Ex. 123

CERT. MERRILL VER: JD [Circular stamp: PROVINCIAL COURT OF
JUSTICE. OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE
PRESIDENT. SUCUMBIOS]
[handwritten: two hundred twenty-one thousand five hundred eighty-eight] [illegible]
[handwritten: 1835 (5) 221,588]
Proceeding No. 2003-0002
PROVINCIAL COURT OF JUSTICE OF SUCUMBÍOS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PROVINCIAL COURT OF JUSTICE OF SUCUMBÍOS. Lago Agrio, Thursday, October 25, 2012, at
11:23 a.m. Add to the record the motion filed by Mr. Adolfo Callejas, counsel of record for Chevron
Corporation, signed by Mr. Enrique Carvajal and received in the Clerk’s Office on Tuesday, October 16,
2012, at 3:22 p.m., concerning a request for certified copies of motions the plaintiffs filed on September 26
and 27, 2012, and in response the Court orders that the copies be provided, at the petitioner’s expense.
Concerning the motion filed by Mr. Pablo Fajardo, joint counsel for the plaintiffs, received in the Clerk’s
Office on October 18, 2012, at 10:00 a.m., the Court orders that it be added to the record. The first request
for expansion is admissible since the order issued October 15, 2012, inadvertently failed to rule on all of
the requests filed on September 26 and 27, 2012. Therefore, the order attaching intellectual property
registered by Chevron and its subsidiaries at IEPI is expanded to include the following trademarks:
Havoline label design, registration No.15220, type PM [product mark]; Havoline label design (energy),
registration No.15219, type PM; Havoline and Design ii, registration No.15218, type PM; Havoline
formula 3 and Design, registration No.1490, type PM; Havoline, registration No.220, type PM; Texaco, un
mundo de energía, registration No.7010, type PM; Texaco, un mundo de energía, registration No.2080,
type SM [service mark]; t-texaco star design, registration No.2655, type PM; t-texaco star design;
registration No.2626, type PM; Texaco, registration No.1915, type PM; Texaco and Design of a hexagonal
edge with a star, registration No.140, type PM; Texacoat, registration No.513, type PM; Red star t green-
texaco, registration No.457, type PM; Texaco, registration No.44,PM; Texaco, registration No.662, type
SM; Texaco super outboard, registration No.1552, type PM; Texaco outboard, registration No.1553; type
PM; Texaco vanguard, registration No.1554, type PM; Chevron, registration No.15133, type PM; Chevron,
registration No.1334, type PM; Chevron design in blue, white and red, registration No.421, type PM;
Chevron design in black and white, registration No.420, type PM; Chevron design in blue, white and red,
surrounded by a white strip in the shape of a pentagon, registration No.419, type PM; Chevron, registration
No.500, type PM; Chevron, registration No.38, PM; Chevron and Design ( color), registration No.996,
type PM; Chevron and Design ( color), registration No.1032, type PM; Chevron and Design ( color),
registration No.422, type SM; Chevron and Design ( white and black), registration No.997, type PM;
Chevron and Design ( white and black), registration No.998, type PM; Chevron and Design ( white and
black), registration No.423, type SM; Chevron and Design (black), registration No.2191, PM; Chevron and
Design (black), registration No.2192, type SM; Chevron and Design (black), registration No.817, type PM;
Chevron Design (color), registration No.2193, type PM; Chevron Design (color), registration No. 2194,
type PM; Chevron Design (color), registration No.818, type SM; Chevron supreme, registration No.196,
PM; Ursa super plus, registration No.265, PM; Ursa, registration No.204, type, PM; Ursa ofrece confianza,
registration No.1220, type SM; Ursa delivers confidence, registration No.1221, type SM; Doro, registration
No.500, type PM; Geotex, registration No.1324-10, type PM; Meropa, registration No.223, type PM;
Motex, registration No.514, PM; Multigear, registration No.1536-10, PM; Rando, registration No.202, type
PM; Regal, registration No.205, type PM; Taro, registration No.495, type PM; TDH, registration No.1551-
10, type PM; Texatherm, registration No.1325-10, PM; Thuban, registration No.203, type PM; Universal,
registration No.1550-10, type PM. The Court also grants the second request for expansion since the Court
inadvertently failed to rule on one part of the request, so the order is expanded to include the seizure of
“Chevron Argentina S.R.L.’s shares in Oleoductos del Valle S.A.” The request for clarification, however,
is not admissible, since the petitioners do not support any “vagueness in the interpretation” of the order (as
required by Art.282 of the Code of Civil Procedure). The order is clear regarding the value of the list in

