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UK Counter Terrorism Case Study


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UK Counter Terrorism Case Study

  1. 1. Terrorism and CounterTerrorism Case Study: Contemporary UK Counter- terrorism – Strategy, judicial review, and review of police powers Dr Paul Norman 1
  2. 2. Session Aims To examine the development of contemporary UK counter-terrorism strategy  Drivers  Legislative development  Government machinery To consider the effect of the judiciary in reviewing legislation / police powers 2
  3. 3. UK experience - NorthernIreland – “de-escalation” (secret) political dialogue; N.I. Peace Process; agreement on power-sharing 26 March, 2007 3
  4. 4. Northern Ireland: securityExceptional police powers and judicial process  Armed police  Special units (allegations of “shoot to kill”)  Diplock Courts (no jury)Military and Security Services  British Military Intelligence  Security Service – lead on intelligenceTemporary counter terrorism legislation  Emergency Powers Act (NI)  Prevention of Terrorism Act 4
  5. 5. Developing Islamist threat –‘new terrorism’Development of mass casualty ‘international terrorism’  World Trade Centre, 1993  Luxor massacre, 1997  USA Embassy bombings in Africa, 1998  GIA [‘Armed Islamic Group’] and Algerian civil war 5
  6. 6. Review of UK Counter-terrorism strategy, 1998Terrorism Act 2000  Made UK counter-terrorism legislation permanent  Detention extended up to 7 days  Proscription extended to international terrorist groups (i.e. al Qaeda)  Wider ‘stop and search’ powers 6
  7. 7. Further post-9/11 review Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001  Expanded Terrorism Act 2000  Funding of terrorism (UN Convention)  Indefinite detention of non-UK suspects (Part IV) – derogation from ECHR (Art. 5) ► ► enhanced powers but lack of overall strategy 7
  8. 8. UK counter-terror strategy?Home Secretary has overall responsibility, scope too narrow Military CT operations in Afghanistan 9/11  ‘critical infrastructure’ insecure 8
  9. 9. UK counter-terror strategy?Home Secretary has overall responsibility, scope too narrow Military CT operations in Afghanistan 9/11  ‘critical infrastructure’ insecure  Coordination with Foreign Office  Tasking/support of Ministry of Defence  Local authorities / utilities / atomic facilities 9
  10. 10. UK counter-terrorism - current Home Secretary UK Counter-terrorism Strategy Intelligence andSecurity Coordinator, July 2002 Ministerial  Cabinet Office Committee on  FCO Terrorism  MoD MI5  International Resilience MI6  terrorism Police  10
  11. 11. Assessing the Threat - Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) The international terrorist threat to the UK has evolved considerably since 2001. There has been a significant increase in the number of people involved in Islamist extremism. Al Qaida continues to pose the foremost international terrorist threat and the most significant long-term threat to the UK. It has developed increasingly sophisticated methods, in particular using the Internet and videos/DVDs, to promote its propaganda which has helped to spread extremist ideologies and techniques to a worldwide audience. However, a more diverse threat picture is emerging. Al Qaidas affiliates and allies across the world pose an increasing threat to the UK and to UK interests in their regions. There is also an underlying, unpredictable threat from people who are inspired, but not trained or directed, by Al Qaida.JTAC created in 2003 to coordinate all terrorism-related intelligence 11
  12. 12. The UK’s Terrorism Plots 12Guardian (2009)
  13. 13. UK Counter-terrorism StrategyPriorities Understanding causes / motivation Identify trends / developments Prepare for attacks Identify risk, reduce threat and vulnerability  reduced risk 13
  14. 14. UK Counter-terrorism StrategyCONTEST – approved 2003, revised 2009; ‘refreshed’ in 2011. Four strands: Prevent Pursue Protect Prepare Downing Street Presentation (2009) 1.45/13.24 14
  15. 15. reference onlyCONTEST: “Prevent” Stopping attacks Averting prospective attacks – ‘next generation’  UK Govt. – Muslim Council dialogue / community leadership Preventing “radicalisation”  Tackling “drivers” to recruitment – Middle East Peace Process, good governance, counter-terrorism capacity-building abroad International diplomatic action 15
  16. 16. reference only CONTEST: “Pursue” Security: Main focus of current efforts  Current terrorists  Financing of terrorism  Immigration and asylum controls  Legislative development Costs? 2001 £1 billion 2008 £2.5 billion 2010/11 £3.5 billion projectedHMG (2008). UK National Security Strategy, p.5 16
  17. 17. reference onlyCONTEST: “Protect”Target hardening National ‘Critical National Infrastructure’ (10 key sectors – telecoms, energy, transport etc.). embracing wide range of Govt. Departments + 50 private companies International Aviation and maritime security 17
