s Treaty and
international-law obligations, is not enforceable pending the resolution of this Arbitration.
For these reasons, and in continuation of their previous requests, Claimants respectfully
request that the Tribunal issue the following interim measures concerning the Lago Agrio
Litigation, to protect their contract, legal, and Treaty rights from imminent and substantial harm.
Specifically, Claimants request that the Tribunal:
55
Claimants’ Request for Interim Measures, Apr. 1, 2010, ¶¶ 51-53; Claimants’ Memorial on the Merits, Sept. 6,
2010, § IV.H.
56
Exhibit C-872, C. Bonifaz Privilege Log, Dec. 7, 2010, at 8, entry CH-270-285; Exhibit C-911, Waiver of
Rights Granted Before Notaries Public of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, Respectively, Nov. 20, 1996.
57
Exhibit C-913, A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.119: UNCITRAL Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation), 36th
Sess., Mar. 4-8, 2002, Secretariat Note: Preparation of uniform provision on interim measures of protection, ¶
14.

15. January 14, 2011
Page 15
(1) Declare that Claimants have met the standards for interim measures protection,
including declarations that: (i) this Tribunal has prima facie jurisdiction over the
present Arbitration; (ii) Claimants have presented a prima facie case on the merits,
including prima facie evidence that the claims involved in the Lago Agrio Litigation
have been settled and released by the Government, that the Lago Agrio Litigation has
been tainted by fraud and/or serious due process violations, and that the Government
has violated the Treaty and international law; and (iii) Claimants’ request for relief is
urgent; and
(2) Declare that any first-instance Lago Agrio judgment is “not enforceable during the
pendency of a first-instance appeal until that appeal has been decided,” in accordance
with Ecuadorian law;58
(3) Declare that, pending the final outcome of this Arbitration, any first-level appellate
court decision upholding the Lago Agrio judgment in Ecuador is not final, conclusive
or enforceable;
(4) Order that, pending the final outcome of this Arbitration, Respondent shall undertake
the following actions in the course of any appeal procedure of a first-instance Lago
Agrio judgment:
(a) The Government and the first-level appellate court shall declare the
enforceability of the Lago Agrio judgment to be suspended, which includes
ordering the Secretariats of the appellate court and National Court of Justice
to refrain from issuing any certificate stating that the judgment is enforceable
in the absence of a bond from Chevron,59
and
(b) The Government shall declare a suspension of enforceability of the Lago
Agrio judgment, by requesting an Attorney General opinion based on the
findings of this Tribunal under Article 237 of the Ecuadorian Constitution;
and
(c) An appropriate Ecuadorian Government organ shall declare that the
enforcement of a Lago Agrio judgment is suspended during the pendency of
any appeal from the first-instance judgment, including waiver or relief from
the bond requirement which, in the circumstances, would be materially
impossible to meet; and
58
This requested relief directly quotes the Republic of Ecuador’s position on this matter and thus represents an
uncontested statement of Ecuadorian law in this Arbitration. Resp.’s Letter to Tribunal Regarding Claimant’s
Second Request for Interim Measures, Nov. 12, 2010, at 4 (emphasis removed).
59
Under Ecuadorian law, in order to enforce a judgment upon the decision of the first-instance appeal, the
Plaintiffs must request from the Secretariat of the Chamber a certificate stating that the appeal has rendered the
judgment enforceable. Further, to obtain enforcement once the judgment is in cassation appeal, the plaintiffs
must ask the Secretariat of the National Court of Justice for a certificate indicating that the respondent did not
post bond. See Exhibit C-260, Ecuadorian Code of Civil Procedure, Arts. 58, 287, 295.