“Form 10-K,” in the sense that the Court considered how Chevron Corp. describes itself to U.S. regulatory
authorities, concluding that “there can be no question regarding the existence of investments (assets) and of
their handling through subsidiaries and affiliate companies,” and the order dated October 15, 2012, finds
that Form 10-K “makes clear who exercises control over them by declaring that ‘All the subsidiaries on the
preceding list are totally owned, directly or indirectly, by Chevron Corporation.” The Court also grants the
petitioners’ reservation of rights to indicate other property owned by the debtor until it fulfills the pending
obligation. Regarding the requested letters rogatory, the Clerk shall prepare them, following the model
attached to the request and considering the specifics of each case. Consequently, and considering Article 3
of the cited Convention, plaintiffs’ counsel Mr. Pablo Fajardo Mendoza is authorized (personally or
through an authorized representative) to send these letters rogatory to the appropriate foreign authorities.
Also add to the record the motion filed by Adolfo Callejas, counsel of record for Chevron Corporation,
signed by Mr. Enrique Carvajal and received in the Clerk’s Office on October 18, 2012, at 2:16 p.m.,
requesting the revocation of the order dated October 15, 2012, at 4:53 p.m., because of an alleged lack of
jurisdiction and procedural nullities, which, he says, is demonstrated by seven arguments described in
section III of his motion. In motions filed April 20, 2012, at 3:37 p.m., and the motion filed June 11, 2012,
at 4:56 p.m., Mr. Callejas already made the argument on Chevron Corp.’s behalf that appears in paragraph
(a), concerning jurisdiction, which, Chevron claims, is had by the judge of the judgment debtor’s domicile.
The first one was rejected in an order issued June 6, 2012, at 9:17 a.m., in which “the Court notes that both
the trial court’s judgment and the affirmation by the court of appeals agree that in this case the defendant
expressly consented to submit to this jurisdiction – Ecuadorian – as a requirement for this action to be
dismissed in the U.S. – U.S. judicial decisions that decisively support this position are even cited – i.e.,
Chevron Corporation has voluntarily agreed to be tried by this jurisdiction and has thus extended the
competence of the Ecuadorian judges over those [sic] of the judges of its domicile, which in effect
constitutes an effective waiver of the judge from its domicile, which now prevents [it from] arguing this
Court’s lack of competence. Moreover, having refused to be judged by the judges of the country of its
domicile, the defendant makes it impossible to transfer the proceeding to the trial court where it argues the
competent judge to hear the enforcement [proceeding] is located, since that jurisdiction already declined to
hear the case.” Chevron’s second request was ruled on in the order issued July 23, 2012, at 4:39 p.m.,
which found “regarding the main petition, seeking annulment of the orders issued June 6, 2012, because,
the defendant says, the undersigned is not the competent judge, the Court denies the request because the
defenses and endless challenges to the competence of all the Ecuadorian judges have already been ruled on
in the decisions being enforced, and this is not the proper procedural moment or appropriate forum to
review those decisions. The defenses were effectively raised and the courts quickly ruled on them, but they
have not been proven, as the [defendant] states in the motion. What is clear and abundantly proven in the
record is that Chevron Corporation consented in the U.S. to submit to Ecuadorian jurisdiction as a
requirement for the court to dismiss the complaint against it. This is an indisputable fact that the
Ecuadorian courts have taken as an express submission to them....The decision/decisions filed with this
Court for enforcement show that those promises have been recognized in different courts in the country of
the defendant’s domicile so, contrary to the defendant’s request, Article 142 of the Judiciary Act does not
apply; rather, Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure applies: ‘A judge or tribunal that in