  18. 18. reference onlyCONTEST: “Prepare”Dealing with consequences (inevitable) Effective ‘first responders’ – blue light services (others?) Maintenance of essential services whilst under attack National disaster management, CBRN – detect, deal with mass infections, mass casualties, evacuation, restore services National Resilience 18
  19. 19. Countering and Criminal Criminal Financing Offences Offences Use of Police Powers UK Mainland 19
  20. 20. Up to 10 years imprisonment for: • Membership • Inviting support • Arranging / addressing a meeting in supportUp to 6 months imprisonment for: • Wearing an item of clothing or display an article in a public place to suggest membership 20
  21. 21. Criminal Offences• Possessing articles for the purpose of terrorism• Inciting terrorist acts• Seeking or providing training for terrorist purposes at home or overseas• Providing instruction or training in the use of firearms, explosives or chemical, biological or nuclear weapons• Acts preparatory to terrorism• Encouragement to terrorism• Dissemination of terrorist publications• Terrorist training offences 21
  22. 22. Detention of Suspects (before charge)Extended to 7 days by Terrorism Act 2000• to 14 days by CJ Act 2003• to 28 days by Terrorism Act 2006 Government proposal for 90 days rejected in 2005. Extension to 42 days as a “reserve power”  to 14 days? – Coalition Review 22
  23. 23. Detention without Trial – Control Orders Detention without TrialFrom:Detention without Trial  ACTSA 2001  A v Home Secretary (2005)To:Control Orders  POTA 2005 23
  24. 24. Detention without Trial – Control OrdersUse of Control Orders imposed on those that the Home Secretary has: ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity’ TA 2005, s.2(1)a individual discretion, based upon evidence/data that generate the suspicion, in climate of uncertainty, with potential catastrophic consequences 24
  25. 25. Use of Control Orders Total: 48 people (most less than 2 years)  28 foreign nationals  2 for more than 4 years, subsequently revoked  10 others, subsequently deported 7 have absconded Currently: 8 people (all UK nationals). HMG (2011). Review of counterterrorism and security powers . Cm 8004 25
  26. 26. Alternative ‘justice’ systemControl, restriction of liberty: No evidence, or Evidence that cannot be publicly presented (or therefore tested) in courtLeads to the need for pre-emptive action via the: (closed) Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), with vetted advocates reasons unknown, evidence unknown 26
  27. 27. The contemporary relevance ‘We will urgently review Control Orders, as part of a wider review of counter- terrorist legislation, measures and programmes. We will seek to find a practical way to allow the use of intercept evidence in court’ 27 4.41
  28. 28. Liberty: “Our objections to Control Orders”1. Unsafe. Dangerous terrorists should not be in their living rooms but convicted and imprisoned. A genuine terrorist can easily remove plastic tags and disappear, as some controlees have.2. Unfair. Innocent people should not be subjected to years and years of punishment without trial. Control orders place dehumanizing sanctions on people based on suspicion rather than evidence.3. Against the British traditions of justice and liberty . They undermine the presumption of innocence,… right to a fair trial.4. There are alternatives to control orders... Liberty urges the government to use criminal law and the courts to lock up … terrorists, and to allow the use of intercept evidence in court.
  29. 29. Conclusion:organisational breadth and resources  Comprehensive national police, intelligence agency and overseas military strategy  Government, other Public agencies, Private companies offences gradually defined in the broadest, and most imprecise, terms - ‘any conduct in preparation’ Dramatic increase in resource human, technical, military, border security 29
  30. 30. Conclusion: precautious, precautionary, & pre- emptive social control Uncertainty, leading to extreme pre-emptive measures preventative detention, control Legal precision is a hindrance offences gradually defined in the broadest, and most imprecise, terms - ‘any conduct in preparation’ From knowledge equals power, to lack of knowledge equals increased executive power 30
  31. 31. Conclusion: Coalition ‘review findings and recommendations’ for Control Orders  From ‘suspect’, to ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ Time limited preventative control; more ‘flexibility’; ‘restrictions should facilitate surveillance’  Continuing legal duty on police to gather evidence No substantive changes to breadth, and imprecision of ‘any conduct in preparation’. - SIAC to be subject to later review of ‘sensitive material in judicial proceeding’ HMG (2011). Review of counterterrorism and security powers . Cm 8004 31