16. January 14, 2011
Page 16
(d) The Government shall transmit the Tribunal’s interim measures order to the
first-level appellate court and the National Court of Justice;60
and
(e) The Government shall inform the first-level appellate court of the binding
nature of the Tribunal’s interim measures decision; and
(5) Declare that, pending the final outcome of this Arbitration, any attachments or
seizures of assets would be improper and inappropriate, in light of the seriousness of
the claims in this case and the prima facie evidence presented by Claimants; and
(6) Grant any other and further relief that the Tribunal deems appropriate in the
circumstances.
Claimants’ request for declaratory relief number (2) is narrowly tailored to satisfy
Claimants’ minimum needs while conforming with Ecuador’s own repeated statements in this
Arbitration that Chevron is protected from enforcement or attachment through legal appeal
rights.61
As Ecuador represented to this Tribunal in May 2010:
[I]n the hypothetical case of an adverse first instance decision,
Claimants have multiple appellate rights within Ecuador …
[Claimants] will not have to pay even a single penny until some
court outside of Ecuador finds that an adverse final judgment (if
one ever be entered against them) should be enforced under the
“comity” rules of that jurisdiction. In most jurisdictions, that will
require a finding by the enforcing court that the environmental
litigation resulting in an Ecuadorian final judgment in fact
comported with fundamental international notions of due process,
in which case the enforcing court would have thus rejected those
due process arguments Claimants make here. Claimants, then,
have multiple layers of protection that gainsay any urgency, and
also demonstrate a miniscule risk of realistic harm—irreparable or
otherwise.62
Considering that both Ecuador and Claimants agree that as a matter of Ecuadorian law, the first-
instance judgment is not enforceable pending appeal, this request should be uncontroversial.
Further, the additional surety of an interim order, repeating merely what Ecuador has conceded
as a legal fact, does nothing to abridge the rights of the nominal Lago Agrio Plaintiffs.
60
The Tribunal may also consider directly transmitting its interim measures order to first-level appellate court.
61
See Resp.’s Letter to Tribunal Regarding Claimants’ Request for Interim Measures, Apr. 6, 2010, at 4–5;
Resp.’s Response to Request for Interim Measures, May 3, 2010, at 4–5; Resp.’s Reply Memorial on
Jurisdictional Objections of the Republic of Ecuador, June 10, 2010, at 7–8; Resp.’s Letter to Tribunal
Regarding Claimant’s Second Request for Interim Measures, November 12, 2010, at 4.
62
Resp.’s Response to Request for Interim Measures, May 3, 2010, at 4–5 (emphasis in original).

17. January 14, 2011
Page 17
This Tribunal is also authorized to declare in response to request number (3) that the
Lago Agrio judgment, as affirmed by a first-level appellate court in Ecuador, is unenforceable
pending the outcome of this Arbitration. Interim measures are intended “to preserve the
respective rights of the parties pending [the Tribunal’s] decision, and presuppose[] that
irreparable prejudice shall not be caused to rights which are the subject of a dispute in judicial
proceedings.”63
Claimants have established the fraudulent and unenforceable nature of any
adverse Lago Agrio judgment, and therefore any such judgment should remain unenforceable
even once affirmed by a first-level appellate court in Ecuador. This request is narrowly designed
to protect Claimants’ due process and Treaty rights throughout the duration of this Arbitration,
by shielding them from the improper enforcement of an illegitimate judgment regardless of its
status under Ecuadorian law.
Claimants’ requests that Ecuador declare a suspension of enforcement during appeal—in
requests numbered (4)(a) through (c)—are based directly on available mechanisms under
Ecuadorian law, and are consistent with Ecuador’s representations to this Tribunal of the “layers
of protection” purportedly available to Chevron. Request number (4)(a) involves the
Government ordering the appellate courts to suspend the enforceability of the judgment,
including, inter alia, the suspension of any certificates rendering the judgment enforceable as a
result of Chevron’s failure to post a bond. Under Ecuadorian law, if Chevron were to fail to post
a bond at the cassation appeal level, the Plaintiffs could: (i) ask the Secretariat of the sole
Chamber to provide a certificate stating that the judgment is enforceable; and (ii) ask the
Secretariat of the National Court of Justice to provide a certificate indicating that the defendant
did not post bond and the judgment is thereby enforceable. The Tribunal’s order would simply
direct Ecuador to order suspension of the issuance of these certificates. Several Ecuadorian legal
principles support this request, including the supremacy of international law64
and the
recognition of binding international arbitration under the New York Convention.65
By executing
the BIT, Ecuador consented to arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which grant
the Tribunal the power to issue “any interim measures it deems necessary in respect of the
63
CLA-5, LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States), Judgment, June 27, 2001, ¶ 22, ICJ Reports 2001 (“the
Court must be concerned to preserve by such measures the rights which may subsequently be adjudged by the
Court to belong either to the Applicant, or to the Respondent”). See also CLA-6, Case Concerning the
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia
v. Russia), Order, Oct. 15, 2008, ¶¶ 118, 128 (same).
64
Ecuador is a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), meaning that it has
submitted to the supremacy of international law in its jurisdiction. In particular, the Vienna Convention
requires member-States to comply with their treaty obligations in good faith, and specifically provides that “[a]
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” CLA-
10, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Arts. 26, 27.
65
See CLA-286, Donald Francis Donovan, The Scope and Enforceability of Provisional Measures in
International Commercial Arbitration: A Survey of Jurisdictions, the Work of UNCITRAL, and Proposals for
Moving Forward, in Albert Jan Van den Berg (ed.), INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT
CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS, ICCA Congress ser. 2002, at 82, 146 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2003) (“When an arbitral
tribunal orders interim measures, it acts on the same authority by which it renders a final award. Indeed … the
very purpose of interim measures is to ensure the effectiveness of the final award. It follows that, if states are
prepared to lend their enforcement machinery to the enforcement of final awards, they should lend it as well to
the enforcement of interim measures.”).