[handwritten: two hundred twenty-one thousand five hundred eighty-nine] [216]
[handwritten: [illegible] 221,589]
principle is not competent to hear a particular matter may become competent if the parties expressly or
tacitly agree to change venue to that court,’ and paragraph two also applies, adding: ‘Once venue has been
changed, that judge excludes any other and cannot recuse herself or himself from hearing the case.’ In this
case, there was obviously an express change of venue, confirmed by the fact that Chevron Corporation,
because of its domicile, is not subject to the jurisdiction of Ecuadorian judges, but it expressly submitted to
their jurisdiction, since it promised the U.S. courts that it would do so. Chevron cannot now, or at any point
in time involving this litigation or its enforcement, go back to the judge of its original jurisdiction or
successfully challenge the jurisdiction of Ecuadorian judges.” Raising the same argument again is just a
futile insistence that consumes the court’s resources and the proceeding’s resources, so in this case and
subsequent ones, the Court rejects the argument and warns petitioner that this type of obstruction to the
case will not be tolerated. The same can be said for paragraph b), which also refers to competence, and
petitioner again objects to the appointment of the substitute judges, as it did in the motion filed June 11,
2012, at 4:56 p.m., and in the one filed July 26, 2012, and in all previous motions (in which Mr. Callejas,
Counsel of Record for Chevron Corp., appears under protest), motions that objected to the jurisdiction and
appointment of each and every one of the judges who have taken over this case. This leads one to believe
that petitioner files challenges out of habit, regardless of their merit, i.e., reflecting a clear intention to
obstruct and unjustifiably delay the normal progress of the proceeding. Paragraph c) revisits the issue of
the evaluation of the self-recusals filed in this case, an issue that was already decided in the order issued
June 6, 2012, at 9:17 a.m. (in response to the request Mr. Callejas filed on May 18, 2012, at 3:55 p.m.) and
an order dated July 23, 2012, at 4:39 p.m., which addresses the motion Chevron filed on June 11, 2012,
and clearly establishes that “it is not appropriate to once again [evaluate] the self-recusals filed in this
case.” In addition, the judge considered all of the self-recusals when assuming jurisdiction in the opening
lines of the order dated October 15 that petitioner challenges, in which the Court expressly considered “the
[self-recusal] of the acting substitute judge of the Division Dr. Luis Alberto Legña,” citing Article 211 of
the Judiciary Act when accepting it. So there is no reason to re-evaluate the prior self-recusals, and there is
no valid reason to challenge this judge’s jurisdiction. Then, continuing the habit of recycling ineffectual
arguments, we find in paragraph d) that Chevron once again refers to an issue already discussed and
decided in prior orders that already ruled on reiterated requests concerning arbitration awards that Chevron
has submitted in this case. First, in the order dated February 17, 2012, at 3:39 p.m., the Court ruled on the
motion filed Friday, February 3, 2012, at 4:39 p.m., by Mr. Callejas on behalf of Chevron Corp., signed by
Patricio Campuzano, which asked the Court to “take all measures at its disposal to suspend or cause to be
suspended” from that award, the Court ordered that “as for the request (ii), to ‘respect the above decision
of the tribunal,’ in reference to taking ‘...all measures at its disposal to suspend or cause to be suspended
the enforcement and recognition within and without Ecuador of any judgment issued against Chevron,”
this Division holds as follows: It agrees with Chevron Corp.’s position regarding Ecuador’s obligations at
an international level, so the Division has proceeded to analyze other International Treaties, in addition to
Ecuadorian law in search of all legal mechanisms that would allow this Court to suspend or cause to be
suspended the enforcement or recognition within and without Ecuador of any judgment against Chevron.
Accordingly, in this investigation, the Division has found that, under Ecuadorian law, the sole

