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Cryptanalysis of the Enigma
whoami
ā€¢ Bob Weiss - @pwcrack -
 President and Founder,
 Password Crackers, Inc.
 (pwcrack.com) & Defcon Goon

ā€¢ Benjamin Gatti - @BenjaminoG -
 Developer, OpenVPN
Alan Turing
Were Alan Turing alive today,
 he would be unconstrained by
 either the mechanical
 computing devices of the
 1940's; or it's pharisaical
 provincialism.
We are pleased to present a
 digital Enigma attack in
 London at #44Con during this
 centennial of his birth.
Demo Time


Yeah we're starting the
 demo now!
Why do we care about The Enigma?

ā€¢ Inflection Point in the
  history of cryptography
ā€¢ Fascinating WWII
 narrative
There is no Enigma
ā€¢ There are multiple versions
ā€¢ Army and Navy
ā€¢ 3 & 4 Wheel
ā€¢ Variable Reflector
How the Enigma works.
ā€¢ Wheel Order (3 of 5 wheels for 60 options)
How the Enigma works.
ā€¢ Ring settings (676 orr 262 options)
How the Enigma works.
ā€¢ Message Settings (17,576 or 263 options)
How the Enigma works.
ā€¢   Plugboard (150,738,274,937,250 or 150 trillion)
How the Enigma works.
ā€¢ Expected complexity of
    Enigma 277
ā€¢   DES 256
ā€¢   AES 2128
Historic Cryptanalysis
ā€¢   Polish Cipher Bureau - 1932, Marian Rejewski,
    Machine Characteristics
ā€¢   Polish Bombe - 1938
ā€¢   Polish Setback - Dec. 1938 Germans add two
    rotors
ā€¢   Polish Disclosure - 1939 Poles tell the French
ā€¢   Crib-Based Decryption - Turing
ā€¢   British Bombe - 1930
ā€¢   American Bombe - 1941
Programming Challenges
ļ¬ GPU ā€“ OpenCL
ļ¬ Memory


ļ¬ Database Throughput
Sorted Chi
Stecker Isolation

Letters for each Stecker Binned separately.
       26!! - 6!! (150T) to 26^3 (17K) (pwned)

EDGYEMHENYFYEJOEIYKUFMKEUA
THEFOXJUMPEDOVERTHELAZYDOG

TOUORD           Chi
(E Stecker)
Diagonal Conflation
Back to the Demo
Q&A
enigmacrack.com

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Cryptanalysis of the Engima - 44CON 2012

  • 2. whoami ā€¢ Bob Weiss - @pwcrack - President and Founder, Password Crackers, Inc. (pwcrack.com) & Defcon Goon ā€¢ Benjamin Gatti - @BenjaminoG - Developer, OpenVPN
  • 3. Alan Turing Were Alan Turing alive today, he would be unconstrained by either the mechanical computing devices of the 1940's; or it's pharisaical provincialism. We are pleased to present a digital Enigma attack in London at #44Con during this centennial of his birth.
  • 4. Demo Time Yeah we're starting the demo now!
  • 5. Why do we care about The Enigma? ā€¢ Inflection Point in the history of cryptography ā€¢ Fascinating WWII narrative
  • 6. There is no Enigma ā€¢ There are multiple versions ā€¢ Army and Navy ā€¢ 3 & 4 Wheel ā€¢ Variable Reflector
  • 7. How the Enigma works. ā€¢ Wheel Order (3 of 5 wheels for 60 options)
  • 8. How the Enigma works. ā€¢ Ring settings (676 orr 262 options)
  • 9. How the Enigma works. ā€¢ Message Settings (17,576 or 263 options)
  • 10. How the Enigma works. ā€¢ Plugboard (150,738,274,937,250 or 150 trillion)
  • 11. How the Enigma works. ā€¢ Expected complexity of Enigma 277 ā€¢ DES 256 ā€¢ AES 2128
  • 12. Historic Cryptanalysis ā€¢ Polish Cipher Bureau - 1932, Marian Rejewski, Machine Characteristics ā€¢ Polish Bombe - 1938 ā€¢ Polish Setback - Dec. 1938 Germans add two rotors ā€¢ Polish Disclosure - 1939 Poles tell the French ā€¢ Crib-Based Decryption - Turing ā€¢ British Bombe - 1930 ā€¢ American Bombe - 1941
  • 13. Programming Challenges ļ¬ GPU ā€“ OpenCL ļ¬ Memory ļ¬ Database Throughput
  • 15. Stecker Isolation Letters for each Stecker Binned separately. 26!! - 6!! (150T) to 26^3 (17K) (pwned) EDGYEMHENYFYEJOEIYKUFMKEUA THEFOXJUMPEDOVERTHELAZYDOG TOUORD Chi (E Stecker)
  • 17. Back to the Demo