18. January 14, 2011
Page 18
subject-matter of the dispute” (Article 26(1)). Moreover, by consenting to UNCITRAL
arbitration, Ecuador, including its constituent branches, undertook “to carry out” any award
issued by the Tribunal “without delay” (Article 32(2)).
Request number (4)(b) involves a measure available to the Ecuadorian Attorney General,
who is responsible for defending the State and its institutions under the law. Article 237 of the
Ecuadorian Constitution states that the Attorney General has the authority “[t]o provide legal
counsel and binding responses to legal queries from public sector bodies and institutions on the
interpretation and application of the law, on those issues where the Constitution or the law does
not grant competences to other authorities or bodies.”66
Any State institution may consult the
Attorney General about the binding nature of the Tribunal’s order in Ecuador, or about the
enforceability of a local judgment subject to an international challenge under Ecuador’s treaty
obligations. The following legal doctrines under Ecuadorian law would support such an opinion:
(i) Article 190 of the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution, which declares and recognizes the validity
of arbitration; (ii) the U.S.-Ecuador BIT signed and ratified by the Republic of Ecuador; (iii)
Articles 41 and 42 of the Ecuadorian Arbitration and Mediation Law, which recognizes the
validity of international arbitration; and (iv) Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the Organic Law for the
Office of the Attorney General, which sets forth as follows certain powers of the Attorney
General:
(a) To defend the State and its institutions pursuant to the law; …
(d) To represent the Ecuadorian State and public sector entities in
any suit or claim filed or brought against them in another State
pursuant to the Political Constitution of the Republic, international
treaties or conventions in force and the laws of the Ecuadorian
State; and (e) To answer consultations and to advise public sector
bodies and entities as well as private juridical persons with a social
or public purpose about the construction or application of
“constitutional” or legal norms or of another juridical order.67
An opinion by the Ecuadorian Attorney General regarding the binding nature of the Tribunal’s
order and its suspensive effect on enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment could be distributed
both within the country and to other enforcement jurisdictions.
Claimants’ requests numbered (4)(d) and (4)(e) are also well within the power of the
Ecuadorian Government. Indeed, the Attorney General of Ecuador has demonstrated his ability
to perform the relief requested under (4)(d), as evidenced by his compliance with the Tribunal’s
first Interim Measures Order through oficios nos. 14170 and 14282, evidence of which was
supplied to the Tribunal by Respondent in correspondence dated June 2, 2010.
Given that the Tribunal’s order in these respects would be grounded in measures legally
available to the Ecuadorian Government, the exercise of these measures would not harm the
66
Exhibit C-288, Political Constitution of Ecuador (2008), Art. 237 (emphasis added).
67
Exhibit C-914, Ecuadorian Organic Law for the Office of the Attorney General, Art. 3. Under Ecuadorian law,
the Attorney General’s opinion is binding. Id., Art. 3(e).

19. January 14, 2011
Page 19
nominal Plaintiffs’ rights under Ecuadorian law. And even if the temporary suspension of
enforcement of a Lago Agrio judgment would affect the nominal Plaintiffs, this could not
impede adoption of the requested measures. The requested measures are intended to preserve
Claimants’ rights as against the Republic of Ecuador under international law. Since the
Government has already settled and released all diffuse environmental claims of its citizens, and
there are no claims for individual damages in the Lago Agrio Litigation, there are no third-party
rights that will be affected by the Tribunal’s measures.
For the reasons set forth above and in their Request for Interim Measures dated April 1,
2010, and letters dated September 2, 2010, October 27, 2010, and December 12, 2010, Claimants
respectfully seek an interim measures award to protect their legal, Treaty, and contractual rights
as well as the status quo pending the outcome of this Arbitration.
Sincerely,
R. Doak Bishop
cc: Eric W. Bloom
MacNeil Mitchell
Dr. Álvaro Galindo Cardona
Bruno Leurent
Ricardo Ugarte
Tomás Leonard
James Crawford