mechanism established at the cassation stage for this purpose is the provision set forth in Article 11 of the
Cassation Act.” The Court later ruled on the motion Chevron filed on March 6, 2012, at 4:26 p.m., which
reiterated and expanded this request. And later still, in response to Chevron’s request of April 20, 2012, the
Court once again remarked, in an order issued June 6, 2012, “with respect to this motion the Court also
notes that the arbitration awards in question were already considered, and what was ordered is
enforceable.” Just because Chevron Corp. raises the same argument again is no reason for this judge to
revoke the decisions of his predecessors, because those decisions are final and binding. Lastly, we find that
the arguments raised in paragraphs e) and f) were already ruled on in the recusal action Chevron itself
filed, as it admits, and it is likewise not this Court’s responsibility to review those decisions since they do
not affect the hearing of the case. Regarding the motion challenging refusal to allow appeal, Chevron cites
Article 9 of the Cassation Act, only highlighting and commenting on the portion of the rule that it cares
about, while it ignores the part of the rule that allows the Court to deny the motion, provided that the denial
is reasoned. Indeed, the October 15, 2012 order denying the improperly filed motion challenging refusal to
allow appeal was duly reasoned because, as the rule itself states, there is a chance the appeal should not be
granted, as when an appeal is used for illegitimate purposes, such as those set forth in Art. 292 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. Regarding the petitioner’s request for revocation because the order supposedly attaches
“property that does not belong to Chevron Corporation,” the Court notes that the petitioner is wrong to
claim that the Court is modifying the judgment being enforced because the judgment is against Chevron
Corporation, and the October 15, 2012 order attaches the company’s property, but this does not mean that
the Court confuses the legal personalities of third parties. Rather, the Court is in fact identifying the
property of a debtor in arrears, in default of its obligations, which must be subject to enforcement
proceedings. Given that the subsidiary companies are “wholly owned by Chevron Corp.,” no third parties
are affected. In other words, these interests are deemed to be part of its corporate assets (regardless of their
legal personality) and their due process rights cannot be deemed to have been harmed because it is
precisely their owner that has appeared in court representing them, and continues to do so even now, the
one who opposes enforcement of supposed “third-party property” with the zealousness of an owner. To
conclude, the Court rejects the motion and also warns the petitioner, for the record, in case it continues to
try to delay this enforcement proceeding, turning it into a proceeding to establish rights [trans. – as
opposed to a proceeding to enforce rights] or an appeals stage for final and binding orders. Next we
continue, along the same lines, with the motion filed by Adolfo Callejas, Counsel of Record for Chevron
Corporation, signed by Enrique Carvajal, and received at the Clerk’s Office on Thursday, October 18,
2012, at 4:41 p.m., which is to be added to the record. In response to his request that the Court annul the
order issued October 15, 2012, at 4:53 p.m., supposedly because I am not the competent judge, since the
petitioner states that “(my) appointment, as well as the appointment of those who preceded (me) in hearing
this case . . . are affected by numerous procedural defects . . .” I reject the request regarding the
appointment of those who preceded me because the petitioner already raised these issues, and the Court has
already ruled on them. Regarding the defects allegedly affecting “my” appointment, I reiterate that my
appointment was carried out by the competent authorities in accordance with the relevant laws (as cited in
the challenged order), and that it is not appropriate to challenge it in this proceeding. The challenged order
identifies the administrative acts and the laws that give me jurisdiction so the accusation (that has also been
made against all the judges who preceded me in this case) is either made in bad faith or

[handwritten: two hundred twenty-one thousand five hundred ninety] [217]
[handwritten: [illegible] 221,590]
out of complete ignorance of the law, and is rejected under warning to the petitioner. Likewise, the
argument in point 2, that the order is not duly reasoned, is incomprehensible and results from a poor
interpretation and a tangling of texts (being ignorant of the grammatical effects of punctuation marks, in
this case the comma separating the phrase “acting substitute judge, member of the Sole Division . . .”) in
the October 15, 2012 order. So, since the order is clear, the interpretations proposed in the motion under
discussion are rejected, as is the argument. The issue of self-recusals is also repetitive in this proceeding,
since we can see that it has already been ruled on in this proceeding, above, in reference to the orders of
July 23, 2012, at 4:39 p.m., and June 6, 2012, which clearly stated that the self-recusals have been
addressed following the proper legal procedure. Significantly, the Court reminds Mr. Callejas that despite
his insistence that he did not challenge the self-recusal filed by Judge Toral, the record says otherwise (see
order of July 12, 2012, at 4:39 p.m.) “Simply for the purpose of rejecting any defect that could be alleged
concerning the competence of this judge, I note for the record that by challenging the order issued on April
17, 2012, Chevron was requesting a ruling from the judge,” so his insistence shows an excess of
stubbornness, since it is repetitive and futile. As an analysis of the record shows, the motions filed by Mr.
Callejas (and signed by Mr. Carvajal) on behalf of Chevron Corp. on October 18 contain repetitive requests
regarding different issues that have already been raised, were raised again, and are being used yet again,
without detriment to those signing. The defendant’s petition for cassation filed with the Clerk’s Office on
October 22, 2012, at 4:59 p.m., which is to be added to the record, is denied because it is without merit,
because the case is in the enforcement stage. In this regard, I cite case law involving a similar issue
appearing in the Judicial Gazette, Year XCV, Series XVI, No. 3, Page780, dated February 28, 1995, which
states: David Vera Alarcón files a cassation appeal against the order issued by the First Division of District
Court No. 1 on Administrative Matters, on April 19, 1994, which ordered that the defendants, Minister of
Labor and Human Resources and the Executive Director of SECAP, compensate the plaintiff, Dr.. Ing.
Vera Alarcón, in an amount equal to one year of wages from September 1, 1991, through September 1,
1992, which is the time remaining on his four-year term as Executive Director of SECAP, the position
from which he was removed, there being a judgment ordering that he be reinstated to the position for the
time remaining for him to complete his term and in addition, considering the defendants’ express statement
that they could not comply with the judgment, and the plaintiff’s express request for compensation. This
case undoubtedly involves an order issued to enforce the judgment; however, it does not decide any issue
not disputed OR DECIDED in the judgment, as Art. 2(c) of the Cassation Act requires for the appeal to be
admitted. On pages 123 through 124 (back) of the record reveals the judgment issued in this case by the
Second Division of the now defunct Administrative-Law Court of the Republic, the holding of which
states: ‘the complaint is accepted in part, and the challenged administrative act is declared to be illegal and
the defendants are ordered to take the necessary steps for David Vera Alarcón to be reinstated as Executive
Director for the remainder of the four-year term to which he was elected. The defendants have ten days to
so act. No legal fees are ordered. Notify the parties.’ This judgment, after a number of collateral issues,
actions and appeals, became final and that is the judgment the plaintiff is attempting to enforce. That is, the
order of April 19, 1994, is nothing more than what was already decided in the judgment partially quoted in
application of Art. 9, paragraph three, of Executive Order No. 611 of the Administrative-Law Jurisdiction
Act (Official Gazette, No. 857, 7/31/75), which has been expressly or tacitly accepted, in the main part, by
the plaintiff. Therefore, reprimanding the lower court

for having granted an inappropriate appeal, ‘ADMINISTERING JUSTICE IN THE NAME OF THE
REPUBLIC AND UNDER THE AUTHORITY GRANTED BY LAW,’ having no jurisdiction to consider
the plaintiff’s claims and the arguments against the defendants for the above reasons, the appeal is denied,
and the record is to be remanded to the First Division of Court No. 1…” The purpose of ordering the
attachment of property and precautionary measures, as was done on October 15, 2012, is to enforce the
judgment, not decide essential issues not disputed in the proceeding or decided in the judgment, and not to
contradict an enforceable decision, so that a cassation appeal against it might be accepted. So the order of
October 15, 2012, perfectly fits with the cited case law. The Court notes the appearance of Mr. Diego
Larrea Alarcón, as counsel of record, as stated in the attached notary document—also to be added to the
record—and the Court notes the judicial address for receiving notifications. The Court warns that new
requests in this proceeding that recycle the arguments expressed in this order will violate the provisions of
Art. 292 of the Code of Civil Procedure, so the relevant sanction will be applied (Art.293 of the Code of
Civil Procedure). The Court notes that if a new appeal of this type were filed it would confirm the illegal
and abusive use of appeals, with the malicious intent of obstructing the proceeding, which would force the
undersigned judge not only to reject the motion but also to apply the established fine on the attorney
signing the request and the party on whose behalf it is filed. Add to the record the responses to the official
letters sent by this Court. The motion filed with the Clerk’s Office on October 24, 2012, at 12:00 p.m., by
Mr. Stalin Chonata Morales, is denied because he is not a party to the case. Finally, before addressing the
motion requesting revocation filed on October 22, 2012, at 11:24 a.m., by the Attorney General’s Office,
the Court orders that the request for revocation is served on the plaintiffs, who will have ten days to
respond. The Court notes the judicial mailbox indicated for notifying this party.-
Notify the parties.
[signature]
DR. WILFRIDO ERAZO ARAUJO
DEPUTY PRESIDENT.
I inform you of this for the purposes established by law.
[Signature]
DR. RÓMULO SARITAMA NAULA
RECORDING CLERK (A)
In Lago Agrio, Thursday, October twenty-fifth, two thousand twelve, starting at 2:33 p.m., by means of
court certificates, I served notice of the foregoing Decree to: MARIA AGUINDA ET AL. at mailbox No.
78 and e-mail pafabibi@gmail.com of Dr. / Atty ATTY PABLO FAJARDO MENDOZA. DR. ADOLFO
CALLEJAS RIVADENEIRA at mailbox No. 63 and e-mail callejaslaw@gmail.com of Dr. / Atty DR.
ADOLFO CALLEJAS RIBADENEIRA (CALLEJAS & ASOCIADOS). to: CERTIFICATE in his office.
I certify:
[Signature]
DR. RÓMULO SARITAMA NAULA
RECORDING CLERK (A)

[handwritten: 218]
CERTIFICATION: I attest that the foregoing copies of pages two hundred twenty-one thousand five
hundred eighty-eight to two hundred twenty-one thousand five hundred ninety of proceeding
concerning environmental damage No. 0002-2003-CJPS, filed by MARIA AGUINDA ET AL. against
ADOLFO CALLEJAS RIBADENEIRA, COUNSEL OF RECORD FOR CHEVRON CORPORATION,
are identical to the original. I Certify.
Nueva Loja, October 29, 2012
[signature]
Dr. Rómulo R. Saritama Naula
RECORDING CLERK (A)

CERT. MERRILL VER: JD
[Illegible handwritten number]
[Emblem]
Judicial Council
CERTIFICATE
The National Human Resources Office of the Judicial Council certifies that Ms. SARITAMA
NAULA ROMULO RICHARD currently performs duties as RECORDING CLERK OF
THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SUCUMBIOS in the canton of NUEVA LOJA, province of
SUCUMBIOS, as stated in the records of this institution.
Quito, October 31, 2012
[Signature]
Eneida Alarcón
ANALYST 3 OF THE HUMAN RESOURCES OFFICE
[Rectangular stamp] Transitional Judicial Council
National Human Resources Office

[Emblem]
Judicial Council
[CERT]IFICATION: At the request of the interested party and in light of the certificate issued
by the National Human Resources Office, I report that Mr. Saritama Naula Romulo Richard is
currently the Recording Clerk of the Provincial Court of Sucumbios of the canton of Nueva
Loja in the province of Sucumbios. Quito D.M., on October 31, 2012, I ATTEST.
[Signature]
Dr. Daniela Caicedo L.
Clerk of the Judicial Council
[Circular stamp] Transitional Judicial Council
National Human Resources Office
Clerk’s Office
[Illegible stamp] Ministry of…

220
[Emblem]
REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TRADE AND INTEGRATION
APOSTILLE
(Hague Convention of 5 October 1961)
1. Country: ECUADOR
This public document
2. Has been signed by: MARTHA DANIELA CAICEDO
LONDOÑO
3. Acting in the capacity of: CLERK
4. Bears the seal/stamp of: JUDICIAL COUNCIL
Certified
5. At: QUITO 6. Date: October 31, 2012
7. By: NELLY NAVARRETE TORRES
LEGALIZATION OFFICE IN QUITO
LEGALIZATION UNIT
8. Nº: 2748202 APOSTILLE
2748202
9. Seal/Stamp: 10: Signature: [Signature]
[Bar code]
AP<<4089>> <<QUITO>> <<2748202>>

Ex. 123

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Ex. 123